


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THE AUTHOR



Yours truly
Frank A. Kew

THE
FIFTEENTH OHIO
VOLUNTEERS
AND
ITS CAMPAIGNS

WAR OF 1861-5

BY
ALEXIS COPE

CAPTAIN, FIFTEENTH OHIO VOLUNTEER INFANTRY

Private, Sergeant, Sergeant Major, Second Lieutenant, First Lieutenant, Adjutant and
Captain in the Fifteenth Ohio Volunteers, Acting Assistant Adjutant General
of the First Brigade and of the Third Division, Fourth Corps,
Army of the Cumberland, and Acting Assistant Inspec-
tor General Western Sub-District of Texas.

COLUMBUS, OHIO
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1916

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PREFACE.

THIS history has been prepared at the request of the regimental association and aims to tell where the regiment was and how it was employed every day of its service, which covered the period from April 21, 1861 to Nov. 22, 1865. The principal authorities used have been diaries of Lieutenant Andrew J. Gleason, Sergeant Nathaniel Mumuagh, Sergeant John G. Gregory, Frank L. Schreiber and William McConnell, a partial dairy kept by Chaplain Randall Ross, hundreds of letters written at the time by officers and men of the regiment to relatives at home, the official reports and correspondence printed in the War of the Rebellion Records, official rosters and reports printed by the State of Ohio, and numerous memoirs and articles published by officers who served in the armies of the west.

The aim has been not only to tell the story of the regiment's life in camp, on the march and in battle, but to give from authentic records a wider vision, wherein the movements of the regiment are co-related to the larger movements of the brigade, division, corps and army of which it formed a part. In brief to tell the story of all the campaigns in which the regiment was engaged.

Special acknowledgements are due to Lieutenant Andrew J. Gleason, who a short time before his death in 1910, placed in the author's hands his personal diary, to Sergeant John G. Gregory, New Concord, O., for the use of his diary; to Thomas W. Evans of Saint Joseph, Mo., who had the diary of Frank L. Schreiber transcribed and sent to the author, and to Mrs. Mary B. Carroll, widow of the late Captain Chandler W. Carroll, who kindly sent her husbands letters written to her during the war; and to the comrades who by letter and otherwise have aided in clearing up, or confirming incidents of the regiment's service.

The author is also indebted to the Hon. Thomas H. Ricketts, 12th Ohio Cavalry, and Major L. S. Sullivant, 113th Ohio Infantry, of Columbus, Ohio, who read the manuscript as it was

written, made valuable suggestions and gave the author encouragement when most needed. He is also greatly indebted to Brigadier General James H. Wilson, U. S. A. retired, the last surviving corps commander of the Army of the Cumberland, who kindly read the manuscript copy of the chapters covering Hood's Invasion of Tennessee and made very valuable suggestions, and to Mrs. Frances M. McClenhan, who has taken a kindly interest in the work from the beginning and whose letters have been encouraging and helpful. To all others who have aided in any way in the preparation of the work, including the stenographers, Misses Effie Merwine, Anna M. Mooar and Anna Rudholzner, who have been patient and helpful, sincere acknowledgements are tendered.

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CHAPTER I.

THE FIFTEENTH OHIO IN THE THREE MONTHS' SERVICE.

THE election of President Lincoln in November, 1860, had been preceded by threats of secession and disunion by the political leaders of the South, but they were lightly regarded by the loyal people of the country, both north and south. Many of them believed that between the election and the inauguration of the new President, there would be time for the passions aroused during the political campaign to cool and for reason to assert her sway. In this, however, they were mistaken. These political leaders, maddened by their inevitable loss of power in case Lincoln should be elected, deliberately set about preparing to carry their threats into execution. In this they were encouraged by the weak, vacillating, out-going administration, which had declared that it had no power under the constitution to coerce a seceding state. Inflamed by their leaders, who asserted that it was the deliberate purpose of the incoming administration to destroy the institution of slavery in the states where it then existed, the people of the southern states began to arm. These open demonstrations of intended violence did not alarm the loyal people of the country so as to cause them to do likewise, although they knew that the Southern members of President Buchanan's cabinet were encouraging the revolt and transferring the arms and munitions of war of the United States to points in the South where they could be seized by the secessionists in case war should result. December 20, 1860, the state convention of South Carolina adopted an ordinance seceding from the Union, and collected a large body of her state troops at Charleston to maintain the position she had taken.

These troops became such a menace to the small detachment of U. S. Troops then at Fort Moultrie in Charleston Harbor, that for greater safety, Major Robert Anderson, who was in command, on the night of Dec. 26, quietly transferred them to Fort Sumter. December 27, Fort Moultrie and Castle Pinckney were seized by the South Carolina state troops, and the guns of the former were trained on Fort Sumter. Dec. 30, the United States Arsenal at Charleston was also seized by the South Carolina state troops. January 2, 1861, Fort Johnson was also taken possession of by the same troops. During the month of January, 1861, following the lead of South Carolina, the states of Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia and Louisiana, in the order named, passed ordinances of secession and their state troops took possession of the United States forts and arsenals within their

borders. The outgoing administration feebly protested against these open manifestations of treason, but a number of members of the cabinet were secretly encouraging them. Having openly proclaimed its lack of power to prevent secession, it contented itself with a feeble attempt to reinforce the garrison of Fort Sumter. On the 5th day of January, 1861, Lieutenant Charles R. Woods, with 200 men left Governor's Island, New York, on the Steamer Star of the West and on January 8, at midnight, arrived off Charleston Harbor. The next morning they crossed the bar and steamed up the main channel. When about one and three-fourth miles from Fort Sumter they were fired on by a masked battery on Morris Island, and were compelled to turn about and get out of the harbor before their retreat was cut off.¹

During the month of February the State of Texas passed an ordinance of secession and the United States Arsenal at Little Rock, Fort Smith, and ordinance stores at Pine Bluffs and Napoleon, Arkansas, were seized by the troops of that state. During the same month the state troops of Missouri seized the United States Arsenal at Liberty and the United States ordinance stores at Kansas City in that state. During this month, delegates from the above named seceding states met at Montgomery, Alabama, and on February 8, 1861, formed a provisional government, adopted the name of The Confederate States of America, and the next day elected Jefferson Davis as President and Alexander H. Stephens as Vice President. On the first day of March this government took control of affairs at Charleston and on March 3, 1861, under its authority, General G. T. Beauregard assumed command of the secession forces at that place.

By this time the entire country began to realize the gravity of the situation, but all hoped that by compromise or in some other way the awful calamity of a civil war would be averted. Amid these hopes, but with doubts and fears on the part of many, the country was rapidly drifting into a bloody conflict. The newly elected President, Abraham Lincoln, from his home at Springfield, Illinois, watched the coming storm, powerless to stem the increasing tide of rebellion. Indeed, it was feared by some that he would never reach Washington to assume the duties of the office to which he had been elected. It is little wonder that when leaving his home for Washington he uttered these memorable words:

"I now leave not knowing when or whether ever I may return, with a task before me greater than that which rested upon Washington. Without the assistance of that Divine Being who ever attended him, I cannot succeed. With that assistance I cannot fail. Trusting

¹ W. R. R. 1-9-10.

in Him, who can go with me and remain with you, and be every where for good, let us confidently hope that all will be well."

The fourth of March came and Lincoln was inaugurated as President. His patriotic appeal to the people of the South in his inaugural address inspired the hope in some breasts that they would at least pause and consider the consequences of their misguided action. But the appeal was in vain. Inflamed by their leaders they pressed madly on. The first three weeks of President Lincoln's administration were consumed in settling political differences among members of his cabinet and trying to fix upon a plan of action which would be approved by them. Their counsels were divided and nothing was done. The absorbing question, strange to say, was whether or not the garrison at Fort Sumter should be supplied with food and reinforced. On this question the cabinet was divided. General Scott was reluctant to take any steps which in his opinion would increase the anger of the South. Lincoln in his inaugural address had clearly stated that his power as chief executive of the nation would "be used to hold, occupy and possess the property and places belonging to the government and to collect the duties and imposts," and he never for one moment wavered from this purpose. He was probably only deferring action in regard to Fort Sumter until his advisers were brought round to his way of thinking. The discussion went on until the evening of March 28, when at the close of the first state dinner he gave at the White House, he called his cabinet together for a moment and disclosed to them the contents of a letter he had just received from General Scott, advising the surrender of Fort Sumter and Fort Pickens. Lincoln's historians, Nicolay and Hay, state that the members of the cabinet were amazed at the advise of General Scott and all dissented from it, though there was no formal vote, and that after being requested to meet in counsel next day the cabinet retired. "That night", say the same historians, "Lincoln's eyes did not close in sleep. It was apparent that the time had come when he must meet the nation's crisis. His judgment alone must guide, his sole will determine, his own lips utter the word that should save or lose the most precious inheritance of humanity, the last hope of free-government on the earth. Only the imagination may picture that intense and weary vigil".¹

In recalling this incident one thinks of the agony in the garden of Gethsemane, and the Master's sorrowful words, "Could not ye watch with me one hour?"

The next day the cabinet met at noon to again take up the burning question. Two weeks before, a decided majority of its

1 Nicolay and Hay's Abraham Lincoln.

members had opposed an expedition to even provision the garrison at Fort Sumter. Now, a majority favored it. Probably they were aware that the President had decided on this course. After the meeting adjourned the President with his own hand wrote the following order to the Secretary of War:

"Sir:—I desire that an expedition, to move by sea, be got ready to sail as early as the 6th of April next, the whole according to memorandum attached and that you co-operate with the Secretary of the Navy for that object."

"A. LINCOLN."

A duplicate of the order and the memorandum attached were at the same time sent to the Secretary of the Navy.¹

It is only necessary for the purposes of this narrative to state that through a misunderstanding and a conflict of orders the expedition failed in its object.

The hesitancy on the part of Lincoln's cabinet to take this decisive step and the clamors of the faint hearted in the north for peace at any price, only emboldened and encouraged the political leaders of the south to greater activity in their rebellious schemes. On the 11th of January the Governor of South Carolina demanded the surrender of Fort Sumter which Major Anderson refused.¹ On the 11th of April General Beauregard repeated the demand, which was again refused and on the 12th at 4:20 A. M. the attack on Fort Sumter began. Major Anderson made a gallant but hopeless defense, and on the afternoon of April 13, 1861, when the fort had been battered to pieces and the barracks were on fire, was compelled to surrender. Next morning, Sunday April 14, 1861, the noble little garrison, after saluting the stars and stripes as they were lowered from the staff at Fort Sumter, were transferred to the steamer Isabel on which they were taken over the bar to the Baltic which carried them to New York.

At the time Major Anderson and his gallant men were evacuating Fort Sumter, President Lincoln and his cabinet, together with several military officers, were at the Executive Mansion. They had heard of the Fort's surrender and were considering details of the action the government had decided to take. At this meeting the President, again with his own hand, drafted a proclamation and issued a call for seventy-five thousand men which appeared in the newspapers next morning.

The attack on Fort Sumter, its gallant defense and enforced surrender awoke the sleeping lion of the North. All talk of compromise and all peace parleys at once ceased, and it was realized

¹ W. R. R. 1—Note page 1.

that the bloody issue which had been tendered by the secessionists of the South must be met and fought to the bitter end.

Lincoln's call was a National Reveille. The people's response to it was immediate and inspiring. Some had been hoping and fearing, some had doubted, some had faith that all would yet be well,

"Till a trumpet voice proclaiming,"
 "Said, 'my chosen people come!'"

* * * * *

"And the great heart of the nation,
 Throbbing, answered, 'Lord, we come!'"

The Fifteenth Ohio Volunteer Infantry was among the first troops to respond to President Lincoln's call, and was made up of the following companies, enrolled at the following times and places and with the following named officers:

- Company A.—April 17, 1861, Zanesville, O.
 Captain—R. W. P. Muse.
 First Lieutenant—Victor S. Perry.
 Second Lieutenant—Asa C. Cassady.
- Company B.—April 18, 1861, Martinsville, O.
 Captain—William Wallace.
 First Lieutenant—James W. Clark.
 Second Lieutenant—Joseph Frazier.
- Company C.—April 23, 1861, Upper Sandusky, O.
 Captain—William T. Wilson.
 First Lieutenant—Franklin W. Martin.
 Second Lieutenant—Henry C. Miner.
- Company D.—April 18, 1861, Shelby, Ohio.
 Captain—Abraham C. Cummins.
 First Lieutenant—Tilman H. Wiggins.
 Second Lieutenant—Henry B. Gaylord.
- Company E.—April 18, 1861, Van Wert, Ohio.
 Captain—Israel D. Clark.
 First Lieutenant—Charles B. Smith.
 Second Lieutenant—Ralston Craig.
- Company F.—April 17, 1861, Sidney, Ohio.
 Captain—Abraham Kaga.
 First Lieutenant—Warren Owens.
 Second Lieutenant—Joel F. Skillings.
- Company G.—April 20, 1861, Upper Sandusky, Ohio.
 Captain—Peter A. Tyler.
 First Lieutenant—William H. Kilmer.
 Second Lieutenant—Frederick Agerton.

Company H.—April 23, 1861, Mansfield, Ohio.

Captain—Hiram Miller.

First Lieutenant—Andrew R. Z. Dawson.

Second Lieutenant—Rufus L. Avery.

Company I.—April 20, 1861, Upper Sandusky, Ohio.

Captain—Isaac M. Kirby.

First Lieutenant—Albert Spaulding.

Second Lieutenant—Samuel Bachtel.

Company K.—April 23, 1861, Wapakoneta, Ohio.

Captain—W. V. M. Layton.

First Lieutenant—C. W. Cowan.

Second Lieutenant—J. W. Moody.

These companies assembled at Camp Jackson (now Goodale Park) Columbus, Ohio, and were mustered into the service of the State to date from April 27, 1861, by Major Henry M. Neil, Aide de Camp to Governor Dennison. On May 4, 1861, they were organized into a regiment with George W. Andrews as Colonel, Moses R. Dickey as Lieutenant Colonel, Silas B. Walker as Major, Orrin Ferris as Surgeon and J. B. Mowry as Assistant Surgeon. Four days later the regiment moved to Camp Goddard near Zanesville, Ohio, where it spent several days engaged in drill and other preparation for service in the field.

The Fifteenth Ohio was one of ten regiments in excess of Ohio's quota under President Lincoln's call for seventy-five thousand men, and which it was wisely decided to accept for the defense of the state.

Whether such defense should be made along its own borders, or in the adjoining states of Kentucky and Virginia, was a grave question, so far as Kentucky was concerned. Governor Dennison at first was opposed to sending any troops under his control into that state, even for the defense of Cincinnati.¹ His contention was, that Kentucky was still in the Union and should be treated as other loyal states until her people showed a disposition to be hostile to the Union. Governor Magoffin in response to President Lincoln's call for troops had publicly declared that "Kentucky would furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister states", and Governor Dennison had increased the patriotic ardor of the loyal people of the country by telegraphing to the War Department at Washington that "if Kentucky would not fill her quota Ohio would fill it for her".² Notwithstanding the hostile attitude of her governor, it was believed at the time that the great majority of the people of Kentucky were loyal to the Union.

¹ Ohio in the War Vol. 1, page 30.

² Ohio in the War Vol. 1, page 42.

In Virginia, however, the situation was different. That state had not then seceded but its people were arming for an aggressive campaign, not only against the Union, but to coerce the loyal people of the Western portion of the state, who had called a convention at Wheeling to give expression to their attachment to it.

General Henry B. Carrington, then Adjutant General of Ohio, had suggested, that the Ohio River was not a proper line of defense against hostile action on the part of Virginia. He urged that it would be better to seize the mountain ranges of Western Virginia and rally the loyal inhabitants to their defense, lest the enemy, operating from Richmond, should occupy the passes and from that base over awe the loyal people of the region and move at pleasure against the Ohio border. The majority of Governor Dennison's advisers urged that neither the armies of the United States nor, much less, the militia of Ohio, could lawfully enter a state not yet seceded, and that the action of the general government had been to this effect. They pointed to the fact that General Scott, rather than cross the Potomac on to the soil of his native state, was permitting rebel pickets to guard the Long Bridge and rebel patrols to pace their beats within rifle range of the White House.¹

Governor Dennison must have changed his former views, for during this discussion he is reported as saying, "We can let no theory prevent the defense of Ohio. I will defend Ohio where it will cost least and accomplishes most. Above all I will defend Ohio beyond rather than on her borders."² As early as April 19, 1861, he had determined to protect exposed points along the Ohio River bordering on Virginia, especially the town of Marietta, across the river from Parkersburg, Virginia, many of the inhabitants of the latter place being violent secessionists. Colonel James Barnett of Cleveland had tendered to the state a battery of artillery in good condition and it was at once accepted and ordered to report at Columbus, where a machine shop cast two hundred solid shot for it. It was hurried thence to Loveland, thence to Marietta, and was on the border to defend the town within forty-eight hours after the order was issued and before the movement was known by friend or foe.³

On the 9th of May, 1861, Governor Dennison telegraphed to Washington asking that the boundaries of a department, which on his request had been created and assigned to General Geo. B. McClellan, be extended so as to include Western Virginia. The extension was made and he then wrote to General McClellan, enclosing a request from John Hall and others of Parkersburg

¹ Ohio in the War Vol. 1, page 44.

² Ohio in the War Vol. 1, page 46.

³ Ohio in the War Vol. 1, page 47.

urging that Ohio troops be sent across the river to occupy that place and thwart the designs of the secessionists, which were fully explained. In the letter accompanying this request, Governor Dennison urged that it be at once complied with and gave reasons why the troops should at once enter Virginia at this point.¹ To this request and similar requests from Governor Dennison, backed by appeals from the loyal people of Virginia, General McClellan turned a deaf ear, or interposed objections and counselled *delay*.

Finally on May 30, John S. Carlisle of Virginia telegraphed Governor Dennison from Wheeling, that troops under order or proclamation of Governor Letcher of Virginia were marching on Grafton, Clarksburg and Wheeling, with the avowed purpose of breaking up the loyal convention then in session at the latter place, and that if Western Virginia was to be rescued from rebellion now was the time to do it. Governor Dennison at once telegraphed the substance of Mr. Carlisle's telegram, not only to General McClellan, but also to General Scott at Washington. As a result of this and of representations made by Governor Dennison to the Secretary of War, on May 24, the latter asked General McClellan if he could not prevent the contemplated action of the secessionists and save Wheeling and Western Virginia. The General then decided it was time to move and asked Governor Dennison to place the ten regiments in excess of the President's call which had been mustered into the service of the state, under his orders. Governor Dennison lost no time in complying with this request. He ordered the Fourteenth regiment, Colonel James B. Steedman, at Zanesville, to move at once by river to Marietta; the Seventeenth, Colonel John M. Connell, at Lancaster, to move at once by rail to Zanesville to support Colonel Steedman; the Fifteenth, Colonel George W. Andrews, at Zanesville, to move by rail to Bellaire and there await orders; the Sixteenth, Colonel James Irvine, at Columbus, to move by rail to Bellaire, to support Colonel Andrews; and the Nineteenth, Colonel Samuel Beatty, and the Twenty-first, Colonel Jesse S. Norton, at Cleveland, to move at once by rail to Columbus for further orders. The Twentieth, Colonel Charles Whittlesey, was ordered to complete its organization for immediate service. All were directed to obey all orders of General McClellan. Within six hours after General McClellan had asked for them the foregoing state troops were moving toward Virginia.

While the foregoing events were transpiring the Fifteenth Ohio Volunteers was at Camp Goddard, Zanesville, Ohio, being disciplined, uniformed, armed and drilled, and otherwise pre-

¹ Ohio in the War, Vol. 1, pages 46-47.

pared for active service. When the order came to move to Bellaire it was probably as well prepared for such service as most of the other volunteer regiments.

The plan of the campaign was to invade Virginia at two points: at Bellaire where the Baltimore and Ohio crosses the Ohio River, and at Parkersburg where another branch of the same railroad also crossed the same river,—the objective point being the town of Grafton in Virginia.

The honor of first crossing the river is due to the 14th Ohio under Colonel Steedman, who on the 27th day of May, 1861, with his regiment and Barnett's artillery, crossed over, took possession of Parkersburg, repressed with a stern hand the rising tide of secession and moved rapidly out along the railroad towards Grafton.

The 16th Ohio, Colonel Irvine, crossed the river at Bellaire on the.....day of May, was immediately followed by the 15th Ohio and other troops, and at once moved out toward Grafton to form a junction with Colonel Stedman's forces, which as above stated were moving toward the same point from Parkersburg. The columns met at Grafton, the enemy having fled precipitately a few hours before their arrival. The Union troops pursued and came up to the enemy at Philippi on June 3, 1861, when the first little skirmish of the war occurred, and Colonel Porterfield and his troops were driven from the place. A portion of the 15th Ohio took part in this skirmish and also in the affairs at Laurel Hill, July 8, 1861, and Carrick's Ford, July 14, 1861.¹

The service of the 15th Ohio in the foregoing campaign was not marked by any unusual incident which distinguishes it above the other regiments with which it served. Like them it had to endure the hardships resulting from inexperience and lack of organization. The commissary, quartermaster and medical departments were poorly organized and inefficient. The food, though ample in quantity, was poorly prepared and as a result there was much suffering from camp diarrhea and similar disorders. Measles broke out in the camp, there was no adequate hospital service, and the men suffered for want of proper shelter and medical attention. The uniforms issued to the men turned out to be shoddy, of the poorest kind, and were soon so ragged that trousers and blouses, or jackets, had to be patched and held together by pieces of the red flannel shirts. Some of the regiments in a few weeks were as ragged as Falstaff's tatterdemalions and there seemed to be no provision for replacing the worn out uni-

1 Roster of Ohio Soldiers, Vol. 1, page 316.

forms. The writer, who served in the Seventeenth Ohio in this campaign, does not recall that any clothing, other than their first uniforms, was supplied to the men during the entire campaign. The men made a joke of trying to mend their worn out gray uniforms with patches from their red flannel shirts, and vied with each other in producing the most grotesque effects. On some of the uniforms the patches were so many and so broad that in the general effect the red seemed to predominate.

The arms issued to the men were mostly old flint lock muskets altered to percussion and the cartridges contained one large round ball and three buck shot. The men were drilled in the manual of arms and in company and regimental movements according to the rules laid down in Scott's Tactics. Lieutenant Colonel Dickey had served in the Mexican war and his experience was valuable in getting the regiment into shape for active duty and in directing its daily routine and movements while in the field.

There is no record or diary to show the regiments itinerary and how it was employed each day of its service in Virginia and the published official reports and records are so meager that little help can be obtained from them.

From these records however we learn that July 12, 1861, six companies of the regiment were posted at Rowlesburg and thence five miles along and up Cheat River,¹ and on the next day received orders to move with General C. W. Hill's column to intercept the Confederates in their flight from Laurel Hill. The six companies marched to Cheat River bridge, about four miles south of Rowlesburg, arriving there at 8:30 P. M. July 13, and at 10 P. M. Colonel Andrews sent out four scouts to learn if possible over what road the enemy was retreating. The scouts found them retreating over a road from Laurel Hill to the Red House, on the North-western turnpike, but were so late in reporting that all chance of intercepting them was lost. The six companies, however, the next day at 11 A. M. started for Red House, about nineteen miles distant, where they arrived at 4 P. M. and found General Hill, with portions of the Eighth, Sixteenth and Twentieth Ohio Regiments and two pieces of artillery. They had been in pursuit of the enemy but had not been able to overtake him.

The next day July 15, at 8 A. M. the six companies, under command of Colonel Andrews marched eastwardly from Red House on the Northwestern Turnpike in pursuit of the enemy. They continued such pursuit for over two days and finding it im-

1 Colonel Andrews's official report, W. R. R. 2-233-235.

possible to overtake the rapidly retreating foe, about faced and marched back to Red House.¹

What the other four companies of the regiment were doing at this time and how they were employed during their service is not disclosed in the published official reports and correspondence. Mr. Hiram K. Brooks who was a member of one of these companies, (Company B) made a statement of their service in 1909, which was taken down at the time. He was then in vigorous health and seemed to have a clear recollection of his experience and to remember dates of the important events of such service. In this statement he says, that they moved from Bellaire to Grafton over the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and thence to Webster. That on the night of June 2, 1861 they marched in a pouring rain from that point to Philippi, and the next day took part in the affair at that place where General Kelly was wounded. That on the 9th day of July, 1861, they marched from Phillippi to Laurel Hill and took part in the skirmish there. That they marched thence to Carrick's Ford where there was another skirmish and the Confederate General Garnet was killed. That General Morris was in command of the troops with which he served. That they marched from Carrick's Ford back to Philippi and thence to Buckhannon. That from Buckhannon the regiment marched to Webster. At the latter point they moved by rail to Parkersburg, and thence by way of Marietta to Camp Chase at Columbus, Ohio, where they were finally discharged August 30, 1861, and were sent home without being paid. That after they got home, about September 4, 1861, the paymaster came to their homes and paid them, the private soldiers each receiving fifty-four dollars in gold and fifty cents in currency.

In the brief sketch of the regiment given in *Ohio In The War*, it is stated that "it was employed for some time in guard duty on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, advancing as far as Grafton:" that "it was engaged in the route of the Rebels under General Porterfield at Philippi on the 13th of June and afterward took part in the affairs of Laurel Hill and Carricks Ford:" that "the regiment performed a large amount of marching and guard duty and rendered valuable service to the Government in assisting to stay the progress of the Rebels who were endeavoring to carry the war into the North".²

The above brief statement is practically repeated in Volume 1, *Roster of Ohio Soldiers*, and it is also therein stated, that hav-

1 Colonel Andrews' official report W. R. R. 2, pages 233-5.

2 *Ohio In The War*, Vol. 2, page 111.

ing served its term of enlistment, the regiment returned to Columbus, Ohio, and was mustered out of service August 29th to 30th, 1861, by Captain E. Morgan Wood, 15th Infantry, U. S. A. having lost eight men, one killed and seven died of disease. It is also stated that the official list of battles in which the regiment was engaged during its three months service had not been published by the War Department but that the following, after careful research, was believed to be a correct list:

Philippi, West Virginia, June 3, 1861.

Laurel Hill, West Virginia, June 8, 1861.

Carrick's Ford, West Virginia, July 14, 1861.



CHAPTER II.

THE REORGANIZATION OF THE FIFTEENTH OHIO FOR THE THREE YEARS' SERVICE AND THE ADVANCE INTO KENTUCKY.

WHILE the Fifteenth Ohio Volunteers was engaged in Western Virginia and the events narrated in the preceding chapter were transpiring, other events of even greater importance were occurring in other parts of the country which were portentous of a long and bloody struggle. There were some optimists, like Mr. Seward, who predicted that the war would be over in sixty days, but the secession of North Carolina, Tennessee and Virginia, the increasing enrollment of troops by the seceded states and the rapidity with which they were organized and placed under the control of the Confederate States Government belied such predictions. A Union Army of perhaps 50,000 men had been assembled at Washington for the protection of the Capital and to operate against the Confederate forces which were assembling at Richmond. The Union people, impatient of delay, clamored for an advance against the enemy confronting Washington. The newspapers of the country raised the cry "On to Richmond", and in compliance with a popular demand an advance was ordered and on the 21st day of July, 1861, and the first battle of Bull Run was fought, resulting in the defeat of the Union forces, the loss of twenty-eight pieces of artillery, five thousand muskets and a large amount of camp equipage and other property.¹

The disaster at Bull Run caused a momentary panic and for a time many feared that Washington would soon be in possession of the enemy. It was soon learned, however, that the losses in the Union Army were not so great as at first supposed. They were really not large in proportion to the numbers engaged. According to the official reports, 481 were killed, 1011 wounded and 1216 missing,² out of about 34,000 engaged in the movement.³ There would probably have been less apprehension had it then been known that the killed and wounded of the enemy were 1867,⁴ or 375 more than our own. The 1216 reported as missing on the Union side were probably stragglers who afterwards rejoined their commands, as General Johnston reported no capture of prisoners.

Congress was in session at the time, and coolly and patriotically faced the situation. Profiting by the experience of the past, the inefficiency of troops enlisted for short terms of service, it passed on July 22, 25 and 31, 1861, a succession of acts au-

1 General Joseph E. Johnson's report,
W. R. R. 2-477.

2 W. R. R. 2-327.

3 W. R. R. 2-309.

4 W. R. R. 2-477.

thorizing the President to accept the services of volunteers, either as cavalry, infantry or artillery, in such numbers, not exceeding 1,000,000, as he might deem necessary for the purpose of repelling invasion and suppressing insurrection, and directing that the volunteers thus accepted should serve for not exceeding three years nor less than six months.¹ These acts of Congress were published in General Orders from the Adjutant General's office and the people responded so rapidly and enthusiastically to the appeals of Congress and President Lincoln that no formal call was issued. Regiments and companies were immediately offered in large numbers by states and individuals and, as circumstances seemed to demand, requisitions were made on the Governors.² Ohio was among the foremost of the states to respond to the appeals above mentioned. Of the requisition of July 22, 1861, the first made under the acts of Congress above mentioned, she furnished 84,116 men, nearly 17,000 more than her quota.³

It was in response to this call that the men of the Fifteenth Ohio, immediately after their discharge from the three months' service, began enrolling for the three years' service. As early as the middle of September, 1861, they had been formed into companies and were reporting at Mansfield where the regiment was being reorganized. Not all the officers and men who had belonged to it in the three months' service became members of the new organization, but enough of them did so to continue its former number and to intimately connect it with its previous service. Moses R. Dickey, who was Lieutenant Colonel of the former organization, became Colonel of the new regiment. William T. Wilson and William Wallace, who were Captains in the three months' organization, were made respectively Lieutenant Colonel and Major of the three years' organization. Orrin Ferris, who was Surgeon of the old regiment, was continued as Surgeon of the new. Six company officers in the new organization had been Commissioned officers of the old, while a large number of the enlisted men had served in the three months' organization. Some of the company officers and many of the enlisted men had served during the three months' service in other Ohio regiments.

The commissioned officers of the new organization and the counties where the several companies were enrolled are as follows:

FIELD AND STAFF.

Colonel—Moses R. Dickey, Mansfield, O.

Lieutenant Colonel—William T. Wilson, Upper Sandusky, O.

Major—William Wallace, Martins Ferry, O.

Surgeon—Orrin Ferris.

1 W. R. R. 126-606.

2 W. R. R. 126-607.

3 Ohio in the War, Vol. 2, page 4.

Chaplain—Richard Ganter, Mansfield, O.
Adjutant—Calvin R. Taft, Mansfield, O.
Quartermaster—Theodore C. Bowles, Mansfield, O.

COMPANY A—Muskingum County.

Captain—James C. Cummins.
First Lieutenant—Cyrus Reasoner.
Second Lieutenant—Samuel T. Storer.

COMPANY B—Guernsey County.

Captain—John McClenahan.
First Lieutenant—Joshua K. Brown.
Second Lieutenant—John R. Clark.

COMPANY C—Morrow County.

Captain—Hiram Miller.
First Lieutenant—Jeremiah C. Dunn.
Second Lieutenant—John G. Byrd.

COMPANY D—Wyandot County.

Captain—Isaac M. Kirby.
First Lieutenant—David Culbertson.
Second Lieutenant—Samuel Bachtel.

COMPANY E—Belmont County.

Captain—Frank Askew.
First Lieutenant—Chandler W. Carroll.
Second Lieutenant—Lorenzo Danford.

COMPANY F—Belmont County.

Captain—Amos Glover.
First Lieutenant—James Welsh.
Second Lieutenant—Nicholas M. Fowler.

COMPANY G—Richland County.

Captain—Andrew R. Z. Dawson.
First Lieutenant—Thomas E. Douglass.
Second Lieutenant—Cyrus H. Askew.

COMPANY H—Van Wert County.

Captain—Thaddeus S. Gilliland.
First Lieutenant—William C. Scott.
Second Lieutenant—Gladwin B. Chaffin.

COMPANY I—Richland County.

Captain—Abraham C. Cummins.
First Lieutenant—Andrew M. Burns.
Second Lieutenant—George W. Cummins.

COMPANY K—Belmont County.

Captain—Otho S. Holloway.
First Lieutenant—Robert H. Cochran.
Second Lieutenant—Vesper Dorneck.

The companies on their arrival at Mansfield were escorted to Camp Mordecai Bartley, about two miles north of the town near the site of the present Ohio Reformatory, and by the 20th day of September the regiment was fully organized. Officers and men were quartered in tents and the usual round of camp and guard duty was duly established. The companies were duly mustered into the United States service by Captain Belknap, U. S. A., September 21, 1861, and orders were issued to be ready to move on Monday, September 23. On Sunday, the 22nd, knapsacks, canteens and haversacks were issued and orders were given to have knapsacks packed ready to march, if orders to move came. That evening there were prayer meetings in a number of the tents, notably in the tents of Company F. where there were three preachers among the enlisted men. In other tents the men sang hymns and the sound of sacred music continued until lights were ordered out. It was no holiday affair in which the men were engaging. The glamour and the light hearted enthusiasm of the preceding April had disappeared and the men were thoughtful and serious,—realizing that they were soon to face the hardships and dangers of real war. This does not mean that the men were oppressed by a sense of coming trials. They were mostly boys—their average age being about 19 years,—and they went about their duties with boyish ardor and when off duty amused themselves in the various ways customary in the regimental camps. In the evenings there were stag dances to the music of violins which some of the men had brought from their homes.

The evening of the 21st Andrew J. Gleason of Company H, organized a singing club,¹ of which more will be heard as this narrative progresses. There was an immediate demand for the services of all the troops which could be organized and armed and placed in the field. The war clouds hung low all along the Southern horizon and no one knew when or where the storm would burst. The Confederate troops at Richmond under Generals Lee and Beauregard were threatening Washington. In Kentucky the armies of the Confederate Generals, Zollicoffer, Buckner and Leonidas Polk were menacing Lexington, Cincinnati and Louisville, and General Sterling Price and other Confederate Generals were operating in Missouri and threatening Saint Louis. General Sherman at Louisville, General Fremont at Saint Louis and General McClellan at Washington were calling for troops to meet the Confederate armies mustering in their respective fronts. Besides the disaster at Bull Run and the affairs in which the regiment had taken part, a few inconsiderable and indecisive skirmishes had taken place, but it was evident that both

1 Gleason's Diary.

sides were preparing for titanic struggles both in the East and West.

Now that the Eastern borders of Ohio were made practically secure by the successful occupation of Western Virginia by the Union troops in the three months campaign, the people of Ohio turned their attention to their more extensive southern border and to the attitude of the people of Kentucky. The position of that state was peculiar. Governor Magoffin, April 15, 1861, as will be remembered, had written the Secretary of War that "Kentucky would furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister states". The legislature while it firmly refused to call a convention to consider the question of secession, nevertheless protested against the use of force by the general government against the seceded states. They declared for the Union but opposed any measures for its preservation. This was the illogical position of many of the leading and most influential citizens, among them John J. Crittenden, James Guthrie, Archibald Dixon and others. Governor Magoffin was known to be in active sympathy with the secessionists and if it had not been for a strong Union sentiment in the legislature, backed by a strong Union sentiment throughout the state, would probably have rushed the state into rebellion.

Checked in obtaining unlimited credit to carry out his schemes, he assumed for the state a position of armed neutrality. His position was supported by a public meeting of leading citizens of Louisville which declared "the present duty of Kentucky is to maintain her present independent position, taking sides not with the administration nor with the seceding states, but with the Union against them both; that her soil was sacred from the tread of either, and that if necessary she would make the declaration good with her strong right arm".¹

The militia of the state had recently been reorganized under the direction of S. B. Buckner, who was virtually its commander, and was instructed by Governor Magoffin to employ it in preventing violation of the state's neutrality by either the Southern or Northern armies. It was suspected, if not believed by the Union people of Kentucky and by the people of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois that both Governor Magoffin and Mr. Buckner were at heart disloyal and that it was their purpose to finally turn over the "State Guard," as the organized militia was called, to the Confederacy. General McClellan who was then in command north of the Ohio River shared this feeling. May 15, 1861, in a letter to General L. D. Townsend, Adjutant General, U. S. A., he said: "From reliable information I am sure that the Governor of Ken-

¹ Nicolay and Hay's, Lincoln.

tucky is a traitor. Buckner is under his influence, so it is necessary to watch them."¹ At a special session of the Legislature called May 6, 1861, the Union members succeeded in framing the Military bill so that the expenditures under it by Governor Magoffin should be controlled by a Union Board of Commissioners. A "Home Guard" was authorized, to check the rebellious tendencies of Buckner's "State Guards", and members of both organizations were required to swear fidelity to both Kentucky and the United States.

Ostensibly, both the United States and the Confederate States governments respected the neutrality of Kentucky for a time, and during that time neither United States nor Confederate States troops invaded her sacred soil.

But such conditions could not continue. There was a strong Union element of the population who were ready to fight for the old flag and only wanted the opportunity to do so, while there were many who sympathized with the secessionists and only waited an opportunity to join the armies of the Confederacy which were mustering on their Southern border. Politically the state was regarded as pivotal. Its alliance with the Union or its enemies was to be settled by the people themselves.

This, however, did not prevent either side from taking such steps as would secure military advantage should the contending armies meet on Kentucky soil. The rival militia organizations,—the "State Guards" and the "Home Guards," vied with each other in increasing their numbers and perfecting their organizations. The "State Guards" had been first to organize and Governor Magoffin and Mr. Buckner had seen to it that all state arms and munitions of war were issued to them. To offset this the Union leaders in the north secretly furnished arms and munitions of war to the "Home Guards".

Both sides were apparently respecting Kentucky's assumed neutrality. Such respect on the part of the Confederacy was more pronounced than that of the Union leaders of the North, for President Davis was advised that such neutrality was intended to aid the secessionists in their plans. President Lincoln, while showing such respect, hoped yet to win over to the side of the Union some of the leaders who had not yet taken an open stand in favor of the South. He went so far as to offer commissions as brigadier general to some of them. He even caused such a commission to be issued for Mr Buckner to be tendered to him by General Robert Anderson,—the tender to remain a secret if declined.² Whether such a commission was

¹ Nicolay and Hay's, Lincoln.

² W. R. R. 4-255.

ever tendered to him does not appear. It is probable that it was not, for two weeks later, General Buckner, while ostensibly favoring neutrality, was in Richmond, advising Jefferson Davis how Kentucky neutrals would best aid the Confederacy.¹ In the meantime hundreds of the younger men of the state were slipping across the Tennessee border and joining the Confederate armies and on the other hand, equal if not greater numbers, were crossing the Ohio River and enlisting in the armies of the Union. Colonels Guthrie and Woodford, with the approval of the Union authorities, established "Camp Clay" on the Ohio River above Cincinnati where two Kentucky regiments made up of Kentucky and Ohio Volunteers, were organized and sworn into the service of the United States. General Lovell H. Rousseau of Louisville established "Camp Joe Holt," on the Indiana side of the same river where he was recruiting a brigade for service in the Union army. The same respect for the pretended Kentucky neutrality kept General Robert Anderson at Cincinnati instead of Louisville where he was much needed. July 1, 1861, Lieutenant William Nelson, U. S. N., a Kentuckian of marked ability and force of character, who was then at Cincinnati, was selected by Mr. Lincoln to look after the organization and equipment of the "Home Guards" of Kentucky and other Union men who desired to enter the military service of the United States. He was authorized to muster into the service of the United States five regiments of infantry and one regiment of cavalry in East Tennessee and three regiments of infantry in southeastern Kentucky and at the same time was notified that 10,000 stand of arms and accouterments, six pieces of field artillery two smooth bore and two rifled cannon would be at once sent to Cincinnati to be used in arming these troops which were to be used in the states where recruited.²

South of Kentucky considerable armies were forming and being placed in camps near the southern border of the state. About June 29, 1861, Governor Isham G. Harris of Tennessee issued a proclamation declaring that state independent of the Union and tendering to the Confederate authorities the state troops under his control.³ General Pillow had been in command of the state militia and in a few weeks time had brought into the field more than 20,000 men armed and equipped and ready for service.⁴ These troops were placed under command of General Leonidas Polk,⁵ who had already collected a considerable force from other Southern states and was menacing important points in Western Kentucky on the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. At the same time a considerable force under General Zollicoffer

1 W. R. R. 4-399.

2 4-251-2.

3 4-363.

4 W. R. R. 4-363.

5 W. R. R. 4-363.

Sig. 2

was collecting in East Tennessee near the Kentucky border and was threatening Lexington, Frankfort and Cincinnati, while another considerable force was threatening Bowling Green and Louisville.

The Governors of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois were alarmed lest the Confederates would over run Kentucky and thus bring the war to their own borders, and repeatedly urged the military authorities at Washington to take some decided steps to prevent such a disaster. Governor Morton of Indiana was especially insistent that decisive steps should be taken. But President Lincoln cautiously opposed any advance of the Union armies into Kentucky until the election, which was to take place June 20, 1861, should be over and the result known. This election, at which members of Congress were to be elected and the maintenance of the Union was a leading issue, was watched with anxious interest. Fortunately for the country it resulted in a complete triumph of the Union sentiment of the state and nine of the ten members of Congress elected were outspoken Union men. In the mean time, Lieutenant William Nelson, U. S. N. had secretly enrolled and organized four regiments of infantry, and shortly after the election threw off all concealment and suddenly assembled them at "Camp Dick Robinson," between Lexington and Danville.¹

Governor Magoffin who was still insisting on observance of the neutrality of the state, on August 19, 1861, wrote to President Lincoln urging "the removal from the limits of Kentucky of the military force now organized and in camp within the state," to which Mr. Lincoln returned a temperate but emphatic refusal.² About the same time he wrote to Jefferson Davis asking an authoritative assurance that Kentucky's neutrality would be respected, to which Mr. Davis, August 28, 1861, answered, saying, among other things.

"I lose no time in assuring you that the Government of the Confederate States of America neither intends nor desires to disturb the neutrality of Kentucky."³

How shallow this pretended respect for Kentucky's neutrality really was, was shortly to be demonstrated. On the 2nd day of September, 1861, less than a week after the date of the letter of Mr. Davis, the Confederate troops under General Leonidas Polk invaded Kentucky and seized Columbus and Hickman. Mr. Davis to whom General Polk had reported the movement, telegraphed him September 4, 1861.

"The necessity justifies the action."⁴ This sudden violation

¹ and ² Nicholay and Hay's Lincoln.
³ W. R. R. 4-396.

⁴ W. R. R. 4-180-181.

of Kentucky's neutrality provoked an emphatic protest from Governor Harris of Tennessee and other leading Confederates who had also pledged themselves to observe such neutrality and who feared its political effect, and caused Mr. Davis to waver in his course. On September 5, 1861, his secretary of war, Mr. L. P. Walker, telegraphed Governor Harris at Nashville, Tenn.

"General Polk has been ordered to direct the prompt withdrawal of the forces under General Pillow from Kentucky. The movement was wholly unauthorized, and you will so inform Governor Magoffin."¹

The Legislature of Kentucky joined Governors Magoffin and Harris in protest against the violation of Kentucky neutrality and even Mr. Buckner advised that General Zollicoffer be halted at the state line and that General Polk's forces should be withdrawn. He also advised Mr. Davis to send General Albert Sydney Johnston to Nashville with discretionary authority to withdraw the Confederate forces from Kentucky.²

General Johnston was sent to Nashville and September 16, telegraphed Mr. Davis as follows:

"After a full conference with Governor Harris, and after learning the facts, political and military, I am satisfied that the political bearing of the question presented for my decision has been decided by the legislature of Kentucky."

"The legislature of Kentucky has required the prompt removal of all Confederate forces from her soil and the Governor has issued his proclamation to that effect. The troops *will not* be withdrawn. So far from yielding to the demand for the withdrawal of our troops, I have determined to occupy Bowling Green at once."³

With this dispatch all pretence of regard for Kentucky's neutrality was cast aside by the Confederate authorities. It had been respected only while it could be used by Governor Magoffin, Buckner and others to cover a deliberate plan to plunge Kentucky into rebellion. Now that it was demonstrated that Kentucky would remain loyal to the Union it was abandoned and orders were given for an immediate advance of the Confederate forces into her territory.

While the above events were transpiring the Union people of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois had not been idle. Besides the steps to organize and arm the Union men of Kentucky, before related on the 22nd day of August, 1861, Governor Oglesby of Illinois directed the capture at Paducah of the little steamer, W. B. Terry, which he believed was in the employment of the Confederate

¹ and ² W. R. R. 4-189.

³ W. R. R. 4-193.

States.¹ The Union authorities had taken the precaution to have a considerable body of troops concentrated at Cairo, with General Ulysses S. Grant in command, and that officer on September 5, 1861, at 11:30 P. M. with two regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery, on transports convoyed by the U. S. gunboats Tyler and Conestoga, steamed up the Ohio River and took possession of Paducah, an important Kentucky town at the mouth of the Tennessee River. He also took possession of the telegraph office, railroad depot, Marine Hospital and a large quantity of military stores which had been collected for the Confederate army. The Confederate army 3000 strong was at the time said to be only sixteen miles away and Confederate flags were flying in the town in expectation of its arrival.²

Now that the mask was off there was a loud call from the Union people of Kentucky and from the Governors of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois for prompt action on the part of the United States to repel the advance of the Confederate armies. Governor Oliver P. Morton of Indiana, voiced the sentiment of all when September 2, 1861, he telegraphed the Hon. Thomas A. Scott, assistant secretary of war, as follows:

"The conspiracy to precipitate Kentucky into revolution is complete. The blow may be struck at any moment, and the southern border is lined with Tennessee troops, ready to march at the instant the Government is ready to meet them. If we lose Kentucky now, God help us." At the same time, with Governor Morton's concurrence, John T. Boyle and John J. Speed of Louisville telegraphed from Indianapolis to President Lincoln urging that Governor Morton be authorized to send at once to the Ohio River five regiments and two batteries, including Colonel Lew Wallace's regiment.

Events from this time on moved rapidly. September 7, General Anderson was directed to remove the headquarters of the Department of the Cumberland from Cincinnati to Louisville and on September 10, General George H. Thomas reported to him for duty and was placed in command of the troops Lieutenant Nelson, U. S. N., had assembled at Camp Dick Robinson.³ At this time they and the troops at Paducah were the only U. S. troops in Kentucky. September 7, 1861, General Charles F. Smith was sent by General Grant to Paducah to hold and fortify that place and to occupy Smithland, which was a few miles above at the mouth of the Cumberland River.⁴ September 9, General Zollicoffer ordered three Confederate regiments from East Ten-

1 W. R. R. 4-171.

2 W. R. R. 4-197.

3 W. R. R. 4-254.

4 W. R. R. 4-257.

nessee into Kentucky, to be followed by other forces of his command. September 12, Governor Morton of Indiana telegraphed the secretary of war that the war in Kentucky had commenced, that Bowling Green had been seized by the Secessionists, and called for troops to be sent to the Indiana border, which was nearly defenseless.¹ September 13, Mr. Buckner threw aside his cloak of neutrality, accepted a commission as Brigadier General from Jefferson Davis and was placed in command of about 6000 Confederate troops and ordered to concentrate them at Bowling Green.² September 15, General Zollicoffer with an army estimate at 10,000 men, marched to the Cumberland ford of the Cumberland River in Kentucky,³ while a large Confederate force was moving toward Paducah. As before stated these forces menaced Lexington, Frankfort and Louisville, Kentucky, Cincinnati, O., and the towns on the Ohio River in Indiana and Illinois.

The brigade which General Rousseau had organized on the Indiana shore opposite Louisville was hurried across the river and with such other troops as were available were sent down the Louisville and Nashville Railroad to Muldraugh's Hill to impede the advance of General Buckner, and other troops were concentrated at Camp Dennison to be thrown forward to the point in Kentucky where most needed. There was now a feverish haste in raising and arming troops needed for the emergency,—which accounts for the short time between the reorganization of the Fifteenth Ohio at Mansfield and the order for its southward movement.

As before stated, orders were issued to the regiment on September 21, to be ready to move on Monday, September 23. Everything was in readiness to move at that time, but owing probably to the difficulty of procuring transportation, the order to move was not issued and the regiment lay quietly in camp that day and the 24th. On the evening of September 24 the order came and we were directed to be up at 2 o'clock next morning, ready to take cars for Camp Dennison. The morning of September 25, everything was packed up, when word came that our train would not be ready until evening. In the evening after supper the regiment marched into the city and formed on the public square, where a beautiful flag was presented to it by the women of Mansfield. The presentation speech was made by the Hon. Barnabas Burns and the response by our colonel, Moses R. Dickey. The regiment then marched to the railroad station to await the train.

¹ W. R. R. 4-277.

² W. R. R. 4-412.

³ W. R. R. 4-407.

There were great crowds on the streets and fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters and sweethearts were there to say the last good-byes to the departing soldiers. Some time in the night the train was ready. It was made up mostly of freight cars, but the men made no complaint and cheerfully took things as they were without grumbling. The train reached Newark at nine o'clock next morning and the regiment was marched to the public square to await a train for Columbus. The citizens of the place learning that the men had not had breakfast, stirred about and soon came laden with baskets of provisions which the men eagerly devoured. They were served by the fair hands of the women of the place, who won all hearts by their tender solicitude for our comfort. At 12:30 P. M. the regiment left Newark for Columbus in comfortable cars, where it arrived at 4 P. M. At Columbus the men were marched up to the windows of the railroad station dining hall and were served with bread, butter, bologna sausage and coffee. At 7 P. M. the regiment left Columbus for Camp Dennison where it arrived at day light the morning of September 27, and at once was placed in camp. That evening Andrew J. Gleason of Company H, who had studied music in Chicago the year before, got his club together and practiced for an hour.¹ September 28, was spent in drill, and the men who had learned the preliminary steps during the three months service found occupation in teaching them to those who had not learned them. In the evening a regiment from Cincinnati passed by our camp on the railroad, going north.

The morning of September 29, there was a white frost. No blankets had yet been issued and the men suffered from cold. It was Sunday and our chaplain, Rev. Richard L. Ganter, held services in a grove near the camp. In the evening Gleason's club sang sacred songs. September 30, Captain Thaddeus S. Gilliland of Company H, arrived in camp, having been at Van Wert closing up his business when the regiment left Mansfield, and took command of his company.

October 1, 1861, the regiment was marched to the Little Miami River about one-half mile from camp where the men bathed and washed their clothing. There were rumors of marching orders. October 2, guns were issued to the men. Most of them were old flint lock muskets which had been altered, with no sights, but there were some new Enfield rifles with graduated sights.¹ The men turned out with their guns at dress parade in the late afternoon. In the evening there were prayer meetings in some of the tents. October 3, there was general drill all morning. In the afternoon word came that we would move at 7 o'clock next

1 Gleason's Diary.

morning,—where we did not know,—but conditions in Kentucky were so alarming that no one doubted that we were to be sent there. Clothing to complete the uniforms of the men and cart-ridge boxes and blankets were issued. Many of the men sent their citizens clothing home.

October 4, we had an early breakfast and at 7 A. M. took train for Cincinnati. When we reached that place we were marched about three miles to the ferry landing and were crowded onto a ferry boat. At 10:30 A. M. the boat swung out into the river and we “bade farewell to the old Buckeye State, possibly forever.”¹

We were told that we would get dinner at Covington across the river, “When we reached the place,” Gleason says, “we received a perfect ovation. As we marched through the streets to where the tables were spread we received many demonstrations of hearty good will. When we reached the tables we found them literally groaning with good things to eat and enjoyed the most bountiful repast we had enjoyed since leaving home.”¹

To add to its relish it was served by the loyal women of the place. Every one voted that we had never before seen so many handsome women and pretty girls. After the dinner was over Gleason got his club together and sang the “Red, White and Blue” which evoked warm applause. After this, the regiment waited, the men sitting on their knapsacks, several hours for the train which was to take us further south into the dark and bloody ground. Two incidents then occurring, come out distinctly from the mists of over fifty years.

After we were seated in the cars a lot of young girls indulged in merry badinage with the men. One fair bright eyed little minx came along side the car occupied by some of the men of Company E and looking up demurely said “Do you know why we call our dog Lige?” No one answered until Tom Wood said, “No, why *do* you call him Lige?” The little minx as demurely replied, “Why, that’s his name,” and there was a great shout of laughter at Tom’s expense. Poor Tom. He was killed at Picketts Mills May 27, 1864, a day or two before his term of service would have expired. When it was reported that he was among the slain on that bloody day, one thought of this incident and of the little beauty who had perpetrated the joke upon him. The other incident is almost too sad to recall. As the train was starting a bright little boy who had climbed upon the bumpers to be near the soldiers fell beneath the wheels and was shockingly mangled.

The regiment left Covington for Lexington, Ky. at 3:45 P. M., Oct. 4, 1861. A short distance out of town we passed the

¹ Gleason’s Diary.

Second Ohio, which had been before us in invading the sacred soil of Kentucky. We reached Lexington at 2 A. M. the morning of October 5, and the colonel gave the men their choice between remaining on the cars until day break, or marching at once to the site selected for our camp. They were drowsy and voted unanimously to remain on the cars. At day light the first object which caught the attention of the men was the stately monument to Henry Clay, which was greatly admired. A short time after day light the regiment was escorted to the state fair grounds about one-half mile from the cars, where it went into camp. The good people of Lexington were soon in our midst with hot coffee and other refreshments and gave us a cordial welcome.

As soon as tents were pitched and we were comfortably installed in our new camp, orders came to begin drilling and we had our first drill in the manual of arms. A sergeant of Company H broke guard, was arrested and was severely reprimanded by Colonel Dickey.¹

Sunday, October 6, there was roll call at 6 A. M. It rained in the afternoon and the men kept their tents. Many of them wrote letters home. There were no religious services and dress parade was omitted. October 7, the men were vigorously drilled,—in the morning in the manual of arms, and in the afternoon in marching. October 8, was also devoted to such drills and in the evening there was dress parade. Gleason records that "the elite of the city were out to see our awkward maneuvers."

Our camp at Lexington was in a beautiful grove. The turf was soft and green and the maples throughout the grounds were putting on their autumnal tints. A great many fair women and pretty girls were attracted to the grounds the afternoon Gleason speaks of and added to the interest of the scene. After the parade was over they moved about the camp showing much interest in the Ohio soldiers. One fair one carried a lovely bouquet which a number of our handsome young officers felt sure would be given to some one of them, and there was a pleasant strife among them to see who should receive the coveted prize. A young sergeant² who was present and witnessed the marked attention the officers were showing the fair Kentuckian and divined its object, also cast longing eyes on the bouquet and side long admiring glances on its fair owner. He was much surprised when the fair one turned from the officers and graciously gave the bouquet to him. The lovely smile which accompanied it lingers as a sweet memory of that beautiful October day, away back in 1861. That same day an Illinois regiment which had come to Lexington shortly after

1 Gleason's Diary.

2 The Author.

we did left for Tennessee, it was said. In the evening Gleason's club was reinforced by some singers from Company E and sang a number of the then popular songs.¹

A letter of Captain Chandler W. Carroll to his wife, dated Lexington, Ky., October 6, 1861, gives such a satisfactory and interesting account of our invasion of Kentucky and our impressions of the country and the people that with the consent of his widow, it is here in part reproduced. He writes:

"We left Camp Mordecai Bartley at Mansfield and stopped at Camp Dennison where we remained three or four days,—long enough to receive our arms and equipments. From thence we started on Thursday morning for some point in this state, not knowing exactly where. But on arriving here our previous orders were to some extent countermanded by reason of the retreat of the rebel forces, consequently we were compelled to lay over here."

"We are now encamped in the state fair grounds within a mile of the city of Lexington, which grounds by the way are the most complete I ever saw. * * * We crossed the river from Cincinnati into the city of Covington about two o'clock in the afternoon. From the time we first set foot on the soil of Kentucky we have been enthusiastically greeted by her citizens. They seemed indeed to vie with each other in acts of kindness toward us. The people were out in great numbers upon the streets, the stars and stripes were floating from every window,—in fact every where could be seen striking manifestations of loyalty to our glorious country by the noble and patriotic citizens of old Kentucky. It would be vain to attempt to describe my feelings upon this occasion. I felt that I could willingly lay down my life for such a people if it should become necessary. * * * I felt that I could endure almost any hardships and privations to secure to Kentucky the Government to which she is so much attached and for the maintenance of which she is willing to render all the aid in her power." * * *

"After we had landed on this side of the river and marched through the city (Covington) we found waiting for us a table bountifully spread with everything the rich country could afford. There were not only eatables of all kinds in abundance,—three times as much as we could eat and carry away,—but they even supplied us with tobacco and cigars in unlimited quantities. Every man, whether he used the weed or not, filled his pockets. The men stowed away in their haversacks enough provender to last two or three days. Old and young ladies of the very best

1 Gleason's Diary.

families waited upon us with the greatest solicitude. They were determined the soldiers should want for nothing and talked and conversed with them freely. This treatment, as you may suppose, was received by the soldiers with feelings of profound gratitude. They gave the ladies cheer after cheer, and only ceased cheering when the train had gone too far to prevent them to be heard."

"All along the road we met with indications of loyalty which were in a high degree encouraging. Union flags were flying from every house. Along the railroad Kentucky soldiers were guarding the bridges." * * *

"We arrived here about three o'clock Friday morning. Again we were received in the most enthusiastic manner by the citizens of the place. Flags and banners were flying in every direction." * * *

"We had been ordered in the first place to Camp Dick Robinson but in consequence of Zollicoffer's retreat we were ordered to remain here until further orders."

"The country surrounding this place surpasses everything I ever laid my eyes upon. * * * Everything that nature can do for man is here done. There is a most magnificent climate, of which fact the appearance of the people gives abundant proof. They are all fine and healthy looking. * * * There is every thing here that can conduce to the happiness of man."

October 9, there was the usual vigorous drill, and afterward dress parade. At dress parade the colonel announced that orders had been received to be ready to move to Louisville at 6 o'clock next morning. That night a number of the men got through the guard lines and went into the city. As a result there were several fights in which one man was stabbed and another severely pommelled.

We learned that we had been hurried to Lexington because of the reported advance of the Confederates under General Zollicoffer, which threatened both Lexington and Frankfort. It appeared that such advance had been checked by a display of our forces at Camp Dick Robinson under General Thomas and that we were now needed to stay the advance of the forces under General Buckner along the Louisville and Nashville Railroad which threatened the city of Louisville.

General Buckner had occupied Bowling Green September 12, as before stated, and on September 19, had moved a force to Munfordsville on Green River¹ which was taken as an advance of his entire army to that point.

¹ W. R. R. 4-416.

The morning of October 19, 1861, the regiment was aroused early and after breakfast struck tents, packed up and were ready to move at the hour stated. We left camp at 7:30 A. M. and marched to the railroad station, where we had to wait until noon for the train of box cars which was to carry us to our destination. The train pulled out at 12:30 P. M. and we were soon rolling along through the lovely blue grass region of Kentucky. As we approached the Kentucky River the scene changed. The country was broken by numerous hills and there were many cuts through the solid limestone rock. After passing Frankfort we soon came out into the blue grass region again and every one thought it was the most beautiful country he had ever seen. At Frankfort many citizens were on hand with refreshments of all kinds. Some of the men were afraid of being poisoned and refused the proffered kindness.¹ What wretch started the scare about poisoned food was not known.

Captain C. W. Carroll, writing to his wife at the time, says:

"At Frankfort we were literally inundated with bouquets and refreshments of all kinds which were forced upon us in unlimited quantities, although we were not delayed over five minutes in the place. One beautiful young lady in particular appeared perfectly frantic with delight at the sight of us. Her appearance and manners were such as to attract the attention of the whole regiment. While she supported a large flag she vociferously hurrahed for Ohio and Kentucky. I do not think there was a member of the regiment who did not form a very warm attachment, bordering close on to love, for the exquisitely beautiful damsel."

The captain here asks pardon of his wife for forgetting, for the moment, that he was a married man. He says of the country between Frankfort and Louisville, "The foot of a white man never pressed the sod of a better country." We were greeted all along the road by demonstrations of welcome. The people seemed glad to see us and manifested their pleasure, by cheering and waving flags and handkerchiefs.

We arrived at Louisville late in the evening and were at once marched to the depot of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad. On the way we stopped in front of the office of the Louisville Journal and gave its brilliant and able editor three times three cheers.² The streets were thronged with people and Gleason says "the cheers they gave us were enough to strike dismay to the hearts of the Secessionists."³ At the depot we found fires built for our comfort and soon after we arrived were served with

¹ Gleason's Diary.

² Letter of Captain C. W. Carroll to his wife.

³ Gleason's Diary.

bread, ham and hot coffee. Gleason says that about midnight the regiment boarded a freight train, some of the cars being open, but Captain Carroll in the letter to his wife above quoted from, says he enjoyed a good nights rest sleeping on the depot floor.

At daylight, October 11, we were still at the depot at Louisville but soon pulled out for Nolin, a station on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, where a large camp had been established. It had begun to rain in the night and continued during the day. To add to our discomfort on account of the rain and the open cars we had no breakfast. At Lebanon Junction we had to wait a long time for a lighter engine, as the one we had was too heavy to cross the bridge over a deep gorge, which had been partially destroyed by the enemy and was being rebuilt. Here were quartered the survivors of an Illinois regiment which had suffered heavy losses in attempting to cross the same bridge a few days before. Captain Carroll in the above letter says:

"Now for the first time we were informed that we had a terrible bridge to cross a few hundred yards distant. It was a bridge across a large stream, which was built in place of one burnt down by S. B. Buckner on the eve of his retreat. It was 100 feet high and over 150 yards long and built of green timbers and was now nearly completed. The members of the Illinois regiment took particular pains to represent this bridge in as dangerous a light as possible, the old settlers expressed great doubt as to its safety, the engineer was apprehensive. All this, after seeing the deplorable effects of a bridge accident upon one regiment, had the effect of creating alarm in the breast of all on the train. * * * The locomotive we were waiting for finally came and we went feeling our way very carefully until we reached the spot. Here was the much dreaded bridge before our eyes and it was a terrifying sight. It did not look as if it could bear the weight of our train,—it seemed so slender and fragile a structure. But we ventured on it at a snails pace, every one holding his breath as he looked at the deep abyss below. The timbers cracked and groaned and to the consternation of every one the train stopped right in the middle of the bridge. Every one held his breath in anticipation of distaster, but in a few moments, it seemed an age, the train again started and slowly moved across to solid ground. It was a great relief and many declared they would rather risk their lives in twenty battles than cross that bridge again."

Soon after we crossed this bridge we came into the roughest and hilliest country we had ever seen. It was a steep grade to the summit of the almost mountainous range we were crossing.

The two engines drawing the train were completely stalled and the train had to be divided and drawn up the steep grade in sections.

Elizabethtown was the only station of any size along the route. We passed several regiments guarding bridges along the railroad. We reached Nolin Station, eleven miles south of Elizabethtown, late in the day and at once left the cars and marched a mile and a half eastward to Camp Nevin, where there was said to be 12,000 men already encamped. We were tired, hungry and sleepy and it was quite late before we got our tents up and were ready to turn in for the rest and sleep we so much needed.



CHAPTER III.

CAMP NEVIN—ADVANCE TO GREEN RIVER AND CAMP WOOD. SIX MONTHS OF INACTION.

THE regiment remained in Camp Nevin until December 7, 1861, and went through a monotonous round of drill, guard, police and picket duty and the disciplinary training necessary to fit it for the arduous trials which lay before it. The camp had been selected by General Lovell H. Rousseau who, October 9, 1861, had been ordered to move from Muldraugh's Hill to Nolin and select a camp for a large body of troops, send scouts to Green River, and take advantage of every position left unoccupied by the enemy.¹ Only the day before, General Robert Anderson, who had been in command of the Department of the Cumberland, had been compelled to retire on account of failing health and had turned the command over to General W. T. Sherman.² When we arrived, there were about 12,000 troops already in the camp and other regiments and batteries were coming as fast as they could be armed and equipped and railroad or river transportation could be furnished them.

The day after we reached camp, October 12, General Alexander McDowell McCook was placed in command of the camp³ and October 15, Brigadier Generals Thomas J. Wood and Richard W. Johnson were ordered to report to him for assignment to duty.⁴ On the same day the Thirty-second Indiana, Colonel August Willich, which had arrived at Louisville, was ordered to move by way of Hogdensville to Camp Nevin.⁵

Our other close comrades, the 49th Ohio, had preceded us and were with General Rousseau's column when it moved out to Muldraugh's Hill, being the first Ohio regiment to set foot on Kentucky soil. On October 1, 1861, there were at Camp Nevin and along the railroad between Nolin and Louisville the following troops: the Fourth, Sixth, Twenty-ninth, Thirtieth, Thirty-second, Thirty-eighth, and Thirty-ninth Indiana Volunteers, the Fifteenth and Forty-ninth Ohio Volunteers, the Third Kentucky Infantry and the Fourth Kentucky Cavalry Volunteers, Stone's Kentucky Light Battery and Cotter's Ohio Battery.⁶

Captain C. W. Carroll in a letter to his wife of date October 22, 1861, says that on October 21, the Fifteenth Ohio was assigned to the Third Brigade, General R. W. Johnson, and placed on the

1 W. R. R. 4-299.
2 W. R. R. 4-296-297.
3 W. R. R. 4-306.

4 W. R. R. 4-308.
5 W. R. R. 4-307.
6 W. R. R. 4-315.

right of the brigade. The Third Brigade was on the right of the division, he says, and he therefore claimed that the Fifteenth Ohio had the post of honor in the entire command. It is not probable that the division was then completely organized, as General Negley's brigade, the Fourth Brigade of the division, did not leave Pittsburgh until after October 17, and on October 22 was in Louisville whence that day it was ordered to Camp Nevin.¹

November 4, the troops at Camp Nevin were organized as follows:

FIRST BRIGADE—General L. H. Rousseau.

The Sixth Indiana Volunteers, Fifth and Sixth Kentucky Volunteers, the Second Kentucky Cavalry Volunteers, Stone's Kentucky Battery, two companies of the Fifteenth U. S. Infantry and two companies of the Nineteenth U. S. Infantry.

SECOND BRIGADE—General T. J. Wood.

The Twenty-ninth, Thirtieth, Thirty-eighth and Thirty-ninth Indiana Volunteers.

THIRD BRIGADE—General R. W. Johnson.

The Fifteenth and Forty-ninth Ohio Volunteers, the Thirty-fourth Illinois Volunteers and the Thirty-second Indiana Volunteers.

FOURTH BRIGADE—General Jas. S. Negley.

The Seventy-seventh, Seventy-eighth and Seventy-ninth Pennsylvania Volunteers, Muellers' Pennsylvania Battery and Cotter's Ohio Battery.²

It so happened that the Fifteenth Ohio, the Forty-ninth Ohio and Thirty-second Indiana were to be together in the same brigade continuously during their entire period of service.

Camp Nevin was well selected with a view to the health and comfort of the men and as a point for the massing of a large force to operate directly against the enemy. It was on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad over which it could draw its supplies and not far from Nolin's creek which furnished an abundant supply of good water. The region was well timbered and there was plenty of wood for fuel. The country was an undulating plain and afforded good opportunities for drainage. But the soil was a red clay which held the water and needed more than ordinary care to keep it from becoming foul and unwholesome. Owing perhaps to a lack of proper care in this respect and to the fact that the men did not then know how to take care of themselves, there was soon a great deal of sickness of a sort which modern scientific methods would have prevented. But the men as a rule

¹ W. R. R. 4-318.

² W. R. R. 4-333.

were uncomplaining and went about their duties in a light-hearted way. Soon after we were established in the camp the work of preparing for the active service ahead was begun and continued with monotonous regularity. Captain C. W. Carroll in a letter to his wife dated November 11, 1861, says:

"Camp life as a general thing is almost intolerably dull and monotonous. Where we are stationed for any length of time at one post it is the same thing over and over every day. At 5 o'clock A. M., reveille beats, at which time we get up and prepare our breakfasts. At 9 A. M., we have battalion drill which lasts until noon. At 1 P. M., we have company drill which lasts until 4 or 5 P. M. From this time until 9 P. M., we have to ourselves. At 9 P. M., we go to bed and the next day go through the same motions. We occasionally go out on picket which gives us some relief." This monotony is the well remembered dominant note of our life at Camp Nevin. But the following notes of our daily employments taken from the diaries of the men, the letters of Captain C. W. Carroll to his wife and the writer's personal recollection will show that the monotony was frequently broken by incidents of interest at the time, and which show more clearly than any general statement how the men lived and what they did.

October 12, 1861, the day after our arrival at Camp Nevin, there was no morning roll call in the camp of the Fifteenth Ohio and no guards were placed around the camp. The men were tired and it was decided to give them a day of rest. Some of them took advantage of it by rambling through the woods hunting for chestnuts, while others made raids on the orchards in the country round the camp.

October 13, was Sunday and there were religious services conducted by Chaplain Ganter, who gave notice that he wished to organize a choir and wished the singers in the regiment to come to his tent. October 14, the daily monotonous drills described by Captain Carroll began. October 15, Gleason writes in his diary that many of the men were suffering from camp disorders.

October 15, a detachment of the regiment had its first experience on picket duty. It was posted about four miles south of the camp near the railroad station of Sonora. It was a rainy night and as an introduction to this sort of service was not reassuring. But the next morning the storekeeper at the station served the men with a breakfast of fried chicken, biscuits and hot coffee, which almost made them forget the trials of a night watch in the rain and strengthened them for their march through the rain and mud back to camp.

October 18, a soldier of the Thirty-ninth Indiana was accidentally shot while on picket. There was said to be an item in the Cincinnati Commercial stating that the Fifteenth Ohio had been all cut to pieces in battle, and many of the men wrote letters home correcting the report.¹ October 19, in the morning the companies were drilled in the lock-step to correct the carriage of some of the men. There was battalion drill in the afternoon. That evening, Adjutant Taft, Captain McClenahan, Gleason and Sergeant Lehew of Company H met in the adjutant's tent and practiced singing the hymns which were to be used in next day's religious services.²

Sunday, October 20, the morning inspection, which was to become a regular thing on Sunday mornings while we were in camp, took place. The tents were struck and the grounds cleaned up, after which knapsacks and haversacks were inspected. After the inspection there were religious services and in the evening dress parade. Orders came to be ready to move next morning.

October 21, our regimental camp was moved to the other side of the general camp, the side nearest the railroad.

It is presumed that such removal was made necessary by our assignment to the Third Brigade mentioned in the letter of Captain Carroll. The site selected for our camp was so foul that next day we moved a little farther south where the ground was cleaner. It rained all night the 22nd and consequently there was no drill on the 23rd and many of the men went outside camp to hunt for grapes and chestnuts. It grew quite cold the night of October 23, and the next morning there was a white frost. In the forenoon some of the men were taken in squads to the creek to wash their clothing. In the afternoon there was battalion drill in a large field a mile north of the camp and dress parade before we returned to our quarters. October 25, there was the usual round of drill and on the 26 and 27 a large portion of the regiment was on picket duty.

October 28, we witnessed the first burial of a soldier. His body was borne to the burial place in an ambulance escorted by quite a detachment of his regiment marching with reversed arms and preceded by a regimental band playing the doleful and depressing "Dead March from Saul." After the burial the customary salute was fired over the grave and the detachment then returned to camp, marching in quick time. It was a very impressive ceremony and very depressing—made doubly so by the doleful strains above mentioned. One wonders why this mournful music at our funerals was not abandoned long before it was.

¹ and ² Gleason's Diary.

The afternoon of October 28, there was battalion drill in the same large field above mentioned, after which Colonel Dickey made an eloquent patriotic speech, which Gleason says was "right to the point and gave much encouragement to the men." At its conclusion he asked the men to co-operate with him in winning for the regiment an honorable name and in response every hand was raised aloft.¹

October 29, there were three funerals in our part of the camp and a number of men were sent to the hospital at Louisville. After drill and dress-parade on October 30, Colonel Dickey proposed to the men that if they would observe the rules requiring them not to leave camp without a regular pass, he would reduce the camp guard detail from six to three from each company. The men gave a pledge of honor that they would obey the rules just as they had done with the full number of guards.

There was a white frost the morning of October 31, and it was quite cold. The usual drills and dress parade took place. November 1, there was a general inspection in the forenoon. Rain in the afternoon prevented battalion drill. In the evening notice was given that the regiment would go out on picket duty next morning. November 2, the rain had ceased but had left the mud very deep and we waded through it to the place where we were to do picket duty. There was no unusual experience during our twenty-four hours detail. There was, however, one amusing incident which Gleason has preserved. Lieutenant Scott of Company H with a small squad was detached to relieve a similar squad which had been posted to guard some government stores at the small station of Glendale. When Lieutenant Scott and his men reached the station they found no guard there. They were told that there had been a company on guard there the day before but that they had left *as soon as it began to rain*. The regiment we relieved on this tour of picket duty was the Thirty-second Indiana. We were relieved of picket duty at 3 P. M., November 3, and got back to camp in time for a supper of corn meal mush, a welcome change of rations.¹

November 4, 5, 6 and 7 the regiment was occupied by the usual dull round of drill. On the 7 some of the companies commenced building bake-ovens. November 8, there was also the usual round of drill and guard duty. In the evening just after taps a heavy thunderstorm came up and continued all night. It was still raining next morning and everything was drenched. The ditches in the camp streets were filled and running over and some of the officers and men were roused by the water rushing through

1 Gleason's Diary.

their tents. The rain and deep mud made drill out of the question. It rained again the night of November 10 and November 11 and only squad drill was undertaken. Governor Morton of Indiana was expected to visit the camp November 11 and the Indiana troops were making great preparations to receive him. Five thousand of them marched to the railroad station to escort him to the camp.¹

Captain Carroll from whose letter of November 11, 1861, the above is taken, says that at that time there were thirty thousand to forty thousand troops in Camp Nevin, that the general health of the troops was good; that the prospects of an advance were not so good as they were and that there was some talk of fixing up winter quarters,—which was not a good sign.

November 12, the entire regiment was on picket duty and were posted about two miles southwest of the camp near the railroad. Gleason, who was with Company H, says they had no particular instructions, that some of the men went out on a scout and many of those remaining took off their cartridge boxes and threw down their guns and were having a good time, when suddenly Colonel Dickey appeared in their midst. The result was that the company was given a good reprimand and the men were instructed thereafter to pace their beats and at all times to be alert and ready for duty.²

November 13, 14 and 15 were devoted to drill, police and guard duty. There was a thunderstorm the evening of November 14 and it was uncomfortably warm in the tents. The night of November 15 was the coldest of the season so far and on the morning of November 16 there was thick ice in the pools about the camp. That day the left wing of the regiment, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Wilson, went out of camp about two miles to discharge their guns. After this they had their first target practice. Gleason says Company H was complimented by Colonel Wilson on having made the best score. There was battalion drill in the afternoon in the old field before mentioned. While we were drilling the First Ohio Volunteers went by, having marched from Louisville.³

November 17, at 11 A. M., the regiment fell in for regular inspection when orders came to make ready for brigade inspection and a review by General Buell, who had succeeded General Sherman in command of the department. We were ordered to dispense with our overcoats and as the air was chilly we were quite cold. We marched to the parade ground, took our position in the line and had to wait *four hours*. At the expiration of that

¹ Letter of Capt. Carroll to his wife, dated November 11, 1861.

² and ³ Gleason's Diary.

time General Buell arrived and, accompanied by Generals McCook and Johnson, rode up and down the line and looked at us. We were then marched by the generals in column of companies. The order of march of our brigade (the sixth) was the Fifteenth Ohio, the Thirty-second Indiana, the Forty-ninth Ohio, the Twenty-ninth Indiana.¹

In a note in his diary, Gleason says that the 29th Indiana was afterwards succeeded by the 34th Illinois and that the 34th Illinois early in December gave place to the 39th Indiana. By order of General Buell dated November 30, 1861, the Fifteenth Ohio, Forty-ninth Ohio, Thirtysecond Indiana and Thirty-ninth Indiana were constituted the Sixth Brigade.²

The first appearance of General Buell in our camp created only a momentary interest. General W. T. Sherman whom he succeeded November 15, 1861,³ had only been in command of the department since October 4, 1861, and was not generally known. General Sherman, on assuming command of the department had taken hold with characteristic energy and his blunt outspoken criticisms and comment regarding conditions then existing and his ill concealed dislike of the newspaper reporters, who dogged his steps day by day, did not tend towards making him a popular commander. What probably led to the break in his military career which afterwards became so famous was a private interview with the Secretary of War and the Adjutant General of the Army, October 16, 1861, in which when asked how many men he deemed necessary to drive the rebels out of Kentucky, promptly replied 200,000.⁴ In a report to the Secretary of War dated October 21, 1861, the Adjutant General related this conversation and it in some way got into the newspapers. It was published far and wide with the comment that General Sherman was crazy. General Sherman resented the publication of this report and sharply expressed his dissatisfaction to the War Department. In a letter to General George H. Thomas dated November 11, 1861, he said: "My expression of dissatisfaction at the publication of Thomas' (Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant General, U. S. A.) report and request to be relieved of this charge has led to the assignment of General Buell, of whom I have not yet heard." Later events demonstrated that he was not far out of the way.

November 18, 19 and 20, were quite cold and disagreeable, with a cold rain the night of the 19th, but there was the usual monotonous routine of drill and police and guard duty.

November 21, the Hon. John J. Crittenden was in the camp and the men were ordered to get ready for a grand review in his

1 Gleason's Diary. 2 W. R. R. 7-460. 3 W. R. R. 4-358. 4 W. R. R. 4-314.

honor but for some unknown reason the review did not take place.¹ That evening orders came to go to picket next morning. November 22 we were out early, had breakfast and were just about starting on our tour of picket duty when it began to rain and rained all day. The mud was deep and the marching hard, but we soon reached our post about four miles from camp and relieved the guards then on duty. It was a dismal day and disagreeable beyond description, but every one took it good naturedly and endured it without complaint. Towards night it grew quite cold, with a high wild wind and about midnight there was a light fall of snow. Company K, in which the writer was then a non-commissioned officer, had its headquarters in an old saw mill near the picket line. There was a report that the enemy was advancing and every one was cautioned to keep a sharp look out. The guards were instructed to halt any one approaching the lines. If he failed to stop after the command "halt" had been given three times, the guard was then to fire. Sometime between midnight and morning a shot was heard on the picket line. The reserve guards at once went forward to the support of the line and found that John Dunn, a member of Company K, had been shot and mortally wounded by William Hazlewood. Dunn was a new recruit and was one of the guard then on duty. He had evidently got confused for he was outside the picket line and was coming towards it when Hazlewood, who did not recognize him in the darkness, called out three times "Halt! who comes there?" and then fired. The shot struck him in the right breast and passed through his body. We carried him back to the sawmill, laid him on a rough bench and made him comfortable as possible. We opened his shirt and saw the ghastly wound the bullet had made and knew that it was mortal. A sergeant of the guard² sat by him, moistened his lips and held his hand, finger on pulse, while his life blood slowly ebbed away. It was a wild night. The wind howled and shrieked without and the sounds mingled with the groans of the dying man. Towards morning he died. In memory, that night remains one of the most awful in the writer's more than four years of service. An ambulance came and took the body to camp where it was afterwards shipped to his family in the north. A strict inquiry into the circumstances of the shooting acquitted Hazelwood of all blame,³ but the accident clouded his life and made him very unhappy. He was afterwards wounded and taken prisoner at Chickamauga and sent to Andersonville, where he endured untold privations, but was finally released and restored to his family and friends.

1 Gleason's Diary. 2 The Writer. 3 Letter of Captain Carroll to his wife.

November 23, 24 and 25 were without any unusual incident.

November 26, soon after reveille, General R. W. Johnson, our brigade commander, came around and gave the orderly sergeants a shaking up for being so tardy in calling the roll. He ordered that thereafter the roll should be called immediately after reveille and that the men should turn out with arms and accouterments.¹ That day the paymaster came and we were marched to General McCook's headquarters and received our first pay in the three years service. Each private and corporal received \$23.40 and each sergeant a little over \$30.00.²

There were heavy rains November 27, 28 and 29, and no drill. On the 29th Captain Thaddeus S. Gilliland, who was dangerously ill of a fever, was removed from his tent to a farm house near camp and his wife and father were reported as coming to care for him.³

November 30, there was a change in the weather. It grew much colder and there was rain and a light snow. We had orders to go out on picket duty, but the river⁴ (Nolin's Creek) was so high that it was impossible and the order was countermanded.

There was the regular Sunday inspection December 1 and one of the regimental wagons went to Elizabethtown for forage and brought back, besides the forage, a bushel of good apples.⁵ December 2, there was quite a snow fall and December 3, some of the boys went rabbit-hunting.⁶ The same day Captain Frank Askew started north on a short leave of absence.⁷ December 4, Captain Gilliland's wife and father accompanied by the father of the Gleason boys, all of Van Wert, Ohio, arrived in camp. Captain Gilliland was reported not so well and there was much anxiety over his condition.

December 5 and 6 there was the usual round of police and guard duty and the usual drill. The Thirty-second Indiana, who were encamped across a little branch from us, were building barracks of round logs. One of their officers said they "did not know that they should ever occupy them but perhaps some one else would and at any rate it kept the men busy and out of mischief." December 7, we were caught in a shower while on battalion drill and got a good drenching. December 8, there was the usual Sunday morning inspection.

It proved to be our last day at Camp Nevin for orders came to march for Green River next morning at nine o'clock. Everyone was glad of the change. The camp had become foul and there was a great deal of sickness, which resulted in a great

1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 Gleason's Diary.

7 Captain Carroll's letter to his wife.

many deaths and numerous discharges for disability. There was a great deal of rainy weather during which, when not on duty, both officers and men were confined to their tents. During these hours of inaction both officers and non-commissioned officers studied the tactics and army regulations so as to familiarize themselves with their duties. The frequent drills and the daily round of duties, together with the studies above mentioned, brought the companies and regiments up to a high state of discipline and efficiency. In fact it may be truthfully said, that the character of the regiments at Camp Nevin was practically formed during the dreary weeks we occupied the place.

The morning of December 9, reveille was sounded early. Hundreds of camp fires soon were blazing and the men taking their breakfasts. This was followed by the striking of tents and the packing up and then came the "assembly," blown by many bugles, and the army at Camp Nevin began its southward march.

We marched slowly, making frequent halts, as the men's knapsacks were heavily loaded with useless impedimenta which had been accumulated during our long stay in Camp Nevin. In passing one house we were much amused to see an old woman dancing and clapping her hands for joy.¹ She may have been some daughter of the revolution of 1776 and had not forgotten her love for the flag of her father.

We soon came in sight of blue capped hills which rose like mountains in the distance. After eight or nine miles the boys began to drop out and lag behind. The heavy road and heavier knapsacks began to tell upon them. After a march of twelve miles we halted for the night at Bacon Creek, where the cavalry and some of the infantry were already in camp. We noticed the camp of the Third Ohio, then commanded by Colonel John Beatty, who was known as "the Christian Soldier." It was said that he would not allow swearing in his presence and said grace at his mess table.

Some of the men went to bathe their galled feet in the creek. As soon as our wagons came up, we pitched our tents and turned in for the night. "Tattoo" sounded wonderfully sweet that night and particularly the long drawn out call of the Thirty-second Indiana which used the German bugle calls.

The morning of December 10, reveille sounded early and we soon had our breakfasts and packed up ready for resuming our march. We waited until 10:20 A. M. before we received marching orders and then moved out, the Thirty-ninth Indiana in advance of the brigade. We took the direct road to Green

1 Gleason's Diary.

River and as it was macadamized we moved out briskly, keeping time to lively martial music. We marched three miles—then halted ten minutes for rest, then another three miles and halted for luncheon. The country grew rougher as we advanced and some of the hills seemed mountainous in their aspect. After luncheon a march of about six miles brought us to the village of Munfordville on Green River where we went into camp about one-fourth of a mile north of the town. Our camp was named Camp Wood, in honor of the Hon. George Wood, a member of the Kentucky Military Board who lived at Munfordville.¹ That night Company I was detailed to guard the ford between Munfordville and Woodsonville, a small hamlet just across the river, and before daylight the next morning was attacked by the Texas Rangers.² In confirmation of this incident, noted in McConnell's diary, a telegram from General McCook to General Buell November 11 states that,

"Seventy-five rebel cavalry came up to Woodsonville at 5 A. M., this morning, got behind a house, and fired a volley. Our pickets returned it. The rebel fled."³

At 8 o'clock A. M., all the regiment except Company I was ordered out on picket duty. Company H was posted about three miles back on the road to Bacon Creek.⁴

December 12, after the companies which were on picket returned to camp, the men set about making their quarters more comfortable. The regiment was encamped on a steep hill side and in some cases the ground had to be graded and leveled off before the tents could be properly placed. December 13, the cars ran to Green River bringing material for rebuilding the big railroad bridge which had been partially destroyed by the enemy some days before. It was evident that the bridge over Bacon Creek had been repaired. This bridge had been destroyed by Captain John H. Morgan of the Kentucky Cavalry the night of December 5, 1861.⁵

Orders come to be ready to go out on picket duty again next morning. We were still on picket duty Sunday morning, December 14, and were relieved in time to have Sunday inspection. There was a skirmish across the river between some of the enemy's cavalry and the pickets of the Thirty-second Indiana.⁶ The situation was becoming so critical that great watchfulness was necessary in order to prevent surprise.

December 11, it was learned and telegraphed to General Buell that the Confederate General Hindman with 4000 men was at

1 Ohio at Shiloh, page 71.

2 William McConnell's Diary.

3 W. R. R. 7-491.

4 Gleason's Diary.

5 W. R. R. 7-12.

6 Gleason's and McConnell's Diaries.

Bear Wallow, a short distance from Green River. General Buell either took alarm, or feared an early engagement with the enemy would interfere with his plans, and ordered General McCook to fall back from his position at Green River. General McCook at once protested that he was all right and safe in his position, that to fall back would be demoralizing to his division and asked that the order be recinded.¹ As we did not fall back it may be presumed that the order was countermanded.

December 16, the regiment drilled for two hours, after which some of the men went to see the great railroad bridge which Captain Carroll describes in a letter to his wife as the most magnificent structure of the kind he had ever seen. Gleason made a sketch of it from the roof of an old cabin nearby. It had been partially destroyed by the enemy and was being repaired as rapidly as possible. The Thirty-second Indiana was encamped between our quarters and the bridge and had erected a bake oven where some of the men got some soft bread.²

The morning of December 17, our teams had to join a foraging expedition to General Buckner's farm eight miles up the river. We got them off in good time and then went out on picket, being posted in the same places as before, except that Company I was sent to Logston's ford seven miles down Green River³ and Company E was detailed to guard the railroad bridge across it. Soon after reaching our posts we heard musketry in the direction of our camp followed by cannonading. We did not know whether it was real fighting or target practice. It was not long, however, until the news came that a real engagement had taken place. There were many conflicting reports about it, but the most plausible one was brought to us in the evening by our adjutant, Calvin R. Taft, who said that the enemy had come up on the cars with a battery, a regiment of infantry and some cavalry, that Colonel Willich of the Thirty-second Indiana had sent out a part of his regiment as skirmishers and after a sharp fight with a superior force of the enemy had fallen back to the river, losing twenty men killed and wounded.⁴

The affair was really more serious than our adjutant had reported. Four companies of the Thirty-second Indiana under Lieutenant Colonel Von Treba were on picket just across the river south of the railroad bridge when they were attacked by a force commanded by General Hindman, which consisted of the First, Second and Sixth Arkansas Infantry, a battalion of Texas Rangers and Swett's battery of artillery.⁵ They maintained a gallant resistance, were soon joined by Colonel Willich with the

¹ W. R. R. 7-491.

² Gleason's Diary.

³ McConnell's Diary.

⁴ Gleason's Diary.

⁵ W. R. R. 7-19-20.

other companies of the regiment and after a severe hand to hand engagement the enemy were finally driven off. The losses of the Thirty-second Indiana were quite heavy, being Lieutenant Sachs and ten men killed, twenty-two wounded and five men missing.¹

Captain C. W. Carroll in a letter to his wife dated December 9, 1861, gives the following account of the affair:

"We had quite a brisk little time on last Tuesday, having had a skirmish with the enemy across the river. Indeed the firing became so lively that it aroused our whole camp and made it assume a very war-like appearance. Unfortunately for us, our regiment was on picket on that day or we certainly would have been in the fight. Our Company came near being in it as it was. Having been an eye witness of nearly the whole affair, I can give you a pretty correct account of what transpired. I had the honor of being in command of Company E and of being charged with the duty of protecting the great iron bridge across Green River. My post at the bridge was a very short distance from the scene of the action. The day was exceedingly beautiful and it was astonishingly warm for this season of the year. About one o'clock, having just finished our dinner of hard crackers and coffee, we were alarmed by the sound of musketry a short distance across the river. We all sprang to our arms and I formed the company in line prepared for action. The fighting was between Colonel Willich's regiment, which was thrown over the river as skirmishers, and from three to five thousand rebels, with a battery of four pieces. Colonel Willich's regiment is the 32d Indiana and is composed entirely of Germans. They fought the overwhelming force of the enemy with obstinate and desperate courage. In fact, there were but 200 of this noble regiment actually engaged—the balance having been sent in another direction to a point where it was supposed the main body lay. This handful of men held in check for three-quarters of an hour over five hundred Texan Rangers who fought with great bravery and desperation. These Rangers would charge right upon them, making it almost a hand to hand fight. But the Germans stood firm and slew them right and left and caused them to fall back before their murderous fire. These charges were frequently repeated and as often repulsed, until our men, driving the enemy before them, ran into range of the enemy's battery only a few hundred yards away. They did not know until the battery opened out on them that the enemy had any artillery with them. The German finding themselves in the presence of a large force of

1 Col. Willich's official report, W. R. R. 7-18.

the enemy fell back until reinforcements could reach them. During this time I had crossed the river with the company and had taken position within a short distance of the battle ground. There we were compelled to stand, in sight of the whole affair, without being able to render our noble comrades any assistance. To have left our post without orders would have subjected me to a Court Martial. In fact in crossing the river as I did, I incurred the displeasure of General Johnson, but after considering the matter he concluded that in crossing the river I had taken a position which enabled me to render more effectual protection to the bridge. * * * This is our first battle and gives us an idea of what we may expect hereafter. But let them do their best we are bound to whip them."

That day four additional brigades and a number of batteries of artillery reached Camp Wood and a part of them crossed the river. Troops came in on the cars during the night and there were good prospects for a fight next day.¹

December 18, was a quiet day at Camp Wood. The prospects for a fight had gone, as the enemy retreated during the night. Our regiment returned from picket duty about noon and in the evening we had dress parade.

December 19, we had drill in the forenoon. In the afternoon our pickets across the river were fired on and two regiments were hurriedly sent to reinforce them. These regiments made a reconnaissance for some distance in our front but found no considerable force of the enemy. Orders came to turn over all our tents except six to the company, which caused some dissatisfaction. Our tents were what were known as "Sibley" tents, were bell shaped with a pole in the center and each was expected to accommodate fifteen men. The men slept in them with their heads toward the outer rim and their feet towards the center, and except in very bad weather they were quite comfortable.

December 20, it was reported that the Sherman Brigade had arrived in camp.² Lieutenant Chaffin of Company H, resigned and left for home.

It rained the evening of December 21 and the morning of December 22, and as we had no picket duty to perform the men kept their tents. Monday, December 23, was freezing cold with a cutting wind and there was no drill. New clothing—roundabouts and trousers—were issued to the men. December 24, new caps were issued. Gleason says, that "tomorrow being Christmas we were selected to go on picket." Some of the men had got canned oysters and had prepared to have a royal Christmas

¹ and ² Gleason's Diary.

dinner, but after hearing of the order to go on picket decided to have them Christmas eve.

The morning of Christmas Day, 1861, the whole regiment was aroused quite early and by 8 o'clock was on its way to the picket line. We crossed the river on a bridge which had been built by the Thirty-second Indiana near the great railroad bridge and were posted on or near the battle ground of the 17th. Some of the men went over the ground hunting for relics and Lieutenant Scott found a bloody bayonet twisted out of shape and sent it home as a trophy.¹ Hickory nuts and butternuts abounded in the woods and as the day was fair the squirrels were out laying in their winter supplies. The men were strongly tempted to shoot them but the orders forbade it. No fires at night were allowed, but as the weather was mild we were all quite comfortable. There were no shots on the picket line, and no other sounds to disturb stillness of the night, except the barking of foxes. One could not help contrasting this Christmas day with those of former times in our homes in dear old Ohio.

December 26, at 9 o'clock A. M., we were relieved of picket duty by the "Louisville Legion" and returned to our camp. It began raining in the evening and we congratulated ourselves that we had escaped one rainy night on picket.¹

The morning of December 27, was freezing cold and the men mostly kept their tents. It was still cold on the 28th but we went out on drill. We were however soon called in and ordered to pack knapsacks and be ready to march at noon. It was reported that we were to have brigade inspection. Colonel Dickey and Lieutenant Colonel Wilson were both absent and Major Wallace was in command of the regiment. Arriving at the parade ground, we found nearly all the regiments in camp assembled and learned that a flag was to be presented to Rousseau's brigade by Mr. Geo. D. Prentice, editor of the Louisville Journal. Many of us were much interested in seeing the distinguished editor whose fame was country wide. Gleason describes him as being an "ordinary looking, elderly gentleman, quiet, approaching almost to timidity." The writer who saw him on this occasion recalls a striking, wrinkled, or pock marked face and piercing dark eyes. He was slouchily dressed, but no one, the writer thinks, would have taken him to be other than the remarkable man he was. We were too far from the speakers to hear the presentation speech or the reply made by General Rousseau, but heard some fine music by the band of the Fifteenth, U. S. A., which well paid us for our march through the mud. We had dress parade in the evening.

¹ Gleason's Diary.

Sunday, December 29, was a fine winter day and we had the usual Sunday morning inspection. December 30, there was no unusual occurrence. Gleason tells of exploring a noted cave in the vicinity and seeing some troops engaged in target practice. He also reports that a pontoon bridge across the river had been completed.

December 31, the regiment was again detailed for picket duty. We were again posted on the battle ground near Rowlett's station and saw the knoll behind which the enemy had masked his battery on that memorable day. It was a double "watch night." We watched for the approach of the enemy and at the same time watched the old year out and the new year in. From a hill near our line we had a fine view of our camps about Munfordville and of the country for miles around. All was quiet during the night.

Between 9 and 10 o'clock, January 1, 1862, we were relieved by the First Ohio and returned to camp, crossing the river on the pontoon bridge above mentioned. We put in the rest of the day resting and sleeping. January 2, it was too cold for drill and the men kept their tents. It grew warmer towards evening and began to rain. It rained the next day and there was no drill. January 4, a reported case of small-pox some where in camp caused alarm and the men were marched by companies to the surgeon's tent and vaccinated. Sunday, January 3, there was the usual inspection and Lieutenant Scott and Sergeant John Capper of Company H received furloughs.¹

January 6, at 4 P. M. our regiment was ordered out on picket and we were placed in reserve on the river bottom near the railroad bridge. It was quite cold, there was no wood near with which to make fires and General McCook gave us permission to burn rails from a fence nearby.²

Next morning, January 7, Major Wallace, while washing at a spring, let his revolver fall and it was discharged, wounding him in the left foot so severely that an ambulance was sent for to take him to camp. During the day the boys chased rabbits in the adjoining fields and caught quite a number. We were relieved earlier than we expected and returned to camp, almost every one carrying a bundle of straw or grass for bedding. We were surprised on reaching camp to find Mr. David Capper of Van Wert, Ohio, who had come to see his son John. John had started home on furlough and they had passed on the way.³

January 8, was notable because that day the great railroad bridge across the Green River was completed. The whistle of the

1, 2 and 3 Gleason's Diary.

first engine which crossed it was greeted by cheers from all parts of the camp and we thought we would now make another forward movement. Some of the companies went out to discharge their guns. "Neb." Miner was on guard at the spring and arrested a member of the Thirty-second Indiana for violation of some rule. The man caused some amusement by his protests but "Neb." held him at the point of his bayonet until a corporal came and took him to the colonel's quarters.¹

January 9 and 10, the weather was cloudy and some rain was falling. On the 10th, twenty men from each company were detailed to work on intrenchments near the railroad bridge. Sergeant John G. Gregg of Company C, having received a commission as second lieutenant was assigned to duty in Company H. Gleason, who was a member of the latter company, says, "To say that he met with a cool reception it putting it rather mild, as he was almost a total stranger and was regarded as a usurper by both officers and men."

January 11, the monotony of our camp life was enlivened by a little concert, given by the band of the Fourteenth Regulars on request of General McCook. It was the finest band in our part of the army and to hear it was a delight. In their repertoire was "The Last Rose of Summer," which was played with unusual sweetness and pathos. The newspapers reported that a great Mississippi expedition started yesterday.

Sunday, January 12, was unsettled and showery. We had our usual inspection and that was all. January 13, was freezing cold, with snow, and orders came to go on picket the next morning.

January 14, the regiment was again on picket near the battle ground of December 17. We relieved the troops on the picket line at 4 P. M. and found that they had provided pretty good quarters for the reserve by building a shelter of cedar boughs and a stone fire place behind a hill where we could have a small fire without its being seen by the enemy. Towards morning, however, it rained and the cedar boughs did not prevent the men on the reserve from getting drenched.

January 15, it rained constantly and we were very uncomfortable. We were relieved by the Louisville Legion and had a very muddy march back to camp and the shelter of our tents. January 16, a large detail from the regiment was sent to work on intrenchments. There was an alarm on the picket line, caused by a small detachment of the enemy appearing on a hill overlooking our camp, but they made no demonstration and soon disappeared.

¹ Gleason's Diary.

January 17, just after noon, there was a general alarm, the long roll was beaten, and the brigade hurriedly fell into line. It was said the enemy was advancing to give us battle and our hearts beat high with the prospect of an engagement. We marched over a mile in mud almost knee deep and crossing the river were formed in line of battle. After waiting quite a while for orders to advance, word came that it was a false alarm and we were marched back to camp much to everyone's disgust.¹ The alarm was caused by the explosion of a shell on our picket line. Milton B. Waters of Company E who was responsible for the explosion and the innocent cause of the alarm, thus relates the incident:

"The river bank on which we were encamped was quite high a mile or more from the river on the east side and low between. Cotter's battery was on the west bank and had been shooting at targets on the hill on the east side, which was just outside our picket line. A day or two after they had been practicing target shooting we were out on picket, not far from the mark. I had a curiosity to know how near they had come to hitting the target and after being relieved at noon, took a piece of pork and a hard tack or two and went out to the hill to investigate. They had never hit the target and it would have been quite dangerous to have been within ten to forty rods in any direction from it. In looking around I noticed that one of the shells, balls, or what not, had struck a large flat rock had glanced and hit a red oak rail, had broken it and had ploughed through the earth and small stones a distance of about twelve feet. I proceeded to excavate for the missile and finally got something which proved later to be a shell. I had not been around the artillery much and did not know a percussion from a fuse shell. It was very muddy but I cleaned it off, threw it against rocks and trees, but no good. I then took it to Lieutenant Carroll's quarters, where he was eating dinner. He asked me what I had and I said I didn't know. He looked the thing over and handed it back saying 'D——d if I know either.' He asked me what I was going to do with it and I told him I was going to take it to our picket post and show it to the boys. I thought I would build a fire and see if I could get it dry enough to be of any good. I took it to the post and the boys looked it over and decided it would do no harm, as the powder was surely wet. I told them I would soon find out whether it was or not, so I went about one hundred feet outside the line, built a fire and laid the shell on it. Corporal Charley Hall said you had better come away, so after seeing the fire was well started I returned to the post. Corporal Hall said, 'that

¹ Gleason's Diary.

thing may explode and kill half of our company' and I began to feel serious about it. I decided to go out and pull the shell out of the fire and had taken about five steps, when it exploded with a tremendous report, scattering fire and fragments in every direction. After learning that no one was hurt all set to work to put out the fire. Presently, five or six mounted officers came galloping up and one of them wanted to know what had happened. No one said a word. He asked again and still no one spoke. He then said, 'Corporal, if you do not tell what this means I will have your whole squad arrested.' The Corporal then said 'one of the men put an unexploded shell on the fire'. The officers seemed very much disgusted and, wheeling their horses, rode back as fast as they came. When we looked toward camp we saw that the whole river bank was alive with soldiers,—infantry, cavalry and artillery,—which had fallen into line ready for battle. I thought my time as a soldier had surely ended. That evening about 4 o'clock, General Johnson, our brigade commander, and Colonel Dickey, who were making the rounds on foot, came towards our post and we got quickly into line to receive them. They saluted us and passed on, but Colonel Dickey stopped, turned and stroking his red beard, said, 'this is the post on which they have the artillery,' and that was the last we heard of it."

January 18, 19 and 20, there was no unusual occurrence. On the evening of the 20 there was a rumor that we were to march within forty-eight hours. Gleason says this was good news, as every one had grown tired of the camp. The morning of January 21, we found that the men in other camps had been up since midnight cooking three days rations out of five drawn the night before. This certainly looked like moving. Orders came to go on picket the next day at 3 P. M. January 22, we had another tour of picket duty, with no unusual occurrence. January 23, we were relieved about mid-afternoon and returned to camp. January 24, there was a report of a skirmish three miles south of the river, in which 40 of the enemy were captured.¹

The 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29 days of January were barren of incidents worthy of record. January 30, the bodies of General Zollicoffer and Colonel Peyton, who had been killed at the battle of Mill Springs January 19, were brought to General McCook's headquarters to be sent through the lines. That afternoon the regiment was ordered out on picket duty and remained on post until afternoon of the 31. On returning to camp we crossed the river on the railroad bridge.

¹ Gleason's Diary.



MOSES R. DICKEY

The First Colonel of the Regiment, Serving from its organization to October 4, 1862.

The first six days of February passed by with no unusual event or rumor to disturb the now painful monotony of our life at Camp Wood. But on the 7th news came that our troops under General Grant had assaulted and captured Fort Henry on the Tennessee River. This news gave hope that we would soon be called on to do something, but nearly a week more went by and we still lay idle in Camp Wood. Our inaction of six months at Camps Nevin and Wood, however, was soon to be broken and the great army our department commander had collected at these places was to be put into motion, not of his own volition, but because other troops under other commanders had opened the way.



CHAPTER IV.

FURTHER DELAY—LACK OF CO-OPERATION BETWEEN HALLECK AND BUELL—GENERAL GRANT FINALLY OPENS WAY FOR GENERAL BUELL'S ADVANCE BY CAPTURE OF FORTS HENRY AND DONELSON.

During the period of which this chapter treats, Major General Geo. B. McClellan was general-in-chief of the armies of the United States. Major General Henry W. Halleck was commander of the Department of Missouri, which included in its boundaries that part of Kentucky west of the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, and Brigadier General Don Carlos Buell was in command of the Department of the Ohio, which included besides other territory that part of Kentucky east of the above named rivers, and the state of Tennessee. A district in the Department of Missouri had been created, named the District of Cairo, which included that part of Kentucky west of the Cumberland River, the southern part of Illinois and the counties of Missouri south of Cape Girardeau, and had been placed under command of Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant.¹

After it had been decided to disregard Kentucky's doubtful neutrality and send U. S. troops into that state to repel its threatened invasion by the Confederate armies, they were sent in such numbers that the Confederate advance was soon checked and an aggressive campaign was proposed which had for its object the expulsion of the Confederate invaders from Kentucky soil. The too tender regard by the Union authorities for Kentucky's neutrality had delayed action so long that the Confederates had seized Columbus on the Mississippi River, defensible points on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, Bowling Green on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad and Cumberland Ford on the river of that name, at which points they appeared to be concentrating large numbers of troops. President Lincoln and his cabinet, for strong political reasons,—and for military reasons also,—were very desirous of sending a strong force into East Tennessee to occupy and hold that region. The people of East Tennessee were known to be loyal to the Union. Indeed, a rebellion against Confederate rule had been started there and had been repressed with a bloody hand and there was a wide spread sentiment throughout the north, that the loyal people there should be relieved at whatever cost. With this in view Brigadier General

1 W. R. R. 7-515.

George H. Thomas was sent to Southeastern Kentucky to organize a force to drive back Confederate General Zollicoffer's army and open communication with the loyal East Tennesseans. General McClellan was at first in hearty sympathy with such movement and in numerous letters to General Buell urged it on.¹ General Buell, however, seems to have been indifferent in regard to it and more bent on maturing some great plan of campaign, which he kept to himself. To all suggestions of aggressive action he seems to have found insurmountable obstacles, or to have urged delay. He seems to have feared that any active movement on any portion of his line would interfere with his grand plan. It will be remembered that on December 11, 1861, he ordered General McCook to withdraw his division from Green River and only rescinded the order when the latter strongly protested that it would demoralize his troops to do so.²

December 17, 1861, he wrote to General McClellan that any formidable demonstration against Zollicoffer would only harrass his, Buell's, troops and derange his plans and that he was letting him alone for the present.³ What those plans were he persistently refused to disclose even to General McClellan, the general-in-chief, whom he addressed in his official correspondence as "My dear Friend". In a letter to General McClellan dated December 10, 1861, evidently in reply to one urging forward the movement for the relief of East Tennessee, he writes:

"The organization of the division at Lebanon has been with special reference to the object which you have so much at heart, though fortunately it is one which suits any contingencies which may arise. * * * The plans which I have in view embrace that fully, but the details and the final determination, while there is yet time to watch the progress of circumstances which might affect our plans vitally; I think I should lack the ordinary discretion by which I hope to retain your confidence, if I did not reserve."⁴

That is, he did not propose to reveal to his dear friend and superior commander the details of his plans until he got ready. General Thomas who was expected to carry out the plans for the relief of loyal East Tennessee and was then at Lebanon in command of the division then being organized for that purpose, wrote to General Schoepf: "General Buell has not communicated any of his plans to me."⁵ This secrecy on the part of General Buell as to his plans, while it may have been satisfactory to General McClellan, did not satisfy the other military authorities at Wash-

1 W. R. R. 7-447, 450, 457, 468, 473.

2 Page 49 ante.

3 W. R. R. 7-501.

4 W. R. R. 7-487.

5 W. R. R. 7-509.

ington. The adjutant general of the army, it seems, asked him categorically what his plans were, to which inquiry General Buell replied: "The plan which I propose for the troops here is one of defense on the east and of invasion on the south".¹ This so far as the records show, was the extent to which General Buell revealed his plan. It was to be "one of defense on the east and of invasion on the south", and by this declaration it must be interpreted.

General Buell's announcement that his plan was one of defense only on the east was bitterly disappointing to the military authorities at Washington, who did not like to give up the idea of an aggressive campaign to recover East Tennessee. This was made known to General Buell, who seems to have conferred with General Thomas in regard to a movement to be conducted against General Zollicoffer,² and to have actually given orders for such a movement.³ This movement it appears contemplated an attack on General Zollicoffer and if such attack was successful an attempt to push a column through the mountains to Knoxville. General Thomas, however, anticipated so many difficulties in the way of a successful march to Knoxville that he suggested to General Buell, whether, if they were successful in beating General Zollicoffer's forces, it would not be a better move to go down the Cumberland River toward Nashville carrying his stores and ammunition on flat boats and marching his troops in two columns, one on either side of the river.⁴ This movement against General Zollicoffer and ultimately to Knoxville cannot have been regarded by General Buell as at all serious, for on the day he issued the order for it, (December 29, 1861), he wrote to General McClellan in answer to a dispatch received from him, evidently about the movement:

"I intend a column of 12,000 men with three batteries for East Tennessee; but as I have telegraphed you, it is impossible to fix a time for it to be there, so much depends on circumstances which may arise in the meantime."⁵ Finally, on January 5, 1862, in answer to a telegram from President Lincoln, asking if arms had gone forward for East Tennessee and what the progress and condition of the movement in that direction was, he states that his judgment from the first had been decidedly against such movement, if it should render doubtful a movement against Bowling Green and Columbus.⁶

This dispatch was very disappointing to the authorities at Washington. President Lincoln in his patient kindly way answered it next day, January 6, saying:

1 W. R. R. 7-511.
2 W. R. R. 7-519.

3 W. R. R. 7-522.
4 W. R. R. 7-524.

5 W. R. R. 7-521.
6 W. R. R. 7-530-531.

"Your dispatch of yesterday has been received and it disappoints and distresses me. I have shown it to General McClellan who says he will write you today. I am not competent to criticize your views and therefore, what I offer is merely in justification of myself. Of the two, I would rather have a point on the railroad south of Cumberland Gap than Nashville—first, because it cuts a great artery of the enemy's communications, which Nashville does not; and secondly, because it is in the midst of a loyal people, who would rally around it, while Nashville is not. Again I cannot see why the movement on East Tennessee would not be a diversion in your favor rather than a disadvantage, assuming that a movement against Nashville is the main object. But my distress is that our friends in East Tennessee are being hanged and driven to despair, and even now I fear are thinking of taking rebel arms for the sake of personal protection. In this we lose the most valuable stake we have in the south. My dispatch, to which yours is an answer was sent with the knowledge of Senator Johnson and Representative Maynard of East Tennessee, and they will be upon me to know the answer which I cannot safely show them. They would despair, probably resign to go and save their families some how or die with them. I do not intend this to be an order in any sense, but merely, as intimated before, to show you the grounds of my anxiety."¹

General McClellan replied to the telegram in a confidential note of date January 6, 1862, in which he said:

"I was extremely sorry to learn from your telegram to the President that you had *from the beginning attached little or no importance* to a movement in East Tennessee. I had not so understood your views, and it develops a radical difference between your views and my own which I deeply regret. My own general plans for the prosecution of the war make the speedy occupation of East Tennessee and its lines of railway matters of absolute necessity. Bowling Green and Nashville are in that connection of very secondary importance at the present moment. My own advance cannot, according to my present views, be made until your troops are solidly established in the eastern portion of Tennessee. If this is not possible, a complete and prejudicial change in my own plans become absolutely necessary. Interesting as Nashville may be to the Louisville interests, it strikes me that its possession is of very secondary importance in comparison with the immense results that would arise from the adherence to our cause of the masses in East Tennessee, West North Carolina, South Carolina, North Georgia and Alabama,—results that I feel

¹ W. R. R. 7-927.

assured would ere long flow from the movement I allude to. Halleck from his own account will not soon be in a condition to support properly a movement up the Cumberland. Why not make the movement independently of and without awaiting for that?"¹

General Buell answered this dispatch January 13, justifying his course, and saying in substance that he would include in his movement against Bowling Green one in the direction of East Tennessee; that his army had suddenly been increased from 70,000 to 90,000 men, that it had been organized into twenty-three brigades and six divisions, but with only sixteen batteries; that his army ought to be increased to eight divisions, and his artillery nearly doubled, say in all 120,000 men; then three divisions would be required for East Tennessee, three in front of Bowling Green, one at Columbia and Jamestown and one in reserve—and added a postscript saying:

"The plan of any colonel, whoever he is, for ending the war by entering East Tennessee with his 5000 men light—that is, with pack mules and three batteries of artillery i. e.—while the rest of the armies look on, though it has some sensible potent ideas, is in the aggregate simply ridiculous."²

General Buell in furtherance of his plan "of defense on the east and invasion on the south" on December 17, 1861, had organized a brigade for service in extreme eastern Kentucky. General Garfield had been placed in command of it,³ and instructed to operate against a Confederate force then organizing under Humphrey Marshall.

It will be remembered that at the very beginning of operations in Kentucky, General Grant had the foresight to seize and hold Paducah at the mouth of the Tennessee River and Smithland at the mouth of the Cumberland. Their tremendous importance as bases of military operations was perhaps not appreciated at the time. On December 23, General Grant by direction of General Halleck assumed command of the newly designated "District of Cairo", with boundaries as stated at the beginning of this chapter, having under his command, besides other troops, all the troops that were there or might thereafter be stationed along the banks on both sides of the Ohio River east of Caledonia and to the mouth of the Cumberland.⁴ The aggregate present for duty of the troops under his command December 31, 1861 was 14,374, infantry, cavalry and artillery, with 12 pieces of field artillery.⁵ His duties appear to have been to protect the

1 W. R. R. 7-531.

2 W. R. R. 7-549.

3 W. R. R. 7-503.

4 W. R. R. 7-515.

5 W. R. R. 7-525.

posts at the mouths of the rivers above named against reported advances of the enemy, with no particular aggressive plan of campaign in view. General Halleck with headquarters at Saint Louis appears to have been mainly occupied with efforts to drive the Confederate armies out of Missouri and save that state to the Union, and to have given little attention to that part of his department included in General Grant's district. He was slow to realize, and perhaps did not realize, that General Grant held the key to the military situation, until the tireless activity of that officer and his aggressive fighting qualities made it apparent.

Up to the close of the year 1861 there had been practically no co-operation between Generals Halleck and Buell. General Grant on assuming command of the district above named had sent to General Buell a copy of the order defining the limits of his command and expressed a desire to co-operate with him as far as practicable, especially in suppressing the smuggling along the Ohio River.¹ Strange to relate, except this letter of General Grant, there had been no suggestion of co-operation from either general Halleck or General Buell.

About the close of 1861 General McClellan was taken sick and President Lincoln, it seems, for a time at least, took upon himself the active duties of commander-in chief of all the armies of the Union. On December 31, he sent a dispatch to General Halleck saying: "General McClellan is sick. Are General Buell and yourself in concert. When he moves on Bowling Green, what hinders it being reinforced from Columbus. A simultaneous movement by you on Columbus might prevent it".² At the same time he sent a similar despatch to General Buell. To this despatch Halleck replied saying he had never received a word from General Buell and General Buell replied saying there was no arrangement between General Halleck and himself.³

At the beginning of the year 1862 the entire north had grown impatient at the inaction of the Union armies, especially that under the command of General Buell. Hundreds and thousands of young men had volunteered to maintain the Union. They had been organized into regiments of infantry and cavalry and batteries of artillery, equipped and supplied with munitions of war at lavish expense and had been sent to the camps in the south. They had there been organized into brigades and divisions, had been trained and drilled for months, and yet nothing had been done to check the growing power of the rebellion. The same feeling pervaded the rank and file of the army, who were eager to be

1 W. R. R. 7-516.

2 W. R. R. 7-524.

3 W. R. R. 7-526.

led against the enemy. The long period of inaction, in some cases, began to injuriously affect the morale of the men, who would often say to themselves and to each other "what are we here for"? Captain Carroll in a letter to his wife dated January 18, 1862, says: "We have been lying here perfectly idle for over two months, with no greater prospects ahead than when we first came, while the hundreds and thousands of noble and loyal Tennesseans with uplifted hands are imploring assistance and protection from the despotic rule to which they are subjected. At least one hundred thousand well armed and equipped men in this department, who are enthusiastically anxious to be led against the enemy, are kept back and doomed to what is styled by military men, masterly inactivity. It may all turn out for the better, but I must say this delay looks to me very unreasonable. * * * We are here conducting the war on the principle that no one must be hurt. One of the boys says 'If we ever do make an advance upon the rebs, I would not be surprised if they would be d——n fools enough to shoot at us,—with balls at that,—and if we don't want our bean-dippers taken we had better lay low and keep dark'."

In another letter to his wife dated January 27, 1862, alluding to the battle of Mill Springs, he says:

"Nothing has happened since the commencement of the war more calculated to arouse the spirits of the soldiers, that were drooping under their enforced inactivity, than this brilliant victory. * * * We are beginning to feel that there is yet some life in our army, and that something will be done in a short time to assure the world that we are really determined to put down the rebellion. To the soldiers nothing is more discouraging than inactivity and nothing more corrupting than idleness in camp. If we could only be kept on the move all the time, it would improve our present condition wonderfully. Although we have been fortunate in escaping sickness, as compared with other regiments here, nevertheless we have over two hundred sick, which all results from being compelled to remain for so long a time inactive in our muddy and disagreeable camps."

The general sentiment in favor of action on the part of the troops became so pronounced that, patient as President Lincoln was, he felt compelled to take the burden and responsibility of urging an advance. The absolute lack of co-operation between Generals Halleck and Buell in the military operations in Kentucky must have been a surprise to him. General Buell protested that he expected General McClellan to arrange for such co-operation, and General Halleck frankly and bluntly

stated that he was not ready for it, and would not be for weeks.¹ But even these conditions were not thought sufficient excuse for any further delay, and on January 3, 1862, General McClellan at the request of President Lincoln sent a despatch to General Halleck urging him to send an expedition up the Cumberland to act in concert with General Buell, who was expected to move against Bowling Green.² The President had written General Halleck a letter to the same purport, and on January 6, 1862 the latter answered it saying he did not have sufficient force to warrant him in sending such an expedition; that he was "in the condition of a carpenter who is required to build a bridge with a dull ax, a broken saw and rotten timber", and closed his letter by further saying that if it was intended that Buell should move on Bowling Green while another column moved from Cairo or Paducah on Columbus or Camp Beauregard, it "would be a repetition of the same strategic error which produced the disaster at Bull Run." The patient President folded the letter and wrote on it the following indorsement:

"The within is a copy of a letter just received from General Halleck. It is exceedingly discouraging. As every where else nothing can be done."³

"January 10, 1862".

"A. Lincoln".

Notwithstanding this discouraging letter, however, on the same day it was written General Halleck sent a letter to General Grant saying he wished him to make a demonstration in force from Paducah on Mayfield and Murray and threaten Camp Beauregard, in order to prevent Confederate troops from being sent from the latter place and Columbus to reinforce General Buckner at Bowling Green.⁴ The next day, January 7, General Halleck asked General Buell to designate a day for such demonstration. Also on January 7, 1862, President Lincoln telegraphed Buell to name as early a day as he safely could on or before which he could be ready to move southward in co-operation with General Halleck.

It does not appear that General Buell paid any attention to General Halleck's telegram of January 7, for on January 10, General Halleck again telegraphed him saying that the troops at Cairo and Paducah were ready to move, and again asked him to fix a day for the demonstration.⁵ General Buell, it seems also paid no attention to this dispatch, and January 11, 1862, General Halleck telegraphed to General Grant that he could hear nothing

1 W. R. R. 7-526-527.

2 W. R. R. 7-527-528.

3 W. R. R. 7-533.

4 W. R. R. 7-533-534.

5 W. R. R. 7-543.

from General Buell, and that he, General Grant, could fix his own time for the advance.¹

General Grant on January 8, received General Halleck's directions for such demonstration and the same day telegraphed that preparations had been made immediately for such advance.² But on January 9, he telegraphed that a dense fog made it impossible to cross the river and that the movement would be deferred for a day.³ January 10, General Halleck telegraphed, delaying the movement until further orders, but on January 12, General Grant reported to General Halleck that the movement had already been commenced before receipt of his telegram, and that it would be demoralizing to recall the troops already in motion.⁴ So the demonstration was made as ordered and had not only the result hoped for, of preventing Confederate troops being sent from Columbus and Camp Beauregard to Bowling Green, but the further result of causing other Confederate troops which were intended to reinforce General Buckner to be sent to Columbus and points on the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers.⁵

While these activities on the part of Generals Halleck and Grant were going on, efforts were made to get General Buell to begin a movement against the enemy in his front. He pleaded insufficient forces, lack of transportation and other excuses for further delay. January 13, General McClellan wrote to him saying that in response to his telegram six more batteries of artillery had been sent to him, and that two more would be ordered next day, that General Meigs, the quartermaster general, had sent him 400 more wagons, which he had made requisition for, and that if these were not enough he could hire private teams or seize them, and that Ohio could send him five or six new regiments. In the same letter General McClellan stated that the pressure for an advance was so strong that it seemed absolutely necessary to make a movement on East Tennessee at once.⁶ This letter, it appears, had the result that General Thomas was ordered forward against General Zollicoffer. But as yet there seemed to be little hope of an early forward movement against Bowling Green.

In the meantime the Union people of the country were cheered by minor successes of some of the forces in the Department of the Ohio. January 10, 1862, General Garfield attacked the forces of Humphrey Marshall at the forks of Middle Creek in Eastern Kentucky and completely routed them.⁷

1 W. R. R. 7-544.

2 W. R. R. 7-537.

3 W. R. R. 7-540.

4 W. R. R. 7-545.

5 W. R. R. 7-565.

6 W. R. R. 7-547.

7 W. R. R. 7-29.

A more notable engagement took place January 19, at Logan's Cross Roads, Kentucky, afterwards known as the battle of Mill Springs. It seems that General Thomas was about to form a junction of his forces near Columbia with those of General Schoepf at Somerset with a view to a combined attack on General Zollicoffer, whose forces were posted at Mill Springs and Beach Grove on opposite sides of the Cumberland River. General Zollicoffer learning of such movement decided to attack General Thomas's column while it was moving across his front and did so on the morning of January 19. He was met by the Ninth Ohio, Second Minnesota, Tenth Indiana and Fourth Kentucky Volunteers and Batteries B and C, First Ohio Light Artillery,¹ when a sharp engagement took place in which General Zollicoffer was killed by Colonel Speed S. Fry of the Fourth Kentucky Volunteers and his forces completely routed. Other troops coming up, the routed enemy was pursued to Mill Springs where it abandoned its intrenchments and 12 pieces of artillery and caissons, a large amount of small arms and ammunition, 150 wagons, 1000 horses and mules, and a large amount of commissary stores and camp equipage.²

The defeat of General Zollicoffer's army opened the way for an almost unobstructed advance into East Tennessee,³ and General Buell gave orders to follow up the victory.⁴ General Thomas, however, insisted that the roads were almost impassable, that it would be extremely difficult to get forage for his animals and again asked permission to move his forces down the Cumberland River and co-operate with the main army against Bowling Green.⁵ On January 27, 1862, General Buell reported to Adjutant General Thomas, U. S. A. that any further advance beyond Somerset, Ky., into East Tennessee was impossible, that he had put a column in motion on the Cumberland Gap route, but did not expect it to penetrate the state.⁶ And there the movement for the relief of East Tennessee ended.

Up to this time all effort on the part of the authorities at Washington to get General Buell to fix a time for an advance against the enemy at Bowling Green had failed. Notwithstanding large reinforcements which were being sent to him and the demonstration before described in his aid, he seemed unable to move. He seemed to be holding back until all his troops could be seasoned and thoroughly trained and until he had an army large enough to move without doubt of success. He constantly magnified the numbers of the enemy in his front and minimized

1 W. R. R. 7-77.

2 W. R. R. 7-81.

3 W. R. R. 7-563.

4 W. R. R. 7-562.

5 W. R. R. 7-563.

6 W. R. R. 7-568.

his own. In response to a call by the adjutant general at Washington for a report of the troops under his command, he reported as follows:

"Infantry present for duty and fit for the field, 41,563; Infantry present, raw not fit for the field, 20,303; Cavalry present for duty, fit for the field 2,549; cavalry present, raw or not organized 5,251; artillery present for duty and fit for the field, 2,038, 108 guns; artillery present, raw or not organized, 708, 40 guns. In these statements the sick and absent are not included."¹ In other words he deducted from his army 26,262 able bodied infantry, cavalry and artillery, all armed, with 40 pieces of artillery, because they were not as well drilled as he thought they ought to be, as an excuse for his inaction, forgetting that the enemy's troops were probably as ill trained as his own. He also magnified the obstacles to be overcome. There was always "a lion in the way." But light was to break in unexpected quarters and he was to be saved for the moment from the trouble of moving against the enemy with untrained troops. This was to be done by another army, smaller and as ill trained as his own, with little or no aid from him.

During the demonstration made by General Grant to prevent Confederate troops being sent from Camp Beauregard and Columbus to reinforce the armies opposing General Buell at Bowling Green, General Charles F. Smith, one of General Grant's subordinate commanders, had gone up the Tennessee River on the Lexington with Flag Officer A. H. Foote to a point near Fort Henry, had looked it over and had reported to General Grant that he thought two iron clad gun boats could make short work of it.² General Grant several weeks before had become satisfied that a movement up the Tennessee River and the occupation of Forts Henry and Donelson would compel the evacuation by the Confederates of the entire state of Kentucky. He was so deeply convinced of it that he asked permission of General Halleck to call on him in person and lay the matter before him. General Halleck permitted him to call, received him coldly and when he presented his plan for such movement, denounced it as preposterous.³ When, however, the plan was approved by so able a general as Chas. F. Smith, General Grant talked it over with Flag Officer Foote, and on January 28, 1862 telegraphed to General Halleck from Cairo, Illinois. "With permission I will take Fort Henry and establish and hold a large camp there."⁴ January 29, he followed up this dispatch with another describing the pro-

1 W. R. R. 7-563.

2 W. R. R. 7-561.

3 Grant's Memoirs.

4 W. R. R. 7-121.

posed movement more in detail, and January 30, General Halleck telegraphed him to take and hold the place.¹

Some one whom General Buell describes as "an intelligent and well informed person I have at Paducah," sent to him a report of General Smith's reconnoissance of Fort Henry and of his expressed opinion that it could be taken, and on January 30, he forwarded such information to Generals McClellan and Halleck, and said that the destruction of the bridges and boats on the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, was an object the importance of which could not be over-rated.² The suggestion, however, came too late, for on that very day General Halleck had telegraphed to General Buell that he had ordered an advance on Fort Henry and Dover and that it would be made immediately. General Buell at once wanted to know General Halleck's plans and January 31, wrote or telegraphed him asking if he considered active co-operation essential to success; if so, each should know the plans of the other, but that it would be several days before he, Buell, could seriously engage the enemy.³ To this General Halleck replied February 1, saying that co-operation at that time was not essential but that if he, Buell, would send his plans he would try to assist him.⁴

General Buell seems to have become greatly interested in the movement against Fort Henry and Dover, and on February 3, expressed a fear that General Grant could not hold both points with the troops he had. He also encouraged General Halleck by telling him that he had best count on meeting a reinforcement of 10,000 Confederate troops from Bowling Green, besides fifteen regiments General Beauregard was said to be bringing from Virginia.⁵ When on February 5, General Halleck telegraphed him saying the advance column—twenty-three regiments—was moving up the Tennessee and asking if he could not make a diversion in their favor by threatening Bowling Green, he answered "that his position did not admit a diversion, that his progress would be slow and that it would be twelve days before he could be in front of Bowling Green."⁶ General Halleck at once telegraphed General McClellan the report that 10,000 men had left Bowling Green to reinforce Fort Henry, and that officer at once asked General Buell if he could assist General Halleck by making a demonstration against Bowling Green. To General McClellan's dispatch General Buell replied saying:

"Bowling Green is secure from any immediate apprehension of attack by being strongly fortified behind a river, by obstructions between us (40 miles) and by the condition of the roads

¹ W. R. R. 7-121.

² W. R. R. 7-573-574.

³ W. R. R. 7-574.

⁴ W. R. R. 7-576.

⁵ W. R. R. 7-580.

⁶ W. R. R. 7-583.

themselves, can only be threatened with heavy artillery. No demonstration, therefore is practicable. I will send him a brigade."¹

While these telegrams were flying General Grant *with the forces he had* was rapidly moving against Fort Henry.

It seems to have suddenly dawned on Generals McClellan, Halleck and Buell that General Grant's movement was one of tremendous significance and importance. February 6, Halleck telegraphed to General McClellan:

"If you can give me, in addition to what I have in this department 10,000 men, I will take Fort Henry, cut the enemy's line and paralyze Columbus. Give me 25,000 and I will threaten Nashville and cut off railroad communication, so as to force the enemy to abandon Bowling Green without a battle."²

General Buell, on the night of February 6, was at his headquarters in Louisville, probably meditating over General McClellan's dispatches of the day, suggesting why, if the roads in his front were so bad, he would not better throw all his available forces on Fort Henry and Donelson, make that his main line of operations and go there in person. At midnight he sent the following telegram to General McClellan:

"This whole move, right in its strategical bearing, but commenced by General Halleck without appreciation—preparative or concert—has now become of vast magnitude. I was myself thinking of a change of the line to support it when I received your dispatch. It will have to be made in the face of 50,000 if not 60,000 men, and is hazardous. I will answer definitely in the morning."³

While Generals McClellan, Halleck and Buell were awakening to the stupendous significance and importance of the movement against Fort Henry and were sending the telegrams of February 6, 1862, above quoted or mentioned, General Grant had invested the place and compelled its surrender. He, too, sent a dispatch dated February 6, 1862, which reads as follows:

"Headquarters District of Cairo"

"Fort Henry, February 6, 1862"

"Fort Henry is ours. The gun boats silenced the batteries before the investment was completed. I think the garrison must have commenced the retreat last night. Our cavalry followed, finding two guns abandoned in the retreat. I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th and return to Fort Henry."

"U. S. GRANT,"

"MAJOR GENERAL H. W. HALLECK,"
Saint Louis, Mo."

"Brigadier General."⁴

The event was startling to the triumvirate of great generals, above named. While they were writing and telegraphing about

1 W. R. R. 7-584.

2 W. R. R. 7-587.

3 W. R. R. 7-587-588.

4 W. R. R. 7-124.

it, considering its hazards and conferring about reinforcements necessary to make the movement successful, General Grant had gone ahead with his little army of 15,000 men, had taken Fort Henry and was moving against Fort Donalson. General Halleck must have recalled how he had denounced the movement as preposterous when General Grant first proposed it, but that did not prevent him from receiving the congratulations of General McClellan and Buell and taking the larger share of the honor and glory of the achievement.

General Buell could ill conceal his chagrin that a subordinate commander should win such a victory, within the territory of his own department, and that, too, without his advice or aid. General Halleck had ordered the advance without consulting him and he protested to General McClellan "against such prompt proceedings, on the part of General Halleck" as, though, he said "I had nothing to do but command 'Commence firing' when he starts off."¹

But startling as General Grant's capture of Fort Henry was to the Union generals above named, it was not less startling in its significance to a triumvirate of Confederate generals (Albert Sidney Johnston, G. T. Beauregard and William J. Hardee.) This triumvirate met at the Covington House at Bowling Green, February 7, 1862, and decided that preparations should at once be made for the abandonment of Bowling Green, Clarksville and Columbus, and the removal of the Confederate army to Nashville in the rear of the Cumberland River with a possible further retrograde movement to Stevenson, Alabama.²

General Halleck at once called frantically on General McClellan, the secretary of war, General Buell and others for troops with which to reinforce General Grant, and General McClellan on February 7, again suggested to General Buell that he take the line of the Tennessee to operate against Nashville.³ But in answer to his telegram making such suggestion General Buell replied saying he could not think a change in his line would be advisable, that he should want eighteen rifled seige guns and four companies of experienced gunners to man them; and hoped General Grant would not require further reinforcements. He added, however, "I will go if necessary."⁴

February 8, he again telegraphed General McClellan, "I am concentrating and preparing, but will not decide definitely yet."⁵

General Halleck had sent General G. W. Cullum, his chief of staff, to Cairo to watch the movement up the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers and to give orders in his name. To him General Grant reported February 8, that he had contemplated taking

¹ W. R. R. 7-933

² W. R. R. 7-861.

³ and ⁴ W. R. R. 7-593.

⁵ W. R. R. 7-594.

Fort Donelson that day, but had found himself locked in by high water and bad roads and prevented from acting offensively. The banks of the river he said were higher at the water's edge than further back, leaving a wide margin of low land to bridge over before he could move inland, that he had intended to move with infantry and cavalry alone, but all the troops were engaged in saving what they had from high water. He also reported to General Cullum that the evening after the capture of Fort Henry he had sent gunboats under Captain Phelps and a transport with troops up the river to destroy the railroad bridge.¹ On February 9, he sent a force under Colonel McPherson which reconnoitered within one-and-a-half miles of Fort Donelson and had a skirmish with the enemy's pickets.² February 10, General Grant sent a message to Flag Officer Foote, saying he had been waiting very patiently for the return of the gunboats under Commander Phelps, which he expected to go around and up the Cumberland, while he moved his forces across to make a simultaneous attack on Fort Donelson, and asked him if he could not at once send two boats from Cairo up the Cumberland.³ The same day he issued orders to his troops to hold themselves in readiness to move on Wednesday the 12th instant at as early an hour as practicable.⁴ He did not propose to wait for reinforcements, but to use the forces he then had to the best advantage. February 11, he sent a message to General Halleck saying that every effort would be put forth to have Clarksville within a few days.⁵ He seems never for one instant to have doubted that with his little army of 15,000 men, he could succeed, and on February 12, moved forward and invested Fort Donelson, whose garrison had by that time been increased to 21,000 men.⁶

February 12, 1862, General Halleck dispatched to General Buell, that gunboats had destroyed everything on the Tennessee River to Florence, Alabama, that 40,000 rebels were at Dover (Fort Donelson) and Clarksville, that if so, they had come from Bowling Green and that if he, Buell, concluded to land a column on the Cumberland River to come at once.⁷ To this and other dispatches of General Halleck, General Buell answered at first, that he would determine on his ultimate movements the moment he had something in regard to Hallack's position on the Tennessee River, but later, the same day, he again telegraphed that he would move on the line of the Cumberland or Tennessee Rivers, but it would take ten days at least to effect the transfer of his troops.⁸ General Buell had already sent four regiments to Fort Henry to

1 W. R. R. 7-596.

2 W. R. R. 7-597.

3 W. R. R. 7-600.

4 W. R. R. 7-601.

5 W. R. R. 7-604.

6 Grant's Memoirs.

7 W. R. R. 7-607.

8 W. R. R. 7-607.

reinforce General Grant where they arrived on February 12 or 14th, and were sent by water to Fort Donelson,¹ and probably on February 12, issued orders to General McCook, commanding our division, to march to the mouth of Salt River and get there Sunday, February 16, 1862.²

It was in pursuance of this order that on the morning of February 14, 1862, the Fifteenth Ohio received the welcome order which terminated our long period of inactivity. The order came the afternoon of February 13, and directed us to be ready to move at 7 o'clock next morning. Strange to say, it was rumored that we were to go north instead of south, and that our destination was Columbus, Kentucky. There was unusual activity in camp. We learned that our brigade trains had been sent in advance to West Point on the Ohio River below Louisville and that General O. W. Mitchell's division had disappeared from camp early that morning. Where it had gone no one knew.

Friday, February 14, reveille sounded at 3:30 A. M. The ground was white with snow and the weather was quite cold. Some of the regiments moved out before daylight but ours did not get started until 7 A. M. The snow soon melted and the roads were deep with mud but we moved rapidly, having the impression that we were marching to meet some emergency and that it was necessary to get to our destination as soon as possible. Gleason the day before had been detailed as an orderly and stenographer at division headquarters and went on a train with the division officers. The train did not move out until the division was well under way. He says that as the train passed Bacon Creek he saw our regiment and other troops plodding along through the mud and "felt deeply for his comrades."³

General Halleck had been calling frantically for reinforcements to send to General Grant, who, he feared, would be overwhelmed by superior numbers. General Grant's position was indeed regarded as extremely critical. February 11, Thomas A. Scott, assistant secretary of war, was at Cairo, Ill. and telegraphed General Halleck asking if General Grant was strong enough for the Cumberland and Donelson movement.⁴ February 13 General McClellan sent a despatch to General Buell, saying: "Watch Fort Donelson closely, I am not too certain as to the result there."⁵ It was in response to General Halleck's calls that General Buell had reluctantly issued the order putting us on the march toward West Point.

In the meantime General Buell had ordered General O. M. Mitchell to move southward on a reconnoissance and he had done

1 W. R. R. 7-612.

2 Probably February 14, see W. R. R. 7-609.

3 Gleason's Diary.

4 W. R. R. 7-604.

5 W. R. R. 7-609.

so on the morning of February 13. General Mitchell reached Bell's Tavern about 18 miles from Green River the same day unopposed and reported to General Buell that Bowling Green was said to have been evacuated.¹ He pushed on next day to Bowling Green, found the enemy gone and at once reported the fact to General Buell. General Buell at once, February 14, sent a despatch to General McCook "by special messenger in all haste," directing him to halt and remain where he was.² This dispatch probably reached General McCook the night of February 14, or the morning of February 15, and caused us to be stopped and placed in camp between Upton and Bacon Creek to await further orders. At the time he sent the despatch halting General McCook's column, General Buell sent a dispatch to General McClellan saying that General Grant could not longer be in any danger and that General Mitchell's advance might effect his movements,³ and a few hours later sent another dispatch to General McClellan saying that the evacuation of Bowling Green made it proper to resume his original line on Nashville.⁴ General Buell also dispatched to General Halleck his change of plan and stated that he proposed to move from Bowling Green on Nashville.⁵

It is difficult to account for General Buell's abandonment of the plan of co-operation with General Halleck in the movement up the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. But he had from the first regarded Nashville as the objective point of his campaign and possibly did not wish to give it up. On that day, February 14, 1862, in response to an inquiry by the adjutant general at Washington, he had reported the forces in his command present for duty as follows: 60,882 infantry, 9,222 cavalry and 3,368 artillery, with 28 field and 2 siege batteries,—an aggregate for duty of 73,472.⁶ For months this great army had been lying in camp inactive, and if now it could move forward and capture the capital of Tennessee it would justify its existence. General Halleck in a despatch to General McClellan denounced the movement from Bowling Green on Nashville as "bad strategy," and urged that if Buell could come and help him take Fort Donelson and Clarksville, and then move on Florence, Alabama, Nashville would be abandoned.⁷ General McClellan sided with General Buell and in a dispatch to him dated February 15, 1862, 10 P. M. said:

"The movement on Nashville is exactly right. If Grant's safety renders it absolutely necessary, of course reinforce him as you propose. But the great object is the occupation of Nashville."⁸ February 15, at 11 p. m. General McClellan dispatched

1 W. R. R. 7-610.

2 W. R. R. 7-615.

3 W. R. R. 7-612.

4 W. R. R. 7-621.

5 W. R. R. 7-617.

6 W. R. R. 7-615.

7 W. R. R. 7-617.

8 W. R. R. 7-620.

to General Halleck, saying he did not see that Buell's movement was "bad strategy" for it would relieve the pressure upon Grant and lead to results of the greatest importance. He also informed General Halleck that Buell's orders were to reinforce Grant if he could not reach Nashville in time, and that he was arranging to talk with him and Buell over the wires next morning.¹

At midnight that same day General Buell seems to have found another "lion in the way" for he telegraphed to General McClellan that it would take a week to repair the road to Bowling Green and that no formidable advance could be made until that was done.² On receipt of a dispatch from General Halleck, saying, that the Confederate forces from Bowling Green were concentrating at Clarksville, that the garrison at Fort Donelson was estimated at 30,000, that the place had been completely invested, that four sorties had been repulsed, and unless more troops could be sent to General Grant the attack might fail,³ General Buell at once answered that one division, (twelve regiments and three batteries) under General Nelson would embark for the Cumberland the next day, February 16, and that he would himself have embarked with two divisions to make the Cumberland the line of operations if it had not been for the evacuation of Bowling Green. General Halleck, rejoiced at this turn of affairs, called on General Buell to come and help him take Fort Donelson and Clarksville and move on Florence and that all would be right.⁴ After directing the movement of General Nelson's division to the support of General Grant, General Buell directed his other troops to move southward and General McCook to be at Bowling Green on February 17.⁵ All this occurred on February 15, 1862, but on February 16, General Halleck, probably fearing that there might be another change on the part of General Buell, again telegraphed General McClellan:

"I am perfectly confident that if Buell moves from Bowling Green on Nashville we shall regret it. Think of it before you approve—I am certain that if you were here you would agree with me. If I had any doubts I would not insist. Fort Donelson and Clarksville are the key points. Since the evacuation of Bowling Green the importance of Nashville has ceased."⁶

Again on the same day, February 16, he telegraphed General McClellan saying that there had been hard fighting at Fort Donelson on Thursday, Friday and Saturday, that at 5 P. M. the day before Grant had carried the upper fort, and that the Union flag was flying over it. He further urged that Buell should not advance on Nashville but come to the Cumberland with his available

1 W. R. R. 7-617-618.

2 W. R. R. 7-620.

3 W. R. R. 7-621.

4 W. R. R. 7-621-622.

5 W. R. R. 7-623.

6 W. R. R. 7-624.

forces.¹ To these dispatches General McClellan answered, "Should Donelson fall you will move on Nashville by either route which may at the time be quickest. A part of the column moving from Bowling Green toward Nashville might relieve Donelson, but the direct move on Nashville is the most important."²

On the same day, February 16, 1862, President Lincoln, knowing perhaps of the divided counsels above mentioned, sent the following message to General Halleck:

"You have Fort Donelson safe, unless Grant shall be overwhelmed from outside, to prevent which latter will, I think, require all the vigilance, energy and skill of yourself and General Buell, acting in full co-operation, Columbus will not get at Grant, but the force from Bowling Green will. They hold the railroad from Bowling Green to within a few miles of Fort Donelson with the bridge at Clarksville undisturbed. It is unsafe to rely that they will not dare to expose Nashville to Buell. A small part of their force can retire slowly to Nashville breaking up the railroad as they go, and keep Buell out of that city twenty days. Meanwhile Nashville will be defended by forces from all south and perhaps from here at Manassas. Could not a cavalry force from General Thomas on the upper Cumberland dash across, almost unresisted, and cut the railroad at or near Knoxville, Tenn.? In the midst of a bombardment of Fort Donelson, why could not a gunboat run up and destroy the bridge at Clarksville? Our success or failure at Fort Donelson is vastly important, and I beg of you to put your souls in the effort. I send a copy of this to Buell."³

While these divided counsels were prevailing as to the manner and method of supporting the movement in which General Grant was engaged, and while the foregoing dispatches of February 15, and 16, 1862 were flying, General Grant had fought his way into the outermost intrenchments of Fort Donelson. On the morning of February 16, 1862, he received its surrender, and he too sent a dispatch, which reads as follows:

Fort Donelson (Via Smithland)

February 16, 1862

Maj. Gen. H. W. Halleck:

We have taken Fort Donelson and from 12,000 to 15,000 prisoners, including Generals Buckner and Bushrod Johnson, also about 20,000 stand of arms, 48 pieces of artillery, 17 heavy guns, from 2,000 to 4,000 horses, and large quantities of commissary stores.

U. S. GRANT,

Brigadier General Commanding.⁴

¹ W. R. R. 7-624.

² W. R. R. 7-625.

³ W. R. R. 7-624.

⁴ W. R. R. 7-625.

February 16, 1862, the men of the Fifteenth Ohio and other troops of the brigade and division turned their faces again southward. The great campaign for the possession of Nashville, unknown to us at the time, had been won by other troops, not of our army, and we were to march to that city unopposed. Later we were to join the victors of Forts Henry and Donelson on a bloody field where our timely arrival was to save the day for the Union.



CHAPTER V.

THE ADVANCE ON BOWLING GREEN AND NASHVILLE AND OCCUPATION OF LATER PLACE.

As stated in the preceding chapter the "special messenger" sent by General Buell "in all haste" to General McCook directing him to halt in his march to reinforce General Grant at Fort Donelson, must have reached General McCook on the evening of February 14, or the morning of February 15, and that on the evening of February 14, we were halted between Upton Station and Bacon Creek. On the 15th, orders came to move and at 2 p. m. we were about-faced and marched back to Bacon Creek, nine miles, and went into camp for the night. It was reported that General Mitchell's division had moved south, had met the enemy and needed reinforcements.¹ At 4 a. m., February 16, we resumed our march southward from Bacon Creek and in the late afternoon reached Green River, which we crossed and went into camp about one mile south of Munfordville. February 17, we resumed our march at 4 a. m., and marched to Horse Cave where at 10 a. m., we halted and went into camp. It was said that General McCook had received a dispatch telling of the surrender of Fort Donelson.² We remained in camp at Horse Cave until 2 p. m., February 18, when we marched eight miles to Bell's Tavern, where we went into camp and pitched our tents. It was said that our division would remain here for two or three days. We remained at this place until February 20. It rained during the night of February 18 and the next day was wet and dismal. The ground inside our tents was muddy and some of the men went foraging for straw to make their beds more comfortable.

The night of February 19 there was a snow storm and the morning of February 20 was quite cold. At 2 p. m., February 20, we marched again and after a tramp of four miles were halted and went into camp. This camp was designated as Camp Fry³ in honor of Colonel Speed. S. Fry who had shot General Zollicoffer. General Buell and staff arrived in camp. We remained in Camp Fry until February 23. On the 21st the weather was pleasant and General McCook and some of his staff went to see Mammoth Cave.⁴ On the evening of February 22, orders came to be ready to march next morning. February 23, the regiment marched at 9 a. m. Our route took us through a good farming country and we saw a great many fine plantations

1 and 2 Gleason's Diary.

3 Wm. McConnell's Diary.

4 Gleason's Diary.

and a great many negro slaves. The road was a substantial limestone pike, the weather pleasant and we made rapid progress. About 3 o'clock p. m., we came in sight of Bowling Green and encamped about two miles north of the town. General McCook and staff took up quarters in an unoccupied house in front of a formidable redoubt which had been abandoned by the enemy. We marched twenty miles during the day. Our camp was designated as Camp Rousseau.¹ It was located in an open woods and our quarters were quite comfortable. We remained here February 24 and 25. During the 25th a number of regiments crossed the river to Bowling Green on a steam ferry boat. That afternoon a shot was heard in the basement of General McCook's headquarters and we learned that a prisoner held by the provost guard had been shot and killed while carelessly handling a gun. We thought it was rather lax discipline to permit a prisoner under guard to have a loaded gun in his hands.² Some of the men went to inspect the fortifications which the enemy had abandoned and saw that the river, the Big Barren, had overflowed its banks and flooded the low lands. A steamer was making efforts to affect a landing within reach of the shore but failed to do so. February 26, a small steamer arrived and it was decided to cross the river at all hazards. Later, a larger boat named the "Masonic Gem" arrived at the ferry landing and about dark came over and we crossed the river on it to Bowling Green and went into camp between the town and the river.

February 27, reveille sounded about 5 o'clock A. M., and at 7 o'clock we pulled out,—for Nashville it was said. We passed through Bowling Green about 8 o'clock A. M. and four miles beyond it came to Lost River, a stream which gushed out of a hill and flowing about two hundred yards through a gorge went roaring and foaming right under the road on which we were marching. The weather was fine, we had a good pike to march on and made good time. In the late afternoon we came to Franklin, Kentucky, where we went into camp for the night, having marched 24 miles.³

February 28, at 8 a. m., we resumed our march southward and 11 a. m. came to the line between Kentucky and Tennessee. The boundary was marked by a large stone set in the center of the pike. As the men saw it every one realized that we were entering the Southern Confederacy and cheers broke forth all along the line—cheers for the Union and the Constitution.⁴ We continued our march until dark when we came to Tyree Springs and went into camp, having marched 25 miles. Rations of flour

1 Wm McConnell's Diary.

2 Gleason's Diary.

3 Wm. McConnell's Diary.

4 Letter of Captain C. W. Carroll to his wife.

and salt were issued to the tired men who set about baking "dough cakes" in the ashes for their suppers. We realized that we were making a forced march and everyone was nerved up to put forth his best endeavor to reach our destination at the earliest possible moment. That destination we knew was Nashville. As it transpired there was really no necessity for pushing us forward on a forced march. On February 24, while we were waiting at Bowling Green for a steamer to carry us across the swollen river, General Nelson with his division, who had been sent to Smithland and thence up the Cumberland River, arrived at Clarksville, Tennessee, and reported to General Grant. General Grant ordered him to proceed at once to Nashville,¹ where he arrived at dawn on the morning of February 25 and took possession of the city.² General Buell on February 26, reported to General Halleck that he entered Nashville the day before with a small force, having been "compelled to it by the landing of a portion of the troops contrary to his intentions." He must have been chagrined that General Grant had again been before him in reaching the great objective point in his campaign, and still more so when on the morning of February 27, he received a letter from General Grant, stating that he had arrived at Nashville early that morning, anxiously expecting to see him, but having failed to do so must return to his command.³ General Grant's brief visit to Nashville was afterwards claimed to have been made without the knowledge or authority of General Halleck and was one of the charges brought against him which led to his being temporarily deprived of his command.

March 1, we resumed our march at 6 a. m., and soon began to descend into the Cumberland River Valley. On the way Gleason plucked the first wild flower of the season in a sheltered nook by the roadside.⁴ After a march of about six miles we halted near the Cumberland River where we went into camp and remained during the night.

March 2, at 7:45 a. m., we resumed our march and at 10 a. m., came in sight of the city of Nashville,—the first prominent object being the noble state capitol. After a great many tedious and tiresome halts we finally reached the river, went aboard the steamer "City of Madison," and at 8 a. m. were ferried across. It had rained all day and was still raining, but we marched through the city and three or four miles beyond and went into camp on the Franklin pike. We had at last reached the objective point in our campaign without meeting the enemy and practically without firing a shot. But we had done our duty as sol-

¹ W. R. R. 7-662.

² General Ammen's Diary, W. R. R. 7-659.

³ W. R. R. 7-670.

⁴ Gleason's Diary.

diers and, in a general way, claimed and were entitled to a share in the glory and honor of what had been accomplished.

The foregoing narrative of our winter march from Green River contains few incidents which show its real character and the difficulties and hardships the men endured. It was a hard, trying experience and tested the powers of endurance of the men as severely, perhaps, as any march in our long period of service. Captain C. W. Carroll in a letter to his wife written just after we reached Nashville reviews it at some length as follows:

"Since the 13th of last month (February) we have been kept constantly on the move and during this period have experienced the severest hardships that fall to the lot of a soldier. * * * On the night of February 13 we received orders to be prepared to march on the following morning. Everything that night was bustle and confusion among the camps, in making the necessary preparation, and many were the speculations on the subject of our destination. Of course, everyone concluded that we were to move on Bowling Green, had it not been that General Mitchell had started for that place on the day before. This fact confused us, for certainly, we thought, we would not follow Mitchell's division after our division had held the advance for so long. However, the preparations were made, the morning came and to our great surprise, our faces were turned toward the north. * * * Why we should turn our backs on Bowling Green and march in the opposite direction was a mystery we could not solve. But we were soon relieved of our perplexity by the announcement that General McCook's division was ordered to report at West Point on the Ohio River at the mouth of Salt River—a big three days march. Further than that we knew nothing. The morning we started there were three inches of snow on the ground and it was very cold. The water in our canteens froze and our ears almost froze. We plodded along all day until we came to a little place called Upton, distant 13 miles, where we stopped for the night. It became evident to us long before we reached the place that we would have to put through the night without our tents and camp equipage, for the roads were so bad the wagons could not possibly get up. We banished all thought of sleep and tried to keep warm by making large fires of rails and standing around them. About midnight we were again surprised by another order which stated that we were to remain at Upton until further orders. The next day we received orders to about face and march for Bowling Green. You can imagine the intense indignation of the men when this order was published. It was not because they cared about the double toil and exposure of marching in the bleak weather, over almost impassable roads, without tents to shelter us

at night, but because they felt we were cheated out of our well-earned position—the advance. It was evident, when the counter-march was ordered, that General Mitchell's division which had been in the rear for months was to reach Bowling Green before us, while our division which had always been in the front and had done picket duty for the entire army tagged along behind. However, we were comforted by the report that our division had been selected to reinforce General Grant at Fort Donelson, and that taken, was to move up the Cumberland and take Bowling Green in the rear. The taking of Fort Donelson changed the program and we had the mortification of marching far in the rear of Mitchell's division until we arrived at this point. We reached the much-dreaded place, Bowling Green, on Sunday, February 23. Here we were compelled to remain for three days, having no way to cross Barren River but by small tug boats—all the bridges having been destroyed by the enemy. We finally got across on the night of the 26th of February and on the morning of the next day started on a forced march to Nashville without our teams and baggage. After much hard marching in all kinds of weather over all kinds of roads, without the least protection from the inclement weather when we laid down to rest our wet and tired limbs, we finally reached our present camp."

Our camp at Nashville was named Camp Andrew Johnson. We remained there until March 16, drilling, doing picket duty and occasionally responding to a call to arms at the anticipated near approach of the enemy.

On the morning of March 8, Colonel John H. Morgan with a small detachment of his cavalry got through our pickets on the Murfreesboro pike and captured five men of the Thirteenth Ohio. Passing the cavalry camp they moved in the direction of Nashville and concealing themselves in the woods opposite the Lunatic Asylum captured a train and twenty-three more prisoners. They continued their operations inside our lines until they had taken in all ninety-eight prisoners, including several officers. They then tried to make their way back to Murfreesboro and were followed by a detachment of the Fourth Ohio Cavalry under Colonel John Kennett, which recaptured all the prisoners except thirty-eight, with a loss of a few men missing and a reported loss to the enemy of four men killed and two wounded.¹

On the morning of March 9, forty men of the First Louisiana Cavalry under command of Captain Jno. S. Scott made an attack on our troops about six miles out on the Granny White pike and a sharp skirmish took place in which quite a number were wounded on both sides² The long roll was sounded in our camp and we

1 W. R. R. 10, part 1-6.

2 W. R. R. 10, part 1-7.

were formed in line of battle. The alarm spread to the entire division and many of the regiments moved out to repel a supposed attack of the enemy in force. The enemy, however, soon retreated and all returned to camp. Our losses in the skirmish were reported to be two wounded, one perhaps mortally.

While we were thus employed in Camp Andrew Johnson plans were preparing for another grand campaign against the enemy, whose main body was believed to be falling back or to have fallen back beyond the Tennessee River. It was generally agreed by Generals McClellan, Halleck and Buell that the next move of our armies in the west should be to strike somewhere the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, effect a lodgment there and thus prevent the junction of the Confederate forces at Columbus and other points on the Mississippi River with General A. S. Johnston's forces which were falling back through Murfreesboro, Shelbyville and Stevenson towards Chattanooga. As early as February 28, General Halleck had telegraphed General McClellan asking if he, Halleck, would not better immediately move Grant up the Tennessee River and try to destroy the railroad connections at Corinth, Jackson and Humboldt.¹ The records do not disclose any answer by General McClellan to this dispatch, but it may be presumed that he approved the movement for on March 1, General Halleck telegraphed General Grant, who was at Fort Henry, that transports would be sent to him as soon as possible to move his troops up the Tennessee River. In this telegram General Halleck stated that the main object of the proposed movement would be to destroy the railroad bridge over Bear Creek near Eastport, Mississippi, and the connections at Corinth, Jackson and Humboldt in the order named. General Halleck represented that with strong detachments of cavalry and light artillery supported by infantry these points might be reached from the river without serious opposition. In the same order he directed General Grant "to avoid any engagement with strong forces" and that "it would be better to retreat than to risk a general battle."²

General Sherman who was at Paducah, under direction of General Halleck at once set out procuring the necessary transports and March 2, reported that he had sent the "Chateau" a very large boat up the Tennessee and that General Grant would be in possession of twenty good steamboats capable of carrying 15,000 men and 3000 horses.³ General Grant had with his accustomed energy issued the necessary orders for the assembling and embarkation of his troops, when an incident occurred which for a

1 W. R. R. 7-671-2.

2 W. R. R. 7-674.

3 W. R. R. 7-677.

short time checked his growing fame and came near terminating his military career.

The occupation of Nashville by Nelson's division under orders of General Grant had apparently alarmed General Buell, who feared the enemy might return and attempt to recapture the city before the remainder of his forces could reach the place. He therefore on February 25, issued an order to General C. F. Smith, who was at Clarksville in command of a division of General Grant's forces, to at once move his division to Nashville and sent transports to convey them to the city.¹ As some of his troops had been ordered to Nashville, early on the morning of February 27, General Grant had gone to Nashville to consult with General Buell about the situation and not finding him had returned to Clarksville. Before going he had notified General Cullum, General Halleck's chief of staff, that he intended to do so unless prevented by orders.² March 2, General Cullum telegraphed to General Grant that General Halleck the night before had sent a dispatch to him (General Cullum), demanding to know who sent Smith's division to Nashville and saying that he, Halleck, had ordered it across to the Tennessee and that it must be ordered back. The same day General Cullum telegraphed to General Halleck that Grant, writing from Fort Donelson on the 28th, said he had just returned from Nashville while he, Cullum, supposed him and his army yet at Donelson.³ General Halleck, probably irritated because General C. F. Smith's division had been ordered to Nashville without consulting him and that General Grant had gone there without his personal knowledge or consent, sent an inconsiderate and unjustifiable dispatch to General McClellan saying, among other things,

"I have had no communication with General Grant for more than a week. He left his command without my authority and went to Nashville. His army seems to be as much demoralized by the victory of Fort Donelson as was that of the Potomac by the defeat of Bull Run. It is hard to censure a successful general immediately after a victory, but I think he richly deserves it. I can get no returns, no reports, no information of any kind from him. Satisfied with his victory he sits down and enjoys it without regard to the future. I am worn out and tired with this neglect and inefficiency. C. F. Smith is almost the only officer equal to the emergency."⁴

This remarkable dispatch was received at Washington March 3, and at 6 p. m., that evening General McClellan in a dispatch approved by Secretary of War Stanton, answered it saying:

1 W. R. R. 7-944-5.
2 W. R. R. 7-666.

3 W. R. R. 676-677.
4 W. R. R. 7-679-680.

"Your dispatch of last evening received. The future success of our cause demands that proceedings such as Grant's should at once be checked. Generals must observe discipline as well as private soldiers. Do not hesitate to arrest him at once if the good of the service requires it, and place C. F. Smith in command. You are at liberty to regard this as a positive order if it will smooth your way."¹

General Halleck on receipt of this dispatch, on March 4, telegraphed an order to General Grant directing him to remain at Fort Henry and place General C. F. Smith in command of the expedition up the Tennessee River.² In the same telegram he asked General Grant why he did not obey orders to report strength and positions of his command.³

It might be sufficient for the purposes of this history to here conclude this incident in General Grant's career, but justice to memory seems to demand that the whole story should be briefly told.

General Halleck March 4, telegraphed General McClellan that he did not think it advisable to arrest Grant at present but that he had placed General C. F. Smith in command of the expedition up the Tennessee River, who he thought would restore order and discipline, and in order, apparently, to justify his former telegram, he reported that a rumor had just reached him "that since the taking of Fort Donelson General Grant had resumed his former bad habits."⁴

General Grant, on receiving the order of General Halleck placing General Smith in command of the expedition up the Tennessee and ordering him, General Grant, into practical inactivity at Fort Henry, gracefully accepted the conditions and like a true patriot gave the necessary orders, congratulated General Smith on his promotion⁵ and proceeded to help him in every possible way.

To General Halleck's question why he had not obeyed his, Halleck's orders to report strength and positions of his command he answered March 5:

"I am not aware of ever having disobeyed any order from headquarters—certainly never intended such a thing. I have reported almost daily the condition of my command and reported every position occupied. I have not, however, been able to get returns from all the troops * * * All have come in except from General (C. F.) Smith's command at Clarksville. * * * The General has probably been unable to get his in consequence of being ordered to Nashville by General Buell * * * As soon

¹ W. R. R. 7-680.

² and ³ W. R. R. 10, part 2-3.

⁴ W. R. R. 7-682.

⁵ W. R. R. 10, part 2-6.

as I was notified that General Smith had been ordered to Nashville, I reported the fact and sent a copy of Buell's order. My reports have nearly all been made to General Cullum, chief of staff, and it may be that many of them were not thought of sufficient importance to forward more than a telegraphic synopsis of * * * * I have forty-six infantry regiments, three cavalry regiments and eight independent companies and ten batteries of light artillery. The average available strength of regiments fit for the field is about 500 men. In conclusion, I will say that you may rely on my carrying out your instructions in every particular to the very best of my ability."¹

Unfortunately, General Halleck did not receive this communication until March 9, 1862. March 6, he wrote to General Grant enclosing an anonymous letter addressed to Judge David Davis of the Western Investigating Commission, charging irregularities in contracts and in the purchase of supplies in his department and saying:

"The want of order and discipline and the numerous irregularities in your command since the capture of Fort Donelson are matters of general notoriety, and have attracted the serious attention of the authorities at Washington. Unless these things are immediately corrected I am directed to relieve you of the command."²

Again the same day, General Halleck telegraphed:

"General McClellan directs that you report to me daily the number and positions of the forces under your command. Your neglect of repeated orders to report the strength of your command has created great dissatisfaction and seriously interfered with military plans. Your going to Nashville without authority, and when your presence with your troops was of the utmost importance, was a matter of very serious complaint at Washington, so much so, that I was advised to arrest you on your return."³

In answer to this dispatch General Grant on March 7, telegraphed to General Halleck as follows:

"Your dispatch of yesterday received. I did all I could to get you returns of my command. Every move I made was reported daily to your chief of staff, who must have failed to keep you properly posted. I have done my very best to obey orders and to carry out the interests of the service. If my course is not satisfactory, remove me at once. I do not wish to impede in any way the success of our arms. I have averaged writing more than once a day since leaving Cairo to keep you informed of my position, and it is no fault of mine if you have not re-

¹ W. R. R. 10, part 2-4-5.

² W. R. R. 10, part 2-13.

³ W. R. R. 10, part 2-15.

ceived my letters. My going to Nashville was strictly intended for the good of the service, and not to gratify any desire of my own. Believing sincerely that I must have enemies between you and myself, who are trying to impair my usefulness, I ask to be relieved from further duty in the department."¹

General Halleck, March 8, answered the above, saying:

"You are mistaken. There is no enemy between you and me. There is no letter of yours stating the number and position of your command since the capture of Fort Donelson. General McClellan has asked for it repeatedly with reference to ulterior movements but I could not give him the information. He is out of all patience waiting for it. Answer by telegraph in general terms."²

General Grant on March 9, answered as follows:

"Your dispatch of yesterday is just received. I will do all in my power to advance the expedition now started. You had a better chance of knowing my strength whilst surrounding Fort Donelson than I had. Troops were reporting daily, by your order, and immediately assigned to brigades. There were no orders received from you until February 28 to make out returns, and I made every effort to get them in as early as possible. I have always been ready to move anywhere, regardless of consequences to myself, but with a disposition to take the best of care of the troops under my command. I renew my application to be relieved from further duty. Returns have been sent."³

General Grant the same day sent a further telegram giving numbers and location of his troops and stating that a return of his forces and their location had been mailed from Paducah March 6.⁴

General Grant did not receive General Halleck's letter of March 6, until March 11, and at once telegraphed to him saying:

"Yours of the 6th instant, enclosing the anonymous letter to Hon. D. Davis, speaking of frauds committed again Government is just received. I refer you to my orders to suppress marauding as the only reply necessary. There is such a disposition to find fault with me that I again ask to be relieved from further duty until I can be placed right in the estimation of those higher in authority."⁵

In the light of the foregoing letters and telegrams it is difficult to resist the impression that there was a disposition on the part of some of General Grant's superiors to find fault with him, to belittle his achievements and to check his growing fame. General Halleck while he had at first denounced as preposterous

¹ W. R. R. 10, part 2-15.

², ³ and ⁴ W. R. R. 10, part 2-21.

⁵ W. R. R. 10, part 2-30.

General Grant's suggestions of the movement against Forts Henry and Donelson, when it had succeeded claimed the honor and glory of it. February 17, almost immediately on receipt of General Grant's dispatch announcing the capture of Fort Donelson, he telegraphed to General McClellan: "Make Buell, Grant and Pope Major Generals of volunteers and give me command in the west. I ask this in return for Forts Henry and Donelson."¹

Two days afterwards, he telegraphed to General McClellan, saying that "Brigadier General Charles F. Smith by his coolness and bravery at Fort Donelson when the battle was against us turned the tide and carried the enemy's out works, make him a major general."² Not one word about General Grant who had given General Smith the orders to charge the enemy's works. On the same day he telegraphed to General Hunter, saying: "To you more than to any other man out of this department are we indebted for our success at Fort Donelson. In my strait for troops to reinforce General Grant I appealed to you. You responded nobly and generously."³ When on the same day he issued an order congratulating the victors "on the recent victories on the Tennessee and Cumberland," he named Flag Officer Foote before General Grant.⁴ In fact we seek in vain among the published official reports and correspondence for one word from General Halleck in specific commendation of General Grant for the brilliant successes at Forts Henry and Donelson. General Buell seems to have ignored him altogether. Can it be that these distinguished generals were piqued at General Grant's victories, secretly jealous of his growing fame, and willing to listen to reports and rumors to his discredit?

There was one general, however, who seemed to have been impressed by the superior military qualities General Grant had exhibited and who wrote him a kind letter. That General was W. T. Sherman. The letter cannot be found, but its character can be partly judged by General Grant's reply in which he said February 19, 1862. "I feel under many obligations to you for the kind tone of your letter, and hope that, should an opportunity occur, you will win for yourself the promotion you are kind enough to say belongs to me. I care nothing for promotion so long as our arms are successful and no political appointments are made."⁵

Perhaps these interchanges were the beginning of that mutual understanding and appreciation, and that close mutual confidence which brought success to our arms and before the end

1 W. R. R. 7-628.

2 W. R. R. 7-637.

3 W. R. R. 7-636.

4 W. R. R. 7-638.

5 W. R. R. 7-638.

came made these two men the great commanding figures of the war.

It is reasonable to suppose that President Lincoln had heard the reports derogatory to General Grant, and did not propose to have the only general who had won a great victory condemned without a thorough understanding of all the facts. March 10, 1862, he directed the adjutant general at Washington to require General Halleck "to ascertain and report whether General Grant left his command at any time without proper authority, and, if so for how long; whether he has made to you proper reports and returns of his force; whether he has committed any acts which were unauthorized or not in accordance with military subordination or propriety, and if so what."¹

General Halleck by this time must have become convinced by General Grant's letters and telegrams that he had been hasty and inconsiderate in making the outrageous charges against him, and on March 13, in answer to General Grant's telegram of March 9, asking the third time to be relieved, said:

"You cannot be relieved from your command. There is no good reason for it. I am certain that all which the authorities at Washington ask is that you enforce discipline and punish the disorderly. The power is in your hands; use it, and you will be sustained by all above you. Instead of relieving you I wish you, as soon as your new army is in the field, to assume the immediate command and lead it on to new victories."²

To this last dispatch of General Halleck, General Grant answered as follows:

"After receiving your letter enclosing copy of anonymous letter, upon which severe censure was based, I felt as though it would be impossible for me to serve longer without a court of inquiry. Your telegram of yesterday, however, places such a different phase upon my position that I will again assume command, and give every effort to the success of our cause. Under the worst circumstances I would do the same."³

March 16, 1862, General Halleck made report of the inquiry into General Grant's conduct which President Lincoln had directed him to make, as follows:

"Headquarters Department of the Mississippi,
Sain Louis, March 15, 1862.

Brigadier Gen. Lorenzo Thomas,

Adjutant General of the Army, Washington:

In accordance with your instructions of the 10th instant I report that General Grant and several other officers of high rank in his com-

¹ W. R. R. 7-683.

² W. R. R. 10, part 2-32.

³ W. R. R. 10, part 2-36.

mand, immediately after the battle of Fort Donelson, went to Nashville without my authority or knowledge. I am satisfied, however, from investigation, that General Grant did this from good intentions, and from a desire to subserve the public interests. Not being advised of General Buell's movements, and learning that General Buell had ordered Smith's division of his (Grant's) command to Nashville, he deemed it his duty to go there in person. During the absence of General Grant and a part of his general officers, numerous irregularities are said to have occurred at Fort Donelson. These were in violation of the orders issued by General Grant before his departure, and probably, under the circumstances, were unavoidable. General Grant has made the proper explanations, and has been directed to resume his command in the field. As he acted from a praiseworthy, although mistaken zeal for the public service in going to Nashville and leaving his command, I respectfully recommend that no further notice be taken of it. There never has been any want of military subordination on the part of General Grant, and his failure to make returns of his forces has been explained as resulting partly from the failure of colonels of regiments to report to him on their arrival and partly from an interruption of telegraphic communication. All these irregularities have now been remedied.

H. W. HALLECK,
Major General.¹

In the great movement now under way in which the Fifteenth Ohio was to take an humble part, and which had been begun by the expedition up the Tennessee River which General Halleck had ordered March 1, that general foresaw from the experience of recent former campaigns that to fully succeed, the movements of both his and General Buell's armies should be under the command of one directing mind. In this, putting aside for the moment a suspicion of personal ambition, events showed that he was correct. Full co-operation between him and General Buell as to details was hardly to be expected and was likely to fail at the critical moments of the campaign. We have already noted a dispatch from General Halleck to General McClellan just after the capture of Fort Donelson asking to be placed in command of all the troops in the west. February 20, General Halleck again telegraphed General McClellan, that he must have command of the armies of the west, that hesitation and delay were losing golden opportunities, and asked General McClellan to at once lay the matter before the President and Secretary of War.²

February 21, he telegraphed to Secretary of War Stanton to the same effect, and said he could not strike a fatal blow unless he could control Buell's army.³

February 22, Secretary Stanton telegraphed that he had laid the matter before the President, who did not think any change in

1 W. R. R. 7-683. In this connection, see Grant's letter to Halleck of March 22, 1862. W. R. R. 10, part 2-62.

2 W. R. R. 7-641.

3 W. R. R. 7-655.

the organization of the army or the military departments then advisable, but directed and expected full co-operation between him and General Buell.¹ General Halleck seems to have acquiesced in this decision, still, however, adhering to his former opinions.²

General Halleck was very desirous that General Buell should join him in the movement up the Tennessee River and repeatedly pressed the importance of such junction on the authorities at Washington. March 2, General McClellan telegraphed General Buell saying that it was important to isolate Johnston's Confederate army from Memphis and Columbus, and directing him to arrange details with Halleck, co-operate fully with him and give him all the assistance he could.³ General Buell answered this dispatch saying he could not get exactly at what Halleck was doing and therefore could not see how he could assist him at that time even if he should need it.⁴ General Buell seems to have been possessed with the apprehension that General Johnston would receive reinforcements and turn upon him, and that he should be prepared to hold Nashville against such possible attack. To these expressed apprehensions, General Halleck urged that in as much as Johnston had destroyed the railroad and bridges in his rear he could not return to make an attack, and urged General Buell to come to the Tennessee and co-operate with him.⁵ To this and other similar suggestions General Buell gave no direct answer, but proposed a personal meeting with General Halleck to talk over plans. General Halleck could not leave his post to attend such proposed meeting. March 6, General Halleck sent a message to Assistant Secretary of War Thomas A. Scott, saying that it was reported that Beauregard had 20,000 men at Corinth and was fortifying, and what a mistake it was that Buell did not send troops to move with him up the Tennessee so as to seize that point. He added that General Smith had gone to seize it, but he feared it was too late and that he was too weak. He also stated that he could not make Buell understand the importance of strategic points until it was too late.⁶

March 7, General Halleck again telegraphed to Assistant Secretary Scott saying he had telegraphed General Buell to reinforce him as strongly as possible at or near Savannah, that he should move immediately and not come in too late as he had done at Donelson.⁷ March 9, he telegraphed to General McClellan giving the reported strength of Smith's column and saying that he was too weak without General Buell's aid to operate on the

1 W. R. R. 7-652.

2 W. R. R. 7-660.

3 W. R. R. 7-678.

4 W. R. R. 7-679.

5 W. R. R. 7-682.

6 W. R. R. 10, part 2-10.

7 W. R. R. 10, part 2-16.

Tennessee.¹ The same day General Buell telegraphed to General Halleck saying he could move from one side of the river to the other at pleasure, but that an attempt to move on both sides might result in the armies being beaten in detail, that the point he had suggested (Florence) was the only one from which they could operate centrally, that if this point was not occupied, he might detach too little to serve Halleck's purpose or so much as to endanger Middle Tennessee.²

To this dispatch General Halleck replied March 10, saying that his forces were moving up the Tennessee as rapidly as transportation could be secured, that Florence had originally been designated as the point of concentration, but on account of the enemy's forces at Corinth and Humboldt it had been decided to land at Savannah, that General Smith, who commanded the advance, had made the selection, and closed by saying, "you do not say whether we are to expect any reinforcements from Nashville."³

To this dispatch General Buell answered the same day saying that the country north of the Tennessee, with Nashville as a center, was of vital importance and under no circumstances should be jeopardized, and that it was unnecessary and inadvisable to change the line on which he proposed to advance in a few days, or as soon as his transportation was ready.⁴

That evening General Halleck exploded in a dispatch to General McClellan saying, among other things:

"I am surprised that General Buell should hesitate to reinforce me. He was too late at Fort Donelson as Hunter was in Arkansas. I am obliged to make my calculations independent of both. Believe me, general, you make a serious mistake in having three independent commands in the west. There never will and never can be any co-operation at the critical moment; all military history proves it. You will regret your decision against me on this point. Your friendship for individuals has influenced your judgment. Be it so. I shall soon fight a great battle on the Tennessee unsupported, as it seems, but if it is successful it will settle the campaign in the west."⁵

This dispatch must have created a sensation in Washington and probably hastened the issue next day of President Lincoln's War Order No. 3, in which General McClellan was relieved from the command of all the military departments and directed to confine his activities to the Department of the Potomac. The two departments commanded respectively by Generals Halleck and

1 W. R. R. 10, part 2-22.

2 W. R. R. 10, part 2-22-23.

3 W. R. R. 10, part 1-25-26.

4 W. R. R. 10, part 2-27.

5 W. R. R. 10, part 2-24-25.

Hunter were consolidated, that part of General Buell's department lying west of a north and south line indefinitely drawn through Knoxville was added, the whole was designated the Department of the Mississippi and General Halleck was placed in command¹

March 13, General Halleck kindly but perhaps mistakenly, informed General Buell that the foregoing order would not interfere with his command and that he would continue in command of the same army and district of country as before, so far as he, Halleck, was concerned, but in order to have perfect co-operation Buell was asked to report the strength and position of his forces.²

General Buell in compliance with such request on March 14, reported an aggregate force of 101,737 in his department, with 55,000 concentrating at Nashville to operate against the enemy. In the same dispatch he stated that he proposed to move in two columns, one through Murfreesboro, Shelbyville and Fayetteville, the other through Columbia.³

From this it seems General Buell was still insisting on his own original plan, but General Halleck argued strongly that all Buell's available forces should be sent up the Tennessee. After two or three days parleying, General Halleck, March 16, 1862, cut matters short and ordered General Buell to move his forces by land to the Tennessee River, directing his march on Savannah.⁴

It was in pursuance of this order of General Halleck, that March 18, 1862, General McCook, commanding our division, received the following orders from General Buell:

"Move steadily forward with your division on the road to Savannah. Ford the streams where they are fordable, and when it is necessary to make permanent repairs in the road, such as building bridges over streams which are liable to frequent interruptions by high water, leave only a sufficient working party and guard for that purpose. As fast as your supply wagons are exhausted send them back for supplies, say about twenty at a time in charge of an officer and escort."

"The railroad will probably be in condition tomorrow to forward supplies as far as Franklin, and in a few days more to Columbia. You will meet supplies at Savannah. Use all possible industry and energy so as to move forward steadily and as rapidly as you can without forcing your marching or straggling. Send forward at once to communicate with General Smith and learn his situation. It will be best to send an intelligent and discreet messenger, so as to avoid the necessity of sending written intelligence, that might be cut off and reach the enemy. The messengers must be on their guard against

1 W. R. R. 10, part 2-28-29.

2 W. R. R. 10, part 2-33.

3 W. R. R. 10, part 2-37-38.

4 W. R. R. 10, part 2-42.

that. They should try to go through in twenty-four hours. Let them observe the amount of forage on the road. Report to me daily by express."¹

The movement southward from Nashville by General Buell's army had already begun when the above order was issued. March 16, 1862, our division, McCook's, broke camp at Nashville and marched to Franklin, Tennessee, 19 miles, and went into camp. The Fifteenth Ohio started at 8 a. m., and went into camp about one-half mile south of Franklin. The morning of March 17, at 8 o'clock we resumed our march. The day was sunny and mild, the road was good and we swung along at a good rate of speed. The country on either side of the road was hilly and the road went up and down between cotton fields where a great many slaves were cutting and burning stalks and preparing the fields for the plow and another crop. The trees were showing a tinge of green and peach and pum trees were in bloom. In the afternoon we passed through the village of Spring Hill and after a march of 17 miles went into a camp named Camp Kirk near Rutherford's Creek, where we were when the order to move onward to Savannah was issued. We knew we were marching toward the enemy, but where, when and under what circumstances we were to meet him we did not know.

¹ W. R. R. 10, part 2-46.

CHAPTER VI.

THE CAMPAIGN WHICH RESULTED IN THE BATTLE OF SHILOH, AND THE FIRST DAY OF THE STRUGGLE.

WHILE General Grant was at Fort Henry, suspended from the active command of the expedition up the Tennessee River, he had put forth every energy towards aiding General Smith, who had superseded him in such active command, by forwarding reinforcements and supplies and otherwise carrying out General Halleck's orders. On March 6, General Sherman who was in command at Paducah and had helped in collecting transportation and in the forwarding of the troops, asked permission of General Halleck to join General C. F. Smith's column, and at the same time informed General Halleck that the enemy had collected a large force at Eastport, or at the bridge near there, and also at Corinth, estimated at 20,000; that he had transports for the whole grand command and that he would send all troops at Paducah to General Smith. General Halleck at once granted General Sherman's request and sent a joint telegram addressed to him and General Grant saying that General Smith must advance with great caution and if the enemy was in force at Eastport or Corinth the landing must be below.¹ On the same day, Assistant Secretary of War Scott telegraphed Secretary Stanton that the enemy at Corinth and vicinity was receiving daily reinforcements and that Halleck's forces were inadequate for the work they were undertaking. In the same dispatch Assistant Secretary Scott said that the Potomac column, twenty days before, could have secured all that country and completely crushed secession in the West.¹ The inference from this dispatch is that reinforcements from the Army of the Potomac had perhaps been asked for and refused.

General Sherman, with the garrison of Paducah organized into a division, embarked March 8, arrived at Fort Henry March 9, and at Savannah, Tenn., March 11.²

Under the direction of General C. F. Smith, General Lewis Wallace with his division had effected a landing at Crump's Landing on the west bank of the Tennessee and on March 11, had sent an expedition out towards Purdy which destroyed the bridge across Beach Creek and a long stretch of trestle on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad north of that place.³

¹ W. R. R. 10, part 2-12-13.

² W. R. R. 10, part 1-28.

³ W. R. R. 10, part 1-10.

March 12, under direction of General C. F. Smith, General Sherman was ordered to operate between Eastport and Corinth, at a point about twelve miles from the river in the neighborhood of Burnsville.¹ General Smith's orders for this expedition are not given, but we learn from General Sherman's orders that it was directed to strike the Memphis and Charleston Railroad at a point near Burnsville and to destroy some trestle work and as much of the railroad as time and the circumstances would permit.²

The expedition, composed of General Sherman's entire division on nineteen transports escorted by the Gunboat Tyler, Commander Gwin, started at 10 a. m., March 14, from Savannah. It proceeded up the river to the mouth of Yellow Creek and at 7 p. m. debarked at Tyler's Landing. At 11 p. m. in a heavy storm of rain and snow it started out toward the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. The advance of the infantry was brought to a halt four and one-half miles out at an unnamed creek which had been so swollen by the heavy rain that it was impossible to get across it. Two attempts to bridge it were made without success. Scouts from the cavalry which had got across returned and reported it impossible to proceed further. The streams in their rear were rising rapidly and it was feared they would not be able to get back to the river.³ The expedition therefore returned to the boats. An attempt to effect a landing further up the river was made, but failed, and the expedition then dropped down the river to Pittsburg, reported to General Smith⁴ and was directed by him to occupy that place strongly,⁵ with a view to further operations against the Memphis and Charleston Railroad.

March 16, at midnight, General Sherman started on another expedition to cut the Memphis and Charleston Railroad which also failed. March 17, he reported to General Grant that the object of such expedition, as directed by General Smith, was to cut the Memphis and Charleston Railroad without a general or serious engagement, that this was impossible from Pittsburg because the ground was well watched and a dash could not be made; that he had tried it twice, the first time being defeated by rains and the second time by coming in contact with a cavalry force of the enemy, which, however, he had signally defeated. General Sherman suggested that the best way to accomplish the object in view was to make a strong demonstration from Pittsburg on the Corinth road and at the same time send a force up to Tyler's Landing and push it out rapidly to Burnsville.⁶

1 W. R. R. 10, part 1-8.

2 W. R. R. 10, part 1-22.

3 Sherman's Memoirs.

4 Sherman's official Report, W. R. R. 10, part 1-22-23.

5 W. R. R. 10, part 1-25.

6 W. R. R. 10, part 1-26-27.

On the same day he reported that Crump's Landing was a good point from which to move toward Corinth. He also reported that he had just returned from a reconnoissance towards Corinth and Purdy and was strongly impressed with the importance of the position at Pittsburg—both for its land advantages and its strategic position; that the ground itself admitted of easy defense and yet afforded admirable camping ground for a hundred thousand men.¹

The same day, March 17, Hurlbut's division, sent by General Smith, reported to General Sherman and was directed by him to disembark and go into camp on a line perpendicular to the (Corinth) road, about one mile from the river. He decided to hold his own division on the transports ready to move promptly in any direction either by land or water.²

General Grant arrived at Savannah March 17, and at once reported his arrival to General Halleck and said he would order all forces at Savannah except McClelland's division to Pittsburg.³ He also reported his arrival to General Sherman and said that "although he had been sick for two weeks he began to feel better at again being along with the troops."⁴ The same day General Halleck telegraphed to General Buell asking him if he could not extend a telegraph line from Nashville to Mount Pleasant and thence to Savannah and send his cavalry to open the way to that place from Mount Pleasant through Waynesborough. He directed him to push his troops rapidly forward so that the enemy's railroad communication could be cut. General Buell on the same day telegraphed to General Halleck that he had information that General Beauregard had moved on the Thursday before from Corinth and Jackson to some other point, not named.—probably Savannah, with 26,000 men to operate against General Smith in anticipation of his crossing the Tennessee River and that a part of his force was to strike the river below Savannah and cut off Smith's transportation.⁵ To this dispatch General Halleck answered rather curtly:

"I fully understand these movements. Move on, as ordered today, to reinforce Smith. Savannah is now the strategic point. Don't fail to carry out by instructions. I know that I am right."⁶

March 18, General Grant reported to General Halleck, that he had found on arrival at Savannah that Generals Sherman's and Hurlbut's divisions were at Pittsburg, partly debarked. General Wallace's division at Crump's Landing six miles below on the same side of the river, General McClelland's division en-

1 W. R. R. 10, part 1-27.

2 W. R. R. 10, part 1-28.

3 W. R. R. 10, part 2-42.

4 W. R. R. 10, part 2-43.

5 and 6 W. R. R. 10, part 2-44.

camped at Savannah and General Smith's division, with unattached regiments, on board transports at the latter place, and that he had ordered all troops except McClernand's division to Pittsburg, to debark there at once and to discharge the steamboats and direct them to report at Paducah for further orders. General Grant also stated that he had not been long enough at Savannah to form much idea of the actual strength of the enemy, but felt satisfied that they did not at that time exceed 40,000 armed effective men; that he should go next day to Crump's Landing and Pittsburg and if he thought any change of the positions of any of the troops was needed he would make it,—but having full faith in the judgment of General Smith, who had located the points of debarkation, he did not expect any change would be made.¹

On March 19, General Grant sent two scouts (Breckenridge and Carson) to General Buell to learn his whereabouts and movements and inform him that he, Grant, was massing troops at Pittsburg, Tenn., and that there was every reason to believe that the enemy had a large force at Corinth, Miss., and many at other points on the road toward Decatur. He asked General Buell to send by such scouts any information he possessed.²

Notwithstanding General Halleck's seeming disregard of General Buell's dispatch stating that it was reported that the enemy would try to cut off General Smith's transports below Savannah, he reported it to General Grant and observed that if the report was correct, General Smith should at once destroy the enemy's railroad connection at Corinth.³ General Grant at once telegraphed to General Halleck that immediate preparations would be made to execute his "perfectly feasible order," that he, Grant, would go in person, leaving General McClernand in command at Savannah.⁴ General Halleck, probably a little alarmed at the promptness with which General Grant was acting on his suggestion, the next day telegraphed him saying he did not fully understand him, and directing him by all means to keep his forces together until he connected with General Buell, who was then at Columbia and would move on Waynesborough with three divisions; to not let the enemy draw him into an engagement then, but wait until he was properly fortified and received orders.⁵

Colonel McPherson, chief engineer, had laid out what he thought was the proper line to fortify at Pittsburg, but it was too far from water, and as it was intended to soon advance the scheme was given up. It was also thought that the troops, which

1 W. R. R. 10, part 2-45.

2 W. R. R. 10, part 2-47.

3 W. R. R. 10, part 2-46.

4 W. R. R. 10, part 2-49.

5 W. R. R. 10, part 2-50.

were largely new and untrained would better be employed in drilling than in building fortifications.¹ Sherman in his memoirs says he acted on the supposition that they were an invading army, that their purpose was to move forward in force and make a lodgment on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, that they did not fortify their camps against an attack because they had no orders to do so and because such a course would have made their raw men timid. He also says, that the position was naturally strong, with Snake Creek on their right, a deep, bold stream with a confluent (Owl Creek) to their right front; and Lick Creek, with a similar confluent on their left, thus narrowing the space over which they could be attacked to about a mile and a half or two miles, and adds, that at a later period of the war they could have rendered this position impregnable in one night.²

March 20, General Grant wrote or telegraphed to General Halleck, saying:

"I will go with the expedition to Corinth in person, if no orders prevent it. Owing to the limited space where a landing can be effected it will take some days yet to debark the troops now there. (Meaning of course Pittsburg Landing.) I was in hopes of starting out the 22, but now think the 23 or 24 will be as early as I can get off. There is no enemy on this side of the river much before reaching Florence. I sent yesterday two scouts to find General Buell. They will probably be back tomorrow."

* * * "I will take no risk at Corinth under the instructions I now have. If a battle on any thing like equal terms seems to be inevitable, I shall find it out in time to make a movement upon some other point of the railroad, or at least seem to fill the object of the expedition without a battle, and thus save the demoralizing effect of a retreat upon the troops. I am very much in hopes of receiving further instructions by mail."³

This letter or dispatch was sent to Captain N. H. McLean, one of General Halleck's assistant adjutant generals. Not receiving any "further instructions" at the time, General Grant March 20, issued orders to General McClernand whose division was at Savannah to make immediate preparations for shipping his command to Pittsburg Landing, and to General C. F. Smith, who was commanding at Pittsburg, to hold all the command at that place subject to marching orders, with three days' rations in haversacks and seven in wagons. He also issued similar orders to General Lewis Wallace, who was at Crump's Landing.⁴

On March 21, however, General Grant telegraphed to Gen-

1 Grant's Memoirs.

2 Sherman's Memoirs.

3 W. R. R. 10, part 2-51.

4 W. R. R. 10, part 2-52.

eral Halleck that it would be impossible to move with any celerity, taking artillery, that Corinth could not be taken without meeting a large force, say 30,000, that a general engagement would be inevitable, and that therefore he would wait a few days for further instructions."¹ The same day he sent General Halleck a dispatch saying he had just returned from Pittsburg, that the roads back were next to impassable for artillery or baggage wagons; that on the 19th, thirteen trains of cars, twenty cars to each train, all loaded with troops, had arrived at Corinth; that this indicated that Corinth could not be taken without a general engagement, which, under his (Halleck's instructions was to be avoided, and that this, taken in connection with the impassable state of the roads, had determined him not to move for the present without further orders.²

March 22, in reply to General Halleck's telegram of March 20, above mentioned, General Grant said that the troops at Savannah had been sent to Pittsburg and that no movement had been made at that point except to advance General Sherman's division to prevent the enemy from fortifying Pea Ridge.³ The same day General Halleck telegraphed to General Grant that several regiments of infantry and batteries would leave that day for the Tennessee and that he proposed to fit out one or more heavy siege batteries to be drawn by oxen and asked if Grant could supply the oxen.⁴ March 23, General Grant issued an order to General C. F. Smith, whom he addressed as "Commanding U. S. Forces, Pittsburg, Tenn." directing him to carry out his (Smith's) idea of occupying and partially fortifying Pea Ridge and saying, "I do not hear one word from Saint Louis."⁵ In the same order he informed General Smith that he was clearly of the opinion that the enemy was gathering strength at Corinth quite as rapidly as we were at Pittsburg, that the sooner they were attacked the easier would be the task of taking the place and that if General Ruggles was in command at Corinth it would assuredly be a good time to attack.

In the light of this order one wonders whether General Grant, in the absence of "further instructions" from General Halleck, was not considering whether he should not assume the responsibility and move against Corinth before the enemy could further concentrate at that point.

In view of the great struggle which was soon to take place at Pittsburg Landing, it is well to take a brief survey of the ground back of the landing and of the positions in which the

1 W. R. R. 10, part 2-55.

2 W. R. R. 10, part 2-55.

3 W. R. R. 10, part 2-57.

4 W. R. R. 10, part 2-57.

5 W. R. R. 10, part 2-62.

troops had been posted. The point as has been shown, was selected by General Smith and occupied by General Sherman under the former's direct orders. The course of the Tennessee at Pittsburg Landing is nearly north and south. The ground west of the river is about seventy feet above the stream, and back of it is somewhat broken and hilly, the hills rising to the west. At that time it was mostly covered with thick woods, with cleared spaces between, and a growth of underbrush along the smaller streams. On the right or north was Owl Creek, a branch of Snake Creek—the latter a deep bold stream which flowed into the river,—the two forming a natural protection to the right flank of the position. To the left or south was Lick Creek, which, with a confluent similar to Owl Creek, formed a natural protection to the left flank.

It will be remembered that the Fourth Division, General Hurlbut's, was directed to debark at Pittsburg Landing and establish its camp on a line perpendicular to the road about one mile from the river. March 19, General Sherman posted his own division in front of and covering the entire camp, about three miles back from the river, the First Brigade at the bridge on the Purdy road about abreast of Shiloh Chapel, the Second Brigade on the Hamburg road where the Purdy road comes into it, the Third Brigade on the left of the Corinth road, its right near Shiloh Chapel, the Fourth Brigade on the right center, its left reaching to Shiloh Chapel. Each brigade was ordered to encamp to the west, so that when the regiments were on their regimental parade grounds, the brigades would be in line of battle. The intervals between regiments were not to exceed twenty-two paces.¹ March 20, the Second Division, General C. F. Smith's, then commanded by Colonel Lauman and afterwards by General W. H. H. Wallace, was directed by General Sherman to select a line for the entire division nearly parallel to the river, about one mile distant from it, and encamp by brigades, so that they could promptly form line of battle and move out in such line by the road leading into the interior as might thereafter be designated as the line of operations.² March 20, General McClelland was ordered to make immediate preparations to ship his division from Savannah to Pittsburg Landing,³ and a day or two afterward arrived at that point and was placed in camp on a line some distance in rear of General Sherman's division and somewhat to his left. March 26, General B. M. Prentiss reported to General Grant and was assigned to the command of a division made up of unattached troops at Pittsburg. This division was placed in

¹ W. R. R. 10, part 2-50.

² W. R. R. 10, part 2-54.

³ W. R. R. 10, part 2-52.

camp to the left of and somewhat in front of General McClelland's division, so that his division was really between the three right brigades of Sherman's division and his left brigade, Colonel Stuart's, which then was on the extreme left guarding the ford over Lick Creek.¹

While General Grant's forces were occupying the positions above indicated, efforts were made from time to time by scouting parties and reconnoissances sent out on the different roads towards Corinth and Purdy, to ascertain the enemy's strength, position and movements, but with little success.

March 24, General Halleck telegraphed General Buell that it was reported that Jackson and Humbolt had been evacuated and that the enemy had concentrated his forces at Corinth with the intention of giving battle, that a battle should be avoided for the present until a larger army could be concentrated against him, but if possible, without a serious engagement, the railroad at Jackson and Humboldt should be cut, and asked him to transmit a copy of the dispatch to General Grant, as he could be sooner reached from Columbia than Fort Henry.²

The same day General Buell telegraphed from Nashville to General Halleck that intercepted letters from Corinth dated March 18 and 19 estimated the forces there at 25,000 to 40,000, that reinforcements were rapidly arriving, that they expected to have 80,000 to 100,000 men, and that he, Buell, expected a battle at Corinth.³ March 27, General Halleck had received information from General Grant and reported it to the Secretary of War, that thirteen trains, twenty cars each, loaded with troops had recently arrived at Corinth.⁴ March 28, General Grant informed General Halleck that the enemy for the last eight days had been evacuating Island No. 10 and concentrating at Corinth.⁵

General Buell, who it seems was still fearful that the enemy would move on Nashville by way of Decatur and Stevenson, reported his fears to General Halleck. General Halleck at once telegraphed him that there was no danger of the enemy's moving against Nashville, that he wished he would, and directed General Buell to concentrate all his available forces at Savannah or Pittsburg, 12 miles above, and added that "we must be ready to attack the enemy as soon as the roads are passable."⁶ General Buell acknowledged receipt of this dispatch from Columbia and the same day answered it saying "we will waste no time."⁷ March 31, General Grant telegraphed to General Halleck's adjutant gen-

1 Sherman's Official Report, W. R. R. 10, part 1-248.

2 W. R. R. 10, part 2-64.

3 W. R. R. 10, part 2-64-65.

4 W. R. R. 10, part 2-70.

5 W. R. R. 10, part 2-73.

6 W. R. R. 10, part 2-77.

7 W. R. R. 10, part 2-77.

eral, that two soldiers from the head of General McCook's division had come in that evening, bearing General Halleck's dispatch of the 24, above mentioned, and stating that all the information they brought was that some of Buell's command had crossed Duck River at Columbia on the 29 and established guards eight miles out. In the same dispatch General Grant stated that on April 1, he would send General Sherman with a regiment of infantry, two companies of cavalry and a section of artillery, with three gunboats, up the Tennessee to destroy the batteries at Chickasaw.¹ This expedition got off as ordered and found that the batteries at Chickasaw and Eastport had been abandoned.

At this time it seems that all at Pittsburg were awaiting the arrival of General Buell's column, expecting as soon as it arrived to at once move forward and attack the enemy at Corinth. General Buell, April 1, from Columbia, 85 miles from Savannah, sent a dispatch to General Halleck saying that his advance was two days march from that place and that he expected to concentrate at Savannah Sunday or Monday.²

It is apparent from the foregoing dispatches and correspondence, that it was finally understood that the main object of the campaign was to make a lodgment on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, so as to sever the connection between the Confederate armies east and west, that the enemy had concentrated at Corinth, that he was to be attacked there, and that the movement on that place would commence as soon as General Buell's army reached Pittsburg Landing. There was apparently no serious thought that the enemy who were fortified at Corinth and expected to be attacked at that place, would leave so defensible a position and risk an encounter in the open. So, it seems all plans were made for offense and not defense. Ordinarily, the judgment of Generals Halleck, Grant, Smith, Sherman and others in this respect would have been correct. But the Confederate armies at Corinth were commanded by General Albert Sidney Johnston, who was smarting under severe criticism for losing Fort Donelson and abandoning Nashville without making a vigorous defense, and who thought by a bold stroke to restore his former military reputation. Knowing that General Buell with a large army was marching toward Savannah to join General Grant, he decided to strike the latter before the junction could be effected. With this in view, on April 2, 1862, he issued orders to his corps commanders, Generals Polk, Bragg and Hardee, to hold their commands in readiness to advance on the Union forces at Pittsburg the next morning at 6 o'clock.³

1 W. R. R. 10, part 2-82.

2 W. R. R. 10, part 2-85.

3 W. R. R. 10, part 2-383.

The organization of his forces was, General Beauregard second in command, General Polk in command of the left, General Hardee in command of the center, General Bragg in command of the right and General Breckenridge in command of the reserve.¹ His command consisted of 75 regiments of infantry, two regiments and fourteen battalions of cavalry, one company of dragoons and twenty-two batteries of artillery.² An abstract of his field returns dated April 1, 1862, which is incomplete and omits Breckenridge's reserve corps and several other organizations, shows, in the organizations thus reported, an aggregate present of 45,524.³ It is claimed that Johnston in this report included in his aggregate present only men with guns in their hands, while in the returns made by the Union forces the aggregate present for duty included all the men carrying guns and all the non-combatants as well.⁴

To oppose this mighty force General Grant had at Pittsburg sixty-three regiments of infantry, two regiments, four batteries and twelve separate companies of cavalry and twenty-one batteries of artillery;⁵ numbering according to General Halleck's returns for March, 1862, 1583 officers and 33,600 men, an aggregate of 35,183 present for duty at Pittsburg,⁶ which did not include General Lewis Wallace's division which was at Crump's Landing six miles below and contained eleven regiments of infantry two battalions of cavalry and two batteries of artillery, numbering by the same returns an aggregate present for duty of 7,534.⁷

The morning of April 3, 1862, General Johnston gave orders for the advance of his army and by noon it was well under way toward Pittsburg Landing only twelve miles away.⁸ General Hardee's corps was in advance, then General Bragg's, then General Polk's and last General Breckenridge's reserve corps.⁹ Corps commanders were instructed that every effort should be made to turn the left flank of General Grant's forces so as to cut off their line of retreat to the Tennessee River, and throw them back on Owl Creek where they would be obliged to surrender.¹⁰

The movement of this overwhelming force on Pittsburg Landing was unknown and unsuspected by General Grant or any of his division generals. They were, as before stated, quietly resting in camp awaiting the arrival of General Buell. The fateful hours passed in fancied security from attack, while only a few miles away the enemy, in vastly superior numbers, was bearing

1 W. R. R. 10, part 2-387.

2 W. R. R. 10, part 1-382.

3 W. R. R. 10, part 2-382.

4 Grant's Memoirs.

5 W. R. R. 10, part 1-100.

6 W. R. R. 10, part 2-84.

7 W. R. R. 10, part 1-100.

8 W. R. R. 10, part 1-392.

9 W. R. R. 10, part 1-393.

10 W. R. R. 10, part 1-397.

down upon them. In the meantime where was General Buell and our division, his advance troops, which we left in Camp Kirk on Rutherfords' Creek, March 17, 1862?

The entire division remained in Camp Kirk until March 20, waiting for the rebuilding of a bridge which had been destroyed by the enemy. The weather was clear and pleasant and there was the usual round of camp duty. On March 18, General McCook returned from a scout toward Columbia, bringing back two prisoners and some guns and horses which had been captured on the trip.¹ That afternoon Captain A. C. Cummins of the 15th Ohio started back to Nashville in charge of an ambulance train.² On the 19 there was a rumor that John Morgan had attacked one of our trains at Gallatin, capturing Colonel Pope and the train guard, burning the cars and running the locomotive into the Tennessee river.³

That evening Gleason with the other singers of the regiment met in one of the tents and sang the old songs. General McCook published an order excluding all negro slaves from our division and directing that those already there should be returned to their masters.⁴ March 20, it was decided not to wait longer for the rebuilding of the bridge across Rutherford's Creek, but to get across it in some way and move toward Columbia. The 15th Ohio, waded through the stream a short distance above the unfinished bridge. The 32nd Indiana crossed on a temporary foot bridge formed by planks laid on a pile of drift near the bridge. The stream had fallen and the teams were able to ford it. A march of five miles brought us to Duck River opposite Columbia and near the ruined bridge. Some of the men had got across the river and pursued a small detachment of the enemy, capturing four prisoners which they brought over on a small ferry boat. The regiment went into camp a short distance from the bridge and was told that the division would remain at this place until the bridge could be built. Our camp was named Camp Stanton. We remained in this camp until March 31, working on the bridge, drilling, doing guard duty and when off duty fishing and hunting rabbits. On two or three evenings the singers voices were heard singing the then popular songs. There were the usual number of camp rumors. One was that Richmond had been taken, another, that our brigade had been ordered to report to General Grant at Savannah, and still another that it was to be broken up and the 15th Ohio sent to Chicago to guard prisoners.⁵ March 28 a squad of soldiers from various regiments

1 Gleason's Diary.

2 McConnell's Diary.

3 Morgan's Report, W. R. R. 10, part 1-31.

4 and 5 Gleason's Diary.

of the division was marched through the camp to the tune of the Rogue's March. The heads of all had been closely shaven, that of the foremost man was bare and the hats of the others were trimmed with chicken feathers and wings. It was their punishment for depredations of some sort.¹

March 29 while some of the men were watching the work on the bridge, General Nelson came riding down toward the river and without pausing pushed into the stream and waded across followed by his entire division. When we had partially recovered from the surprise and mortification of seeing other troops take the advance, we saw that the movement had been well planned beforehand. Cavalrymen had taken post in the river to guide the men away from the deeper places in the stream, and the men had taken off their trousers and drawers and carried them in bundles on their bayonets. How this came about is related in the following extracts from the diary of General Ammen who commanded a brigade in Nelson's division.

"March 27,—late in the evening General Nelson informed me that he had General Buell's permission to take the advance and gave me a verbal order to cross Duck Creek at daylight the 29th. I inquired if the bridge would be done. He answered 'No.' Are there boats? He said 'No, but the river is falling; and, d—n you, get over, for we must have the advance and get the glory.' He enjoined secrecy, lest we should be prevented taking the advance."

"March 28—Went to Duck River to examine fords; sent some of my cavalry in; river 200 yards or more wide; fords crooked. Fortunately, some army wagons return with forage and ford the river; the water just touches the beds of the wagons; current strong; water above and below, deep; no boats."

"March 29,—Reveille at 3 A. M. breakfast, wagons loaded, column formed; march commenced before it is light; reach the ford, the men are ordered to make bundle of pantaloons, drawers, etc., attach it to their bayonets, and wade the stream. Cavalry were stationed in the river to point out the ford, break the force of the current, and protect the infantry if necessary. The Tenth Brigade (Ammen's)—infantry and artillery and train—crossed Duck River this cold and disagreeable day without accident; went two miles southwest of Columbia, Tenn., and encamped."²

The other brigades of Nelson's division which were encamped ten miles back moved up, waded the river and next day were followed by Crittenden's division,³ and we thus lost our place as the advance division of General Buell's army. To say that our officers and men were deeply chagrined and mortified but feebly expresses their feeling at the time. But we now see that if all General Buell's troops then at or near Columbia had waited until the bridge across Duck River at that place had been

¹ Gleason's Diary.

² W. R. R. 10, part 1-329-330.

³ W. R. R. 10, part 1-330.

completed, the battle of Shiloh would probably have been won without their aid, or irretrievable lost.

On one of the days while a detachment from our regiment was working on the bridge, Generals Buell, Crittenden and McCook came to the river and looked on for a while.¹ We worked on the bridge on the 30, and on the 31 until noon, when an order came to move. We at once returned to camp, struck tents and at 3 p. m. crossed the river on the bridge, marched through Columbia and two miles beyond it and halted for the night. April 1, at 9 a. m., the regiment resumed its march. At 3 p. m. we passed through Mount Pleasant and in the evening encamped on a beautiful little stream called Bigbee Creek, having marched fourteen miles.²

April 2, was fair and warm. Reveille sounded at 4 a. m. and at 6 a. m. we resumed our march. Our course was south-westerly through a hilly region. The road followed a tortuous valley for some distance then wound partly around a hill until it reached the very top where it followed a high tableland. We passed through a little village called Summertown, a summer resort where there was a fine spring, and on to Big Buffalo Creek where we went into camp.² The days march 15 miles.³ That evening the paymaster was in camp and paid off five of the companies. Later in the evening the regimental quartette got together in one of the tents and sang, mingling their voices with the gentle murmurs of Buffalo Creek. Before they again met events were to occur which would cause them to strike minor chords in their melodies.

April 3, two more companies were paid off and at 9 a. m. we resumed our march. It was said we were to march seven miles and then halt to await the coming up of the supply trains. After marching six miles the brigade turned into a field near Little Buffalo Creek, to go into camp, as we supposed. Our halt, however, was short and we marched steadily on. Where the advance troops had encamped the woods were on fire in many places and the smoke made the marching disagreeable. We plodded on and on until after dark and at last turned into camp near Pardee's Furnace, having marched twenty miles.⁴

April 4, we resumed our march at 8:30 a. m. Six miles out we passed through Waynesborough, a village of about 600 inhabitants, and then turned into the Savannah road. There was now no doubt as to our destination. We moved forward rapidly and after a day's march of 14 miles, halted at Hardin's Creek and

1 McConnell's Diary.
2 Gleason's Diary.

3 McConnell's Diary.
4 Gleason's Diary.

went into camp for the night. That evening the remaining companies of the regiment were paid off.

April 5, we got started at 7 a. m. our brigade being in the advance of the division. It had rained in the night and the roads were very bad. Our march was very slow with frequent halts and after going about seven miles the brigade turned into a little nook where we remained during the night.

The morning of April 6, 1862, we were still twenty miles from Savannah an dthirty-two miles fro mPittsburg Landing. The regiment was up at 6 a. m. and about 7 a. m. started on its last lap toward Savannah. The roads were the worst we had ever travelled over. When we had gone about two miles we began to hear distant reverberations, either thunder or cannon, in the direction of the Tennessee River. Colonel Willich of the 32nd Indiana was seen to dig a small hole in the ground with his sword and lie down with his ear over it. It was soon understood that the sounds were sounds of cannon and a little later it was reported that a battle was going on somewhere in the region towards which we were marching.

The cannonading continued as we tramped along through the mud and grew more distinct and louder as we approached Savannah. Reports came that our forces had at first been driven back, but afterwards had rallied and driven back the enemy. The following account of this day's march is taken from a letter of Captain Carroll to his wife written just after the battle of Shiloh.

"Shortly after we heard the cannonading, an order came directing us to leave our baggage train and everything else except what was needed in action and march with all speed to Savannah. We had not gone far before another order came directing us to halt and wait for our trains to come up. This led to the belief on the part of some that the noise we were hearing was only a little fight between some of our gunboats and some batteries of the enemy along the river. The train soon came up, the men were supplied with three days' rations and we resumed our old slow march, halting every few hundred yards to let the wagons pass over a mud hole. We continued this slow march for two hours when another order came to leave every thing and report at Savannah as soon as possible. This had the effect of arousing our spirits and quickening our steps and we pushed on over the worst roads I ever saw. We reached Savannah about 11 o'clock p. m.¹ and stacked arms in the middle of the street. It commenced raining and rained hard all night. We were without shelter and everyone was wet to the skin."

1 Gleason says 12 o'clock and McConnell 3 a. m.

In the preceding pages we have shown the strength and disposition of the Union forces at Pittsburg Landing, their non-apprehension of an attack by the enemy, and that on the morning of April 3, the Confederate forces were moving upon them in overwhelming force. This was not meant to imply that General Grant's army was not watchful in guarding against surprise.

At midnight, April 2, Colonel Taylor of the Fifth Ohio Cavalry, with four hundred men of his command, under orders of General Sherman, went out on a scout on the Corinth road. Colonel Smith's regiment of Zouaves had preceded them at 8 o'clock with directions to post the command in ambush at Greer's House on Lick Creek. Colonel Taylor was directed after going some distance on the Corinth road to turn toward Greer's. Colonel Smith, after going about four miles on the Corinth road, halted until daylight. About a mile and a half beyond Chambers House he came on the enemy's pickets, wounded one and captured another. His troops chased the enemy's pickets some distance and found fifteen of his cavalry posted a mile and a half from Greer's House. Marching on toward Greer's and finding no trace of the enemy, the command returned to camp.¹

April 3, Colonel Buckland's brigade of Sherman's division was sent out three miles to his front on the Corinth road for drill and instructions, and to arrest and bring in any suspicious characters.²

April 4, General Sherman issued orders directing that in case of an alarm day or night, regiments and brigades should form on their parade grounds and await orders. In case of an attack on the advanced pickets they were directed to fire and fall back on the guard posted between them and the main brigade guard. This guard was to hold its ground and if necessary be re-inforced from the nearest regiment by the commanding officer of the brigade. In no event was a brigade commander to go beyond his advance pickets without orders from his division commander, as thereby the advantage of position and artillery would be lost.³

April 4, the enemy's cavalry attacked General Sherman's pickets two miles out on the Corinth road, and captured an officer and seven men. Colonel Buckland sent out a company to re-inforce the pickets and then followed it with a regiment. General Sherman, fearing Colonel Buckland might be worsted, called out his entire brigade and advanced some four or five miles when the cavalry, which were in advance, encountered the enemy's artillery. After dark General Sherman withdrew his forces and reported the incident to General Grant.⁴

1 W. R. R. 10, part 1-86, part 2-90.

2 W. R. R. 10, part 2-90.

3 W. R. R. 10, 2-92.

4 Sherman's Memoirs.

April 5, there was no unusual incident along his front and General Sherman reported to General Grant that all was quiet along the lines, that the enemy was saucy but got the worst of it the day before and would not press his pickets far.¹

Saturday evening, April 5, General Prentiss posted the usual advance guards in front of his division and later, on receipt of information from its commander, sent forward five companies of the Twenty-fifth Missouri under Colonel David Moore, and after consultation with Colonel David Stuart, commanding a brigade of General Sherman's division, sent to the left one company of the Eighteenth Wisconsin.

About 7 o'clock the same evening Colonel Moore returned and reported some activity in front—which was believed to be a reconnoissance by the enemy's cavalry. On receiving this information General Prentiss strengthened the guard stationed on the Corinth road, extended his picket lines to the front a mile and a half and extended and doubled the lines of his grand guard.²

In the meantime, April 4, General Buell, from a point three miles west of Waynesborough, reported to General Grant that he would be at Savannah the next day with one, or perhaps two divisions, and asked General Grant to meet him there.³ That day General Halleck reported to General Grant that General Buell's forces would concentrate at Waynesborough, that he and General Buell would act in concert, that General Buell would exercise his separate command unless he, General Grant should be attacked, in which case General Grant was authorized to take general command.⁴

The Confederate Army, which had moved out from Corinth April 3, on April 4 had reached a point within striking distance of General Grant's forces and orders were given to make the attack early in the morning of April 5, in three lines of battle: The first and second lines extending from Owl Creek on the left to Lick Creek on the right, supported by the third line and the reserve. The second line was to follow the first at a distance of 500 yards, the third line to follow the second at a distance of 800 yards, and the reserve to follow closely the third line.⁵ But a heavy rain on the night of April 4, seems to have dampened General Johnston's ardor and the attack was postponed until the morning of April 6.

The night of April 5, passed without unusual incident and all was quiet along the fronts of Generals Sherman and Prentiss.

1 W. R. R. 10, part 2-93-94.

2 General Prentiss' official report,
W. R. R. 10, part 1-277.

3 W. R. R. 10, part 2-91.

4 W. R. R. 10, part 2-94.

5 W. R. R. 10, part 1-386.

The pickets were well out and watchful and in front of General Prentiss' division both pickets and grand guards had been strengthened and extended. About three miles away the enemy in battle order lay also quiet, except in front of General Bragg's corps, where "continued firing by volleys and single shots was kept up all night by the undisciplined troops" in his front.¹

The morning of Sunday, April 6, dawned bright and clear; the sky was without a cloud and gave promise of a lovely day. It may be asserted with some credibility that the battle was commenced by the Union forces. General Prentiss in his official report states that at 3 o'clock on the morning of April 6, Colonel David Moore of the Twenty-first Missouri, with five companies of his regiment proceeded to the front, and at break of day, drove in the enemy's pickets and pushed forward and engaged his advance, commanded by General Hardee.²

General Beauregard in his official report says, that "at 5 a. m. on the 6th instant, a reconnoitering party of the enemy having become engaged with our advanced pickets, the commander of the forces gave orders to begin the movement and attack as determined upon."³

General Bragg in his official report says: "The enemy did not give us time to discuss the question of attack, for soon after dawn he commenced a rapid musketry fire on our pickets. The order was immediately given by the commanding general and our lines advanced."⁴ The discussion to which General Bragg refers was doubtless begun the evening before when General Beauregard had proposed abandoning the attack and falling back on Corinth.⁵

General Hardee, who commanded the enemy's first line, in his official report says: "At early dawn the enemy attacked the skirmishers in front of my line, commanded by Major (now Colonel) Hardcastle, which was handsomely resisted by that promising young officer. My command advanced and in half an hour the battle became fierce."⁶

Colonel Hardcastle, in his official report gives a graphic account of this opening incident of the battle, in which he says that on the evening of the fifth he was on picket duty covering the front of his brigade and about a quarter of a mile in front of it, that just before dawn indications of the enemy's approach were made known by singular beats on the drum in their lines; that about dawn the cavalry videttes in his front fired three shots, wheeled and galloped back; that the

1 General Bragg's official report W. R. R., part 1-464.

2 W. R. R. 10, part 1-278.

5 W. R. R. 10, part 1-407, Grant's Memoirs.

3 W. R. R. 10, part 1-386.

6 W. R. R. 10, part 1-568.

4 W. R. R. 10, part 1-464-465.

lines of the enemy seemed to be about 350 yards long and to number about 1000; that he suffered them to approach within ninety to one hundred yards and then fired on them and returned to his battalion: that the enemy opened a heavy fire at the distance of about 200 yards; that he returned their fire immediately, and fought the enemy an hour or more without giving an inch, and at 6:30 A. M., seeing his brigade formed in his rear, he fell back.¹

This testimony, besides showing that the battle was commenced by the Union forces, seems to establish beyond doubt that General Prentiss' division was not surprised by the enemy, as was reported in the newspapers shortly after the battle and was generally believed. But how was it with General Sherman's division? In his official report he says:

"On Sunday morning early, the 6th instant, the enemy drove our advance guard back on the main body, when I ordered under arms my division and sent word to General McClernand asking him to support my left, to General Prentiss, giving him notice that the enemy was in our front in force, and to General Hurlbut asking him to support General Prentiss." * * * "Shortly after 7 A. M., with my entire staff, I rode along a portion of our front, and when in the open field before Appler's regiment, the enemy's pickets opened fire on my party, killing my orderly, Thomas Holliday of Company H, second Illinois Cavalry. The fire came from the bushes which line a small stream that rises in the field in front of Appler's camp and flows to the north along my whole front. This valley afforded the enemy a partial cover, but our men were so posted as to have a good fire at him as he crossed the valley and ascended the rising ground on our side."

"About 8 A. M. I saw the glistening bayonets of heavy masses of infantry to our left front in the woods beyond the small stream alluded to, and became satisfied for the first time that the enemy designed a determined attack on our whole camp. All the regiments of my division were then in line of battle at their proper posts."²

Colonel John A. McDowell, commanding the right brigade of Sherman's division, in his official report, says:

"At the first alarm of the enemy's attack Sunday, the 6th, the line of the First Brigade was formed, as per previous orders, to hold the Purdy road and the right front. Two companies of the Sixth Iowa were detached to defend the bridge crossing Owl Creek and one of the twelve-pound howitzers of the Morton battery placed to command the crossing on the hill at the right of our encampment. About 8 o'clock the line was thrown for-

1 W. R. R., part 1-602-603.

2 W. R. R. 10, part 1-248-249.

ward to the brow of the hill, and the remaining guns of the Morton battery brought up to command the several openings to the front, and from this position several shots were fired on the enemy's masses, not then formed into line."¹

Colonel David Stuart, who commanded the brigade of General Sherman's division which was posted on the extreme left, a little to the left and rear of Prentiss' division, and was guarding the ford over Lick Creek, in his official report, says:

"In obedience to General Sherman's orders I kept a company at and in the vicinity of the Back (Bark?) road (coming in on the hills opposite and southeast of the encampment) as picket guards, and on his order on Saturday sent six companies out on the Hamburg road, with a squadron of cavalry sent forward by General McClernand, to reconnoiter beyond Hamburg. The disposition of my pickets was reported to and approved by General Sherman. At 7:30 o'clock on Sunday morning I received a verbal message from General Prentiss that the enemy was in his front in force. Soon after, my pickets sent in word that a force with artillery was advancing on the Back (Bark?) road, * * * I established my line of battle * * * with the right of the Seventy-first Ohio resting opposite the eastern extremity of the Fifty-fifth Illinois. * * * I had two companies of the Fifty-fifth Illinois and two companies of the Fifty-fourth Ohio detached as skirmishers on the hills opposite and across the creek or ravine."²

Colonel Ralph P. Buckland, who commanded the brigade of General Sherman's division which was posted on the right of the Corinth road with its left near Shiloh Church, in his official report, says:

"Between 6 and 7 o'clock on Sunday morning I was informed that our pickets were fired upon. I immediately gave orders for forming the brigade on the color line, which was promptly done. About this time I was informed that the pickets were being driven in. I ordered the Forty-eighth Regiment (Ohio), Colonel Sullivan, to advance in support of his pickets, which he did, but discovered that the enemy had advanced in force to the creek, about eighty to one hundred yards in front. I immediately ordered the brigade to advance in line of battle. We had marched about thirty or forty rods when we discovered the enemy, and opened fire upon him along the whole line, which checked his advance and caused him to fall back."³

Colonel Jesse Hildebrand, who commanded the brigade of Sherman's division which was posted on the left of the Corinth

1 W. R. R. 10, part 1-254-255.

2 W. R. R. 10, part 1-257.

3 W. R. R. 10, part 1-266.

road, its right resting near Shiloh Church, in his official report, says:

"Early on the morning of Sunday, 6th instant, our pickets were fired on, and shortly after 7 o'clock the enemy appeared in force, presenting himself in heavy columns of regiments at least four deep. He opened upon our camp a heavy fire from infantry which was immediately followed by shell. Having formed my brigade in line of battle, I ordered an advance. The Seventy-seventh and Fifty-seventh (Ohio) Regiments were thrown forward to occupy a certain position but encountered the enemy within 300 yards of our camp. Unfortunately, we were not supported by artillery, and consequently were compelled to retire under cover of our camp. The engagement becoming general along the entire front of my command, a battery having been brought to support our right, the Fifty-seventh and Seventy-seventh Regiments stood side by side for four hours, contending with a force of not less than four to one."¹

Lieutenant Colonel Robert A. Fulton, Fifty-third Ohio, of Hildebrand's brigade, who made the official report for that regiment, says that "shortly after daylight on the morning of the 6th the regiment was formed on the color line under order and direction of Colonel Appler."²

So it appears from the foregoing official reports that there was no surprise by the enemy on any part of Sherman's line, such as was reported in the newspapers at the time. Such reports, however, continued so persistently that on May 2, General Halleck sent a dispatch to Secretary Stanton saying:

"Reports of the battle of the 6th and 7th are received, and copies forwarded as rapidly as possible. The newspaper accounts that our divisions were surprised are utterly false. Every division had notice of the enemy's approach hours before the battle commenced."³

As has been shown, the battle commenced at the break of day in front of General Prentiss' division on the left of the Union line, by an attack on the enemy's advance troops by troops under command of Colonel David H. Moore. Shortly before 6 o'clock Colonel Moore was severely wounded, and his regiment fell back, reaching the front line of Prentiss' division about 6 o'clock. Here the entire division was formed in line and with cavalry on its right and left was advanced to the extreme front, and shortly after 6 o'clock came under the enemy's fire and received the assault of the enemy, who was advancing in three columns upon its left center and right.⁴

1 W. R. R. 10, part 1-262.

2 W. R. R. 10, part 1-264.

3 W. R. R. 10, part 1-99.

4 W. R. R. 10, part 1-278.

Prentiss seems to have held his position until the enemy passed his right flank, when he ordered his division to return to the color line of his camp and sent word of the movement to General Smith, who he supposed was in command of his old division, and General Hurlbut, asking for reinforcements. Being again assaulted by an overwhelming force of the enemy, he ordered his division again to fall back to the line occupied by General Hurlbut, and at about 9 o'clock reformed to the right of General Hurlbut and to the left of General Smith's division, which was then commanded by General W. H. H. Wallace. About 10 o'clock Prentiss' line was again assailed. Many of his men being for the first time exposed to the enemy's fire, became panic-stricken, and fell back to the river. General W. H. H. Wallace at this moment sent the Eighth Iowa Infantry to reinforce Prentiss, who, with its aid, drove the enemy back.

At this juncture General Grant appeared and on seeing the disposition of Prentiss' force, ordered him to maintain his position at all hazards. He maintained such position until 4 P. M. when General Hurlbut, on his left, was overpowered by superior numbers and compelled to retire. When General Hurlbut retired, General Prentiss consulted with General Wallace and both agreed to hold their positions at all hazards.

Shortly after this General Wallace was mortally wounded, and his division, except three Iowa and one Illinois regiments, also retired from the field. Perceiving that the enemy had passed between him and the river, General Prentiss sent an aide for reinforcements and determined to assault the enemy with his entire force. The enemy was advancing in mass, completely surrounding him, but he kept up the fight until 5:30 P. M. when finding that further resistance would result in the slaughter of his entire command, he gave up the fight and yielded himself and 2200 of his rank and file as prisoners of war, many of them being wounded.¹

The same heroic resistance to overpowering numbers of the enemy was made by the divisions of Generals Hurlbut and W. H. H. Wallace. General Hurlbut, when his division fell back from support of General Prentiss, reformed his line near the river, and under direction of General Grant assumed command of all troops that came up, checked the further advance of the enemy, and at dark advanced his line 100 yards to the front, threw out pickets and bivouaced for the night.²

Colonel James M. Tuttle, Second Iowa, who assumed command of General W. H. H. Wallace's division when the latter fell, rallied what was left of his own brigade and was joined

1 General Prentiss' official report, W. R. R. 10, part 1-277.

2 General Hurlbut's official report, W. R. R. 10, part 1-203.

by the Thirteenth Iowa, the Ninth and Twelfth Illinois and several fragments of other regiments, formed them in line on the main Pittsburg and Corinth road and held the enemy in check until the line was formed which repulsed the enemy's last charge on the left just before dark.¹

Colonel David Stuart who, with his brigade, held the extreme left of the Union line, after receiving word from General Prentiss, that the enemy was in force in his front, formed his brigade, and sent forward four companies as skirmishers to the hills opposite and across the creek from his position, where the enemy was trying to plant a battery. The enemy succeeded in planting their battery and opened fire on Stuart's brigade, and under cover of such fire advanced his infantry diagonally from the right of Prentiss's division. Colonel Stuart at once hastened to the battery which half an hour before he had seen was posted in front of the tent of Colonel Rodney Mason of the Seventy-first Ohio, intending to order it further east to a more commanding position, and found that it had left without firing a gun and that the battalion on its right had disappeared. For a quarter of a mile to his right, Colonel Stuart says, no soldier could be seen, except fugitives making their way to the rear. A large force of the enemy was advancing due north toward Colonel Mason's camp and he saw that his position was flanked by an overwhelming force. Before he could change his position the Fifty-fifth Ohio had become engaged, but he soon withdrew them to the brow of a hill and formed a new line. At this point all of his brigade had disappeared but about 800 men of the two above named regiments. The enemy's force of five regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery which had been moving on his right flank was here halted and formed line of battle, a body of cavalry was sent to the right and rear to cut off his retreat, and a force was sent to turn his left flank.

The fighting at this point began with the opposing lines about 150 yards apart. Inadequate as Colonel Stuart's forces were, he held his position here for more than two hours, hoping to check the enemy's advance toward the river. While in this position Colonel Stuart received a message from General McArthur to hold on, and that he would be supported on his right. He, however, received no support from General McArthur, nor any one else. His men had emptied their own cartridge boxes and those of the killed and wounded, their ammunition had become exhausted, and with the advice of his regimental commanders, Colonel T. Kilby Smith and Colonel Malmborg, Colonel Stuart gave orders to fall back through a

1 W. R. R. General Tuttle's Official Report, W. R. 10, part 1-149.

ravine and form on a hill to his right. But when he reached the new position he found that the enemy commanded it. Whereupon he moved still farther to the rear, by ravines and circuitous paths. On the way a portion of the Seventy-first Ohio joined the command. Colonel Stuart finally decided that instead of sending for ammunition, he would march to the rear toward the river, which he did. Being wounded, Colonel Stuart turned over the command to Colonel Smith. General Grant appearing at this time ordered the command into line near the batteries, and through the efforts of Colonel Malmborg the remnants of the brigade and other straggling troops were brought together and a line of 3000 men was formed, which took part in repelling the last attack of the enemy near the landing.¹

The Confederate lines which had become heavily engaged with General Prentiss' division a little before 6 o'clock A. M. did not strike the three right brigades of General Sherman's division until after 7 A. M. (Sherman says about 8 A. M.) The three brigades were posted as before stated. Taylor's Battery was posted at Shiloh and Waterhouse's on a ridge to the left. Eight companies of the Fourth Illinois Cavalry were posted in a large field to the left and rear of Shiloh Church, which Sherman regarded as the center of his position. When he saw the glistening bayonets of heavy masses of the enemy's infantry to his left front, he rode to Colonel Appler (Fifty-third Ohio), who held the extreme left of his front line, and ordered him to hold his ground at all hazards. At General Sherman's request General McClelland had sent three regiments of his division which were posted to protect Waterhouse's Battery and the left of his line. The battle opened on Sherman's front by the enemy throwing shells into his camp from a battery in the woods to his front, to which Taylor's and Waterhouse's Batteries responded. General Sherman soon observed heavy battalions of infantry passing obliquely to the left across the open field in Colonel Appler's front and other columns advancing directly upon his position. Infantry and artillery at once opened all along the line and the battle became general.

Other heavy masses of the enemy's troops kept passing across the open field and directing their course on General Prentiss' division. General Sherman, it seems, then saw that the enemy designed to pass his left flank and fall on General McClelland and Prentiss, whose line of camp, he says, was almost parallel with the river and two miles west from it. The sounds of musketry and artillery soon announced that Prentiss was engaged and at 9 a. m., General Sherman judged that he was

1 W. R. R. 10, part 1-257-259.

falling back. About this time Appler's regiment broke in disorder and fell back, followed by fugitives from Mungen's regiment, the Fifty-seventh Ohio, and the enemy pressed forward on Waterhouse's battery. In spite of the gallant resistance made by the three Illinois regiments, which were supporting it, the enemy got possession of three of its guns. Although Sherman's left was thus turned, he deemed Shiloh so important that he gave orders to Colonels Buckland and McDowell to hold their ground, which they did until 10 A. M., when the enemy got their artillery to the rear of his left flank.

This made a change of position necessary and orders were given to fall back to the Purdy and Hamburg road and make that the new line. But the enemy pressed forward with such vigor that Sherman was forced to choose a new line of defence. Hildebrand's brigade had disappeared from the field, though Hildebrand himself remained, but Buckland's and McDowell's brigades retained their organizations and were conducted back and formed on General McClernand's right. This, Sherman says, was about 10:30 A. M. The enemy then made a furious attack on General McClernand's whole front. At an opportune time, General Sherman with McDowell's brigade charged against the left flank of the enemy and drove him back for some distance. At this point in the battle, General Grant visited this part of the line and presumably told Sherman and McClernand to hold hard as he had sent Colonel McPherson and another staff officer to hurry up General Lewis Wallace's division. General Sherman says he and General McClernand, acting in perfect concert, held this line for four hours, sometimes gaining and at other times losing ground. But about 4 P. M. it was known that General Hurlbut had been driven back to the river, and Generals Sherman and McClernand, knowing that General Wallace was on the way from Crump's landing, selected a new line of defence, with its right covering the bridge by which General Wallace had to approach. They fell back to this line as well as they could, gathering in addition to their own such scattered forces as they could find. The enemy pressed upon them with fury, charging with his cavalry, but was checked by the timely arrival of two batteries of artillery. General McClernand's division charged the enemy and drove him back into the ravines to the front and right, and there the battle on the right ended for the day.¹

General Wallace's division arrived from Crump's Landing after dark and formed line to Sherman's right and rear. General Wallace had mistaken General Grant's orders, had taken the

1 Sherman's official report, W. R. R. 10, part 1-248.

wrong road and thus missed a great opportunity. If he had taken the right road he would have arrived on the field in the thick of the fight and his eight thousand seasoned troops, which had gone through the ordeal of Fort Donelson, would probably have turned the tide of battle in favor of the Union. He was charged with failure to obey General Grant's orders to move by the river road, and separate reports made by Colonel, afterwards, General, McPherson, Major W. R. Rowley and Captain, afterwards, General, John A. Rawlins, seem to support the charge.¹ But General Grant in his Memoirs, not wishing to do any one an injustice, says that General Wallace under the circumstances may have been justified in taking the road he did.²

The night of April 6, the troops of both armies bivouaced on the field in the midst of a pouring rain. The woods, ravines and fields, in the limited space over which the battle had raged, were filled with the dead and dying, but the survivors slept the sleep of exhaustion, broken only by the shells of the gunboats, which at intervals during the night were fired from the river toward the Confederate camps.

1 W. R. R. 10, part 1-177 to 188.

2 Grant's Memoirs.



CHAPTER VII.

THE SECOND DAY OF THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.

In the preceding chapter we left the opposing armies bivouaced in the rain on the field where the fierce and bloody struggle of April 6, had taken place.

General Grant's forces had been driven back to near Pittsburg Landing. The left of his line rested near the river where it was protected by a ravine at the mouth of which the gunboats Lexington and Tyler, all night long, at intervals, sent shells into the enemy's camps. The line extended nearly due west along the main Pittsburg and Corinth road and on to the Savannah and Hamburg road, and thence northwesterly along the latter road to near Owl Creek, covering the bridge across the stream over which General Lewis Wallace's division arrived during the night.

The advance brigade of Nelson's division, Buell's army, reached Savannah about noon April 5, and went into camp. The rest of the division arrived during the day and also went into camp. General Grant knew of its arrival, but did not order it forward to Pittsburg, because he thought there would be no battle there, but that the enemy would fight at Corinth where they were fortified.¹

April 6, after the enemy's attack had begun he sent an order to General Nelson directing him to move his entire command to the river opposite Pittsburg.² The division started at 1:30 P. M., and marched to a point on the river opposite the landing where it arrived in four hours. At 5 P. M. the head of the column crossed the river, marched up the bank and took position in the road under fire of the enemy's artillery. By 9 o'clock the infantry of the division was all across the river.³ General Hurlbut says that at 12 P. M., General Nelson's division passed through his line and went to the front, when he called in his advance guard.⁴

General Grant, just before dark, after the last assault of the enemy at the ravine near the steamboat landing had been repulsed, sought General Sherman, told him that he was convinced the battle was over for the day and ordered him to be ready to assume the offensive in the morning. He said that he had observed at Fort Donelson at the crisis of the battle that both sides seemed defeated and whoever assumed the offensive

¹ Colonel Ammen's Diary, W. R. R. 10, part 1-331.

³ General Nelson's Report, W. R. R., part 1-323.

² W. R. R. 10, part 2-95.

⁴ W. R. R. 10, part 1-205.

was sure to win.¹ Though his army had been sorely worsted by the day's engagement, General Grant seems to have been undismayed. Whitelaw Reid in "Ohio In The War" describes him as sitting on his horse, quiet and stolid, near the point where the enemy was making his last charge on the left, and when someone said to him, "Does not the prospect begin to look gloomy?" answered, "Not at all; they can't force our lines around these batteries tonight. Tomorrow we shall attack them with fresh troops and drive them, of course."

General Crittenden's division of General Buell's army, composed of General J. P. Boyle's and Colonel W. S. Smith's Brigades, the Third Kentucky Cavalry and Captain Mendenhall's and Captain Bartlett's Batteries, had reached Savannah, and on the evening of April 6 and all except the cavalry, embarked for Pittsburg Landing, which place they reached at 9 P. M. The cavalry marched up the river to a point opposite the landing, and not being able to get boats to carry them across, were compelled to hold their horses almost in sight of the battle field, but powerless to aid their comrades in the fierce struggle in which they were engaged. The troops arriving on the boats were soon landed and marched about a half mile from the landing, where they stood at arms all night in the road. At about 5 o'clock next morning they were placed in position on the right of General Nelson.²

General McCook, in his official report says, that he arrived at Savannah with his entire division, except the Second Kentucky Cavalry, which was left to guard the baggage, at 7 P. M., April 6. This is evidently a mistake, as our brigade did not arrive until much later, as shown by diaries of Gleason and McConnell and letter of Captain Carroll. Eager to get to the battlefield, he saw that Rousseau's Brigade was embarked and, with the Thirty-fourth Illinois, took passage on another boat and arrived at Pittsburg Landing at 5 A. M., April 7th. On arrival he found Rousseau's Brigade debarking, and as soon as it was ashore marched it forward to a point where he believed his troops would be of most service. Here he met General Buell and was directed to form line of battle with his left on General Crittenden's right, his right extending in the direction of General McClernand's division.³ This, according to General Rousseau's report was a little after 6 a. m.⁴

The rest of Colonel Kirk's Brigade arrived shortly afterwards and was placed by General McCook in position as a

1 Sherman's Memoirs

2 General Crittenden's report, W. R. R. 10, part 1-354.

3 W. R. R. 10, part 1-302.

4 W. R. R. 10, part 1-307.

reserve.¹ General Grant on the night of April 6, had given orders for an advance next morning "as soon as day dawned,"² and General Buell ordered Nelson's and Crittenden's divisions to move forward "as soon as it was light in the morning."³

General Buell's three divisions may be said to have formed the left of the line and General Grant's divisions the right, but Colonel Tuttle, then commanding General W. H. Wallace's division, had collected all of the division that could be found and such other detached regiments as volunteered to join him and formed them as a reserve for General Buell.⁴ General Buell says he found on the ground parts of about two regiments—about 1000 men—and subsequently a similar fragment of General Grant's force came up, that he directed the first to act with General McCook's attack and the second was similarly employed on the left. He also saw some straggling troops of General Grant's force immediately on McCook's right where some firing had already commenced.⁵

The battle of April 7, was begun on the extreme right soon after daybreak by two batteries of General Lewis Wallace's division, throwing shells at a battery of the enemy posted across a hollow in front of a portion of his line.⁶ On the extreme left, according to General Nelson, his division moving forward, met the enemy at 5:30 A. M., when the action commenced with vigor.⁷ General Sherman on the immediate left of General Lewis Wallace's division, at daylight received orders from General Grant to advance and recapture his original camps. He dispatched several members of his staff to bring up all the men they could find, and especially Colonel Stuart's brigade, and at the appointed time (hour not stated), moved forward and re-occupied the ground on the extreme right of General McClermand's camp, where he attracted the fire of a battery located near Colonel McDowell's former headquarters. Here he waited for the sound of General Buell's advance on the main Corinth road.⁸

About 8 o'clock the skirmishers in front of General Rousseau's Brigade of General McCook's division near the main Corinth road were driven in and his line was fiercely assailed.⁹

General McClermand had early in the morning moved forward, attacked the enemy, pressed forward and readjusted his line just behind his old camp,¹⁰ and soon the battle raged along the whole line. Our brigade, Johnson's of McCook's division, commanded by Colonel W. H. Gibson of the Forty-ninth Ohio,

1 W. R. R. 10, part 1-303.

2 W. R. R. 10, part 1-109.

3 W. R. R. 10, part 1-292.

4 W. R. R. 10, part 1-149.

5 W. R. R. 10, part 1-293.

6 W. R. R. 10, part 2-170.

7 W. R. R. 10, part 1-324.

8 W. R. R. 10, part 1-251.

9 W. R. R. 10, part 1-308.

10 W. R. R. 10, part 1-119.

was still at Savannah where it had stood on the street of that village all the night before in the rain.

The Fifteenth Ohio, with the rest of the brigade, had had an early breakfast of hot coffee, bacon and hard tack and awaited orders. About 9 o'clock A. M., the entire brigade, consisting of the Fifteenth and Forty-ninth Ohio and the Thirty-second and Thirty-ninth Indiana, marched to the river and were crowded on the steamer John J. Roe. While the men were embarking the distant boom of cannon at Pittsburg Landing grew louder and louder and boats were arriving from the battlefield filled with the dead, dying and wounded. As the steamer left the shore a band struck up the "Marcellaise," and to its inspiring strains we moved slowly up the river.

Captain Carroll, in the letter to his wife before mentioned, says:

"The boat being heavily loaded moved very slowly, which gave us plenty of time for sober reflection. There were a great many long faces, and more serious looks would overspread the countenances of the men when a boat would pass loaded with the dead and wounded from the battlefield." There is conflicting testimony as to the exact time at which we reached the landing at Pittsburg. Captain Carroll does not give the hour. McConnell in his diary says it was at 10 A. M. Gleason says 10:45 A. M. Captain (afterwards Colonel) Askew says the steamer reached the landing at Pittsburg in about an hour after it left Savannah. Colonel Harrison of the Thirty-ninth Indiana says, "At 10:30 o'clock, guided by the din of battle we moved upon the field." Colonel Willich, Thirty-second Indiana, which was the first regiment to debark, says: "The regiment arrived at 10 A. M. at Pittsburg Landing and marched up the hill, where it received orders from General Grant to start immediately for the field of action." Colonel Gibson says, "We reached Pittsburg Landing about 11 o'clock." It is possible that Colonel Gibson's statement is more nearly correct, and it seems to be confirmed by Gleason, who was very careful and methodical, and fixes the hour positively at 10:45 A. M. This is partly confirmed by Lieutenant Colonel Blackman, commanding the Forty-ninth Ohio, who says "the command was brought into action at 2 P. M.," and by Captain Carroll who says, "the regiment, when it reached the scene of the conflict was formed in line in reserve and listened for two hours to the din of battle before orders came to engage the enemy." The three regiments of the brigade which, during the engagement were under Colonel Gibson's immediate command, were formed in line with the Fifteenth Ohio on the right, the Thirty-ninth Indiana in the center and the Forty-ninth Ohio

on the left,¹ and the whole line moved into action at one and the same time. Four descriptions of the part the Fifteenth Ohio took in the battle of Shiloh are at hand—a short one in John G. Gregory's diary, one in Gleason's diary, taken in shorthand at the time and afterwards written out in longhand, one in a letter of Captain C. W. Carroll to his wife, dated April 14, 1862, and one in a letter of Colonel Frank Askew to his father, dated April 11, 1862, Gregory says:

"April 7, marched to the river, got on the boat, started for the battleground twelve miles up the river; arrived on the ground at 12 o'clock. Laid back one hour on reserve, then went into them rough shod. Fought three hours; drove them howling back. Then we marched back toward the river and camped. We had no blankets or overcoats; rained all night."

Gleason says: "About 9 o'clock we went aboard a steamer and started up the river, reaching the landing at 10:45 A. M. The river bank and the sides of the road through the bluff were crowded with panic-stricken cowards who had drifted back from various regiments of Grant's army, and could only be restrained from leaping on the boats by a strong line of guards with fixed bayonets at the landing. No appeals or threats sufficed to induce them to return to duty, and having thrown away their arms and accoutrements it was useless to waste time upon them. They were evidently not without some sense of shame, for many of them greeted us with the most doleful accounts of the battle, which were not calculated to inspire us with courage. But the boys sized them up at once, and taunted them with cowardice, urging them to fall in the ranks and do their duty. * * * We marched at once from the boat to the front, only stopping near the landing to pile up our knapsacks² and leave a man to guard them, and pushed on to the scene of the conflict, a part of the way on the double quick. We met many wounded returning painfully to the landing, and soon began to see many dead—both Union and Confederate, which was not calculated to brace us up much, but not a man flinched. On the contrary all seemed afraid of not getting there in time. * * * We passed on some two or three miles and halted in the rear of the battle line under cover of a ridge. After a short rest, during which we had lunch, we were ordered up to relieve the force which was then engaged. We advanced in line of battle till within sight of the fighting when, opening ranks for our predecessors to retire, we took their place on the front line. While advancing in line three boys of Company H—Philip Beamer, Chris. Harnley and Reuben

1 Gibson's Report, W. R. R. 10, part 1-315.

2 Colonel Askew, it will be noted, says we left our knapsacks with the teams before we reached Savannah.

Cremean were wounded, all in the feet or legs, showing that the enemy was firing low. About the time we took our place in line a rebel battery on our left planted a shell which exploded in the ranks between Companies H and E, doing sad execution. Being but a short distance from where it struck, I witnessed most of the havoc it wrought. Corporal Deniston of Company H, was hit in one foot by a fragment of it and sprang up on his other foot, crying out in agony, and was borne to the rear. Corporal Campbell of Company E, was terribly mangled, and as he was taken back begged to be shot, knowing he could not live. Others sustained severe or slight injuries which I could not note in the confusion. We had been ordered to lie down as soon as we got in position, and soon opened such a hot fusillade that the enemy began to fall back, as the slackening of their fire indicated, and the battery which had annoyed us so much was soon silenced by Captain Cotter's guns of our brigade.¹ The smoke from our guns (caliber 69) and the dense forest in front prevented us from seeing the enemy and we had to guess at his position, mainly by the flashes and smoke of his guns. We fired low where the smoke outside of our line was thickest. As the rebel line gave way ours advanced, with our battery well to the front. At about 4 o'clock the enemy's fire ceased, showing them to be in full retreat. We then advanced and the Thirty-second Indiana threw out a strong skirmish line to the front and found no enemy within reach. After advancing to open ground overlooking a creek other troops took up the pursuit of the enemy, and we were withdrawn a short distance and stacked arms, as we supposed, for the night."

Gleason says that after this he, with a few men got permission to go back to the landing and procure blankets. That after much trouble they secured them and started back, but when they reached the place where the regiment had stacked arms it had disappeared. They finally learned after much inquiry that it had marched back to the landing. It was then pitch dark; they could not find their way back, and coming to the recovered camp of an Iowa regiment they were kindly taken in and fed and given shelter for the night. He closes his story of the day as follows:

"When they (the Iowa boys) learned that we belonged to Buell's army, it seemed they could not do enough for us, saying that we had saved them from defeat and probable capture, and were welcome to the best they had. So after a hearty supper, such as we had not eaten since leaving Nashville, we were given

¹ Gleason is here mistaken. This battery did not reach the field until the action was over. It was then "Goodspeed's" battery, Captain Cotter having left it some time before—see W. R. R. 10, par 1-302.

an empty tent, and having plenty of blankets we were soon sound asleep. Outside on the parade ground lay many a form in blue or gray uniform, sleeping their eternal slumber. A pitiless thunder storm raged nearly all night, but we slept in the dry, with much concern, however, for our comrades who were shelterless and blanketless by reason of our failure to find them. There were also doubtless many wounded lying on the battlefield exposed to the drenching rain, and many a life flickered and went out amid the fury of the elements. Firing had long since ceased all along the lines and silence would have been supreme, if it had not been for the storm, the moans of the wounded and the plaintive bleating of a species of frog in a swamp near by."

We have already quoted from Captain Carroll's letter describing the feelings of the men as the steamer carrying them passed slowly up the river. He goes on to say, "We at last reached the landing and immediately disembarked and proceeded to the scene of action, distant three miles. We had not gone far before the terrible effects of a desperate battle were visible on either side of the road. Dead Federal, dead Sesesh and dead horses and mules lay thick on the ground and the wounded could be heard groaning even above the noise and confusion of the battle. These sights, although the first of the kind we had ever witnessed, strange as it may seem, dispelled all gloomy thoughts, directed our thoughts toward the enemy and nerved us for the encounter. Our brigade was ordered to take position in reserve and immediately in rear of the point where the battle was hottest. I thought I had a pretty good idea of what a battlefield was, but this exceeded anything I had ever imagined. The noise was deafening. The artillery belched forth at a tremendous rate, making everything quake, and the roar of the musketry was incessant. To this music we listened for two hours. The men began to show signs of uneasiness and an eagerness to get into the fight. We had been drawn up in line for two hours when an order came for our brigade to take the advance. The men stepped off silently but cheerfully, with animation and spirit. I had always believed that the Fifteenth Ohio was composed of good fighting material, that it would never disgrace the state from which it came, and the manner in which it conducted itself on this occasion, the coolness with which the men marched into the galling fire of the enemy exceeded my most sanguine expectations. It made me feel proud that I belonged to it. In moving to the position assigned to us we had to pass some distance under the enemy's fire, but not a man flinched. When we reached our position, the command, 'Commence firing,' was given and our men opened on the enemy with one of the most deafening

volleys of musketry I heard at any time during the day. It was continuous and incessant for over two hours. We then changed front under fire, but every one stuck to his work nobly and manfully. Again we let loose upon the enemy with such vigor and energy that he was forced to fall back. About this time the enemy fell back all along the line, the retreat soon became a rout, and thus ended the great battle of Pittsburg Landing."

The letter of Colonel Askew describing the battle is given in full as follows:

Pittsburgh Landing, eight miles above Savannah, on the Tennessee River, April 11, 1862.

Dear Father:—I write this on the ferry boat on my way to Savannah from this landing where I go to express money home.

You will have heard ere this of the terrible battle fought here on the 6th and 7th inst. On Sunday morning the 6th, we were encamped 16 miles from Savannah on the road between there and Columbia, Tenn. We quietly struck our tents, packed our baggage and started on our march to Savannah. We had gone but a short distance when we heard the distant firing of cannon. We marched on for some time, the cannon still sounding and the discharges becoming more frequent and louder, finally we halted. Our teams were allowed to come up and we were ordered to leave our knapsacks with the teams, taking our blankets and three days rations and our ammunition, which we did, and started in quick time.

We reached Savannah about 11 o'clock that night. Shortly after we arrived a violent hail and thunder storm came up which we stood and took the best way we could. We stacked our arms in the street, built fires out of the fences and remained there until morning.

We got some hot coffee in the morning and got on a steamboat about 9 o'clock in the morning and started for the scene of action.

During the night of Sunday we could hear the discharge of cannon at short intervals, said to be fired by the gunboats to harass the rebels, but at daylight in the morning they all commenced again and there was almost an incessant roar. We reached the landing in about an hour, our whole brigade being on the boat, with one battery of artillery. The whole river bank and bluff were crowded with the wounded and stragglers.

We disembarked and started for the field in double quick time, the roar of the cannon and the rattle of the musketry keeping up an infernal din. We reached the field, passing over the scene of the battle on Sunday, our men having driven the rebels back early Monday morning from the position they had driven our men from on Sunday. Although we had but little time to look around, the scene was truly horrible. The ground was thickly strewn with dead men and horses killed in almost every conceivable way.

We formed in line of battle in the rear of Rousseau's brigade of our division, who had been engaging the enemy on that part of the field since early in the morning. We had been there but a short time when a shell came hissing through the tops of the trees and lit about ten feet in front of our company, throwing the dirt in our faces, but fortunately doing no injury. We were soon ordered to advance and relieve Rousseau's brigade whose ammunition was about exhausted.

We advanced leisurely, Rousseau falling to the rear. The scene of the action was in a woods. We soon got within close range of the rebels, as the bullets whistling about our heads too plainly told. Joe Hewetson was wounded here, I think before he got a chance to fire a shot, the ball entering near the stomach.

We were then ordered to lie down and commence firing, which we did, pouring into the rebels a most terrific fire which was well responded to by them. We kept up the firing for an hour and a half or more almost incessantly, when our cartridges being nearly exhausted, we were ordered to fall back to get more ammunition and to allow our battery to take a position. We fell back about 25 yards, got a new supply of ammunition and the battery was placed in position right in front of our company. It poured into the rebels and their battery several rounds of grape and canister when it soon became evident that the enemy were retiring, which they did over the brow of a small hill out of reach of our battery.

We were then wheeled into column by company, filed past our battery and were brought into line again beyond our battery, all of which was executed with almost as much precision as if we had been on battalion drill.

We were again ordered to advance, which we did. We reached the brow of the hill but there was no enemy to be seen. The only signs we saw of them were some shells thrown from their battery from a wooded eminence at some distance from us. Our battery in the meantime having been placed on the top of the hill above us, poured a tremendous storm of grape and canister after the flying foe. We remained in line under the brow of this hill for some time, our battery firing over our heads, and other batteries pursuing the rebels. The cannon shots finally became less frequent and more distant and told that we were left masters of the field.

Stacy Craft, poor fellow, was shot dead near the beginning of the action by a musket ball through the head. He never spoke after he was struck.

Joe Hewetson, I have told you, was wounded. The doctor thought the wound was not dangerous, declaring that the ball did not penetrate the stomach, but I learn that he died on the next day after the battle. Walter was with him and I have not been able to see him since.

John Campbell, from near Farmington or Colerain was shot in the leg with either a cannon ball or canister shot, shattering and mutilating his leg most horribly from the hip-joint almost to the foot. He has since died, making in all three killed of our company.

The same ball which struck Campbell also struck Park Mechem, and shattered his ankle so that it is probable his foot will have to be amputated. It also struck John Thompson, taking off all the flesh on the ball of his foot though not injuring the bone. John's wound is not serious. The same ball wounded two men in Company H next to us. I saw it strike Campbell. Was but a few feet from him when he was struck and it was a most pitiful sight.

Wm. R. Smith, a stepson of George Anderson, was wounded in the thigh by the fragment of a shell—a flesh wound—pretty serious, though not dangerous.

Hugh Douglass was wounded slightly in the head by the same shell. He is going about.

Sergt. Jno. W. Harris was wounded by a musket ball in the right arm—not serious—a flesh wound.

John T. Mercer from Mt. Pleasant left the company before we had got fairly into the fight and has not been heard from since. Charles J. Williams was with the company until near the close of the fight when he disappeared, no one of our company seeing him go. One of Company H says he saw him leaving the field wounded in the head. He is from Mt. Pleasant. This makes our casualties 3 killed, 5 wounded, 2 missing.

The rest of the boys are all well and the wounded are doing as well as could be expected.

I will have to close this now as I have reached the express office and it is growing dark, hoping to give you a fuller account on a more favorable opportunity.

Your son,

FRANK ASKEW.

It will be noted that Colonel Askew states that John T. Mercer of Company E, left the company before it had fairly got into the fight and had not been heard from at the time he wrote, but Captain Carroll three days later, in letter above mentioned, states that he was wounded in the head. The official rosters, however, do not include his name among the wounded.

Colonel Dickey and Lieutenant Colonel Wilson were both absent from the regiment during the engagement and its command devolved upon Major William Wallace. Major Wallace made a very brief official report, in which he says: "Being the only field officer present, I detailed Captain I. M. Kirby of Company D, and Captain A. R. Z. Dawson of Company G, as acting field officers. * * * The Fifteenth occupied the right of the Sixth Brigade, and about 12 M. engaged the enemy, and until near 4 o'clock P. M. we were under a most galling fire of the rebel forces. During the entire time no inch of ground was yielded, but twice we advanced our lines until we were in close proximity to the rebel forces. No language can do justice to the brave officers and men under my command. They poured a most deadly fire into the enemy's ranks amid a raking charge of musketry and artillery which was fast thinning my ranks, but nothing could move the gallant Fifteenth. Forty rounds of ammunition were discharged by my brave men with such precision that the enemy at last gave way and our artillery occupied the ground, the Fifteenth scattering the flying rebels in wild confusion." He expresses his obligation to Captains Kirby and Dawson, and Adjutant Taft for their valuable assistance, and closes his report by saying, "We are all proud of the regiment, the Sixth Brigade and the Second Division; of General McCook, its brave commander, and yourself (Colonel Gibson), who led us to victory and honor."¹

Colonel Wm. H. Gibson of the Forty-ninth Ohio, who in the

absence of General R. W. Johnson, was in command of the brigade, describes the battle as follows:

"Reaching Savannah at 10 P. M. of the 6th, and holding the rear of the Second Division, we were compelled to await transportation until the next morning at 9 o'clock.

"After great exertions the entire brigade with two batteries of artillery was embarked on the steamer John J. Roe. We reached Pittsburg Landing about 11 o'clock, and at once hastened forward to the scene of the conflict in the center, where a portion of the Second Division was then engaged. Colonel Willich, with the Thirty-second Indiana, being the first to debark, and to reach the field, was detached from the brigade and placed in position by General McCook in person. Nothing further was heard from him by me during the day, but his list of casualties shows that he was hotly engaged, and the testimony of distinguished officers who witnessed the conduct of his command, justifies me in saying that officers and men gave proof of skill and courage worthy of the heroes of Rowlett's Station. Here-with I submit Colonel Willich's report for full particulars. Obedient to orders, the balance of the brigade was deployed in line of battle in rear of the Fourth Brigade under General Rousseau, then closely engaged. His ammunition being exhausted, the Sixth Brigade was ordered to advance, which command was executed promptly and in perfect order. The enemy's infantry, concealed by tents, behind trees and in dense undergrowth, opened a terrific fire on our whole line simultaneously. With one battery he opened on the Fifteenth Ohio, holding the right, with another he annoyed the left of the Forty-ninth Ohio, holding the left, and with a third he poured a torrent of grape on the Thirty-ninth Indiana, holding the center. The fire of the enemy's infantry was promptly responded to along our entire line. Our volleys were delivered with rapidity, regularity and effect. The enemy's lines were shaken, and we steadily pressed forward, driving him before us at least eighty rods. I here discovered that under cover of a ravine the enemy was turning my left, and at once ordered the Forty-ninth Ohio to change line of battle to the rear on first company, which order was executed with perfect order under a heavy fire. Lieutenant William C. Turner was dispatched to General McCook to inform him of the danger of my left, but the fire of the Forty-ninth Ohio from its new position soon drove the enemy back, and the regiment moved forward into line. The enemy now, with increased force, made a second demonstration on my left, and the Forty-ninth Ohio again changed line to the rear and arrested his advance. Captain Bouton with two guns of his Chicago battery reached the ground

at this junction, and after silencing the enemy's battery which had been annoying my left, moved quickly to the left of the Fifteenth Ohio, and opened on the batteries which had up to that time harassed that regiment and the Thirty-ninth Indiana. The enemy's guns were quickly silenced, and Captain Bouton has my warmest thanks for the aid so skillfully and gallantly rendered. The Forty-ninth Ohio, having again moved forward into line and my left being supported by troops ordered forward for that purpose by General McCook, I again ordered an advance, and our line pushed forward in gallant style, driving the enemy before us a full half mile and taking possession of the camp from which a portion of General Sherman's division had been driven the day before, including the General's headquarters. The enemy now abandoned the contest and retreated under the protection of his cavalry, leaving us in possession of that portion of the field and two of his hospitals crowded with his wounded."¹

Colonel Gibson praises the conduct of the officers and men of the brigade and makes special mention of Mr. Rodig, hospital steward of the Fifteenth Ohio, for his efficiency in caring for the wounded. "Little Rodig," we called him, was afterwards promoted to second lieutenant and yielded up his life at the battle of Nashville.

The battle had raged all along the line from early morning. The enemy had been driven from position to position, making his last desperate stand near Shiloh Church, near which General McCook's division and a portion of General Grant's forces were posted. The last charge was made under the personal direction of General Grant, who gathered up two or three regiments, among them the First Ohio of General Rousseau's brigade, and ordered them to charge across an open field in Rousseau's front, where the enemy was making his last stand. They moved forward in gallant style, drove the enemy in utter rout and thus ended the battle.² By this time the enemy had retreated all along the line, but was making extraordinary efforts to save his artillery and trains. The troops of both Grant's and Buell's armies were too much exhausted to make vigorous pursuit. General T. J. Wood's division of General Buell's army came on the field after the fight was over and under General Grant's directions moved forward in pursuit of the fleeing foe but was unable to reach them with small arms.³

The men of the Fifteenth Ohio, the Sixth Brigade and Second Division of Buell's army may well feel proud of the part they took in the struggle of that memorable day.

¹ W. R. R. 10, part 1-315

² General Rousseau's report, W. R. R. 10, part 1-309, and Grant's Memoirs.

³ W. R. R. 10, part 1-378.

General Sherman, in his official report, says, "I concede that General McCook's splendid division from Kentucky drove back the enemy along the Corinth road, which was the great central line of this battle. There Beauregard commanded in person, supported by Bragg's, Johnston's and Breckenridge's division."¹ They were on the part of the line where the enemy made his most stubborn resistance and where the fight was hottest. This is shown by the official lists of casualties. The losses in Nelson's division were 716, in Crittenden's 465, and in McCook's 916.

The casualties in Grant's army on the second day of the battle are not stated separately, but the losses in General Lewis Wallace's division, which was the only one not engaged on the first day, were 296. The losses by brigades in McCook's division were: Rousseau's, 311; Kirk's 346; Johnson's, 261. The losses by regiment's in Johnson's brigade were: Thirty-second Indiana, 96; Fifteenth Ohio, 75; Forty-ninth Ohio, 40; Thirty-ninth Indiana, 36. There is testimony outside the reports of our immediate commanders, showing the gallant bearing of our officers and men. General Sherman, especially, pays them a high tribute. In his official report he says that under cover of the fire of artillery, "we advanced till we reached the point where the Corinth road crosses the line of McClernand's camps, and here I saw for the first time the well ordered and compact columns of General Buell's Kentucky forces, whose soldierly movements at once gave confidence to our newer and less disciplined forces. Here I saw Willich's regiment advance upon a point of water oaks and thicket, behind which I knew the enemy was in great strength, and enter it in beautiful style. Then arose the severest musketry fire I ever heard, which lasted some twenty minutes, when this splendid regiment had to fall back. * * * The enemy had one battery close by Shiloh and another near the Hamburg road, both pouring grape and canister upon any column of troops that advanced toward the green point of water oaks. Willich's regiment had been repulsed, but a whole brigade of McCook's division advanced beautifully, deployed and entered this dreaded woods."² He says he ordered his Second Brigade, then commanded by Colonel T. Kirby Smith, and his Fourth Brigade, Colonel Buckland, to form on the right of the brigade of McCook's division, and all to advance abreast with it. He says this brigade, which he afterwards learned was Rousseau's, "moved in splendid order steadily to the front sweeping everything before it."³

1 W. R. R. 10, part 1-251.

2 W. R. R. 10, part 1-251-2.

3 W. R. R. 10, part 1-252.

The following is a carefully revised list of the killed and wounded and missing in the Fifteenth Ohio:

Company A.—Wounded: James E. Boyd, Robert Hammond, Jacob Kissinger, William R. Stewart, John D. Fleming.

Company B.—Wounded: Sergeant William McClenahan, Alfred C. Gleaves and John Frazier.

Company C.—Killed: Reuben Hissong. Wounded: Sergeant Thomas C. Davis, Corporal William A. Rogers, Corporal Hugh S. Moore, Reuben Davis, Daniel Shuma, Enoch Numbers, Hiram A. Morehouse, Joel T. Miller (died of wounds at Lexington, Ky., Sept. 1, 1862), and William C. Markwood, who was also reported missing.

Company D.—Wounded: Color Bearer, Sergeant William C. Mulford and Caleb Hesser.

Company E.—Killed: John Campbell, Joseph Hewetson, Stacey B. Craft. Wounded: Sergeant John H. Thompson, Andrew J. Taylor, Edward P. Mechem (died of wounds May 8, 1862), John W. Harris, William R. Smith, Charles J. Williams.

Company F.—Killed: James McKirahan. Wounded: Levi Brock, George A. Porterfield and David Mills.

Company G.—Killed: James McBride Dickey, William N. Beach, Martin B. Leedy. Wounded: Benjamin F. Cline, Wilson Barcus, Henry S. Robinson, William Wood, William F. Curtis, Jeremiah Mackley, John F. Gardner, William H. Shade, Jacob Stauffer, N. P. Hagerman.

Company H.—Wounded: Philip Beamer, Reuben H. Cremean, William H. H. Deniston, Christian Harnley, George Myers, James L. Updegrove, Andrew J. Stewart, William H. Payne.

Company I.—Wounded: Daniel Geiseman, Barnet Sims, Charles E. Livenspire, James T. Purdy.

Company K.—Wounded: Levi Atkins, Simpson G. Haines, Alanson Herrick, John W. Ridgeway, Giles Tillet.

After the first days fierce struggle at Pittsburg Landing the newspapers were filled with alarming reports of the battle. It was said that the Union forces had been surprised, that many of them had been bayoneted in their tents, that General Grant was drunk, that no steps had been taken to entrench the camps, that thousands of lives had been sacrificed by the inefficiency and carelessness of the officers in command, and that General Grant's forces were only saved from utter defeat and capture by the timely arrival of General Buell's army.

A storm of hostile criticism was directed against General Grant, the chief officer in command. Relatives and friends of

those who had been killed and wounded and some officers who had disgraced themselves, wrote letters to the newspapers which increased the fury of the storm. The stories of the battle thus set afloat made a deep and strong impression which still to some extent prevails.

The first official reports given to the press did not tend to remove such impression. General McClelland in his official report impliedly stated that General Prentiss, with his division, had been captured early in the morning of April 6th, thus lending credence to the story that his troops had been surprised and some of them bayoneted in their tents. Generals Buell, Nelson and Crittenden, in their official reports, dwelt upon the demoralization of Grant's army at the time of their arrival, and also gave credence to the newspaper reports.

General Prentiss and many of his brigade and regimental officers, unfortunately, had been captured by the enemy and could make no reports of what had occurred on their part of the line. General Grant bore the storm of reproach which had burst over his head in silence, but General Sherman took up a cudgel in his defense and in the newspapers denounced these stories as vile calumnies.¹ But they had come to be generally believed and his fierce invective had little effect. General Grant never made any official report of the battle. A few days after it was over General Halleck arrived at Pittsburg Landing, ordered the reports of division commanders sent direct to him, and General Grant never saw them until some time afterwards. It was not until after General Prentiss was exchanged and returned from captivity, that the real truth in regard to what occurred on the Union left, his heroic fight against overwhelming numbers and the hour of his capture, were known by the public.

In one of the articles on the Civil War published in the *Century Magazine* in 1885, General Grant first broke silence and gave his story of the battle of Shiloh. Afterwards in his memoirs he repeats the story, striving to correct or modify statements in his century article which he feared were unjust to others. In the foregoing narrative the pertinent facts in the official reports and correspondence have been given and they confirm General Grant's story. In their examination, preconceived opinions and strong prejudices have been laid aside, with a desire to report only the truth.

It was natural that in the thirst for glory General Buell and his division commanders should exalt their own achievements by enlarging upon the desperate condition of General Grant's forces when General Nelson's division arrived on the field, the de-

1 Sherman's Memoirs

moralization of the skulkers they saw at the landing, and their loss of all sense of shame. They seem not to have realized that there were perhaps nearly 20,000 of General Grant's troops who had not been stampeded and all day had bravely faced greatly superior numbers, before their arrival had completely checked the enemy's advance, and were under orders to renew the fight next day. General Grant pertinently remarks that if they could have seen the rear of the enemy's line, they would have seen as great, if not greater demoralization among the Confederate troops. This is confirmed by General Bragg's official report, in which he states that on April 6, the Confederate ranks were "thinned by killed, wounded and stragglers, amounting to nearly half our force." As their entire losses in killed, wounded and missing were officially reported to be 10,699, their stragglers must have numbered over 10,000. But these contentions and bickerings are now almost forgotten. It must be admitted that the fierceness and fury of the first day's battle far surpassed that of the second day, which was fierce and furious enough to satisfy the ambition of those engaged in it. That is shown by the official reports of casualties. The losses in Grant's army, the larger part of which occurred the first day were, killed: 1513; wounded, 6601; missing or captured, 2830; total, 10,944.

In Buell's army the casualties were, killed: 241; wounded, 1807; captured or missing, 55; total, 2103.¹

Both armies fought with determination and valor. It was the first great battle in which many of the troops were engaged. Many of them had not been long enough in the field to be properly trained and disciplined, and it is little wonder that some of them became panic-stricken and fled the field. Afterwards these same troops who fled at Shiloh received the proper training and discipline and fought bravely on many a bloody field.

It was the first great battle in which the Fifteenth Ohio was engaged. It had had a long period of severe training and discipline and its ranks stood firm. It was a fiery ordeal, but its experience was valuable, and its lessons were not forgotten in other battles and campaigns in which it was afterwards to take part.

¹ W. R. R. 10, part 1-108.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE SIEGE OF CORINTH.

The night of April 7, 1862, after the fighting of the day was over, General Grant sent a note to General Buell saying that it was his intention to have the infantry occupy the most advanced position for the night and follow up the success of the day with cavalry and fresh troops, expected to arrive, but that the fatigue of the men after three days fighting and marching would preclude the idea of making any advance that night without the arrival of the expected reinforcements. He stated that his plan therefore would be "to feel on in the morning with all the troops on the outer lines, until the cavalry and a sufficient force of artillery and infantry support to follow them was ready for a move." He also stated that previous instructions, and a dispatch received that day from General Halleck, would not permit an advance beyond Pea Ridge, or some point from which the troops could return in a day.¹

The above mentioned dispatch from General Halleck is not found.

A Mr. Stevens, Western Union telegraph operator at Cincinnati, O., states that "General Halleck gave orders to General Grant some days previous to the battle that in case he was attacked not to pursue the enemy. Consequently pursuit was not kept up for any distance."²

It is now apparent that it was a great mistake that the enemy was not vigorously pursued. He was thoroughly beaten and dispirited and if he had been hotly pressed, his artillery and trains and a good part of his army would have been compelled to abandon Corinth. General Bragg in a dispatch to General Beauregard, dated three miles on the road from Mickey's to Corinth, April 8, at 7 A. M., says:

"Our condition is horrible. Troops utterly disorganized and demoralized. Road almost impassable. No provisions and no forage, consequently everything is feeble. Straggling parties may get in tonight. Those in the rear will suffer much. * * * It is most lamentable to see the state of affairs, but I am powerless and almost exhausted. Our artillery is being left all along the road by its officers; indeed, I find but few officers with their men."³

¹ W. R. R. 1, part 2-96

² W. R. R. 10, part 2-104.

³ W. R. R. 10, part 2-398.

Again at 2 P. M., he sent another dispatch to General Beauregard saying:

"The roads are horrible and unless we can mend them it is impossible for the artillery to get in. The teams are exhausted by incessant labor and no forage. * * * I left General Hardee behind in command with working parties on the road, but the men are exhausted, dispirited and work with no zeal."¹

General Breckenridge, who was in command of the rear guard, at 5:45 P. M., April 8, sent a dispatch from Mickey's to General Bragg, saying:

"My troops are worn out, and I don't think can be relied on after the first volley."²

It was said that the Union troops were too much exhausted to pursue the enemy, but that is only partly true. General Wood's division of nearly 6000 men came to the field the evening of the 7th after the fighting was over. They did pursue the enemy for a short distance that evening, but were comparatively fresh next morning. General Thomas' division, of over 8000 fresh troops, arrived shortly after General Wood's. Colonel Ammen in his diary says it arrived on the 7th.³ General Wallace's division, of over 7000 men, had had no marching and few losses and was not at all exhausted by the battle of the 7th. The Third Kentucky Cavalry, which all day of the 7th, had held their horses across the river from the landing, were ferried over that evening. There were over 20,000 comparatively fresh troops which, on the morning of April 8th, could have been sent after the defeated and demoralized army. They could have been closely supported by other cavalry, which, owing to the nature of the ground, had taken little part in the two days' battle, and by those portions of Nelson's, McCook's and Crittenden's divisions which had suffered few losses and had had a night's rest, even if it had been in the rain. They would cheerfully have made the sacrifice.

It was, perhaps, not wholly because of General Halleck's orders that the enemy was not promptly followed up. His real strength was not known and it was feared that he would receive reinforcements and return and renew the struggle. It seems that there was actually a suggestion that the Union forces should retire across the river and there await reinforcements. This may have been caused by the results of reconnoissances sent out the morning of April 8, particularly that of General Sherman on the Corinth road, where in the affair of Fallen Timbers, his advance was charged upon and routed by the enemy's cavalry led by

1 W. R. R. 10, part 2-399.

2 W. R. R. 10, part 2-400.

3 W. R. R. 10, part 1-336.

General Forrest.¹ But, be that as it may, General Grant April 9, sent a dispatch to General Halleck saying there was little doubt that the enemy intended concentrating at and near Corinth all the force possible, that they had sent steamers up the White River in Arkansas to bring down Van Dorn's and Price's commands and were also bringing forces from the east, and adds: "I do not like to suggest, but it appears to me that it would be demoralizing upon our troops to be forced to retire upon the opposite bank of the river and unsafe to remain on this for many weeks without large reinforcements."²

The strength of General Beauregard's forces, as compared with the combined strength of General Grant's and Buell's armies, seems to have been overestimated.

April 9, General Beauregard sent a dispatch to General Cooper, Adjutant General at Richmond, saying that he could then muster only about 35,000 effectives.³ His field returns of April 15, by which time he had probably received some reinforcements, show an aggregate present of 43,529.⁴ On the other hand, the strength of the Union forces was under-estimated.

The field returns of General Grant's forces of April 10-15, show an aggregate present of 34,206,⁵ while the returns of Buell's army for the month of April made up of division returns of earlier dates than April 30, but perhaps later than April 7, show a probable aggregate present of over 35,000,⁶ making a total aggregate present April 8, in Grant's and Buell's armies of 69,206.

Surely with such a superiority in numbers a vigorous pursuit should have been ordered and the result doubtless would have been successful. Even if begun as late as April 10, it probably would have succeeded, for at that time the enemy had received no reinforcements, though six regiments had been ordered from Chattanooga and Kingston.⁷

But both officers and men of Grant's and Buell's armies were greatly depressed by the terrible losses they had suffered, and worn by the severe strain of the two days' battle. The roads were very bad, the country was difficult and little was known of the enemy's strength and resources. Halleck's over-cautions orders were in the way, and so a great opportunity was lost.

Fortunately, on April 8, General Halleck was able to report to Generals Grant and Buell that General Pope had captured Island No. 10 in the Mississippi river, and on April 15, his army of 21,510 men was ordered to Pittsburg Landing.⁸ Other reinforcements were hurried forward until the Union forces at

1 W. R. R. 10, part 1-639

2 W. R. R. 10, part 2-99

3 W. R. R. 10, part 2-403

4 W. R. R. 10, part 2-421

5 W. R. R. 10, part 1-113

6 W. R. R. 10, part 2-148

7 W. R. R. 10, part 2-409

8 W. R. R. 10, part 2-107

Pittsburg Landing were increased to an aggregate of 128,915.¹ The Confederate Army at Corinth had at the same time received large reinforcements and on May 26, had reached an aggregate present of 75,402.²

General Halleck arrived at Pittsburg Landing April 13, and took immediate command of all the forces which were to operate against Corinth, and ordered that Generals Grant and Buell should retain the immediate command of their respective armies in the field.³ April 22 he informed General Pope that General Grant's army would form the right wing, his right resting on Owl Creek; General Buell's the center, his left resting on Lick Creek, and General Pope's the left, his right connected with General Buell. April 28, in the orders preparatory to a general advance, General Grant was to command the right wing.⁴ But April 30, an order was issued transferring General Thomas' division to the Army of the Tennessee, placing General Thomas in command of the right wing and making General Grant second in command,⁵ thus practically retiring him from active service. The order, however, specified that General Grant should retain General command of the District of West Tennessee, including the Army Corps of the Tennessee, and reports should be made to him as before. General Sherman, in his memoirs, says that soon after General Halleck's arrival at Pittsburg Landing it became manifest that his mind had been prejudiced by the rumors which had gone forth to the detriment of General Grant: that when he issued the orders reorganizing the whole army, General Grant was substantially left out and was named "Second in Command," according to some French notion, with no well defined command or authority; that for more than a month he thus remained, rarely complaining, but feeling deeply the indignity, if not insult, heaped upon him; and that after the occupation of Corinth by our forces he obtained a leave of absence with a view of retiring from the service, but was dissuaded therefrom by his, Sherman's, advice.⁶ General Grant soon found himself completely ignored. His division commanders were directed to report direct to General Halleck and were receiving orders in the same way. He complained about this treatment and May 12, General Halleck wrote him a letter which throws a curious light on the incident. In it he says:

"I am very much surprised, General, that you should find any cause of complaint in the recent assignment of commands. You have precisely the position to which your rank entitles you. * * * You certainly will not suspect me of any intention to

1 W. R. R. 10, part 2-235.

2 W. R. R. 10, part 2-548.

3 W. R. R. 10, part 2-105.

4 W. R. R. 10, part 2-138.

5 W. R. R. 10, part 2-144.

6 Sherman's Memoirs.

injure your feelings or reputation or to do you any injustice; if so, you will eventually change your mind on the subject. For the last three months I have done everything in my power to ward off the attacks which were made upon you. If you believe me your friend you will not require explanations; if not, explanations on my part would be of little avail. ¹

While the army was thus being reinforced and reorganized, the troops at Pittsburg Landing went through another period of practical inaction, save only the usual round of drill, police and guard duty and an occasional reconnoissance.

The morning of April 8, the Fifteenth Ohio got breakfast and after making a detail of men to aid in gathering up the wounded who still lay on the field, marched out about five miles in pursuit of the enemy and then returned to a position near the place where it had fought the day before.² Gregory in his diary says, "Oh, what a horrible sight, ground covered with dead and dying men and horses." It commenced raining again about midnight and the men were compelled to rise and sit by the campfires until daylight.³ April 9 and 10, the men remained quietly in camp and were visited by some of the officers of the Forty-sixth and Sixty-fifth Ohio Regiments who reported their experiences during the battle.

The evening of the 10th, Major Wallace formed the regiment in line and made a speech praising the men for their gallant conduct in battle and thanking them for the confidence they had shown in him as their commander.⁴ April 11 was practically without incident to break the monotony of standing or sitting about in the rain and wet, for as yet we were without tents. April 12 was a very wet day. In the evening the wagons of Companies E and G came up and the men of those companies rejoiced in having tents to sleep in. During the day we moved our camp a short distance to a better position. Major Smith and Chaplain Baker of the Forty-sixth Ohio, came over in the afternoon. Gleason says, "We came in for a good deal of praise from the Forty-sixth boys, who generally blame their generals for not being prepared to resist the attack on the first day, having been duly warned of the enemy the day before. General Grant comes in for a good share of the criticism, it being claimed that no regular line was established until General Buell came on the field and established one." April 13 was a clear bright day; other wagons came up and the men were about to pitch tents when an order came to get ready to go out on picket. We marched to an open field where the entire brigade had assembled for the same purpose.

¹ W. R. R. 10, part 2-182

² Gregory's Diary

³ and ⁴ Gleason's Diary.

The brigade took a westerly course and marched about four miles where it halted and posted guards for the night. The left wing of the regiment was fortunate in being a part of the reserve. The night passed without alarm or disturbance of any kind. We were ordered to sleep with accouterments on and consequently did not rest well. The morning of April 14 broke bright and fair and gave promise of another fine day.

Gleason got permission to go on a scout to an old Confederate camp, not far away, and noticed in the woods a beautiful shrub which he could not name, which bore a white and pink blossom and was very fragrant, having an odor like the garden pinks at home. He also noticed that the frogs in that region made a bleating noise like that of a young lamb or kid.¹ Our relief arrived between 10 and 11 o'clock and we marched back to our camps, where we arrived at 12:30 P. M., and at once set about pitching tents. As soon as the tents were up, many of the men began writing letters home. It was the first opportunity they had to do so since the battle. That evening the men were a good deal worked up over an account of the battle in the Chicago Tribune, which made favorable mention of Wood's and Thomas' divisions, which were not in the fight, and did not mention our division at all.

April 16, we moved about two miles further west and encamped in a wheat field. April 17, the men were busy putting quarters in order. The weather was very warm. April 18, orders came to send overcoats and other winter clothing to the landing to be sent home. About noon the long roll was beaten in the camps of other regiments, our drummers took it up and the loud voice of Adjutant Taft was heard calling us to "fall in." The regiment and, indeed, the entire division, was soon in line and marched out to the picket line where we remained until about 4 o'clock. During this time the picket line was advanced about two miles farther to the front. While we were so occupied a violent thunder storm broke upon us and a heavy rain drenched us to the skin. It was said that the alarm was given and the movement ordered to accustom the troops to getting out promptly.²

April 19, it rained steadily all day and the men not on guard duty kept their tents. In the evening Colonel Dickey returned and took command of the regiment. April 20, was Easter Sunday. Gleason says that the question of "eggs" came up in his mess but that old Gouger (Geiger), the sutler, wanted 50 cents per dozen and they decided to go without them. In the evening "the singers" sang several songs from the "Jubilee." April 21, was

¹ and ² Gleason's Diary.

another rainy day, with the usual discomforts of such days, but we had become accustomed to them and did not worry about them. In the afternoon Lieutenant Colonel Wilson returned. That evening Captain A. C. Cummins, who had resigned the day before, left for home.¹ April 22, a curious incident is related by Gleason. He says that he and some of his comrades got permission to go to a deserted Confederate camp to look for relics; that they found quite a number and packed them in a barrel to send home; that the relics only filled one-half the barrel and they filled the other half with *their surplus coffee* to help pay transportation. This shows that the United States was very liberal with its coffee or that Gleason's mess was very sparing in its use. In the evening Gleason got his singers together and sang several glees.² April 23, regular inspection was ordered for 9 a. m. The men were formed in line and waited for a full hour before our time came. There was an exchange of wounded prisoners that day and our regiment made coffee for them.³ That evening, some of the boys having got somewhere a couple of fiddles and men who could play them, there was a regular old stag dance in one of the company's streets.⁴

April 24, while some of the men were still at dinner we were suddenly called into line and hurriedly marched out to the front. The entire division was called out to support a reconnaissance in force, ordered by General Halleck.⁵ We marched out about five miles from camp where we learned that our cavalry, supported by artillery, had made a dash on a Confederate camp at Monterey, taking a number of prisoners and burning their quarters. We met the cavalry coming back and saw that they had nine prisoners with them—stout lusty looking fellows. As soon as the cavalry passed us we about faced and marched back to our camps.⁶ We learned that Captain Gilliland had resigned on account of ill health. In the evening orders came to be ready for picket duty at 11 o'clock next morning. It was raining the morning of April 25, and rained most of the day. Between 10 and 11 o'clock the regiment started out on picket duty, taking the same route we had taken the day before. We marched about two miles and took post for the night. In the late afternoon the rain ceased and we had rather a pleasant night, free from disturbance or alarm. April 26, we were relieved about 11 A. M., and made a quick march back to camp, where we arrived about noon.

April 27, we had inspection at 9 o'clock. There was a movable picture gallery in camp and many of the men had their

1 McConnell's Diary.
2 Gleason's Diary.
3 McConnell's Diary.

4 McConnell's Diary.
5 W. R. R. 10, part 1-677.
6 Gleason's Diary.

pictures taken to send home. Our teams went to the landing, taking our surplus clothing, which was put on a steamboat bound for Louisville. We had dress parade at 5 p. m.¹ April 28, it was reported that the enemy had again occupied Monterey. There was dress parade at 5 P. M., and about dark we received orders to march at 7 o'clock next morning.²

We had now been three weeks encamped on and near the battleground of April 6 and 7, while General Halleck was assembling the grand army for the movement against Corinth. He was now ready and the advance was to begin. General Halleck, April 28, issued preliminary orders for such movement, but they did not fix the hour or the day when it was to commence. In it he specified that the usual allowance of wagons per regiment should be thirteen—one for each company—two for field officers and one for extra ammunition—and that a company officer should be detailed to inspect the men's food at each meal to see that it was properly cooked.³ The allowance of transportation to each regiment in the light of our subsequent experience seems extravagant. We had not then learned to rid ourselves of useless impedimenta, strip ourselves of every useless encumbrance, even knapsacks, and go through great campaigns carrying everything we needed on our backs with only enough wagons to carry necessary supplies and ammunition.

On the morning of April 29, reveille sounded at 4 o'clock and we had breakfast and were ready to move at the hour designated. Captain Gilliland took leave of his company and regiment and went to the landing to await the acceptance of his resignation. Shortly before 7 o'clock we fell in and were soon on the march. We moved very slowly, for the whole division was moving. After we had passed the place where we had been on picket we turned toward the left. Our pulses had been quickened by hearing distant cannonading. Company A, by order of General McCook, was sent to the front as skirmishers and beat the woods in front of our column in order to prevent surprise.⁴ About mid-afternoon, after a march of four or five miles, we halted and pitched tents about one-half mile from Lick Creek and about one mile to the left of the Corinth road.⁵ The woods where we camped were full of "varmints" of every description.⁶ April 30, was clear and pleasant and we cleaned up and policed the streets of our camp and put everything in good sanitary condition. The boys had a good deal of fun chasing squirrels and wild turkeys, but were not allowed to shoot them. Quite a num-

1 Gleason's Diary.

2 McConnell's Diary.

3 W. R. R. 10, part 2-138.

4 Gregory's Diary.

5 W. R. R. 10, part 1-677.

6 Gleason's Diary.

ber of recruits for the regiment arrived, among them E. L. Quick and Daniel Stanton, Company H, and Alexander Lord and William Ross, Company I.

May 1, the men of Company H were a good deal worked up over the assignment of Lieutenant Culbertson of Company D to the command of their company. They preferred their own Lieutenant Scott and looked upon Lieutenant Culbertson as an intruder. There would probably have been a public manifestation of their feelings, had not an order to go on picket intervened at 3 P. M. We moved out to the picket line about a mile and a half south of our camp and posted guards for the night. The weather was pleasant and the night passed without disturbance. About noon the next day Lieutenant Colonel Wilson came along the line and said we were to march next morning with seven days' rations and advised us to be prepared for a long rapid march.

We were not relieved until 4 P. M. and were late getting back to camp. On arrival the trouble in Company H was settled. Captain Kirby of Company D had resigned and Lieutenant Culbertson would take his place, thus leaving Lieutenant Scott in command of Company H.¹ Gleason, Gregory and McConnell all note in their diaries that on this day we received *our first sky blue pants*. The morning of May 3, every one was astir early and we began preparations for marching. Our orders directed us to be ready to march at 11 o'clock. We were all ready by that time but had to stand by the roadside an hour waiting for the advance troops to pass. We finally got started but there were frequent halts and our progress was so slow that at 6 P. M. we had only gone two miles. About that time we heard heavy cannonading in front which indicated an attack in earnest, but it finally ceased. When we got started again we made up for lost time and marched at a rapid pace, part of the time at a double-quick. After marching at this rapid rate for a mile and a half we came to quite a steep hill and ascended it at such a killing pace that some of the men could not keep up. We finally reached the summit and kept on at a double-quick for quite a distance, when we turned to the left into the woods where we formed line of battle and stacked arms.

Colonel Dickey here passed along the line and told us we were near the enemy's lines and that if he was wise he would attack us at daybreak next morning. He exhorted us to remember Ohio and the friends at home.² Our wagons did not come up so officers and men slept on the ground without shelter, many of them on beds of leaves. The morning of Sunday, May 4, we

¹ and ² Gleason's Diary.

were informed that we were not to attack the enemy on that day and the men were permitted to take off their accouterments, provided they kept them within reach. But we were not allowed to rest long. The Colonel soon came along the line and ordered us to be ready in eight minutes with guns and accouterments to go with the brigade on a reconnoissance. We took the Hamburg and Corinth road,¹ passing several camps, and halted opposite that of Nelson's division. After a short halt we hurried on about six miles and threw out skirmishers. Our skirmishers advanced two miles further where they came upon the enemy's pickets which were posted about two or three miles from Corinth, exchanged shots with them, driving them back and then returned. Our brigade then marched back to camp, having accomplished the object of the reconnoissance.²

It had commenced to rain about noon and continued all the afternoon, making the ground slippery and the marching hard. To add to the discomfort, when we started back we were hurried as if our lives depended on our getting back quick and the men vented their displeasure on the Colonel with curses deep if not loud.³ We finally reached camp at 4:30 wet to the waists.⁴ We were tired out and went to rest early, but were awakened by Adjutant Taft with orders to march at 6 A. M. next morning with three days rations. The morning of May 5, reveille sounded about 4 A. M. and we were ready to move at the hour designated. It had rained all night and the prospect for the day was dismal indeed. After waiting about two hours we were much relieved by the announcement that we would not move unless the enemy came out and attacked us and every one made himself as comfortable as he could the rest of the day. May 6, was clear and pleasant. We had reveille at 4 A. M. and got ready for an early start when the movement was again postponed on account of the roads, which were said to be impassable for artillery and trains. A large detail from the regiment was sent out with picks, shovels and axes to repair the roads. Rumors were rife that Corinth had been evacuated. In the evening orders came to be ready to march at 6 o'clock next morning. The men made beds of green branches to keep them out of the mud.

The morning of May 7, we moved out about 7 o'clock but progressed slowly. The roads were bad and we had to keep the artillery along with us. As soon as the road was clear, however, we marched rapidly forward for four or five miles and halted while the generals selected proper camping grounds. We were soon moved to the left of the Hamburg and Corinth road and went into camp in an unusually fine location. Our position was

1 W. R. R. 10, part 1-678
2 W. R. R. 10, part 1-678

3 Gleason's Diary
4 Gregory's Diary

a little south of Seven Mile Creek; General Wood's division was on our right and General Nelson's was on our left.

May 8, we remained in camp all day. Our wagons came up and we pitched our tents and made ourselves comfortable. About 9 A. M. some men of the Twenty-ninth Indiana and Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania who were at work on a bridge over Seven Mile Creek were attacked by the enemy, when a spirited skirmish took place in which the enemy was driven off with a loss of four killed, a number wounded and one prisoner. Our loss was one killed, three wounded and one captured; all of the Thirty-ninth Indiana.¹ That evening after we had returned we heard heavy cannonading over on the left, in the direction of General Pope's command.

May 9, at 8:30 A. M., we were ordered out on picket duty. We marched about a mile and a half south towards Corinth, where the four right companies of the regiment were posted as picket guards and the four left companies, with the Forty-ninth Ohio, placed in proper position as a reserve. Soon afterwards firing was heard on the left which gradually extended to our front and continued for about half an hour. The enemy had attacked our pioneers, killing and wounding several, who were carried back past our post. We expected to be ordered to the front but were not, as it was reported the enemy had fallen back. Adjutant Taft went back to camp to report the attack and soon came back with Captain Dan McCook, A. A. G. at division headquarters, who told the Colonel he ought to send out the two pieces of artillery which were with us and "belt h—l out of them."² The pioneers were then ordered back to work and there was no further disturbance in our front.³ During the day we heard cannonading over on the left in the direction of General Pope's position. It was reported that General Pope had driven the enemy and taken many prisoners. The firing we heard was at Farmington where a large force of the enemy moved out against our left wing and attacked General Pope's advance brigade. Quite a severe engagement took place, and General Pope, being under instructions from General Halleck to avoid a general engagement, withdrew his troops behind Seven Mile Creek. His losses were 178 killed and wounded.³ May 10, between 9 and 10 A. M., the First Ohio and a battalion of regulars came out to relieve us, but they had no artillery with them and we had to wait until a section of artillery was sent out. When it came we marched back to camp which we reached about

1 General McCook relates this incident as occurring on the 8th (W. R. R. 10, part 1-678) but Gleason, Gregory and McConnell place it on the 9th.

2 Gleason's Diary
W. R. R. 10, part 1-804-5

noon. We had barely time to eat our dinners when orders came to pack up and move at once. After we had struck tents and loaded our wagons General Wood's division took the road in advance of us and we were kept waiting until 6 P. M. We then pulled out but soon overtook General Wood's train which hindered our progress until we came to where his division had halted. From this point we pushed on quite rapidly about two miles and turned into an open field where we supposed we would bivouac for the night. A detail of five men from each company was sent forward on picket until we could learn if there was a picket line in front of us. The pickets did not have to stand guard very long, as we soon resumed our march and moved forward about half a mile to a woods where we lay all night in line of battle.

The attack on our left wing in such force May 9, caused some anxiety on the part of our superiors. The Hon. Thomas A. Scott, Assistant Secretary of War, who was with General Pope's army, was thrown into a momentary panic, and at 10 P. M. that evening telegraphed to Secretary Stanton that the enemy was in overwhelming force and that a heavy reinforcement of infantry and artillery should be sent to General Halleck at once or he would soon be besieged in the heart of the enemy's country.¹

May 11, we lay in line of battle until dusk when we marched about a mile to the left and bivouaced near General McCook's headquarters. Our division had been designated as the reserve of the center of the army before Corinth.²

May 12, at 2:30 A. M., the adjutant came round with orders to be ready to move in three quarters of an hour. Our entire brigade, supported by General Rousseau's brigade, was to go out on a reconnoissance to ascertain the position of the enemy. We moved out on the Hamburg road to Chambers Creek, where General Rousseau's brigade was posted as a reserve, and our brigade sent forward to develop the enemy. We soon came upon the enemy's pickets, drove them in and then returned to camp,³ which we reached about noon. General McCook in his official report says this reconnoissance took place on the 14th, but all our diarists place it on the 12th.

May 13, news of the battle of Williamsburg and the taking of Memphis reached our camps. It was also rumored that Corinth had been evacuated and General Johnson was reported as saying that we would not be in the service more than six weeks longer.⁴ That evening Colonel Gibson of the Forty-ninth Ohio,

1 W. R. R. 10, part 1-803
2 W. R. R. 10, part 1-678

3 W. R. R. 10, part 1-678.
4 Gleason's Diary.

returned from a leave of absence.¹ There was some picket firing during the day. May 14, water being scarce a number of wells were dug to add to our supply. He had dress parade in the evening when it was announced that the paymaster was at the landing and would soon be out to pay us off. There was heavy cannonading off to our right. May 15, we went out with the division on a reconnoissance. There was hard marching but no fighting. May 16, there was the usual round of camp duty and dress parade in the evening. After dress parade orders were published to be ready to march a 8 A. M. next morning with three days' cooked rations and Colonel Dickey said he believed "the dogs of war would bark tomorrow."²

May 17, we had roll call without reveille, packed knapsacks and were ready to march at the time appointed. We then stacked arms and awaited orders. No orders to move came. There was heavy cannonading on the right and it was reported that our troops had effected a lodgment on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and had been attacked by the enemy but had held their ground.

The next ten days we lay in camp on reserve, engaged in the usual routine of camp duties. During that time some changes in the officers of the regiment took place. The non-commissioned officers and men of Company H had heard that Captain Culbertson was again to be assigned to command the company, and signed a petition to the Governor asking that Lieutenant Scott be promoted to Captain and placed in command of the company. Their petition, however, was disregarded and Lieutenant Cyrus Reasoner of Company A was promoted to captain and placed in command of the company. This caused a good deal of dissatisfaction and some of the men proposed a concerted plan to disobey his orders. Wiser counsels, however, prevailed. Lieutenant Scott resigned and after a time it all blew over.²

While we were thus resting quietly in reserve General Halleck was pressing his lines towards Corinth by regular approaches. Scores of miles of well-constructed intrenchments were made and as our men advanced from one position to another, other intrenchments were built and it was said our troops had discarded guns for the pick and spade. The advance to a new position was usually contested by the enemy and almost every day we heard cannonading and sometimes musketry, but were not called upon to take part in the movements. By this time, however, our army was nearly up to the enemy's advanced works and had control of or were close up to the Memphis and Charleston Railroad

¹ McConnell's Diary.

² Gleason's Diary.

east and west of Corinth. General Halleck was still over-estimating the enemy's strength and Assistant Secretary Scott and others were so persistently urging that reinforcements be sent to him that on May 24, Mr. Lincoln was constrained to send him a telegram, saying in substance, that all the commanders along the line from Richmond to Corinth believed they were confronted by superior numbers, that the War Department had done the best it could to meet calls for reinforcements, and that he believed the brave officers and men of his, Halleck's, army would be victorious at Corinth.¹

General Halleck answered this dispatch on the 25th, saying he had not asked for reinforcements, but only whether any were coming. If they were, he would wait for them; if not, he would venture an attack; that his army was now in the immediate presence of the enemy and the battle might occur at any moment; that he had every confidence he would succeed but did not like to run any risk, etc.² At that time General Beauregard and his chief officers had held a council of war and decided to evacuate Corinth, and on May 26, orders were given accordingly.³

May 27, the regiment drilled for an hour in the morning and after drill returned to quarters. The men were eating their dinners when the bugle sounded "Attention," and the companies fell into line, but stacked arms in order to get two days rations in their haversacks. The men had hardly time to get their dinners when we were ordered to "fall in" and the whole division was soon moving out to the front on the Hamburg and Corinth road, our brigade in advance. We were halted for a short time to allow a large body of other troops to get out of our way and then pushed on. About two miles out we passed General Buell's headquarters and a half mile further came into a large open space near Wood's division which was posted behind strong intrenchments. After an hour's delay our brigade moved out half a mile beyond the intrenchments, where we formed line of battle. The Thirty-second Indiana threw out a strong skirmish line which advanced, engaged the enemy's pickets and drove them back across Bridge Creek, suffering a loss of two men wounded. General McCook in his official report relates this advance as occurring on the 26th, but General Buell and our diarists place it on the 27th, which is doubtless correct. After this skirmish was over we lay down for the night, expecting to be called to arms at any moment, but were undisturbed. The night was cool; we were without our blankets and some of the men got little sleep.

1 W. R. R. 10, part 1-666

2 W. R. R. 10, part 1-667

3 W. R. R. 10, part 2-546

May 28, according to General Buell's report, McCook's, Nelson's and Crittenden's divisions all advanced, and our division, General Rousseau's brigade leading, drove the enemy from and occupied Serratt's Hill, a commanding position which was less than a thousand yards from the enemy's works and the nearest point occupied by any of the troops in front of Corinth previous to the evacuation.¹

General McCook gives a detailed report of the advance of our division and states that his skirmishers drove the enemy across Bridge Creek and over Serratt's Hill and kept up the pursuit until 4 P. M., when an officer came to him and reported that the advance was not more than 200 yards from the enemy's intrenchments. He says the losses in Rousseau's brigade were thirteen men wounded and in our brigade seven wounded, five in the Thirty-second and two in the Thirty-ninth Indiana. The enemy's loss was reported to be forty-one killed and seventy-three wounded.²

The following account of our operations is taken substantially from Gleason's diary: On the 28th about 10 o'clock, General McCook came back from the front and said "we would go out and see what we could find." We then moved out about one-fourth of a mile, formed line of battle and awaited the progress of events. Skirmishing was going on a short distance to the front and artillery firing to the right and left. It was understood that General (T. W.) Sherman was trying to carry an important position known as McGee's Hill and that our brigade was expected to support him. The Thirty-second and Thirty-ninth Indiana were in front as skirmishers, the Fifteenth Ohio supporting the former and the Forty-ninth Ohio supporting the latter—Ohio thus supporting Indiana. As the enemy was driven back we advanced and the enemy was driven back across a field, but held his position in the woods across it until Cotter's battery came up and shelled the woods. We then crossed the field, but were at once recalled to our former position in the edge of the woods. Sharp firing all along the line took place; our skirmishers were driven back and it was thought there was a general advance of the enemy. We took position along the fence overlooking the field, while Cotter's battery to our left poured a raking fire into the woods where the enemy was supposed to be advancing. We held our position along the fence without attempting any further advance. That night after dark we posted four companies and five men from each of the other six companies, all under command of Captain Culbertson, in the center of the field to give warning of the enemy's approach. We could

1 W. R. R. 10, part 1-675

2 W. R. R. 10, part 1-670

hear quite a hubbub in the enemy's camp and towards morning saw quite a number of rockets which were sent up by the enemy as signals of some kind. A Sergeant of Company K¹ was sitting on the ground behind the fence with his gun between his knees trying to keep awake, when the first rocket was discharged. It went up with a great roar and he thought it was a shell coming straight towards him. Acting upon a natural impulse he dropped his gun and hugged the ground to escape it. He soon saw that it was a rocket instead of a shell, and looked around to see if any one had noticed his momentary panic. Fortunately no one saw him and he kept the incident to himself.

May 29, we lay all day and all night along the fence above mentioned, annoyed a good deal by the enemy's sharp shooters in the woods across the field, to whose fire our skirmishers replied in a vain effort to put them out of business. They were concealed in the woods and when they would fire our men would notice the puffs of smoke from their guns and aim at them. One of the enemy's sharp shooters was particularly annoying and came near his mark a number of times. The boys got familiar with the crack of his rifle, which they called "Long Tom," and a determined effort was made to get rid of him. Finally one of the men climbed a tree off to the right and after a little maneuvering fired and reported that he "had got him." This was probably true, for we heard no more the familiar crack of "Long Tom." It was a pleasant day in the woods, barring the fire of the sharpshooters, and we had nothing to do but await developments on other parts of the line. A siege gun on our left kept booming away, throwing shells into Corinth, but evoking no reply, and an occasional rattle of musketry, also on the left, indicated some activity on that part of the line. The quartermaster brought up some rations to piece out our nearly exhausted supply. The sutler had ventured up within half a mile of our line, and supplied ale to those who cared to go that distance for it and could get permission to do so. General McCook's headquarters were a short distance above us in the woods. About noon we saw some negroes spreading a cloth on the ground for the noonday repast of himself and staff and noticed that his larder was well supplied with eatables and drinkables. Not far away Edward L. Quick of Company H, "Lasky" the boys called him, was lying on the ground asleep. He suddenly started up with a cry of pain and began running round and round crying out and holding his hands to his head. General McCook came running down, took hold of him and on inquiry found that a bug had crept into his ear. The General at once

1 The writer.

directed him to lie down on his side, produced a flask and poured some whisky into his ear when the bug came out. By this time a crowd had collected, among them the General's staff. All laughed heartily over the incident, and Mr. J. W. Collier, the General's purveyor, upbraided him for wasting the whisky when water would have served the purpose quite as well. Gleason notices the incident in his diary but says the bug came out before the whisky was poured in. A short time before General McCook's death the writer had the pleasure of meeting him, when the incident was recalled. Late that evening we were relieved by the Thirty-second Indiana, and bivouaced near General McCook's headquarters.

The evening of the 29th, General Buell proposed to General Halleck to advance and crowd the enemy back and across Bridge Creek and suggested that General Pope should also be prepared to advance at the same time. General Halleck replied that General Pope was of the opinion that he could not advance without bringing on a general engagement. General Buell therefore gave orders for a general advance next morning.

The morning of May 30, we were up early and ready for action. The day was expected to be the decisive one of the campaign. Soon came a rumor that deserters had come into General Nelson's lines and reported Corinth evacuated. We soon fell in and moved forward across the open field. Just before the regiment reached the woods on the farther side of the field, Sergeant Hanson of Company A and Sergeant Cope of Company K, were ordered to step a hundred paces to the front of the right and left respectively of the regiment and advance into the woods to see if the enemy was in ambush there.

They found no sign of the enemy and the regiment moved forward. We soon cleared the woods and came in full view of the enemy's intrenchments which were entirely deserted. We then marched by the flank inside the enemy's fortifications and beheld the town, which seemed wholly abandoned. Much of it was in smoldering ruins. We here halted to await orders and learned that Nelson's division had preceded us by about two hours. General Buell in his official report states that about 4:30 A. M. he received a message from General Nelson saying that the enemy were evacuating the place and that he ordered his troops to advance, but in view of dispatches he had received from Generals Halleck and Pope two and a half hours before, he ordered General Nelson to adhere to his original instructions and advance at the time appointed. He adds that very soon after this the divisions of McCook and Nelson entered the enemy's works.¹

¹ W. R. R. 10, part 1-676

Toward evening the entire brigade moved back towards the woods under orders of General Johnson. One regiment had already crossed a road leading to the south and the Fifteenth Ohio, led by Colonel Dickey, had just commenced to cross it, when General Nelson at the head of his division, hot and dusty from a vain pursuit of the enemy, came marching up the road we were crossing. General Nelson in a loud angry voice, with much profanity, ordered Colonel Dickey to take his regiment out of the way and let his troops pass. Colonel Dickey said he was moving under orders of General Johnson and being already partly across the road had the right of way. Thereupon General Nelson got into a towering rage and cursed the colonel up and down. Colonel Dickey put his hand on his holsters and glared at General Nelson as if he intended to draw his pistol. The general saw the glare and exclaimed, "God d--n you, don't you look at me that way."¹ The altercation finally ended by the general placing Colonel Dickey in arrest and ordering him to take his place in the rear of the regiment, which the colonel sullenly obeyed.

General Nelson then called on Lieutenant Colonel Wilson to take command of the regiment and turn it aside, which order was also obeyed, and we waited until his entire division had passed. A few months later at Louisville General Nelson was shot by General Jeff. C. Davis, when this incident was recalled, and some thought that if General Davis had been in place of Colonel Dickey at Corinth, the tragedy which resulted in his death would have occurred there instead of at Louisville. General Nelson was a brave and most capable officer and it is a matter of unavailing regret that his ungovernable temper resulted in his loss to the country, which at that time sorely needed his services. Had he lived he would doubtless have greatly distinguished himself and attained high rank in his country's service.

After General Nelson's division had passed we counter-marched and took position, for the night we supposed, near an old Confederate camp. We had just made ourselves reasonably comfortable when an order came to go on picket. We started at once and after several halts reached the center of the town and halted near the ruins of the Confederate commissary department. There was quite a quantity of stores uninjured by the fire, among them some hogsheads of sugar, from which the men supplied themselves liberally. We crossed the railroad on a high bridge and after going a short distance halted and sent out three companies as picket guards. The other companies were constituted the reserve. The men were without shelter or blankets and got what rest they could on the bare ground.²

¹ Colonel Dickey was cross-eyed

² Gleason's Diary.

After more than seven weeks of digging, with little marching or fighting, the great army of General Halleck had taken Corinth. General Halleck duly reported it to the Secretary of War on May 30, in several dispatches. The first merely stated that his advance guards were in Corinth; the second, that the enemy's works were exceedingly strong and that General Beauregard evidently distrusted his troops or he would have defended so strong a position: that in his flight he destroyed an immense amount of public and private property, stores, provisions, wagons, tents, etc.; that for miles out of town the roads were filled with arms, haversacks, etc., thrown away by the flying troops and that General Pope estimated that 2000 prisoners and deserters had been captured. His next dispatch stated that General Pope with 50,000 men was pursuing the demoralized enemy. June 4, he telegraphed that General Pope with 40,000 men was thirty miles south of Corinth pursuing the enemy hard and had already reported 10,000 prisoners and deserters and 15,000 stands of arms captured and that thousands of the enemy were throwing away their arms.¹

General Pope afterwards denied that he had ever made such report,² but it evoked from Secretary Stanton the following, dated June 4, 1862:

"Your glorious dispatch is just received, and I have sent it to every state. The whole land will soon ring with applause at the achievement of your gallant army and its able and victorious commander," and from President Lincoln a message saying, "Thanks for the good news."³

The land soon rang, not with applause, but with criticism and ridicule that so great an effort had resulted in such little gain. The special correspondent of the Chicago Tribune in a dispatch dated May 30, wrote as follows:

"General Halleck has achieved one of the most barren triumphs of the war. In fact it is tantamount to a defeat. It gives the enemy an opportunity to select a new position as formidable as that at Corinth and in which it will be far more difficult for us to attack him, on account of the distance our army will have to transport its supplies. * * I look upon the evacuation * * as a victory for Beauregard * * It prolongs the contest for at least six months. * * * * * General Halleck must be deeply mortified at the evacuation. It shows that he knew nothing of the position and strength of the enemy and his ulterior designs."⁴

¹ W. R. R. 10, part 1-668-669.

² W. R. R. 10, part 2-635-636.

³ W. R. R. 10, part 1-669.

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Whitelaw Reid, the special correspondent of the Cincinnati Commercial, May 30, wrote to that newspaper the following:

"On the day the Second Division moved out, advances with heavy cannonading were made by Thomas on the right and Pope on the left, but not a response in kind was elicited from the enemy. During that night we could hear teams being driven off and boxes being nailed in the rebel camp. * * * Last night the same band sounded retreat, tattoo and taps all along the rebel lines, moving from place to place, and this morning suspicion was ripened into certainty when we saw dense columns of smoke arise in the direction of Corinth and heard the report of an exploding magazine. Corinth had been evacuated and Beauregard had achieved another triumph. I do not know how the matter strikes abler military men, but I think we have been fooled. The works are far from being invulnerable, and the old joke of quaker guns has been played on us. They were real wooden guns, with stuffed 'paddies' for gunners. I saw them. We approached clear from Shiloh in line of battle and made preparations to defend ourselves compared with which the preparations of Beauregard sink into insignificance. This morning we could have poured shot and shell from over 300 guns into works that never saw the day when General McCook could not have taken his division into them. The rebel force here did not exceed 60,000 men. With what light I had I regarded the mode of our advance on Corinth as deep wisdom; with the light I now have I do not."¹

The columns of other newspapers of the country were crowded with similar comment and our great campaign against Corinth became the subject of ridicule throughout the country. We had taken the place, it is true, but after all our vast preparations and large expenditure of time and strength the military power of the rebellion had not been materially weakened. The taking of Corinth was a practically bloodless victory and resulted in little material gain to the cause of the Union.

1 W. R. R. 10, part 1-772

CHAPTER IX.

THE MARCH FROM CORINTH, MISS. TO BATTLE CREEK, TENN.

May 30, 1862, General Halleck, not yet satisfied that the enemy was in full retreat, and evidently apprehensive that he might return and deliver an attack on some portion of his line, issued an order directing General Pope to withdraw his forces and occupy the high ground southeast of Corinth. General Thomas by the same order was directed to fall back to the enemy's entrenchments and hold the Corinth and Purdy Road and, with General McClelland's division in reserve, be prepared to meet any movement of the enemy on our right flank. General Buell was directed to place a cavalry force in Corinth, occupy the enemy's entrenchments with one division and hold his forces in the rear, ready to move to the right or left.¹ In view of our now known great superiority in numbers and the enemy's precipitate retreat, one smiles at this over cautious order. It was in pursuance of this order that our (General McCook's) division was placed in control of the place. May 31, however, General Halleck had become convinced that the enemy was in full retreat toward Okolona and telegraphed the Secretary of War that he did not propose to follow him far into the Mississippi but would immediately proceed to open the railroad to Decatur, Ala. and Columbus, Ky.²

At that time General George W. Morgan with the Seventh Division of General Buell's army was holding Cumberland Ford on the river of that name and watching a force of the enemy at Cumberland Gap, 12 miles away. General Ormsby M. Mitchell, commanding the Third Division of General Buell's army, by a remarkably brilliant campaign had cleared Middle Tennessee of the enemy, except some roving bands of free booters, and held the north bank of the Tennessee River from a point near Chattanooga to Decatur, Ala.³ He had also occupied positions in the mountain regions bordering on the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad from which he menaced Chattanooga.⁴ He could have taken and held that place if the reinforcements he repeatedly called for had been furnished. We now see that those could easily have been supplied from General Halleck's great army at Corinth without impairing its necessary strength. It was with a view of opening connection with General Mitchell's troops that

¹ W. R. R. 10, part 2-230

² W. R. R. 10, part 1-668

³ W. R. R. 10, part 2-876

⁴ W. R. R. 10, part 2-892

General Halleck was preparing to repair the railroad from Corinth to Decatur.

May 31 he suggested to General Buell that General Mitchell be directed to cross a small force at Decatur and repair the railroad and telegraph line towards Corinth. The same day he ordered General Buell to immediately put his engineer regiment and such railroad officers and men as he might have, at work to open and repair the road from Corinth to Tuscumbia, sending with them a sufficient force to guard the working parties.¹ General Buell the next day, June 1, issued orders putting his engineer regiment at work on the bridges near Corinth, and assigning General Wood's division to the duty of repairing the Memphis and Charleston Railroad from Corinth to Decatur. General Wood was ordered to assume military command of the expedition, to furnish the necessary working parties and guards, to take necessary precautions to prevent surprise and to give all orders necessary to accomplish the speediest repair of the railroad and secure the government interests. General W. S. Smith was detailed as superintendent of the work, and General Wood was directed to honor his requisitions for fatigue parties, etc.²

June 2 General Halleck ordered General Buell to push General Wood's division toward Decatur, repairing the road as rapidly as possible as they advanced and saying, that it was possible that the original army of the Ohio would soon move in that direction and that he, Buell, should make arrangements on that supposition.³ Probably on this suggestion General Buell, June 3, directed General Nelson, unless otherwise ordered, to move his division to the Bear Creek bridge on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, following up General Wood's division, and at the same time General Wood, on General Nelson's approach to Bear Creek, was to move his division further on towards Decatur.⁴ General Pope, however, who had been following up the enemy, reported that they were making a stand at Baldwyn on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, and General Halleck ordered General Buell to move two of his divisions to reinforce General Pope.⁵ General Buell decided to go with his two divisions and made known his intention to General Halleck, who directed him to take command of all the forces moving against Baldwyn. He also informed General Buell that it was not the intention to pursue the enemy beyond that place, and that the repair of the railroads was the great object to be attended to, after getting the enemy at sufficient distance so that he could not cut our lines.⁶

1 W. R. R. 10, part 2-232.

2 W. R. R. 10, part 2-236.

3 W. R. R. 10, part 2-244.

4 W. R. R. 10, part 2-250-251.

5 W. R. R. 10, part 2-253.

6 W. R. R. 10, part 2-254.

June 5 General Pope found the enemy in force posted behind Twenty-Mile Creek, reported the fact to General Halleck and said that he proposed to attack him if not prevented by orders to the contrary.¹ June 6 General Buell arrived at Twenty-Mile Creek and reported to General Halleck that he "should not run any improper risk." The same day General Halleck telegraphed General Buell saying that if he, Buell, "was confident the enemy was retiring," he might assume command and make the attack but that no risk should be taken.² June 7, while General Buell was preparing to press the enemy at Twenty-Mile Creek, General Mitchell telegraphed from Huntsville, Ala. to General Halleck, that the enemy still occupied the railroad from Tusculumbia to Decatur, that he had no force to drive him out, that he supposed this would be done by General Buell, but was informed by that officer that his troops would not probably pass east of Bear Creek for seven or eight days.³ The same day, evidently on receipt of this dispatch, General Halleck directed General Buell to urge General Wood to push forward the work on the Bear Creek bridge with all possible dispatch and employ every man who could find room to work on it.⁴

June 8 General Buell issued elaborate orders for an attack next day on the enemy's position on Twenty-Mile Creek, but at midnight found that he had retreated and reported the fact to General Halleck.⁵ General Mitchell had sent a force under General Negley against Chattanooga which reached the side of the Tennessee river opposite the town June 7, and June 8, after a six hours' artillery duel, drove the enemy from his rifle pits and compelled him to evacuate the place.⁶ General Mitchell reported this event to General Buell June 8, and expressed the opinion that every effort should be made to maintain the position General Negley then held. He urged that if we fell back the door would be opened to the enemy to pour in troops at the exact point they had already determined to use, and that if we commenced to fall back it was difficult to determine where we could stop. He deemed this a matter of such importance that he requested orders of both Generals Buell and Halleck.⁷

These views of General Mitchell in the light of subsequent events seem prophetic. June 8, the eastern line of General Halleck's department was changed so as to place all of the states of Kentucky and Tennessee under his command.⁸

June 9, General Buell reported to General Halleck that he had countermanded the order for an advance upon Bald-

1 W. R. R. 10, part 2-258.

2 W. R. R. 10, part 2-264

3 W. R. R. 10, part 2-271

4 W. R. R. 10, part 2-268

5 W. R. R. 10, part 2-273-274.

6 W. R. R. 10, part 1-920

7 W. R. R. 10, part 2-275

8 W. R. R. 10, part 2-277

wyn and that everything indicated the enemy was continuing his retreat.¹ General Halleck the same day, probably on receipt of this report, dispatched to General Buell saying that it was useless to pursue the enemy further, and directed him to send another division toward Tusculumbia to repair the railroad and drive out the enemy this side of Decatur. In the same dispatch General Halleck urged that connection with General Mitchell be made with all possible dispatch and added, that he was only waiting for advices from Washington to order his. Buell's movement.² The same day in another dispatch General Halleck ordered General Buell to move Nelson's and Crittenden's divisions in the direction of Decatur on such roads as he might deem best, to send General T. W. Sherman's division to Corinth, to replace McCook's, and to order General McCook's division east.³ Orders were at once given by General Buell for the movements of General Nelson's and General Crittenden's divisions as above directed. June 9, General Buell reported to General Halleck General Mitchell's dispatch of June 8, above given, and stated that he had instructed him on June 7, that he was in no sufficient force to advance on Chattanooga, and that if he succeeded in taking it he would jeopardize the force sent there and expose middle Tennessee.⁴ The same day, June 9, General Mitchell sent a dispatch direct to General Halleck, which is so important in view of subsequent events that it is given in full:

Huntsville, Ala., June 9, 1862.

General Halleck:—I have kept General Buell fully advised of my own movements and those of the enemy. Fearing my dispatches may not have reached him I venture to address you direct. Having heard that the enemy was passing troops from Chattanooga across the Tennessee for the purpose of occupying Jasper, Winchester and the mountains bordering on the river and railroad, I sent an expedition under General Negley to arrest the movement of the enemy and drive them back, and this has been handsomely done, and General Negley on the 7th held a position opposite Chattanooga, as well as Jasper and all the ferries, thus effectually shutting that door of entrance; but on yesterday I learned that a heavy force was threatening Murfreesboro and the adjacent posts, and I am thus compelled to withdraw General Negley and send him to reinforce Colonel Lester. Since the fall of Corinth the enemy being relieved from the necessity of concentrating all his strength at that point, will be at liberty to advance through Cumberland Gap into Kentucky, from Knoxville across the mountains into Nashville and from Chattanooga into Northern Alabama.

Pardon me if I have exceeded the limits of my duty. It is for me to report that my force is totally insufficient to do anything more than to guard the extensive region over which they are spread from

1 W. R. R. 10, part 2-279.

2 W. R. R. 10, part 2-280.

3 W. R. R. 10, part 2-281.

4 W. R. R. 10, part 2-280.

hostile citizens and small bands of the enemy. I wait your orders with anxiety.

O. M. MITCHELL, Major General.¹

General Halleck seems to have been too much occupied with the repairs of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad to heed General Mitchell's prophetic warning as to the probable movements of the enemy, if the Union troops were withdrawn from Chattanooga, and instead of sending Mitchell reinforcements to enable him to hold his advanced positions, he merely advised him that General Buell would move one division across Bear Creek at once and that another would follow soon, and urged him to get some locomotives and cars across the river at Decatur with all possible dispatch, to aid in repairing the railroad.²

It is now apparent that if Generals Buell and Halleck had heeded General Mitchell's warning and had sent him the reinforcements he needed, the immense disaster which a few weeks afterwards overtook the Union arms would have been prevented. It was sheer folly to waste time in repairing the railroad from Memphis to Chattanooga as a means of supplying Buell's army. It ran 300 miles through the enemy's country and was liable to be broken at any hour. After experience demonstrated this fact. If General Mitchell had been properly reinforced at this time, as could easily have been done from the great army at Corinth, Chattanooga could have been occupied and held and the whole of East Tennessee would have been abandoned by the enemy. General E. Kirby Smith, who was in command of the Confederate forces in East Tennessee, June 6 sent a dispatch to the war department at Richmond saying, that General Mitchell's movement upon Chattanooga, he feared, "involved the loss of East Tennessee and with it the railroad, Cumberland Gap and Chattanooga."³ June 7, General Smith gave orders to General Stevenson, commanding the Confederate forces at Cumberland Gap, looking to its abandonment,⁴ as well as the retirement from Chattanooga.

General Halleck, as has before been stated, had ordered General Buell eastward from Corinth along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, repairing it as he went, and laid such emphasis on rebuilding bridges and putting the railroad in running order, that General Buell seems to have acted on the idea that this was the chief object of his movement. In fact he afterwards claimed, when charged with neglect of

1 W. R. R. 10, part 2-282

2 W. R. R. 10, part 2-283

3 W. R. R. 10, part 2-597

4 W. R. R. 10, part 2-598

duty in not getting to Chattanooga in time to prevent the enemy's concentration at that point, that "General Halleck desired that the movement should be made as promptly as possible, but it was a condition that the railroad from Corinth east should be repaired and it was his idea that I should draw my supplies by that route."¹ The military commission which tried General Buell in its report states: "We are of the opinion that General Buell had force sufficient to accomplish the object if he could have marched promptly to Chattanooga. The plan of operations, however, prescribed by General Halleck, compelled General Buell to repair the Memphis and Charleston Railroad from Corinth to Decatur, and put it in running order as a line of supply during his advance."² General Halleck indorsed this report as follows: "So much of the report as states that General Buell's march on Chattanooga was delayed by the repairs of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad and that General Buell's line of supplies was unnecessarily long is incorrect. General Buell had no other line of supply but this road until he reached Decatur and connected with Nashville. General Buell was not delayed an hour beyond what he himself deemed necessary to secure his supplies. Moreover, his lines of supply were those which he himself selected."³

There seems to have been no written orders to General Buell directing his movement eastward from Corinth to Chattanooga. The Military Commission above mentioned states that "on the 11th day of June, General Buell with his army of the Ohio was ordered by General Halleck to march against Chattanooga, and take it, with the ulterior object of dislodging Kirby Smith and his rebel force from East Tennessee."⁴

We have already noted that on June 9, General Halleck directed that the division of General T. W. Sherman be sent back to Corinth from Twenty Mile Creek to relieve our division, McCook's, so that it could be ordered east. No order directing General McCook to move is found, but June 12, he acknowledged receipt of such order, and said he would move as ordered. General McCook at the same time acknowledged receipt of an order about extra baggage.⁵ The order about extra baggage was probably issued by General Buell June 3, and directed that each soldier in his army should have the following named articles of clothing and none other: One blanket, two shirts, two pairs drawers, two pairs socks, one

1 Statement of General Buell reviewing evidence before military commission. W. R. R. 16, part 1-30.

2 W. R. R. 16, part 1-9.

3 W. R. R. 16, part 1-12.

4 W. R. R. 16, part 1-9.

5 W. R. R. 16, part 2-18.

jacket or blouse, one pair pants, one pair shoes and one cap or hat, and no articles of clothing were to be carried in the knapsack except such of the above as were not worn.¹

In the preceding chapter we left the Fifteenth Ohio on the night of May 30, posted as pickets a short distance out of Corinth. At noon May 31, it was relieved from picket duty and started back to the camp it had occupied May 27, previous to the final movement on Corinth. It was a hot afternoon and it was a tiresome march, as most of the men were overburdened with loot gathered in the deserted camps of the enemy. There was a good deal of straggling and as the regiment approached camp a good many of the men began firing off their guns, preparatory to cleaning them up, they said. The firing was without orders and Gleason and "Billy" Geller of Company E, were caught in the act by Colonel Gibson and placed in arrest. However, Lieutenant Carroll interceded for them and they were not punished.² June 1, one half of the regiment was paid off. June 2, Gleason says Colonel Dickey signed a paper commending Lieutenant Scott's record while with the regiment. Lieutenant Scott had resigned and next day went to the landing where he took a steamboat for home. June 3, at 6 A. M., the entire division broke camp, marched into Corinth and stacked arms in the edge of the town. General Halleck rode up and passed us just as we halted.³ June 4 and 5, we were in camp near Corinth, engaged in usual camp duties and having company drills. On the morning of June 6, we marched about a mile east of the town and went into camp on a large plantation. The wagons soon arrived, the tents were pitched and the men then scattered in search of dew berries and huckleberries which were abundant in the fields and woods. One party found a wild plum thicket laden with fruit which was soon stripped bare.⁴ June 7 and 8 there was only the usual round of camp duty. June 9, a detail of forty men was sent into the city to clean and drain the streets. Gleason was with the detail and frankly states that the sun was very hot and that they did not overwork themselves. There was great cheering throughout the camp that evening, and at dress parade Major Wallace announced that news had come that Richmond had fallen and that 10,000 prisoners had been taken. He said he had called us out in order that we might give three cheers for the glorious victory. Of course the cheers were given, but many doubted the truth of the story.⁵ Gregory says in

1 W. R. R. 10, part 2-628

2 Gleason's Diary

3 McConnell's Diary

4 Gleason's Diary

5 Gleason's Diary.

his diary: "Our brigade is nearly all drunk over the news that Richmond has been taken with 16,000 prisoners." June 10, in the morning rations of whisky were issued to the men. It was mixed with quinine at which many grumbled but most of them partook of it. Some of the men worked all the forenoon digging a well and had reached a good supply of water when orders came to be ready to march at a moment's notice. Later we were ordered to be ready by 3 P. M. We struck tents, packed up, and were ready to move at the appointed time. Not receiving orders to move, we stacked arms and waited. At 4:30 P. M., the orders came, the bugles sounded and we moved out, taking a short route to the road leading eastward from Corinth, thus avoiding the town. When we reached this road we marched eastward until we reached the Purdy road and there turned south, passing through Farmington and General Pope's long line of formidable intrenchments. We then again turned toward the east. Our march was over a hilly region. The hills were partly covered by pine trees and there were no streams to furnish needed water. We continued our march after night-fall. Many of the men became exhausted and fell out, and nothing but the hope of soon reaching water prevented others from doing so. At 10 P. M., McConnell says 11 P. M., we halted near a stream of water and bivouaced for the night, having marched fifteen miles.¹ June 11, at 7 A. M., we resumed our march. Our brigade had the lead of the division. We passed through an extensive swamp and then came into another hilly region and the most extensive pine forest we had yet seen. The sun was hot and the road dusty, the halts were few and the men soon began to fall out in considerable numbers. Gleason was one of the stragglers and relates that when he, with others, came to the springs near Iuka, "General McCook with his staff was there and spoke kindly to them, telling them to drink all they wished and then fill their canteens." The regiment reached Iuka about 3 P. M. and went into camp about a mile beyond the town. There was a small stream near by which furnished a good supply of water and afforded the men the luxury of a bath. June 12, there were no marching orders and all enjoyed a day of rest. That evening General McCook received the following order from General Buell:

"March for Florence with your division tomorrow morning. You are expected to reach that point on the 14th instant and rest there on the 15th, during which day you will have everything closed up snug for crossing the river on the 16th.

¹ McConnell says 12 miles

General Crittenden follows you, so keep your troops and trains well in hand.”¹ The same day General Halleck issued an order directing that the states of Kentucky and Tennessee east of the Tennessee River, except Forts Henry and Donelson, and such portions of North Alabama and Georgia as are or may be occupied by our troops, will constitute the District of the Ohio under command of Major General Buell, and that the District of West Tennessee should include all that portion of the state west of the Tennessee River, and Forts Henry and Donelson.²

June 13, we resumed our march at about 6 A. M., and were eager to make as much time as possible before the heat of the day. In this we were disappointed. The trains of the brigades preceding us encountered bad places in the road and caused frequent and annoying delays. About the middle of the afternoon we crossed the line between Mississippi and Alabama. There we halted for a long rest, made coffee and had our suppers. We then resumed our march and at sunset came to Bear Creek. We rolled up our trousers, waded through the stream and marched on. A mile or two further on we forded another stream and soon came into an open country where there were many fine plantations with fields of corn as high as our heads. Our march after this was quite rapid, and when we had gone about six miles from Bear Creek we went into camp for the night.³

The morning of June 14, reveille sounded about 4.30 A. M., and by 6 A. M. we were ready to continue our march. Our wagons having come up, we drew rations and then swung out at a good pace, ours being the rear regiment of the brigade. About noon we crossed a stream and halted for dinner. The men at once threw off their knapsacks and clothing and rushed down the banks into the stream for a bath and swim. We had our dinners and rested until 4:30 P. M. We then resumed our march. During the morning General Buell with his staff rode by and seeing a good many stragglers, roundly reprimanded General Johnson for permitting it. General Johnson threw the blame on the colonels and they passed it on down the line. As a result the captains were ordered to cause anyone caught straggling to carry a rail for two hours, and to have the roll call at night in order to detect the delinquents.⁴ We marched until dark when we bivouaced in an open field about three miles from Tusculumbia, having marched thirteen miles.⁵ Before turning in

1 W. R. R. 16, part 2-18.

2 W. R. R. 16, part 2-20.

3 McConnell's Diary.

4 Gleason's Diary.

5 McConnell's Diary.

we had orders to march at 3 o'clock next morning. June 15, reveille sounded at 1:30 A. M., and at the time designated we moved out slowly and reached the outskirts of Tuscumbia at sunrise. We were halted and stacked arms near a beautiful stream of clear water which was said to come from large springs near by. We filled our canteens and then continued our march, passing through a portion of the town. The Tennessee River was three miles distant and before we reached it the sun came out scalding hot. General Buell was apparently directing the march.¹ After nearly reaching the river we had to retrace our steps about a mile. We then marched across a plantation to a bluff above the river where we halted and went into camp. That morning General Buell issued an order directing General McCook to hold one brigade in readiness to cross the river next day. The same order directed that in moving forward on the other side of the river, the brigades should march with considerable intervals, the leading brigade being a day in advance of the other two, the intervals between the last two to be indicated thereafter.²

The site of our camp on the bluff above mentioned was covered with a thick growth of saplings. Water could not be obtained from a large spring 200 feet below. To reach the spring we had to descend the bluff, part of the way on rude, almost perpendicular ladders, fastened to the bluff. Our wagons soon arrived, the saplings were cut away and we pitched our tents in the spaces thus cleared. After this great numbers of the men went swimming and bathing in the Tennessee River. Some of them swam across it, a distance of about one-fourth of a mile. Several accidents occurred. One man was reported drowned, two bitten by snakes and one nearly killed by falling over the bluff³—all of the Thirty-ninth Indiana. June 16, we remained in camp all day. In the evening we heard some fine music by the band of the Fifteenth regulars of Rousseau's brigade. June 17, an order came to turn over all tents except three Sibley and one wall tent to each company, all clothing except one blanket and a change of underclothing,⁴ and pack the surplus to be sent home. In the afternoon there was an inspection of knapsacks to see that the order had been obeyed. That evening a steamboat and two barges laden with supplies came up the river. A large crowd had collected at the wharf to see them land, which the provost guard, under orders of General McCook, soon dispersed. June 18, there was regular inspection and guns were found in bad condition. While at Tuscumbia an

1 Gleason's Diary.

2 W. R. R. 16, part 2-24.

3 Gleason's Diary.

4 W. R. R. 16, part 2-25.

epidemic of gambling broke out and everywhere throughout the camps small groups of men in secluded spots were seen engaged in it. The game was called "chuck-a-luck," and was probably introduced by southern negroes who had come into our lines. Large sums of money were said to have changed hands every day. On the 18th, two men of Company H were said to have cleared up one hundred dollars. The evil became so prevalent that special orders were issued for its suppression and were rigidly enforced by the provost guard.¹ A steamboat came up the river, carrying a railroad engine and supplies, which were landed, and troops were being ferried across the river. June 19, we had little to do but watch the loading of wagons and mules on the ferryboats and talk about the many rumors which, in the absence of news of any kind, were of the wildest character. It was reported that Richmond had been taken and Jeff Davis and Beauregard captured. The absence of reliable news caused some to think that McClellan had been defeated.²

June 20, was uneventful. Some of the men went fishing and caught some fine catfish. In the evening two steamboats came up the river heavily loaded with supplies. General Buell's advance forces had now been nearly two weeks in motion towards effecting a junction with General Mitchell with a view of seizing Chattanooga and occupying East Tennessee, and had only covered the comparatively short distance between Corinth and Tusculumbia. General McCook, as will be remembered, on June 12, had been ordered by General Buell to march toward Florence, Ala., next morning, arriving there on the 14th, and to be ready to cross the river on the 16th. General Crittenden's division was to immediately follow him. But on the 15th, General Nelson, whose division was near Iuka, reported to General Buell that the enemy were said to be concentrating a considerable force at Fulton, with the purpose of attacking our scattered forces in flank.³ This report doubtless caused further delay in the movement eastward. But there were other causes which operated to postpone the movement. June 17, General Buell sent a dispatch to General Halleck saying in substance that "the movement in which he was engaged could not be made without risk if it was not made promptly"; that General Nelson had reported that the enemy was in force at Fulton, Okolona and other points ready to take advantage of any disorder in his arrangements, and on the other hand General Mitchell

¹ and ² Gleason's Diary.

³ W. R. R. 16, part 2-25.

reported that there were 20,000 of the enemy's troops at Chattanooga and more arriving from the west, and that our forces, scattered as they were, were really weaker than a smaller one concentrated. He then stated that in his opinion the importance of the railroad from Bear Creek to Decatur was greatly over-rated; that as a means of transporting troops it was of no value and as a means of supplying those in Tennessee, it was neither essential nor the most convenient.¹

To this General Halleck answered the same day that he appreciated the importance of moving promptly and that he did not think there was any serious risk of a flank attack from Fulton. He also stated that it seemed to him that by repairing the road to Decatur, Chattanooga could be reached sooner than in any other way, but would oppose no objection to Buell's crossing a part of his army at Florence if in his, Buell's, opinion it would facilitate his advance—still he thought the movement along the railroad to Decatur was the shortest and best route.² Late that evening General Nelson from Iuka reported to General Buell that a considerable force of the enemy had advanced from Fulton to a point on Bear Creek, twenty-seven miles from Tuscumbia, and was directed to halt his march at Tuscumbia and await further orders.³ June 18, President Lincoln sent a dispatch to General Halleck wishing to know how the expedition towards East Tennessee was progressing,⁴ in answer to which General Halleck sent the following dispatch:

Corinth, Miss., June 21, 1862.

General Buell's column is at Tuscumbia. As soon as the bridge at that place is rebuilt he will move east more rapidly. The enemy has evacuated Cumberland Gap, must soon leave all East Tennessee. Our troops have reached Memphis and the railroad connection will be complete in a few days.

H. W. HALLECK, Major General.⁵

The same day General Halleck sent a dispatch to General Buell saying he was still of the opinion that the railroad, rather than the river, should be relied upon for supplies, expressing dissatisfaction that such slow progress had been made in repairing it, and directed that the road should be put in order with all possible dispatch.⁶

June 20, General Buell ordered General McCook to begin sending his baggage trains across the river the next day, and saying that the same orders would apply to Crittenden's and Wood's divisions which were to immediately follow him.⁷

1 W. R. R. 16, part 2-33.

2 W. R. R. 16, part 2-33.

3 W. R. R. 16, part 2-34.

4 W. R. R. 16, part 2-37.

5 W. R. R. 16, part 2-43.

6 W. R. R. 16, part 2-43-44.

7 W. R. R. 16, part 2-40.

But on June 22, he received a telegram from General Nelson telling of the advance of a column of the enemy of at least 10,000 men which threatened Eastport. General Buell at once sent General Nelson's dispatch to General Halleck and said that he could move two divisions east across the river next day, and would do so if the reports of the enemy's advance were less serious than at present. General Halleck, on the receipt of the telegram, at once ordered General Thomas' division to Iuka, and a division under General Rosecrans to move against the enemy's flank by the Jacinto road. At the same time General Thomas' division was ordered to report to General Buell, but was not to be moved beyond Tuscumbia.¹ General Buell the same day sent a joint dispatch to Generals Thomas and Nelson ordering, that if the report of the enemy's advance should prove untrue or the danger not serious, General Nelson's division should move to Tuscumbia for further orders.² The same day General Buell telegraphed to General Mitchell at Huntsville that it was doubtful whether reinforcements could be sent to him by the time before indicated, and that he must make his dispositions with that in view.³

June 21, we heard the German bugle call "strike tents" sounded in the tent of the Thirty-second Indiana, and soon an order came directing us to pack up everything and load the wagons. We were also directed to have three days' rations in our haversacks. We loaded the wagons as directed, saw them start for the ferry landing and then waited for further orders. We soon learned that we should probably remain where we were another night. Some of the men went swimming in the river and noticed that it was falling rapidly. That night we bivouaced in the open air. Sunday, June 22, at a very early hour we heard the bugles of the other brigades of our division sounding the reveille, but ours did not sound until the usual time. We got our breakfast and lay around until near 9 o'clock, when the assembly sounded and we started for the ferry landing, the other brigades having preceded us. After a tedious delay we marched aboard the ferry-boat "Lady Jackson" and were ferried across the river. We marched about a half mile from the landing and there waited an hour and a half for the Forty-ninth Ohio to come up. We then marched on and about 1 o'clock reached Florence, Ala., which we found to be a pleasant looking town of about 2000 population, with three or four churches. We passed through

1 W. R. R. 16, part 2-48.

2 W. R. R. 16, part 2-50.

3 W. R. R. 16, part 2-51.

the place and about a mile beyond it and went into camp on a small knoll near the river. There were rumors that we were going home, but such rumors were too good to be true. That afternoon some of the men discovered a bee tree and after nightfall slipped out of camp and cut it down. They were rewarded by a rich store of fine honey which sweetened their toil and also their plain rations.¹ June 23, we remained in camp near Florence. There was little restraint on our goings and comings and many of the men went fishing and swimming in the river. General Buell, who had arrived in Florence, noticed this relaxation of military discipline, and in the afternoon orders were issued prohibiting the men from leaving the camp without a pass from their company commanders. Orders were also issued requiring us to have forty rounds of ammunition in our cartridge boxes and be prepared for a long and rapid march on short notice. We learned that marching orders had been received by other regiments in the division but received none ourselves. The morning of June 24, we heard reveille in other brigades long before it was sounded in ours. While we were at morning roll call orders came to hurry up our breakfasts and be ready to march at 6 A. M. A detail was made to report to Lieutenant Miles of the Forty-ninth Ohio, to act with similar details from other regiments of the brigade as a pioneer corps. We moved out a little after 6 o'clock and took a road leading eastward. We passed through a fine rolling country and some distance out crossed a wide, shallow, swift stream which was spanned by a covered bridge. We marched about nine miles and about noon halted for the day near a beautiful stream—the outlet of Gray Springs, which were not far away.² Orders came to be ready to march at 3 o'clock next morning. June 25, the bugles of other brigades commenced sounding a little after midnight and kept us awake until 1:45 A. M., when our own bugles blared out that it was time for us to be up and getting ready to march. We pulled out at the appointed time and, as the road was fine, we made good time. The day was cloudy and cool and at our frequent halts the men gathered blackberries which grew in abundance along the roadside. We passed through the dilapidated little hamlet of Rogersville and at 5:30 P. M. came to Elk River, which we forded, and about one half mile beyond it went into camp for the night. The other brigades did not cross the river but encamped on its west bank. Our day's march, according to Gleason, had been seventeen miles. McConnell says eighteen

1 Gleason's Diary

2 McConnell's Diary.

miles, and Gregory, nineteen miles. Before turning in for the night orders came to march at 3 o'clock next morning and make eight miles before breakfast. June 26, reveille sounded at 2 A. M. and at 3 A. M. we resumed our march. We moved quite rapidly and before we were aware of it had passed our advance guard of cavalry, leaving them asleep behind us. Three or four miles beyond we halted until the cavalry could come up and take the advance. After a march of ten miles we came to a little creek about five miles from Athens, Tenn., and went into camp in an open field on the farther side of the creek. The captain of Company H was placed in arrest by the provost guard for permitting William Angevine of his company to straggle from the ranks.¹ We heard of several similar arrests in the brigade. Orders came to be ready to march at 6 o'clock next morning. June 27, the bugles sounded reveille at 4 A. M. We were ready to march at 6 A. M., when orders came announcing that we would not move until 4 P. M. Many of the men took this opportunity to write letters home. Our march was resumed at the appointed time, our brigade being in rear of the division. We reached Athens about sunset and halted for awhile opposite a house full of pretty girls, whose fair faces, Gleason says, "were wreathed with smiles and presented quite a contrast to the scowling visages which had greeted us at times." There was a Young Ladies' Institute in the town, which probably accounted for the fair faces mentioned by Gleason. We marched about five miles beyond the town and bivouaced for the night. From the stores which had been accumulating at Athens we drew rations of fresh beef and beans—articles we had not seen for several weeks. Orders came to be ready to march at 4 o'clock next morning. June 28, we were awakened by the bugles at 2:30 A. M., and at 4 A. M. marched off at a brisk pace. We passed through a level fertile country abounding in fine plantations. A decided Union sentiment was manifested at many places. Blackberries of a fine quality were abundant along the road and the men had a surfeit of them. About 10:30 A. M. we came to a small stream called Indian Creek, about eight miles from Huntsville, Ala. where we halted for the day. Our camp was on a bluff overlooking the creek and reminded us of our camp at Tusculumbia, especially, where we had to descend the bluff to get water. Sunday, June 29, we had orders to resume our march at the usual early hour, but reveille did not sound until after 4 A. M., and at roll call we were informed that we would

1 Gleason's Diary

not move until further orders were received from General Buell. During the afternoon many negroes from neighboring plantations came into camp bringing a great quantity of green apples for sale. They were of poor quality, too sour for eating purposes, and when cooked, took too much sugar to make them palatable.¹

We remained in camp at Indian Creek until July 5 occupied with the usual camp duties. June 30, a report came from the Thirty-second Indiana that our forces had taken Chattanooga and a large number of prisoners and had burned the town. Captain Reasoner was released from arrest and sent in his resignation which was approved by Colonel Dickey. During the day we moved our camp to a better place further up the creek and pitched tents in regular order. As many of the men had got to slipping out of camp to hunt blackberries and on other adventures, orders were issued to have roll call at tattoo. July 1, the officers undertook to regulate and control the indiscriminate foraging above mentioned, and a detail of a non-commissioned officer and three men from each mess, under command of Lieutenant Cyrus Askew, was sent out into the country to gather blackberries for the regiment. The detail, of about 100 men, marched out about a mile on the Athens road where a rendezvous was established, and the men in squads were sent out to scour the country and gather and bring in the berries. In the late afternoon the men returned to the rendezvous with buckets and camp kettles laden with the delicious fruit and were marched back to camp. July 2, an old rooster which one of the men had brought into camp the day before, sounded reveille some time before the bugles sounded it, and caused some of the men to swear.² Rations of flour were issued and some of the mess cooks made blackberry cobbles and pies. It was reported that the Fifteenth and Forty-ninth Ohio, under command of Colonel Dickey, were to be sent to Huntsville to garrison the place, and that Adjutant Taft would be detailed as a member of General McCook's staff. Lieutenant Gregg of Company H tendered his resignation, which was accepted. Lieutenant Thos. E. Douglass of Company G, was temporarily placed in command of Company H.³ Newspapers of June 30, announced great successes of our troops near Richmond, Va., but no particulars were given. July 3, Lieutenant Douglass made a speech to Company H, in which he said that his assignment had not been of his own seeking, but if he was continued in command he would try to make the company

1, 2 and 3 Gleason's Diary

equal if not superior to any in the regiment.¹ July 4, was the dullest Independence Day some of us had ever experienced. The day was ushered in by two shots from a revolver. A search was made for the offender but he was not found. We heard cheering in other regiments, but there was no demonstration in our camp except the revolver shots above mentioned. In the evening Gleason got his singers together and sang some pieces from the "Jubilee."² July 5, at morning roll call we were notified to get ready to march. We got breakfast, struck tents and at 9 A. M. moved out in an easterly direction. General Johnson, in General McCook's absence, was in command of the division and Colonel Dickey in command of the brigade. The men were permitted to put their knapsacks in the wagons. We soon came in sight of the Cumberland Mountains, their tops blue in the distance, and after a march of about nine miles, went into camp on a small stream about two miles north of Huntsville, Ala. The First Ohio passed us on their way to Huntville to take cars for Stevenson, Ala. Lieutenant Colonel Wilson and Captains Dawson and Burns returned from leave of absence. Orders came to be ready to march at 4 o'clock next morning.

July 6, reveille sounded at 2:30 A. M., and we marched at the appointed time. We soon came to the foothills of the Cumberland range and began their ascent, which was steep and rocky. The road, after reaching the top of a considerable hill, wound along a ridge for about a mile and then descended into a valley of surpassing loveliness. On the way we met a number of wagons loaded with cotton on their way to Huntsville. After marching ten miles we came to Flint River, a swift, shallow stream, crossed by a railroad bridge which was guarded by a company of the Tenth Wisconsin. We crossed on the railroad bridge, and four miles further on came to a smaller stream where we went into camp, and received orders to be ready to march at 3 o'clock next morning. July 7, we resumed our march at the hour appointed and marched twelve miles to Paint Rock Creek, where we found a railroad bridge 200 feet long, also guarded by a company of the Tenth Wisconsin. The brigade went into camp in the woods about half a mile above the bridge. A short distance above the camp was one of the finest springs we ever saw. It rose from a great depth and discharged a volume of water sufficient to furnish power for a mill which once stood near it. The water was wonderfully sweet and refreshing. July 8, we resumed our march at 4 A. M. Two miles from the bridge

1 and 2 Gleason's Diary.

we passed the village and station of Woodville, whose houses had been burned because a train had been fired on by bushwackers at that point. The road was very rough and rocky. After a march of about twelve miles we came to the pleasant little town of Larkinsville, where, at 3 P. M., we went into camp for the night. Another beautiful spring supplied us with abundance of good water. July 9, we continued our march at an early hour. For a few miles the country was more heavily timbered than any we had passed through and not so hilly. But we soon came to a more hilly region and plodded along until near noon, when we reached Bellefonte, Ala., and went into camp. The town was appropriately named from three beautiful springs, near which we pitched our tents in a fine grove of oaks. A cavalry detachment had occupied the ground previous to our arrival and left us a legacy of flees which disturbed our rest during the night. July 10, we resumed our march at 2 A. M. The road was obstructed by fallen timber. We made slow progress, as we had to wait for the pioneers to clear the way. We crossed a number of small streams, among them Crow Creek, which we forded, and one half mile beyond it went into camp in a dense forest about three miles from Stevenson, Ala. Here we pitched our tents and were told we were to remain for a few days.

We remained in this camp until July 18, awaiting, we supposed, the movements of other troops, and putting in the time as best we could. July 15, we were placed on half rations because of General Forrest's raid on the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad. That dashing officer with a force estimated at 1300 to 2000 cavalry, at 4:30 A. M., the morning of July 13, attacked Murfreesboro, compelled the surrender of its garrison of about 1400 men, and four pieces of artillery, and burned the railroad bridge below the town.¹

July 16, Adjutant Taft returned from leave of absence, bringing a commission as Captain for Lieutenant Thomas E. Douglass, who was permanently assigned to duty as commander of Company H.² Orders were received to be ready to march next morning. July 17, the orders to march that day were countermanded, and in the evening we were notified that we would move at 4 o'clock next morning. July 18, we had reveille at 3 A. M., and moved out on time in the direction of Jasper, Tenn. The road and bridges needed repairing and the pioneers were sent ahead to do the work. Gleason was with the pioneers and relates that while they were building

¹ W. R. R. 16, part 1-810
² Gleason's Diary.

a bridge over a small stream General Johnson, our brigade commander rode up and hearing some of the men complaining about having to work on half rations, told them they "talked more like children than soldiers." He then dismounted and seizing a pick put in a few vigorous blows by way of example. Further on, when the pioneers came to an almost impassable section of the road, the General and his handsome little orderly, Frank, busied themselves helping to carry brush to fill the holes. Before the holes were all filled the boys turned the "half rations" joke on the general. Orderly Frank got hungry and asked if some one could give him a piece of cracker, and only one man could spare any.¹ After a toilsome march of about fifteen miles, we went into camp near Battle Creek, in a dense woods about one mile from the Tennessee River. Here we were destined to remain for more than a month, during which time events occurred which compelled a complete change in the plans of our military commanders.

1 Gleason's Diary.



CHAPTER X.

A MONTH AT BATTLE CREEK AND RETREAT TO NASHVILLE.

While we were making the slow and deliberate march from Corinth to Battle Creek and Generals Halleck and Buell were haggling over repairs of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad between Corinth and Decatur, the opportunity to seize Chattanooga was lost. The activities of Generals O. M. Mitchell and Geo. W. Morgan had compelled the evacuation June 18 of Cumberland Gap¹ and General Kirby Smith was about to abandon Chattanooga.

On June 22, after receiving a telegram from Jefferson Davis, that there was little chance of Bragg's being able to aid him in holding Chattanooga,² he ordered the troops at that point to Knoxville.³ The Confederate authorities at that time were evidently of the opinion that General Mitchell had been reinforced so as to enable him to hold the important commanding positions he had gained. But his withdrawal from before Chattanooga indicated that he had not been reinforced as they had supposed.

June 20, General Bragg was assigned by President Davis to the command of the Confederate Armies in the West, Vice General Beauregard, and June 22, reported to the Confederate Secretary of War that General Halleck had divided his army and that he proposed to strike his center.⁴ Thereupon it was decided to hold Chattanooga and large reinforcements were ordered to that point.⁵ The enforced withdrawal of General Mitchell from the important points he had gained at Chattanooga and along the Tennessee River resulted as he had predicted. The enemy were free to cross the river and threaten our lines of communication and even Nashville itself. We have already mentioned the successful attack of a small force under General Forrest on Murfreesboro and the destruction of the railroad bridge at that place July 14. About this time General John H. Morgan with his own regiment, a Georgia regiment, a squadron of Texas rangers and two additional companies of cavalry, was sent from Knoxville into Kentucky, and in a raid of 24 days, according to his official report, "captured seventeen towns, destroyed all the government supplies and arms in them, dispersed about 1500 Home Guards and parolled nearly 1200 regular troops."⁶ Among the towns he captured were Tompkinsville, Galsgow, Lebanon, Harrods-

1 W. R. R. 16, part 2-683

2 W. R. R. 16, part 2-695

3 W. R. R. 16, part 2-699

4 W. R. R. 16, part 2-701.

5 W. R. R. 16, part 2-707.

6 W. R. R. 16, part 1-770.

burg, Lawrenceburg, Georgetown, Cynthiana, Paris, Crab Orchard and Somerset. This raid produced the wildest sort of a panic in the north, and let to the detachment of two of General Buell's divisions from the main object of his expedition to guard against similar raids, and an order from General Halleck to put down the Morgan raid even if the Chattanooga expedition should thereby be delayed. It also led to an order directing General Thomas's division to move to General Buell's assistance.¹

Encouraged by the success of the Confederate raids above mentioned, General Bragg July 17, ordered all the available cavalry of his command, under General Armstrong, to move toward the Tennessee River near Decatur,² and July 21, issued orders sending the Army of the Mississippi under General Hardee via Mobile to Chattanooga.³ By these movements, General Buell, with an army which, omitting General Thomas' division, contained July 10, an aggregate present of over 65,000 men,⁴ found his communications seriously interrupted, his supplies partly cut off, and was compelled to assume the defensive against an enemy whose numbers were much inferior to his own.

The expedition to "seize Chattanooga and drive the enemy from East Tennessee" was however at that time not entirely abandoned, and troops in large numbers were being moved forward to Battle Creek, Tenn., at which point our division, McCook's, arrived July 18, as related in the preceding chapter.

The more than a month the Fifteenth Ohio passed at Battle Creek was a trying period in its experience. Our camp was in a thick woods near the Tennessee River which was full of miasms; the days were hot, we were most of the time on short rations and part of the time without sufficient clothing. Our shoes and socks and outer garments began to wear out and it was impossible to replace them. The record of our daily doings may be hurriedly sketched as follows:

July 19, after a day of discontented idleness the men had all retired, when an alarm was given and all tumbled out and were hurriedly formed in line of battle. The occasion for the alarm was not explained, and after standing in line for half an hour, we were permitted to return to quarters where we stacked arms and again retired to rest. July 20, there was an inspection of arms. July 21, we began to clean up our camp and some of the men made cots of poles to keep them off the damp ground. Some got permission to go to the river about a mile and a half away, where on the opposite shore they saw the enemy's pickets posted in rifle pits along the river bank. Although they were

1 W. R. R. 16, part 2-143.

2 W. R. R. 16, part 2,728.

3 W. R. R. 16, part 2-731.

4 W. R. R. 16, part 2-120.

within easy range of our rifles, our men were not permitted to fire on them and they did not fire on us. July 22, 23, 24 and 25 were uneventful. We were on half rations and all were constantly hungry. A number slipped out of camp and went foraging for additional food with little success. A number of the men were arrested and brought back to camp and orders were issued from division headquarters, heavily reinforcing the camp guards and requiring daily regulation guard mounting. July 26, 27 and 28, were also uneventful. Squads were sent out under command of commissioned officers to scour the region for food but found little. One squad under Lieutenant Cyrus Askew brought in about two bushels of green apples. July 29, Gleason records that the day was very quiet and that he read the "Merry Wives of Windsor". That evening orders came sending the entire regiment out on picket duty at once, and it was said the entire division was to go out on similar duty at 2 o'clock next morning. Our regiment was posted up on the mountain side and next morning we could see the enemy's camps across the river. July 30, was pleasant until late in the afternoon, when a torrential rain storm flooded the camps, and the men, who had by this time returned from picket duty, had to build scaffolds to sleep on at night.¹

July 31, was remarkable for the arrival of a supply train. Gleason says, "It was amusing as well as pathetic to see the men flocking to the commissary tent to feast their eyes on the piles of cracker boxes," and that "the issue of the crackers made a very agreeable change in the condition of the men". August 1, orders were issued requiring three hours company drill in the morning and battalion drill in the afternoon. The captains of companies at the same time were ordered to have daily meetings of the non-commissioned officers at which they were instructed in their duties. August 3, Colonel Dickey informed company commanders that an officer and one man from each company were to be sent home on recruiting service. In the evening orders came directing the entire regiment to go out on picket duty next morning at 6 o'clock. August 4 the entire brigade moved out of camp at 6 a. m., which looked like a reconnoissance in force. We crossed Battle Creek and after a march of about three miles were posted along the Tennessee River above the mouth of the creek. There was no alarm during the night and the men not on duty slept undisturbed.

The morning of August 5, just before we were relieved, we saw the enemy relieving his pickets across the river. We were relieved at 7 A. M. and reached camp at 9:30 A. M. where we found that a supply train had come up bringing rations and a

1 Gleason's Diary

small supply of clothing.¹ We again rejoiced when full rations were issued. We heard that the order requiring details of men for recruiting service had been countermanded. August 6, 7, and 8, were quiet and uneventful but on the evening of the eighth orders came to go on picket again at 6 o'clock next morning. August 9, the regiment marched at an early hour and was posted on picket between the river and Battle Creek. Nothing unusual occurred during the day or night. The enemy across the river was quiet and there was no firing. It was said that some of the pickets of the opposing forces found a way to communicate with each other in mid stream and exchange tobacco for coffee. Captain C. W. Carroll in a letter to his wife of date August 5, 1862, gives an account of one such picket detail, and at the same time discloses how the men in the ranks talked and felt. He says:

"We have just put through twenty-four hours of picket duty at Battle Creek on the Tennessee River. For the first time since the siege of Corinth we were within sight and speaking distance of the rebel pickets, who were on the other side of the river. There was no firing and a great many questions were asked by the men on both sides and there were some amusing answers. Among the questions the rebels asked were, 'How do you like old Abe?' 'How do you like McClellan's magnificent change of base?' 'What do you want with 300,000 more men when you already have 700,000 to our 250,000 etc?'" Our men would answer these questions as well as they could, and in return would taunt the rebels by calling out the battles we had won. One of our men called out, 'How do you like General O. M. Mitchell?' and a rebel answered, 'Oh! he has gone to Washington where he can do no more devilment.' Another of the men called out, 'How do you like Buell?' and the answer was, 'First rate, first rate, bully, he's a bully fellow.' Another asked, "How do you like Pope?" and a reb answered, 'He's a d——d rascal.' It was easy to tell from these answers their estimate of our generals and why they made them. One thing is certain,—the officer who handles them as if he meant something has their ill will, while those who pursue the 'velvet policy' have their good wishes."

This desultory conversation between the pickets bred considerable familiarity. One day a rebel having proposed an exchange of newspapers, one of our men swam across the river and exchanged the "Cincinnati Commercial" for the "Southern Confederacy" and returned without being fired on. This incident became generally known and orders were issued forbidding further communication between the pickets. August 10, the regiment was relieved at 7 A. M. and reached camp about 9 A. M.

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That morning a general order was received assigning Colonel August Willich of the 32nd Indiana, who had been promoted to Brigadier General, to the command of our brigade. Colonel Dickey as soon as the regiment came in from picket duty tendered his resignation.¹ Whether there was any connection between the two is not known.

General Willich was an interesting personality and commanded marked attention whenever he was seen in our camps. His regiment was made up of Germans and was remarkably well drilled and efficient. At the battle of Shiloh, Colonel Willich had led it into the thickest of the fight and had won high praise, not only from General McCook, but from General Sherman and other superior commanders. He was over six feet tall, with broad shoulders and yellow hair, and when in action or on the drill ground gave the impression of one born to command. About this time Moncure D. Conway, who was one of his close friends, wrote an article which appeared in a Cincinnati paper in which he stated that General Willich was the child by amorganatic marriage of the elder brother of King William of Prussia, who afterwards became Emperor William of Germany. Mr. Conway further stated that General Willich was educated by the royal family of Prussia and at an early age was captain in the Royal Artillery; that he became a liberal and for some indiscreet action or speech was arrested and thrown into military prison at Spandau from which royal influence secured his escape; that afterwards he held a high command in the revolutionary army of 1848 and when the revolution collapsed fled to Switzerland and thence made his way to London, where for a time he was in close association with Kossuth, Mazzini and other European liberals: that from London he went to New York and thence to Cincinnati where he was editor of a German newspaper when the war broke out. This story is partly confirmed in Mr. Conway's "Autobiography, Memories and Experiences", 1904, in which he says that Judge Stallo of Cincinnati and other Germans believed that General Willich "bore in his veins the blood of the royal family of Prussia", that he was a soldier in the Prussian army until 1846, but was compelled to resign because he had joined the band for the liberation of Germany, and that Judge Stallo had said that Willich had committed enough political offenses in Prussia to have lost him his head a dozen times, if he had not been a natural son of one of the royal family.

This story created an additional interest in General Willich in the minds of those who read it. At all events, it did not make him less interesting as our future brigade commander. We were

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soon to know him better, and he was to become in time the idol of the men of the brigade.

Lieutenant Colonel Wilson had sent in his resignation some days before, but August 10, it was returned "not accepted" and he assumed command of the regiment.¹

Late in the afternoon a detail of men from the regiment was ordered to work on fortifications at the mouth of Battle Creek. August 11, an insufficient supply of clothing was issued and on the 12th another detail was sent to work on fortifications. This day some of the men got some green corn to piece out their short rations. August 13, General Willich reviewed the brigade and afterwards it was formed into a hollow square and he made a speech in broken English to the men which made a good impression. August 14, the regiment was again on picket along the Tennessee River. The enemy's pickets on the other shore kept hallooing across at us all day. August 15, we were relieved at 6 A. M. and marched back to camp. During the day General Willich called the officers and non-commissioned officers of the regiment together and gave them some novel instructions. August 16, he stated that German bugle calls would be adopted by the entire brigade, and explained them by putting words to the music. He caused great laughter by saying that the alarm call meant, "The devil is loose! the devil is loose! the devil is again loose".

August 16, Lieutenant Colonel Wilson's resignation was accepted and he left for home, leaving Captain James C. Cummins in command of the regiment. August 17, Sergeant Gleason left for home with a detail of an officer and enlisted man from each company, which were being sent north on recruiting service. August 18, at 6 A. M. the regiment again went out on picket along the river and stood guard all day. About dusk part of a Union Tennessee regiment arrived and, dressed in citizens clothing, went out through our lines.² We were relieved at 6 a. m. August 19, and marked back to camp where General Willich had another meeting of the officers and non-commissioned officers.

August 20, at 6 A. M. there was battalion drill by Captain J. C. Cummins and orders came to be ready to march at any moment. At 4 P. M. orders came to strike tents and be ready to march at 7 P. M. We started at 8 P. M. The men were instructed to keep silence and the bridge across the creek was muffled, by piling green corn stalks on it, to prevent the enemy hearing our trains and artillery when they crossed it. We reached the mouth of Battle Creek, about two miles distant, at midnight

¹ Gleason's Diary

² Nathan Muneau's Diary.

and then lay down and slept. We wondered what it all meant. At 5 o'clock August 21, we resumed our march. Our route was along the Tennessee River at the foot of a range of mountains until we came to within a mile of Jasper, where at 10 a. m. we halted and remained until noon. There were corn fields near, where the men were permitted to gather roasting ears to piece out their half rations. After dinner we marched on, passed Crittenden's and Mitchell's divisions, and went into camp in a field where the weeds were higher than our heads. August 22, we marched forward about three miles, the 49th Ohio with two pieces of artillery leading the brigade.¹ We were moving towards Chattanooga. After we had gone about three miles we halted while the cavalry were sent forward. From this point we turned back and halted at a tannery for dinner. At 2 P. M. we resumed our march, passed back through Jasper, and late in the evening arrived at the place near Battle Creek where we had been on picket. Then we turned to the right of our old camp on the north side of the mountain and went into camp on the creek.¹ It had been a rainy day and our days march of fifteen miles had made us ready for a nights rest.

While we were lying at Battle Creek General Buell was very slowly getting his army together for an attack on Chattanooga. Preparatory to such attack, he was repairing with great deliberation and care the railroads from Nashville to Decatur and Chattanooga, and had given orders to build stockades at all the bridges on both roads to protect them from Confederate raiders. He had under his immediate command, July 10, an army of 65,000² men omitting General Thomas' division. Including the latter division which was soon returned to him he had force of about 60,000 which he could have hurled against Chattanooga, if he could have moved promptly. But the raids of the Confederate Generals Forrest and Morgan broke his lines of supply and created such a panic that he was compelled to scatter his forces and delay concentration until it was too late.

In the meantime the enemy had recovered from their loss of Corinth, and learning that General Halleck had divided his great army, began preparations to turn this strategic mistake to advantage. July 17, General Bragg who was in command of the Confederate forces at Tupelo, Miss., ordered all the cavalry of the Army of the West under General Armstrong to move toward the Tennessee River, as near as possible to Decatur, to operate on General Buell's flank.³ To General Kirby Smith, however, is given the distinction of originating the movement which further

¹ Mumaugh's Diary

² W. R. R. 16, part 2-120.

³ W. R. R. part 2-728.

scattered and practically paralyzed General Buell's army, and compelled its shameful retreat to the Ohio River a few weeks later.

July 20, General Smith, who was in command of the Confederate forces in East Tennessee, sent a dispatch to General Bragg, stating that General Buell had completed his preparations for crossing the Tennessee River at Bridgeport and that now was his time to strike at Middle Tennessee.¹ This dispatch seems to have met with immediate response, for on July 21, General Bragg ordered the Army of the Mississippi, commanded by General Hardee and composed of Cheatham's, Wither's, Jone's and Wood's divisions, to move without delay to Chattanooga,—the artillery and trains by common roads and the infantry by rail by way of Mobile.² But July 24, General Smith had conceived a much grander scheme, which he on that day submitted to General Bragg. It was that General Bragg should shift the main body of his forces to East Tennessee, take command in person of his own and Smith's forces, and from that region make a summer campaign, with every prospect of regaining Middle Tennessee and possibly Kentucky. General Smith in this communication stated his own force to be 18,000 effectives.³ General Bragg arrived at Chattanooga July 30, and on the 31, met General Kirby Smith and arranged that they should co-operate. General Smith was to move at once against General Geo. W. Morgan at Cumberland Gap, and, if successful, their combined forces were to be thrown into Middle Tennessee to cut off General Buell.⁴ In pursuance of this plan, August 5, Cleburne's and Preston Smith's brigades of the Army of the Mississippi, were ordered from Chattanooga to Knoxville to report to General Smith,⁵ and August 8, General Bragg issued orders stripping his command of all unnecessary impedimenta for the campaign.⁶

In the meantime Generals Morgan and Forrest were raiding at will in Tennessee and Kentucky, cutting railroads, destroying bridges and tunnels, capturing town after town, and creating the wildest sort of panic in the North, which began to express fears for the safety of Buell's army.

August 12, General Bragg reported to General Kirby Smith from Chattanooga that his infantry would all be up that day and on Friday, August 15, he should probably commence crossing the Tennessee River; that as soon as possible he should move on to middle Tennessee, ignoring the enemy's strong works at Stevenson, Murfreesboro, etc., and that he had ordered Van Dorn and

1 W. R. R. 16, part 2-730.

2 W. R. R. 16, part 2-731.

3 W. R. R. 16, part 2-734.

4 W. R. R. 16, part 2-741.

5 W. R. R. 16, part 2-744.

6 W. R. R. 16, part 2-746.

Price with about 25,000 men to threaten West Tennessee. General Bragg also stated in the same dispatch that "the government is aware of our proposed operations and cordially approves."¹

General Smith the next day reported to General Bragg that on Saturday night (August 16) he would cross the mountains by Rogers Gap with four brigades of infantry, 6000 strong, and march directly on Cumberland Ford; that at the same time General Heth with the artillery and trains and two brigades would move by Big Creek Gap upon Barboursville, Ky., while General Stevenson (with about 9000 men) would move up and take position close to Cumberland Gap, then held by General Geo. W. Morgan's division, and that General Scott with 900 cavalry and a battery of mounted howitzers, would reach London, Ky. on Sunday (August 17).²

August 15, General Bragg assumed command of the Army of the Mississippi, then at Chattanooga, with General Leonidas Polk in command of the right wing and General Wm. J. Hardee of the left wing. The actual strength of Bragg's army at that time is not accurately known. The field returns of the right wing August 22, show an aggregate present of 18,731, and included Preston Smith's brigade, which had been sent to Kirby Smith.³ No returns of the left wing are found, but it is possible that it did not number more than the right wing. August 27, when Bragg's movement was under way, his field returns show an aggregate present of only 31,884.⁴ This apparent falling off in only five days may be explained by the absence of Patrick Cleburne's and Preston Smith's brigades, which had been ordered to report to Kirby Smith at Knoxville as before stated.

General Kirby Smith's army, according to his reports to General Bragg before mentioned, numbered about 21,900 men. Add to the two armies the commands of Generals Forrest and Jno. H. Morgan, about 3500, and it appears that the aggregate of Bragg's and Kirby Smith's forces was about 60,000 men and that the forces General Bragg had across the river from Chattanooga did not exceed 25,000.

General Kirby Smith's forces moved rapidly into Kentucky and August 17, Colonel Scott with his 900 cavalry and battery of mountain howitzers, reached London, Ky., and attacked and captured the place.⁵ General Kirby Smith with Generals Cleburne's and Churchill's divisions (6000) as claimed by General Smith, commenced crossing the mountains August 16, and on the 18th took possession of Barboursville, Ky.,⁶ where on the 22nd he was

1 W. R. R. 16, part 2-755.

2 W. R. R. 16, part 2-755.

3 W. R. R. 16, part 2-772.

4 W. R. R. 16, part 2-784.

5 W. R. R. 16, part 1-937.

6 W. R. R. 16, part 2-766.

joined by General Heth's division with the artillery and supply trains.¹ On the 19th General John H. Morgan made a raid on the Louisville and Nashville Railroads and destroyed all the bridges between Gallatin and Edgefield Junction,² having previously destroyed the tunnel at the former place. August 20, General Kirby Smith reported to General Bragg that he proposed to move on Lexington, Ky. as soon as possible.³ On the same day he sent word to General Humphrey Marshall, who was at Piketon with a force of perhaps two or three thousand men, that he should leave Barboursville the 25th and move on Lexington via Richmond, Ky. and asked Marshall's co-operation.⁴ So it appears that when our part of Buell's army was still at Battle Creek, Tenn., the invasion of Kentucky was well under way and our main line of supplies cut off. The successful movement of a large body of the enemy across the Cumberland mountains and its advance to the borders of the Blue Grass region of Kentucky, threw the people of the border states into still wilder panic. General Geo. W. Morgan's division at Cumberland Gap was practically surrounded and it was feared would be captured. The numbers of the enemy were greatly magnified and there were rumors that General Kirby Smith had been largely reinforced by troops from Lee's army at Richmond.⁵ It was also feared that the safety of Buell's army in Tennessee was imperiled. It would be interesting to relate the incidents of the uprisings in the States of Ohio, Indiana and Illinois to meet the southern invaders, but this is only incidental to the history of the regiment and its campaigns and will not be attempted. It is sufficient to say that in a few weeks these three states raised and sent into the field nearly sixty regiments of new troops, and thousands of the men of Ohio, armed with squirrel rifles, flocked to the Ohio River to the defense of Cincinnati and other towns on the border.

General Buell was duly informed of General Kirby Smith's invasion of Kentucky and on August 16, ordered General Nelson to Kentucky to take charge of all troops opposing General Kirby Smith's advance.⁶ He also appealed to General Halleck for more troops. A former similar appeal had resulted in General Grant's ordering Davis' and Paine's divisions east, to reinforce the troops at Battle Creek and Stevenson.⁷ General Buell had been apprised of a probable movement of Bragg's army into Middle Tennessee and had ordered a large number of troops to McMinnville and other places within supporting distance, and August 16, ordered General Thomas to that point to take command of them. General

1 W. R. R. 16, part 2-777.

2 W. R. R. 16, part 1-878-879.


3 W. R. R. 16, part 2-766.

4 W. R. R. 16, part 2-767.

5 W. R. R. 16, part 2-323-324.

6 W. R. R. 16, part 2-348.

7 W. R. R. 16, part 2-337.



AUGUST WILlich

Brevet Major General—Commander of the First Brigade, Third Division, Fourth Corps, Army of the Cumberland.

Buell still kept his headquarters at Huntsville, Ala., and seemed so indifferent to what was taking place in Kentucky and so deliberate in his movements, that August 18, General Halleck telegraphed him saying:

"So great is the dissatisfaction here at the apparent want of energy and activity in your district, that I was this morning notified to have you removed, I got the matter delayed till we could hear further of your movements".¹

To this dispatch General Buell replied saying only, that his movements had been such as the circumstances seemed to him to require, and that if the dissatisfaction could not cease on grounds which he, Buell, thought might be supposed or apparent, he wished to be relieved. He also stated that lacking cavalry, the work of rebuilding the railroads and erecting stockades to keep open his 400 miles supply line had to be done under the protection of heavy detachments, which had been tedious, and that he was apprehensive this would have to be repeated. He also reminded General Halleck that three months before he had asked the War Department for eight more regiments of cavalry for service in Tennessee and Kentucky.²

There was not one word in the dispatch about his future plans or movements and the Washington authorities were as much in the dark as ever in regard to them. General Buell's orders at this time seem indefinite and inconclusive, and while apparently indicating a purpose to advance and attack the enemy, at the same time they seem to imply that there was little hope of meeting him on such terms as would insure success. In almost every instance retreat is counselled should the enemy advance in supposed superior force. August 19, he issued an order to General McCook saying that the purpose was to advance against the enemy, if it could be done with any prospect of success, and if the enemy advanced, to fight him and to the best advantage and to the last extremity. He then gives the various roads over which the enemy might advance, and gives McCook directions how he should fall back to Murfreesboro by way of Hillsborough, Manchester and Beech Grove. He asks General McCook to study the situation and adds, that the details of an advance could be considered at another time.³

The same day he issued an order to General Rousseau placing him in command, when necessary, of all troops on both lines of railroad from Huntsville to Nashville, and tells him that it was possible, when the main army advanced, the enemy would come upon our rear in such force that it would be impossible to

1 W. R. R. 16, part 2-360.

2 W. R. R. 16, part 2-360-361.

3 W. R. R. 16, part 2-368.

hold such extended lines, and that in such case the Decatur road should be first abandoned and a determined effort made to hold Huntsville, Stevenson, Battle Creek and the railroad. In certain contingencies he says that it will be necessary for the whole force from Battle Creek to Huntsville to fall back toward Nashville, but always making a stand whenever it would be done with advantage. One sentence in this order seems to give a key to General Buell's attitude of mind at this time. He says, "these suggestions suppose an advance of the enemy which cannot be resisted with any prospect of success, but a determined resistance is always to be made when there is any hope of success."¹

The same day General Buell ordered General Paine's division, which General Grant had placed at his disposal some days before, to march to Decatur on the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad.²

The same day the War Department, apparently hopeless of General Buell's being able to give any relief to the situation in Kentucky, created a new Department of the Ohio, which included Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin and that part of Kentucky east of the Tennessee River, including Cumberland Gap and the troops at that point, and placed General H. G. Wright in command.³

August 20, General Buell ordered General Davis' division of General Grant's army, which had also been ordered to report to him some days before, to move by forced marches via Columbia, Tenn. to Nashville.⁴ On the same day he ordered General McCook to move his division up the Sequatchie Valley on the north side of the Anderson road and send out strong foraging parties to collect forage, beef and flour if he could find them, stating that supplies was the great problem and that we "must solve it by management and by starving too if necessary". He also directed him to move Crittenden's division at the same time and halt him near where the road from the Sequatchie Valley turns off to Tracy City. He tells McCook that Thomas' division had been ordered to Tracy City next day and, as some little time would be required to concentrate, not to become seriously engaged with the enemy. He also again gives direction for the retirement of McCook's divisions if it was necessary.⁵ The last named order was the occasion of our march from Battle Creek to Jasper before narrated.

August 22, General McCook reported to General Buell that on Friday (August 15) General Cheatham's division had crossed

1 W. R. R. 16, part 2-370.

2 W. R. R. 16, part 2-369.

3 W. R. R. 16, part 2-375.

4 W. R. R. 16, part 2-376.

5 W. R. R. 16, part 2-377.

the river at Chattanooga: that up to Wednesday (August 20), 33 regiments had crossed and that 6 regiments had crossed the night before: that General Withers had crossed 11 regiments of his division on Wednesday (August 20), that the troops crossing were well armed and had good artillery; that the enemy's advance had reached the top of Walden's Ridge the night before and was marching toward Tracey City; that he was fully convinced the enemy was marching upon McMinnville, and that he, McCook expected to be there Sunday (August 24).¹ General Buell was slow to concur in General McCook's ideas as to the intentions of the enemy and believed they would advance on Decherd where he then was. He at once telegraphed to General Thomas at McMinnville, stating the substance of General McCook's report, and asking him how it would do to fight the enemy at Altamont. He ordered him to be ready to march in the morning.² The same day he had ordered General Thomas to withdraw his absent troops and that he would advance to attack the enemy in the Sequatchie Valley. General Thomas on the same day answered General Buell's several dispatches and advised concentration at McMinnville, leaving a division at Decherd, saying that neither water or forage could be obtained at Altamont, that it would be as difficult for him to march across the mountains to the Sequatchie Valley as for the enemy to come either to Altamont or McMinnville and that he would not advise concentrating at McMinnville, except for battle, or for an advance into East Tennessee. He also pointed out that the enemy could not reach Nashville by any other route than through McMinnville, except by way of Sparta, and that in his opinion the demonstrations of the enemy in the direction of McMinnville were intended to cover an advance to Kentucky.³ Notwithstanding these representations of General Thomas, August 23, General Buell advised him that there was no possibility of concentrating at McMinnville, that the army must concentrate in advance of that place and assume the offensive or fall back to Murfreesboro. He therefore ordered General Thomas to move by a forced march to Altamont and there form a junction with McCook, Crittenden and Schoepf.⁴

In accordance with the foregoing, orders were given for concentration of the foregoing troops at Altamont on the evening of August 24, and General Wood's division was also ordered to that point.⁵ A dispatch from General Buell to General Halleck dated August 24, at 2:15 P. M. reveals the former's inadequacy

1 W. R. R. 16, part 2-389.

2 W. R. R. 16, part 2-400.

3 W. R. R. 16, part 2-392.

4 W. R. R. 16, part 2-399.

5 W. R. R. 16, part 2-401.

to control the situation and its apparent hopelessness. It is as follows:

"The intimations of various kinds which I have heretofore alluded to, of a design on the part of the enemy to attempt a formidable invasion of Tennessee are being verified, and there can be no doubt that Tennessee and Kentucky are in very great peril. It is impossible to ascertain with any certainty what the force of the enemy is. It probably is not less than 60,000 men independently of irregular cavalry and the force operating toward Kentucky in the rear of Cumberland Gap. They have crossed at Chattanooga, Harrison, Blythe's Ferry and Kingston and are marching on McMinnville. Upon receipt of this information I ordered the forces at Battle Creek to move up the Sequatchie River (Valley); one division to stop on the Little Sequatchie at the Higginbottom road leading to Tracy City and the other to the Anderson road which leads directly from Chattanooga through Altamont. Thomas with two divisions was ordered to watch the Sparta road by which the Kingston column would advance, and be prepared to concentrate on Altamont or in the Sequatchie Valley, according to circumstances. Owing to the mountainous character of the country, and perhaps some misapprehension, the concentration was not effected as I designed, and is not yet, though the troops are now in motion for that object. If not too late it will yet be made at Altamont and the enemy attacked on that route; but my impressions are that the enemy is already at Altamont. If the junction cannot be effected then it may be necessary to fall back on Murfreesboro. More embarrassing than the force in front is the condition of things in the rear. Our communications have now been effectually cut for twelve days. I have had no force there sufficient to open and keep them open, and our supplies cannot last more than ten days. The condition of things has determined me to withdraw the stationary force from the roads so as to increase the force at Nashville and in the rear if possible, without reducing our active force, which after all cannot be brought up to more than about 30,000 men. The force is clearly insufficient, and ought to be increased without an hour's delay. The consequences may be of the most serious character. I have been of this opinion for some time. Grant's troops have not crossed the river that I have heard of and it must be several days before they can complete the march to form a junction, even if they were already across. New troops, if they could move rapidly enough, are not suitable for the service required. We want cavalry very much".¹

1 W. R. R. 16, part 2-406.

How the hearts of President Lincoln and his close advisers must have sunk on reading this hopeless dispatch from a nerveless commander of a great army. That it produced a very unfavorable impression may be inferred from the fact that August 25, General Halleck telegraphed to General H. G. Wright that the President and Secretary of war were very much displeased with the slow movements of General Buell, and unless he did something very soon, he believed he would be removed.¹ As usual General Buell was greatly overestimating the strength of the enemy and under estimating his own. We have already seen that the official returns of Bragg's army showed that his force at Chattanooga could not have been over 35,000 men.

Governor Andrew Johnson, who must have had unusual means of informing himself, August 1, informed General Buell that Bragg's forces did not exceed 25,000 and that 50,000 troops could not be subsisted or supplied between McMinnville and Chattanooga or any other place from which they had marched.² From this force General Bragg detached a considerable force under General Sam Jones to hold his base at Chattanooga and make demonstrations against Bridgeport and other points along the river.³ General Buell, according to his official returns of date August 1, had under his immediate command, including the troops at Nashville and excluding General George W. Morgan's division at Cumberland Gap, an army of 60,122. He had had no losses by battle and between that date and August 24, his strength had probably not been materially diminished. Besides these troops two divisions of General Grant's army were on the way by forced marches to join him and General Grant had sent troops to reoccupy Clarksville on the Cumberland River a short distance below Nashville. With such a force a general with nerve and decision, it seems, would have interposed between Bragg and Kirby Smith, or moved against General Bragg's flank and brought the proposed invasion of Kentucky to a sudden and disastrous end. General Bragg was delayed in getting his transportation from Tupelo, and did not issue orders for the advance of his main body until August 25.⁴ General Wheeler's cavalry brigade, consisting of parts of the First Alabama and First Kentucky regiments, the advance of General Hardee's troops, did not cross the Tennessee River until August 27, and did not receive orders to march on Altamont until the 29th.⁵ General Bragg's army did not take up its march over Walden's Ridge and the mountains until August 28,⁶ and there was ample time for General Buell

1 W. R. R. 16, part 2-421.

2 W. R. R. 16, part 2-461.

3 W. R. R. 16, part 2-785.

4 W. R. R. 16, part 2-779.

5 W. R. R. 16, part 1-893.

6 W. R. R. 16, part 1-1089.

to have concentrated a sufficient force to intercept and destroy him.

The orders for our division were first, to move by way of Tracy City to McMinnville, but August 24, we were directed to move by way of Pelham to Altamont and be at that place by noon August 26.¹ On the 23rd we moved out about a mile from our camp near Battle Creek into an open field where we killed hogs, sheep and geese, got corn and sweet potatoes and put up brush shanties to sleep in during the night.² The morning of August 24, we were called out about 2:30 A. M. and ordered to be ready to march at 4 A. M. We were all ready by that time, when the order was countermanded and the men laid down for a little more sleep. But at 5:30 A. M. the bugle sounded and we fell in and marched out in a northwesterly direction, our regiment leading the brigade. We soon began to climb a mountain by the steepest road we had ever marched over. Ropes were attached to the artillery and we aided in pulling the guns up the mountain. Water was scarce, but we fortunately found some fine springs. We finally apparently reached the top of the mountain and rested by a small brook. We then moved on to another brook and bivouaced for the night having marched fifteen miles. The five right companies of the regiment were ordered out on picket duty.³ The regiments of the brigade were bivouaced in close support on either side of a narrow road and beyond them was the artillery. Word was given out that Wheeler's Confederate cavalry was not far away and to be on the alert for an attack. About midnight two artillery horses which had been tethered with their harness on got loose and came galloping down the road, the heavy chains of their harness clanking as they came. The men, awakened from sound sleep, thought that Wheeler's cavalry were making a night charge on our camp, and for a few moments there was the wildest sort of a panic. Some of the men commenced firing their guns at the imaginary enemy. General Willich's boy, "Sam," climbed up a tree with the General boots and would not come down. The General and other officers exerted themselves to restore order and soon convinced the men that there was no cause for alarm. The panic thereupon subsided, with many a hearty laugh over the many amusing incidents which it had occasioned. August 25, the bugles sounded about 4 A. M. and at 4:30 A. M. we resumed our march. Our route was over a flat table land on top of the mountain. One would have thought we were on a level plain if breaks in the forest had not shown mountains all about us. We passed two considerable farms and then started down the moun-

1 W. R. R. 16, part 2-408.
2 Gleason's Diary.

3 McConnell's Diary.

tain by a road so steep that the artillery and trains could not follow it, but were sent by another route. After a march of six miles we came to one of the finest springs we had seen where we went into camp in an open field nearby. Not far away was one of the largest peach orchards we had ever seen from which the men supplied themselves liberally. There were also corn fields near and foraging was lively.¹ It was reported that the whole of Buell's army was nearby and that the enemy 80,000 strong was at McMinnville.¹

August 26, we remained in camp all day and sent out foraging parties. Some of the men brought in some honey. The 64th Ohio and 6th Ohio Battery were encamped near us. Some of their men told us they had burned their tents while crossing the mountains. Four men of Company H were reported captured, but they returned to camp late in the evening bringing some domestic ducks and a lot of honey. There were rumors that Stevenson, Battle Creek and Bridgeport had been occupied by the enemy.² This rumor was partly true, for on that day General Maxey occupied Bridgeport and was ordered to send a force to take Battle Creek.³ We remained in camp all day the 27th. The men occupied the time foraging and visiting other regiments, among them the 17th and 64th Ohio. General McCook was said to be in command of all the forces in our neighborhood and General Sill was in command of our division. In the evening we received orders to march next morning at 3 o'clock. August 28, we were ready to march at the appointed time but did not get started until day light. We moved out in an easterly direction, but soon turned north. We soon came to a fine spring where we made a short halt and filled our canteens. We then started up the mountain and got near its summit, when the report came that there was no water to be found and the whole column counter-marched about two miles and went into camp by a spring we had passed. That evening some of the foragers brought in a large store of fine honey. Our day's march was 14 miles. We heard that Battle Creek had been taken by the enemy.⁴

August 29, we resumed our march at 5 A. M. and marched to the top of the mountain where we rested until noon. After dinner we marched on over a flat table land to Altamont where we went into camp. Our day's march was about 10 miles.⁵ A lot of Confederate prisoners were brought into camp. It was said McCook's command was the only body of Union troops at Altamont. August 30, we remained in camp until 10 o'clock

1 Mumaugh's Diary.

2 Mumaugh's Diary.

3 W. R. R. 16, part 2-783.

4 Mumaugh's Diary.

5 McConnell's Diary.

P. M. Companies A, F, B and G went out on a reconnoissance but developed no great force of the enemy. At 1 P. M. we took up our line of march in a southwesterly direction. Our regular rations were exhausted and we had to depend on our foragers. We passed a woman standing by the road side and crying because some of our foragers had taken her oxen.¹ We started down the mountain at 5 P. M. We noticed a Confederate ambulance which had been wrecked on the mountain side and went into camp in a field where there was running water. Our days march was about 9 miles. On this day General Thomas who was at McMinnville reported to General Buell that the news from all sources seemed to indicate that General Bragg would move his main force by Sparta, and advised that if he was moving on Murfreesboro the army should concentrate at that place as soon as possible and drive him back.² Acting probably on this suggestion, General Buell August 30, issued orders for such concentration. The orders for our division were to march to Pelham September 1, to Manchester September 2, to Hoover's Gap September 3, to a point within ten miles of Murfreesboro September 4, and to Murfreesboro September 5.³ August 30, General Kirby Smith defeated General Nelson's raw troops at Richmond, Ky. and was supposed to be marching on either Louisville or Cincinnati and the whole North was arousing to meet and check the invaders.

August 31, and September 1, our part of the army rested at the foot of the mountain where we had encamped the evening of August 30, and sent out foraging parties who scoured the valley and brought in cattle, chickens, salt, honey and every article of food they could lay hands on. Three Confederate prisoners were brought in, one of whom had an Enfield rifle belonging to a bugler in the 32nd Indiana, who was missing. A force was sent out to block the road down the mountain by felling large trees across it. The night of the 31st there was a big fire on the mountain some distance away which indicated the presence of the enemy. That night a part of the regiment was posted as pickets up the mountain side. One who was then a sergeant in Company K⁴ recalls that the night was very dark and that he had much difficulty in posting his relief because of the darkness. Fortunately he stumbled over a stump of phosphorescent wood and afterwards used portions of it to mark the line through the dark woods and back to a sweet potato patch where the reserve was posted. He recalls that in the middle of the night he heard a woman's scream far down the valley.

1 Mumaugh's Diary

2 W. R. R. 16, part 2-453

3 W. R. R. 16, part 2-455.

4 The Writer.

September 2, at 5 A. M. we marched in a southwesterly direction toward the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad. After marching three miles we halted for a rest at a fine spring. After this our route was along the McMinnville branch of this road. At 3 P. M. after a march of fifteen miles we came to Manchester where we encamped for the night. The night was cool and many of the men were without blankets. During the day we heard of the disaster to our arms at Richmond, Ky. and realized that our march was a retreat in earnest.¹ September 3, we marched at 7 A. M. taking the road to Murfreesboro. Our route was through a fine farming country and foraging parties were sent out to collect food and forage and drive in horses and cattle. After a march of thirteen miles we went into camp for the night. The 18th Ohio was temporarily attached to our brigade. September 4, we resumed our march at 5 A. M. For about three miles the road passed through a cedar woods. Water was very scarce. After marching about 9 miles we came to a small muddy spring. General Willich stood over it and allowed each man only one cup of water. The sun was very hot, the pike over which we marched was very dusty and the men suffered intensely from thirst. After a march of about sixteen miles we halted about four miles from Murfreesboro and went into camp. During the day we heard of Kirby Smith's attack on Lexington, Ky. Frankfort had been occupied by the enemy September 3, and the flag of the 1st Louisiana cavalry had been hoisted over the state house.² At the same time we heard of General Pope's defeat in Virginia. In the evening our tents and knapsacks came up.³

General Buell now had his whole force concentrated at Murfreesboro and had been reinforced by a division from General Grant's army. September 2, General Thomas had advised him that the enemy was advancing on the Therman, Dunlap and Sparta roads, and that by convenient roads our main force could be thrown upon him between McMinnville and Decherd, or at Hillsborough, overcome him and drive him toward Sparta, his longest line of retreat, while a force of cavalry and light infantry could be pushed across the mountains by the Dunlap and Therman road, attack him in rear and completely route his whole force. To give emphasis to his suggestion, General Thomas added that he had studied the roads and was convinced that this was the best plan of attack.⁴ If General Buell had needed any additional spur to action it was supplied by a dispatch from General Halleck dated the same day. General Buell had telegraphed to General Halleck from Nashville that his whole force would

1 Mumaugh's Diary.

2 W. R. R. 16, part 1-939.

3 Mumaugh's Diary.

4 W. R. R. 16, part 2-471.

be at Murfreesboro on the 5th, that the movement had become necessary in order to protect Nashville and open his lines of communication; that he proposed to fortify and hold Nashville and with the remainder of his army move rapidly against the enemy in Kentucky, that Bragg had crossed the Tennessee River with 45,000 or 50,000, etc.¹ General Halleck answered this dispatch by curtly saying "March where you please providing you will find the enemy and fight him".² But General Buell feared to risk an encounter with the enemy unless with known superior numbers and the opportunity was lost.

General Buell was an accomplished soldier and had the respect and confidence of his contemporaries in the old army, but he was slow, over cautious, and, singular to say, during the whole time he was in high command never fought a battle that was not forced on him. It is true that he gave orders to General Thomas to attack the enemy at Mill Springs but the enemy attacked before Thomas could concentrate against him. His orders to fight had nearly always a caution, or condition, or a suggestion of retreat, which must have been painful and paralyzing to his subordinate commanders. He was, with always superior numbers, continually on the defensive. While concentrating at Murfreesboro to strike the enemy he was contemplating falling back on Nashville and September 3, telegraphed General Wright from Nashville that Louisville was the point the enemy was aiming for.³ He was perhaps at that time considering a retreat to that point.

It was soon evident that we were not to advance against the enemy, but to make a further retreat. We lay in camp three or four miles southeast of Murfreesboro all day September 5, and until 9 a. m. September 6, when orders came from General McCook to march to Lavergne.⁴ We started at once, marched four miles beyond Murfreesboro, and then countermarched three miles in order to get water, making our day's march about 10 miles.

The morning of September 7, reveille sounded at 3 o'clock and we had orders to march at 5. As our trains were ordered ahead we did not get started until 7 o'clock. The sun was very hot, the roads were thick with dust and water was very scarce. Added to this, the shoes of many of the men were worn thin and marching on the hard limestone pike blistered their feet. But we trudged on, not knowing whither we were bound. At one point along the road we saw a fine plantation house, cotton press and outbuildings on fire and were told that they had been burned because the owner had given information to the enemy. After a tiresome hot march of 15

1 W. R. R. 16, part 2-470
2 W. R. R. 16, part 2-471

3 W. R. R. 16, part 2-476
4 W. R. R. 16, part 2-490

miles we came to the little town and railway station of Lavergne and halted, as we supposed, for the night. Soon after we halted General Willich called the brigade together and in his broken but impressive English told us that the enemy was in Kentucky and that we "must get there quick and give him salt and pepper". He dwelt upon the patience and endurance of the men, their courage and self sacrifice in former campaigns, and said we must be ready for still greater exertions, for Louisville and Cincinnati were in danger. He then said we would rest two hours and then march on to Nashville, 16 miles distant. His speech produced a profound impression. Every one felt the gravity of the situation and the necessity for prompt action. One little Irishman, John F. Murray of Company K, said all he wanted was "nothing to eat and forty rounds of cartridges". After the two hours rest and such food as we could prepare, we moved out into the darkness and took up the march to Nashville. That it was night favored us, for it was cooler, but the dust was stifling and we were short of water. The hard pike blistered our feet, the blisters broke and our feet bled as we marched. The way was long, and before we reached our destination many of the men fell out from sheer exhaustion. About 2 A. M. the regiment reached the suburbs of Nashville and turned into a field deep with clover, which was reeking wet with the dews of the night. Into the wet clover those who had had the courage, strength and dogged determination to keep afoot and not fall out, dropped exhausted and were soon in a stony sleep.

CHAPTER XI.

THE RETREAT FROM NASHVILLE TO LOUISVILLE AND MARCH TO CRAB ORCHARD, KENTUCKY.

The morning of September 8, 1862, we were awakened by the hot sun beating down on our faces, and arose stiff and footsore from the thirty miles march of the day before. Some of the men took off their shoes and socks to cool their feet in the wet clover and found it a painful operation. The blood from the broken blisters had dried and their socks stuck to their feet. At 7 A. M. orders came to move and we took up again our painful march. We marched toward Nashville and in about an hour halted on an eminence commanding a fine view of the city, and were told we would rest five hours and then move on to the north. The prospect of even a short rest was very welcome, for we had had little sleep during the preceding forty-eight hours and were very tired. Since August 24, we had been almost constantly on the move. The distance from Battle Creek to Nashville was said to be 164 miles, but by the route we had come it must have been over 200 miles. Word soon came that we would remain where we were during the day and night, which was also welcome news. During the day we received rations of soft bread, which was a rarity. A large mail was received and many got letters from home; Lieutenant George W. Cummins returned to the regiment, and many men who had been sick in hospital rejoined their companies. September 9, our wagons were sent across the river and the brigade was expected to move on, but did not. Hugh Long of Company I, was shot by a provost guard of Nashville.¹ At this time General Bragg with his army had reached the Cumberland River near Carthage, Tenn., and, sending Wheeler's cavalry and other troops to make a strong demonstration against Nashville,² crossed the river and gave orders directing the concentration of his entire force at Glasgow, Ky.³ It was the opinion of the Commission which later investigated the operations of General Buell's army, that General Buell should not have fallen back from Murfreesboro, but should have attacked Bragg's army before it crossed the Cumberland River, and that if he had done so, he would have been successful.⁴ But as before stated, General Buell believed that the enemy greatly outnumbered him,

¹ McConnell's Diary.

² W. R. R. 16, part 1-893

³ W. R. R. 16, part 2-804

⁴ W. R. R. 16, part 1-9

and he decided, as usual, to take no risks. He had even then contemplated falling back from Nashville to Louisville and avoiding a general engagement until he could be reinforced by the troops collecting at that place. He had already ordered General Rousseau's, General Wood's and General Crittenden's divisions to march to Bowling Green. He could get no reliable news of the movements of Bragg's army, and September 8 President Lincoln ironically asked him by telegraph "how he knew that Bragg and his army were not in the Shenandoah Valley."¹ To this dispatch General Buell answered that Bragg was certainly this side of the Cumberland Mountains, that for the want of supplies he could not follow him nor remain at Nashville, and that he thought he must withdraw from Tennessee.² With a great army at his command and more certain of supplies than was the enemy, he was helpless and hopeless. On September 10, he received a report from General Wood, whose division had reached within twelve miles of Bowling Green, that Bragg had crossed the Cumberland River, September 7, and was moving by forced marches to Glasgow, Mumfordsville and on to Louisville.³ This information probably led to General Buell's orders of the same day directing General Nelson's division, then commanded by General Ammen, and our division, to move on at once to Bowling Green.⁴ The morning of September 10, we had orders to march on fifteen minutes' notice. Joseph Navins of Company H, was killed by a tree falling on him in the camp of the First Ohio Cavalry. At 7 P. M. the bugles sounded and we again took up our line of march northward. The three days rest had put us in good condition and we took up a swinging pace and marched without fatigue. We marched through Nashville, crossed the river on the railroad bridge and took the main road to Louisville, over which we had marched southward six months before. The Third and Fourth Ohio Cavalry passed us soon after we got started. After a march of fifteen miles, at 2 A. M., we came to Tracy Junction and went out on picket. September 11, we had orders to resume our march. A body of cavalry passed us and also the other brigade of the division, and we did not get started until 3 P. M. We were the rear guard of the column. Generals Buell and McCook passed us, riding to the front. Just after passing through Goodrichville a heavy rain drenched us thoroughly. A march of about thirteen miles brought us to Tyree Springs where, at 11 P. M., we bivouaced for the night, without supper. There was another

1 W. R. R. 16, part 2-497.

2 W. R. R. 16, part 2-500.

3 W. R. R. 16, part 2-501-502.

4 W. R. R. 16, part 2-501.

heavy shower during the night. It was reported that General Ammen's division had had a skirmish with Forrest's cavalry. September 12, at 5 A. M., we fell in and marched without breakfast, except hard tack, and there was some hard swearing over it.¹ The day was cloudy and wet and every one was in ill humor. We fooled along for a distance of about fifteen miles, and at 4 P. M., went into camp near Mitchellsville for the night. An unexpected night's rest was very welcome for we had lost much sleep. September 13, we resumed our march at 5 A. M., passed through Mitchellsville and near it crossed the state line between Kentucky and Tennessee. As we passed through Franklin, Ky., the citizens were entertaining General McCook. After a march of about fifteen miles, at 1 P. M., we halted and were told we would remain there for the night. Our foragers went out and brought in some sweet potatoes. In the evening we received orders to march at 1 o'clock next morning. That day General Buell ordered General Thomas, whose division was still at Nashville, to move with his own and General Paine's division by forced marches to Bowling Green, and get there in three and a half days at least. He informed General Thomas that Bragg's army would be concentrated at Glasgow the next day, that if it was defeated Nashville was safe, and if not, it was lost.² There was no intimation, however, in this dispatch that he intended to attack the enemy. In fact he seems to have been as helpless and hopeless as ever. On the 14th he sent a dispatch to General Halleck which reached Evansville, Indiana, the 19th and was forwarded to Washington from that point, in which he told of the concentration of Bragg's forces at Glasgow, of his own concentration at Bowling Green, and said he would "commence to move against Bragg's force on the 16th," and that the danger was that Bragg would form a junction with Kirby Smith. He also stated that Bragg was virtually between him and Louisville, and all communication between him and Louisville by rail and telegraph were cut off.³ It was another nerveless and hopeless dispatch.

On the same day he sent a dispatch also by way of Evansville, to General Wright saying that Bragg was then moving to form a junction with Kirby Smith, and that **he**, General Wright, should prevent it if possible at once, and that not an hour should be lost.⁴ He also said he would commence moving against Bragg on the 16th, but the dispatch was as hopeless and nerveless as the one to General Halleck. Sep-

1 Mumaugh's Diary
2 W. R. R. 16, part 2-511-512

3 W. R. R. 16, part 2-515
4 W. R. R. 16, part 2-516

tember 14, we were aroused about 1 A. M., got breakfast and, at 2 A. M., marched toward Bowling Green. After a march of about thirteen miles we came to Lost River, about two miles from the town, and went into camp. At 5 P. M. that evening we had inspection of arms and at 7 P. M. went out on picket. Some of our pickets fired by mistake on the Fourth Ohio Cavalry, but fortunately hit no one.¹ At 6 A. M., September 15, our pickets were called in and we were notified to be ready to march in an hour. After drawing rations of sugar and coffee we marched into Bowling Green and went into camp northwest of the town on the Barren River, where we had opportunity to wash and boil our clothing to get rid of vermin. September 16, we remained in camp and heard that the enemy in force had attacked our troops at Munfordville. Wood's division crossed the river, moving north and we had orders to march next morning at 3 o'clock. If General Buell had any notion of moving to attack the enemy at Glasgow he evidently had given it up. September 17, at 5 A. M., we fell in, waded the river and set out on a seventeen-mile march to Dripping Springs, which we reached at 7 P. M., and went into camp. It rained all night and we were without blankets and got little sleep. That day General Wilder, after a gallant defense of Munfordville, was compelled to surrender his entire force of 155 officers and 3921² men and all his artillery (ten guns) to General Bragg. We had orders to march next morning at daybreak with three days' rations in haversacks. We had no bread of any kind but fortunately had flour and salt. We made dough of the flour, put in a little salt and baked it in hot ashes, and thus prepared our three days' rations. We did not march until 1 P. M. After a march of about twelve miles we encamped for the night in the rear of our old camp near Prewitt's Knob. September 19, we remained in camp near Prewitt's Knob. The officers and men who had been captured at Munfordville passed our camp. They had been paroled and the officers had been permitted to keep their swords and the men their blankets. There was some firing in front. The Fourth Ohio Cavalry were encamped near us. They reported that on the day before they had taken 600 prisoners and some wagons at Glasgow, and that the prisoners said they had been living on pumpkins.³ We cleaned our guns and were supplied with a fresh stock of ammunition. September 20, we were still in camp near Prewitt's Knob. General Thomas' division passed us, and the cavalry broke camp and moved on. The

1 Mumaugh's Diary.

2 W. R. R. 16, part 1-967.

3 Mumaugh's Diary.

men put in most of the afternoon baking ash cakes, our only bread. Orders came to be ready to march at daylight next morning. There was a report that the enemy was leaving, which was perhaps true, as on the 19th General Bragg had issued orders to concentrate his army at Bardstown.¹

On the 20th General Halleck sent a dispatch to General Buell saying, among other things, that he feared he, Buell, would permit the junction of Generals Bragg and Smith, and added, "The immobility of your army is most surprising. Bragg in the last two months has marched four times the distance you have."²

September 21, there were rumors that Bragg had left Munfordville and was moving on Louisville, and General Buell sent a messenger to General Nelson, who was in command at that place, to apprise him of the movement.

Although under orders to march at daylight, we did not get started until 4 P. M., and then fooled along, halting every few minutes, and did not reach Cave City until dark. We kept on in the same slow pace, many of the men dropping asleep and falling out, and after a march of thirteen miles, at 3 A. M., we reached Rowlett's Station and dropped down for a little sleep, with warning to be ready to march at 6 A. M.

September 22, we were aroused at 6 A. M. It was reported that the enemy was moving on Louisville and that General Wood had had a fight with them. Rations of fresh beef were issued, but before it could be cooked the assembly sounded and we had to leave it. We moved out at 11 A. M. Near Rowlett's Station we saw dead horses and other signs of the fighting at Munfordville on the 14th and 17th. We also saw wounded men, both Union and Confederate. We forded Green River and saw that the railroad bridge had been partly burned. Water was scarce and we filled our canteens from ponds covered with green scum and containing dead animals. We pushed on to Bacon Creek, thirteen miles, and went into camp for the night. September 23, General Buell ordered General McCook to march to the mouth of Salt River and cross next day. General McCook said he would be at mouth of Salt River "tonight," but must march so as not to leave his men on the road.³ We marched at 6 a. m. It was reported that Bragg's army consisted of forty-two regiments, 30,000 men, which was nearly accurate.⁴ We struck out at a swinging pace which we maintained all day. About noon we came to Camp Nevin where we took a good rest and

1 W. R. R. 16, part 2-849.

2 W. R. R. 16, part 2-530.

3 W. R. R. 16, part 2-536.

4 W. R. R. 16, part 2-784.

made coffee. We saw some dead Confederate soldiers, said to have been killed by our advance, and heard that the enemy had here turned to the right to join Kirby Smith's forces. About 1 P. M. we swung into the road again and marched on until 8 P. M., and went into camp about one mile from Elizabethtown. Our day's march had been twenty-three miles. Orders came to be ready to march at 5 o'clock next morning. September 24, reveille sounded at 3 A. M., and at 5 A. M. we resumed our march. We passed through Elizabethtown and about twelve miles beyond it halted for dinner. After dinner we pushed on at a rapid pace and at 7 p. m. came to West Point on the Ohio River, at the mouth of Salt River, and bivouaced for the night. Our day's march had been twenty-five miles. The night was cold; we were without tents or blankets, but all were so tired that they slept, cold as it was. The morning of September 25, when we awoke, we looked out on the Ohio River and saw that it was so low it was only navigable for small boats. No orders came to march and the men set about baking ash cakes. At 9 o'clock orders came to fall in and resume our march. We crossed Salt River at its mouth on a pontoon bridge, followed the Ohio for three or four miles, and then left it for the open country. After a march of fifteen miles, we again turned towards the Ohio and at 6 P. M. went into camp on its banks. September 26, at 8:30 A. M., we moved on to Louisville, distant about eight miles. Up to this time we had given little thought to our personal appearance. We had marched over 400 miles since leaving Battle Creek. We were footsore and our shoulders had become calloused from carrying our heavy guns, like our feet used to be after running barefoot in the summer. Our clothing was in rags; of our shoes little remained except the soles, and we were covered with dust. But we soon forgot all about our ragged uniforms in the almost frantic demonstrations of welcome which greeted us from housetops, windows and sidewalks, as we marched through the principal streets of the city. Never in all our experience had we received such an ovation. As we marched square after square amid enthusiastic cheering and waving of flags and handkerchiefs from housetops and windows, we began to feel proud of our ragged blouses and shirts and worn shoes, and a contempt for the soldiers in new uniforms and white collars which we saw in great numbers along the sidewalks. And how proudly and splendidly we marched. Our lines were true, we kept perfect step and proper distances and moved like an army of veterans. After marching through the principal streets we moved out to

one of the suburbs and went into camp on the Ohio River. The arrival of Buell's army was an event of tremendous moment to the citizens of Louisville, for that night they went to sleep feeling that the safety of their city was assured. From September 27 to 30, inclusive, we rested quietly in camp. We were fitted out with brand new uniforms, underclothing and shoes, and felt the joy of again being clean. The paymaster came and paid us off and we had some spending money.

On the 29th, we were startled by the report that General Nelson had been shot at the Galt House by General Jeff C. Davis. Some of us went into the city and through an excited crowd at that hotel where we learned that the report was true and that General Nelson was dead. The circumstances of the tragedy were reported by General Buell to General Halleck October 3, as follows: "Brigadier Davis is under arrest at Louisville for the killing of General Nelson. His trial by a court martial or military commission should take place immediately, but I can't spare officers from the army now in motion to compose a court. It can, perhaps, better be done from Washington. The circumstances are, that on a previous occasion, Nelson censured Davis for what he considered neglect of duty and ordered him to report to General Wright at Cincinnati, Ohio. Davis said with reference to that matter that if he could not get satisfaction or justice he would take the law into his own hands. On the occasion of the killing he approached Nelson in a large company and introduced the subject. Harsh or violent words ensued and Nelson slapped Davis in the face and walked off. Davis followed him, having procured a pistol from some one in the party, and met Nelson in the hall of the hotel. Davis fired. The ball entered the right breast, inflicting a mortal wound and causing death in a few minutes."¹

General Nelson had been in command of all the troops at Louisville previous to General Buell's arrival and had the confidence of the Union people of Kentucky. A general order announcing his death paid deserved tribute to his fine qualities as a soldier.² He was a man of violent temper and sometimes intolerant and abusive in speech, as was shown in his altercation with Colonel Dickey at Corinth. General Davis was acquitted of blame for shooting General Nelson, and afterwards rendered distinguished service to his country in high command.

Before the arrival of General Buell at Louisville, on September 23, by direction of the President, the Department of the Tennessee was created, consisting of the state of Tennessee east

¹ W. R. R. 16, part 2-566

² W. R. R. 16, part 2-558

of the Tennessee River and such parts of Northern Alabama and Georgia as might be taken possession of by our troops, and General Thomas was placed in command, with directions to find the enemy and give him battle. At the same time an order was issued relieving General Buell and directing him to turn over the command to General Thomas. These orders were placed in the hands of Colonel J. C. McKibben, Aide de Camp, with directions to find General Buell, and if he was in the presence of the enemy preparing to fight a battle, or had gained a victory, or if General Thomas was separated from General Buell so that he could not take command of the troops, the orders were not to be delivered.¹ September 27, General Halleck telegraphed to Colonel McKibben who was then supposed to be at Cincinnati, not to deliver the dispatches until further orders,² and the same day informed General Buell that by virtue of his rank he would exercise command of the troops in Louisville until further orders, with a caution that there should be as little delay as possible in advancing upon the enemy.² September 29, General Halleck again telegraphed to Colonel McKibben at Louisville to await orders before acting, but the latter did not receive the dispatches, and at 12:45 p. m. that day, delivered the orders and so informed General Halleck, stating that it was fortunate that he had obeyed instructions, as there was much dissatisfaction with General Buell.³ General Buell at once turned over the command to General Thomas. That officer, however, shrank from the responsibility and asked that General Buell be retained in command. General Halleck at once denied responsibility for the orders, they were suspended by order of the President,⁴ and September 30, General Buell resumed command.⁵ It was afterwards known that Secretary Stanton was responsible for the attempted removal of General Buell.⁶ In the light of subsequent events it probably would have been fortunate for the country if the great war secretary had had his way.

These events doubtless had the effect to stir General Buell to unusual activity. He now had under his command an army of probably 90,000 men and proceeded to organize it into three corps, commanded respectively by Generals McCook, Crittenden and C. C. Gilbert, twelve divisions commanded respectively by Generals Schoepf, Sill, Rousseau, William S. Smith, Van Cleve, Thomas J. Wood, Negley, Robert B. Mitchell, James S. Jackson, Sheridan, Dumont and John M. Palmer, and a division of cavalry commanded by Colonel John Kennett. His artillery, consisting of thirty-six batteries, was distributed among

1 W. R. R. 16, part 2-538-539

2 W. R. R. 16, part 2-549.

3 W. R. R. 16, part 2-554

4 W. R. R. 16, part 2-554-555

5 W. R. R. 16, part 2-559

6 W. R. R. 16, part 2-652

the several brigades and divisions.¹ General Thomas was named second in command.² Our division, then commanded by General Sill, was assigned to McCook's corps. October 1, General Buell issued tentative orders to continue the march toward the enemy.³ He was probably further quickened in his movement by a dispatch from General Halleck dated October 2 in which that officer stated there was much apprehension in Washington that unless he, Buell, moved immediately, the enemy would send a portion of his forces against Cincinnati, which was not in position to resist a serious attack, and urging him to prompt action.⁴

September 30, our entire brigade was called out at 3 a. m., marched through Louisville and then returned to camp. The cause of the march was not known, but it probably was an idea of General Willich's to give us a little exercise before beginning the campaign. October 1, at 7 a. m., our division moved out in the direction of Lexington, passing through Middletown. The men were in good spirits, the road was good, and although the enemy was reported to be not very far in our front, there seemed to be no haste. After a pleasant march of about fifteen miles, at 7 p. m., we halted for the night near Carter's Creek. Cannonading was heard some distance in front. Colonel Dickey who had tendered his resignation at Battle Creek and gone home, was back in command of the regiment. October 2, we resumed our march at 8 a. m. We crossed Carter's Creek and passed through a number of small villages along the route. After marching about seventeen miles we came to Shelbyville. The enemy had been there the night before and their camp fires were still burning. On arriving near the town our regiment was ordered out on a reconnoissance and then on picket duty.⁵ There was rain during the night. The diarists speak of the enthusiastic Union sentiment of the people of Shelbyville, and note that they were lavish in their attentions to our troops. October 3, there was firing heard in our front and the picket line was advanced about 500 yards. At 5 p. m., we were relieved and went into camp on a dirt road leading to Frankfort.⁶ October 4, there were no orders to move and we rested quietly in camp. Our teams went back to Louisville for rations. October 5, there were still no orders to move. It was Sunday and one of the clergymen of Shelbyville held religious services in our camp,—the first for a year,—Mumaugh says in his diary. We also had regular inspection and afterwards went out on picket, at the same place as before. October 6, we had reveille at 3:30 a. m., and at 6 a. m., started on a

1 W. R. R. 16, part 2-591-596 and 562

2 W. R. R. 16, part 2-560

3 W. R. R. 16, part 2-560

4 W. R. R. 16, part 2-564

5 McConnell's and Mumaugh's Diaries

6 Mumaugh's Diary.

rapid march for Frankfort, distant 21 miles. The country through which we marched was most interesting and the views along the Kentucky River were exceedingly fine. At Hardinsville, fourteen miles out, we halted for a short rest and then pushed on through Claysville, Bridgeport and other villages and in the evening went into camp on the pike one mile west of Frankfort. It was said that our advance had driven the enemy out of the place. October 7, we remained at Frankfort all day. Our camp was moved down closer to the river where the men could bathe and wash their clothing. On October 2 General Bragg had reported to General Polk, who was at Bardstown, that he expected to be in Frankfort on the 3rd with all his force, and directed Polk to attack the enemy in flank,¹ but that officer reported that the rapid advance of our forces made such an attack impracticable.² A good part of General Kirby Smith's forces were then in Frankfort and it was General Bragg's intention to concentrate his whole army there. General Polk's neglect to move as ordered made such concentration impossible, and necessitated an entire change in General Bragg's plans.³ General Bragg was in Frankfort October 4, had the Confederate flag hoisted over the capitol and went through the form of installing a provisional governor of Kentucky.⁴ On the same day he gave orders for concentration at Harrodsburg for the purpose of giving battle.⁵ The movements of General Buell's forces had compelled the concentration of General Bragg's forces at Perryville instead of Harrodsburg, and October 7, General Buell reported to General Thomas the near approach of his own forces to that place and that he expected to attack and carry the place next day. At the same time he directed General Thomas to march at 3 o'clock next morning, gave directions about placing the troops, and ordered him, when the column was in position, to report in person at his, Buell's headquarters, when further instructions would be given.⁶ Probably in pursuance of this order and with the purpose of having our division join in the attack on the enemy at Perryville, we were aroused at midnight, October 7, and at 1 a. m., October 8, took up our march for the place. We marched around through the city and started south on the west side of the river. We passed through the village of Rough and Ready and on to Lawrenceburg. At that place a force of the enemy caused us to halt, while a detachment of the 9th Kentucky Cavalry under Colonel Jacobs was sent forward to reconnoiter. As the detachment was emerging from a cut in the road, it was charged by a force of the enemy's cavalry, thrown into confusion,

1 W. R. R. 16, part 2-896-897.

2 W. R. R. 16, part 2-901.

3 W. R. R. 16, part 1-1091.

4 W. R. R. 10, part 1-1091.

5 W. R. R. 16, part 2-905-906.

6 W. R. R. 16, part 2-580-581.

and a general hand to hand conflict took place. The 15th Ohio was ordered forward at a double quick and formed along a fence overlooking the field where the fight was going on. Both sides were using the saber and the movements were so rapid and involved, that we could not fire without danger of hitting our own men. Finally, we saw a Confederate soldier with a double barrelled shot gun pursuing Colonel Jacobs, who was wounded, calling out to him, "Surrender G—d d—n you!", and heard the Colonel say, "G—d d—n you, I won't surrender." The two came on toward our line, when suddenly more than a dozen men in our ranks fired and brought down Colonel Jacob's pursuer. The horse and rider, both mortally wounded, came on towards our line and fell dead a few paces from it. The man's shot gun was picked up as a trophy by Morris Cope of Company E. The aggressive fighting of the 9th Kentucky Cavalry soon drove the enemy back and they beat a hasty retreat, leaving their dead and some of their wounded in our hands. Cotter's battery of our division threw a few shells after the retreating enemy and hastened their flight. After this little engagement, we marched west on a new road about eight miles where we bivouaced for the night among the hills, near a place called Dog Walk.¹ Our day's march, according to Mumaugh was 25 miles, according to McConnell 27 miles.

While we were making this day's march the battle of Perryville was fought by Rousseau's and Jackson's divisions of McCook's corps and Sheridan's and Mitchell's divisions of Gilbert's Corps, while the other troops of Buell's army, in supporting distance, lay idly by, not daring to move because it would interfere with Buell's plans. As our regiment was not engaged in the battle no detailed account of it will be given. Suffice it to say for the present, that about 2:30 p. m., the left of Buell's army at Perryville,—two divisions of McCook's corps, and Sheridan's division of Gilbert's corps were attacked by General Bragg's army. General R. B. Mitchell's division of Gilbert's Corps came to their relief, and they maintained an unequal fight against greatly superior numbers until dark, with a loss of 4231 men killed and wounded² and 11 pieces of artillery, only two of which, however, were carried off the field.³

October 9, we had orders to march at 7 a. m. and were getting ready to move when we heard cannonading behind us. We formed line of battle and the 32d Indiana, 1st Ohio and the 15th and 19th Regulars were sent out as skirmishers and met the enemy's forces coming up in our rear. A severe skirmish en-

1 Writer's recollection.

2 W. R. R. 16, part 2-1035.

3 General McCook's Report, W. R. R. 16, part 1-1042.

sued in which our losses were, 32d Indiana, 1 killed; 1st Ohio, 3 killed and 8 wounded, and 1 killed in one of the Regular Regiments. During the engagement the 49th Ohio went to the support of the men engaged.¹ A train insufficiently guarded had gone down to a small stream where there was sufficient water for the animals, and was captured and burned, and the officers and men in charge were taken prisoners and parolled. Among the property captured and destroyed were our regimental and company books and the private baggage of the officers. About 1 p. m., the enemy being driven off we took up our march towards Perryville, our brigade acting as rear guard. After a march of ten miles we went into camp on Beaver Creek, near Johnsonville.² October 10, we resumed our march at 5 a. m., and at noon halted at a creek where we got dinner and filled our canteens, being told that we would not find water again for ten miles. Our advance was said to have taken some horses and clothing belonging to one of the Confederate generals. We began to get reports from the Perryville battle field. It began to rain, but we moved on and at 4 p. m. made another halt and rested for two hours or more. Night came on and it was so dark we could scarcely see the men immediately before us. At 9 p. m. we stopped for the night. Some of the men got hay somewhere for their beds. October 11, we were called up at 4 a. m., got breakfast, cleaned our guns, dried our blankets and were ordered to be ready to move at any moment. At 9 a. m. the bugles sounded and we resumed our march. We marched to Willisburg, where we took the pike and marched southeast to Maxville. There we began to meet men who were wounded at Perryville and to hear the fate of friends and relatives in the regiments engaged. We moved thence on towards Perryville and at dark went into camp in a field where the battle had raged three days before. Strange to say, some of the dead were still unburied. One who had a brother in the 98th Ohio³ who was reported killed in the battle, wandered about in the dark with the vain hope of finding his body. That night General McCook came to our camp and was greeted with wild cheering. We had been separated from him since leaving Louisville. He said that if he had had us, his old division, with him in the battle, "we would have cleaned them out."⁴ He said he would lead us ahead next morning, Major Cotter, his chief of artillery, who had been captured and parolled, was with him. Our days march had been fifteen miles. October 12, we marched at 5 a. m. We soon began to see dead men and horses and other evidences of the battle, but Mumaugh says "it

1 W. R. R. 16, part 1-1134-1135.

2 Mumaugh's Diary.

3 The Writer.

4 Mumaugh's Diary.

was not a patching to what we had seen at Shiloh." We marched on to Perryville where we saw a great many wounded and parolled men and prisoners coming in. We rested for two hours and then marched on to near Harrodsburg where we bivouaced for the night. Our day's march had been about 11 miles. General Rousseau rode through our camp and the cheers that greeted him were hardly less loud and enthusiastic than those we had given General McCook. He said we would go after the enemy again tomorrow. October 13, at 5:30 a. m. we resumed our slow march in pursuit of Bragg's army which was now said to be in full retreat. We marched about seven miles, passing around but in sight of Harrodsburg, and through the village of Bradfordsville, which had been burned. We finally came to a fine spring about four miles from Danville and went into camp with no orders for a further advance. The enemy was said to be at Camp Dick Robinson. October 14, the division marched at 9 a. m., but our regiment was detached to guard the division trains and did not move until 5 p. m. We marched through Danville and three miles beyond, where, at midnight the trains halted and we dropped down for a little sleep. The night was cold with a heavy frost and the men suffered from cold and lack of shelter. October 15, at 6 a. m., we were relieved from duty as train guard and marched to rejoin our brigade and division. The whole of McCook's corps was said to be present and we were pressing forward in the hope of overtaking the retreating enemy and bringing him to bay. There was heavy cannonading in our front and, formerly, our blood would have been stirred with the prospect of a battle. But we had been so long accustomed to being led away from or around the enemy, that it caused little interest. We marched through Stanford and on to Crab Orchard, a distance of twenty miles, and went into camp in sight of the Cumberland mountains. Here our part in the pursuit of Bragg's army ended.

On October 16, General Buell reported to General Halleck that he thought it useless and inexpedient to continue the pursuit of Bragg's army and proposed to move with his main force rapidly back to Nashville.²

General Halleck strongly objected to General Buell's proposed movement and October 18, telegraphed him saying that the main object of the campaign was to drive the enemy from Kentucky and Tennessee, and that if it could not be done then we need never hope for it. General Halleck urged that by keeping between Bragg and Nashville, Buell could cover that place and at

¹ Mumaugh's Diary.

² W. R. R. 16, part 2-619.

the same time compel Bragg to fall back into the valley of Virginia or into Georgia. That by the occupation of Knoxville or Chattanooga the enemy could be kept out of Tennessee and Kentucky, and that to fall back on Nashville would be to give up East Tennessee to be plundered. General Halleck also pointed out that Buell was nearer to Knoxville than Nashville and as near to Chattanooga, and suggested that if he went to Nashville the enemy might make another raid into Kentucky.¹ October 19, General Halleck again telegraphed General Buell, saying that President Lincoln concurred in his views, and that he was directed by the President to say that his, Buell's army "must enter Tennessee this fall and that it ought to move there while the roads are passable" and that the President "does not understand why we cannot march as the enemy marches, live as he lives and fight as he fights, unless we admit the inferiority of our troops and of our generals."²

General Buell answered General Halleck's dispatch of the 18th on the 20th, opposing the movement into East Tennessee and representing that it would take an available force of 80,000 men to take and hold it, and made other objections.³ These objections seem to have made no impression on the authorities at Washington, for at 12:20 p. m. of that day, General Halleck issued a positive order to General Buell to proceed and occupy East Tennessee with all possible dispatch.⁴ The authorities at Washington by this time had become thoroughly dissatisfied with General Buell and had decided on his removal. October 23, General Rosecrans, who was at Corinth, was ordered by telegraph to report at once at Cincinnati,⁵ and October 24, orders were issued relieving General Buell and placing General Rosecrans in command of the army.⁶ General Rosecrans was not able to assume the command until October 30,⁷ and by this time the situation had materially changed. General Bragg had got into Middle Tennessee and October 31, General McCook telegraphed from Green River, that he was attempting by forced marches to reach Nashville ahead of our forces.⁸ The orders sending us back to Nashville were therefore not changed.

1 W. R. R. 16, part 2-623.

2 W. R. R. 16, part 2-626-627.

3 W. R. R. 16, part 2-636-637.

4 W. R. R. 16, part 2-638.

5 W. R. R. 16, part 2-639.

6 W. R. R. 16, part 2-640-641-642.

7 W. R. R. 16, part 2-654.

8 W. R. R. 16, part 2-658.

CHAPTER XII.

THE MARCH BACK TO NASHVILLE AND PREPARATION FOR THE MURFREESBORO CAMPAIGN.

Our pursuit of Bragg's army came to an end October 15, 1862, after a march of twenty miles to Crab Orchard in plain view of the mountains. We encamped at 9 o'clock p. m., three miles east of that place. Here we remained until the 20th, and then started back over the route we came. We did not know then what a failure our toilsome summer's campaign had been. We heard, on the march from Nashville north, that we had lost opportunities to inflict damaging blows on the enemy at Munfordville and Glasgow, and that with more prompt movements we might have prevented the capture of the former place and General Wilders' force of nearly 5000 men. We also heard rumors that McCook, Rousseau and Sheridan had fought Bragg's entire army at Perryville, while Union troops, equal in numbers to those engaged, lay within supporting distance and were not permitted to help them, and that if McCook and Rousseau had had proper support from these unengaged troops, Bragg's army would have been destroyed. But this was only talk while we marched or lay in camp or bivouac. We did not know the real facts then, and perhaps it was better that we did not know them. It was after the war ended that the facts were made known to the public. We afterwards heard that these rumors and complaints had reached the ears of General Buell and that he had demanded a court of inquiry as to his conduct of the campaign and that the court had vindicated him. It is now known that on November 4, 1862, the Secretary of War directed Halleck to organize "a military commission to inquire into and report upon the operations of the forces under command of Major General Buell in the states of Tennessee and Kentucky, and particularly in reference to General Buell suffering the state of Kentucky to be invaded by the rebel forces under General Bragg, and in his failure to relieve Munfordville and suffering it to be captured; also in reference to the battle of Perryville and General Buell's conduct during that battle, and afterwards suffering the rebel forces to escape from Kentucky without loss or capture."

Such a commission was afterwards, November 20, 1862, appointed, composed of the following officers: Major General Lewis Wallace, Major General E. O. C. Ord, Brigadier General Albin Schoepf, Brigadier General N. J. T. Dana, Briga-

dier General Daniel Tyler, with Major Donn Piatt as Judge Advocate and Recorder.

The commission met in Cincinnati, Ohio, took the testimony of a large number of witnesses and made its report, which was submitted to the Secretary of War, April 15, 1863, and in some unaccountable manner was lost.¹ On March 1, 1872, nearly ten years later, the House of Representatives passed a resolution calling for a copy of the proceedings of the commission, and the Secretary of War reported "that a careful and exhaustive search among all the records and files in this department fails to discover what disposition was made of the proceedings of the commission and the papers annexed thereto, and that no record indicative of the nature of the report of the board or the conclusions reached by it can be found, other than what is contained in the accompanying papers." The accompanying papers were a copy of the original opinion of the commission, copy of a communication from General Buell of date, April 10, 1864, commenting on the report of the board; copy of an unsigned communication reviewing the proceedings of the commission which was referred to the Secretary of War by the Judge Advocate General, at the request of Lieutenant Colonel Donn Piatt, May 23, 1863; copy of a communication submitted by General Buell to the commission May 2, 1863; copy of a communication from General Buell, April 11, 1864, submitting statement prepared by him reviewing the evidence taken before the commission; and a copy of General Orders No. 29a, Headquarters Army of the Ohio of July 11, 1862.

On June 5, 1872, Congress passed an act to provide for the restoration of the records of the proceedings of the court of inquiry concerning the operations of the army under "the command of General Buell in Kentucky and Tennessee, directing that whereas there was a full and complete report of the proceedings of said court of inquiry then in the possession of Ben Pittman, the stenographic reporter of said court, that the Secretary of War be directed to employ said Ben Pittman to make a full and correct transcript of the notes taken by him during the sessions of said court of inquiry and that the same be placed on file in the War Department and furnish a copy to Congress."

This was done and the same is to be found in Volume 16, Part 1, Series 1, of the War of the Rebellion Records, pages 67 to 724, inclusive.

This did not contain the "opinion of the commission" or "the unsigned review of the proceedings" heretofore mentioned,

¹ W. R. R., Series 1, Vol. 16, part 1-8.

which was evidently prepared by Major Donn Piatt, Judge Advocate of the commission.

The copy of the opinion of the court or commission, states in substance that on the 11th day of June, 1862, General Buell, who was then with his army at or near Iuka, Miss. was ordered to march against Chattanooga and take it; that his forces were sufficient for the purpose, and that he could have done so if he had moved promptly, but that the plan of operations prescribed by General Halleck, his superior in command, compelled him to repair the Memphis and Charleston Railroad from Corinth to Decatur; that while the road thus repaired, was of little service, the work of repairing it made a prompt march on Chattanooga impossible; that such delay gave Bragg time to send a numerous cavalry force to operate against Buell's lines of supply, and that made it impossible to concentrate enough of the army of the Ohio to capture Chattanooga; that the massing of the rebel forces at Chattanooga compelled a relinquishment of the designs on that place, after which General Buell was required to exert all his energies to prevent the recapture of Nashville and the invasion of Kentucky. The commission was of opinion that he could have done this by an early concentration of his army at Sparta, McMinnville or Murfreesboro, that instead of that, he waited until September 5, before concentrating at Murfreesboro, from which point he retired to Nashville and thereby permitted Bragg to cross the Cumberland River without interruption. The commission could not justify General Buell's falling back from Murfreesboro to Nashville and expressed the opinion that it was his duty from that point to have attacked the rebel army before it crossed the Cumberland River, and that if he had done so he could have defeated that part of it under Bragg's immediate command.

The commission also found that General Buell was not responsible for the capture of Munfordville, except so far as his failure to attack Bragg south of the Cumberland River made him responsible for the consequences of that failure. The commission's findings and opinion in regard to General Buell's conduct at the battle of Perryville, were substantially that he intended to attack Bragg at Perryville on the ninth of October. That on the morning of the 8th General Gilbert with his corps was in position in the center. General McCook with his corps, except General Sill's division, arrived on the left about 9 o'clock, and that General Thomas, in command of the right wing (Crittenden's corps) reached his position and reported to General Buell about noon. That about 2

o'clock the enemy poured a heavy column of attack on McCook, resulting in an obstinate and bloody contest which lasted five hours, and ended at nightfall, at which time McCook's right had been turned and driven back with serious loss: that General Buell had established his headquarters about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the front on the Springfield road: that he was not on the field or along the line during the day, and did not know of the attack on McCook until about 4 o'clock in the evening: that about 2 o'clock a heavy and furious cannonading was heard at his headquarters, and coming out of his tent he said "there was a great waste of powder over there" and directed General Gilbert, who was with him at the time, to send an order to the front "to stop that useless waste of powder." The commission therefore thought it clear that General Buell did not believe a battle was in progress and mildly state that in their opinion, "General Buell should have been on the field ready for emergencies and advantages, or have taken and required to be taken every precaution for the instant transmission of intelligence to his headquarters, and that as he had an organized signal corps with his army, this failure was all the more culpable." The commission in order to be as neutral as possible say, "General McCook was equally culpable because he did not send up to General Buell instant notice of the attack upon him."

The commission also found that during the greater part of the attack on McCook, Gilbert's corps was unengaged, although his left was only 300 yards from McCook's right when the severest fighting took place, while the right wing under Thomas had not so much as a demonstration made against it, and that there could be no question "that it was somebody's duty to assist McCook. That nothing but positive orders fixing and holding Gilbert in his position, could justify his failure to do so, and that there was no evidence that he had received any such orders."

The commission also found that General Buell's army was superior to the armies of Bragg and Kirby Smith combined. They stated they had reason to believe that all of Bragg's army at Perryville at the time was thrown against McCook, and that his lines of retreat by way of Harrodsburg and Danville were so exposed that after 4 o'clock they might have been cut off, if the troops under Thomas had been pushed vigorously forward for this purpose, and that in their judgment the opportunity slipped by through General Buell's absence from the field, or on account of his ignorance of the condition of the battle. They say, "We are very sure that if he

could have ordered supports to McCook at an earlier hour than he did order them the attack would have repulsed with less loss to himself and greater to the enemy."

The commission also found that the escape of Bragg's army from Kentucky was due to Buell's delay.

General Halleck received the report of the commission, and recommended that the commission be dissolved and that its officers, as well as General Buell be ordered on other duty.

The unsigned paper, a copy of which was found in the War Department as above stated, is evidently a review of the evidence by the Judge Advocate of the commission, Major Donn Piatt.

It is a mild arraignment of General Buell's conduct throughout the entire campaign. General Buell reviewed the evidence taken before the commission and endeavored to justify himself. All these papers are now accessible, and the careful reader cannot help concluding that the findings of the commission were mild when judged by the facts brought out in the hearing. It is well, as has been before remarked, that we did not know at the time why our summer's trying campaign of long marches, scant food and clothing, hardships and dangers, had all been for nought. So as above stated we started back over the same road on which we had marched in pursuit of Bragg's army, not knowing what was before us in coming campaigns, but trusting in those who commanded us.

"Ours not to reason why
Ours not to make reply,
Ours but to do or die,"

as those in authority over us should command.

On October 20, we started at 7 o'clock a. m., marched about twenty miles and encamped where our brigade had encamped on the evening of October 14—about three miles southeast of Danville. We were told that our trains had started for Lebanon Junction on the 18th, carrying our tents, and we had with us only our knapsacks, blankets and cooking utensils. Fortunately the weather was fine. The nights were cool, but by doubling up we managed to sleep comfortably without shelter. The next day we marched through Danville and then took a road leading west and encamped near a large spring, having only made about eleven miles. The next morning we started at 6:30 o'clock, still marching west, and unexpectedly came into Perryville. We were told that by the road we had come the distance from Crab Orchard to Perryville was twenty miles shorter than by the road we had marched

over in pursuit of Bragg. At Perryville we saw a number of dead lying out by a hospital and were told that many of the wounded left there were dying. After leaving Perryville we marched about nine miles and encamped on Rolling Fork about two miles from the road, having marched during the day about fifteen miles. The night was very cold and ice formed on the water where it was still. Next morning, October 23, we were awakened by reveille at 4:30 o'clock and ordered to be ready to march at 6 o'clock. We started at 7 and followed Rolling Fork to Bradfordville, where most of the houses had been burned by the rebels about two weeks before. On the march we passed General Gilbert's troops and many of our men saw among them neighbors and friends in other regiments. At 12 o'clock we rested and made coffee, and orders came to march two miles further and there go into camp for the night. We marched about five miles further over a hilly road and when we halted for the night we were very tired. We had marched about fifteen miles. That night we had straw to sleep on and got the impression that we were to remain here for some time. We had no orders to march further and took a good rest. Next morning there were still no orders and we went to work fixing up and making ourselves comfortable. But at 10 o'clock orders came to march again and every one was angry. According to the diaries of Nathan Mumaugh, Company H, and John G. Gregory, Company A, there was some tall swearing by the men. We fell in and resumed our march and as we left our camp we saw General Sheridan's division marching in and occupying our camp. Our route soon brought us to the pike south of Lebanon, Ky. We passed the village of New Market, where General Rousseau's division was encamped, crossed Rolling Fork on a covered bridge, and went into camp at dark at Saloma, eight miles from New Market. Mumaugh's and Gregory's diaries before mentioned state that on this day, October 24, 1862, Colonel Dickey left us, having again resigned, and that Captain Douglass left on leave of absence. The next day we remained in camp at Saloma and our tents, which we had not seen for over two months, came to us. It was a dull drizzly day and in the evening it snowed. Some of the men put up their tents, but many bivouaced on the ground without shelter, as we had been doing for the past two months. One of the men of Company K¹ recalls a sense of chilliness when he lay down with three of his comrades and they drew their blankets over them, which was succeeded by delicious warmth, and then

1 The writer.

by a profound refreshing sleep. Such rest was not broken until daylight next morning. A comrade of Company K, Squire Palmer, roused us by imitating a cock's crow. We looked out from under our blankets and saw that we were covered by two or three inches of snow. This was the blanket which had caused such delicious warmth and sound sleep. All around us were white mounds which indicated where others of our comrades had bivouaced as we had done, and soon from scores of such mounds, Squire Palmer's cock crow was answered by similar imitations. We were all so comfortable we did not care to get up, and for quite a while the badinage of the camp went on from mound to mound. We got no orders to march on the 26th, but lay in camp all day, busy with routine camp duty. The weather grew warmer and the snow soon melted. Sergeant Andrew J. Gleason joined the regiment with a number of recruits for Company H, whose men gave him and them a rousing reception.

On Monday the 27th, we were awakened by the bugle of the Forty-ninth Ohio, which was soon followed by reveille sounded by our own bugler, and we soon received orders to march at 6 a. m. but did not march until 7 a. m. We took a mud road leading towards Bell's Tavern, marched to Green River and crossed it on a bridge of rails and went into camp before dark about three-quarters of a mile beyond the river—distance marched about fifteen miles.

The next day we marched twelve miles to Three Springs. The weather was fair and warm. We crossed the Little Barren River when about five miles out and went on for two miles when we halted and rested for two hours. Apples and persimmons were abundant along the road and we helped ourselves to them liberally. After our rest we marched five miles farther and encamped on the farm of a noted "secesh" who had fled on our approach. He had a large flock of sheep and as rations were scarce we confiscated two or more for each company and had fresh mutton for our meat ration. We were told by General Sill, commanding the division, that we would not get regular rations until we got to Bell's Tavern next day.

On the 29th we marched at 8 o'clock for Bell's Tavern, or Proctor, said to be distant 15 miles, but it proved to be nearer 20 miles. We had two or three miles of pike to march on and then left it to the right and bearing nearly west went on until we reached the Bowling Green pike at Prewitt's Knob. We reached our destination in good season and drew rations, which we were very much needing, but could not get



WILLIAM WALLACE

Colonel of the Regiment from October 24, 1862 to July 19, 1864.

before because our supply train was not up. On the 30th we marched to Dripping Springs, eight miles, and on the 31st to Lost River, 17 miles. We started on this march at 7:30 a. m. moving directly on the turnpike leading south and as the road was good we made good time. We reached the river opposite Bowling Green a little after noon and crossed it on a pontoon bridge. We rested awhile on the commons between the river and the city and then moved on through the city and three miles beyond to Lost River and went into camp, where we remained until the morning of November 4. While in this camp we heard that General Rosecrans, who had succeeded General Buell as our commander, had arrived at Bowling Green, and a little later that he was actually in our camp, but we did not see him.

Here we drew clothing, replenished our equipment and had opportunity to bathe and wash our clothing. On the evening of November 2, 1862, we heard the singers of the regiment, the Gleason boys, Major McClenahan, Adjutant Taft and others, singing in one of the tents of Company H the old home songs, which sounded sweet and awakened in some hearts unutterable longings. On November 3, we received orders to march next morning with five days' rations, two of which were to be in our haversacks. Next morning we sent a number of our sick men to hospital in Bowling Green and left our camp at Lost River between 7 and 8 o'clock, marching on the pike toward Franklin, Ky. which we reached at 2 o'clock in the afternoon. We were all impressed by the substantial look of the place, as compared with Bowling Green. We marched through the village with drums beating and colors flying. A squad of horsemen in citizens' dress was assembled on the square, which we regarded with suspicion, thinking perhaps they were guerillas. We were afterwards told that our suspicions were groundless, as Franklin was known as one of the strongest Union towns in Kentucky. We marched about three miles beyond the town and encamped near a small stream. We were allowed one-half dozen rails to the company for fuel. There was a straw stack in a field not far off and we were allowed to get some of it for our beds. This permission was no sooner announced than each man raced for his share. It was soon surrounded and covered over with blue-coated men and in almost an instant it was gone as a stack, but its separate parts, of the size of armfuls, seemed to be alive and moving in every direction over the field. That night the more swift of foot had soft beds to sleep on.

November 5, our bugles awakened us at 4 o'clock

a. m. and we received orders to march. We were the advance brigade and got started a little before 6 o'clock. The road was dusty and the march was a weary one. We crossed the state line between Kentucky and Tennessee a little after 7 o'clock. We were marching back over the same ground we had marched over September 13, 1862, going north. There is a little hamlet named Mitchelville near the line and we all recognized the place. As our column crossed the line, we sang,

"John Brown's body lies a mouldering in the ground
But his soul is marching on."

The chorus rose and swelled as regiment after regiment came to the line and took it up, and one felt that the spirit of the old martyr to liberty was indeed pervading the hearts of the dusty men in blue and that they, willingly, or unwillingly, were to be God's instruments to break the yoke of the oppressor and let the oppressed go free. We rested a brief space near Mitchellville and made a small detail of men to guard a railroad tunnel nearby. Further on we met two spruce young men in a buggy, dressed in citizen's clothing, whom we regarded with suspicion, as they seemed quite inquisitive. They were afterwards arrested and indentified as being two of John Morgan's men.¹ After a twenty-mile march we reached Tyree Springs at 2 o'clock and went into camp near a large hotel. We had some trouble in getting water as the springs were low. Some of the boys got a violin and in the evening had a dance in the hotel. While the dance was going on Nathan Mumaugh, Company H, discovered that the hotel was on fire and gave the alarm, and by dint of hard work the building was saved from destruction. Some mattresses stored in a room had been set on fire and the fire was extinguished by throwing the mattresses out, with the result that some of the men had soft beds that night. Some of the officers and men had taken quarters for the night in the hotel, and a guard was placed about it to prevent further attempts to burn it. It was reported to be a harbor for guerillas. The next morning we found the hotel still standing, to the surprise of many who thought that the attempt to burn it would be renewed. We marched November 6 to near Edgefield Junction, twelve miles. We were aroused by an early bugle call, but as our brigade was to march in the rear of the division we did not start until 10 o'clock. Near the little hamlet of White Hill we halted for a short time. Resuming our march we soon came to the winding descent into the Cumberland valley. The

¹ Gleason's Diary.

day was cloudy and cold, a day of unusual depression. One of the men in the ranks, at a turn in the road, saw the long dusty column of men moving painfully southward, and recalling the experiences of the past year, involuntarily said to himself, "Will this war ever end?"¹ It was the dark year of the war. Almost everywhere our arms had met with disaster, and incompetence and inefficiency had been exhibited in some of our most exalted leaders. All over the north men's hearts seemed failing them. It is no wonder, that recalling our own experience, some of us should at times be also faint-hearted. On our march this day, a rebel lieutenant was captured by some stragglers of Goodspeed's battery while spying the movements of our army. We rather expected an attack from guerillas. Our regiment was in the advance and two sections of Goodspeed's battery were placed in the center of it. But no signs of the enemy were seen, and we marched on to Edgefield Junction and encamped on a hill where we had plenty of rails for fuel and plenty of straw for our beds. Companies C and H were sent out on picket duty. We received orders to be ready to march at 6 o'clock next morning. On the morning of November 7 reveille was sounded at 4:30 o'clock, but we did not march until near 7, when we moved out rapidly on the road to Nashville, distant nine miles. We soon met a long supply train going after supplies. The train was escorted by a battalion of cavalry and some artillery and the wagons carried a large detachment of armed men. After we met this train our progress was slow. Once we were halted for nearly an hour and our men built small fires of rails to keep themselves warm, for the day was raw and cold. When we came in view of the city of Nashville we turned to the left, marched to the Cumberland River and encamped on its banks. When we had halted and stacked arms, Colonel Wallace gave the command, "Get Rails" which was promptly obeyed.

We pitched our tents and soon got the impression we would remain in this camp for some days. Some of the men erected small furnaces to warm their tents and otherwise prepared to make themselves comfortable. Our impression this time was correct, for we remained here until November 16, nine days. While here orders came to make out lists of men who had remained in Nashville when we marched north from the city in September, with a view of having them returned to the regiment. On November 12, the five right companies of the regiment went on picket duty. November 14, we were supplied with new caps and other clothing and needed equip-

1 The writer.

ment, and took part in a brigade review. The reviewing officers were Generals Rosecrans and McCook. It was our first sight of General Rosecrans, our new army commander. Accompanied by General McCook he passed down the line in front and then between the open ranks talking familiarly to the men, examining their dress and commenting on it. One sergeant,¹ who had taken exquisite pains to put this gun and accouterments in first-rate order and have the buttons on his uniform bright as burnished gold, was deeply humiliated when the general passed him and said "Sergeant button up your coat." One button, unfortunately, had by mistake been left unbuttoned. After the inspection we marched in column past the generals and then returned to our camp, all much pleased over the review. General Rosecrans had won all hearts, and we felt that we had a commander on whom we could safely depend. The weather was fair and pleasant all the days we were in this camp, and in the evenings, we had stag dances in the company streets. One day while we were in this camp we got another sight of Colonel Daniel McCook, our General McCook's brother. He and Lieutenant Colonel D. D. T. Cowen of the Fifty-second Ohio came riding through our camp and Colonel McCook forced his horse down the steep bank to the river to give him a drink, with the result that both horse and rider went into the river and came near drowning. On the evening of the 15th, Captain Thomas E. Douglass of Company H returned, having come through on a wagon train from Mitchelville. That night we received orders to have reveille at 4 o'clock next morning and be ready to march at 6.

The next morning we were ready to march at the appointed time, but our wagons were not all up, so each company was ordered to put its baggage all in one tent and leave it standing until the wagons came up. We started at 6 o'clock, passed through Edgefield and crossed the river on the railroad bridge. We marched through Nashville and on out the Murfreesboro pike four or five miles and then halted and threw out skirmishers. Reports came that the enemy had been seen in our front, but we moved on and finally got orders to double quick. Our knapsacks were well filled and heavy and we were soon winded carrying them. We then were ordered to unsling them, which was quite a relief. They were piled up and a guard was placed over them. We again advanced and soon wheeled into line and supported the Thirty-ninth Indiana on the skirmish line. We found it pretty severe work marching

¹ The author.

through cornfields, over fences and through patches of burrs which covered us from head to foot. After advancing in this manner for nearly two miles we halted, while a section of artillery was brought up and shelled the woods in our front. We then pushed on about two miles further, developed the enemy in some force and then retired and marched back to the place where we had left our knapsacks, where we went into camp. The place was near the state asylum for the insane. Our camp was in a large field, part of the asylum grounds, and there was a large fine spring nearby. Our wagons soon came up with out tents and the more expeditious of the men had them up in time to shelter them from a hard shower.

We remained in this camp until November 29, 1862. It was one of the most pleasant camps in our recollection and, although we heard frequent rumors of a change and two or three times had orders to be ready to march, we remained long enough to make ourselves very comfortable. The enemy we knew were not far off, and individual foraging by the men was done at great risk of capture. This was shown on the 11th, when James A. Jackson and Pelham C. Johnson of Company H and others of the brigade were captured while foraging on private account.

The morning of November 18, we heard several shots fired out towards the picket line, but paid little attention to them. We were just about ready for our breakfast when the brigade call was sounded, quickly followed by our own regimental call, and we were at once ordered out on a reconnoissance, leaving our breakfast untasted. We marched to the picket line, where we formed a line of battle and moved forward to the same position we had advanced to on the 16th. Again a section of artillery was brought forward and shelled the woods in our front. We remained in this position about an hour, when all being apparently serene, we marched back to camp, as hungry as bears. At 3 o'clock we received orders to go on picket. It being a rainy day and night it was an uncomfortable duty. We got back to our camps the next day at 4 o'clock, and got orders for a general inspection at 9 o'clock, November 20.

The inspection took place at 3 o'clock p. m. and when it was over, many of the men commenced building fireplaces and chimneys for their tents, as the weather had cleared and it was growing rapidly colder. An incident occurred this day which caused some adverse comment. Sergeant Capper of

Company H was reduced to the ranks for taking rails to build a fire.

On the 22nd, the regiment was detailed as guard for a foraging train. It marched at 8 o'clock a. m. and returned at 3 p. m. The expedition was successful in getting a good supply of forage. Some of our men were just as successful in adding to their stock of eatables, and brought back quite a quantity of yams, turnips, cabbages and beets. That evening Captain Douglass entertained some of the officers in his tent and uncorked a bottle of "Gougers'" best.¹ Our sutler was George Geiger and because of the high prices he charged was called by the men "Gouger." On the 23rd we had brigade inspection by General Sill and Colonel Gibson, who was temporarily in command of the brigade, and at 2:30 p. m. were ordered out on picket duty. We got back next day, November 24, at 3 o'clock p. m. The regiment had light duty during this detail, being on the reserve. This day, Lieutenant J. Alonzo Gleason, Company H, was detailed as commandant of a pioneer company made up of two men from each company of the regiment. It was the first organized force of the kind we had. The men carried besides their guns, axes, picks and shovels, etc—a full set of entrenching tools. That evening we heard again the old songs swelling from a tent in the quarters of Company H where the Gleasons, Major McClenahan, Adjutant Taft and others had come together for a sing.

On the 25th, we had dress parade in the evening and orders were published requiring two hours' company drill every morning. On the 26th, we had another dress parade and were then drawn up in close column to hear the orders read. On the 27th, just as dinner was ready, the assembly sounded and we were hurried to the picket line, a foraging party having been attacked. General Willich, our brigade commander, who had been absent for some time, joined us on our hurried march and was given a cordial welcome.

November 28, we had company drill in the morning at which General Willich was present and instructed us in skirmish movements, according to the German tactics. In the afternoon the regiment was ordered on picket. The line we occupied was about a mile long and it took two-thirds of the men to occupy it. Towards night, however, the number of posts was reduced so that we could have three reliefs. There was a brick house on the left of the pike where one of the reserve posts was sheltered by a barn. The night passed without incident, but at 4:30 next morning all were awakened and

¹ Gleason's Diary.

stood at arms until daylight. This and other like incidents gave us a premonition that an attack by the enemy might be made at any time and that we were being prepared for it. We were relieved from picket duty about 10 o'clock on the 29th, by the Thirty-fifth Indiana and a small Irish regiment of the same brigade. As soon as we were relieved we started back to our camp but found it deserted by the other regiments of the brigade. Thereupon we were marched back toward the picket line about a mile, then changed our direction to the left, passed under a new railroad bridge which had been built by our own engineers, and on to a new camp on Mill Creek, where we were placed on the right of our brigade, the other regiments having preceded us. We found the ground selected for our camp covered with walnuts and all fell to cracking them at a lively rate. That night the quartermaster for the first time furnished us straw to sleep on. We pitched our tents and made ourselves unusually comfortable for the night. November 30, was Sunday, and we policed our new streets and had our usual Sunday morning inspection. After this the men lay resting in their tents, or were employed in writing letters to loved ones at home. The increased activity in drill and other preparatory precautions made us feel that we were being trained and nerved up for some great exertion soon to be called for. We learned that the enemy in force was near at hand, but whether they should attack us or we should attack them we could not guess. December 1 a dispatch was received from Captain A. R. Z. Dawson of Company G who was in Columbus, O. that Captain Frank Askew of Company E had been appointed Lieutenant Colonel of the regiment and that he (Dawson) had Askew's commission in his pocket. This appointment gave general satisfaction, not because of any dissatisfaction with Major McClenahan, but because Captain Askew had already exhibited unusual skill and efficiency and unusual qualifications and fitness for larger command. In the evening Captain Askew held a reception for the officers of the regiment at his tent, where liquid refreshments were dispensed liberally and a number of the officers grew quite mellow and hilarious. It was told about camp that Charles De Graffenried, the captain's colored servant, had remarked that a certain tall officer "was the onhandiest man he had ever tried to put to bed, that when he had his head on the cot his feet were still on the ground, that when he put his feet up, his head went back to the floor, and when he took him by the middle both head and feet were on the ground."

On the 2nd of December we lay quietly in camp and on the 3rd we had regimental drill, in order that General Willich might judge of our proficiency, and we were ordered to have roll call four times a day until further orders. On the 4th we had battalion drill under Colonel Wallace and Lieutenant Colonel Askew in which the latter showed such skill in command as to elicit general praise. Orders were issued to have the men turn out for roll call at reveille fully armed and equipped. December 5 was very cold with light snow. We kept our tents closely and were undisturbed by orders of any kind. December 6 the drums beat the reveille at 6 a. m. and we all turned out for roll call armed and accoutered as ordered. About noon we received orders to go on picket at 2 o'clock and a little later were ordered to start at 1 o'clock. We marched out the Mill Creek pike about two miles and then took a road leading west, which we followed until we came to the picket line we were to relieve. After we had been as we supposed properly placed, General Willich came out along the line and made some changes, and we received orders forbidding the men to build fires day or night. We had no unusual experiences during the night. It was unusually cold, and while on post we had to shake ourselves to keep warm.

The next morning, December 7, was the coldest of the winter so far. We were relieved at 3 o'clock in the afternoon and got back to camp in time for supper. Soon after we reached camp the adjutant came round with an order requiring us to cook three days' rations, put them into our haversacks and be prepared to march at a moment's notice.

December 8 we received no orders to march but lay about expecting such orders at any moment. Orders came that all men who were unable to march were to be left behind to pack the tents in wagons, which were then to be sent inside the fortifications at Nashville. In the evening we were directed to be in line of battle at daylight next morning.

December 9, at 3 o'clock we were ordered out on a reconnaissance. We marched out beyond the picket line but did not develop the enemy. We were ordered to remain out all night, but to our surprise and satisfaction, at night fall we were marched back to our camp.

Dec. 10, we were called into line and moved back on the Mill Creek pike one-half mile, turned there to the right, and halting at the foot of a hill near a stream went into camp. We pitched our tents and prepared to make ourselves comfortable. But in the afternoon, General R. W. Johnson, who had that day succeeded General Sill in command of our division, sent word

that we should not go to much trouble in fixing up our quarters, as we should probably not remain in this camp longer than next day. In the evening we received orders to be ready at 6 o'clock next morning to escort a foraging expedition. The night was cold, the ground was damp and we did not get much sleep.

On December 11, our entire brigade and a section of artillery started as escort for a large train of empty wagons to gather forage from the country. We marched across to the Nolensville pike, striking it where Sheridan's division had been encamped. We followed this pike about three miles where we found plenty of forage, loaded our wagons and brought them safely into camp only a little after noon.

Decemebcr 12, we remained all day in camp, attending to usual routine of camp duty. December 13, we moved our camp to a much better location further up on the hill and got our tents pitched and the company streets in pretty good order before noon. The day was one of unusual excitement. Orders came to have three days' rations constantly in haversacks, and we learned that shelter tents had arrived at brigade headquarters. We had heard about these tents, which were really a sheet of canvass about six feet square, with buttons and button holes at the edges. Each man was to have one of these squares, and four men could button together the squares and thus make a tent under which they could all sleep together. There were three light pieces of wood with each four squares, which were to serve as ridge poles and props for the tent. We decided that we would not have them. Late in the evening came the stereotyped order "to be ready to march at a moment's notice."

The next day, December 14, we remained in camp. A shelter tent was set up at the tent of the regimental quartermaster. It attracted much attention and was universally condemned. A regimental board of survey was called and condemned it, and our Surgeon openly said they would cost the army ten thousand men if they were adopted. In the evening we received orders to go on picket at 6 o'clock next morning.

December 15, we had reveille at 4 o'clock and marched out to the picket line at 6 o'clock. The forenoon was fair and warmer than usual, but rain came about noon and poured down during the afternoon and night, so our picket duty was far from pleasant.

December 16, we did not get in from picket duty until near eleven o'clock and after we got our dinners we were permitted to rest the remainder of the day. In the afternoon Captain Douglass was detailed as member of a general Court Martail to try Captain Monk of the 32d Indiana for some trifling offense.

December 17, we received orders to drill in changing front in line of battle, and in firing, which we did for an hour. This was still another incident in confirmation of the prevailing idea that we would soon be called on for heavy work, but we light heartedly put it aside. It passed out of our thoughts when in the evening we again received orders to march with the brigade as escort for another foraging train at 7 o'clock next morning. December 18, we marched a little before the time appointed, taking the same route on the Nolensville Pike, the Thirty-second Indiana in advance. When about three miles beyond our picket line, we turned into a by-road leading east and soon found a barn full of corn and plenty of it in the fields. After emptying the barn we marched to a field on a hillside, where we stacked arms and all hands turned in to fill the remaining empty wagons. This was quickly done and we started with the train back to our camp. We had several roll-calls during the day as a precaution to keep the men together and prevent straggling. The men made much sport of it by shouting at every halt, "Roll Call", "Roll Call". During the march the sun came out bright and warm, melting the ice in the fields and roads and making the marching hard and tiresome. We got back to our camp about one o'clock and the orderly sergeants were busy the rest of the day drawing and issuing rations.

December 19, our adjutant, Calvin R. Taft, was assigned to duty on General Johnson's staff and Lieutenant Joseph N. Dubois of Company E. took his place. Captain Theodore C. Bowles, our old quartermaster, who had been visiting the regiment, bade us all goodbye and Lieut. John R. Clark who had been acting as quartermaster sent in his resignation, being compelled to leave the service because of heart disease. He was a great favorite and we were sorry to have him leave us. On this day our men witnessed for the first time the ceremony of drumming out of camp. Two soldiers, one of Company B. of our own regiment, had been tried by court martial and convicted of stealing a watch. They were marched through the camp, a fife and drum playing the "Rogue's March." Both appeared to be under the influence of intoxicating liquor but conscious of their degradation. The procession passed through our regimental quarters and thence to the Nashville pike, where the guard left them and the music stopped. One or two of their friends accompanied them for a short distance, as they struck out for Nashville, still with the placards on their backs bearing the word "Thief," which they had forgotten to remove. They were doubtless glad to escape from the scene of their humiliation and soon disappeared in the distance.

December 20, we had a brigade drill, beginning at 8 o'clock and lasting until noon, which was witnessed by Generals Johnson and Sill. General Willich put us through a number of rapid movements and as a result we felt fully capable of successfully meeting any equal body of troops under the sun. We were well drilled, and each man in the ranks seemed to feel the enthusiasm of acting in perfect concert with his fellows in making our movements successful. We felt that we were getting well prepared for the heavy work which now seemed nearer at hand than ever before. During the evening cannonading was heard in the direction of the Murfreesboro pike, and we could see the flashes of the guns. We afterwards learned that a force of the enemy had come up and had thrown some shells at our picket line, but that no damage had been done.

Sunday, December 21, reveille sounded a little earlier than usual and we turned out and stood to arms. The cannonading of the evening before was the cause of our early call. No enemy appearing we stacked arms and got our breakfasts. We had the usual Sunday morning inspection. Shelter tents sufficient for the entire regiment were drawn and issued to the several companies, and we were directed to turn over all surplus arms on hand and also those of other caliber than 69-100. So we were not only being made fit for a coming struggle, but we were being stripped of all unnecessary impedimenta.

On the 22nd, we had battalion drill and on the 23rd, brigade drill, and all permits to visit Nashville or to leave the regiment even temporarily were refused.

On the evening of the 23d an order came detailing the right wing of the regiment for picket duty in the morning and later an order directing us to escort a foraging train. On the morning of the 24th reveille sounded at 5 o'clock and we fell in and stood at arms as usual. A little later an order came notifying us that we would not go foraging but must be ready to march at daylight with three days' rations. Shelter tents were issued to the men, and as we got the impression we were also to retain our Sibley tents, no objection was made to them. Soon after this an order came to strike tents and pack up. We had barely time to obey this order when the bugles sounded the "assembly", and we fell in. Our teams started back toward Nashville and the regiment took the opposite direction. We marched nearly to the Nolensville pike where we halted for an hour and were then ordered back to our old camp. The wagons came back and we repitched our tents, to remain until tomorrow, it was said.

It was Christmas Eve, and there was a great deal of hilarity in some of the quarters.

December 25, was Christmas Day, but it was no holiday for us. After breakfast we received orders to march with another foraging expedition at 8 o'clock. We took our former route, following it until we came to a road leading south from the Nolensville Pike. We marched about five miles on this road, when we came to a place where there was forage in abundance and filled our wagons by 3 o'clock. There had been some skirmish firing in our front as we marched.

Near the place where we loaded our wagons there was a house where a Christmas dinner had been prepared for some of our enemies, and some of our men either confiscated it or paid for it with counterfeit confederate scrip. We were well into a portion of country where the enemy was in control and it was a matter of some concern to get our loaded train back safely to camp. But we had a formidable force, covered our train well with flankers and brought it in safely. On arriving at camp we learned that orders had been received at brigade headquarters to march in the morning, but that they would not be published until it was certain that we would move. There was now every indication that a general movement was on foot.



CHAPTER XIII.

THE CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE OF STONE RIVER.

The morning of December 26, we had roll call at 5 o'clock. As we were eating breakfast the order came to move in an hour. At the time appointed the assembly sounded and we marched, taking the familiar route of our late foraging expeditions. We were halted before we reached the Nolensville Pike to allow a large body of troops to pass, and when we reached the pike there was a long ambulance train moving out in advance of us. We now had little doubt that there was a general forward movement of our entire army, and that there was hot work for us ahead. We felt, however, that we were ready and fit for any trial or emergency, and our hearts quickened and beat high with the thought of again meeting the enemy. We took the direct road for Nolensville. Our progress was slow, there was considerable cavalry skirmishing ahead, and it was evident that the enemy's cavalry was impeding our advance. It was thought that the enemy would make a stand at Stewart's Creek, but they fell back from this line after destroying the bridge to impede our progress. Night came on while we were still on the march, but we marched on until we reached Nolensville, and went into camp just beyond it on a hillside near the road. For the first time, we pitched our shelter tents. We were safely tucked away in them when it began to rain and we found them rain-proof and comfortable. From our regimental camp we looked out on a great number of other camps which formed an irregular semi-circle overlooking a valley or depression. The tents were lighted with candles, and they gave the impression of an almost innumerable host. It was an inspiring and comforting spectacle. At nine o'clock we were called to rest by the "German Tattoo", sounded by General Willich's bugler. Never in all the lives of some of us, have we heard anything sweeter than those long drawn notes of that famous call as it was sounded that night on the hill near Nolensville.

Mr. John H. Sarchet of Cambridge, Ohio, who was our principal musician and band leader during the later years of our service, has reproduced the music of this call and it is here given:



We were all very tired after the day's march, although we had marched only ten miles.

It was raining next morning, December 27, but we resumed our march at nine o'clock, passing Negley's and Sheridan's divisions and taking the front in the advance. After marching at a rapid pace for three or four miles, hearing cannonading in front, we reached a little valley where the advance of our division was drawn up in line of battle. We were halted here until afternoon, when we were moved forward in double ranks over the hill and across another little valley, and halted on the summit of the next ridge. Our artillery was here brought forward and opened on the enemy, who occupied a position across another little valley in our front. Our fire soon drew the fire of the rebel artillery and down in the valley we heard the rattling fire of the carbines of the cavalry who were advancing against the enemy. While this firing was going on a very heavy rain set in and continued until the firing ceased. One who was there, a sergeant of Company K, has a vivid recollection of General Willich and of his appearance at this time.

He wore a rubber cap, rubber overcoat and rubber boots. He seemed changed in manner, for he was quiet and cool, where before he had been nervously and intensely active. Afterwards we learned that this quiet, cool, deliberate demeanor was his battle manner.

The enemy's artillery was soon silenced and we were moved forward beyond the ridge and soon came in sight of the village of Triune on a steep bank beyond a small stream. The enemy having retreated we moved forward rapidly, crossing the stream on the stringers of a bridge and on stones in the stream, and passing through the village were halted on a wooded hillside where we encamped for the night. The entire population of the village seemed to have fled and it was literally sacked by our men. Everything was taken that the stragglers could carry away. On our march next morning men were seen carrying bolts of cloth, muslin, calico, hoopskirts, ribbons, hardware, queensware and glassware, and one was happy in the possession of an old fashioned surveyor's compass, which he was carrying on his knapsack.

General Rosecrans on December 28, reported to General Halleck at Washington, concerning our advance on Triune, as follows: "Our advance was delayed one day. The right wing under McCook drove Hardee's skirmishers 18 miles down the Nolensville pike and advanced on Triune for battle. A heavy fog delayed their advance and gave Hardee time to escape towards Murfreesboro."

Sunday December 28, we had orders to move at 7 o'clock a. m. After passing the outposts, the two Indiana regiments of the brigade, the 32d and 39th, sent out skirmishers, with a squadron of cavalry in the advance. We moved forward rapidly southward on the Shelbyville pike, but soon left it and turning into a road running west toward Salem, followed it for two or three miles and formed line of battle in a large open field, where a sharp skirmish took place in front. There we received orders to return and marched back to our camp at Triune.

General Rosecrans speaks of this march as a reconnoissance to Riggs Cross roads, which developed the fact that Hardee's corps had fallen back toward Murfreesboro.¹ General McCook at 1:30 P. M. sent a dispatch to General Rosecrans saying, among other things:

"The following dispatch has just been received (verbatim et literatim) from General Willich, who is 7 miles in advance on the Shelbyville pike. 'The enemy is no more here; all gone to Murfreesboro' ".²

On the night of the 28th, General McCook sent word to General Rosecrans that, unless he had other orders, before daylight next morning he would march his troops (the right wing) as rapidly as possible toward Murfreesboro over the Bole Jack road, that the road went by Lane's store and crossed the old Shelbyville road at Wilkinson's, seven miles from Murfreesboro, that the distance from Triune to Murfreesboro was 16 miles, that his corps threatened the enemy's line of communication and that he expected to be strongly resisted.³

December 28, we marched at 7 o'clock, and in order to reach the Bole Jack road marched apparently towards Nashville for about three miles, which gave rise to the rumor that we were retreating. We then struck the Bole Jack road and followed it all day. The first few miles of the road had been beaten smooth by other troops preceding us and the marching was easy. But after passing over a hill from the top of which we had a fine view of the country for a long distance, we came to a dense cedar forest

1 W. R. R. 20, part 1-190.

2 W. R. R. 20, part 2-254.

3 W. R. R. 20, part 2-255.

where the roads were nearly impassable and we made slow progress. About dark, when pushing on ahead of the artillery and trains, we came into an open country where we rested for awhile. We then moved into a muddy corn field near Wilkinson's Cross roads, where we bivouaced for the night and were forbidden to build fires. We were hungry and cold and would have given almost anything for a cup of hot coffee or a chance to make it. To add to our discomfort it began raining. We passed a miserably uncomfortable night. Except some light skirmishing early in the evening, nothing occurred to indicate our close approach to the enemy, although we were said to be within four or five miles of Murfreesboro. At 10:25 that night General McCook sent a dispatch to General Rosecrans saying that all was quiet on his front, that his right was retired and he thought safe, that his headquarters were exactly on the cross roads and that he hoped to see him, General Rosecrans, that night or early next morning.¹

Next day, the 30th, at daybreak, we were permitted to build small fires, and after getting our breakfasts stood around them in a pouring rain. We were ordered to move at 8 o'clock and resumed our onward march toward Murfreesboro on a new pike made of sharp gravel which ground away our shoe soles, already grown thin from recent marches. We began to hear an occasional boom from our cannon opening the great contest which we realized was beginning. After marching two miles we formed column in a piece of woods, where the 5th brigade, (General Kirk's) was also formed. We afterwards advanced to the cover of another woods, where we remained during the afternoon. Considerable firing was going on, both artillery and infantry, as our army gradually closed in on the enemy.

The writer recalls that while in these woods awaiting orders, all were impressed with the sense of impending battle. Those who were close friends seemed to wish to get together and talk of home and mutual friends and of the chances of the strife. The writer recalls a talk he had with Sergeant William Addison Hogue of Company E, a home friend and companion, who went into the battle next day and was never heard of afterwards.

We were held in this place in reserve until near dark, when we were moved about a mile to the right on the Franklin road. There the brigade was formed to protect the extreme right of the army. Five companies of the 39th Indiana were formed on the right of General Kirk's brigade, but retired almost at right angles to it, and five companies were put forward as skirmishers, connecting with General Kirk's skirmishers on the left, and on the right with the skirmishers of the 32nd Indiana, which extended

¹ W. R. R. 20, part 2-269.

south and west of the brigade and covered its flank, extending round to its rear. The 49th Ohio was formed, its left connecting with the right five companies of the 39th Indiana, and fronting south. The 89th Illinois was in close column in rear of the 49th Ohio. Our regiment was formed facing to the west, directly west of the right flank of the 89th Illinois—our left only a short distance from the right of the 49th Ohio. Our line was at right angles to that of the 49th Ohio, and we faced directly to the rear. In the angle formed by the 15th and 49th Ohio was placed Goodspeed's battery. In this position we bivouaced for the night. We were not allowed to build fires, the night was very cold and some of the men suffered severely. We did not know how we were situated with reference to the enemy, but we afterwards learned that our position was about opposite the center of the rebel army.

General Rosecrans' plan of battle was to make a feint of moving to the right to threaten the enemy's line of communications and when the enemy had massed to meet the feigned attack, to push the left of his army rapidly across Stone River and into Murfreesboro. It was made on the assumption that the enemy would not make the counter-attack which he did, with a view of cutting us off from our communications. We did not know our General's plans and rested in blissful ignorance of what awaited us on the morrow.

That night, it is presumed, General Rosecrans issued the following general orders dated December 31, 1862.

Hdqrs. Dept. of the Cumberland,
In Front of Murfreesborough.

General Orders.

December 31, 1862.

No.———

The General commanding desires to say to the soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland that he was well pleased with their conduct yesterday, it is all he could have wished for, he neither saw nor heard of any skulking, they behaved with the coolness and gallantry of veterans. He now feels perfectly confident, with God's grace and their help, of striking this day a blow for the country, the most crushing, perhaps, which the rebellion has yet sustained.

Soldiers, the eyes of the whole nation are upon you, the very fate of the nation may be said to hang on the issue of this day's battle. Be true, then, to yourselves, true to your own manly character and soldierly reputation, true to the love of your dear ones at home, whose prayers ascend to God this day for your success.

Be cool! I need not ask you to be brave, keep ranks. Do not throw away your fire. Fire slowly, deliberately, above all fire low, and be always sure of your aim. Close steadily in upon the enemy, and, when you get within charging distance, rush on him with the bayonet.

Do this, and the victory will certainly be yours. Recollect that there are hardly any troops in the world that will stand a bayonet charge, and that those who make it, therefore are sure to win.

By command of Maj. Gen. W. B. Rosecrans.

J. P. GARESHE,

Asst. Adjt. Gen. and, Chief of Staff.

As will be seen there was no time to publish this order on the morning of December 31 to the troops on our part of the line.

The morning of December 31, 1862, was very cold and clear. At daybreak we were awakened, built small fires and made our coffee. While we were so engaged we had time to look about us. We saw that our brigade, posted as above described, was in a wooded field about 330 yards square and that a comparatively open country stretched away toward the supposed position of the enemy, with a clump of woods several hundred yards to the south-east of our position. To our rear, towards which our regiment fronted, was a small open field and on the farther side of it was a fence made of upright cedar poles closely tied together, and to the left of the fence was a small farm house which was reached by a gate in the fence.

Lieutenant Colonel Miles, of the 49th Ohio, who was then a Lieutenant and Aide de Camp on the staff of General Willich, in a letter written to his father January 7, 1863, says that very early, on the morning of December 31, General Willich rode to General Johnson's headquarters, that he, Lieutenant Miles, notified Colonel Gibson of General Willich's absence and then followed him. That the general had started back to the brigade and rode right into the advancing enemy and was captured; that he, Lieutenant Miles, after reporting to General Johnson, also started back to the brigade and rode between two of the advancing lines of the enemy. That having on his overcoat, he was mistaken for an aide of one of the Confederate generals and ordered to place an Arkansas regiment in position. He says, "I saluted him as I would one of our own commanders, wheeled my horse and rode in the direction of their reserve until behind a cluster of bushes, when I turned to the left and came out through Davis' lines". He also says that he met General Davis, told him where the enemy's lines were, saw him place a battery in position to play on them and then rode back to the brigade.

While we were blowing our coffee cool enough to drink, suddenly came the sharp *st, st,* of bullets and we heard General Gibson's stentorian voice calling out, "Fall in 49th and 15th Ohio! Hook up them battery horses"! Dashing our coffee to the ground we rushed to the line, took our guns from the stacks and soon had orders to move a few paces forward and countermarch. In the

confusion, the order was not understood by Captain Joshua K. Brown, commanding Company B, and there was a momentary delay, until a sergeant of Company K¹ ran to him, took him by the arm, told him the order and pulled him in the right direction. But before the movement to countermarch could be completed, we were ordered to lie down and commence firing. Captain Thos. E. Douglass, long afterwards, claimed to have first given the order to fire. Mr. A. B. Graham, who was writing a history of Richland County, asked the writer to confirm his statement in this respect, as Captain Douglass had cited him as witness of the fact, but the writer could not recall the incident he described. How many rounds we fired one cannot remember. Colonel Gibson in his official report as brigade commander says six. It may have been more or less. It seems, however, from the official reports that we held our ground long enough to enable the 49th Ohio and 89th Illinois to retire in fairly good order, but not the 32d and 39th Indiana, who for a time were separated from the brigade. It soon became apparent that the enemy were rapidly closing in on our front and flank and threatening our rear in such numbers that our only hope of escape was in rapid retreat. Whether we received an order to fall back or not one cannot recall, (Colonel Wallace in his official report says he gave such order). We went back in fairly good order until the picket fence, heretofore mentioned, arose in our way. Many of our men tried to pull the pickets apart in order to get through. Some got over and many were either killed or wounded trying to do so. The writer tried to get over or through the fence and failing to do so, ran to the left towards the advancing enemy and passed through the gate leading into the house before mentioned. Just after passing the house a ball from one of the enemy's rifles struck him in the right arm and knocked his gun from his hand. He picked it up with his left hand and continued his retreat not knowing whether his arm was broken or only bruised. Fortunately the ball was so far spent and his overcoat cape so thick that it only inflicted a severe bruise.

The above description of the beginning of the battle is the writer's personal recollection. Gleason in his diary says, "we had hardly tasted our breakfasts when the bullets began to whistle about our heads and we sprang to arms as quickly as possible. Advancing to the open field in the edge of which we had lain, we received the order to counter-march by file left to bring us facing the enemy, but before this movement could be executed our men began to fall and after delivering one volley, seeing the enemy in close proximity, three lines deep, with no

1 The writer.

supports near us, we were ordered to fall back. A high rail fence was close in our rear, while a little to our right was a gap leading to some negro quarters on a plantation. Many of the men went through the gap instead of climbing the fence, and got too far to the right (he means too far to the west), while those who got over the fence necessarily lost their formation, and the result was an indiscriminate retreat to the rear, in which men of nearly all the regiments of the brigade mingled together."

This fence proved to be a fatal obstruction to anything like an orderly retreat. The writer thinks he cannot be mistaken in its character, for he tried to get through it by pulling the cedar pickets apart and failing to do so took the course before mentioned. The fence farther to the right may have been built of rails and this may account for the discrepancy in our experiences. It was in this field and at or near this fence that we suffered our chief losses of the four day's battle. Here Lieutenant Colonel Askew, Major McClenahan, Capt. Thos. E. Douglass and Lieutenants Samuel Hilles and Nicholas Fowler were wounded. Here the most of our killed and wounded fell, and here over a hundred of our men were taken prisoners by the enemy. Lieut. Col. Askew was severely wounded in the hip. Sergeants Wm. G. Malin and William Addison Hogue of Company E tried to get him off the field, but he ordered them to leave him and take care of themselves, which they did. Sergeant Malin is the last known person who saw Sergeant Hogue alive. He was never seen or heard of afterwards and to this day his fate is not known. Father, mother, sisters and brothers, since then have searched among the grave stones in all the cemeteries north and south and have traced every clue which promised anything tangible, but all to no purpose. All that can be said of him is, that he went into the battle and was never heard of afterwards. One can imagine the weary vigil in the country home where he was the joy and pride of the family, and how a step on the walk, or an unexpected knock at the door, made the hearts of loved ones beat with fond hope, only to sink again into despair. The father and mother are long since dead, but perhaps even yet, some loving one of the family is still hoping against hope for his return. The war was full of terrible tragedies, but there were few more terrible than instances like this.

Shortly after clearing the fence, those who did so, crossed a small stream and came on to higher ground. Our compact, close, efficient organizations had apparently gone all to pieces and one could see only a disorganized crowd moving to the rear, apparently under no command whatever. The enemy's cavalry appeared on our flank, and some one called out "fix bayonets" and

every man fixed his bayonet to be ready for a cavalry charge. Soon we came to a rail fence extending along a bluff bank which commanded a good view of the valley we had crossed in our disorderly retreat. Everyone saw it was a good place to make a stand, and without orders the men formed a line along the fence. A sergeant of Company K¹ noticed that the men still had their bayonets on their guns, and went along between the fence and the approaching enemy and asked the men to unfix bayonets so they could better fire through the fence. The request was as promptly complied with as if it had been an order from the commander in chief delivered in person. Lieutenant Belden with one gun of Goodspeed's battery had taken position on our left, and as the enemy came forward in heavy columns he planted some shells right in their midst. The shells and the well-delivered fire from our line behind the fence gave the enemy a momentary check. Soon, however, we were out-flanked by the enemy's cavalry and were compelled to fall back, firing at the enemy every chance we could get. Finally, we came to a "devil's lane", two fences close together, crossed them and came into a fine open piece of woods through which thousands of men seemed to be drifting in disorder. There had been no attempt to reform our regiment and so far as one could see, the other regiments of the brigade with one exception were in the same state of disorder. The exception was the 89th Illinois. It appeared to be compact and in perfect order. It was commanded by Charles T. Hotchkiss, its Colonel, who was mounted and was coolly conducting its retreat. In this woods we had the color sergeant with us, who was still carrying our regimental flag. Lieutenant Chandler W. Carroll of Company E and a few men rallied about the flag, raised a shout, and started back through the woods to the devil's fence above mentioned, calling on every one to turn back. In a moment, almost, the tide of retreat turned and everyone was cheering and rushing wildly back. We formed along the devil's lane and as the enemy came up we gave them a galling fire. We continued it until the enemy's cavalry again came round our flank and we were again compelled to fall back. It was our last stand until we reached the Nashville pike. Here we saw a line of men in perfect order, standing with bayonets fixed, and ready to meet the enemy as soon as our stragglers got out of the way. The line was in command of Colonel Moses B. Walker of the 31st Ohio, who sternly ordered us to pass round his troops and not to attempt to break his line. We had no sooner passed to his right than the enemy approached within firing distance, and Walker's men did some as fine stand up firing and fighting as we

1 The writer.

had ever seen. The remnants of our regiment soon formed on the right of Walker's troops and with them advanced into the cedar woods and engaged the enemy. Here Isaac Eugene Dillon of Company E was wounded—shot in the cheek or jaw—and the writer can still see his look of anguish as he went to the rear. At this point the enemy's advance was checked. It was about night-fall. The remnants of the regiments of the brigade were gathered together and withdrawn a few yards and placed in reserve, Colonel Wallace in command.

We bivouaced among the rocks, and as our stragglers came up we began to realize how disastrous the day had been. General Willich was reported killed. Colonel Askew was wounded and captured, and more than one-half our men were missing, many of whom were killed or wounded and in the enemy's hands. We had been driven back between three and four miles and had lost, it was said, thirty-one pieces of artillery and thousands of prisoners. The night was very cold, all had lost their blankets and overcoats and fires were forbidden. A group of shivering men, in violation of the order, had made a small fire between two rocks and were trying to warm themselves when General Rosecrans came by on foot. He said, "My men you must not do that. Just a short while ago some men farther along the line made a little fire and the rebels threw a shell into their midst and killed or wounded some of them. Better bear the cold". The men put out the fire very promptly. While we were shivering and waiting, a group of officers were crouched together talking, and we noticed Colonel Gibson who had been taken prisoner in the morning, and when released had drifted back with the debris of battle to Overall's or Stewart's Creek. He had just come up and was relating his experiences. He said, among other things, "when our cavalry charged the enemy and released us, I thought the day was lost, and said to myself, 'Here's for Nashville or the Cumberland River'". General Rosecrans came to our part of the line more than once during the night. He seemed to be unattended. He wore a private's cavalry overcoat. His face was drawn, his jaw set, and we heard him say more than once, "Bragg's a good dog, but Hold Fast's a better". His presence inspired confidence. He gave us to understand that there was to be no retreat, but that we would fight it out where we were. We got the impression that we were receiving large reinforcements, and stragglers coming in reported seeing the camp fires of several thousand new troops coming to our help. We heard afterwards that, to create this same impression on the enemy, General Rosecrans had sent out officers to instruct the stragglers back at Overall's and Stewart's Creeks to build fires. This deception evidently had its

desired effect for General Bragg in his official report of the battle gives our reinforcements as one of his reasons for giving up Murfreesboro. It also gave us hope that we could renew the battle next morning with hope of final victory.

Our regiment that night was but a sorry remnant of the fine body of men which had faced the enemy at daybreak. Over one hundred had fallen into the hands of the enemy, how many had been killed and wounded, we could not know. Company H which mustered 60 men in the morning, could only muster 8 including Lieutenant Updegrove and Orderly Sergeant Gleason.¹ Some of the other companies had suffered as severely. But our thinned ranks closed up and there was no faltering on the part of any one. Added to the terrible depression over our defeat and the loss of so many of our comrades, was the hunger which seized us. We had had no rations all day and none were in sight. So in hunger and cold and wretchedness we passed the awful night. The near presence of the enemy and an occasional firing along the picket line, however, kept us nerved up for further effort and prevented anything like despair.

The next morning we drew one day's rations of hard tack, bacon and coffee. We were on the reserve of the brigade but expecting to be called on at any moment. The conflict of the preceding day had been so fierce and deadly, that it seemed both armies were loth to renew it. There was some artillery firing on different parts of our line and an occasional lively rattle of musketry along parts of the skirmish line, which seemed a renewal of the battle. Although we were on the reserve, we were exposed to the artillery fire of the enemy, but it did us no damage. One solid shot from the enemy's cannon came ricocheting into our bivouac, knocked down a stack of guns and struck Sergeant John J. Glover in the rump, which caused a great laugh at his expense, as we saw it did not seriously hurt him.

We were shortly called into line and the brigade, Colonel Gibson in command, moved back along the pike. We moved out behind a ridge which hid our movement from the enemy and then marched back in plain view of his skirmishers and cavalry. We did this a number of times, for the purpose, it was said, of giving the rebels the impression that we were receiving reinforcements. We were a nervous lot, although we made a bluff of seeming as brave as ever. When we were making one of these marches, a single musket ball from the enemy's lines came singing over our heads and every man in the line ducked his head as it passed, which caused a general laugh. Finally we were posted along the pike to resist a threatened attack on our right. Colonel

1 Gleason's Diary.

Gibson in his official report says our brigade was directed to reconnoiter the woods to the right and rear of our position, that it was done under the observation of Generals Rosecrans and McCook; that we reached the woods unobserved by the enemy, but soon met his sharpshooters and discovered that he was massing his infantry under cover of these woods, with the apparent design of attacking our extreme right; that in withdrawing we were harassed by shot and shell from the rebel batteries, but sustained no loss; that we were soon directed to reoccupy the woods and promptly took up our position with the 15th Ohio, the 32d Indiana and the 89th Illinois in line of battle, (their front covered by skirmishers) and the 39th Indiana and 49th Ohio, which had been temporarily consolidated under Lieutenant Colonel Jones, as a reserve; and that the enemy's cavalry made a dash upon our position but were gallantly repulsed by our skirmishers. He also says that other troops were placed on our left, our line withdrawn to the margin of the woods, our flank covered by a strong force of cavalry and that "the prompt movement of our forces and the splendid maneuvering of the commander in chief defeated the designs of the enemy and no further attack was made".¹

Lieutenant Miles really first discovered and reported this attempt of the enemy on our right, and in the letter before quoted from he says: "General Rosecrans in the after part of the day, (January 1st) ordered Gibson out with the brigade about three-fourths of a mile to the rear and right on a reconnoissance. We discovered immense bodies of the enemy's infantry and artillery approaching, preceded by cavalry, which made one dash upon us and were handsomely repulsed. Reporting the same to General Rosecrans, he came on, viewed the ground, and in a few moments great preparation was made for an attack. The enemy seeing this, withdrew during the night to their center".

We remained in the position last above described until night, when our regiment was marched back near the General Hospital, where we were permitted to build fires and make ourselves as comfortable as possible for the night. Companies G and H were called out, however, after three hours rest, and went on picket duty for the same length of time. We were without rations and there were no prospects of receiving any, as the enemy had burned the train which was bringing them up to the front. These facts are taken from Gleason's diary, and he adds, "So we expect to fast tomorrow as well as fight." The day had passed without any very serious fighting on any part of the lines, and it seemed both armies were resting and making ready for hot work on the morrow. During the day

1 W. R. R. 20, part 1-306.

quite a number of our men who had been slightly wounded came up and took their places in the ranks.

The morning of January 2, we were called out on picket and stood until daylight, when we were relieved and built fires with rails from the roadside. We soon heard considerable artillery firing at the front towards Murfreesboro, and were marched back to the position we held the morning of the 1st. The cannonade soon became louder and more terrific, and we knew that the enemy was making an assault on a portion of our line. The attack continued nearly an hour, the shells, some of them, falling unpleasantly near us, when the enemy was driven back. We were again in reserve, one of the most trying positions during a battle. We were exposed to the enemy's fire but could not reply. We were in constant suspense, not knowing when we would be called on, but realizing that some disaster on some portion of the line might occur at any moment, and that then we would be called to help retrieve it. Added to our suspense was a keen hunger, for we had no rations issued to us that morning. During the day we did get some corn which we parched on the cob, and each man got about two cubic inches of mixed vegetables which we cooked and ate. We congratulated ourselves that we were not yet driven to horse flesh, as we heard was the case with the men in Rousseau's division. After the assault in the morning there was more or less firing going on on different parts of the line, but it was desultory and indicated no serious advance of either army. Suddenly, there was a furious rattle of musketry and roar of artillery over on our left, and our batteries on a knoll to our left and a few hundred yards in front, began a furious cannonade. The storm of battle raged for perhaps an hour. It had grown dark enough to reveal the flashes of the guns, when out of the dun smoke of the batteries came an officer riding with great speed towards our bivouac. It was General McCook. As he came up he called out: "Colonel Gibson, take your brigade and charge those d—d rebels who are coming up along the river. Give 'em the bayonet! Drive 'em into the river! Stick 'em in the —!" Colonel Gibson at once called out, "Fall in First Brigade." We quickly formed and Colonel Gibson made us a little speech. He said: "Men, there is no use to disguise matters; our situation is desperate. We've got to fight for our very existence. We'll march out here in double column and deploy and go in on the bayonet. Every man to his post!" That speech, delivered with that marvellous voice and impressive manner which distinguished Colonel

Gibson above all other men of his day and generation, has never been forgotten by the men who heard it. All suspense, all anxiety at once vanished, and each man seized his gun with a firmer grasp, as we marched forward to the charge. We deployed into line, fixed bayonets and marched up the knoll where our batteries, fifty cannon, were posted and firing on the enemy. In the growing dusk, the flashes gleamed through the smoke, and it seemed a genuine inferno into which we were marching. The ground in rear of the big guns was covered by men lying on the ground in support of them. We tried to pick our way through them, but they called out, "step right on us boys," and we did step on their prostrate bodies and so preserved our line unbroken. We soon cleared the batteries and charged down along the river. The Thirty-second Indiana was to our right, and was the only regiment of the brigade to meet the enemy, who gave way under their well directed fire. We kept on until our regiment found itself facing the river, with our backs toward the enemy's batteries, which were shelling a ford in our front. There we were halted and ordered to lie down still facing the river. A sergeant of Company K¹ noticing that our own troops were across the river in our front, and that by moving a few feet forward the line could protect itself from the enemy's shells, by the river bank, was imprudent enough to go to Colonel Wallace and make this suggestion, and was rudely ordered back to his post. Just then a shell from one of the enemy's guns exploded in our midst, and severely wounded Sergeant W. G. Malin of Company E and one or two others. Thereupon the line, without orders, quickly advanced to the river bank, faced about and took the position the imprudent sergeant had suggested. We remained in this position for a short time and were then marched back and bivouaced near the river bank. On the way General Negley, a part of whose division had been engaged on the left across the river, galloped past us carrying a rebel battle flag which had been captured in the engagement. Mounted on a fine horse, on which he sat superbly, his striking face all aglow, he formed a picture long to be remembered.

The following taken from the official report of General Crittenden, who commanded on the left, is a good description of the battle that evening, and gives just credit to our brigade for the part it took in securing the complete success of the engagement. He says:²

¹ The writer.

² W. R. R. 20, part 1-450-451.

"On the evening of the 2nd about 4 P. M., a sudden and concentrated attack was made on the Third Division, now commanded by Colonel Beatty. Several batteries opened at the same time on this division. The overwhelming numbers of the enemy, directed upon two brigades (across the river), forced them after bloody, but short, conflict, back to the river. The object of the enemy (it is since ascertained) was to take the battery which we had on that side of the river. In this attempt it is most likely they would have succeeded but for the judgment of Colonel Beatty in changing the position of his battery.

As soon as it became evident that the enemy were driving Colonel Beatty, I turned to my chief of artillery, Captain John Mendenhall, and said: 'Now, Mendenhall, you must cover my men with your cannon.' Without any show of excitement or haste, almost as soon as the order was given, the batteries began to open. So perfectly had he placed them, in twenty minutes from the time the order was received, fifty-two guns were firing upon the enemy. They cannot be said to have been checked in their advance—from a rapid advance they broke at once into a rapid retreat. Reinforcements soon began to arrive, and our troops crossed the river, and pursued the fleeing enemy until dark.

It is a pleasant thing to report that officers and men from the center and right wing hurried to the support of my left, when it was known to be hard pressed. General J. C. Davis sent a brigade at once, without orders; then applied for and obtained orders to follow immediately with his division. General Negley, from the center, crossed with a part of his division. General McCook, to whom I applied for a brigade, not knowing of Davis' movement, ordered immediately Colonel Gibson to go with his brigade, and the Colonel and the brigade passed at double-quick in less than five minutes after the request was made. Honor is due to such men."

In the evening we heard that the heavy firing just before our charge was an attack by Breckenridge on our left, which had been repulsed, and that we had captured several pieces of artillery. We were also told that the enemy were forming to cut off our troops across the river, and that our charge prevented it. That night we got rations of flour, beans and molasses, and our hunger was appeased. Shortly after we got back to our bivouac it began to rain and rained all night.

Since December 31, the enemy had tried in vain to find some weak spot in our line, and with the day's successes we

were encouraged to hope that victory would yet crown our arms.

Once in the night we were awakened by an alarm which proved to be false. The rain was so heavy that our shelter tents afforded us little shelter. At 4 o'clock next morning, January 3, 1863, we were called into line and moved by a circuitous route through water and mud to our former place on the reserve in a grove of tall cedars. After daylight we built fires from dead branches picked up in the grove. Our supply train had come up and about 11 o'clock we were getting in a new supply of rations, when we were called into line and stood for an hour expecting the enemy to attack our right. The attack was not made and we returned to our fires and rations. The rain ceased about noon. The firing during the remainder of the day was desultory, and we dried our clothing and blankets and some of us cleaned our guns, which had become very foul and rusty. We had prepared our supper and were thinking we would have no more fighting that day, when suddenly our guns began shelling the woods to our left front. The cannonade continued for a space and then we heard cheering that indicated a charge on the left of our line. The cheering extended along the line from the left until finally it reached our front, and we were expecting to be called out, but no such orders came. We afterwards learned that a force of three or four regiments, under cover of our artillery, had advanced and driven the enemy's skirmishers back to their main line. Picket firing was kept up during the night until towards morning, when it apparently ceased, on the part of the enemy, at least, and we slept.

Next morning, January 4, 1863, we could scarcely realize that we were not to be called into line and stand at arms in anticipation of attack by the enemy. Instead, we slept on, and when we did rise from our damp beds, it was daylight and all was quiet along the line. Soon reports came that Murfreesboro had been evacuated, and some of our troops began moving to the front. Later the report was confirmed. The long, hard and bloody battle was over and we were in possession of the field.

In the early afternoon all who had loaded guns were taken out to a safe place and discharged them. The writer was placed in charge of a detachment of two men from each company of the regiment and directed to go over the ground covered by our retreat of December 31 and look after the killed and wounded. It was a march of three or four miles back to our position on December 31, 1862, and covered the

ground where some of the hardest fighting took place. We found that the enemy had begun to make preparations for burying our dead. Their own had already been buried or carried off the field. In a number of places the bodies were laid side by side in long ghastly rows, and in one or two places the ditch in which they were to be placed was partly dug. The dead had been stripped of their outer clothing, their shoes and socks, and the awful wounds gaped at us as we went by. They were of every conceivable character. The rain had washed them clean and there was absent the sickening smell of dead human flesh that is one of the usual results after a two or three days' battle. But no one who that day saw these awful results of the conflict could ever forget it. We went on and on and finally came to the house and the fence where so many of our men were killed, wounded, or captured. In one house we found several of our men who were badly wounded, and almost starved, and we gave them everything in our haversacks. Some of them wept for joy at our coming. In one room we found Fernando W. Shackelford of Company E, John Rennard of Company K and others. Sergeant John Danford of Company E, was lying on the floor with his shoes for a pillow. He was suffering from a mortal wound in the abdomen, from which he shortly afterwards died.

In another house we found others of our wounded, and in still another, about a mile from where he was wounded, we found Captain Douglass, who had been shot in the lungs and still carried in his body until his death in 1914, the bullet which wounded him.

Some of the men had wonderful stories to tell of their experience, but we could not take the time to hear all of them then. We searched the fields for our killed, found some of them, and as hogs, running at large, had begun to eat some of the bodies, we hastily gathered together all of our dead we could find, and built a pen of rails to protect them until another party could come to bury them. One of the severely wounded men has written the story of his experience in such a wonderfully interesting manner that it is given here, and will show how our seriously wounded suffered on and after that first terrible day of the battle.

He who writes the story is John Rennard of Company K. He had enlisted August 11, 1862, had fallen in with the Ninety-eighth Ohio just before the battle of Perryville, and had fought with that regiment in that battle, its baptism of fire, October 8, 1862. After the battle he had

joined the Fifteenth Ohio and had been with it ever since. He says, under date of May, 1909:

Your request for my recollections of the Battle of Stone River, brings to my mind recollections of scenes that I shall never forget as long as reason remains on her throne. The battle for you, and for me, began December 31, 1862, when we were attacked about sunrise where we had bivouaced the night before. When the attack began we were trying to make our breakfast on the remains of our rations, which were supposed to have run out the evening before. The attack was so sudden that we did not know what to do. The battery horses had gone to water. Colonel Gibson rode up, inquired for our Colonel, and ordered us to fall in. He then galloped off in fearsh of Colonel Wallace. Colonel Gibson assumed command of the brigade as General Willich was on the picket line and had been taken prisoner by the Confederate forces. We marched rear in front and in line out into a cotton field. In crossing the cotton field Colonel Wallace saw we were in an awkward fix and tried to change our front by a counter-march. As we were trying to accomplish this feat the Colonel saw the rebels were gaining on us too fast, and gave the command forward! That seemed only to tangle the men all the more. We were then ordered to lie down and fire. It was when we rose to retreat that one of our boys was shot through the head. His name was Samuel Cowles. We then came to a fence, and after getting over it I was trying to reload my gun as we ran. Had succeeded in getting the charge in the muzzle, took my place in line, and was in the act of trying to ram the charge home when I was shot in the right thigh by a minnie ball. I threw my gun in one direction and the ramrod in another, spread my arms, a black curtain came before my eyes, and I fell on my side. When I struck the ground the curtain seemed to be gone. I lay in a thick frost which had fallen in the night, and was without overcoat or blanket. The rebels marched by me three lines deep, the first passing directly over me. It was but a few minutes until some of them came back, bringing with them some of our boys as prisoners. I recall Calvin Etzler, Leinard Pickering, and a boy named Wagner (of Co. G I think), whom we called "Cap" Wagner. As they passed I called out "hello Cap". I was dreadfully cold, my teeth were chattering, and I saw the Hospital flag hoisted over the Smith house, about two hundred yards away. I thought I would try to drag myself to it, as it did not seem so very far off. My feet were towards it, and I found I must get around with my head towards it. I drew up my sound leg, anchored my heel in a horse track, and made the effort. But I might as well have tried to crawl away with my body chained to the rock of Gibraltar.

During the forenoon two rebel captains came along gathering up stragglers, and stopped to talk with me. One of them asked if I was cold. I asked him if he did not see my teeth chattering. He ordered some of the men he had gathered up to go upon the field and get some blankets. They soon came back bringing three, which had been discarded by the rebel soldiers when they found better ones thrown away by our men in their retreat. He spread them on the ground so as to make the holes in them miss each other, and then said, "come men", and made a move to put me on them, but I begged to remain just as I was. He said he would be careful with my broken leg, so I consented, and they lifted me and placed me on the blankets. He ordered his men to get more blankets and they brought three more

and he placed them over me tenderly, and said he could do no more. I thanked him warmly. He then kneeled at my head, uncorked his canteen and told me to take a good drink. I was shy about it, but he told me it would do me good, as it was something fine. I drank of it and it was as he said. The blankets, the whiskey and the sunshine began to warm me up, but the night was before me, and it gave indications of being very cold. The rebels at Murfreesboro had parolled some of our men, and had directed them to go out over the field and care for the wounded. I had a call from one of them. The night was very clear and I got very cold. All night long I could hear the groans of Samuel Cowles, but towards morning he died. He was a noble true hearted soldier.

The next day dawned bright and clear and about ten o'clock two men rode up and I asked them if there were no surgeons in their army. They asked me why, and I told them I would like to have my wound dressed. They called each other doctor and both got off their horses and looked at my leg. I asked them about the possibility of saving it and they told me that if they had me where they could care for me, they could save it. Towards evening they put me on a stretcher, carried me to the hospital and laid me in the yard with my head near a tree. They filled the circle around the tree with other wounded men. Morning came again, at last, and the day wore on until evening of Friday, January 2, when I was taken into a lower room of an out house which had been used for cooking and weaving. As I was taken into this place one of the doctors said, "Now I have all sheltered but one up among the rocks who is shot in the head, and a squad are after him." It then began to rain. While I lay out in the field I thought the noise from the artillery would burst my head. The echo from that wide valley was far louder than the original report, and nearly distracted me. I tried to keep out the noise by stopping my ears with my fingers.

I recall another incident which occurred while I was lying on the field. Three stragglers came along, and seeing me covered up, one of them said "he is one of our men and is all right." Then one of them saw my cap and said, "No, he is a yank". Another picked up my gun and ram rod and said, "Look! he had a ball ready to ram down to kill us. Let us ram it down and give it to him and see him grind." Another agreed with him so he rammed the load in the gun. But the third said, "No, he cannot hurt us now" and persuaded the others to go away and let me alone. They took my gun with them. On Saturday night the firing ceased and on Sunday morning I remarked that there were no Johnnies around, and was told they were cleaning up for inspection. That morning they brought us some chicken broth in one of our tin cups. It tasted good for it was the first food I had had since Wednesday morning. I begged for more but was told it was all I could have. In the afternoon the nurse told me there was a skirmish line coming across the field and he thought it was our men. He went out, and soon came back and said it was indeed our men. He had hardly told it, until the door opened and Captain C. W. Carroll and a few comrades walked in and I wept the sweetest tears I ever shed. My eyes fill again as I pen this sketch. I begged them for something to eat, but all they had was one hard tack and a part of another. After they had gone I broke the hard tack into small pieces and divided it among the wounded in the room. I think there were five besides myself. After suffering eight days, they came in the night

of the eighth day and set my leg. Doctor Park, Surgeon of the 49th Ohio, was head surgeon of the Smith Hospital, where we lay. Of the soldiers in this hospital I recall the names of but two. Fernando Shackelford of Company E of our regiment and John T. Gantz of the 89th Illinois. Gantz was wounded in the right thigh, and Shackelford in the leg below the knee.

Sometime after Shackelford's leg was set, the pus burrowed down to near the ankle, and it was decided to amputate it. The doctors were consulting about trying to save the knee, but Shackelford insisted that they should cut off the knee too, as it too was affected. When the surgeons were ready to operate they came to me and asked if I wished them to take him to another room for the operation. I told them that if Gantz was willing to have it done in the room, I was. Gantz consented and we saw as much of the operation as we cared to see. The bone was not sawed off short enough, and soon protruded through the flap, making necessary a second operation. As we were soon to be removed to the General Field hospital near Murrefreesboro, Doctor Park said he would not perform the second operation until after such removal. After the removal the same three of us were in the same tent and I saw him operated on again. Oh! but I felt sorry for him. When the aenesthesia passed off I did not dare to look at him. But when supper time came I turned towards him, and to my surprise and astonishment, he said in a weak voice, "Rennard, when this leg gets well I am going to have the other one cut off." I asked why, and he said, "then I will get some more good wine to drink." He had more grit than any man I ever knew.

At one time while we were in the Smith Hospital they ran short of proper food for the wounded, as all the chickens in the neighborhood had been killed. The doctors were troubled about it, and Mr. Smith who owned the premises, suggested that they get robins. Doctor Park laughed and said there would be nothing left of the robin when shot by one of our guns. Mr. Smith then suggested that if the attendants would go out after night with a lantern into the second growth cedars where they roosted, and tap them with clubs, they could get numbers of them. This was tried and the first party came back with a half bushel basket full, and the next with a two bushel bag and a basket full. Some of them were sent to another hospital about a mile away from us. They usually served them boiled with hulled barley, and they were fine eating. But they only gave us one a day for fear we would tire of them."

This one personal reminiscence reveals the condition in which our wounded were left after our right- was overwhelmed on that terrible morning of December 31, 1862. The case is a typical one—not the most extreme—for Shackelford was left on the field without shelter or covering until Friday evening, his leg below the knee being shattered by a ball and being also shot through the arm, and was not operated on until the wound in his leg had begun to mortify.

We had more than a hundred men captured during the battle, and to show how it went with them, the following narrative has been prepared by Morris Cope, who was then a Corporal of Company E, and afterwards a First Lieutenant of Company I. The narrative is dated 809 Vance Avenue,

Chattanooga, Tenn. (where he now resides), May 15, 1910. It is as follows:

"You probably know that on the night of December 30, 1862, the rebel army was massed in front of the extreme right of our line before Murfreesboro, their left extending far beyond our right. The 15th and 49th Ohio Regiments were formed at right angles to our front and on the extreme end of our line. I think the general understanding among our soldiers was that the most of the rebel army was in front of our *left*. Our commanders, I suppose, knew or should have known, the true situation. I don't remember that any extraordinary precautions were taken to guard against surprises, or to resist an attack by superior forces.

We had only one line of battle, with no reserves within supporting distance. The next morning while our artillery horses were at water and our men at breakfast, with guns stacked in line, our pickets, many of them, were captured, and the rest were driven in, followed so closely by the enemy, that many of our men were shot down before they reached their guns.

I suppose you remember the awful blunder that was made by ordering our regiment to counter-march out in an open field under fire of the enemy, before we got to fire a shot. By the time we got into position to fire the rebels were close upon us, and even then, our commanding officer yelled at us not to fire, that they were our own men. But dear old Ashew was there and had his head with him, and said, "Damn it, don't you see their rebel flag? Fire," and fire we did, with good effect. But as they were close to our single line of battle with their four lines, we could not stand long before them. In our rear was one of those cedar picket fences with some gaps in it, and I think several of our boys were captured here. You know it is a serious matter to climb one of those fences under the most favorable circumstances, but with a howling mob of Johnnies after you it was somewhat embarrassing. I remember one incident connected with this crossing that in spite of the serious surroundings was amusing. You remember we had in Co. E, one Jack Heaton (familiarily called Granny Heaton), and one Edwin G. Blocker, both good old soldiers, always ready for duty and never shrinking from danger, but they were disposed to be a little brittle at times when matters didn't suit them. They would quarrel at the drop of a hat. On this occasion they both arrived at the same moment at a narrow opening in this fence. It was too narrow for both to pass at the same time, and each was determined to go through first. They quarreled about it until both came near being captured.

After passing this barrier, our boys did some effective shooting. They were considerably mixed up, but fell back slowly and fought over all the ground. We saved one gun of our battery and under command of Lieutenant Belden. It mowed some good gaps through the ranks of the rebs. I don't know the particulars of the capture of many of our boys. I would not have been taken prisoner if I had not undertaken to carry off one of our boys. Johnny Penton was shot through the foot. You remember he was a little fellow, and he coaxed so hard for me to help him that I took him on my back and tored him off. I had been painfully hurt about the time I crossed the fence. I think it must have been a large piece of shell which struck my gun, breaking it and knocking it out of my hand and dislocating my wrist, from which I suffered terribly until it was put in place several days afterwards by a rebel doctor at Atlanta.

Right here I wish to relate an incident which should be given a permanent place in the history of our regiment. I was one of the color guard, and the color sergeant had been shot in the beginning of the fight, one of the other color guards took the colors, and just after we got over or through the picket fence the colors went down. I took the flag and tried to keep it up. Captain Andrew R. Z. Dawson noticed me, saw that I was hurt, and himself took the flag and waved it and called on the men to rally to it.

I carried Fenton back until we came to an old log-house filled with corn shucks. I put him inside near a window and covered him up with my overcoat and started out, when I saw,—I think, not less than twenty revolvers, pointing at me and several gentlemen very emphatically invited me to surrender. I notified them that I would do so at once. It was the Texas Rangers who captured us. They were a bully set of fellows and treated us very nicely. We had seen, as we were going into the cabin, a long line of blue-coated cavalry on our flank, and thought they were our own men until they introduced themselves as above described. They gave Fenton a horse to ride and at once started with us for Murfreesboro. As we passed through corn fields they let me lead the horse, so as to keep standing stalks from hurting Fenton's foot. When we got to Murfreesboro we were required to sign a parole binding us not to perform any military duty until exchanged. We were then turned into the Court House yard, among the rest of the prisoners from our regiment and brigade. The yard was about full.

As we were passed into the crowd, I noticed General Willich. He seemed very much distressed to see so many of his soldiers captured. He was rubbing his hands, and as we passed him he said, "Oh my poor poys, my poor poys." I did not see him again during our captivity.

A very strange circumstance occurred that afternoon. I have never had any explanation of it, and suppose I never will, now. Some rebel soldiers came to the yard and took me and four or five others out and marched us to the county jail and not only locked us up, but placed a guard over us for the night. I do not remember who the others were, but if this incident should ever appear in print and any of them who were with me in that jail the last night of Dec. 31, 1862, should see it, I hope they will write to me at once. I don't think this special attention was because we were more dangerous looking than the other prisoners. They must have thought us the handsomest,⁽¹⁾ and should be separated from the common herd. They came the next day and without further explanation took us out and loaded us in stock cars with the other prisoners.

At Chattanooga we were placed in camp on a hillside which is now covered with beautiful residences. It was raining and the wounded were furnished with old tents that the water dripped through. The water ran through under the tent I was in and drove us out. Next morning we were again loaded on stock cars and started for Atlanta. I think I suffered a thousand deaths from my dislocated wrist, that night and the next day, until we reached Atlanta, where it had the first attention. From Atlanta we were taken to Montgomery, and then back to Atlanta, and there we were put on a train for Richmond, where we finally landed in "Libby." We understood that it was first intended to take us to Vicksburg but Grant's operations there caused them to change their minds.

I think our boys were mostly captured by keeping too far to our

1 Corporal Cope's comrades will appreciate this joke.

right as we fell back. Wheeler's rebel cavalry was hovering on our flank ready to take any one who came their way.

It was a long tedious trip. The railroads were in poor condition and poorly equipped. We rode many miles over roads with wooden rails with a bar of iron spiked on top. The weather was mild and pleasant most of the time, which was well for us, for we had neither blankets nor overcoats. We had little to eat, I have no recollection of what we did eat, but I remember I was hungry most of the time. One time we stopped at Dalton, Ga., and waited most of a day for an engine to pull us to Knoxville, Tenn. On a side track near our train, was a car load of sugar. We managed to open a hogshead, and filled our haversacks with it, and some of the boys also filled their tin-cups and pockets with it. I saw one boy with his cap full. We were a sweet lot for a day or two at least.

We passed up through East Tennessee at a time when they were conscripting every man, young and old for the Confederate army. It was a sorrowful time for these people, for they were dragging young boys and old men from their homes at the railway stations, followed by their weeping wives and children. I do not remember the day we arrived at "Hotel Libby." Libby Prison had been an old tobacco warehouse, and was situated on the bank of the James River. Near two hundred and sixty prisoners, including myself, were quartered in a room in the second story of the building. We were somewhat crowded. When we lay down to sleep at night we covered about all the floor space. We had nothing to do but to talk and time passed slowly with us. We were fed once a day. One day we had a small loaf of bread and some soup and the next day some bread and the meat the soup was made from. We were hungry most of the time, but hungriest after disposing of our daily rations. It was mid-winter and part of the time it was quite cold. We were without blankets, and the floor was pretty hard, but it was dry, and some of us slept a good deal. There were windows in the end of the room, without glass, and sometimes the wind blew in off the river and chilled us through. But as I recall it now, after 47 years, we were most of us in good health. The quarters where our captured officers were confined were on the first floor directly under us and we managed to make a hole in the floor large enough for them to pass a deck of cards up to us. I think several packs found their way to us through this hole, and I think none of them was idle as long as it was light enough to see the spots on them. When the sun went down our light went out. It came back when the sun rose in the morning. We were allowed no artificial lights in the prison, and the gloomy winter nights seemed doubly long. Day and night the sentinels paced their beats about the prison, and every hour of the night was called the refrain, "All is well." I remember how lonesome and homesick I would feel when the sentinel at mid-night would call out, "Twelve o'clock and all is well.

One day some rebel officers came in to our room and asked us to volunteer to work on the stockade for the prison they were building on Belle Isle. We told them we were already volunteers for three years or more, or during the war, and could not volunteer again until our time expired. After that we would volunteer to build stockades, but it would be to put *them* in.

When our time came to leave the prison we had no notice of it until we were ordered to get ready to leave. I don't understand yet what we had to do to get ready, or why that order was given, unless some of us were lying down, and it meant for us to get up. We had

nothing else to do to get ready. Perhaps some of us had to turn around and face the door before starting. We were not told where we were to go. Some one said we were going to South Carolina, and it was reported we were going to Andersonville, Ga., where a prison was to be established. As we were marching along the street a man handed me a morning paper, and I read in it an item stating that 1000 Yankee prisoners were to be sent to City Point to be turned over to U. S. officers. We soon all knew that we were going home and no one could express what that meant to us. We were loaded on flat cars, but that didn't matter, we were going home! We would have been willing to ride on the cow catcher.

We were all feeling fine, but kept quiet until we rounded the bend of the river at City Point and caught a glimpse of our own Stars and Stripes floating over the steamer New York. Then we broke loose. Talk about the Fourth of July, political meetings, Teddy, or the cheers of modern base ball fans. Any or all of these would be tame beside the cheers we sent forth. We got off the cars, cheering, and kept it up until we got on the boat. Then the cheering suddenly stopped. We were passed between two lines of our own men and each one of us was given a loaf of bread, a big hunk of meat and a tin-cup full of good old black coffee. Gee! we soon forgot all about that old flag, and ate and drank until we were too full to cheer any more just then. We ate what was given us, and then more and more, for they gave us all we wanted and I really thought some of us would be sick from over eating. But I guess when a fellow is real hungry, it does not matter how much he eats. None of us suffered from our over-eating, as I recall it.

We rejoined the regiment about the middle of June, finding it encamped on the Stone River battlefield, and two days afterwards, started on the Tullahoma campaign. While absent we had seen our friends at home, and had missed no battles. We dropped back into the routine of a soldier's life so quietly and naturally that in a day or so we could hardly realize there had been any break or gap in our service.

Lieutenant Colonel Frank Askew, it will be remembered, was severely wounded in the hip on the morning of December 31, 1862, and was left on the field. He soon, of course, fell into the enemy's hands. He was taken to a house in Murfreesboro and placed in the same room with General George W. Gordon, then Colonel of the Eleventh Tennessee, who had been dangerously wounded in the cedar thicket where our line made its last stand and the enemy was checked. The two wounded officers, though political and military enemies, soon became friends. Colonel Gordon, with genuine southern hospitality, interceded for Colonel Askew, and he was spared the trouble and annoyance of signing a parole. Afterwards, when Murfreesboro fell into our hands and Colonel Gordon was our prisoner, Colonel Askew interceded for him and the same courtesy was extended to him that had been shown to Colonel Askew. Occasionally during their long period of after service they exchanged personal compliments under the white flag. Later, in another battle, they again had opportunity to meet face to face, but that belongs to a later chapter.

The evening of January 4, 1863, after our return from our trip over the battlefield, Colonel Gibson made us a speech, telling us in substance, that Murfreesboro had been the objective point in our campaign, that it was now in our possession and that the enemy was in full retreat. As usual, when he made a speech, he was heartily cheered.

On January 5, we sent out a party of three men from each company to bury our dead. We heard cannonading at a distance during the day, which indicated that our troops who were in pursuit of the enemy had come up with his rear guard. We got no rations that day, as all on hand had been issued to the troops who were pursuing the enemy. We were very hungry and when our teams bringing rations came up in the evening the boys helped themselves to a box of crackers. Some of our slightly wounded men who had been taken to hospital in Murfreesboro rejoined the regiment. During the day the orderly sergeants and the adjutant were busy making out lists of our losses for the official reports. The following are the names of the killed, wounded and missing, or captured, during the engagement:

FIELD AND STAFF.

WOUNDED.—Lieutenant Colonel Frank Askew and Major John McClenahan.

COMPANY A.

WOUNDED.—Wm. T. McKinney (and captured), Jacob Kissinger, Wm. J. Permar (and captured), James W. White, Corporal Johnston Hammond (and captured), Jos. S. Brown (and captured), and Richard McKinney (and captured).

MISSING.—Sergeant Andrew L. Hadden Joseph McKinney, Corporal John D. Fleming, Corporal Matthew E. Cherry, Samuel B. Few, Wm. Melone, Robert W. Thompson, David Wilson, Wm. R. Stewart and Benoni Ledman.

COMPANY B.

KILLED.—Corporal James W. Pollock, Alvah P. Allison, Absalom Sines and Levi Frost.

WOUNDED AND AFTERWARDS DIED AS THE RESULT OF SUCH WOUNDS—Corporal John R. McCune, Wm. H. Wiles, Samuel Black and Andrew S. Ross.

OTHER WOUNDED were, Isaac Adamson, Benjamin Chance, Wm. Calvert, Andrew Downer, Wm. Selders, Alonzo Milner, John S. Penrose, David Frazier, who was also captured, Thomas W. Evans, also captured, Lemuel Smith, John Hunter, Patrick Kelly, and Alexander Milligan.

COMPANY C.

KILLED—John Massmore.

WOUNDED AND DIED OF SUCH WOUNDS.—Marshall S. Byrd, Emanuel Strawbridge and Sherman A. Jolly.

OTHER WOUNDED.—Wm. A. Ward, Albert Noe, David K. Baggs, Geo. M. Chambers, Daniel C. Courtwright, Amos T. Harding, Enoch Timbers, Calvin S. Paxton, and Jacob S. Riser, who was also captured.

MISSING.—Henry C. Graff, Robert D. McBride, Harvey C. Calkins, Henry C. Meredith, Aaron M. Craven, Wm. D. Hammell, Alfred H. Hurd, and Joseph B. Ross.

COMPANY D.

WOUNDED.—Amos F. Miller, Henry Schriver and John Hesser.

MISSING.—Corporal John Sheehy, Charles F. Hoffman, Wm. H. Cavins, John A. Clark, Francis M. Carter, John Harnett, John Hahn, Christian Mafzgar, Butler Ramey and George W. Tucker.

COMPANY E.

KILLED AND MISSING.—Sergeant William Addison Hogue, who went into the battle, and was last seen trying to help Colonel Askew off the field. He was never heard from afterwards.

WOUNDED AND DIED AS RESULT OF SUCH WOUNDS—Corporal John W. Danford and John B. Dysart.

OTHER WOUNDED.—Lieutenant Samuel Hilles, Sergeant Wm. G. Malin, Isaac Eugene Dillon, George Billeb, Geo. W. Ashton, Corporal Morris Cope, John Fenton, John P. Heaton (the four last named were also captured) Smith Gardner, Fernando W. Shackelford, Samuel McMillan, John Pickering, Andrew J. Taylor, Wm. B. Smith and James Hall.

MISSING.—Corporal Calvin Etzler, Isaac W. Knight, Henry H. Brooks, Stephen Burley, Wm. Cavender, Charles Embree, Hugh Foster, William Cilham, Oliver J. Henderson, Charles W. Hall, Abner Jones, Anderson McGrew, David S. McMasters, Alfred Powell, John D. Roscoe, Jos. E. Stewart, Wm. H. Satterthwaite, Albert Wagner, Hugh Hawkins, Isaac Paxton and Wm. McComas.

COMPANY F.

KILLED.—Corporal Adam C. McCaffrey, John Craig and Jacob Hesht.

WOUNDED AND DIED OF WOUNDS.—Wm. Scott.

OTHER WOUNDED.—Corporal E. W. Hutcheson, Dixon M. Hays, Josiah D. Bowles, Joseph Bowles, Andrew Garlock, Nelson D. Madden.

MISSING.—Lafayette Hess, Thos. Benton Jackson, Charles Brandon, Thomas C. Collins, Charles C. Gibson, Isaac H. Green, Joseph McMillan, Daniel Thomas, James Barnett, James Bernard.

COMPANY G.

KILLED.—William Bell, Edward Brown, Wesley Nelson, John R. Park and Archibald Ralston.

WOUNDED AND DIED AS RESULT OF WOUNDS.—Jacob G. Everly and Philip C. Hafflick.

WOUNDED.—Wm. H. Patterson, Joseph C. McColley, Smith A. Walker, Wm. G. Whips, Jacob Stauffer, Thos. G. Maycock, Charles W. Craycraft and Charles K. Sanders, the four last named being also captured.

MISSING.—Andrew B. Dobson, Joseph T. Hanes, Logan McD. Scott, Wilson Barcus, George B. Gilbert, Hiram K. Brooks, Joseph Harnley, William Wallace, John Koons, and Theodore Coss.

COMPANY H.

KILLED.—Elias H. Evers.

WOUNDED AND DIED AS RESULT OF WOUNDS.—Chris. R. Harnley, Henry K. Wise and Wm. Crone.

WOUNDED.—Captain Thomas E. Douglass, Corporal Wm. Crates, Corporal David Capper, Jas. R. Updegrove, William H. Pier, Eli Timbers (also captured), Casper Miller, Wm. Angevine and Philip Beamer.

MISSING.—Sergeant George T. Todd, Corporal Calvin Morehead, Corporal Jos. S. Lehw, Cornelius Linn, Wm. G. Balding, Asa T. Crapo, Peter Cupp, Andrew J. Stewart.

COMPANY I.

KILLED.—Lucas Borer, John W. Charity and William H. Whiting.

WOUNDED AND DIED AS RESULT OF WOUNDS.—Louis Goshorn.

WOUNDED.—William Morton (also captured), William McConnell, James M. Swanger and Winfield S. White.

MISSING.—Sergeant Alexander R. Lord, Corporal, Jos. J. Millard, David D. Hart, Barnet Sims, Joseph Lee Kerr, Benjamin Gardner, George Stoll, Thomas W. Curran, Jas. C. Delancy, Alva Anderson, John Coble, Samuel Canter, Samuel Fletcher, James Guthrie, Peter S. Kirkendell, Joseph E. Meck, Geo. W. Rockwell, Alexander Simon, Joseph Sheehy, John F. White, Thomas Connor.

COMPANY K.

KILLED.—Samuel W. Cowles.

WOUNDED.—Sergeant Alexis Cope (slightly), Landon B. Grimes, John Rennard, Peter Russell, Jas. W. Thompson, Eber T. Fort and Frank W. Sanders.

MISSING.—Sergeant George W. Chessell, Corporal Rees

Pickering, Brown Deselems, James M. Andrews, James W. Bateman, James McConnell, James McMillan, Leinard Pickering and Benjamin R. Buffington.

The appalling total is three (3) officers wounded, nineteen (19) enlisted men killed, seventeen (17) enlisted men, mortally wounded, ie., died as the result of wounds received in the battle, eighty (80) other enlisted men wounded, and one hundred and sixteen (116) enlisted men captured or missing—a grand total loss of 232 killed, wounded and missing.

The return of casualties of the army under General Rosecrans from December 26, 1862 to January 5, 1863 inclusive,¹ made up as stated from nominal lists, returns, etc., gives the losses in the 15th Ohio as 17 killed, 70 wounded and 128 missing or captured, or a total loss of 215. But herein are given the names of each man and the total is 17 greater. The names are taken from the official rosters and reports and corrected by reference to diaries of Chaplain Ross, Lieutenant Andrew J. Gleason and Sergeant John G. Gregory.

The 17 men reported above as mortally wounded, or died as the result of wounds received in the battle, died a day or a few weeks after the battle and might perhaps be classed as among the killed.

The number of missing or captured include only those who were reported captured or missing and not known to be wounded. Those captured who were also wounded are numbered among the wounded and not among the missing or captured. One man reported among the killed is Sergeant William Addison Hogue of Company E. At the time he was reported among the missing, but as he was never heard from, it is believed that he was killed and buried on the field by other troops without having been recognized. That could easily be accounted for. Our dead left unburied by the enemy had been stripped of all their outer clothing, leaving nothing on their bodies by which they could be identified. The other discrepancies between the actual and then reported losses may have readily occurred as a result of the confusion following the battle.

Surgeon Clarke McDermott, the medical director of the right wing, General McCook's command, gives the loss in killed and wounded in the 15th Ohio, as follows: Killed 17, wounded 96, total 113.² The number of wounded given in his report is one less than that given above in this history, while the number of killed is two less. His report was forwarded to General McCook January 14, 1863, several days after General Rosecrans

1 W. R. R. 20, part 1-208.

2 W. R. R. 20, part 1-259.

"Return of Casualties" above mentioned, and is probably nearer the truth.

The battle of Stone River was one of the hardest and bloodiest contests of the war. The losses in killed and wounded, in proportion to the numbers engaged, were exceeded in only a very few battles where equal or greater numbers were engaged. General Rosecrans officially reports the effective force of his army at the battle of Stone River December 31, 1862 as 43,400¹ and his percentage of loss as 20.22 per cent of the forces engaged. But his return of casualties above referred to shows 1730 killed, 7802 wounded and 3777 captured or missing—or a total loss of 13,249,² which indicates a loss in killed and wounded of nearly 22 per cent, or a total loss of over 30 per cent of the numbers engaged. General Bragg officially reports 37,712 officers and men present for duty, December 31, 1862, and that his losses were killed, 1294, wounded 7945, missing 1027—a total loss of 10,266³—a loss in killed and wounded of a little over 21 per cent. and a total loss of 27 4-7 per cent.

There are no means at hand to enable the writer to arrive at the exact percentage of loss in the 15th Ohio. General Rosecrans' official statement of the effective force present December 31, 1862, gives the number in each brigade, but not the number in each regiment. The number in Willich's (our) brigade was given as 1650. There were five regiments in the brigade—the 15th Ohio the 49th Ohio, the 32nd Indiana, the 39th Indiana and the 89th Illinois,—all good sized regiments. Neither Colonel Gibson, who made the official report of the battle for the brigade, nor either of the regimental commanders, in his official report of the battle, gives the number of men present in his command December 31, 1862. Gleason in his diary says Company H went into battle that morning with about 60 men. Company H was at that time the largest company in the regiment, having received fourteen recruits on October 26, 1862. It is probable that the regiment, as it hastily formed on the morning of December 31, 1862, mustered 360 officers and men. The writer recalls that on the morning of January 1, 1863, there was a mere remnant of it left. Gleason in his diary says that when the regiment reformed after we had got back to the Nashville pike on the evening of December 31, there were present only eight men of Company H, including Lieutenant Updegrove and himself. Other companies could not muster any more, but the next day quite a number returned and we had perhaps a hundred or more present. On the supposition that the 15th Ohio had 360 men December 31, 1862, its percentage

1 W. R. R. 20, part 1-201.

2 W. R. R. 20, part 1-215.

3 W. R. R. 20, part 1-674.

of loss in killed and wounded was 32.2 per cent. and its total loss 64.4 per cent.

General Sheridan, who commanded a division in the right wing, says in his "Memoirs", (Pages 241 and 242), "my effective force in the battle of Stone River was 4154 officers and men", (General Rosecrans says 5029),¹ and that his killed and wounded and missing numbered 1633, or nearly 40 per cent. He also says that "in the remaining years of the war, though often engaged in most severe contests, I never experienced in any of my commands so high a rate of casualties".

The writers of war history and military critics have generally regarded the battle of Stone River as not of much importance, and have passed it by without giving it the attention it deserves. General Grant is on record as saying substantially that it led to no results and should never have been fought. But it is due to the men who fought there to say that on no field of battle during the great war of 1861, were the courage and endurance of soldiers on both sides more severely tested and more steadfastly maintained. There was little disparity of numbers in the opposing armies, and we may claim that under the circumstances they were evenly matched. It was a life and death struggle lasting for four days, and it ended by the practical exhaustion of the contending forces. The percentage of loss in killed and wounded in the two armies was practically the same, as is shown,—the loss in our army being a little less than 22 per cent and that of the enemy over 21 per cent. Neither army can lay claim to any superior valor or skill. So far as these are concerned, it was a drawn contest. But history should continue to repeat that on no other battle field in its history did American manhood show higher examples of patriotism and devotion to duty than on this bloody field of Murfreesboro and Stone River.

Eighty thousand one hundred and twelve men engaged in the contest, and twenty-three thousand five hundred and twelve men were killed, wounded or missing. Little has been done to preserve this battle field and it lies neglected. In justice to the men, living and dead, who fought there, the field should be made a national park and the historic portions of it should be marked by fitting monuments, while there remain alive those who could see that they are accurately placed.

On January 5, burial parties were sent over the field to bury our dead. Some of the other troops were ordered out in pursuit of the enemy and all the rations on hand were issued to them. We went hungry until our burial parties returned, when some of the men brought some mutton they had foraged.

1 W. R. R. 20, part 1-201.

January 6, a little after noon, we were formed in line and marched into Murfreesboro, crossing Stone River on the railroad bridge. We reached the town about three o'clock and marched through it without halting, taking the Shelbyville pike. When we had gone about four miles from the town the brigade halted and went into camp. The 15th and 49th Ohio were ordered to go on picket duty and marched about two miles further, where we were placed on a line west of the pike in a thick woods. We were forbidden to have fires at the reserves. At a plantation near one of the posts some of the boys captured some fresh pork and yams,—a fine combination at any time,—but to half starved men nothing could have been finer. The night passed without any unusual incident.



CHAPTER XIV.

A LONG PERIOD OF APPARENT INACTIVITY AT MURFREESBORO.

January 7, 1863, we were relieved from picket duty at 9 o'clock A. M., and returned to the place selected for our camp. It was in a grove of large oaks, east of the railroad, north of the river and not far from the railroad bridge. We remained here until January 11, when we moved through the woods to our rear to a road, which we followed for about a mile in an easterly direction, crossed the river and a mile further went into camp in a piece of woods near General McCook's headquarters. That day the enemy threw some shells at our pickets and an order was issued requiring us to be in line and under arms before daylight each morning.

Rations were short and one day two men from each company were detailed to shell corn to be ground at a horse-mill near camp. There was some promiscuous foraging going on and some of the men brought in some fresh pork.

The morning of January 10, the "German Reveille" was sounded quite early and we were ordered out on a foraging expedition. Some of the men were not familiar with the German call, and had to start without having had their breakfasts. Nothing unusual occurred during the expedition.

January 13, we were ordered out to guard a foraging train. We took a westerly course on the Columbia pike, and did not go very far until we found plenty of forage. We stacked arms while the wagons were being filled, and the men went to cracking walnuts and hickory nuts which were plentiful in the woods near-by. Quite a large body of troops passed us, going out on a reconnoissance. On the 14th, in the evening, we received orders to start for Nashville at 5 o'clock next morning. We started in a pouring rain, and learned we were to go as guard for a supply train. We reached the wagon train on the pike after a tiresome march through the rain. We were wet to the skin and cold, and were permitted to build fires, while the Colonel went to obtain further information. We were about to get into the wagons when the Colonel returned and announced that the order was countermanded and we returned to camp. The next day a detail from the regiment was ordered out on another foraging expedition, and on its return there was loud complaint because Captain Dawson, who was in command, had forbidden private foraging. The prohibition was not very strictly enforced,

for Gleason in his diary reports that that day the boys brought in chickens, turkeys, and honey in considerable quantities, and that one man brought in an immense sausage. On the 24th we were ordered out on battalion drill, the first drill we had had since the battle. Owing to the absence of all the field officers, the regiment was commanded by Captain J. C. Cummins. We went to a near-by field and were put through some rather awkward and amusing maneuvers by this inexperienced battalion commander, who was much relieved when it began to rain, as it ended the drill.

That day an order was published saying, in substance, that whereas it had come to the knowledge of the General that a large number of receipts had been given by men for bacon foraged in the country, it was ordered that thereafter the men would be prohibited from giving such receipts under heavy penalties. This, to some extent, stopped our supplies of fresh pork and vegetables, and we had to reconcile ourselves to plain hard tack and fitch, with an occasional alternative of fresh beef, which were all furnished by our own commissary. On this day company commanders were ordered to make out lists of all their men who were absent with or without leave and give them to Captain Burns, who was going home on leave, with instructions to look them up and have them returned to the regiment.

On the morning of January 30, before it was light, we started to Murfreesboro to work on fortifications. We understood that the place was to be strongly fortified as a base for supplies, preparatory to another forward movement. We made the three miles to Murfreesboro in good time. We marched through the town to near the railroad and pike bridges where a fort had been commenced and were put to work throwing up intrenchments. We saw several other forts or redoubts also in progress, and quite a large force was at work on them. We worked in reliefs of one hour each and the time passed quite pleasantly. We were relieved between 3 and 4 o'clock and marched back to camp, taking the railroad track. In the evening we had orders to return next day for further work on the fortifications. Next day we returned to our work and got back to camp at 5 o'clock in the evening, tired with work and the marching. We were glad the next day was Sunday, but did not know whether it would be a day of rest or not, as it was near our time to go on picket again. It proved to be, indeed, a day of rest, and late in the evening came the order to go on picket duty the next morning. The day was much colder, with snow, and our day

and night on picket were very uncomfortable. There was no untoward incident while we thus guarded the camp in order that others might sleep, and on the morning of February 3, we were relieved, and returned to camp about 9 o'clock. On the morning of February 4, we had reveille at 5 o'clock and stood at arms until daylight. At 8 o'clock we were ordered out with the brigade on a foraging expedition. Three men from each company were detailed to go in the wagons. We took an irregular course for the Shelbyville pike and moved out on that until we came to an eminence where we could see several miles ahead of us. Some of the men fancied they could see rebels in the distance. We marched on about four miles beyond our picket line, where our advance ran up against the enemy's pickets and skirmishing began. The enemy retreated to a range of hills, overlooking our position and giving them quite an advantage. We had a section of artillery with us and it was brought forward and threw some shells at the enemy. They replied with their artillery and fired several shots, one of which took effect in the Forty-ninth Ohio, killing one man and wounding two others. A cavalryman had been wounded when the enemy's pickets first opened fire. The enemy did not develop any large force, but their musketry fire was very annoying. We held our ground until our wagons were loaded with forage and then faced towards camp. We marched in line of battle with a line of skirmishers in our rear, until we met a division of our troops coming to our assistance. These troops were formed on both sides of the road and we passed through them. We were told that they had been sent for by General Johnson, who was with us, and formed a trap for the enemy in case he should attempt to pursue us. But the enemy was not rash enough to pursue us after dark, and the snare was laid in vain. It was very late before we got back to our camps. It had been a cold, snowy day and we were very cold and tired. We all thought the orders which required us at this time to have reveille at 5 o'clock and stand under arms until daylight, were very foolish. We did not know that Bragg's army was at Shelbyville and Tullahoma, 25 to 30 miles distant, and that on January 20, he had over 49,000 men present,¹ while General Rosecrans had at Murfreesboro only 47,478 present for duty.² At a later period of the war, under similar circumstances, we would not only have been under arms at daylight each morning, but our camp would have been strongly intrenched.

On the 5th of February we were permitted to rest, but

¹ See General Bragg's return of that date, W. R. R. 20, part 2-503.

² See General Rosecrans' return of same date, W. R. R. 20, part 2-343-5.

on the 6th at 6 o'clock in the morning we were started to Murfreesboro to again work on fortifications. We supposed we were to work on the same redoubt we had before worked on, but we were marched down the river and after some delay, crossed it, and were put to work on an intrenchment on that side. We worked until 4 o'clock but did not get back across the river until an hour later. While we were waiting at the river, Captain Dawson got into an altercation with a drunken Dutch pioneer and got severely pummelled.¹ We did not get into camp until after dark.

Our camp from this time on seems to have been known as Camp Sill, so named in honor of General Sill, who was killed in the battle of Stone River.

On February 7, we were ordered out on picket duty and started at 7 o'clock A. M. After we were posted a foraging expedition marched out, taking the same direction we had taken on the 4th. Before long we heard the boom of cannon, which indicated that they, too, had found the enemy. When they returned they reported only two men hurt. There was so much cannonading and so many conflicting reports, that at one time our entire picket reserve was ordered out to the line. Our posts this day were all numbered, and it was ordered that in case of an alarm the number of the post was to be sent along the line. We were not disturbed during the night, and were relieved at 8 o'clock next morning and returned to camp. We rested during the day, but in the evening received orders to go out with a foraging expedition next morning.

February 9, we marched at 8 o'clock going to the left front, instead of out the Shelbyville pike as before, and soon found abundance of forage. As soon as our train was loaded we changed position to guard a train from General Davis' division while it was being loaded. There were about 200 wagons in the two trains and all were loaded. While we were guarding the trains the boys found plenty of walnuts, and some did a little private foraging. During the day or night it was rumored that General McCook had been taken prisoner by the enemy, but next morning the rumor was found to be false. On the 11th, we were again out on picket duty. On the 12th our sutler, Mr. George Geiger of Columbus, O., familiarly known as "Old Gouger," arrived and was greeted with shouts all over the regiment, as it was then considered certain that the paymaster was coming. He was expecting his goods and wanted to be here when the men were paid so as to get

1 Gleason's Diary.

his share, which in the case of many of the men was the "*lion's share*".¹ That evening we received orders to go as escort for a foraging expedition next morning at 8 o'clock.

On the 13th we marched at the appointed time and went out the same road we took on our last foraging expedition. We went, however, much farther—nearly to the hills which bounded the valley on the south. We found forage in abundance, soon loaded all our wagons and returned to camp without being disturbed by the enemy. In our absence the sutlers supplies came in—*five wagon-loads*, which caused much excitement in our camp.¹ On the 14th we signed the payrolls for four months' pay. On the 15th we were ordered to get ready for inspection at 10 o'clock. We got ready, but after waiting an hour, were ordered to go out on picket duty immediately. There was considerable grumbling, as it was rainy and cold, but we went all the same. We were posted in the same place as on our recent tours of such duty—out on the Shelbyville pike. In the evening there were apprehensions of an attack, and our reserves were ordered out to the line, where they remained for an hour, and then were permitted to go back to the reserve stations. The night passed without unusual incident. We were not relieved until 10 o'clock the morning of the 16th. A large foraging expedition went out while we were waiting to be relieved. We rested quietly after returning to camp, undisturbed by orders of any kind, that day or the next, but the evening of the 17th we received orders to go out with a forage train next morning. We started out the morning of the 18th, marching on the railroad nearly to the picket line, where we waited for the forage train. It was raining and the roads were so bad the mules had about all they could do to draw the empty wagons. When we came to a creek we had crossed on a former similar expedition, it was so swollen that we had to be carried across in the wagons. One poor mule fell in the stream and broke its leg and had to be shot. The success of the expedition seemed doubtful, but we finally found forage, loaded the wagons, and started back, having a skirmish with the enemy when we reached the pike, but having no one hurt. It was after dark when we got our train inside our lines. On the 19th we had orders for inspection, but found it was only a ruse to find out who had fired off their guns without orders. Some of the men were caught and as a result had to go on extra duty, which they did with a crest-fallen air. Among them were Haverstick and Cook of Company H.² About noon the companies were formed and marched to brigade headquarters

1 and 2 Gleason's Diary.

and the men were paid for four months' service. Many of the men set apart considerable sums to send home by the state agent who was expected in a day or two, but before he came the sutler had proved the stronger attraction. Gleason in his diary of that day notes the receipt of a song entitled, "Take Your Gun and Go," from a young lady who had made it popular by singing it herself. The evening of the 20th we got orders to go on picket duty next morning at 7 o'clock. The only record found of this tour of duty is that it rained hard most of the time and that it was late next morning before we were relieved and got back to camp. That evening, the 22nd, we learn from Gleason's diary that a number of the officers and men assembled in the sergeant major's tent and sang. The books they used were "The Jubilee" and "The New York Glee and Chorus Book." Major McClenahan, Gleason and the sergeant major were present and perhaps Captain J. K. Brown and others. Their voices are all silent now, but one can recall how on many a night they led the chorus in some candle-lighted tent and awoke fond memories of home and boyhood and loved ones far away. Those of us who remain owe a debt of gratitude to these singers which we can never repay. We rested on the 23rd, and on the 24th again went out on a foraging expedition, and returned by an eight-mile march on the Manchester pike.

The 25th and 26th were days of hard rain and, fortunately, we were permitted to remain in camp. The rain was so heavy that it dripped through our tents and made even our rest uncomfortable.

On the 27th we had general inspection and in the evening orders came to go on picket duty next morning at 7 o'clock. We spent the day and night of the 28th on picket duty with no untoward incident. There was rain at intervals, but that was expected, and the men took it as a matter of course. The first day of March, 1863, was mild and pleasant and we had a good rest after our day and night of guard duty.

March 2, Lieutenant Augustus L. Smith, our regimental quartermaster, returned to the regiment after a leave of absence and brought with him several of the men who had been taken prisoners at the battle of Stone River and had been exchanged. March 3, we were ordered to go out with a forage train next morning at 7 o'clock. We started at the hour named, the brigade being under command of the lieutenant colonel of the 32d Indiana. We went by a circuitous route across the fields and finally reached the river, which we crossed on a foot bridge. We soon came out on the Columbia pike, which we followed. We passed

Sheridan's division, which we understood was out on a reconnaissance, and having heard firing before meeting them, thought the prospects good for a fight. We found, however, that the men were only emptying their rusty guns. We passed through Salem and kept steadily on until we reached the Eagleville pike, which we followed until we came to a region where forage seemed to be abundant. This road had been recently repaired and the marching over it was hard. When we halted to load the wagons we estimated that we had marched about seventeen miles. We were posted to guard the train while loading, and built fires, for it was very cold. We thought we would remain there during the night, but after making coffee we started back for camp. It was a long hard march and it was very late at night when we reached it. Some of the men fell out and did not get in until about two o'clock next morning. We rested quietly in camp until the morning of the 6th, when we were ordered out on a reconnoissance with two days' rations in haversacks. It had rained during the night and was still wet and disagreeable. Soon after we started, the clouds thickened and poured forth a deluge of rain. But there was no halt or turning back. We passed the camps of Davis' and Sheridan's divisions, crossed the creek on the Franklin pike bridge and there took a course about parallel with the Shelbyville pike, on a mud road which the rain did not improve. We soon heard cannonading to our left. We marched on several miles without meeting opposition from the enemy, when suddenly we heard skirmishing in our front and were hastily formed in line of battle. We advanced, driving the enemy back, and occupied the little village of Middleton, passing a dead and a wounded rebel on the way. The Fifteenth and Fortyninth Ohio were deployed to support the skirmishers, a piece of artillery was brought forward and swept the fields beyond our line with canister. The skirmish line and the cavalry then again advanced and put the enemy to flight. We then retraced our steps about two miles and bivouaced for the night, drenched to the skin. A heavy rain set in and continued all night. For the first time, we really began to appreciate our shelter tents, which we had carried with us on this march. In this skirmish, three men of the brigade were wounded and the enemy's loss was reported to be at least twenty killed and wounded.¹ When we retired to go into bivouac, the enemy followed us closely and our pickets had to fight for their position. The enemy, however, soon withdrew and left us undisturbed the remainder of the night. At 3 o'clock on the morning of the 7th we were awakened by the guards and ordered to get ready to move immediately. As our regiment was the rear guard it was nearly an hour before we

got started. It was very dark, the roads were deep with mud and water and the marching was difficult. Company H had charge of one of the howitzers, and once or twice it got stuck fast in the mud and delayed our progress.¹ We finally reached the village of Salem, where we halted until all the stragglers came up. We then resumed our march and reached camp about noon, very tired, and wet from head to foot.

In the afternoon we got orders to march at a moment's notice. The order caused a good deal of mutinous talk. It was said that the boys in the Thirty-second Indiana threatened to stack arms if the order came.² The order did not come that evening. If it had, we would have eaten our words and have gone wherever ordered, and the Thirty-second would have done the same.

Next morning an order came, not to march, but to go on picket. There was some grumbling, but we went, had no unusual experience during the day or night and returned to camp, only to receive an order to pack up and be ready to move at a moment's warning. We struck tents, "packed up" and after waiting for orders for more than an hour, were ordered to pitch tents and prepare for picket again at 9 o'clock next morning.

That night we heard Major McClenahan, Captain Brown, Andrew J. Gleason and others singing again in the sergeant major's tent. It seemed unusual that we should be ordered on picket duty so soon after being relieved from such duty, but Gleason in his diary explains, that such duties were unusually arduous at this time because two divisions were absent on some expedition. We pitched our tents and had the satisfaction to know that striking them had given our quarters a needed airing.

Our picket duty on the day and night of the 10th of March was quite arduous. It was rainy and disagreeable. Our watch was under instructions more guarded and careful than usual, and the loss of sleep in standing guard two nights in succession was very trying. It was hard to keep awake, although we were warned that we might expect an attack on the picket line at any time.

Fortunately, on the morning of the 11th, we were relieved earlier than usual and had almost the whole day and all the night for sleep and rest. At 6 o'clock on the morning of the 12th we were again ordered out on picket duty and returned on the morning of the 13th. On the 13th, Aaron Wortman of Co. H died in the brigade hospital of typhoid fever. He was a favorite in the company and his death was a great shock to his brother James of the same company, who had now lost two brothers since he

¹ and ² Gleason's Diary.

entered the service. The boys of Company H built a rude bier on which to lay his body, placed it in a shelter tent, and his comrades stood watch over it during the day and night. Next morning, although the regiment was again ordered out on picket duty, a detail of four men was ordered, to dig the grave and assist in the last sad rites of their deceased comrade. At 3 o'clock on the afternoon of March 14, he was buried on a knoll across the pike from our camp, where others had been buried. At the grave, at the request of his brother, a hymn was sung and a passage of scripture was read by one of the comrades. The grave was then filled and marked with some large stones.¹

On the morning of the 15th the regiment was later than usual in being relieved, and it was near noon when it got back to camp. We heard that Sheridan's division had returned from its expedition and therefore did not anticipate a continuation of our severe picket duty. After a good rest we were notified that we would drill on the morrow.

The morrow was the 11th and at 9 o'clock we marched out into the field in front of our camp and were put through various battalion movements. After this we had a sham battle with the Thirty-second Indiana and Goodspeed's battery. After two hours of such drill and maneuvers we returned to camp, and in the afternoon, put in about the same time in company drill.

It was the last day we spent in Camp Sill. It was a pleasant camp, well located and fairly well drained, and the nine weeks we spent there, although filled with arduous and sometimes very exacting and trying duty, were among the most pleasant of our long experiences.

When off duty both officers and men seemed to enjoy themselves. The landscape was attractive and the country rich agriculturally. There were some fine plantations where there were young ladies, who were a great attraction for both officers and men. It was quite common for some of the officers who had the countersign to pass out-side our picket or guard lines of evenings and call on these young women. It became so common, in fact, that General Rosecrans found it necessary to issue an order forbidding the officers to go outside the lines without a written pass from brigade, division or army headquarters. Even this order did not altogether stop the practice and some of the officers both old and young at times disregarded it. There was one plantation just outside our lines where lived a family named Winstead or Winston in which there were a number of bright, attractive young women. General Rosecrans' orders did not avail to keep quite a number of our own and other officers of the com-

¹ Gleason's Diary.

mand from calling on them, without having obtained the required written permission, and almost every pleasant evening a dozen or more of them continued to disregard the orders. They would ride up to the guard, give the countersign, and pass on out to Winstead's or Winston's where they were always entertained with true southern hospitality. Lieutenant Wallace McGrath of the Fifteenth Ohio, who was serving on the brigade staff, knew of these infractions of military discipline, and made up his mind to play a practical joke on Lieutenant Green of the same staff, with whom he had frequently called at Winsteads, by having him arrested while making such a call. We will let him tell the story in his own words written for this history in 1909, a short time before his death. He calls it

"THE ADVENTURE AT WINSTEAD'S."

"Just outside the picket line at Murfreesboro there lived a well to do planter who counted two beautiful young daughters as his most valuable possessions, one of whom was a widow whose husband, an officer in the confederate army, had been killed in battle. The young ladies vied with each other as to which could say the most bitter things about the Yankees. They were exceedingly attractive, having many accomplishments. Young officers, and old ones too, their wives being north of the Ohio, went to see them."

"A few evenings after General Rosecrans had issued an order that 'no officer should be absent from his brigade without the written permission of his brigade commander', a party of six officers from our brigade went out to call on the young ladies. I have forgotten who they all were, but remember that Lieutenant Green of our brigade staff, Captain Goodspeed, commanding the battery, and Captain Jim Cummins, 'of ours' were among them. General Willich was then the guest of the Confederate government at 'Hotel Libby' and Colonel Gibson was in command of the brigade. Had the Old Man (meaning General Willich) been in command at that time, there would have been no adventure at Winstead's to tell, for he never would have stood for the like of that. Colonel Gibson knew what the party were up to and had not objected to their going out of camp, but as it was *written* permission General Rosecrans' order required, I saw a good opportunity to play a practical joke. My idea was to send some one to represent an officer on General Rosecrans' staff and arrest the whole gang. I didn't send one of our own officers for fear Green might know him, so I decided on Fred Stevenson, who was a sergeant in the Thirty-ninth Indiana. He had lived in Columbus, Ohio, where I had known him before the war."

"We had a staff uniform belonging to Captain Butler of the brigade staff, who was absent on leave. It was complete in every particular,—hat with feather and ornament, black field in the shoulder straps, gilt cord on the trowser legs—and it fitted Stevenson very well. He was a bright fellow and it did not take long to explain to him what I wanted to do, or to thoroughly enlist him in the madcap enterprise. He was a little nervous for fear Green might recognize him, for he had been at headquarters to see me a number of times. However, after getting into Butler's uniform, he said that his own captain would not know him."

"I instructed him thoroughly, gave him the countersign and told him he was Captain Bird of General Rosecrans' staff. He passed the picket and the guard at the house and was announced in a loud voice by the colored butler as Captain Bird of the staff of 'Majah General Rosecrans'. Going in, he was nearly paralyzed to find not only the party from our brigade, but six or eight other officers from other brigades of our corps and one, a colonel, from another corps. He was in a fearful panic for fear Green would recognize him and kept his hat on. So General Rosecrans' staff officer did not make a very favorable impression. After sitting a few moments he pulled himself together and rising to his feet, said, 'Gentlemen, have you written permission to be here?' The 'panic' was thereupon transferred to the other fellows. Some looked wild, others mad, but they were all speechless for awhile and then all confessed they had no written permission to be out of camp. (He had decided he must arrest all or none). The colonel made the excuse that he was sick and had come out to get a bed in which to sleep. He was really a sick man and it was a shame to shake him up in that way. Thereupon Stevenson asked each one for his name and regiment and made a show of taking them all down in his book. Then going to the door, as if to leave, he turned back and said, 'Gentlemen, you will consider yourselves in arrest, and report immediately to your brigade commanders.' He then passed out, hurriedly mounted his horse, passed the pickets and rode rapidly back to brigade headquarters, where he changed his clothing and was soon back in his tent in the camp of the Thirty-ninth Indiana. Soon, the party, Green, Goodspeed, Cummins and the three others belonging to our brigade came stringing in with woe-begone countenances, reported themselves to Colonel Gibson as in arrest, and detailed the circumstances. Colonel Gibson, when all were in, presented in eloquent words the gravity of the offence, the personal disgrace of an arrest for violation of orders, and the bad effect it would have on the men and on the discipline of the command. He, however, sympathized with them and said he would try to have some of their per-

sonal friends appointed on the court martial which would be called to try them. By this time, the news of the arrests had spread through camp and forty or fifty officers of the brigade had come to headquarters. Colonel Gibson went on discussing the court martial and finally said, 'If I am directed to convene the court I will appoint anyone you want. Here is McGrath, how would he do for the president of the court? He would let you all off.' This last remark made them begin to think that perhaps their situation was not as bad as they feared. Soon it dawned upon them that a practical joke had been played on them, and they were greatly relieved. The news went from tent to tent among the officers' quarters and all turned out to enjoy the fun. When the whole story was told, Stevenson was sent for and each one of the victims gave him an order on the sutler for a keg of beer. What followed was 'contrary to good order and military discipline', and over it we will drop the curtain."

"The next morning we had to skurry around to relieve the minds of the officers of other commands who had been arrested, especially the old colonel who was sick.

"The story soon found its way to higher up headquarters. General Johnson pretended to scowl about it, but General McCook and General Rosecrans laughed heartily over it and thought it an excellent practical joke, which it was."

On March 18, we received orders to move camp at 8 o'clock. We took the Murfreesboro pike, which was quite dry and dusty, reminding us of last summer's marches. Our regiment and brigade led the corps. Just before we reached Murfreesboro we turned to the left, marched through a dirty old camp and were halted just west of the town and in plain view of it, the fortifications and the surrounding camps. We pitched our tents on top of a fine knoll at the foot of which was the railroad and a creek which supplied us with water. We took much pains in preparing the ground, as there were good prospects for remaining for some time. Our new camp was designated as Camp Drake in honor of Lieutenant Colonel Drake of the 49th Ohio, was killed in the battle of Stone River.

On the 19th we spent most of the day in fixing up our new quarters, and received orders for inspection and review next day. The next day, the 20th, we had the inspection and review as ordered. The whole division was formed near our brigade headquarters, our regiment being on the extreme right of the line. A brass band had been provided for the occasion which enlivened the ceremony. It was very tiresome, standing in line with our knapsacks and all our accouterments on, while the general passed in front and rear of the entire line. We then marched in review

and returned to our camp where we had inspection of our quarters by the general. We were told that our regiment and our brigade made the finest appearance of any in the line. On the morning of the 21st we received orders to get ready at once to go out on picket duty. We had scarcely time to get our breakfasts when the brigade and regimental calls both sounded, and we fell in. There was some cannonading in our front, but it soon ceased. For some reason we did not understand, our tour of duty was short and we were ordered in to camp in the evening. On the 22d we received notice to be ready to march at noon with two days rations and our shelter tents. Our whole division, we learned, was included in the order. We took the road to Salem, where we relieved Davis' division which had been there on outpost duty for two days. Soon after we arrived at Salem we were ordered out on picket duty. Just outside the line was the residence of one of the Jenkins family, and a couple of pairs of bright eyes gazing from one of the porticos attracted the notice of the men who were on that part of the line. There were numerous excuses made for going to the house during the day, and in the evening the adjutant, the sergeant major and Lieutenant George W. Cummins made a ceremonious call and stayed so late they had difficulty in getting inside the lines again.¹ We were relieved the next day at 10 o'clock and were placed in the reserve and posted near General Johnson's headquarters, about a mile from the village.

That day we received a mail and newspapers which said that the famous Yazoo Canal had been finished, all but taking out the stumps, that Morgan and Wheeler had been defeated in Tennessee and that the rebels had begun to negotiate for peace. In the evening it rained, but our shelter tents kept us comparatively dry.

The 24th was rainy and disagreeable, a ration of whisky was issued, and some of the boys got more than their share and were quite jovial but not disorderly.²

On the 25th the left companies of the regiment were ordered out on picket duty and relieved a portion of the 49th Ohio. They were posted on the left of the pike and occupied a station jointly with a detachment of the 32d Indiana. It rained in the morning, but towards noon the clouds rolled by and were followed by high north winds which made the air quite cold. The morning of the 26th, the left wing of our regiment was relieved by the right wing and a detachment of the 49th Ohio. At two o'clock we got orders to be ready to move in an hour. General Sheridan and staff arrived soon after this, our pickets were called

1 and 2 Gleason's Diary.

in and we started for our camp at Murfreesboro, meeting Sheridan's division coming out to take our places. The day was clear and warm and it was a hot tiresome march. We reached camp at 4:30 o'clock P. M. and soon received orders to go on picket duty at 7 o'clock next morning. We heard that General Johnson, our division commander, had been assigned to duty as Post Commander of Murfreesboro. Seven large siege guns and a long train of wagons arrived this day.

It was reported that General Steedman had orders to intrench at Triune. We could see signalling from the court house to some point to the westward. There were rumors of another invasion of Kentucky and stirring events were expected. On the morning of the 27th we started out on picket early, taking the Shelbyville pike and being posted near a house which had been General McCook's headquarters. No disturbance occurred during the day or night and at 8 o'clock next morning we were relieved and started for camp, where we rested the rest of the day. March 29, we had our usual Sunday morning inspection. March 30, we had orders for review at 10 o'clock and the men busied themselves cleaning their guns and brushing their clothing so as to be in good condition for the ceremony. We understood we were to be reviewed by Colonel Gibson, but when we were formed in line, to our surprise Generals Rosecrans and McCook came into view, and after inspecting a fortification near-by they came over and reviewed us. General Rosecrans gave us some instructions about packing knapsacks. We marched in review before the two generals and then returned to quarters, which they inspected as they rode by. In the evening we had dress parade. We had dress parade again the 31st and got orders to go on picket next morning. We were on picket the day and night of April 1 and until about 11 o'clock on the 2d. On the 2d and 3d we remained in camp without orders of any kind. On the 4th we had battalion drill in the afternoon followed by dress parade. On the 5th we were again ordered out to Salem on outpost duty and remained there until the 10th. On the 6th while we were on picket duty we heard cheering by the troops on the reserve, and soon heard that General Rosecrans had received a telegram from Washington saying that Charleston had fallen. On the 7th we recalled that it was just a year since our first baptism of fire and blood at the battle of Shiloh. On the 8th we heard firing away to our right which indicated that fighting was going on in the neighborhood of Triune.

On the morning of the 9th, it was rumored that Hardee's corps was marching on Tribune, and that our corps would march to reinforce General Steedman who was in command there. That

day the boys captured quite a number of squirrels. We returned to Camp Drake in the afternoon and on the 11th put in a good part of the time drilling. On the 12th we received orders to strike our Sibley tents and turn in all but one for the officers. Later the order was countermanded, but too late to enable us to put them up again that day. On the morning of the 13th, strange to say, there was no reveille, and all slept or lay in their shelter tents until they were tired. There was a rumor in camp that General Rosecrans had been ordered to Vicksburg, which caused general dissatisfaction.¹

On the 14th we got ready for inspection but it begun to rain and it was postponed. In the forenoon we were paid off. The Sutler, as usual, was on hand. He had several barrels of beer in his stock and the men were eager to get their share of it. His tent was full of officers and the men could not get in. This caused quite a disturbance and the men made several attempts to pull down the tent. It was reported that the colonel got so full that he had to be taken to his quarters. It was a disgraceful spectacle. There were a number intoxicated, and they were not all enlisted men, either¹ On the 15th a copy of the Mansfield Shield and Banner was brought into camp which contained what was thought to be a disloyal speech by our old Colonel, Moses R. Dickey. It created a good deal of feeling, and the boys called a meeting and appointed a committee to express their indignation over it. We received orders to go on picket next morning at 7 o'clock. It was also ordered that thereafter when the regiment went on picket the men should take their shelter tents with them and be ready to march without returning to camp. On the 16th we started at the appointed time, marched out the Shelbyville pike and occupied the same position we did the last time. Three deserters came into our lines, claiming to be conscripts. We were relieved at 8 o'clock and had a hot march into camp. From Gleason's Diary we learn that the sutler's beer was not all gone and that there was a good deal of drunkenness as a result, which he greatly deplored. In the afternoon there was dress parade. After it was over the men of the Forty-ninth Ohio and some of the Thirty-second Indiana came over to a meeting held in our camp, at which the speech of Colonel Dickey in the Mansfield Shield and Banner was read and a set of resolutions condemning it adopted amid great enthusiasm. They were also indorsed by the Forty-ninth Ohio and some of the Thirty-second Indiana.² That night the singers met in Gleason's tent and sang the songs of home,—the old, old songs of long ago. On the 18th, 19th and 20th of April, we remained in Camp Drake drilling and perform-

¹ and ² Gleason's Diary.

ing regular camp duty. On the 21st we were awakened between two and three o'clock in the morning by the adjutant who gave out orders that we must be ready to move at 7 o'clock with three day's rations and light equipage. We started at the appointed hour, taking the Shelbyville pike. We pushed on beyond the picket line about six miles when we halted and made coffee. We were then moved forward and our regiment was sent out on picket. Next day about noon the pickets were called in and we moved back over a hill where we passed General Johnson and his staff, dismounted. After passing the 7th milestone two of the regiments of the brigade were deployed on either side of the pike, while we halted in the road. Some firing was heard in front. After resting here several hours, apparently watching a rebel force in front, we moved up to the right, leaving our fifth company behind to guard the wagons and artillery. We had a clear view of the road in front, but no offensive demonstration was made by either side. After holding our position about an hour we retired and were followed by the enemy who skirmished with our rear guard, until a few well directed shots from our artillery checked his further advance. After reaching the north side of the hill we halted and stacked arms for the night. The next day, the 23rd, we remained in the same position and all was quiet in front. General McCook and staff came out in the evening and it was said we could go back to camp next day. We were on short rations, but fortunately found plenty of walnuts which the winter's frost had not injured. Next day, the 24th, at 4 o'clock we returned to our camp.

On the 25th the men of the 49th Ohio presented Colonel Gibson with a fine sword and saddle. The presentation speech was made by a private soldier of the 49th. Colonel Gibson replied in an eloquent speech. Colonel Larabee of a Wisconsin regiment also made a speech. On the 26th we were on picket at our old station on the Shelbyville pike. We relieved the 73d Illinois and next morning were relieved by the 88th Illinois. On the 28th we had company drill in the morning and in the afternoon battalion drill under Lieutenant Colonel Askew, who had recovered from the wound he had received at the battle of Stone River.

On the 29th it rained at intervals all day and there was no drill. The only orders received were to have pay rolls made out and to prepare for inspection and muster next morning. On the 30th, at morning roll call, the officers called attention to President Lincoln's proclamation setting the day apart as a day of fasting and prayer. Gleason in his diary says, "As we usually had all the fasting we thought good for us, very few, if any, observed

that part of the programme, and being without a chaplain, I fear very few prayers were offered, unless they were silent ones". We were not permitted to rest on that day, for a little after noon we were called into line and started on a march out to Salem for another tour of outpost duty. Our regiment was halted just beyond the river to await the coming up of our battery. When we reached Salem we were at once ordered out on picket. We were posted near a ruined brick house, on the right and in front of which were two Quaker guns, (cannons made of porch columns taken from the house mounted on old wagon wheels), which possibly may have made our troops a little cautious when they first occupied the country. The house evidently was only a short time before the abode of wealth and refinement and its present condition was a sharp commentary on the wickedness of those who brought on the war.¹ It made excellent quarters for our picket reserve. On the morning of May 1, some refugees came into our lines. They belonged to a party which had been fired into by our scouts, who had mistook them for rebel soldiers. Shortly after this we were relieved and marched back to our post in the reserve, where we remained until the morning of the 4th, when we were again sent out on picket duty. That day, the 4th, Ohio cavalry passed outside the picket lines and had a little fight with the enemy, bringing in three prisoners.

In the evening several scouts passed out through our portion of the picket line. The next day, the 5th, we were relieved, joined the reserve and a little later marched back to Camp Drake, where we heard reports of General Hooker's fighting at Chancellorsville, which were very encouraging.

On the 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th we remained in camp drilling and taking lessons in the school of the soldier. On the 9th we heard that General Hooker had reached his old camp after the battle of Chancellorsville.

On the 10th we went on picket duty and were posted in the usual position we had occupied recently when on such duty. The day was warm and pleasant and some of the men not on duty went fishing but caught no fish. The astounding news came that Richmond had been captured by Generals Heintzelman and Stoneman. We did not believe it at all. The papers came and stated that General Heintzelman would supercede General Hooker.

On May 11, we were relieved by the Thirty-eighth Illinois, got back to camp in good season and had dress parade in the evening. On May 12, as it was very warm, we were excused from drill in order that the men might cut brush and build arbors to

¹ Gleason's Diary.

protect themselves from the hot sun. In the afternoon we had dress parade and in the evening many of the men went swimming.

On the 13th and 14th we worked putting up arbors in front of our tents and had company and battalion drill and dress parade. On the 15th and 16th we had brigade drill under Colonel Gibson. On the 17th we were again on picket duty on the Shelbyville pike and found another brigade in our front, which was explained by the fact that the enemy had been making some demonstrations on that part of the line. On the morning of the 18th we were called up at daybreak and stood at arms. This seemed an unnecessary precaution, as there was another brigade and two other regiments between our reserve and the picket line. We were relieved by the Twenty-seventh Illinois and at once started for camp. The road was very dry and very dusty. When we got to camp we received orders to reduce our baggage and be ready for brigade drill at 6:30 the next morning. We were out on brigade drill promptly at the hour designated and were drilled over three hours. News came of the capture of Jackson, Miss., by General Grant, and as the news came through rebel sources we were inclined to believe it. On the 20th and 21st we were drilled morning and afternoon and on the 21st many of the men packed up their extra clothing to send it home. It was rumored that General Palmer's division had made an advance on the enemy to ascertain whether any of General Bragg's forces had been sent to reinforce General Johnston, whom General Grant was pressing sorely in Mississippi. On the 22nd we heard that 200 rebel prisoners had been captured that morning at Middleton. On the 23rd there was some pleasant excitement in camp over the rumor that General Johnson had said that our division was to remain as the garrison of Murfreesboro and that Willich's (our) brigade was to be mounted. Most important news was received through rebel sources saying, that General Grant had beaten Pemberton and had driven him across the Big Black River towards Vicksburg. Such news was very cheering in contrast with the last news from our army in the east.

At 8 o'clock on the morning of the 24th we were again ordered to Salem on outpost duty. It was a hot, sultry day and wagons were provided in which to haul our knapsacks. On arrival at Salem we were at once ordered out on picket duty and posted in the same position as the last time we were there. In the evening the commander of the cavalry videttes in our front, sent in word that the enemy were in some apparent force outside the lines and threatened an attack in the

morning. We took the proper precautions to give them a warm reception should they come and redoubled our vigilance during the night. There was no alarm during the night. The picket reserves were alert and in line at 4 o'clock and stood at arms until daylight, when light skirmishing took place near the village where the videttes were stationed. We were relieved of picket duty at 9 o'clock and returned to the brigade. We received good news from Vicksburg.

The most notable event of May 25, 1863, was the return to the brigade of General Willich. Gleason in his diary says:

"The meeting between him and the boys was one not soon to be forgotten. He had the men called up in front of the Colonel's tent and told us he was 'so glad to see us' he could almost take us in his arms and kiss us.' After a few remarks in his broken English, he said he had some 'teetle ding' to tell us when he got the brigade together. He then bid us good bye and rode off followed by the cheers of the men."

We were again on picket the 26th, our station being changed so we had more shade. It was near the well where we got our water. We had later news from Vicksburg and rejoiced over Grant's victories. Next morning at 5:30 a. m. we were all in line and stood at arms until daylight. At 9 o'clock we were relieved and went back to the reserve. The 27th and 28th we were a part of the reserve at Salem and on the morning of the 29th marched back to Murfreesboro to get our camp.

Some of the men in the regiment went to the brigade repair shop to see a wagon for the transportation of troops which was being constructed under the direction of General Willich—something, it was said, he had worked out while he was a prisoner of war at Libby. Each wagon was to be capable of transporting twenty men. If the wagon when finished was approved by General Rosecrans, enough of them were to be made to carry our entire brigade. The 30th and 31st days of May, 1863, were passed quietly in Camp Drake, no unusual event occurring. The notable event of the next day was the review of our brigade by Generals Rosecrans, Willich and Turchin. Colonel Gibson was still in command. We marched to a large field where we had brigade drill and gave the Generals a few samples of our movements. Colonel Gibson then formally turned over the command to General Willich to which the latter had been assigned May 21,¹ and resumed command of his regiment, the Forty-ninth Ohio.

On June 2, a vote was taken in our brigade on the ques-

¹ W. R. R. 21, part 2:349.

tion whether or not we should be mounted, and the vote was nearly unanimous in favor of it. Gleason says, "all seemed tired of marching afoot."

On the 3rd we received orders to have three days' rations in haversacks and four of bread, coffee and sugar in knapsacks. This looked very much like a forward movement.

On the 4th the right wing of the regiment was detached for picket duty and the left wing was ordered out on drill. It was in this drill that General Willich first instructed us in a new movement which he called "advance firing." This, too, he said he had thought out when he was in Libby prison. It was one of the "little dings" he had promised to show us.

The movement was quite simple, being a line of battle in four ranks, each rank advancing a few paces in front and firing, then stopping to load while the other ranks advanced alternately, thus keeping up a steady advance and a steady fire all the time. At first there was some confusion, caused by some man passing to the right instead of to the left of the man in front of him. (General Willich said, "two men must not try to go through the same hole.") After practicing a short time we had no trouble in executing the movement and all were much pleased with it. In the afternoon we heard cannonading to the front and also to the right toward Franklin. It was rumored that our army was advancing on the enemy, and that our division was to be left to garrison Murfreesboro. We learned that Davis' division had moved out on the Shelbyville pike and found the rebels in force.

June 5th and 6th we had drill, company and battalion, under the direction of Lieutenant Colonel Askew, and learned that Colonel Wallace was at home. He had obtained orders to go to Louisville to have copies of the company rolls made from the payrolls on file in the pay department there, to replace those captured near Lawrenceburg, Ky. the fall before. He had taken the Sergeant Major with him to do the clerical work, had gone to Columbus, O. and had been appointed commandant of Camp Chase. Quite a number of men of the Thirty-ninth Indiana, and some of our men, who had been captured at Stone River returned for duty. It rained the 7th, and we had no duties to perform except the regular Sunday morning inspection.

It is here noted that up to the 2nd day of February, 1863, General Rosecrans' army had been officially designated and known as the Fourteenth Army Corps. On and after that date it was designated as the Army of the Cumberland. It was divided into three separate commands, designated as the

Right Wing, commanded by General A. McDowell McCook, the Center, commanded by General George H. Thomas and the Left Wing, commanded by General Thomas L. Crittenden. The Right Wing was designated as the Twentieth Army Corps, the center was designated as the Fourteenth Army Corps, and the left wing was designated as the Twenty-first Army Corps. Our brigade was designated as the First Brigade, Second Division, Twentieth Army Corps, and was composed of the Fifteenth Ohio, the Forty-ninth Ohio, the Thirty-second Indiana, the Thirty-ninth Indiana and the Eighty-ninth Illinois.

On the 8th and 9th we had our usual drill and on the 10th were on picket duty. On the 11th, the officers of the brigade presented watches to Colonel Gibson of the Forty-ninth Ohio and Lieutenant Colonel Jones of the Thirty-ninth Indiana, both of whom had been in command of the brigade.

On the 12th we exchanged our rifled muskets for Enfield rifles. On the 13th we had brigade drill under General Willich. On the fourteenth (Sunday) we had our usual inspection. On the 15th we had battalion drill. On the 16th quite a number of men who had been captured at Stone River reported for duty. Some of them asked for a courtmartial to vindicate them of a groundless charge that they had permitted themselves to be captured. Among them were Lebew, Myers and Stauffer of Company H.¹ On the 17th the newspapers reported that Lee's army had crossed the Potomac and was moving northward, and that General Hooker was trying to head him off.

In the afternoon we had brigade drill under General Willich's direction and maneuvered to get possession of the Franklin road bridge across Stone River, which was assumed to be in possession of the enemy. One great advantage and benefit in brigade drills under General Willich was, that every movement was explained beforehand and directed to some definite purpose and object. We were to attack the enemy in some assumed position, or we were to be attacked by the enemy in front, flank, or rear, and were moved in such a manner as to meet the attack. By this method the drills were made interesting and instructive to every man in the command.

On the morning of the 17th we were ordered out on picket duty and returned to quarters next day late in the forenoon. After supper we had brigade drill. Next morning, the 19th, we had reveille at 4 o'clock, were out on brigade drill at 5 o'clock and drilled three hours. In the evening we had bat-

¹ Gleason's Diary.

talion drill under Major McClenahan. General Willich's idea was, that in order to keep his men healthy and fit they must be kept active. Idleness, he said, bred discontent and disease. There was perhaps another reason for our daily activity in brigade and battalion maneuvers, but of that further along. On the 20th we had battalion drill twice and General Willich was present to note and criticise our movements.

June 21, was Sunday, we had our usual amount of drill and the evening of the 23rd received orders to march at an early hour next morning, with two days' rations in haversacks and ten days' rations in wagons.

We had been at Murfreesboro over five months, and while we had not been idle, as an army we had accomplished nothing. We did not know that a good portion of this time the War Department and President Lincoln had been urging General Rosecrans to move against the enemy, and that he had been claiming he had not sufficient force to warrant such a movement. He pleaded for delay until he had more cavalry, he wanted more and more horses, and was so importunate that the War Department pointed out to him that since he had taken command of the army, he had been furnished over thirty thousand additional horses, and this, too, to the neglect of other points but little if any less important than his own.¹ May 1, 1863, General Meigs, quartermaster general, informed him that by his own reports he had received since December 1, 1862, 33,057 animals—7,000 per month—that on March 23, 1863, he had 19,164 horses and 23,859 mules, 43023 animals in all, or one horse or mule to every two men in his army.² He wanted a fleet of gunboats constructed to patrol the line of the Cumberland River, and appealed to President Lincoln to interfere and order them supplied, and the good President had to say to him that he could not take the matter into his own hands, "without producing inextricable confusion."³

He wanted, as importunately, repeating carbines in such quantities, that he was informed that all the factories in the country could not turn out enough to meet his demands. But in spite of what the War Department considered unreasonable demands, every energy was directed to furnishing everything needed for the complete organization and equipment of a great army, in the hope that its strength would be effectively used against the common enemy. The inaction of the Army of the Potomac, and that of the Army of the Cumberland were trying the patience of Lincoln's cabinet and Generals Halleck and

¹ Halleck to Rosecrans, W. R. R. 23, part 12-284.

² W. R. R. 23, part 2-301.

³ W. R. R. 23, part 2-58.

Meigs, but the patience of Lincoln himself, though sorely tried, was never wholly lost. He often found excuses for short-comings that others could not excuse.

When Grant commenced the successful movement on Vicksburg, and fought the series of battles which resulted in the retirement of Pemberton within its fortifications, there were grave apprehensions that the inaction of Rosecrans would result in Bragg sending a portion of his army to re-enforce General Johnston who was operating in Grant's rear. General Rosecrans was repeatedly urged to keep Bragg's army so occupied that he would not dare to detach any portion of it, but it seems little heed was paid to such appeals, and that Bragg did actually detach about 15,000 men of his army and sent them to re-enforce Johnston. Finally, President Lincoln himself felt called upon to interfere, and sent the following dispatch:

"Washington, May 28, 1863.

General Rosecrans,
Murfreesboro, Tenn.

I would not push you to any rashness, but I am very anxious that you do your utmost, short of rashness, to keep Bragg from getting off to help Johnston against Grant."¹

"A. LINCOLN."

To this message General Rosecrans replied the next day: "Dispatch received. I will attend to it." But it seems nothing was done, and on June 3, General Halleck telegraphed to General Rosecrans the pointed words: "Accounts received here indicate that Johnston is being heavily re-enforced from Bragg's army. If you cannot hurt the enemy now, he will soon hurt you."²

There was still no serious movement against Bragg's army, and on the 8th day of June, General Rosecrans addressed the following confidential communication to Generals Brannan, Crittenden, Davis, Granger, McCook, Mitchell, Negley, Palmer, Reynolds, Rousseau, Sheridan, Stanley, Thomas, Turchin, Van Cleve and Wood—all his corps and division commanders,³ desiring an answer that night:

Head Quarters, Army of the Cumberland
Murfreesboro, Tenn.

(Confidential)

June 8, 1863.

General: In view of our present military position, the general commanding desires you to answer, in writing, according to the best of your judgment the following questions, giving your reasons therefor:

1. From the fullest information in your possession do you think the enemy in front of us has been so materially weakened by detach-

¹ W. R. R., 23, part 2-369.

² W. R. R. 23, part 2-383.

³ W. R. R. 23, part 2-394.

ments to Johnston, or elsewhere, that this army could advance on him at this time, with strong reasonable chances of fighting a great and successful battle?

2. Do you think an advance of our army at present likely to prevent additional reinforcements being sent against General Grant by the enemy in our front?

3. Do you think an immediate or early advance advisable?

W. S. ROSECRANS,
Major General Commanding.

All the generals above named made answer by letter to the foregoing questions.

On the 12th of June General Garfield, chief of staff, in a remarkable letter addressed to General Rosecrans, analyzed these letters and stated his finding therefrom as follows:

To the question, whether the enemy in our front had been materially weakened by detachments sent to General Johnston or elsewhere, six answered that he had, and eleven that he had not.

To the question, could our army advance against the enemy with strong reasonable chances of fighting a great and successful battle, two answered yes and eleven no.

To the question whether an advance on our part was likely to prevent additional re-enforcements being sent against General Grant four answered yes and ten answered no.

To the question whether an immediate advance was advisable, fifteen answered no. Not one was in favor of it.

To the question whether an early advance was advisable two answered no and not one favored it.¹

This result is another confirmation of the military maxim that, "Councils of War never fight."

General Garfield then took up the questions himself and submitted an estimate of the strength of Bragg's army, showing conclusively that it did not exceed, including all arms of the service over 41,680 men and 20 batteries of artillery. He then showed from our own official returns that, after leaving full forces to garrison Murfreesboro and all important posts in our rear, we could throw against Bragg's army 67,137 bayonets and sabers, not counting officers and excluding about 40 batteries of artillery, probably double the number the enemy had.

He then submitted the following considerations:

1. Bragg's army was weaker than it had been since the battle of Stone River or was likely to be again for the present, while our army had reached its maximum strength:

2. That whatever might be the result at Vicksburg, the determination of its fate would give large reinforcements

¹ W. R. R. 23, part 421.

to General Bragg. If Grant's army was successful it would take many weeks for it to recover from the shock and strain of its late severe campaign, while Johnston would send back to Bragg a force sufficient to insure the safety of Tennessee.

3. If Grant failed the same result would inevitably follow. He then added, "No man can affirm with certainty the result of any battle, however great the disparity of numbers. Such results are in the hands of God. But viewing the question in the light of human calculation, I refuse to entertain a doubt that this army, which in January last defeated Bragg's superior numbers cannot overwhelm his greatly inferior force.

4. A retreat (on the part of Bragg) would greatly increase the desire and opportunity (on the part of his men) for desertion, and would very materially reduce his physical and moral strength. While it would lengthen our communications it would give us possession of McMinnville, and enable us to threaten East Tennessee and Chattanooga, and it would not be unreasonable to expect an early occupation of the former place.

5. But the chances are more than ever that a sudden and rapid movement would compel a general engagement, and the defeat of Bragg would be in the highest degree disastrous to the rebellion.

6. The turbulent aspect of politics in the loyal states renders a decisive blow against the enemy at this time of the highest importance to the success of the government at the polls, and in the enforcement of the conscription act.

7. The government and the War Department believe that this army ought to move upon the enemy; the army desires it, and the country is anxiously hoping for it.

8. Our true objective point is the rebel army, whose last reserves are substantially in the field, and an effective blow will crush the shell, and soon be followed by the collapse of the rebel government.

9. You have in my judgment wisely delayed a general movement hitherto, till your army could be massed and your cavalry could be mounted. Your mobile force can now be concentrated in twenty-four hours, and your cavalry, if not equal in numerical strength to that of the enemy, is greatly superior in efficiency and *morale*.

For these considerations I believe an immediate advance of all our available forces is advisable, and under the providence of God will be successful."

In this communication General Garfield fairly and completely met and disposed of every objection made by the corps and division commanders to an immediate advance. Why it was not at once made will perhaps always remain an unsolved problem. But knowing now the conditions then existing in the two armies, there is little reason to doubt that, if the advance had been made as General Garfield had recommended, the days of the rebellion would have been shortened and there would have been no fateful battle of Chickamauga, no battles of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge and perhaps no Atlanta Campaign, with its terrible one hundred days of continued battle and waste of human life.

General Bragg had sent large reinforcements to General Johnston and at that time had not been reinforced by General Buckner's force of two batteries and near three thousand infantry, which had been ordered to his support June 24, the day our advance was ordered.

He could have been attacked and overwhelmed in his chosen position if General Garfield's advice had been at once followed, and the army had moved energetically forward. The weather from the 12th to the 24th of June and indeed for the period from the first to the 24th was ideal. Little rain had fallen, the roads were in fine condition and the movement which was afterwards made failed because of rain and bad roads. With good weather and good roads our army would have reached Tullahoma before Bragg's, and thus would have compelled a battle which doubtless would have resulted in Bragg's defeat.

Why the advance was so long delayed, and why it was begun at the time are not easy of explanation. There was urgent entreaty from the War Department, which had its influence, but perhaps one of the determining factors in deciding to advance was, that on the 19th General Burnside sent General Rosecrans a dispatch saying he proposed to send the principal part of Carter's division, with three East Tennessee regiments, to the neighborhood of Knoxville, to hold that part of the country between the Clinch and Holston Rivers,¹ and a day or two later General Burnside reported great activity on the part of our forces, which had gone to within fourteen miles of Knoxville, had burned three important bridges, captured three pieces of artillery, 1000 stand of small arms and over 500 prisoners.²

1 W. R. R. 23, part 2-438.

2 W. R. R. 23, part 1-385.

CHAPTER XV.

THE TULLAHOMA CAMPAIGN, BATTLE OF LIBERTY GAP—ANOTHER LONG PERIOD OF INACTIVITY AND THE MARCH TO THE TENNESSEE RIVER.

On the morning of the 24th of June, 1863, the drums sounded the reveille at 3 o'clock and we soon received orders to march at 5 o'clock. It was a rainy morning. Reaching the West Fork we halted to allow Sheridan's division to pass to our front. We then followed it until we reached the first range of hills, when we turned to the left, striking one of our old foraging roads, which we followed to the next range of hills. There the Thirty-ninth Indiana (now mounted) captured a rebel outpost and our brigade formed line of battle, the Fifteenth Ohio on the right of the road and the Forty-ninth Ohio on its left.

Several companies were deployed as skirmishers and found the enemy in a strong position in front of what is called Liberty Gap. A field piece was brought forward and after several rounds were fired toward the enemy, our line advanced but met strong opposition. Little headway was made until movements were directed on the enemy's flanks, when they gave way. Lieutenant Smiley was brought back mortally wounded in the abdomen and Captain Danford was slightly wounded. Four men were reported killed and several wounded. The rebels lost heavily before they got out of range of our guns. We pursued them a mile through the Gap, until we came to Liberty Church, where we bivouaced for the night. A reserve brigade passed us and established a line of pickets in a good position after a lively skirmish.

On the morning of June 25, we were awakened at 3 o'clock and stood at arms until daylight. It was still cloudy and raining. As soon as we could get our breakfasts we moved out to the front, where picket firing had already begun. Moving up one-half mile, we turned to the left into an orchard where, after a reconnoissance, we advanced to a hillside in support of the picket line on the left. The rain was falling steadily. In front of our position lay a dead rebel who had probably been killed the evening before. Desultory firing was going on in front all morning. In the afternoon the Thirty-ninth Indiana made an attack, assisted by the artillery. We moved forward in support of the Thirty-second Indiana, the regiment, except the color companies, being deployed. When

the companies engaged were nearly out of ammunition, Company H was ordered forward and two men were slightly wounded (Scott and Johnson). After some severe fighting the rebels were driven back, not, however, without heavy loss on our left, which being more in the open fields, was more exposed. The men on the left also ran out of ammunition. We were relieved in the evening and bivouaced near the position we had held that morning. The foregoing account of this engagement is taken from Gleason's diary.

Lieutenant Colonel Askew, in his official report of the engagement, says:

"When we arrived in the vicinity of the Gap, on the morning of the 24th instant, the Fifteenth Ohio Regiment, being in advance of the column, Companies A and B, by order of the General (General Willich), were deployed as skirmishers on the right of the road, the left of Company B resting on the road, Company A supported by Company F in reserve, and Company B by Company G. Company D was afterward, by orders of the General, deployed to protect our right flank. We had moved forward but a short distance when our skirmishers encountered the pickets of the enemy and drove them back on to the brow of the hill on the right of the Gap, where they met reserves, protected by a dense forest which crowned the hill and extended some distance down to a fence, having before them and between us and them open fields for the distance of 600 or 700 yards. The position was a very strong one, as the face of the hill, on the summit of which the enemy was posted, was very steep and rocky and was of a convex shape, the convexity toward us, so that their line being extended around the brow of the hill, they had the protection of the woods and fence and their flank was perfectly protected. Our skirmishers were halted, and I was ordered by our General to extend our line to the right and see if we could find the left flank of the enemy, in pursuance of which Company D, which had been on the left flank, was swung around into the line on the right of Company A. Company I deployed on the right of Company D, Company E on the right of Company I, and Company K in rear of the right of the line in reserve. After making this disposition, we moved forward a short distance and found that the enemy's left extended farther than our right, and that they were posted with all the advantages of their strong position. I sent information of this to the General, when the Twenty-ninth Indiana was sent to be deployed on our right flank, their line extending perpendicularly to the rear. We had to wait until

they had swung around into line with us. In the meantime, the left of our line had swung around and under a galling fire had gained the fence and the edge of the woods. Company B losing in this two men killed and five wounded. Lieutenant Smiley of Company A, received a mortal wound, and five men of his company were wounded, one man in Company I and one in Company D was killed. When the Twenty-ninth Indiana had got into position on our right the supporting companies were deployed into line, and the whole line moved forward across the open field and up the steep face of the hill at a double-quick pace, the enemy fleeing before them, Companies E and K capturing two of the enemy. After reaching the top of the hill, we moved forward some distance past Liberty Church, but did not again encounter the enemy. We were relieved by the Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania."

"In the affair of the 25th instant, the next day the Fifteenth Ohio was in reserve to the Thirty-second Indiana, which was on picket duty. About 3 o'clock P. M. Lieutenant Blume of the General's staff informed me that the enemy had driven in the sentinels of the Thirty-second Indiana, and was then pushing forward on to the line. I immediately deployed the battalion as skirmishers, and moved forward to the line of the Thirty-second Indiana, which extended across the valley through which the road runs, through a wheat field, on the side of the hill on the right of the road, and into the woods on the top of the hill. We opened fire on the enemy, who were posted opposite our left on the hill across the valley and along a fence around a cornfield, and about a house in the valley near the road. We had a good position, and our men were mostly under cover, so that the enemy did us little damage on the left of our line, although they kept up a brisk fire from their line, from a battery posted on a hill, a short distance in rear of their line, and from a mountain howitzer posted on the road near a house in our front. The right of our line, Companies A, F, D and H which were in the woods on the top of the hill, together with that part of the Thirty-second Indiana and Eighty-ninth Illinois, which were on picket duty there, encountered a very spirited attack of the enemy, who, I have no doubt, designed to drive us from the summit of the hill which, in their position, would have made our whole line untenable, and compelled us to fall back. They were gallantly met and repulsed, and driven from the hill across the valley to the hill beyond. Company F suffered severely in this affair, losing two men killed and eight wounded. Company A lost one man killed and one wounded.

"We held this position after the Thirty-second Indiana and all but one company of the Eighty-ninth Illinois had been relieved and withdrawn to replenish their cartridge boxes. This part of our line was not relieved when the rest was, and I deemed the position so important that I did not withdraw those four companies until after nightfall, and after I had informed an officer of one of General Davis' regiments which had relieved the Eighty-ninth Illinois, still further on our right, of the importance of the position; that we were out of ammunition, and that the rest of the brigade had been relieved and moved off. We then quietly withdrew and joined the brigade."

"I have but to add that the conduct of the officers and men was gallant and soldierly and I think the general (General Willich) may flatter himself that his unwearied exertions in drilling and disciplining his brigade, were on these days to some extent rewarded."

General Willich made a characteristic official report of the two days' engagement.

He says: "At 2 p. m., on the 25th, the enemy advanced with strong skirmish lines, which were driven back. He repeated his attack, bringing up lines of battle, even columns, and planting one battery in front of our left and two small pieces in the center, but was not able to break our picket line which was reinforced by our support companies, who charged repeatedly against the forward pressing lines of the enemy, and drove him as often as he advanced.

"About 3 o'clock the ammunition of the Thirty-second Indiana volunteers and the Eighty-ninth Illinois volunteers began to give out, then the Fifteenth Ohio volunteers was ordered to advance to their support in the front line. The men of the Fifteenth Ohio volunteers divided their ammunition with those of the Thirty-second Indiana volunteers and the Eighty-ninth Illinois volunteers. This, with the ammunition taken from the wounded and killed, enabled these three regiments to resist the repeated desperate efforts of the enemy. At this time the Fifteenth Ohio volunteers advanced. I sent a report to General Johnson that the fight was becoming serious, and ordered Colonel Gibson with the Forty-ninth Ohio volunteers forward as a reserve behind the center of my lines, and planted the battery of Captain Goodspeed on a hill about 100 feet high, and somewhat to the rear of our lines from where it opened fire against the enemy's batteries and some buildings occupied by the enemy's infantry. The battery being compelled to fire over our lines, I cautioned the

officers to take sufficient elevation, and though the skill of our present artillery officers (among them Captain Simonton, Chief of Artillery of the Second Division) is generally known and acknowledged, some of the shells fell into our own lines. This deficiency is not the fault of the officers, or of the men, or of the splendid pieces we were supplied with, but has its cause in the Ordnance Department, which does not make it impossible that a neglect in the fabrication of the cartridges still exists, which had already been discovered at the beginning of the war, but appears not as yet, to be corrected. The powder used for the cartridges is of different quality, so much so, that the best officers, with the most superior arms, and served by the most skillful men, can never become certain of the exact range of their guns. Notwithstanding this, the battery rendered efficient service."

One smiles at this amusingly worded and elaborate apology for the dropping among us of a few shells from our own battery.

General Willich describes in glowing terms the movement of the Forty-ninth Ohio through the open woods under the command "Advance firing." It was one of the movements he had worked out when in Libby Prison, and he took particular pride in it. He says: "The regiment formed in four ranks. The first rank delivered a volley, then the fourth, third and second in succession took the front and delivered their fire, but already to the third volley the enemy did not answer. He had precipitately left his position."

After describing the various movements of the two days' engagement, he says:

"To name those who distinguished themselves I would merely be obliged to copy the muster rolls of the brigade. It is certain that some officers and men were placed in more trying positions, and had therefore better occasion to prove their metal than others. Throughout both days' fight the regimental Commanders—Colonels Gibson and Hotchkiss, Lieutenant Colonel Askew and Major Glass—had their commands under perfect control, to which all other good qualities expected from accomplished and experienced officers becomes serviceable. In their efforts they were well supported by their officers and men, who far above the mere martial courage which rushes headlong at the enemy, maneuvered under the heaviest fire as if on the parade ground, obeyed and executed every order without regard to danger, and so kept up a unity of order and action which alone can make courage successful. The advance of the Forty-ninth

Ohio volunteers and the two companies of the Thirty-second Indiana volunteers and later of the Fifteenth Ohio on the right, which was made in double-quick up a steep hill and over open ground against a concealed and brave enemy, was heroic. The fight of the picket line of the Thirty-second Indiana and Eighty-ninth Illinois on the second day against the whole of Cleburne's division, was continued for hours, after having been harassed during the whole forenoon. The successful charges of single companies will find few equals in the history of war. The prompt advance and solid fighting of the Fifteenth Ohio volunteers and the splendid and irresistible charge of the Forty-ninth Ohio volunteers are military deeds worthy to be registered in the annals of the Nation. The battery came not under close fire, but the men served their pieces so well that they gave the conviction they would do the same under cannister range. Cheering, the men went into the fight; cheering, they held their position partly, even without ammunition; cheering, they replenished their cartridge boxes, and formed, ready for a new battle. The highest ambition of a commander must be satisfied by being associated with such men, who through patriotism and love for the free institutions of their country, have attained a degree of efficiency which professional soldiers very seldom ever reach. Instances—as when a man wounded in two places returns to the front after having his wounds dressed, and another, standing, without a round, behind a tree, near two of his dead comrades, and keeping his position till he can get some cartridges and opened fire again—are anything but uncommon."

Probably no one in the Fifteenth Ohio or in either of the other regiments of General Willich's brigade at the time saw or read the foregoing official report. How the hearts of the men who fought at Liberty Gap would have swelled with pride if they could have done so, and how the hearts of those now living will warm towards their beloved brigade commander, when they now read his words of praise for their valor.

It was no new volunteer officer, with only a few months military experience, who thus praised them, but one who had led armies and fought battles on another continent, where war was a trade.

The men of the brigade, and especially those of the Fifteenth Ohio, knew they had performed notable and exceptionally gallant service at Liberty Gap, and every one who was there on the 24th and 25th of June, 1863, remembers with

pride their achievements. They have reason for just pride in the battle of Liberty Gap.

They have always regarded it as a *battle* because of its severity. General Johnson, in his report of it, says: "The affair at Liberty Gap will always be considered a skirmish, but few skirmishes ever equalled it in severity."¹

While the movements of the Fifteenth Ohio were not so dramatic or conspicuous as those of other regiments of the brigade they did the heaviest fighting and suffered the heaviest losses. The five regiments of the brigade lost in killed and wounded five officers and ninety men. The Fifteenth Ohio lost in killed and wounded two officers and thirty men, more than one-third of the casualties in the entire brigade.²

The enemy's loss in these engagements was 120 officers and men killed, wounded and captured.³

The following are the names of the killed and wounded in our regiment at Liberty Gap, so far as they can be learned from the imperfectly printed rosters of Ohio regiments.

COMPANY A.

KILLED.—Lieutenant Andrew E. Smiley and William J. Permar.

WOUNDED.—Sergeant Joseph McKinney, James W. Paxton, Frank L. Schreiber, John G. Decker, John A. McKinney and John S. McKinney.

COMPANY B.

KILLED.—William H. McFarland and William R. Kirkwood.

WOUNDED.—Sergeant John A. Green, Milton McDowell, Franklin Cowgill, William A. Stewart, William Johnson and John Frazier. The latter died as the result of his wounds July 23, 1863.

COMPANY D.

KILLED.—James Fowler.

WOUNDED.—Butler Ramey.

COMPANY E.

WOUNDED.—Captain Lorenzo Danford.

COMPANY F.

KILLED.—William Barnett, George Davis and George Richeson.

WOUNDED.—Lafayette Hess, John Diday, B. F. Richeson,

¹ W. R. R. 23, part 1-485.

² W. R. R., 23, part 1-422.

³ W. R. R., 23, part 1-592.

James E. Ramage and Christopher Taylor. Ramage died of his wounds June 28, 1863 and Taylor September 14, 1863.

COMPANY H.

WOUNDED.—Pelham C. Johnson, Philip Beamer and Luke W. Scott.

On June 26 at daybreak we got a supply of ammunition and after breakfast, as it looked like rain, we put up our shelter tents. Some sharp firing was heard on our left, but we were left undisturbed until evening, when we were ordered out on picket. We had just got fairly posted when orders came to be ready to move at sunset. We moved at dark, and left large fires burning, we supposed, to mislead the enemy. We marched back through the Gap about three miles. It was intensely dark, the roads were deep, and when we halted and bivouaced for the night we were covered with mud from head to foot. We lay down in our wet clothing and tried to sleep. At daylight on the 27th, the adjutant gave warning to be ready to march in half an hour. Our course was over intricate by-roads, made very muddy by the recent continuous rains, and the marching was unusually toilsome. Finally, we came to the Manchester pike where we rested for awhile. When we resumed our march it was on a road which led through Glover's Gap, a strong position which General Thomas had taken from the enemy. After a tedious further march we came up with the rest of our division and bivouaced in a nice little cove. There our trains came up and some of us got a change of clothing. General Thomas was said to be far in advance, and we heard cannonading to the left and in our front. Although, as before stated, General Thomas was said to be far in our front, on the morning of the 28th, we were awakened at 3 o'clock and stood to arms until daylight. We received orders to march at 7 o'clock. We drew two days' rations and fired off our guns and cleaned them. The brigade call sounded while some of the men were yet cleaning their guns.

Our regiment led the advance of the brigade but halted opposite a house where General McCook had his headquarters, to allow the trains and other troops to pass. So, after all, it appeared that we were to act as rear guard. After General McCook and staff had moved off, some of the men captured a hive of bees somewhere about the premises and we had a feast of honey. We were detained here several hours. Resuming our march we passed through Beech Grove, where another halt occurred. After a number of such halts we reached Hoover's Gap, where we made coffee, and a mile

further on went into bivouac. It was after dark but we were not permitted to remain there, and resumed our muddy, sloppy march in the darkness, which, however, was slightly relieved by the light of the moon. We marched on through mud and darkness over a road so intricate that at one time we lost it. Some places were almost impassable. To add to our discomfort a heavy thunderstorm came up and drenched us to the skin and made the mud still deeper and the road more slippery. Many men fell out from sheer exhaustion. We finally reached and crossed Duck River within one-half mile of Manchester, and after some confusion, which came near scattering the regiment, were halted and went into bivouac just as day was breaking, and slept until 7 o'clock. That morning, the 29th, there were various rumors as to the whereabouts of the enemy, and it was the general belief that we were to push on immediately for Chattanooga and try to get there in advance of Bragg's army.

Orders were issued to send all knapsacks and unnecessary baggage back with the supply train. The wagons were reduced to only five for each regiment. It rained heavily at times during the day and we could not get dry. Towards evening we were reduced to half rations of crackers.

Near our camp were several large mills and factories, the power being furnished by the falls in the river, which were an interesting sight, and furnished excellent bathing facilities for the men. In the angle formed by Duck River and a stream which flows into it near the bridge which there crossed them, were some old fortifications, said to have been thrown up by De Soto for protection against the Indians.¹

We lay in bivouac at Manchester all day June 30. The day was warm and rainy. We had brigade inspection at 9 o'clock. There was a report that our forces had occupied Tullahoma, but this was later denied and it was said we would have a hard battle there. In the evening orders were issued for picks and shovels to be carried by the men when we again moved.

July 1, at 11 o'clock we marched for Tullahoma. The heat was oppressive and there were several cases of sunstroke in the brigade. The road was very bad and the marching very difficult. After a march of two miles we were halted for a little rest. While here an officer came riding back and announced the evacuation of Tullahoma and its occupation by our forces. It was said the Thirty-ninth Indiana, mounted infantry of our brigade, was the first to enter the place. We

1 Gleason's Diary.

moved on two or three miles further and turned off the road into a large plantation, supposing we would remain there over night. But after we had our suppers we moved on. We found more bad roads and swollen streams to cross, and made slow progress. We were still several miles from Tullahoma when night came on, but the moonlight helped us to avoid some of the mud-holes. We reached Tullahoma at 11 o'clock, and encamped on the west side of the town across the railroad.

Next morning we saw some quite extensive fortifications which the enemy had built, and which would have cost us many lives to have taken by direct attack. We heard no reveille and were allowed to lie in our bivouac later than usual. Soon after we were up, the colonel came around and cautioned us not to leave camp. The company commanders were ordered to have four roll calls during the day.

A fine spring near the town furnished us with excellent water for drinking and cooking and a stream nearby afforded us good opportunities for bathing and washing our clothes. During the day our camp was moved to a place about one-fourth mile southwest of the town. The ground was higher than that we had before occupied, but it was covered with undergrowth and offal from an abandoned rebel camp, and the stumps were so numerous, we could scarcely find places for our shelter tents. The enemy had left a number of tents in their hasty retreat and some of our men got some of them and had them pitched before night. At midnight we were roused from sleep by the adjutant, and were ordered out to aid the supply train on the Manchester road. We took only our guns, haversacks and canteens, but the cooks went with us carrying their coffee kettles so we could have our breakfast wherever we might be. In the darkness we took the wrong road, but after a long march found our way back to the right one. At daylight, learning that the train was parked a short distance ahead of us, we halted, prepared our breakfasts and had time for a short nap before the train came up. When a portion of it had arrived, our left wing under command of Major McClenahan went forward with it as guard. Just then a violent thunderstorm came up and the rain drenched us thoroughly. It also made the roads much worse, and we had hard work getting the wagons through. On the way the boys did some private foraging and brought in pigs and chickens. That evening a dispatch was received at brigade headquarters indicating that our troops

were successful at Vicksburg, and that a great battle was in progress in Eastern Pennsylvania.

On the morning of July 4, 1863, we were still at Tullahoma. No reveille sounded and we were permitted to sleep until late. When we got astir we policed our streets and tried to make them cozy and comfortable. Just before noon we received notice that a national salute would be fired by Goodspeed's Battery at 12 o'clock and that the men would be expected to cheer. The salute was fired as ordered, but not a cheer was heard—probably because there seemed to be no one to start it. After that a ration of whisky was issued. Gleason in his diary suggests that perhaps this was done to arouse the patriotism of the men who failed to cheer when the salute was fired. Some firing was heard in our front, and many prisoners were brought in. It was said the woods were full of them.

Sunday, July 5, the regular inspection was not required, and we moved our camp to a better location. General Willich came into our camp and told us good news from Gettysburg which brought the cheers which had been held back on the glorious Fourth. Orders came to go on picket next day. The morning of the 6th we started at 3:30 o'clock to relieve the pickets covering a portion of our front. There was great rejoicing in camp over the confirmation of the news of Lee's defeat at Gettysburg.

July 7, we were relieved from picket duty quite early and marched back to camp for breakfast. General Willich called the brigade together and in his broken but forcible English told us of the capture of Vicksburg and of the retreat of Lee's army from Gettysburg. General Rosecrans announced the news officially, cannon were fired and there was great rejoicing. But neither the official announcement by General Rosecrans, nor the firing of the cannon, created the enthusiasm which followed the story told to us in his quaint way by our dear old brigade commander, General Willich.

Young as the most of us were, we appreciated in a general way that the capture of Vicksburg permitted the "father of waters to again go unvexed to the sea" and cleft the Confederacy in twain, and that the defeat of Lee at Gettysburg rendered it possible to destroy his army, if he was vigorously pursued, before he could get back to the defenses of Richmond. These results, accomplished and hoped for, made it seem to some of us that our days of trial might soon be over. We did not know what months of weary marching and stubborn fighting were before us. If the curtain had been lifted

and we could have seen Chickamauga, Missionary Ridge, Lookout Mountain, the terrible winter at Strawberry Plains, the hundred battles and skirmishes of the Atlanta campaign, the battles of Spring Hill, Franklin and Nashville, and the terrible toll of life and blood and tears and suffering they would demand, the stoutest hearts among us would have quailed and shrank back in horror. The future was wisely hidden from us and we went forward obedient to the call of duty.

We remained at Tullahoma until Sunday, August 16, 1863, and during that time were engaged in the daily routine of drill, inspection, forage and picket duty. General Bragg had got off with his entire army and trains and had crossed the Tennessee River on the 11th of July. General Sheridan's division, or a portion of it, after some delay occupied Bridgeport, and his pickets patrolled the north bank of the river. So, while we lay at Tullahoma no enemy menaced our peace and we went our daily round undisturbed.

The movement which resulted in the enemy's giving up his strongly fortified positions at Shelbyville and Tullahoma was a brilliant one. General Rosecrans' general plan was to threaten the enemy's right, advance a portion of his troops to hold him at Shelbyville, and then turn his right by concentration of McCook's and Thomas' Corps at Manchester. From Manchester to Tullahoma was only twelve miles, while the distance between Shelbyville and Tullahoma was near twenty miles. If the concentration at Manchester had been more prompt, and the movement had been pressed with a little more vigor and with less disposition to augment the enemy's numbers as compared with our own, we would have been concentrated at or near Manchester on the 26th and could have advanced on Tullahoma and taken it before Bragg could have reached it. We have already shown or tried to show that if the movement had been begun when General Garfield urged it, we would have had good weather and good roads and that the movement would have been successful.

This would have forced him to give battle in the open and, with our superior numbers, we could easily have beaten him and perhaps destroyed his army.

But the roads were difficult; it rained constantly, and we were encumbered by too much transportation and unnecessary baggage, which should have been left behind. With these encumbrances our movements were constantly impeded and the concentration at Manchester was delayed until the 27th. By that time Bragg had discovered our real intentions,

had suddenly abandoned his position at Shelbyville and withdrawn his army to Tullahoma.

Why we remained so long at Tullahoma we did not then know, and we did not know that, as at Murfreesboro, General Rosecrans, during our long stay there, was being constantly urged by the War Department at Washington to press forward. We now know that he was delaying any forward movement until the railroad bridges between Nashville and Bridgeport could be thoroughly repaired. This road he considered of vital importance in supplying his army from its secondary base at Nashville. General Sheridan, in his memoirs, says: "General Rosecrans though strongly urged from Washington to continue on, resisted the pressure" until he could repair this road.

By the 16th of August the road was said to be thoroughly repaired and on that day we broke our camp at Tullahoma, called Camp Read, and at 5 o'clock P. M. took the road leading south toward Elk River. Owing to the rain the road was in very bad condition and our progress was slow. Our brigade was in the rear of the column, and we were held back by trains which were frequently stalled in the mud. Night came on and we were still floundering along a dark trail in the woods, with no sign of civilization until we came to a valley. There we found a better country and better roads. After following the valley for several miles we again ascended the hills and midnight found us still floundering along in the mud. We reached Elk River about 2 o'clock a. m. the 17th, and there stacked arms, threw ourselves on the ground and slept until daylight. We resumed our march at 6 o'clock, taking a southwesterly road toward Winchester, which we reached at 10 o'clock, and passed through it without halting. From the village we took a road leading west, marched about three and one-half miles, and then halted for the night. Near our camp we found plenty of good ripe peaches and green corn and helped ourselves liberally. Next morning, the 18th, we resumed our march at 4 o'clock, our brigade being in the advance. After a five-mile march we came to the village of Salem, Tennessee. There we turned to the left, leaving the Huntsville road. After a march of near four miles we came to the mountains where we made a short halt by a large spring which gushed out from a ledge of rocks. Here two of our Sergeants, George M. Everett of Company G, and Frank H. Riggs of Company I, received commissions as captains in the First Regiment United States Colored Troops, and left us. We resumed our march in a short time, winding

through a gap in the mountains and frequently crossing a stream, until night came, when we encamped at a spot where we had good bathing facilities and found plenty of green corn. Our march next day, the 19th, was through the mountains. We were the rear brigade of the column, and were delayed by the wagon train. At our frequent halts, however, we found abundance of ripe peaches, which enabled us to put in the time agreeably. We halted for dinner where the road divided, one branch going over and the other around the mountain. There was a large cornfield and a large peach orchard nearby from which we helped ourselves liberally.

When we resumed our march we took the road over the mountain, and after a hot and dusty march reached a place near its foot where we encamped for the night. Company H was sent out to picket the mountain side. Some private foragers went out and soon returned with a supply of chickens, potatoes and honey, which they had bought and paid for in counterfeit Confederate money.¹

The next day we only moved about a mile and then halted, while the other brigades and trains ascended the mountains. While waiting for orders, the orderly sergeants made out reports showing the number of men present for duty in each company. On the 21st we were ordered to march at 4:15 in the morning. We marched to the foot of the mountain and there waited until the trains got ready to make the ascent. We were divided into squads of fourteen men each, and each squad was assigned to a wagon. The mountain road was quite steep and rocky and the ascent was very laborious. The wagons were subjected to a severe strain, as well as the horses and men, who pulled and pushed them over the steep places. The cooks had been sent forward and when we reached the summit, we found coffee already made. We had barely time to enjoy it when we were ordered forward. We moved along a mountain road which we were told would lead us to Bellefonte, Ala. The road was good and we made good progress. We halted for the night, as we supposed, at a log church on the mountain, but finding little or no water, we moved back about a mile where water was abundant, and there bivouaced for the night. Near our bivouac was the home of a Union man, who, with his two sons, was in our army. The sons were at home on a furlough. Several bushwackers were captured that day, some of them were identified by the Union mountaineers. Rations of whisky were issued to the men.²

¹ and ² Gleason's Diary.

The next day, August 21, we marched at 5:30 A. M. The roads were good, there was little dust and we made good time. We passed several groups of Union people by the roadside, who manifested much joy at again seeing the old flag. We descended the mountain, which was quite steep, so steep, in fact, that we went almost at a double-quick, the six miles down to its foot. We afterwards crossed over quite a high foothill, followed it quite a distance and halted for an hour near a large spring. During the halt some of the men found some green corn and peaches in the neighborhood. The rest of the march it was very warm and we made frequent halts. We reached Bellefonte at 2 p. m., having marched sixteen miles. We encamped in a shady, grassy, bottom, near a good spring. We found that the Second Brigade of our division had arrived here at 3 o'clock P. M. the previous day.

Our arrival at Bellefonte completed the first stage of the movement of General Rosecrans' army, which had for its objective, as stated by him in his official report,¹ the capture of Chattanooga. The movement began, as stated in this report, on the 16th day of August.² General Crittenden's Twenty-first Corps was to move in three columns—General Wood's division from Hillsboro by Pelham to Therman in Sequatchie Valley; General Palmer's division from Manchester by the most practical route to Dunlap; General Van Cleve's division, with two brigades from McMinnville (the Third Brigade to be left at that place as a garrison) to Pikeville at the head of the Sequatchie Valley—Colonel Minty's cavalry to move on the left of Sparta, driving back Dibrell's rebel cavalry toward Kingston and then, covering the left flank of Van Cleve's division, to proceed also to Pikeville.

General Thomas' Fourteenth Corps was to move as follows: General Reynolds' division from University by way of Battle Creek, to take post near its mouth; General Brannan's division to follow him; General Negley's division to go by Tantallon and halt on Crow Creek between Anderson and Stevenson; General Baird's division to follow him and encamp near Anderson.

General McCook's Twentieth Corps was to move as follows: General Johnson's (our) division to move by Salem and Larkin's Fork to Bellefonte; General Davis' division by Mount Top and Crow Creek to near Stevenson—General Sheridan's division was already at Stevenson and Bridgeport.

On his arrival in the Sequatchie Valley General Crittenden was directed to send a brigade to reconnoiter the Ten-

¹ W. R. R., 50-47.

² W. R. R., 50-50.

nessee near Harrison's Landing and take post at Poe's Cross Roads. Colonel Minty was to reconnoiter from Washington down, and take post at Smith's Cross Roads, and Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry was to reconnoiter from Harrison's Landing to Chattanooga, and was to be supported by a brigade of infantry, which General Crittenden was to send from Therman to the foot of the eastern slope of Walden's Ridge in front of Chattanooga.¹

The three brigades of cavalry were to move by Fayetteville and Athens to cover the line of the Tennessee from Whitesburg up.¹ These movements, General Rosecrans says in the official report above quoted from, were completed by the evening of August 20. It will be noticed that our brigade did not reach Bellefonte until the afternoon of the 22nd,² but it is probable that the head of our division reached this point on the evening of the 20th as stated. This movement General Rosecrans states took his army over the first great barrier between it and the objective point, and placed it opposite the enemy on the banks of the Tennessee.³

1 General Rosecrans' Report, W. R. R., 50-50-51.

2 Gleason's Diary.

3 W. R. R., 50-51.



CHAPTER XVI.

THE CAMPAIGN AND BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

We lay in camp at Bellefonte until August 30. Our camp at Belle Fonte was named "Camp Von Trebor," in honor of Colonel Von Trebor of the Thirty-second Indiana. It was very hot, and when not engaged in picket duty and the ordinary police duties of camp, the men lay in the shade and amused themselves in various ways. On one or two evenings the singers in the regiment, Major McClenahan, Andrew J. Gleason, Lieutenant Geiger, Wilson Iler, the bugler, and others, got together and sang the songs, which were popular, at that time: "When this Cruel War Is Over," and "A Response By a Soldier," and selections from the "New York Glee and Chorus Book." One evening some of the Forty-ninth Ohio singers come over and Wilson Iler, the bugler, got together a quartette who sang, "Come Where My Love Lies Dreaming."¹

When the night came down it was pleasant to hear these old songs, sung as they were by voices of men whose hearts, for the moment, were away back in their northern homes, and the music as it rose and swelled, carried other hearts far away to loved ones who were doubtless waiting anxiously for news of the next battle.

On the 30th we marched to Stevenson, Ala., and went into camp near the place where we had encamped from July 10 to 17 the previous year. The old camp was re-visited and was found to be almost as we had left it more than a year before.

The next morning, the 31st, we took up our march southward, but owing to a blockade of wagon trains did not reach the pontoon bridge across the Tennessee, only a mile and a half distant, until 10 o'clock. After crossing the long bridge we marched about half a mile and halted in the woods near a large cornfield which we patronized liberally. We got notice that we were likely to remain here a few days, so the boys pitched their tents and began cleaning up generally.

The morning of September 1, we had reveille and roll call and then busied ourselves about camp. Orders came to turn over all teams except three to a regiment, and limiting officers' baggage to eighty pounds each. We were also required to turn over all tents except shelter tents.

¹ Gleason's Diary.

September 2, we marched at 8 o'clock, with three days' rations in haversacks, towards Sand Mountain, said to be three miles distant. When we reached the mountain we at once began its ascent. Our progress was slow, as we had to help the teams up the steeper places. We reached the top near noon and marched about a mile and went into camp. We were again in a pine region similar to that between Iuka and Tuscumbia, which we had marched through the year before. The sand and dust were quite deep in some places. It was rumored that our destination was Rome, Georgia. Next morning, the 3rd, reveille sounded at 3:30 o'clock, and we were soon again on the march. Our course was in a southerly direction, which seemed to confirm the rumor that Rome, and not Chattanooga, was our destination. We crossed several mountain streams, and our march would have been quite comfortable if it had not been for the dust. At one place we passed the dead body of a negro lying by the roadside. It was afterwards said that he had proved a false guide and that his life had paid the penalty for his deceit.¹ We halted for the night by a mountain stream where corn and peaches were abundant. There was a distillery nearby, abandoned by the owner, who left some half-fermented fruit, which some of the boys tried to convert into peach brandy. On the 4th we remained in camp until 3:30 P. M. A large cavalry force went forward while we waited. We marched at the hour last above mentioned but were detained by trains ahead of us. Night came on and we made the descent of the mountain in the darkness. It was a laborious and dangerous march, but we finally got safely down and encamped at a place called Winston, or Winston's Gap—a cove which was said to separate Sand Mountain from Lookout Mountain.

We lay in this camp all day the 5th, 6th and 7th, our only duties being police and picket details. On Sunday the 6th, our new chaplain, Randall Ross, preached his first sermon and the same evening Wilson Iler, the bugler, brought some of the Forty-ninth Ohio boys over for a little concert. The "music in the air" attracted a large number of listeners from other regiments.

On the morning of the 8th our brigade moved about five miles in the valley and went into bivouac, after listening to a talk from General Willich.

That evening General Rosecrans received a dispatch from General Wagner saying that Chattanooga had been evacuated

¹ Gleason's Diary.

and that he would occupy the place next day.¹ At 10 P. M. General Rosecrans sent a message to General Wagner saying that General Crittenden had been ordered to occupy Chattanooga in the morning early and push forward in vigorous pursuit. He ordered General Wagner to cross the river immediately, with all the forces under his command in the Sequatchie Valley, and report to General Crittenden to join in the pursuit. He also ordered him to supply his troops with five days' rations, and other things needed in marching rapidly over mountains.² Numerous deserters came in to our lines and reported the enemy was rapidly retreating to Rome. These reports were sent to General Rosecrans, and from such reports, which were evidently intended to deceive, he evidently formed the opinion that the enemy was in a rapid and disorganized retreat, either on Rome or Atlanta. In his official report and in repeated public declarations, afterwards, he claimed that the advance of our widely separated columns was necessary to the occupation of Chattanooga, and that the capture of that place was the objective point of the campaign. If this was true, that Chattanooga *was* the objective point of the campaign, why was not the army concentrated there after he knew of its evacuation, which we now see could have been done in five or six days at furthest. If we had to fight a battle to retain it, we could have fought on ground of our own choosing, and there is little doubt that the result would have been favorable to us. Instead, the official reports show that the different corps and divisions, on widely separated lines, were sent in rapid pursuit of a supposed flying and demoralized enemy, which in fact had deceived him, and was concentrating for an attack on his divided forces. This is the truth as history will record it, and as revealed by the now collected and published official reports.

Ignorant of what was going on in other parts of the army, and as to our destination and the movements of the enemy, we lay all day on September 9 in our camp in Winston's Valley, at the foot of Lookout Mountain, making ourselves comfortable,—no one dreaming of impending battle. The impression prevailed that all we had to do was to advance against the enemy and he would flee as he had done at Shelbyville and Tullahoma. All were of the opinion that he would fall back from Chattanooga and not dare to give us battle. We were soon to realize that all this was a mistake. Where we were encamped it was 25 miles to Lafayette, 23 miles from Trenton, where General Rosecrans had his headquarters, 25 miles from where we crossed the Tennessee River, 48 miles from Rome and 42 miles from Chattanooga.

1 W. R. R., 52-460.

2 W. R. R., 52-459.

That morning, September 9, at 9 o'clock General Rosecrans sent a dispatch to General McCook directing him to move as rapidly as possible on Alpine and Summerville, for the purpose of intercepting the enemy in his retreat. General Thomas was ordered to move on Lafayette, and General Crittenden was to follow from Chattanooga, in pursuit of the supposed retreating enemy.¹ That morning a supposed loyal citizen of Chattanooga reported at General Rosecrans's headquarters that the enemy was "badly demoralized", "all feel that they are whipped", "one-seventh of the troops mostly naked"; "the rations for three days would make one good meal", and that if they were pursued vigorously they would "not stop short of Atlanta".² It is pretty evident now that General Rosecrans believed this and similar stories brought into our lines by pretended deserters, and that many of his subordinate general officers also believed them.³

September 10, rumors regarding the true state of affairs in Bragg's army reached Rosecrans but were dismissed as "hardly worthy of a moments consideration".⁴ The next day General Crittenden, sent a number of dispatches to General Rosecrans, saying "that the enemy had all gone to Rome,"⁵ and on the 12th at 9:30 p. m. reported, that he believed "the enemy is running, and that he will make no stand short of Rome."⁶ September 12 at 9:50 p. m. General Rosecrans became convinced that the enemy was in heavy force near Lafayette,⁷ and on the 13th, he fully realized that he had been deceived by reports that Bragg was making a disorderly retreat. On that morning at 8:15 our, McCook's corps received orders to march to General Thomas' assistance.⁸

It will be remembered that on the eighth day of September, we moved five miles and went into a new camp in Winston's Valley. We remained there on the 8th and 9th and began building bowers to shade our tents and in other ways making ourselves comfortable.

The morning of the 10th, we received sudden orders to march at 5 o'clock with three days' rations, leaving the wagons behind. We passed through Davis' division, and marched through a gap which led to Lookout Mountain, at the foot of which we waited for General Davis' division to get out of our way. We then began the ascent, halting to rest but once on the way up. When we reached the summit we stacked arms and rested for half an hour. From a bluff nearby we had a fine view of the valley and site of our late camp, and of Sand and Raccoon Moun-

1 W. R. R. 52-488.

2 W. R. R. 52-481.

3 W. R. R. 52-508-519.

4 W. R. R. 52-517.

5 W. R. R. 52-545.

6 W. R. R. 52-576.

7 W. R. R. 52-577.

8 W. R. R. 52-598-602.

ains. The prospect stretched away, far as the eye could reach. We resumed our march in a northeasterly course and made good progress. We soon came to a place where the road forked and took the fork leading southward, as we supposed, towards Rome. At noon we halted for dinner, enjoyed a good rest, and at 2 P. M. resumed our march. We followed a mountain road and crossed a considerable stream which ran through a gully or canyon. Just before dark we descended the mountain and encamped on a knoll at its foot. The road down the mountain had been blockaded by the enemy with rocks and fallen trees which were removed by our forces as we advanced.

The morning of September 11, we learned that we were near Alpine, Ga. We lay quietly in camp, resting after our hard march over the mountain, and some of the boys went foraging and brought in some sweet potatoes. In the evening there was a religious service in our quarters, conducted by Chaplain Ross and Willison B. White of Company A. Later, two bands in Davis' division gave us some fine music. We remained in our camp near Alpine on the 12th. The days were warm and the nights cool. There were various rumors afloat, one of which was that the enemy was in force in our front, and in that of General Thomas to our left a few miles, and that we were likely to be attacked in the morning. Another was that a portion of General Grant's forces was coming to reinforce us. But when we learned that the wagon train was ordered back, it was apparent that there would be no fight after all.¹ Next morning at 6:30 we took up our march again, but were detained by the ambulance train and the artillery. Our course was up Lookout Mountain, by a different road from that we had traversed coming down. It was more to the eastward, and we reached the top in good time. The brigade halted for dinner and we were told that our destination was Dougherty's Gap, and that we were to await orders until it was determined whether our way was clear. We resumed our march at 1:30 P. M. in the same direction, and were told that orders had come for us to reinforce General Thomas, who was confronted by a large force of the enemy. Some three or four miles further on we halted and stacked arms by the roadside in the woods, and word came back that the whole rebel column could be plainly seen in the valley from a position nearby. Many went forward to see it, but it turned out to be a column of our own men. Resuming our march we passed the road on which we ascended the mountain, and, following a road along its crest we came to the gully or canyon before mentioned. We descended into it, crossed the same deep stream we had crossed

1 Gleason's Diary.

in our march to Alpine and bivouaced there for the night. A nest of "yellow jackets" at the road side made it lively for the troops and trains coming from the rear. Next morning, the 14th, reveille sounded at 2:30 o'clock and we were ordered to march at 4. We found to our disappointment that we were to retrace our steps to Winston's Valley. We were delayed in getting up out of the gulch or canyon. Our road led us nearly to Alpine, before we turned in the direction of Winston's, and the dust became so deep from much travel that the marching was very disagreeable. Our route to the valley was more direct and nearer by several miles than the one we had marched over before. At noon we halted for dinner beside a mountain stream near where it plunged into a chasm with a fall of near 100 feet, and formed a pool which was said to be fathomless. The roaring of the fall could be heard for a mile or more. On each side of the chasm were walls of solid rock and few of us had ever beheld anything approaching it in grandeur. Far down in the chasm and on projecting ledges higher up, we saw groups of bathers enjoying the magnificent shower bath which nature had provided.¹ Resuming our march we soon came to the descent of the mountain and ere long were down again in the quiet Winston's Valley, where we rested beside a fine large spring. After a short rest we filled our canteens from the spring, pushed up the valley by the Trenton road some four miles, and encamped near another fine spring, having marched since morning 21 miles.

The next day, the fifteenth, we had orders to march at 4:15 A. M., but we did not start, and it was said we were to rest and await orders. During the day some of the men found some wild grapes and brought them into camp. There were some details made for wagon guards and picket duty, but most of our men took a good rest. In the evening we were told that we were again to cross Lookout Mountain, General Davis' division having begun the march in the afternoon. Next morning, the 16th, at 6 o'clock we started on a march back over the same road toward Lookout Mountain. We halted at a large spring to fill our canteens, and while there our regiment was detailed to help the wagons up the ascent. After following the old familiar road some distance we took one leading north. It was not so dusty as our previous marches, but after crossing the stream before mentioned water was scarce. We marched until we reached the head waters of this stream, which we then first learned was Little River, and encamped there for the night,—our day's march 13 miles. Some of the men at once set out on foraging expeditions and were arrested by the provost guards, but one, Dan

1 Gleason's Diary.

Norman of Company H, escaped arrest, and brought into camp a bee hive, which he had bought with "fac simile" Confederate scrip. After the bees were smoked out, Dan made a free distribution of the honey and was pronounced a good fellow.¹ That night a stray mule got among the gun stacks, knocked some of them down and almost caused a panic. We heard rumors during the evening that a cavalry fight had occurred the day before in the valley below near Lafayette.

The next day, the 17th, was warm and dry. We were awakened about 5 o'clock and got ready to march. Companies H and G were detailed as rear guard of the division and remained behind until the last wagon started. Sergeant Evers of Company H and six men were sent back as lookouts, while the companies followed the train. We took a northerly course through a broken and uneven country. Our march was irregular, water was scarce, and we longed for the cool and abundant springs we had enjoyed in the valley. We looked in vain for sufficient water for coffee. We descended by a long narrow road into a valley, where we drew rations from a supply train and found a stream of good water. There we filled our canteens and pushed ahead for the front. It was said there was a fair prospect for a fight. Darkness found us climbing over foot hills and winding through ravines. General Willich told us that the whole army was ahead of us in line of battle, and that we were going forward to our position. A new moon afforded some light for a while, but set before we reached the position assigned to us on the bank of a sluggish stream, which we afterwards learned was Chickamauga Creek. We had marched during the day 25 miles. After a late supper we lay down to rest our tired limbs, expecting an early call next morning. We found we were not so near the front as we supposed, and there were rumors that the enemy was withdrawing. We had not yet got over the impression that we were still pursuing a fleeing enemy, and really did not expect a general engagement. There was another rumor,—that General Bragg had received reinforcements from Virginia and elsewhere and was trying to mass his forces and crush Crittenden's and Thomas' corps before we could come up to their support, but that he would be foiled in the attempt. There was a sprinkle of rain in the night. Next morning, Friday, September 18, was cloudy and cool. We had had a fairly good night's rest and were ready for any emergency. Orders were issued for each man to have sixty rounds of cartridges, and they were issued after breakfast. Inspection of arms was ordered at 9 o'clock, but before the hour came our entire brigade was ordered out on picket duty. We

1 Gleason's Diary.

moved to the front about a mile and were posted as pickets, our regiment being in the reserve. General Willich being in temporary command of the division, the command of the brigade devolved on Lieutenant Colonel Askew, and Major McClenahan commanded the regiment.

We heard considerable cannonading far to our left during the forenoon, but all was quiet on our front. We lay undisturbed until the middle of the afternoon, when we were relieved by the second brigade and moved back about half a mile where we encamped, as we supposed, for the night. We therefore made beds of cedar boughs and got ready for the night's rest. We drew rations of fresh beef and the cooks went to work to boil it and make coffee. We had barely time to drink the coffee when we were hurriedly ordered out on picket again. We moved to the left along the Chattanooga road. A part of our regiment was posted in a corn field where the stalks were so high the tops bent over like saplings.¹ We were not disturbed during the night. The next morning, Saturday, September 19, we were all aroused early and were allowed to build fires to warm by, as the air was frosty and cold. Soon after day light we had coffee and at 6 o'clock, marched back past our last camp and found it deserted. We were double quicked for three or four miles and finally came up to the rest of the brigade. We then pushed on at a slower pace. General McCook and his staff overtook and passed us, the General speaking cheerily as he rode by. The road grew very dusty. Burning fires warmed the air and the smoke from them almost stifled us at times. The roar of artillery ahead soon convinced us that the battle had opened and that no time was to be lost. We halted at a small place called Gordon's Mills and filled our canteens at a large spring by the roadside.² We then pushed on and soon came within hearing of musketry firing. We here left the artillery and trains and struck across the woods and fields to another road, which we soon reached and were given a short rest, after which we were ordered forward at double quick. Turning off the road to the right at the Kelly farm, we formed line of battle in a wood. The Forty-ninth Ohio and Thirty-second Indiana were in the first line and our regiment and the Eighty-ninth Illinois were formed in support. The noise of the battle grew constantly louder to the left, towards which we shifted, until the Forty-ninth Ohio finally sent out a strong skirmish line, which soon became engaged. Gleason's diary, from which the main facts above narrated are taken, says: "the skirmish line of the Forty-ninth advancing too far at one

¹ Gleason's Diary.

² Crawfish Spring.

time, was outflanked on the right and had to retire a short distance. We then lay down under a murderous fire of musketry and artillery from the right and suffered severely. Big Phil Beamer, my file closer, was struck fatally in the head by a musket ball, and lay almost at my side. Desiring to inform the lieutenant in command of the company, I was told that he had gone back severely wounded and that I was left in command. I had poor Phil, who was still alive, but unconscious, carried to the rear.¹ The rebel fire was soon slackened by a few broadsides from Goodspeed's battery, which was ordered up. The Third Brigade of our division (Baldwin's) now came up on our left and we again advanced, the Forty-ninth Ohio 'advancing firing,' according to new tactics General Willich had taught us, with such signal effect that they recaptured Loomis' battery, which had been lost in the morning, and the guns were taken to the rear. We then lay down within range of the enemy's fire, but were not actively engaged for an hour or more.

While standing talking to two or three comrades, we heard a shot and a minnie ball came shrieking toward us. It struck the ground close to me, and, rebounding, struck me in the thigh, abrading the skin and raising quite a lump. Happy to feel that I was not dangerously hurt, I picked up the bullet and put it in my pocket to preserve as a souvenir of the battle. Toward evening the enemy massed on our left and front and at twilight made a furious assault on our lines. Our regiment was ordered into the front line, on the left of the Forty-ninth Ohio, and we had all we could do to maintain our position, as our left was overlapped by the enemy. It was the liveliest fight for nearly an hour that we had been engaged in. Hugh Thompson was struck here by a spent cannister shot and stunned but recovered in a short time. After using my musket to good purpose for some time, firing at the flashes of the enemy's muskets and keeping the men in line, it became so foul that a ball I was ramming in stuck half way down. While I was trying to get it home I was struck by a bullet in the right breast. Its course was through the muscles each side of the arm pit across which it plowed a furrow. Its force while sufficient to pass entirely through, did not knock me off my feet, but feeling the blood running down my side I knew I was badly "winged" this time. I left the old dirty musket right there, and feeling a sense of growing weakness, turned the command of the company over to Sergeant M. B. Evers, told Captain Danford of Company E of my mishap and walked unaided to the rear. When nearly exhausted, an ambu-

1 Beamer died that night.

lance picked me up and took me to the brigade hospital near the Kelly house where my wound was dressed."

Gleason is mistaken about the battery the brigade captured, being Loomis' Michigan Battery. That battery was captured by the enemy but was not retaken. It may have been the Fourth Indiana Battery, commanded by Lieutenant Flansburg, in Starkweather's Second Brigade of Baird's Division of the Fourteenth Army Corps, five of whose guns were captured by the enemy that morning, but were recaptured in the afternoon engagement, as shown by General Starkweather's official report. He says, "In order to save my line from total destruction a slow retirement was ordered to the ridge directly to the rear. * * * The enemy was then struck by some of our troops in his rear and on his flank, throwing him into confusion, thus leaving my guns not withdrawn untouched, and I immediately set to work to place my battery again in fighting condition". General Willich in his official report states positively that in the charge our brigade made, which Gleason describes, "Five pieces of the enemy's artillery, which had done us much damage, were taken, brought to the rear and delivered by my assistant adjutant general at the headquarters of the army." Captain Goodspeed officially reports this incident as follows: "The brigade having captured a battery from the enemy, I was ordered to haul the pieces off the field. I sent for my caisson teams and took off three ten-pounder Parrott and two twelve-pounder Napoleon guns". It appears from the official report of Captain George A. Kensel, chief of artillery of Baird's division, that the Fourth Indiana Battery was equipped with two twelve-pounder light guns, two twelve-pounder light howitzers, and two six pounder James guns.¹ These guns do not answer the description of the guns Goodspeed says he took to the rear. An examination of the official reports of the enemy's forces opposed to us fails to disclose what battery the guns belonged to.

It appears from the official reports that the assault of the enemy in which Gleason was wounded was finally repulsed, and that afterwards the entire division was withdrawn back into the Kelly field and placed in line,—Baird's division on its left, and Palmers on its right.

The division was formed with Berry's formerly Baldwin's, Third Brigade on the right and Dodge's Second Brigade on the left, with Willich's First (our) Brigade as a reserve. Here we bivouaced during the night. Early next morning the brigades on the line threw up a line of breast works, in anticipation of a

1 All above mentioned reports in Serial No. 50 W. R. R.

renewed attack by the enemy. There was no firing until between nine and ten o'clock, when a furious storm of battle opened along the line in our front. The shells from the enemy's artillery reached the Kelley house, where our wounded of the day before had been sent, and compelled their quick removal back to Snodgrass hill.¹ The musketry firing in front of our division, General Johnson describes as being the heaviest he had heard during the war.² The enemy maintained its assault for over an hour with great vigor. At a critical moment our brigade, which had been in reserve, was ordered forward. The Eighty-ninth Illinois and Thirty-second Indiana passed over the troops on the main line and charged the enemy who fell back in disorder. General Willich reports that, feeling sure the enemy would fall on our flank, he ordered the Fifteenth Ohio back to the support of the battery (Goodspeed's), "where they arrived in the brink of time, as the enemy were advancing in triple lines on the flank and toward the rear. Goodspeed's battery had changed front and poured double shotted canister into the enemy's ranks and the Fifteenth Ohio gave a volley and formed on the battery left. Just then the Ninth Ohio of General Brannan's division deployed into line under a heavy fire, and with the Fifteenth Ohio made a glorious charge. A similar glorious charge was made on the left flank of the enemy's advancing columns by the Forty-ninth Ohio and Louisville Legion" (the Fifth Kentucky), "the Forty-ninth Ohio, changing front by the rear rank, and the enemy was driven back with heavy loss." General Willich in his report further says, "that the very existence of our army would have been endangered if this bold and powerful charge of the enemy had succeeded". He says "the enemy was driven by this charge of his troops half a mile, when he rallied and brought the fight to a stand".³ The official report of the battle made at the time by Lieutenant Colonel Askew who commanded our regiment, is brief, modest, precise and remarkably clear. Of the action of the regiment on the first day, (the nineteenth) he says: "We formed the second line, in rear of the Forty-ninth Ohio, which was on the left. We followed the first line closely in their brilliant and rapid advance, ready to support them if necessary, until the brigade was halted, when we were formed in double column on the center. We were lying in this position when the enemy made the attack about dark on Saturday evening. The stragglers from the first line, of which there was a considerable number, threw the regiment into some confusion, but they were soon rallied, and the regiment deployed into line on the left of the Forty-ninth Ohio, when the

1 Gleason's Diary.
2 W. R. R. 50-535.

3 Gen. Willich's Report, W. R. R. 50-540

enemy was checked and the firing ceased". It is at this point, where the regiment was at the front, to the left of the Forty-ninth Ohio, that our regimental monument is located. Many members of the regiment were much disappointed that it was not placed in the Kelly field, where it rendered such brilliant service on the second day, and largely aided in preventing the capture of Goodspeed's battery. Captain Goodspeed much desired and made strenuous efforts to have it located there. But General Aquila Wiley, one of the Monument Commission, insisted that on this advanced line of the first day's battle occurred the heaviest fighting and the heaviest losses on both sides, and that the regiments who took part in the engagement on this line should have their regimental monuments so placed as to preserve its historic accuracy, for here, the fiercest conflict of the entire two days' struggle took place. The matter was submitted to General Askew, and after careful study of the question and an examination of the official reports he coincided in opinion with General Wiley and the monument was so located. As a sort of compromise between the two locations, a plain and durable stone shaft was placed in Kelly's field, where the regiment fought on the second day and repelled the assault on Goodspeed's battery. The writer who has studied the official reports of both sides and who has recently gone over the field, is convinced that, as time goes on, it will be more and more evident that our monument is in its proper place, and that the Monument Commission was most wise and patriotic in placing the regimental monuments of Johnson's division where they are, thus recognizing and preserving the historic importance of that fierce struggle on the evening of September 19, 1863. The monument stands near D. C. Reed's field where the regiment assisted in the repulse of the night attack September 19.

Its site is one hundred feet south of the graded road, and two hundred feet directly in rear of the monument, stands the historic pine which still shows more wounds from cannon shot than any other tree on the battle field.¹

Of the operations of our regiment on the second day Colonel Askew says: "The brigade being in reserve in rendezvous position, we were formed in double column on the center, in rear of the Eighty-ninth Illinois and to the left of the Forty-ninth Ohio, fronting the line occupied by the Second and Third Brigades of our Division. We remained in this position for some time when the brigade advanced to the first line of barricades, deployed into line. There I received an order from the General to go to the support of Captain Goodspeed's Battery and

1 Chickamauga Record of the Ohio Commission, page 39.

to form on its left. The battery at that time was near the house on the road, a little to the right and considerably to the rear of our line. I immediately moved by the right flank. When the head of my column had nearly reached the battery, though we were still on the right of it, we received a sharp volley from a body of the enemy who were advancing down the road and on the left flank of our general line of battle, and who had driven our troops that were protecting that flank before them. I immediately halted and faced by the rear rank, and gave the enemy a volley. By this time the Ninth Ohio which had been formed parallel to the road and fronting our general line of battle, changed front forward on their tenth company, which threw their line in front of ours, and this attack of the enemy was repulsed with the assistance of two other regiments of the brigade, which were in line along the barricades, and which faced I supposed by the rear rank and gave the enemy a fire on his flank. As soon as possible I proceeded to form on the left of the battery as before ordered, my right resting on the road and fronting up the road in a northerly direction, and in the direction from which the last attack was made. While here General John Beatty came to me and informed me that the enemy were again directly on our front and requested me to advance the regiment with some other troops which were formed on our right and left. I told him I would do so if I got permission of the general. He obtained the permission and we advanced through the woods, driving the enemy before us, until we reached the point where the field on the right of the road terminated and the woods began. The regiments on our right and left having halted before this, and being considerably in advance of the line without support, I did not deem it prudent to advance further and the regiment was halted here. I then sent Major McClenahan to inform the general where we were and to ask for orders. The Major returned with the order to rejoin the brigade. Before this order was begun to be executed the enemy again advanced to the attack. Our flanks being exposed we fell back slowly and gradually, firing in retreat. We fell back perhaps 100 yards in this way, when the enemy appeared to have been satisfied as he did not follow us up, I formed the regiment here and moved back over the ground which we had retreated over, the enemy falling back rapidly before us".

"We gathered up our wounded and then joined the brigade near the house (the Kelly house) forming on the left of the Thirty-second Indiana and fronting to the west".

"The movements of the regiment during the remainder of the day having been with the brigade and directly under the eye

of the general, I do not think it necessary to go into an extensive account of it. I cannot speak in terms of too high praise of the conduct of the officers and men of the regiment. Under the hottest fire they were cool, collected and determined. The men fired deliberately, never firing unless they saw something to fire at, and then with good aim. Lieutenant Fowler, commanding Company F, a gallant officer was killed. Captain Byrd and Lieutenant Updegrave both commanding companies, were wounded. Major McClenahan, although quite unwell, remained on the field to the last and rendered gallant and efficient service in the management of the regiment".

Major McClenahan, in a paper read at Monmouth College, Illinois, giving the military record of his two brothers who were graduated from that college says:

"At the battle of Chickamauga, after a march of twelve miles, our division, on the left flank, attacked the enemy at nearly sun down and drove them about one mile through timber as dusk came. They turned suddenly and made a fierce charge and drove us back four or five hundred yards, when we stopped and rallied. It was quite dark by this time. I went along the regiment to see what condition the different companies were in. I found my brother William, who was in the color guard, limping badly. He was reported wounded or killed. Brother Stewart with five men, all that were there of Company B attempted to find William by going to the front in the line of the colors and nearly ran into the ranks of the enemy. We were then withdrawn and went to our starting place. I looked for William in the dark as best I could and found him sitting on a log badly wounded. I placed him on my horse and took him to the field hospital, where I left him,—the last I saw of him during the war. * * * The second day of the battle we had hard fighting around the horse shoe shaped field which that part of the battle assumed. During one of the fierce charges made upon our part of the line my horse was killed and I was wounded by a spent canister shot. At midnight we retreated toward Chattanooga".

The ranks were sadly decimated by the two days' fighting. Morris Cope, who was then a corporal in Company E, recalls that on Sunday night, when the regiment withdrew from the Kelly field, there were only two officers and nine men with the company. He thinks the two officers were Captain Danford and Lieutenant Carroll, and recalls that James Hall, Calvin Etzler and Eugene Dillon, besides himself, were among the nine. He adds, "Of course all the balance of the company were not killed; some were killed, some wounded, and some strayed or stolen."

In the confusion of the two days' battle, owing to the nature of the ground fought over and the promiscuous mingling of troops of the different commands in the various charges and countercharges, many men became separated from their commands who afterwards turned up and rejoined their companies. Recurring to General Willich's official report for further particulars of the battle, he states that "on the 19th instant, at 5:30 A. M., the brigade marched (from the right of the army) with the rest of the division, the brigade leading, behind the line of battle to the left, to the support of General Thomas. Arrived at a gap in the line, I halted under orders and formed the brigade, the Thirty-second Indiana, Lieutenant Colonel Erdelmeyer, commanding, and the Forty-ninth Ohio, Major Gray commanding, protected by their skirmishers in front; the Eighty-ninth Illinois, Lieutenant Colonel Hall commanding, and the Fifteenth Ohio, Lieutenant Colonel Askew, commanding, in the second line; the battery, under Captain Goodspeed, in the rear of the brigade. The ground being wooded and hilly, it would not allow free maneuver for artillery and I gave Captain Goodspeed instructions to keep his battery out of musket range and in rear of the infantry until further orders. * * * My skirmishers soon engaged the enemy, who opened with shell and then with canister from a point right in front. * * * After having reinforced the skirmish line and having brought to bear two sections of my battery and having sufficiently shaken the enemy's infantry line, I ordered a bayonet charge. * * * The charge was executed in splendid order and with such an energy that everything was swept before it for about a mile. Five pieces of the enemy's artillery, which had done us much damage, were taken, brought to the rear and delivered by my assistant adjutant general at the headquarters of the army. Fearful to lose all connection with other troops, I halted my brigade in a good position and endeavored to find that connection. The Third Brigade was on my left; on the left of the Third Brigade was nothing. Calling on General Johnson, commanding the division, and inquiring for our connection with other troops, I was assured by the division inspector that a division of another corps was on our left. Colonel Rose, Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, at my request, reconnoitered the right along the enemy's skirmish line and reported the next troops on our right a mile distant. To the left of the Third Brigade was an open field enclosed by woods. After some hours of light skirmishing in front, Colonel Baldwin, commanding the Third Brigade, communicated to me

that the enemy was turning his left flank toward the rear. I advised him to take his two rear regiments and charge to the rear and to the left. At the same time I threw the Forty-ninth Ohio along the fence enclosing the open field, on the right of the First Ohio of the Third Brigade. As soon as the enemy entered the open ground he received a murderous fire which he could not stand. At the same time Colonel Baldwin attacked his right and drove them, with great slaughter, before him, capturing two pieces of artillery." After referring to the fact that the attack and repulse of the enemy "took place directly in front of that division of our army which had to make connection with our left, but which did not move along with us in our first advance, and thereby created an opening of one and one-fourth miles to one and one-half miles between their front and our own," he goes aside to intimate what would have happened if that division had spontaneously advanced to our support. He then states: "As it was, all I could do was to keep my position and be on the lookout for other attacks in the flank and rear." He states further that he "received a written order from General Johnson to fall back at 6:30 P. M. to our general line of battle. With dusk the attack looked for took place. The enemy had succeeded in bringing his batteries and masses of infantry into position.¹ A shower of canister and columns of infantry streamed at once into our front and on both flanks. My two front regiments were swept back to the second line. The line for a moment came into disorder. Then they received the command, 'Dress on your colors,' repeated by many men and officers; and in no time the four regiments formed one solid line, sending death into the enemy's masses, who immediately fell back from the front and then did not answer to a single sound."²

Of the operations of the brigade, including our regiment, on the next day, he says:

"On the 20th of September the other two brigades of our (Johnson's) division were ordered into temporary breast works erected during the night in our front, my brigade in reserve. I took my position in rendezvous formation behind a slope in an open field in rear of the breast works. From here I could support the front and be prepared for the flanks and rear. After a short stay in this position, at 9 a. m., I was ordered forward and directed by General Johnson to engage the enemy immediately in our front. I obeyed and advanced the Eighty-ninth Illinois and Thirty-second Indiana over the lines

¹ Cleburne's Report, W. R. R., 51-154.

² General Willieh's Report, W. R. R., 50-538-9.

not engaged up to the skirmishers, with whom they mixed, and helped to drive back the charging enemy. Feeling sure that the enemy would fall on our flank, I ordered the Fifteenth Ohio back to the support of the battery, where they arrived in the brink of time, the enemy advancing in triple lines on the flank towards the rear. The battery had changed front, and Captain Goodspeed poured double-shotted canister into the enemy, who left some of his dead fifty yards in front of the battery. The Fifteenth Ohio gave a volley and formed on the left of the battery. The Ninth Ohio (General Brannan's division) deployed into line under a heavy fire, and made, supported by the Fifteenth Ohio, a glorious charge. The same glorious charge was made on the left flank of the enemy's advancing columns by the Forty-ninth Ohio, with rear rank in front, supported by the Louisville Legion of the Third Brigade. The rebel columns were driven back with heavy slaughter and the enemy was routed. Our army, whose very existence would have been endangered by a success of this bold and powerful charge, was for the time safe." * * *

The enemy was driven for half a mile, when he to some extent rallied and brought the fight to a stand. The Forty-ninth Ohio reported that their ammunition gave out. On my inquiry, Colonel Berry, who commanded the Third Brigade after the fall of Colonel Baldwin, declared he could hold the breastworks with his own command. At this, I took the Thirty-second Indiana, leaving the Eighty-ninth Illinois in its old position, advanced with it through the Forty-ninth Ohio, and charged and drove the enemy for one and three-fourth miles, leaving the ground strewn with dead and wounded and taking numerous prisoners. Then I swept to the left through the woods, where I fell in with the enemy's cavalry, and on the Chattanooga road to the open field where my battery was planted. Here I assembled my whole brigade and took a position in the northwest corner of the field, which in my opinion was the most threatened point. My skirmishers caught some prisoners (100) in front of my new line and I learned that a whole brigade of Longstreet's corps was about 500 yards in my front, concealed and quietly lying down in a gap between the line of battle of our wing and General Thomas' position. The enemy's artillery was playing on my brigade, though partly silenced by Captain Goodspeed, but I could do no more than watch his intentions. At this time I perceived heavy clouds of dust moving through the woods to the left of our intrenchments. The intention of the enemy's troops in my front was then clear. They would break in

with the attack to be made on our breastworks and cut their defenders off in the rear. I called the attention of General Johnson several times to the approaching thunder storm. Just as it was on the point of breaking forth, one or two of our divisions on the right of our breastworks left this position of the battlefield under higher orders, each regiment cheering as it went, which cheering did not at all cheer us, who kept the position under a heavy fire. Then the storm broke loose, first in small squads, then in an unbroken stream, the defenders rushed without organization over the open field, partly over and through my brigade, which was formed in two lines. At the same time the enemy's artillery in front of me and in the rear of our lines, advanced within canister range, swept my position, and entered into a canister duel with Captain Goodspeed. The enemy's infantry did not attempt to force me. When the fugitives had reached the cover of the woods, I ordered the battery to retire and to join the troops under General Thomas. I then slowly withdrew the brigade in two lines, exposed to heavy artillery fire, but not pressed by the enemy's infantry. On the other side of the woods, formerly General Thomas' ground, I took a position, reported to General Thomas and received orders to cover the retreat in connection with General Reynolds. I sent my battery, which had made good its retreat without loss and had faithfully waited for me, ahead on the Rossville road, took a new position, permitted all troops to pass and followed as rear guard, driving many stragglers before us, and reached camp unmolested at 12 p. m."¹

Usually in our military operations the regiment was the unit. Its several companies were fused together as one propelling force directed by the regimental commander. But with General Willich in command of the brigade, the brigade was the unit. The regiments of the brigade were skillfully commanded, as were the companies of the regiment, but in time of action all looked to General Willich as the directing mind, trusted him with the utmost confidence and followed him implicitly. We had our company and regimental drills, but the brigade drill was that to which most attention was given, and it was always given with battle movements and battle emergencies in view. It was probably with this in mind that Colonel Askew made his own report of the battle of Chickamauga so meager. He says, as above quoted, that "the movements of the regiment during the remainder of the day" (the second day of the battle) "having been with the brigade and under the eye of the general, I do not think it nec-

1 W. R. R., 50-541.

essary to go into an extensive account of it." General Willich was everywhere directing and inspiring both officers and men. Some of the regimental commanders in their official reports pay just tribute to his superior skill, courage and imperturbable coolness under fire. Major W. D. Williams of Eighty-ninth Illinois, relates this incident of the first day's battle. The Eighty-ninth, in its advance against the enemy, encountered a heavy artillery fire and was thrown into some confusion. At this point, says Major Williams, "General Willich came forward and standing in front of the regiment and amid a shower of bullets poured into us, complimented the regiment for its impetuous advance, calmed their excitement, instructed them how to advance firing, and maintain their alignment with the advance of the brigade, and by his own inimitable calmness of manner restored order and confidence in the regiment, and after dressing them and drilling them in the manual of arms for a short time, ordered them to advance about thirty paces to the edge of an open space. They did so in good order, lay down and kept the enemy in check for the next two hours." The same regimental commander, in complimenting his men on their conduct, further says: "It remains for me but to say the men and officers of the Eighty-ninth Illinois Infantry are in my judgment—and I trust, in the judgment of my superiors—worthy to belong to the First Brigade, and to be under the command of such a general as A. Willich. I trust the time will come when we can all sit by our peaceful firesides (when great command shall have been awarded him) and recount the time when he was our brigade commander standing in front of our regiment, amid the rain of bullets and shells, and drilling us into steadiness and confidence."¹ Major S. F. Gray, commanding the Forty-ninth Ohio says, in closing his official report of the battle: "Allow me to congratulate the general commanding the brigade upon the successful operations of his entire command, its perfect organization from the beginning to the end of the fight, and to tender to him on the part of every officer and man in my command his heartfelt thanks, feeling that we owe to his superior courage and skill our preservation and any honor we may have won."²

Captain Goodspeed, in his official report, says: "I feel in duty bound to acknowledge the obligations I am under to the general commanding the brigade for the able manner in which he handled and the care he took of my battery."³

1 Major W. D. Williams' official report, W. R. R., 50-542.

2 Major S. F. Gray's official report, W. R. R., 50-551.

3 Captain Goodspeed's official report, W. R. R., 50-554.

One of the most important services rendered by the Fifteenth Ohio in the battle of Chickamauga and one which the men of the regiment remembered with just pride, was that in connection with the charge of the enemy with the intention of capturing Goodspeed's battery. It has already been detailed in the reports of General Willich and Colonel Askew. It only remains to give the incident, as related by Captain Goodspeed in his official report. He says:

"On the morning of the 20th the brigade changed position, facing south. I changed front with the brigade, keeping my battery still in the rear of the infantry. In this position I remained when the brigade was ordered into action. At about 10 A. M. one of the enemy's batteries opened on me from the left in front. I changed front and replied with three pieces, throwing shells, silencing the enemy. At about 11 o'clock a heavy column of the enemy was discovered about 1000 yards from my position. Crossing the road I immediately changed front. At this time the Fifteenth Ohio volunteers came up and was ordered to the left of my battery. A few minutes later, the enemy charged on us, and got up to within fifty yards. My battery then opened, double shotted with canister, and being gallantly supported by the Fifteenth Ohio, we succeeded in routing the enemy and driving him back with great slaughter. The enemy having disappeared from my front and showing himself in my rear, my battery with the Fifteenth Ohio moved to the small log houses which were temporarily used as hospitals and was faced to the rear. At about half past 1 P. M., the rest of the brigade having formed near my position, the enemy opened on me in my new front with artillery. I replied with about fifty rounds, when he ceased firing. My battery remained in this position until nearly dark, when a general retreat began. The troops on our left giving way, the enemy threw shell and canister into the position of the brigade from that side. I answered with the same projectiles."

"After the other troops had passed us, General Willich ordered the brigade to fall back. I attached the prolonges to my pieces and retreated firing. The enemy closed from three sides and his batteries came so near that we fired at each other with canister. Under orders I limbered up and moved back to a hill in the rear, where I awaited the arrival of the brigade. Here General Willich ordered me to move on the Rossville road, and follow the other troops. My battery arrived at Rossville at 12 P. M. and went into camp."

It has been already noted that Captain Goodspeed wished

to have the regimental monument of the Fifteenth Ohio located in the Kelly field, near the position occupied by his battery where it was assaulted on the afternoon of the 20th and where the Fifteenth Ohio so gallantly aided in repelling the assault. Failing in this, he largely aided in securing the location of the stone marker indicating the position of the regiment in that trying moment.

Further evidence of his desire to have the Fifteenth Ohio associated with his battery in what he regarded as its most critical moment during the entire engagement, is shown by the following inscription on the bronze tablet near its imposing monument in the Kelly field:

“Battery A First Ohio Light Artillery.

4 James.

2 Napoleons.

Willich's Brigade, Johnson's Division, McCook's Corps.

“September 20th, 1863.

Capt. Wilber F. Goodspeed, commanding.

First Lieut. Edmund Belding, wounded.

First Lieut. Charles W. Covill.

Second Lieut. Roland C. Day.”

“This battery came into position on this field early in the morning in rear of its brigade reserves. About 10 o'clock a heavy Confederate column was discovered about 1000 yards north. Crossing the road the battery changed front. A few minutes later the Confederates charged on this position, and got within fifty yards.”

“The battery then double shotted with canister and with the aid of the Fifteenth Ohio Infantry of the Brigade, and various commands, and fragments of infantry, they were repulsed and driven with heavy loss.”

“The Confederates having disappeared in front, and showing themselves in the rear, the battery moved to the Kelly House and faced to the rear.”

The official reports bear striking testimony to the courage, the coolness, the steadiness, and the efficiency of the officers and men of the Fifteenth Ohio in this memorable engagement.

General Johnson, after paying deserved tributes to Colonel Askew and Major McClenahan for their coolness and distinguished gallantry, says:

“For individual mention of subaltern officers reference is respectfully made to regimental and brigade reports; but I take this occasion to thank every officer and soldier in the division for their good conduct. No troops ever behaved

better. I wish it were possible for me to mention each member of the division by name in this report..”

General Willich, in characteristic language, says:

“I do not feel competent to bestow praise on the officers and men of my command, for their bravery and self-denial—they are above praise. They have again and again proven that they are true sons of the republic, who value life only so long as it is the life of freeman, and who are determined to make the neck of every power, slaveratic (sic) or monarchical, bend before the commonwealth of the freemen of the United States of America. Young and brave Lieutenant Colonel Hall, Eighty-ninth Illinois, sealed dying, his political creed with the words: ‘Tell my regiment to stand by the flag of our country.’ Captain Whitney, Eighty-ninth Illinois, the beloved brother and leader of his men; Captain William H. Rice, Captain Spink, Lieutenant Adams, all Eighty-ninth Illinois; Captain Ritter, Thirty-second Indiana, good and brave to the last moment; brave Lieutenant Fowler, Fifteenth Ohio, and all those brave men whose bodies now molder in Southern ground—they are so many columns in the arch of this Republic, and every Northern traitor who tries to make their glorious deaths useless for the cause of humanity should be led to the little mound of earth which covers their remains and learn penitence.”

We smile at the perfervid eloquence of our dear old general, as we often smiled at his broken speech, but we know there was never any break in his courage and patriotism nor in his affection for the men of the old First Brigade.

But the most discriminating and the highest tribute paid to the valor of the men of Fifteenth Ohio, was paid by our beloved regimental commander, Lieutenant Colonel Frank Askew, when he said:

“I cannot speak in terms of too high praise of the conduct of the officers and men of the regiment; under the hottest fire they were cool, collected and determined. The men fired deliberately, never firing unless they saw something to fire at, and then with good aim.”

The regiment went into action with 325 men, and lost 120 killed, wounded and missing.¹

The following are the names of those killed, wounded and missing during the engagement, as printed in the published roster of the regiment and gleaned from other sources:

1 Colonel Askew's official report, W. R. R. 50-550.

KILLED, WOUNDED AND MISSING—BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.

WOUNDED—FIELD AND STAFF—Major John McClenahan, Sergenat Major Oliver S. Langon.

COMPANY A.

KILLED OR DIED OF WOUNDS—Corporal William Rice, Carson E. Madden, Thomas W. Skuner, James M. McKinney (died of wounds Nov. 23, 1863).

WOUNDED—Sergeant Wm. S. Scott, Corporal Benjamin Briggs, Hugh Gormley, Emmett Hart, Wesley A. McDonald, Samuel L. Patterson, John D. Patterson (and captured), Joseph Wood, Converse Wylie.

CAPTURED—Harvey White (and died in Andersonville prison).

COMPANY B.

WOUNDED—Corporal Wm. F. McClenahan, Edward T. Merriam, Jefferson McDowell, Spencer Wiseman.

CAPTURED—Corporal John Hunter, (and died at Richmond, Va., Dec. 1863), Wm. R. Kirkwood, Joseph Woods, (and died June 4, 1864 in Andersonville prison), James B. King, John A. Green, John Hunter.

COMPANY C.

KILLED OR DIED OF WOUNDS—Leroy Fields, died Sept. 22, 1863; Joseph S. Hunt, died Nov. 15, 1863.

WOUNDED—Captain John G. Byrd, Sergeant Harvey Sipe, Corporal Welcome Ashbrook, Charles C. Byrd, William Carr.

CAPTURED—Corporal Andrew J. Craven (died in rebel prison Oct. 20, 1864); George C. Early, Melvin B. Lane (died in Danville, Va. prison March 5, 1865), Sylvester H. Reed.

COMPANY D.

KILLED OR DIED OF WOUNDS—Wm. H. Cravins, Lorenzo D. Harcomb, John Welk, Nelson Ellis (died of wounds), Marvin Lombard (died Nov. 20, 1863).

WOUNDED—Sergeant Thomas M. Straw, Corporal Silas Jones, Corporal Jerry Driscoll, Corporal Wm. H. Worley, Corporal Wm. H. Campbell, Corporal John Caldwell, (and captured and died in Andersonville prison June 17, 1864), James W. Corwin, John Hahn, John Halliwell, Amos E. Miller, John Hesser (and captured).

CAPTURED—Francis M. Carter (and died on Steamer Sultana, April 18, 1864), J. D. Higginbotham, James O. Keller (and died in Andersonville prison, Oct. 4, 1864), Thomas Pagan, missing—no further record—George W. Tricker, Wm. R. White (and died at Andersonville prison, Nov. 18, 1864).

COMPANY E.

KILLED—Stephen Burley.

WOUNDED—Lieutenant Samuel Hilles, Sergeant Wm. G. Malin (and captured), Frank M. Heaton (and captured), Chas. W. Hall (and captured), James T. Maring (and captured), Wm. A. Nichols, Isaac Paxton (and captured), Albert Wagner, Hugh Crymble.

CAPTURED—Wm. H. Satterthwaite.

COMPANY F.

KILLED—Lieutenant Nicholas M. Fowler.

WOUNDED—Sergeant James Scott, Henry C. Bowles, Chas. C. Boetlicher, Abram Ewers, Leonidas Harris, Israel Kinney, Leander Warren, Thomas Collins.

CAPTURED—Nathan Watson, Geo. W. Boston, Charles Brandon, John Brandon (and died in Andersonville prison, June 30, 1864), Cyrus Hurley (captured and died in Andersonville prison, June 21, 1864), James H. Knox, John Mills, Samuel R. Wingrove (and died in Andersonville prison, June 16, 1864).

COMPANY G.

KILLED OR DIED OF WOUNDS—John W. Koons, died Sept. 21, 1863.

WOUNDED—Levi Barcus, Elmer D. Nelson (and captured), William Wallace (and died of wounds Oct. 11, 1863).

CAPTURED—Joseph T. Hanes, Wilson Barcus, Charles W. Myers (and killed or drowned on Steamer Sultana, April 18, 1864).

COMPANY H.

KILLED—Philip Beamer.

WOUNDED—Lieutenant Jos. R. Updegrove, Sergeant Andrew J. Gleason, John Capper (and captured), Henry Myers, Daniel Stanton (and missing), Oliver P. Shaw, Hugh Thompson (and missing), Robert Miller (and died of wounds Oct. 21, 1863).

CAPTURED—Wm. G. Balding, Wm. W. Martin (and died in Andersonville prison, Oct. 26, 1864).

MISSING—Samuel F. Webber.

COMPANY I.

KILLED AND DIED OF WOUNDS—Wm. H. Nyman, died Sept. 22, 1863.

WOUNDED—Wm. Ash, Alva Anderson, Chas. Brown (and captured), Thomas Clark (and captured), Samuel Canter, Louis Kraft, Wm. Morgan, Barnet Sims (and captured).

CAPTURED—Geo. L. Hershisier.

COMPANY K.

WOUNDED—Corporal Wm. Hazlewood (and captured), Corporal John W. Brown, Corporal John W. Ridgway, Wilson S. Van Curen.

CAPTURED—Benjamin Freeman, John S. Hutchinson.

So far as our regiment was concerned, although our army retreated from the field, we did not feel defeated, for we had repulsed every attack made on our line in front, flank and rear, and had never advanced against the enemy that we did not drive him before us. This was true of the brigade and the division. General Willich in his official report says:

"Though our loss can only be a percentage of the loss inflicted on the enemy, in no instance he resisted (repelled) our charges, or was able to force our lines."¹ General Johnson officially states, "It is a source of great pleasure to me to know that the Second Division did not yield an inch; that it defeated every force, whether attacked or attacking."¹

The battle of Chickamauga has been called a mystery, because of the inexplicable confusion of portions of both armies. It was within General Bragg's power to have defeated our three corps separately, between the 10th and 16th days of September, before their concentration, but he adopted a halting, hesitating policy and let the opportunity go by. General Longstreet in a letter to the Confederate Secretary of War, dated September 26, 1863, said:

"Our chief has done but one thing that he ought to have done since I joined his army. That was to order the attack upon the 20th. All other things that he has done, he ought not to have done. * * * It seems that he cannot adopt and adhere to any plan or course, whether of his own or some one else."²

On the other hand there were stupendous blunders on our side, one of which, the withdrawal of Wood's division to our right, evidently lost us the field. If this division had not been withdrawn and the line on the right had held, the victory would have been ours. We did not know of the disaster on the right, at the time it occurred, but fought on, in the faith that we would win the battle. It was not our fault that the day was lost. When we lay in bivouac near Rossville, at midnight of that terrible second day's battle, we were comforted by this thought. Although our army had been defeated we were not dismayed, and there was not a man in our ranks who was not as ready to again face the enemy as he was when the battle began.

¹ General Willich's report, W. R. R. 50-541.

² W. R. R. 53-705.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA AND THE OPENING OF THE TENNESSEE RIVER.

On the morning of September 21, 1863, our corps (the 20th) was again re-united and formed in line of battle covering Rossville, the left resting on Missionary Ridge and covering the Crawfish Spring road, the right extending toward Chattanooga Creek and Lookout Mountain.¹ Our brigade and regiment formed a portion of this line. We expected the enemy to renew his attack and were ready for him, but no attack came. There was some firing on the left of our position, but no general attack was made. It is now known that the enemy was too much exhausted and demoralized by the two days' battle to renew the advance.

As General Thomas saw that our position at Rossville could easily be turned and advised concentration at Chattanooga,² General Rosecrans decided to withdraw to Chattanooga that night, and at 4:40 p. m.³ orders were issued accordingly. These orders were received by General Thomas about 6 o'clock; about 9 o'clock p. m. the movement began, and by 7 o'clock on the morning of the 22nd, the entire army was in position in front of Chattanooga, its right resting on the river below and its left on the river above the town. Our corps was placed on the left. General Thomas' corps in the center and General Crittenden's on the right. Our regiment reached Chattanooga at 3 o'clock, and after a short rest began putting up breastworks and making other preparations to resist the further advance of the enemy, which we all felt would not long be delayed. We were correct in our apprehensions, for by the evening of the 22d, the enemy's skirmishers were in touch with ours along our entire front,⁴ and skirmishing began on our left. That day Companies A and F were detailed for picket duty.⁵

Much to the disappointment of the authorities at Washington, our troops on Lookout Mountain were withdrawn and the enemy occupied it, thus getting control of the river and railroad below the town, and cutting off the routes over which we had drawn our supplies.

The situation of our army was extremely critical. At 6 o'clock that evening Mr. C. A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of

1 General McCook's report, W. R. R., 50-490.

2 General Thomas' report, W. R. R., 50-254.

3 W. R. R., 50-77.

4 W. R. R., 50-161.

5 Frank L. Schreiber's Diary.

War, who was then in Chattanooga, telegraphed to Secretary Stanton that General Rosecrans was considering the question of retreat. Later, however, at 9:30 the same evening, Dana sent another telegram saying, "General Rosecrans has determined to fight it out here at all hazards.¹ Dana also reported General Rosecrans as saying he had fifteen days rations on hand, which would last twenty days in case of need; that we had sufficient ammunition for two days hard fighting in the field, which would last much longer behind breastworks, and that our army consisted of 35,000 effectives.² Confronting us and pressing upon us at every part of our line was Bragg's army, which on October 7, as reported by him to the adjutant and inspector general of the Confederate States Army, contained for duty, 68,368 infantry, cavalry and artillery, including forty-six batteries of artillery.³ The condition of our army caused general alarm at Washington and throughout the north, and all the energies of the administration were aroused and directed towards sending us relief. Indeed, as early as September 15, when it was known at Washington that a part of Lee's army at Richmond had been sent to reinforce General Bragg, General Halleck had dispatched to General Hurlbut at Memphis, saying that "all the troops that could possibly be spared in Western Tennessee and on the Mississippi River should be sent without delay to assist General Rosecrans on the Tennessee River."⁴ This dispatch was not received by General Grant, who was at New Orleans, until the 22nd, when he at once ordered General Sherman and General McPherson each to send a division of his corps to reinforce General Rosecrans.⁵

Orders were sent to General Burnside to move all his troops toward Chattanooga to support of Rosecrans, and the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps of the Army of the Potomac were at once started to his assistance. Secretary Stanton, on the 23rd, answering Mr. Dana's telegrams of that date, said: "Every nerve is being strained to strengthen General Rosecrans and his gallant army. If he holds his ground for half the time stated in your telegram there can be no doubt that ample reinforcements must reach him within that period."⁶ While the strength and resources of the nation were thus being drawn upon so lavishly for our relief, the problem before us was, how we could subsist and hold the enemy in check until such relief came. We worked diligently

1 W. R. R., 50-197.

2 Special report of effective force, infantry and artillery, Sept. 28, shows 38,928 officers and men, W. R. R., 52-915.

3 W. R. R., 53-733.

5 W. R. R. 50-162.

4 W. R. R., 50-161.

6 W. R. R., 52-792.

on our fortifications, and soon made them so formidable that General Bragg dared not make an attack upon them. On October 3 he wrote to the adjutant general of the Confederate States Army at Richmond that to attack us in front, strongly intrenched as we were, would be suicidal.¹

The steps taken for our relief form an interesting chapter in the history of the times.

It has already been noted that the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps of the Army of the Potomac had been sent at once to our relief,—the Eleventh, commanded by General Howard, and the Twelfth by General Hooker—General Hooker in command of the whole reinforcement. About 3000 of Howard's corps reached Nashville the night of September 29th, and Bridgeport the next morning about 10 o'clock. The rest of the Eleventh Corps and the Twelfth Corps were following as fast as transportation by rail could be furnished, and were scattered along the railroad from Louisville and points further south to Bridgeport, with a view of quick concentration at that point, when events occurred which for awhile alarmed the country and delayed such concentration.

On the night of September 29, a large force of the enemy's cavalry, commanded by Generals Wheeler and Forrest, evaded the watchful eye of General Crook who was guarding the fords of the Tennessee River above Chattanooga, and crossed the river on his flanks near Washington and Kingston. General Crook fought them for an hour or so, but as they were about to surround him, and demanded his surrender, he fell back to Smith's cross roads, saving all his train.²

About the same time another large force of the enemy's cavalry under General Roddey, crossed the river at Gunter's Landing, about twenty-eight miles from Belletonte, Ala., below Chattanooga.³ Both of these cavalry commands were directed towards breaking our lines of communication and cutting off our supplies, hoping thereby to compel us to abandon Chattanooga. On October 2, a detachment from Wheeler's cavalry attacked one of our supply trains near Anderson's and captured and destroyed it.⁴ The train was said to consist of 350 wagons loaded with food and ammunition. About the same time General Forrest with his command appeared before McMinnville, attacked and captured it, and burned the railroad bridge there.⁵ Ather detachments appeared at points on the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad.

1 W. R. R., 53-726.

2 W. R. R., 52-953.

3 W. R. R., 52-951.

4 W. R. R., 53-79.

5 W. R. R., 53-78.

burned bridges and stations and, for four or five days, completely blocked traffic over this line.

It was believed to be the plan of the rebel commanders to have the forces of Wheeler, Forrest and Roddey effect a junction somewhere in Tennessee and then move northward, burning bridges and trains and working such havoc that our army would be starved into surrender, and the whole line of the Tennessee River abandoned. Fortunately, the Twelfth Corps was arriving at Nashville, and was immediately distributed along the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, to act as bridge and station guards and to aid in the pursuit and capture of the raiders. Our own cavalry, under such skillful and bold leaders as General George Crook, General Edward McCook, General R. B. Mitchell and others, gave the enemy's cavalry under Wheeler and Forrest no rest, but pursued and fought them, whipping them near Murfreesboro and at Farmington, and finally driving them in confusion across the Tennessee River before they could effect a junction with General Roddey, and General S. D. Lee who was at Courtland with 5000 men on the same day Wheeler crossed the Tennessee River, with orders to join him.

It was common at that time among the infantry to belittle the cavalry, but if we had known what tremendous efforts they were putting forth to prevent the destruction of our cracker line, we would not have done so. A letter of General Crook to General Garfield, who was still chief of staff of the Army of the Cumberland, dated Brownsborough, Ala., October 18, gives some idea of the severity of the cavalry service at that time. Garfield had received advices from General Hooker that Wheeler was at Courtland, that Roddey was still north of the Tennessee, that both were awaiting orders to renew their raid, and stated that it would be splendid to get on his (Roddey's) trail and capture or destroy him. General Crook answers General Garfield that he had arrived at Brownsborough the day before, expecting to find a train of provisions awaiting him, but that no train was there, that the bridge over Paint Rock River and several culverts between that stream and Brownsborough had been destroyed, and that the river was so deep it could not be forded for several days, and adds: "for twenty days I have been constantly marching, part of the time in a drenching rain, and have only drawn three days' rations in that time. A great many of my men are nearly naked; a great many of my horses are bare-footed and worn out. The command is in a terrible condition."¹

¹ W. R. R. 53, page 463-4.

By this time the broken railroad between Nashville and Chattanooga had been patched up and trains were carrying provisions and troops to Bridgeport, whence they were carried over the mountain road to Chattanooga as fast as the starving teams could haul them.

To repeated orders from the War Department to General Burnside to go to the relief of General Rosecrans at Chattanooga, he paid no attention. It was well that he did not go, unless immediately on his arrival the enemy had been attacked and driven from Lookout Mountain. Had he done so, both his and Rosecrans' army would have starved, as there was not food enough to subsist one of them properly.

It has been noted that on the 15th of September, General Grant had been ordered to send all the forces he could spare to reinforce Rosecrans on the Tennessee River, and that on receipt of the order, September 22, he ordered three divisions, with General Sherman in command, to move at once toward Chattanooga. General Sherman was then encamped on the Big Black River about 20 miles east of Vicksburg. Though painfully oppressed by the sickness and death of a favorite son, he at once set about getting his troops on boats for Memphis, and went there himself to personally hurry them forward. Memphis is 330 miles from Chattanooga at the then western terminus of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad. It was known in Washington that General Rosecrans' army was on very short rations, so General Sherman was ordered to move out over this road, repairing it and keeping it in repair, so as to draw his supplies over it. The road ran through the enemy's country, infested by guerilla bands, which often destroyed a bridge immediately after it had been repaired, and often tore up the track immediately after one of Sherman's detachments had passed over it. Besides this, a remnant of Johnston's army was in striking distance of some of his detached columns, and he had literally to fight his way along. To keep the road in order after his army had all passed out of Memphis, so as to get his supplies over it, proved to be literally impossible. Fortunately, the Tennessee River was rising, and General Grant collected a fleet of transports, which he loaded with supplies, and when the river reached a boating stage, sent them up the Tennessee River to Eastport, convoyed by gun boats which Admiral Porter ordered from his fleet. When this arrangement had been made, General Sherman pressed forward with renewed energy.

While these great movements were being made so energetically for our relief we were practically undergoing a siege

at Chattanooga. From the diary of Frank L. Schrieber we get the following daily record of our experiences:

On September 22 and 23 we worked all day on the fortifications. On the 23rd there was some cannonading and skirmishing. That day General Rosecrans came out to the works and spoke to all the regiments. On the 24th we lay in reserve and orders came putting us on half rations. In the evening there was heavy cannonading, and a few of the enemy's shells came into our camp but did no harm. On the 25th we were called out to the line at 3 a. m. and the Thirty-second Indiana drove a body of the enemy across Chattanooga Creek in our front and killed several. On the 26th, we worked on the fortifications and drew one's day's rations to last two. The usual cannonading and firing continued during the day. On the 27th we were called out at 4 a. m. and went with the brigade to Chattanooga Creek on picket, where we were covered by breastworks, and exchanged a few shots with the enemy's pickets across the creek. We were relieved by the Second Brigade and got back to camp at 8 p. m. At 10 p. m. we were called out, because of unusually heavy firing on the picket line, and a night attack by the enemy was feared. On the morning of the 28th a large team of ambulances went outside the lines to bring in our wounded who were still within the enemy's lines and came back in the evening. Our chaplain, Rev. Randall Ross, in his diary says, "This evening will be long remembered by many. These men had fallen into the hands of the rebels on the days of the battle, and *for ten days* remained without their wounds dressed, and the only food they received was about a handful of cornmeal mixed in cold water. I will not attempt a description of the condition of these poor soldiers because it is indescribable by pen or human tongue. It was more than some of us could stand to behold, much less to endure. When will those, who saw those clothes clotted with blood, and those wounds full of worms, and smelled that terrible stench from their undressed wounds, forget these things?"

October 3, Mr. Dana reported to Secretary Stanton that 1742 of our wounded had been brought in and that about 750 still remained in the enemy's hands.¹

On the 30th many of our men got leave to go to the hospital to see their wounded comrades who were brought in the day before. We moved our quarters to a better place and drew full rations. On October 1, 2 and 3 we worked on the fortifications. On the 3rd we heard of the capture of one of our supply trains by the enemy's cavalry, which in large force had crossed the Tennessee River and was threatening our com-

¹ W. R. R. 50, page 205.

munications. On the 4th we were called up at 4 a. m. and an hour later started as guard for a forage train. We rode in the wagons and went across the river and up a valley about 35 miles, where we camped for the night. We were up at 4 o'clock the next morning, loaded our train, and started back about 8 o'clock. We got some potatoes. After we had marched about 15 miles we went into camp for the night, the four left companies of the regiment being detailed for picket duty. It was reported that the enemy was shelling Chattanooga.¹

On this day occurred the first general bombardment of Chattanooga by the enemy. The following, taken from a dispatch, dated October 5 at 8 p. m. sent by General M. C. Meigs, quartermaster general of the army, who was then in Chattanooga, to Secretary of War Stanton, thus describes it:

"The first day's bombardment of Chattanooga is over, and I have not been able to learn that anyone has been injured. About 10 A. M., while watching the construction of a pontoon bridge, whose planks have been sawed by the volunteers in two steam saw mills captured in this town, and whose pontoons have been constructed on the river bank by these same volunteers, I heard the sound of heavy guns. As the firing continued for some time, I went to one of the enclosed works constructing in the defenses of this place to find out what it was."

"From the sides of Lookout Mountain on the west, a number of guns, one or two of them very heavy, were firing toward the camps of Rosecrans' right. Also a heavy rifle was firing slowly from the base of Missionary Ridge to the south, and two light rifled pieces were being run occasionally to the crest or on the side of a knoll some 600 or 800 yards distant, southeast of the work, to which as a good lookout, I had gone. No shell had entered this work when I left at 2. The men said one had struck the parapet of a line of defense a couple of hundred yards to the right, and Bradley's battery of rifled field pieces fired one shot while I was present, which grazed the top of the knoll, and for a time quieted the rebel field pieces behind it. Two of the shells burst."

"Later in the day the firing was more rapid, and more of the shells from the mountain burst in the air over the camps occupied by the troops. Eight or ten guns, if not more, opened from the mountain. They appeared to be planted singly, at many yards intervals along the road which wound up the mountain side. I went back, after watching the firing for an

¹ Frank L. Schreiber's Diary.

hour or two, to observe the progress of the bridge-builders, and toward sunset with General Wagner, took a position on Cameron's Hill, a high peak on the bank of the river, west of Chattanooga, and commanding the whole plain of Chattanooga. By the sound I found that the most distant gun, some 1500 feet above the river on Lookout Mountain, was distant from Cameron's Hill 2.7 miles and the large rifle on Mission Ridge was from the same point just three miles distant. This would make their distance from our extreme right about two and one-half and three miles respectively."

"No one seems to have made it his business to count the number of shots fired in the forenoon. They seemed to be firing deliberately and for range. About 2 o'clock I counted twelve explosions in three minutes, some of which may have been from our own guns, which replied at intervals. As the firing began at 10 and ceased only at sunset, I presume that some hundreds of shots were fired in the seven hours' practice.¹ The large gun on Mission Ridge fired a conical shell about six inches in diameter. The base of one was picked up and carried to headquarters."

"The negro boys about the camps continued their games of marbles, and the men stood on the parapets and places of the intrenchments watching the shots and speculating upon their effect. The men are indifferent to distant artillery fire, and expose themselves. Some severe casualties will, if this shelling continues, result from this practice. The rebels did not show themselves much."²

The result of this bombardment was the wounding of one artillery man in Negley's division.³

The night of October 5 was very cold. On the morning of October 6 we resumed our march back to camp at Chattanooga. When we reached the river the water was running over the bridge on which we had crossed on our way out, and we had to leave the wagons and teams on the north side of the river.

On the morning of the 7th, the following congratulatory address by General Rosecrans was read to the regiment:

Headquarters Department of the Cumberland,
Chattanooga, Oct. 2, 1863.

Army of the Cumberland:

You have made a grand and successful campaign. You have driven the rebels from Middle Tennessee.

You crossed a great mountain range, placed yourselves on the banks of a broad river, crossed it in the face of a powerful opposing army, and crossed two other great mountain ranges at the only practi-

¹ Cox's 10th Indiana Battery fired some 75 shots, W. R. R., 53-103.

² W. R. R. 53-102.

³ W. R. R., 50-208.

able passes, some 40 miles between extremes. You concentrated in the face of superior numbers, fought the combined armies of Bragg, which you drove from Shelbyville and Tullahoma, of Johnson's Army from Mississippi, and the tried veterans of Longstreet's corps, and for two days held them at bay, giving them blow for blow with heavy interest. When the day closed you held the field, from which you withdrew in the face of over powering numbers, to occupy the point for which you set out—Chattanooga.

You have accomplished the great work of the campaign. You hold the key of East Tennessee, of North Georgia, and of the enemy's mines of coal and niter.

Let these achievements console you for the regret you experience, that arrivals of fresh hostile troops forbade your remaining on the field to renew the battle for the right of burying your gallant dead, and caring for your brave companions who lay wounded on the field. The losses you have sustained, though heavy, are slight considering the odds against you and the stake you have won. You hold in your hands the substantial fruits of victory, and deserve and will receive the honor and plaudits of a grateful nation, which asks nothing of even those who have been fighting us, but obedience to the constitution and laws established for our common benefit.

The general commanding earnestly begs every officer and soldier of this army to unite with him in thanking Almighty God for His favor to us. He presents his hearty thanks and congratulations to all the officers and soldiers of this command for their energy, patience and perseverance, and the undaunted courage displayed by those who fought with such unflinching resolution.

Neither the history of this war nor probably the annals of any battle furnish a loftier example of obstinate bravery and enduring resistance to superior numbers, when troops, having exhausted their ammunition, resorted to the bayonet so many times to hold their position against such odds as did our left and center on the afternoon of the 20th of September at the battle Chickamauga.

W. S. ROSECRANS,
Major General, Commanding.¹

On the 8th there was cannonading, and in the evening some of our batteries threw a few shells onto Lookout Mountain. At 8 P. M. we were ordered out on picket. Some of our outposts were within twenty yards of the enemy's picket line. On the 9th the regiment was relieved from picket duty and sent back to the second line of defense at 7 P. M., and enjoyed a good night's rest. October 10, General McCook, our corps commander, took leave of us and started for Indianapolis. October 11, was Sunday and our chaplain, Rev. Randall Ross, preached at 10 a. m. and again at 5 p. m. Ninety men of the regiment were detailed to work on the fortifications. On the 12th, six companies of the regiment worked on fortifications. Frank L. Schreiber, from whose diary these notes are taken, says that on this day, he, John G. Gregory and J. D. Fleming of Company A built a house for themselves, and that the

¹ W. R. R., 50-78.

weather was cold. October 13 the regiment had orders to move at 5 a. m. which order was countermanded on account of rain. It was election day in Ohio, and the Ohio soldiers in our army exercised the privilege of voting, which had been conferred on them by law. The candidates for governor in Ohio were John Brough and Clement L. Vallandigham, and the lines were sharply drawn between those who supported and those who were opposed to the war. Schreiber in his diary says that there were only five votes in the regiment in favor of Vallandigham and that one of them was cast by Lieutenant Storer of his company.

From October 14th to 19th, inclusive, the regiment did its full share of picket duty and working on fortifications, no unusual incident occurring.

On the 20th of October, Scheiber states that our whole army changed position, that our brigade was consolidated with the Third Brigade of Davis' division, with General Willich in command of the brigade, and General Wood in command of the division, and that we moved about one mile to the left of our former position.

The order for the consolidation Schreiber refers to above was dated the 9th of October.

After the battle of Chickamauga there were loud complaints of the conduct of some of our General Officers who commanded troops on the right of the line in the engagement of the 20th. That portion of the line was routed and driven from the field, and some one had to bear the blame. Generals McCook and Crittenden seem to have been the two officers selected as the chief offenders, and public clamor demanded their retirement. A careful study of the official reports shows no ground for the contumely which was heaped upon them at the time. When the right was driven in disorder on that fatal second day of the battle, believing that our army was beaten, and being cut off from the rest of the army, they made their way back to Chattanooga, as General Rosecrans did. There was no question as to their courage and fidelity. Both had shown superior skill and coolness in battle on the hotly-contested fields of Shiloh, Perryville and Stone River, and both were men of worth and good reputation as military men. Courts of inquiry afterwards vindicated them from all the charges brought against them, except error of judgment in leaving the field when they did. But some victims were needed to satisfy the public, and they were relieved. Their two corps were consolidated into one, which was designated as the Fourth Army Corps, and General Gordon Granger—who rose

to sudden fame on September 20 because General Steedman's division of his reserve corps arrived on the field at a critical moment, and not long afterwards sank into eclipse—was appointed to command it. The order making the consolidation above mentioned added to our brigade (composed of the Fifteenth Ohio, Forty-ninth Ohio, Thirty-second Indiana and Eighty-ninth Illinois) the Eighty-seventh Indiana and the Third Brigade of the First Division of the Twenty-first Corps, composed of the Twenty-fifth Illinois, Thirty-fifth Illinois, Eighth Kansas and Fifteenth Wisconsin. The new brigade was designated as the "First Brigade Third Division, Fourth Army Corps,"¹ a designation it retained until the close of the war. It seems that shortly after this order was issued the Eighty-seventh Indiana was attached to the Second Brigade, Third Division, Fourteenth Corps, and the Sixty-eighth Indiana was assigned to our brigade. The new position to which we were removed was known as Fort Wood and we occupied it until November 23, the day of the assault on and capture of Orchard Knob, which will be hereafter described.

On the 21st and 22nd we worked on fortifications. By this time we had received and placed in position on our works some heavy siege guns, and about a dozen shots were fired by them. The weather had turned cold, rains were frequent and it was very disagreeable. On the 24th we went on picket at 5:30 o'clock A. M. Schreiber in his diary says that on this day General Grant arrived to take command. He really arrived the night before. The coming of General Grant and his taking command at Chattanooga was, on the whole, cheering to the officers and soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland. The rank and file of the army had not got entirely over their admiration and fondness for General Rosecrans. They remembered Stone River and Liberty Gap and the Tullahoma campaign, and in spite of the known incident of his quitting the battlefield of Chickamauga and going back to Chattanooga, leaving General Thomas to work out the salvation of the army, they were not yet ready to transfer that admiration and attachment to another. Their faith in Rosecrans had, however, been materially weakened and there were few tears when he was relieved.

The mistakes of General Rosecrans during the recent campaign and battle of Chickamauga were well known and duly weighed at Washington, and probably the change in our chief commander would have come sooner, if it had not been

¹ W. R. R., 53-210.

for Lincoln's kindness of heart, and the fear that to supersede him immediately after the battle would not be well received by his army. There was evidently a fear at Washington that General Rosecrans would, in a momentary panic, relinquish Chattanooga and try to save the bulk of his army by a retreat across the mountains, which would have resulted in irretrievable disaster. We have already referred to a dispatch of Mr. Charles A. Dana to Secretary Stanton saying that Rosecrans was about to retreat from Chattanooga, and one a few hours later in which it was stated that he had changed his mind and would hold his position. Mr. Lincoln was evidently very uneasy over General Rosecrans' condition of mind, sent him extracts from rebel newspapers stating that their claimed victory at Chickamauga was not so great as was first reported, and also called his attention to the fact that their loss of general officers was greater than ours.

On the 3rd of October General Rosecrans sent the following dispatch to Mr. Lincoln:

"If we can maintain the position in such strength that the enemy are obliged to abandon their position, and the elections in the great states go favorably, would it not be well to offer a general amnesty to all officers and soldiers in rebellion? It would give us moral strength, and weaken them very much."¹ This dispatch must have been a little disheartening to the good President. While he, the Secretary of War, and in fact every one in authority was straining every nerve to help General Rosecrans, he seems not to have been thinking of helping himself. He was waiting until reinforcements came in sufficient numbers as to *oblige* the enemy to abandon his position. There was no talk of war against the enemy in this dispatch, nor of attacking and defeating him. If he obligingly abandoned his position, the President was to throw an amnesty proclamation after him.

In his kindness of heart, the President answered this dispatch as follows:

"War Department,
October 4, 1863, 11:30 A. M.

Yours of yesterday received. If we can hold Chattanooga and East Tennessee I think the rebellion will dwindle and die. I think you and Burnside can do this, and hence doing so is your main object. Of course, to greatly damage or destroy the enemy in your front would be a greater object, because it would include the former and more; but it is not so certainly in your power. I understand the main body of the enemy is very near you—so near that you could 'board at home,' so to speak, and menace or attack him any day. Would not the doing

¹ W. R. R., 53-57.

of this be your best mode of counter-acting his raids on your communications? But this is not an order. I intend doing something like what you suggest whenever the case shall appear ripe enough to have it accepted in the true understanding, rather than as a confession of weakness and fear.

A. LINCOLN."¹

Was ever rebuke administered so gently and kindly and yet so effectively? Lincoln's words in this brief dispatch were like the Saracen's sword—so keen they figuratively cut off the adversary's head without his knowing it.

Mr. Charles A. Dana, assistant secretary of war, was still in Chattanooga, and was reporting almost daily the condition of the army and freely giving his opinions of the capabilities of its officers. He seems to have been sent to Rosecrans's army to observe everything going on and report it to Washington. He was a man of great ability, strict probity, fearless and free spoken, and careless of military reputations. His dispatches which are made public in the War of the Rebellion Records are good reading, but one feels that his judgments of men and measures were sometimes mistaken, and sometimes harsh and unjust. But they had great weight with the War Department and Mr. Lincoln, and doubtless had great influence with them. On October 12, in a long dispatch to Secretary Stanton, he sharply criticized General Rosecrans for giving up Lookout Mountain, and stated that both Generals Garfield and Granger had protested against it, and had contended that seven regiments could have held it against the whole power of the enemy, but that "Rosecrans, who is sometimes as obstinate and inaccessible to reason as at others he is irresolute, vacillating and inconclusive, pettishly rejected all their arguments, and the mountain was given up." Thus ensued the situation which he describes: "Our animals starved and the men with starvation before them, and the enemy bound to make desperate efforts to dislodge us."

He winds up the dispatch by saying that "In the midst of this, the commanding general devotes that part of the time which is not employed in pleasant gossip, to the composition of a long report to prove that the Government is to blame for his failure. It is my duty to declare that while few persons exhibit more estimable social qualities, I have never seen a public man possessing talent with less administrative power, less clearness and steadiness in difficulty and greater practical incapacity than General Rosecrans. He has inventive fertility and knowledge, but he has no strength of will and no con-

¹ W. R. R. 53, page 79.

centration of purpose. His mind scatters; there is no system in the use of his busy days and restless nights, no courage against individuals in his composition, and, with great love of command, he is a feeble commander. He is conscientious and honest, just as he is imperious and disputatious; always with a stray vein of caprice and an overweening passion for the approbation of his friends and the public outside."

"Under the present circumstances, I consider this army to be very unsafe in his hands; but do know of no man except Thomas who could now be safely put in his place."¹

This dispatch of Dana's must have hastened action at Washington, for four days later, on October 16, the Military Division of the Mississippi, consisting of the Departments of the Cumberland, Ohio and Tennessee, were created, General Grant was assigned to the command, and General Thomas was ordered to take command of the Department of the Cumberland in place of General Rosecrans, who was relieved.² The recall of General Rosecrans had doubtless been considered before this. On September 29, General Halleck, then General in Chief, had sent word to General Grant who was then at Vicksburg, recovering from a fall from his horse, that some able commander like Sherman or McPherson should be selected to command the troops sent to Rosecrans's relief, and that as soon as Grant was able he should himself go to Memphis and take direction of the movement.³ It is quite probable that at this time General Grant believed that General Sherman would relieve General Rosecrans as commander of the Department of the Cumberland, for on September 30, he wrote General Sherman a letter in which, among other things, he said:

"I hope you will be in time to aid in giving the rebels the worst or best thrashing they have had in this war. I have constantly had the feeling that I should lose you from this command entirely. Of course I do not object to seeing your sphere of usefulness enlarged, and think it should have been enlarged long ago, having an eye to the public good alone. But it needs no assurance from me, General, that taking a more selfish view, while I would heartily approve such a change, I would deeply regret it on my own account. I have no intentions in the world upon which to base the idea of such a change as is referred to being made except my own feelings. I may be wrong and judge Rosecrans from a preju-

1 W. R. R., 50-214.

2 W. R. R., 53-404.

3 W. R. R., 52-923.

diced view, instead of impartially, as I would like to try to do."¹

But other plans were being considered of which General Grant had then no knowledge. On the 3rd of October, General Halleck sent a dispatch to General Grant at Vicksburg ordering him to report at Cairo, Ill. He did not receive this dispatch until the 9th. On that day he started for Cairo, with his staff, and on the 15th reported from Columbus, Ky., that he was on the way.² General Sherman who, with tremendous energy, was pressing his corps eastward along the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, fighting off the enemy's cavalry and repairing the road as he went, had, it seems, other ideas as to who would be selected to repair the disaster at Chickamauga, and relieve the critical and dangerous situation at Chattanooga. On the 10th of October, after Grant had taken boat at Vicksburg for Memphis, Sherman sent a dispatch addressed to

"General Grant,
Expected Hourly at Memphis."

In which he said: "I feel sure you will be ordered to Nashville to assume a general command over all the forces operating in the southwest, say Rosecrans your center, Burnside left wing, and Sherman right."³ Again on the 14th of October from Corinth, Miss. he sent another dispatch saying: "Accept the command of the great army of the center; don't hesitate. By your presence at Nashville you will unite all discordant elements and impress the enemy in proportion. All success and honor to you"⁴ and on the 15th of October still another dispatch, in which he said:

"I am very anxious you should go to Nashville, as foreshadowed by Halleck, and chiefly as you can harmonize all conflicts of feeling that may exist in that vast crowd. Rosecrans and Burnside and Sherman, with their subordinates, would be ashamed of petty quarrels if you were behind and near them—between them and Washington."⁵

General Grant arrived at Cairo, October 16, at once reported his arrival to General Halleck, and on the 17th received orders to go at once to the Galt House at Louisville, Ky., where he would meet an officer of the War Department from whom he would receive instructions. He at once started by rail, by way of Indianapolis. Just as the train was pulling out from that place, a messenger came running up to stop it, saying the Secretary of War was coming into the station and

1 W. R. R., 52, 945.

2 W. R. R., 53-375.

3 W. R. R., 53-236.

4 W. R. R. 53-354.

5 W. R. R. 53-380.

wished to see General Grant. The secretary came aboard the train, accompanied by Governor Brough of Ohio, and accompanied General Grant to Louisville. It was the first time General Grant had met the great war secretary. Up to that time no hint had been given him of what he was expected to do, except a suggestion in a dispatch from General Halleck that he had better go to Nashville and superintend the operation of troops sent to relieve Rosecrans. Soon after the train started, the Secretary of War handed him two orders, saying he might take his choice of them. The two were identical in every particular except one. Both created the Military Division of the Mississippi, with General Grant in command; one left the Department of the Cumberland under command of General Rosecrans, the other relieved General Rosecrans, and placed General Thomas in command of that department. General Grant accepted the latter.¹

A day or two after the receipt of such order, General Grant received from General Halleck the following letter of instructions which throws much light on the then existing situation and the operations which preceded it. The letter is as follows:

Headquarters of the Army

Washington, D. C., October 20, 1863.

Major General Grant,
Louisville.

General: In compliance with my promise, I now proceed to give you a brief statement of the objects aimed at by General Rosecrans and General Burnside's movements into East Tennessee, and of the measures directed to be taken to attain these objects.

It has been the constant desire of the government, from the beginning of the war to rescue the loyal inhabitants of East Tennessee from the hands of the rebels, who fully appreciated the importance of continuing their hold upon that country. In addition to the large amount of agricultural products drawn from the upper valley of the Tennessee, they also obtained iron and other materials from the vicinity of Chattanooga. The possession of East Tennessee would cut off one of their most important railroad communications and threaten their manufacturies at Rome, Atlanta, etc. When General Buell was ordered into East Tennessee in the summer of 1862, Chattanooga was comparatively unprotected, but Bragg reached there before Buell, and by threatening his communications, forced him to retreat on Nashville and Louisville. Again, after the battle of Perryville, General Buell was urged to pursue Bragg's defeated army, and drive it from East Tennessee. The same was urged upon his successor, but the lateness of the season and other causes prevented further operations after the battle of Stone River.

Last spring when your movements on the Mississippi River had drawn out of Tennessee a large force of the enemy, I again urged General Rosecrans to take advantage of that opportunity to carry out

¹ General Grant's Memoirs, Vol. 2, page 18-19.

his projected plan of campaign. General Burnside being ready to cooperate, with a diminished but still efficient force. But he could not be persuaded to act in time, preferring to be still till your campaign should be terminated. I represented to him but without avail, that by this delay Johnston might be able to reinforce Bragg with the troops then operating against you.

When General Rosecrans finally determined to advance, he was allowed to select his own lines and plans for carrying out the objects of his expedition. He was directed, however, to report his movements daily, till he crossed the Tennessee, and to connect his left with General Burnside's right. General Burnside was directed to move simultaneously, connecting his right, as far as possible, with General Rosecrans's left, so that, if the enemy concentrated on either army, the other could move to its assistance. When General Burnside reached Kingston and Knoxville and found no considerable number of the enemy in East Tennessee, he was instructed to move down the river and cooperate with General Rosecrans.

These instructions were repeated some fifteen times, but were not carried out, General Burnside alleging as an excuse that he believed that Bragg was in retreat and that General Rosecrans needed no reinforcements. When the latter had gained possession of Chattanooga he was directed not to move on Rome as he proposed, but simply to hold the mountain passes, so as to prevent the ingress of the rebels into East Tennessee. That object accomplished, I considered the campaign as ended, at least for the present. Future operations would depend upon the ascertained strength and movements of the enemy. In other words, the main object of the campaign were the restoration of East Tennessee to the Union, and by holding the two extremities of the valley to secure it from rebel invasion.

The moment I received reliable information of the departure of Longstreet's corps from the Army of the Potomac, I ordered forward to General Rosecrans every available man in the Department of Ohio, and again urged General Burnside to move to his assistance. I also telegraphed to General Hurlbut, Sherman and yourself to send forward to General Rosecrans all available troops in your department. If these forces had been sent to General Rosecrans by Nashville, they could not have been supplied; I therefore directed them to move by Corinth and the Tennessee River. The necessity of this has been proved by the fact that the reinforcements sent to him from the Army of the Potomac, have not been able, for the want of railroad transportation, to reach General Rosecrans's army in the field.

In regard to the relative strength of the opposing armies, it is believed that General Rosecrans when he moved against Bragg had double, if not treble his force. General Burnside, also, had more than double the force of Buckner. Even when Bragg and Buckner united, Rosecrans army was greatly superior in numbers. Even the eighteen thousand men sent from Virginia under Longstreet, would not have given the enemy the superiority. It is now ascertained that the greater part of the prisoners parolled by you at Vicksburgh, and by General Banks at Port Hudson, were illegally and improperly declared exchanged, and forced into the ranks to swell the rebel numbers at Chickamauga. This outrageous act, in violation of the laws of war, of the cartel entered into by the rebel authorities, and of all sense of honor, gives us a useful lesson in regard to the character of the enemy with whom we are contending. He neither regards the rules of civilized warfare, nor even his most solemn engagements. You may, therefore

expect to meet in arms thousands of unexchanged prisoners, released by you and others, on parole not to serve again till duly exchanged.

Although the enemy by this disgraceful means has been able to concentrate in Georgia and Alabama a much larger force than we anticipated, your armies will be abundantly able to defeat him. Your difficulty will not be in the want of men, but in the means of supplying them at this season of the year. A single track railroad can supply an army of sixty or seventy thousand men, with the usual number of cavalry and artillery; but beyond that number, or with a large mounted force, the difficulty of supply is very great.

I do not know the present condition of the road from Nashville to Decatur, but, if practicable to repair it, the use of that triangle will be of great assistance to you. I hope also that the recent rise of water in the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers will enable you to employ water transportation to Nashville, Eastport or Florence.

If you recover the passes of Lookout Mountain, which should never have been given up, you will be able to use the railroad and river from Bridgeport to Chattanooga. This seems to me a matter of vital importance, and should receive your early attention.

I submit this summary in the hope that it will assist you in fully understanding the objects of the campaign, and the means of attaining these objects. Probably the Secretary of War, in his interviews with you at Louisville has gone over the same ground.

Whatever measures you may deem proper to adopt under existing circumstances, you will receive all possible assistance from the authorities at Washington. You have never heretofore, complained that such assistance has not been afforded you in your operations, and I think you will have no cause of complaint in your present campaign.

Very respectfully

Your obedient servant,

H. W. HALLECK,¹
General-in-Chief."

General Grant relates that the day of his arrival in Louisville was spent with Secretary Stanton, going over the military situation of the country, and that by the evening, all matters of discussion seemed exhausted and he and Mrs. Grant, who was with him, went to spend the evening with relatives in the city. In the course of the evening, Mr. Stanton received a dispatch from Mr. C. A. Dana at Chattanooga, saying, that unless prevented, Rosecrans would retreat, and advising peremptory orders against his doing so.

On the receipt of Dana's dispatch Stanton at once sent for General Grant, who says: "Finding I was out he became nervous and excited, inquiring of every person he met, including guests of the house, whether they knew where I was, and bidding them find me, and send me to him at once. About 11 o'clock I returned to the hotel, and on my way, when near the house, every person met was a messenger from the Secretary, apparently partaking of his impatience to see me. I hastened to his room and found him pacing the floor rapidly

¹ W. R. R., 54-667.

in his dressing gown. Saying the retreat must be prevented he showed me the dispatch. I immediately wrote an order assuming command of the Military Division of the Mississippi and telegraphed it to General Rosecrans. I then telegraphed to him the order from Washington assigning Thomas to the command of the Army of the Cumberland; and to Thomas that he must hold Chattanooga at all hazards."¹ General Grant also inquired in the same telegram how long present supplies would last and the prospect for keeping them up and the same night received the following reply from General Thomas:

"Chattanooga, Tenn.,

Major General Grant:

October 19, 1863.

Two hundred and four thousand four hundred and sixty-two rations in store houses, ninety thousand to arrive tomorrow, and all the trains were loaded which had arrived at Bridgeport up to the 16th—probably three hundred wagons. I will hold the town till we starve.

G. H. THOMAS,
Major General."

It seems the order to General Thomas to hold Chattanooga at all hazards was not sent until the day after the order assigning him to the command of the Army of the Cumberland. It is dated October 19, 1863, at 11:30 P. M.²

On the morning of the 20th at 1:30 A. M. General Thomas sent another dispatch about supplies, saying: "If the wagons now on the road arrive safe we are all right till November 1, at least."

General Grant arrived at Chattanooga on the evening of October 23rd. The situation at that time was extremely critical, owing to the shortness of supplies, and it was rumored that a large detachment of Bragg's army was about to cross the Tennessee on our left and interpose itself between us and Burnside at Knoxville. The situation of the army at that time is thus described by General Rosecrans in a dispatch to General Halleck, dated October 18, at 7:30 P. M.

"Enemy in front. Rumor of his moving a corps up as if to cross at Washington. River at stand. Our pontoon bridge restored. Boats for a second under way. Roads horrid. Forage and animals failing."³

There had been, up to about this time, great suffering among the troops because of insufficient food. Chaplain Ross, in his personal recollections of these days, says:

¹ General Grant's Memoirs, Vol. 2, page 19-26.

² See W. R. R., 53-455-479.

³ W. R. R. 53-455.

"During this time (the days of the siege) there was an immense amount of labor performed by our soldiers in building fortifications, and other necessary labor, and it was done under the most trying circumstances. There was a degree of patient endurance and uncomplaining suffering manifested by our men that has no parallel in the histories of armies. For fuel we had to cut down the parks and groves around and in the city. We then cut the stumps level with the ground and finally grubbed up the roots for fuel. So scarce were the provisions that I have seen men sitting 'round picking the corn out of the mud where the mules and horses were fed, and washing and eating it. I saw them wash the entrails of beeves and eat them. I saw them eat the flesh of the mules that had died for want of forage, as hundreds of them did. I saw them gather up and eat the rotten crackers in the sweepings of the commissary, when hauled out and thrown away. Yet in the midst of it all, ask these men if they were willing to fall back and evacuate Chattanooga and give it over again to the rebels, and they would have answered with an emphatic 'No!' We'll starve first.'"

Colonel McClenahan, in the paper read at Monmouth College, before quoted from, says:

"For the next two weeks (after the retreat from Chickamauga) we had a starving time. Officers and men fared the same. My horse had to be guarded while he ate, to prevent the hungry soldiers from stealing the corn from him. When the guard was withdrawn the soldiers would pick up the scattered grains, and wash and parch them for food for themselves."

General Grant, in his Memoirs, describes the condition of affairs as they impressed him on his arrival at Chattanooga. After observing that if Rosecrans, after he had skillfully maneuvered Bragg out of Chattanooga, "had stopped then and intrenched, and made himself strong, then all would have been right and the mistake of not moving earlier partially compensated," and that, "a retreat from Chattanooga at that time would have been a terrible disaster," involving not only "the loss of a most important strategic position to us," but also "the loss of all the artillery still left with the army of the Cumberland, and the annihilation of the army itself, either by capture or demoralization," he says:

"All the supplies for Rosecrans had to be brought from Nashville. The railroad between this base and the army was in possession of the government to Bridgeport, the point at which the road crosses to the south side of the Tennessee

River; but Bragg, holding Lookout and Raccoon Mountains west of Chattanooga, commanded the railroad, the river and the shortest and best wagon roads, both north and south of the Tennessee, between Chattanooga and Bridgeport. The distance between these two places is but twenty-six miles by rail; but owing to the position of Bragg, all supplies for Rosecrans had to be hauled by a circuitous route north of the river and over a mountainous country, increasing the distance to over sixty miles. This country afforded but little food for his animals, nearly 10,000 of which had already starved and not enough were left to draw a single piece of artillery, or even the ambulances to convey the sick. The men had been on half rations of hard bread for a considerable time, with but few other supplies except beef driven from Nashville across the country. The region along the road became so exhausted of food for the cattle that by the time they reached Chattanooga they were much in the same condition of the few animals left alive there—"on the lift!" Indeed, the beef was so poor that the soldiers were in the habit of saying, with a faint facetiousness, that they were living on 'half rations of hard bread and *beef dried on the hoof.*' Nothing could be transported but food and the troops were without sufficient shoes or other clothing suitable for the advancing season. * * * The fuel within the Federal lines was exhausted, even to the stumps of trees. There were no teams to draw it from the opposite bank where it was abundant. The only way of supplying fuel for some time before my arrival had been to cut trees on the north bank of the river at a considerable distance up the stream, form rafts of it, and float it down with the current, effecting a landing on the south side within our lines by use of paddles or poles. It would then be carried on the shoulders of the men to their camps."¹

When General Grant arrived at Chattanooga we were in rather better condition as to food than we had been some time before, but we were still in a very critical condition as to supplies, and owing to the death of so many horses by starvation, and the weakness of those left, we were in no condition for any general offensive movement against the enemy in our front. The raid of the rebel cavalry on our communications had halted the movement of a part of Hooker's two corps, and particularly his transportation, and he could do nothing toward restoring our communication with our base of supplies at Nashville until his transportation came up.

¹ Grant's Memoirs, Vol. 2-24-25.

General Rosecrans, previous to General Grant's arrival, had already matured plans for a movement intended to open up our communications, but for some reason it had not been begun. General Grant on his way from Louisville had doubtless learned the condition of affairs at Nashville and Bridgeport, and he had traveled the sixty miles of mountain road over which we were then drawing our supplies. He realized that the first problem before him was to open what our boys called "the cracker line," and set himself resolutely to solve it. On the 26th, three days after his arrival, he made his first report to General Halleck. He said, that so long as the weather remained clear it would be barely possible to supply the army from Bridgeport, but that when the winter rains set in, it would be impossible; that the fortifications of Chattanooga were being rapidly completed and when done, a large part of the troops could be moved back nearer to their supplies; that a railroad from Bridgeport to Jasper was being built by the soldiers at Bridgeport and would be finished in about two weeks, which would shorten the distance to supplies twelve miles, and avoid the worst part of the road; that General Thomas, before his arrival, had set on foot a plan for getting possession of the river from a point below Lookout Mountain to Bridgeport; and that if it should be successful, as he thought it would be, the question of supplies would be fully settled. He states in the report that he was apprehensive that the enemy would move a large force up the river and force a passage between Blythe's Ferry and Cotton Port, and that if he did, that we were in no condition to follow him; that to provide against such a movement, he had directed General Thomas to strengthen the forces at McMinnville by a regiment of cavalry; that as soon as the fortifications were defensible he would send a division there; and that he had ordered General Sherman to move eastward toward Stevenson, without stopping to guard anything, with a view to having his forces for use in case the enemy should attempt such a movement. In this report he tentatively outlines his plan of operations, if the enemy should not move as apprehended. In view of subsequent movements a month later this plan is well worth noting. He says:

"When Sherman gets well up, there will be force enough to insure a line for our supplies and enable me to move Thomas to the left, thus securing Burnside's position and give a stronghold on that part of the line, from which I suppose a move will finally have to be made to turn Bragg. I think this will have to be done from the northeast. This leaves a

gap to the west for the enemy to get into Middle Tennessee by, but he has no force to avail himself of this opportunity with, except cavalry, and our cavalry can be held ready to oppose this. I will endeavor to study up my position well, and post the troops to the best of my judgment, to meet all contingencies. I will also endeavor to get the troops in a state of readiness for a forward movement at the earliest possible day."

One cannot help comparing this report with the reports which Rosecrans had been sending to the War Department and to Mr. Lincoln, and to be impressed with its quiet confidence. Where before there was irresolution and apprehension bordering on panic, there was now fixedness of purpose, a clear comprehension of the situation, and an assurance that its difficulties, though great, would be courageously met and overcome.

It will have been noticed that General Grant had sent orders to General Sherman to drop the work of repairing the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, as he moved eastward, and to hasten the march of his troops to Stevenson. How such orders were sent, is told in Sherman's Memoirs as follows:

"I was still busy in pushing forward the repairs to the railroad bridge at Bear Creek and in patching up the many breaks between it and Tuscumbia, when, on the 27th of October, as I sat on the porch of a house, I was approached by a dirty, black haired individual with mixed dress and strange demeanor, who inquired for me, and, on being assured that I was in fact the man, he handed me a letter from General Blair at Tuscumbia, and another short one, which was a telegraph message from General Grant at Chattanooga, addressed to me through General Crook, commanding at Huntville, Alabama, to this effect: 'Drop all work on Memphis and Charleston Railroad, cross the Tennessee, and hurry *eastward* with all possible dispatch toward Bridgeport, till you meet further orders from me.'"

"The bearer of this message was Corporal Pike, who described to me in his peculiar way, that General Crook had sent him in a canoe; that he had paddled down the Tennessee River, over Muscle Shoals, was fired at all the way by guerillas, but on reaching Tuscumbia he had providentially found it in possession of our troops. He had reported to General Blair, who had sent him on to me at Iuka."¹

The plans for regaining possession of the river and rail-

1 General Sherman's Memoirs, Vol. 1, page 357.

road between Chattanooga and Bridgeport, and thus re-opening our line of supplies, was originated by General W. F. Smith, who had recently been appointed chief engineer of the department. He says, on the 19th of October he was instructed by General Rosecrans to reconnoiter the river in the vicinity of Williams Island (about nine miles down the river from Chattanooga), with a view to making the island a cover for a steamboat landing and store houses, and began the examination near the lower end of the island. Following the river up, he found on the opposite bank, above the head of the island, a sharp range of hills, whose base was washed by the river. He says: "This range extended up the river nearly to Lookout Creek and was broken at Brown's Ferry by a narrow gorge, through which ran the old road to the ferry, and also flowed a small creek. The valley between this range of hills and Raccoon Mountain was narrow and a lodgment effected there would give us the command of the Kelley's Ferry road and seriously interrupt the communications of the enemy up Lookout Valley and down to the river on Raccoon Mountain. The ridge at the time seemed thinly picketed, and the evidences were against the occupation of that part of the valley by a large force of the enemy, and it seemed quite possible to take by surprise what could not have been carried by assault, if heavily occupied by an opposing force." He further says, that a few days after this reconnoissance, Generals Grant and Thomas visited Brown's Ferry with him, and were agreed as to the importance of the position by itself, and especially in connection with the movements to be made from Bridgeport to open the river.¹

As early as October 23, General Thomas had directed General Hooker, who was at Bridgeport in command of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps,, to leave one division of the Twelfth Corps to guard the railroad from Murfreesboro to Bridgeport, and concentrate the remainder of that corps at Stevenson to move with the Eleventh Corps on the south side of the Tennessee River.² On Saturday, the 24th, General Hooker was ordered to leave General Slocum at Bridgeport to command the division of the Twelfth Corps assigned to guard the railroad between that point and Murfreesboro, and to concentrate the Eleventh Corps and one division of the Twelfth Corps at Bridgeport, preparatory to crossing the Tennessee River and moving up the south side to take possession of Rankin's Ferry between Shellmound and Running Water Creek. He was cautioned to look well to his right flank, which might

¹ W. R. R., 54-77.

² W. R. R., 54-42.

be approached by four roads, and was informed that General Palmer, with two brigades from the army at Chattanooga, would leave there at 2 P. M. for Rankin's Ferry and would reach there Monday evening; that troops from Chattanooga would also co-operate with him at Brown's Ferry: and that the object of the movement was to hold the roads from Rankin's Ferry via Whiteside to Brown's Ferry and gain possession of the river as far as Brown's Ferry. He was ordered to report by telegraph when he was ready to move.¹ In the meantime General Smith was placed in command of the expedition to seize Brown's Ferry and the position there, heretofore described, and set about preparing for it with unusual energy and skill. About fifteen hundred men under command of General Hazen were to be placed in fifty pontoon and two flat boats and floated down the river at night, passing the enemy's skirmishers for seven of the nine miles, while the remainder of General Hazen's brigade and General Turchin's brigade and three batteries under Major Mendenhall, were to move to the point where the landing was to be effected, concealing themselves in the woods until the boats arrived.

General Hooker, when he received the order to move south of the river, evidently doubted the wisdom of the movement, for on the evening of the 24th he dispatched to General Thomas that he had been informed that the direct route from Bridgeport to Brown's Ferry was not practicable for wagons, and in order to take artillery to that point it would be necessary to take the road to within two miles of Trenton, and from there turn down Lookout Creek Valley; that there were several bridal paths leading from the crest of Lookout Mountain into the valley between Trenton and the river, and that infantry could descend the north slope of the mountain at many points: and if this was the case, from his knowledge of the means at hand at Chattanooga, there was nothing to prevent Bragg from detaching two-thirds of his force to thwart the object of the proposed movement.²

Apparently General Hooker did not then realize that General Grant was at Chattanooga, and proposed to keep Bragg too busy to permit him to detach any large portion of his troops from his immediate front. He was also, perhaps, not aware that on October 23, General W. F. Smith, chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland, had told Mr. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, that one more day's work would make the interior line of

1 W. R. R., 54-43.

2 W. R. R., 54-44.

fortifications at Chattanooga temporarily safe with a garrison of 10,000 men.¹

Mr. Dana, in a dispatch to the Secretary of War, October 23, says that Hooker showed no zeal in the enterprise.¹ Mr. Dana went to Bridgeport to be with Hooker's column during the movement, and on the morning of October 27th, from that point, sent another dispatch to Stanton, saying, among other things:

"Hooker came here from Stevenson last night. He is in an unfortunate state of mind for one who has to co-operate—fault-finding, criticising, dissatisfied. No doubt the chaos of Rosecrans's administration is as bad as he describes, but he is quite as truculent toward the plan he is now to execute as towards the impotence and confusion of the old regime."²

General Hooker's dispatch seems to have made no impression on Generals Grant and Thomas, and on the 25th orders were given to him for the concentration at Bridgeport as directed, and on the same day at 10 P. M., he reported that he would be in readiness to move at sunrise on the 27th. On the 26th, he received orders to commence the movement the next morning, and to open and secure the railroad and wagon road from Bridgeport to Rankin's Ferry and thence as far towards Chattanooga as he could. He was informed in the same dispatch that General Palmer would co-operate with him at Rankin's Ferry, and that a co-operating force would cross at Brown's Ferry and take possession of the bank there.³ These co-operating movements began as ordered and were carried out with great energy, courage and skill. They, and especially that under command of General W. F. Smith, were among the most brilliant episodes of the war. It would be out of place in this history to describe them, or the march of Sherman from Memphis, which was almost a continuous skirmish from the time he started until he crossed the Tennessee—the skirmishes sometimes, as at Cane River, approaching the dignity of a battle—because, as a regiment we had no part in them. Indeed, the most of this chapter may be subject to the same criticism. But it is well for the beleaguered troops at Chattanooga, of which our regiment was a part, to know that while they were holding on with starvation staring them in the face, their comrades of other commands, were marching and fighting and enduring hard toil and privation in order that they might be relieved. The movements above mentioned were brilliantly

¹ W. R. R. 54-69.

² W. R. R. 54-72.

³ W. R. R. 54-47.

successful and the objects sought by them were fully attained, not, however, without hard fighting and considerable loss of life; and on the evening of October 28, General Grant was able to telegraph to General Halleck at Washington as follows:

"General Thomas' plan for securing the river and south side road thence to Bridgeport has proven eminently successful. The question of supplies may now be regarded as settled. If the rebels give us one week more time, I think all danger of losing territory now held by us will have passed away, and preparations may commence for offensive operations."¹

¹ W. R. R., 54-56.



CHAPTER XVIII.

LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN AND MISSIONARY RIDGE.

While these movements were going on our regiment was performing its daily round of fatigue and picket duty, still hoping that relief would come. The fighting at or near Brown's Ferry by General Smith's expedition must have been heard by our troops in Chattanooga, for Frank L. Schreiber, in his diary of October 27, says: "We heard some cannonading on our right." He also says that on "the 28th we heard heavy fighting a few miles down the river, and that the rebels had a battery planted on Lookout Mountain." Again on the 29th, he reports that "firing was kept up all night, and was heavy between 1 and 3 o'clock this morning." This firing was evidently the engagement at Wauhatchie between General Hooker's forces and the rebel forces under General Longstreet, and was a part of the movement heretofore described. Schreiber also reports some firing down the river on the 30th. On the 29th General Rosecrans' farewell address was read to the regiment at roll call. It is here given in full, as follows:

"Hdqrs. Dept. of the Cumberland

General Orders

Chattanooga, Tenn., October 19, 1863.

No. 242

The General commanding announces to the officers and soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland that he leaves them under orders of the President. Major General George H. Thomas, in compliance with orders, will assume the command of this army and department. The chiefs of all the staff departments will report to him for orders.

In taking leave of you, his brothers in arms, officers and soldiers, he congratulates you that your new commander comes to you not as he did, a stranger, General Thomas has been identified with this army from its organization. He has led you often in battle. To his known prudence, dauntless courage, and true patriotism, you may look with confidence that under God he will lead you to victory. The general commanding doubts not you will be as true to yourselves and your country in the future as you have been in the past. To the division and brigade commanders he tenders his cordial thanks for their valuable aid and hearty cooperation in all he has undertaken. To the chiefs of the staff departments and their subordinates, whom he leaves behind, he owes a debt of gratitude for their fidelity and untiring devotion to duty.

Companions in arms, officers and soldiers, farewell and may God bless you.

W. S. ROSECRANS,
Major General."¹

¹ W. R. R., 53-478.

On the 27th of October Frank L. Schreiber, together with three other men of the regiment, was detailed for duty with the Twenty-fourth Pennsylvania Battery and served with it until November 18, when he returned to the regiment which still occupied its camp at Fort Wood. From his diary we learn that the weather during this period was cold, with a good deal of rain. October 30 he reports some firing down the river, and that the regiment went out on picket duty. Sunday, November 1, he reports that he "went to church at the regiment and that there was some firing on Lookout Mountain." November 2, he says he "built a chimney for our tent, going to town for wood and brick," that the rebels threw a few shells into our camp from Lookout Mountain, but did no harm, that some mail was received and that in the evening orders were issued to prepare for a fight. On the 3rd he was on guard from 2 o'clock to 5 o'clock in the morning; after that he went to town to get a plank with which to make a port hole for one of the battery guns; that he was on guard again from 2 to 6 o'clock in the evening, and that there was some cannonading during the day. On the 4th he says he took two horses to pasture, and that there was heavy cannonading around Lookout Mountain in the evening. On the 5th he reports that we drew *three-quarter rations*. So it seems that although the question of supplies had been settled by the movements on October 27 and 28, as Grant had reported, they were not yet coming forward in such quantities as to warrant the issue of full rations. On the 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th he reports the usual cannonading, and that on the night of the 8th he stood guard over the battery guns. November 9th he went with a detail across the river to the upper boat landing to get some old artillery harness. They found that the harness had been hauled to the ferry and went there and camped for the night. The next morning they loaded the harness and started with it, but the mules could not pull the load. They then sent for some of the artillery horses, and with their aid they got the load along slowly and reached camp about sunset, where they again drew three-fourths rations of hard bread. The nights of November 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13, he reports as very cold. On these days he reports the usual cannonading, and the same on the 14th. On the 14th the troops were paid off. This was regarded as a good sign, as the paymasters, it was believed, would not venture into camp with their treasure if there was danger of its capture. On the 16th he reports "nothing going on of importance."

These notes from Frank Schreiber's diary are interesting of themselves, but more interesting because they throw light on the conditions of the army at that time. They disclose the ceaseless activity made necessary by the immediate presence of the enemy who, knowing we were expecting reinforcements, would probably resort to some desperate attempt to destroy us before such reinforcements would reach us. On the morning of the 17th, Schreiber reports that we were aroused by heavy cannonading up the river: that the enemy had attempted "to throw a raft in the river," but had failed to do so.

In General Grant's first report to Washington after taking command, he expressed an apprehension that the enemy would attempt to throw a large force across the Tennessee River between Blythe's Ferry and Cotton Port, and stated that if he did, we were in no condition to follow him. But so far as known, there was no serious attempt of this kind on the part of the enemy. The cannonading heard up the river by Schreiber, may have been a feint on the part of the enemy to cover some other movement, possibly that of the detachment of a force under Longstreet to operate against Burnside at Knoxville—a movement which was then well under way.

While our troops were still holding on, employed as Scheiber describes, General Grant was preparing for aggressive action against the enemy. The supply line being opened, efforts were made to practically reclothe the army which was much in need of shoes and clothing suitable for winter that was near at hand, and to get the horses and mules in condition for another campaign. A suggestion of General Halleck to General Grant, that all animals not actually needed at Chattanooga be sent to Bridgeport where the forage was, instead of hauling the forage to them at Chattanooga,¹ was at once carried out. The suggestion was made to General Grant on October 22, and on October 24, the morning after his arrival at Chattanooga, he telegraphed to General Halleck that all animals that could be spared would go back the next day. This suggestion seems so simple and practical, the wonder is it was not thought of before.

Another of General Halleck's suggestions, made in his general letter of instruction to General Grant on the latter's taking command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, was the reconstruction of the railroad between Nashville and Decatur. General Grant soon realized that he would soon

¹ W. R. R., 54-698.

nede this road as well as the road from Nashville to Bridgeport, to supply his army after General Sherman's troops should arrive, and promptly took steps to have it reconstructed. On the 10th of November he telegraphed to General Hurlbut at Memphis directing him to have rails and chairs on railroads from Memphis to Humboldt, Tenn., from Memphis to Grenada, Miss., and from the Central Railroad south of Grand Junction, taken up and shipped by river to Nashville with all dispatch. The commanding officer at Corinth, Miss., was ordered to do the same thing from the railroad south of that point, except that he was to send the rails and chairs to Hamburg, to be sent by river to Reynoldsburg on the Tennessee River.¹

It fell to the lot of General Grenville M. Dodge, commanding a division in Sherman's army, to do this work, which was one of the most marked evidences of the general efficiency of the soldiers in the western armies. General Grant refers to it in his Memoirs as follows: "Sherman's force made an additional army, with cavalry, artillery and trains all to be supplied by the single track road from Nashville. All indications pointed also to the probable necessity of supplying Burnside's command in East Tennessee, 25,000 more, by the same route. A single track could not do this. I gave, therefore, an order to Sherman to halt General Dodge's command, about 8000 men, at Athens and subsequently directed the latter to arrange his troops along the railroad from Decatur north towards Nashville and to rebuild that road. The road from Nashville to Decatur passes over a broken country, cut up with innumerable streams, many of them of considerable width, and with valleys far below the roadbed. All the bridges over these had been destroyed and the rails taken up and twisted by the enemy. All the cars and locomotives not carried off had been destroyed as effectually as they knew how to destroy them. All bridges and culverts had been destroyed between Nashville and Decatur, and thence to Stevenson where the Memphis and Charleston and the Nashville and Chattanooga roads unite. The rebuilding of this road would give us two roads as far as Stevenson over which to supply the army. From Bridgeport, a short distance farther east, the river supplements the road. General Dodge, besides being a most capable soldier, was an experienced railroad builder. He had no tools to work with, except those of the pioneers,—axes, picks and spades. With these he was able to intrench his men and protect them against small

1 W. R. R., Vol. 56, page 113.

parties of the enemy. As he had no base of supplies until the road could be completed back to Nashville, the first matter to consider after protecting his men was the getting in of food and forage from the surrounding country. He had his men and teams bring all the grain they could find or all they needed, and all the cattle for beef, and such other food as could be found. Millers were detailed from the ranks to run the mills along the line of the army. When the mills were not near enough to the troops for protection, they were taken down and moved up to the line of the road. Blacksmith shops, with all the iron and steel found in them were moved up in like manner. Blacksmiths were detailed and set to work making the tools necessary in railroad and bridge building. Axemen were put to work getting out timber for bridges and cutting fuel for locomotives when the road should be completed. Car builders were set to work repairing the locomotives and cars. Thus every branch of railroad building, making tools to work with, and supplying the workmen with food, was all going on at once, and without the aid of a single mechanic or laborer except what the command itself furnished. But rails and cars the men could not make without material, and there was not rolling stock enough to keep the road we already had worked to its full capacity. There were no rails except those in use. To supply these deficiencies I ordered eight of the ten engines General McPherson had at Vicksburg to be sent to Nashville, and all the cars he had except ten. I also ordered the troops in West Tennessee to points on the river and on the Memphis and Charleston road, and ordered the cars, locomotives and rails from all the railroads, except the Memphis and Charleston, to Nashville. The military manager of railroads also was directed to furnish more rolling stock and as far as he could bridge material. General Dodge had the work assigned him finished within forty days after receiving his orders. The number of bridges to rebuild was one hundred and eighty-two, many of them over deep and wide chasms, the length of road repaired was one hundred and two miles."¹

These preparations for supplying the army were taken none too soon. The apprehended movement of the enemy took the form of an attempt to turn Burnside's left flank and destroy him before reinforcements could reach him. On November 3, General Longstreet with two divisions (General McLaw's and General Hood's) was detached from Bragg's Army in front of Chattanooga, and directed to drive the enemy out of East Tennessee or capture him.² Later General Wheeler with three brigades of

¹ Grant's Memoirs, Vol. 2, page 47.

² Longstreet's Report, W. R. R., 54-456.

cavalry was directed to join him. There was some delay in the expedition's starting. It finally got off, but moved slowly. On the fifth of November, General Thomas J. Wood, commanding our division, reported to headquarters that one of his spies had just come in and reported that *four* divisions of Bragg's Army had been sent up the Tennessee River to operate against Burnside.¹

General Grant became convinced of the truth of this report on November 7, and at once, addressed an order to General Thomas, saying, that news from General Burnside, with information gained by a deserter "is of such a nature that it becomes an imperative duty for your forces to draw the attention of the enemy from Burnside to your own front. * * * I deem the best movement to attract the enemy to be an attack on the northern end of the Missionary Ridge, with all the force you can bring to bear against it, and when that is carried, to threaten, and even attack, if possible, the enemy's line of communications between Dalton and Cleveland. Rations should be ready to issue a sufficiency to last four days the moment Missionary Ridge is in our possession; rations to be carried in haversacks. Where there are not horses to move the artillery mules must be taken from the teams, or horses from ambulances; or if necessary, officers dismounted and their horses taken. In view of so many troops (of the enemy) being taken from this valley and from Lookout, Howard's Corps of Hooker's command can be used in this movement. Immediate preparations should be made to carry these directions into execution. The movement should not be made one moment later than tomorrow morning. You, having been over this country, and having had a better opportunity of studying it than myself, the details are left to you."²

On the same day General Grant telegraphed Generals Halleck and Burnside that he had given the orders above quoted.³

The order contemplated an attack by General Thomas on the north end of Missionary Ridge, moving along the south bank of the Tennessee River and by Citico Creek, a movement which had been suggested by General W. F. Smith. Generals Thomas, Smith and Brannan reconnoitered the ground from the heights opposite, on the north bank of the Tennessee, found that Citico Creek and the country adjacent had been wrongly laid down on maps, and that no operation for the seizure of Missionary Ridge, such as proposed, could be undertaken with the forces under General Thomas' command.⁴

1 W. R. R. 56-50.

2 W. R. R. 56-73.

3 W. R. R., 56-74-76.

4 Dana to Stanton, W. R. R. 55-58.

After this reconnoissance General Thomas reported to General Grant that he could not possibly comply with the order. General Grant in his memoirs says that General Thomas persisted in declaring that he could not move a single piece of artillery, that he could not possibly comply with the order, so that nothing was left for him, General Grant, to do, but to answer Washington dispatches as best he could, and urge General Sherman's forces forward.¹

On the same day he gave the above order to General Thomas, he sent word to General Sherman that the enemy had moved a large part of his force against Burnside, that he had to make an immediate move toward his line of communications and that he was anxious to see Sherman's old corps on hand at the earliest moment.²

Sherman's advance would be at Fayetteville, Tenn., about 100 miles from Bridgeport on the eighth. The continuous rains had swollen the streams and made the roads difficult, and his progress was necessarily slow. Added to this, he was virtually living off the country. In a characteristic letter, dated Elkton on the Elk River, November 6, and addressed to General George Crook who was at Maysville, Alabama, in command of a cavalry division, he said:

"I found Elk 200 yards wide, four and a half feet deep and running very swift. I could have passed horses and men, but artillery and wagons would have bothered me. To wait for a fall would have been precarious and to bridge would have delayed me, so I turned at Rogersville and came through by this route. But yesterday rain caught me down in the rugged valley of Elk, and I had to bridge Richland Creek. I have two divisions here, and have sent back orders for the other three division to come round to Fayetteville by way of Pulaski. I will be at Fayetteville early day after tomorrow. * * * I find plenty of corn, cattle, hogs, etc., on this route, but I don't think there will be much left after my army passes. I never saw such greedy rascals after chickens and fresh meat. I don't think I will draw anything for them but salt. I don't know but it would be a good plan to march my army back and forth from Florence and Stevenson, to make a belt of devastation between the enemy and our country." He asked General Crook to tell General Grant he was "moving steadily and rapidly as possible to Fayetteville and Winchester."³

It appears that General Grant readily acquiesced in General Thomas' representations that it was impossible to carry out his

1 Grant's Memoirs, Vol. 2, page 50.

2 W. R. R., 56-79.

3 W. R. R., 56-69.

order directing an attack on the 8th. Such an attack, under the circumstances, would have been extremely hazardous and might not have succeeded. With General Sherman's army present he evidently thought there would be no doubt that a successful attack could be made from the north side of the Tennessee.

He was in constant communication with General Burnside, and did not believe him to be in such dire straits as was feared at Washington. In his memoirs he says: "All of Burnside's dispatches showed the greatest confidence in his ability to hold his position as long as his ammunition held out", and that "he even suggested the propriety of abandoning the territory south and east of Knoxville, so as to draw the enemy further from his base and make it more difficult for him to get back to Chattanooga when the battle should begin."¹ So on the 8th, General Grant telegraphed to General Halleck that General Thomas, could not make the movement for several days yet,² and to General Burnside that Thomas would not be able to make the attack proposed until Sherman got up, but would drive the enemy from the west side of Lookout and move a column up the valley, which might have the effect of withholding any movement of the enemy's troops against him, Burnside, until a larger force could be collected and a greater effort made to force the enemy back.³ It seems that this movement was also deferred until Sherman should arrive, though there were some demonstrations against the enemy on the west side of Lookout.

In the meantime, General Grant matured plans for the attack, still adhering to his original plan of turning Bragg's right by a movement against the northern end of Missionary Ridge. Grant in his memoirs says his orders for the battle were all prepared in advance of Sherman's arrival,⁴ but they were not really issued until November 18. By that time a crisis had been reached. The enemy had closed in on General Burnside at Knoxville and he was virtually besieged, with no prospect of relief until reinforced from the army at Chattanooga. There was a fear at Washington that he would attempt to abandon his position, which would probably have resulted in the destruction of his army. These fears were communicated to General Grant by General Halleck on the 14th and 16th of November.⁵ General Grant on the 14th telegraphed General Burnside, describing the movements he was about to make for his relief, and on the 15th sent him the following dispatch:

"I do not know how to impress upon you the necessity of

¹ Grant's Memoirs, Vol. 2, page 50.

² W. R. R., 56-84.

³ W. R. R., 56-88.

⁴ Grant's Memoirs, Vol. 2, page 52.

⁵ W. R. R. 56-145-163.

holding on to East Tennessee in strong enough terms. According to the dispatches of Mr. Dana and Colonel Wilson,¹ it would seem that you should, if pressed to do it, hold on to Knoxville and that portion of the valley which you will necessarily possess. Holding to that point, should Longstreet move his whole force across the Little Tennessee an effort should be made to cut his pontoons on that stream even if it sacrificed half of the cavalry of the Ohio Army. By holding on and placing Longstreet between the Little Tennessee and Knoxville he should not be allowed to escape with an army capable of doing anything this winter. I can hardly conceive of the necessity of retreating from East Tennessee. If I did so at all, it would be after losing most of the army, and the necessity would suggest the route. I will not attempt to lay out a line of retreat. * * * I would not think it advisable to concentrate a force near Little Tennessee to resist the crossing, if it would be in danger of capture, but I would harass and embarrass progress in every way possible, reflecting on the fact that the Army of the Ohio is not the only army to resist the onward progress of the enemy.”² On the 17th General Grant again telegraphed General Burnside as follows:

“Your dispatch received. So far you are doing exactly what appears to me right. I want the enemy’s progress retarded at every foot all it can be, giving up each place only when it becomes evident it can not be held without endangering your force to capture.”³

On the 18th at 9:10 p. m. Burnside telegraphed to Grant saying that skirmishing had commenced at 10 o’clock that morning, that the troops were all within the fortifications and that they had every hope of repelling an assault if one was made.⁴

This dispatch from General Burnside was the last received from him before the battle of Missionary Ridge. Reports came that he was surrounded, and his communications with the outside world were for a time suspended. There were very grave fears of his capture, although Mr. Dana, who left Knoxville on the fourteenth, reported that his position at that place was safe.⁵ As before stated, General Grant issued his orders for the movement against Bragg’s army at Chattanooga on November 18. His instructions to General Thomas were as follows:

1 General Grant had sent them to Knoxville to observe and report conditions there.

2 General Grant’s official report, W. R. R. 55-30.

3 W. R. R., 56-177.

4 W. R. R., 56-182.

5 W. R. R., 56-190.

"Major General George H. Thomas:"

"All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's position on Missionary Ridge by Saturday (the 21st) at daylight. Not being provided with a map giving names of roads, spurs of the mountain and other places, such definite instructions cannot be given as might be desirable. However, the general plan, you understand, is for Sherman, with the force brought with him, strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a crossing of the Tennessee River just below the mouth of Chichamauga, his crossing to be protected by artillery from the heights on the north bank of the river (to be located by your chief of artillery), and to secure the heights from the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel before the enemy can concentrate against him. You will cooperate with Sherman. The troops in Chattanooga Valley should be well concentrated on your left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend fortifications on the right and center, and a movable column of one division in readiness to move wherever ordered. This division should show itself as threateningly as possible on the most practical line for making an attack up the valley. Your effort will then be to form a junction with Sherman, making your advance well toward the northern end of Missionary Ridge, and moving as near simultaneously with him as possible. The juncture once formed, and the ridge carried, communications will be at once established between the two armies by roads on the south bank of the river. Further movements will then depend on those of the enemy. Lookout Valley, I think, will be easily held by Geary's division and what troops you may still have there belonging to the old Army of the Cumberland. Howard's corps can then be held in readiness to act either with you at Chattanooga or with Sherman. It should be marched on Friday night to a position on the north side of the river, not lower down than the first pontoon bridge, and there be held in readiness for such orders as may become necessary. All these troops will be provided with two days cooked rations in haversacks and 100 rounds of ammunition on the person of each infantry soldier. Special care should be taken by all officers to see that ammunition is not wasted, or unnecessarily fired away. You will call on the engineer department for such preparations as you may deem necessary for carrying your infantry and artillery over the creek."

"U. S. GRANT
Major General."¹

General Sherman, upon the arrival of whose army depended any effective movement to relieve General Burnside, arrived at Bridgeport at 6:15 P. M. November 13, his advance division (Ewings) being only a short distance behind him, at Stevenson, and was directed to assemble the Fifteenth army corps at Bridgeport. This would take two or three days at least, for one of his divisions (John E. Smith's) was coming across the mountains by Battle Creek, which would take two days, and another (Blair's) was still back near Paint Rock creek.² Other portions of his army were still further behind on their march.

The next day General Sherman visited General Grant at Chattanooga, and in his memoirs reports his impressions as follows:

1 W. R. R., 55-31.

2 W. R. R., 56-139-140.

"The next morning (the fifteenth) we walked out to Fort Wood, a prominent salient of the defences of the place, and from its parapet we had a magnificent view of the panorama. Lookout Mountain, with its rebel flags and batteries, stood out boldly, and an occasional shot fired toward Wauhatchie or Moccasin Point gave life to the scene. * * * All along Missionary Ridge were the tents of the rebel beleaguering force; the lines of trench from Lookout up toward the Chickamauga were plainly visible; and rebel sentinels in a continuous chain, were walking their posts, in plain view, not a thousand yards off. 'Why', said I, 'General Grant you are besieged'; and he said 'It is too true'; up to that moment I had no idea things were so bad. The rebel lines actually extended from the river, below the town, to the river above, and the Army of the Cumberland was closely held to the town and its immediate defenses. General Grant pointed out to me a house on Missionary Ridge where General Bragg's headquarters were known to be. He also explained the situation of affairs generally, that the mules and horses of Thomas's army were so starved that they could not haul his guns; that forage, corn and provisions, were so scarce that the men in hunger stole the few grains of corn that were given to favorite horses; that the men of Thomas's Army had been so demoralized by the battle of Chickamauga that he feared they could not be got out of their trenches to assume the offensive"; (which fear was nobly dispelled a few days later); "that Bragg had detached Longstreet with a considerable force up into East Tennessee, to defeat and capture Burnside; that Burnside was in danger, etc.; and that he (Grant) was extremely anxious to attack Bragg in position, to defeat him, or at least force him to recall Longstreet. The Army of the Cumberland had so long been in the trenches that he wanted my troops to hurry up, to take the offensive *first*; after which he had no doubt the Cumberland Army would fight well".¹ The same days, Generals Grant, Sherman, Thomas, W. F. Smith, Brannan and others, crossed to the north bank of the Tennessee and reconnoitered the ground, and especially the point where Sherman was to make the attack at the northern end of Missionary Ridge. That night Sherman got a rough boat, manned by four soldiers, to take him down to Bridgeport where he arrived by daylight next morning, and at once started his troops toward Chattanooga.²

The attack on Missionary Ridge by Sherman's and Thomas' armies acting in conjunction, was ordered to be made at daylight

¹ Sherman's Memoirs, Vol. 1, page 361.

² Sherman's Memoirs, Vol. 1, page 363.

on Saturday the twenty-first. But General Sherman's confessed mistake in not ordering his troops to leave their heavy trains behind them, greatly retarded their progress, and before they were all across the river, heavy rains came, raised the river, and the enemy sent heavy rafts down the river and broke the bridges at Chattanooga and Brown's Ferry. The delay was such that the force with which General Sherman was to make the attack on the northern part of Missionary Ridge did not get into position until the twenty-third. Indeed, one division of the Fifteenth Corps, that of General Osterhaus, temporarily commanded by General Chas. R. Woods, did not get up at all.

In the meantime, incidents occurred which gave our portion of the line something to do. On the twentieth General Bragg sent under flag of truce to General Grant the following communication:

"Headquarters Army of the Tennessee,
In the Field, Nov. 20, 1863.

"Maj. Gen. U. S. Grant,
Commanding U. S. Forces, etc.
Chattanooga.

As there may still be some non-combatants in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal.

I am General.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
BRAXTON BRAGG."

General Grant, it appears, paid no attention to this note, regarding it as merely a ruse to cover some movement other than an attack on our position. On the twenty-second a deserter from the rebel army came into our lines and reported Bragg falling back. This report and the note from General Bragg above given determined General Grant to direct General Thomas early on the morning of the twenty-third, to drive in the enemy's pickets and make him develop his lines. The order for the movement was given to General Thomas, who at once directed General Gordon Granger, then commanding the Fourth Corps, to throw one division of the corps forward in the direction of Orchard Knob and hold a second division in supporting distance, to discover the position of the enemy and saying, that Howard's and Baird's commands would be ready to co-operate if needed.¹ General Granger selected our division (General Thomas J. Wood's) for this important service.

Orchard Knob at that time and the ground to right and left of it and between it and Fort Wood, where our division lay behind intrenchments, is thus described by General Granger in his official report:

¹ W. R. R., 55-128.

"Orchard Knob is a rugged hill rising 100 feet above the Chattanooga Valley, lying between Fort Wood, a work on our exterior line of defense northeast of Chattanooga and Mission Ridge, being distant from the former point one and three-quarter miles and about one mile from the ridge. The ascent of the knob is very steep save on the side to the right, looking south, where the ground, gradually sloping from the summit, makes a dip or gorge, and rises on the other side to nearly the same height as the knob; from this point running off in a south-western direction for over one-half of a mile, turning to the right, is a rough rocky ridge, which is covered with a sparse growth of timber. Along the crest of this ridge the enemy had made breast works of logs and stone and a line of rifle pits. Along the base of Orchard Knob, on the side toward Chattanooga, was another line of rifle pits, which extended beyond the knob, on our left more than one mile, following the curvature of Citico Creek, and yet to the left of its termination, and on the other side of the creek ran two additional and parallel lines. A heavy belt of timber, ranging from one-fourth to three-fourths of a mile in width lay between our lines and Orchard Knob, covering the front of the knob and the line of the ridge, and serving the enemy as a mask for his position and movements. Between this timber and Chattanooga were open fields, some of which being low and swampy were difficult to cross with troops. Through them runs the Atlantic and Western Railroad, which, as it approaches the river, bends towards the north end of Missionary Ridge where it passes through the tunnel."

At noon on the twenty-third, General Granger sent the above order he had received from General Thomas to General Wood accompanied by the following order:

"Brig. Gen T. J. Wood,

Commanding Third Division, Fourth Army Corps.

November 23, 1863, 12 M.

Brigadier General Wood with his division will, as soon as possible, carry out the foregoing instructions, and will be supported by General Sheridan's division, to be posted along near the line of railroad, its right resting about midway between Moore's road and the Brush Knob, in front of Lunette Palmer.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. GRANGER,

Major General Commanding."¹

In pursuance of these orders, at one o'clock, the troops designated to take part in the movement moved out of the intrenchments and formed in line facing the enemy's position. Our

¹ W. R. R. 55-254.

division was formed with our brigade (General Willich's) on the left, General Hazen's brigade on the right, while General Samuel Beatty's brigade was in reserve in their rear, to be used in protecting our left flank, should it be found necessary. Our brigade was selected to carry Orchard Knob, "which was the citidel of the line of the enemy's intrenchments".¹ Our regiment held the position of honor, the right of the front line of the advancing column, connecting on the right with the left of Hazen's brigade. To our left, were our old comrades of the Forty-ninth Ohio, then came the Twenty-fifth Illinois, and to their left was the Thirty-fifth Illinois. In the second line in column doubled on the center were, from right to left, the Thirty-second Indiana, Eighty-ninth Illinois, Sixty-eighth Indiana and Fifteenth Wisconsin. At 1:30 o'clock, at a bugle signal from division headquarters, the line moved impetuously forward, across the 2100 yards of intervening space between Fort Wood and the knob. General Wood in his official report says: "General Willich was ordered to direct his brigade on the knob and General Hazen his brigade on the intrenchments on the right of it. So soon as the skirmishers moved forward the enemy opened fire. Across the open field and through the woods the skirmishers kept up a sharp rattling fire, steadily and rapidly driving in the enemy. As the knob and intrenchments were neared the fire became hotter, the resistance of the rebels more determined; but the majestic advance of our lines was not for a moment stayed. Finally Willich's brigade, which had met with less opposition than Hazen's, having arrived quite near the knob, 'by a bold burst', ascended its steep acclivity, crowned its summit and it was ours".²

In the meantime Hazen's brigade was meeting with stubborn resistance from the enemy on our right, but pressed on through a destructive fire, and soon afterwards poured over the enemy's barricades. As soon as the knob and barricades were carried General Granger, commanding the corps, joined General Wood on Orchard Knob. The extensiveness and completeness of our success was at once seen by these officers and reported to General Thomas, who ordered that the position be held and intrenched. So, "after resting a few minutes we began to erect a barricade or breast-work of logs and stones and whatever loose material we could find on the knob. As soon as we began to work the enemy opened on us with his batteries from the top of Mission Ridge and also from the batteries at its foot, and although their firing was rapid, and con-

1 General Wood's Official Report, W. R. R., 55-255.

2 W. R. R. 55-255.

tinued until nearly dark, it did not materially interfere with the progress of our work, so that by the morning of the twenty-fourth we had erected a very good protection against the fire of the infantry".¹ The position gained was considered of great importance, as with these heights in our possession, a column marching to turn Missionary Ridge would be secure from flank attack.² Mr. Dana in the same dispatch to Secretary Stanton describes the movement as "a spectacle of singular magnificence". General Wood in his official report describes it as follows:

"At 1:30 P. M., the arrangements were all completed, the troops were in position, and the reserve ammunition and ambulance trains in rear of Fort Wood. Then, at the bugle signal, the magnificent array, in exact lines and serried columns moved forward. It scarcely ever falls to the lot of man to witness so grand a military display. Every circumstance that could heighten the interest of, or impart dramatic effect to, the scene was present. On the ramparts of Fort Wood were gathered officers of high rank covered with honors gathered on other fields. There were also officers distinguished for scientific attainments, and rare administrative ability. Troops in line and column checkered the broad plain of Chattanooga. In front plainly to be seen was the enemy so soon to be encountered in deadly conflict. My division seemed to drink in the inspiration of the scene and when the 'advance' was sounded, moved forward in the perfect order of a holiday parade. It has been my good fortune to witness on the Champ de Mars and on Long Champs reviews of all arms of the French service, under the eye of the most remarkable man of the present generation. I once saw a review, followed by a mock battle, of the finest troops of *El Re Galantuomo*. The pageant was held on the plains of Milan, the queen city of Lombardy, and the troops in the sham conflict were commanded by two of the most distinguished officers of the Piedmontese service, Cialdini, and another whose name I cannot now recall. In none of these displays did I ever see anything to exceed the soldierly bearing, and the steadiness of my division, exhibited in the advance of Monday afternoon, the twenty-third. There was certainly one striking difference in the circumstances of these grand displays. The French and Italian parades were peaceful pageants; ours involved the exigencies of stern war; certainly an immense difference."³

But this movement, grand and imposing as it certainly was.

1 Colonel Askew's Official Report, W. R. R., 55-275.

2 Mr. Dana's dispatch to Stanton, W. R. R., 55-65.

3 W. R. R., 55-254.

was only preliminary to the grander and more imposing movements which were soon to follow.

While we were thus engaged, General Sherman was energetically concentrating his troops on the north bank of the Tennessee River, preparatory to his attack on the north end of Missionary Ridge. His movements had been further delayed by the breaking of bridges as before stated, and also by the fact that the artillery from our part of the army, which was needed to protect the crossing of his troops, could not be moved until horses from Sherman's divisions had been sent to move it. But at midnight on the twenty-third, while we were bivouacing on Orchard Knob, Sherman's leading brigade under General Giles A. Smith, embarked in poontoons in North Chickamauga Creek, and dropping down the Tennessee River, landed on the south bank, just above the mouth of the South Chickamauga, and captured the rebel pickets. The remainder of General Morgan L. Smith's and the whole of the division of General John E. Smith were ferried across by daylight and immediately set to work digging rifle pits to cover the bridge, which was to be at once built to bring over other troops. This bridge was finished by 1 P. M. on the twenty-fourth, the troops were at once put in motion, and the crest of the north end of Missionary Ridge was gained without serious opposition a little before 4 o'clock, and at once strongly fortified.

While Sherman was thus struggling against great obstacles and fighting his way to the position above named, General Hooker in pursuance of orders from General Grant, was moving against the enemy on Lookout Mountain and fighting what is now known as "the battle above the clouds". This movement of General Hooker's was not contemplated as a part of the plan of battle at first decided on by General Grant. His plan was to throw an overwhelming force against the northern end of Missionary Ridge, leaving only a sufficient force west of Lookout Mountain to hold the enemy there in check. But Osterhaus' division of the Fifteenth Corps, temporarily commanded by General Charles R. Woods, which Sherman was very anxious to have as part of the attacking column, was for some reason so delayed that he decided to make the attack without it. Thereupon, by direction of General Grant, at 10 P. M. November 23, General Hooker was ordered, that if Osterhaus' division did not get across the river by daybreak next morning, it was to report to him, and in that event, he, Hooker, was directed to try to take the point of Lookout Mountain.¹ Osterhaus' division did not get across the river by daybreak next morning, and

1 W. R. R. 55-105.

so reported to General Hooker, who at about 11 o'clock began the attack on Lookout, as ordered.

In addition to the line of breastworks on Orchard Knob which we had thrown up, we also, built epaulements for artillery, and Captain Bridge's battery of four three and one-half inch Rodman guns and two Napoleons, was brought up on the knob. During the twenty-fourth, besides some picket duty, we had nothing to do but to lie around and await developments and orders. Generals Grant, Thomas and Granger found the knob an admirable position from which to view the field and to direct the grand movements going on, and all were there in person. These men were keenly and anxiously studied by our officers and men, and their movements, gestures and manners were critically observed. General Wood in his official report before mentioned says: "During the twenty-fourth the division was quiet, remaining in undisturbed possession of the important acquisitions of the previous afternoon. The enemy, in full view and sheltered behind his rifle pits at the base of Missionary Ridge, made no effort to retrieve his losses. An occasional shot from the skirmishers, and the booming of a gun from Orchard Knob, varied the monotony of the day. We had ample opportunity to watch with eager interest the brilliant operations—though miles away from us—of General Hooker's command for the possession of Lookout Mountain, and when the morning sun of Wednesday had dispelled the mist from the mountain top and displayed to our view the banner of the free and the brave flying from the topmost peak of Lookout Mountain, loud and long were the joyous shouts with which my division made the welkin ring".¹

The night battle of Hooker's forces on Lookout Mountain was a wonderful spectacle, as witnessed from Orchard Knob. It lasted until 10 P. M. A full moon made their battle field as plain as if it were day, the blaze of their camp fires and the flashes of their guns displaying brilliantly their position and the progress of their advance.²

By the operations of the twenty-fourth, above detailed, that night our forces maintained an unbroken line, with open communications, from the north end of Lookout Mountain, through Chattanooga Valley to the north end of Missionary Ridge, and General Grant gave orders for our advance all along the line at daylight the next morning. His order to General Thomas was as follows:

1 W. R. R., 55-257.

2 W. R. R., 55-67.

"Hdqrs. Military Division of the Mississippi,
Chattanooga, Tenn., November 24, 1863.

Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas,
Commanding Army of the Cumberland.

General: General Sherman carried Missionary Ridge as far as the tunnel, with only slight skirmishing. His right now rests at the tunnel and on top of the hill; his left at Chickamauga Creek. I have instructed General Sherman to advance as soon as it is light in the morning, and your attack, which will be simultaneous, will be in co-operation.

Your command will either carry the rifle pits and ridge directly in front of them, or move to the left, as the presence of the enemy may require. If Hooker's present position on the mountain can be maintained with a small force, and it is found impracticable to carry the top from where he is, it would be advisable for him to move up the valley with all the force he can spare and ascend by the first practicable road.

Very respectfully,

U. S. GRANT,
Major General Commanding."¹

At 6:30 P. M. the same day General Thomas instructed General Granger, "to have everything ready for an offensive movement early tomorrow morning", and such orders were communicated to General Sheridan² and presumably to General Wood. Early on the morning of the twenty-fifth the troops at Orchard Knob saw the stars and stripes floating from the top of Lookout Mountain and knew that General Hooker's night battle had been a glorious victory. Soon it was known that Sherman was advancing against the northern end of Missionary Ridge. Long columns of the enemy could be seen from Orchard Knob, marching along the ridge towards Sherman's position, and soon their guns and Sherman's could be heard opening the battle. We knew that our comrades of the Army of the Tennessee were deliberately drawing the firecest forces of the enemy to their battle front, and were impatient to get into the fight and do our part. Generals Grant, Thomas, Granger, Wood and other high officers were on Orchard Knob, aides and orderlies were hurriedly coming and going, and the signal flags, over where Sherman's troops were fighting, were wig-wagging reports of his progress. On the twenty-fourth our regiment had been relieved from duty on the first line by the Thirty-second Indiana and took their places on the second line, but on the morning of the twenty-fifth we again took our position in the first line, the Thirty-second Indiana resuming its place in the second line. Our brigade was formed from right to left as follows: First line, the Fifteenth Ohio, Forty-ninth Ohio, Twenty-fifth Illinois Thirty-fifth Illinois; second line, Thirty-second Indiana, Eighty-

¹ W. R. R., 55-44.

² W. R. R., 55-137.

ninth Illinois, Eighth Kansas, Sixty-eighth Indiana, with the Fifteenth Wisconsin as a last reserve.¹ We were thus again on the right of the line of the brigade, with our brave and tried comrades of the Forty-ninth Ohio on our left, and our equally brave and tried comrades of the Thirty-second Indiana supporting us in the rear. On our right in close touch were the gallant men of Hazen's brigade. The front of our regiment was covered by Company A (Capt. J. C. Cummins), and Company B (Lieutenant A. L. Smith) as skirmishers, supported by Company F (Captain Amos Glover), and Company G (Captain A. R. Z. Dawson) in reserve, all under command of Major John McClenahan.²

At 9 o'clock the pickets covering our front were moved forward and drove the enemy's pickets back to their rifle pits at the foot of Missionary Ridge.³ "As the day progressed the interest which attracted every eye and absorbed every feeling was that involved in the attempt of General Sherman's command to effect a lodgment on Mission Ridge near the tunnel."⁴ The signal for our advance,—six guns fired in rapid succession from Orchard Knob,—had been agreed upon and was known as early as 11 o'clock A. M.

The men along the line awaited it like hounds in leash, eager to be let loose on the quarry. The conflict on the left seemed to deepen, and more and more of the enemy in our front along Missionary Ridge were detached and hurried to their right to be flung against Sherman's advancing columns. Finally, "at twenty minutes before 4 P. M." says Granger, "the booming of the big guns on Orchard Knob awoke the echoes on Lookout Mountain and Walden and Missionary Ridges, and before they had died away our advance was begun."

The story of this charge on Missionary Ridge has been eloquently told by many who witnessed it, but herein are presented only the official reports of our regimental brigade, division and corps commanders, an extract from the report of General Thomas, and the personal experiences of some members of the Fifteenth Ohio, who were active participants in it. Colonel Askew in his official report says: "When the signal for the general advance was given * * * we moved forward with the whole line, taking the double quick step as soon as we reached the open ground in front of the first line of the enemy's works at the foot of Mission Ridge. The skirmishers, with the supporting companies deployed with them, went into the works

1 General Willich's Report, W. R. R., 55-264.

2 Colonel Askew's Report, W. R. R., 55-275.

3 General Willich's Report, W. R. R., 55-264.

4 General Wood's Report, W. R. R., 55-275.

at the foot of the ridge meeting with very little resistance from the few infantry of the enemy, who occupied these works * * * our skirmishers were soon followed by the regiment in line, which, as we neared the foot of the ridge, was exposed to a very heavy fire from artillery and infantry, posted behind the works on the top of the ridge, the artillery fire doing us but little damage, however, as they shot over us. Here, everyone being considerably exhausted by the rapid pace at which we had reached the foot of the ridge, and under the protection of the log huts, which had been the camp of the enemy, most of the command halted, and rested for a moment before undertaking the difficult task of climbing the steep face of the ridge, 'crowned with batteries and encircled with rifle pits'. However, the stouter ones soon pushed out, followed by the whole command and slowly and stubbornly began to climb the hill, exposed all the while to a deluge of grape and canister from the batteries and musket balls from the rifle pits. Still on they went, a stage at a time, picking off any of the enemy who dared show his head above their works. Finally the works were reached, and with a yell, the men went over them, and in among the terror-stricken and confused enemy, many of whom threw down their arms, yielded themselves prisoners and were sent to the rear. Those who attempted to escape were pursued down the eastern slope of the ridge and many of them captured. Pieces of artillery and caissons, which the enemy were attempting to get off down the road—which leaves the summit of the ridge where this command gained it and runs down the eastern slope of the ridge to the valley—were pursued, some of the horses shot, and the artillerists driven off or captured. The command being by this time very much scattered, and fearing that there might be an attempt on the part of the enemy to regain the ridge, I caused the rally to be sounded and in as short time as possible we were reorganized and ready for any movement, offensive or defensive and awaited orders. While resting here, Captains Dawson, Carroll and Pettit were sent with details from the regiment to bring up the artillery and caissons which we had compelled the enemy to abandon. They returned with five pieces of artillery and several caissons. Shortly after this I received the order to join the brigade on the top of the ridge, which we did, and our operations for the day were ended".¹

General Willich in his official report, says: "At 11 A. M. I received an order to prepare for an advance, and to advance toward Missionary Ridge at the signal of six rapid cannon shots. I understand since that the order was given to take only the

¹ W. R. R., 55-275.

rifle pits at the foot of the ridge; by what accident I am unable to say, I did not understand it so; I only understood the order to advance. On the given signal the brigade advanced in quick time, but shell and spherical case fell very thick, and all the regiments double quicked until they reached the rebel rifle pits and camps at the foot of the ridge, driving the enemy's infantry before them, all his artillery being on the crest of the ridge. It was evident to everyone that to stay in this position would be certain destruction and final defeat; every soldier felt the necessity of saving the day and the campaign by conquering, and every one saw instinctively that the only place of safety was the enemy's works on the crest of the ridge. My Adjutant Captain Schmitt, was already at the extreme left, and Ordnance Officer, Lieutenant Foot (who on this occasion was wounded by a shell) was sent to different regiments. I myself with my Inspector, Lieutenant Green went to the Eighth Kansas, and the command forward was soon heard all along the lines, though I verily believe that even without any command the regiments would have stormed, as a great number of skirmishers were already climbing up the ridge before the command was given. The part of the ridge which fell to the share of my brigade formed a kind of crescent; two roads, one on the right, one on the left, leading up the hill, there joining with the roads on the crest of the ridge and forming the main road to Chickamauga station; the only good line of retreat of the enemy. The ascent was (in the closer quarters) defended by one battery to the right and two batteries to the left, on two different rallying points. Many men fell down exhausted in climbing up under the enemy's fire, some fainted, but irresistible was the general advance. What so often is uttered in eloquent speeches, in comfortable *salons*, in State Houses and in halls of Congress 'Victory or Death', was here an uncomfortable reality. The right of the brigade reached first, and mounted the enemy's breast works, consisting of men from all the regiments of the center and right. From these works they had to charge the rallying enemy and received the fire from the batteries on the right and on the left. The battery on the right was taken in a very few moments by the right of mine and the left of General Hazen's brigade. The Thirty-second Indiana and Sixth Ohio, claim the honor of being the first to plant their colors on the crest; but a few moments (elapsed) and all the colors of the brigade were in the enemy's works. The Thirty-fifth Illinois and Twenty-fifth Illinois, supported by the Sixty-eighth Indiana and a portion of the Eighth Kansas, took the first battery on the left, drove the enemy from

the guns and passed it. This battery was afterwards claimed as a trophy of another command. Lieutenant Colonel Chandler, carrying his regimental colors after seven color sergeants had been killed or wounded, the colors receiving more than thirty bullet holes, planted them on the works where they were soon joined by those of the Sixty-eighth Indiana, Eighty-sixth Indiana and Fifty-ninth Ohio (the two latter of General Samuel Beatty's brigade). Here Lieutenant Colonel Chandler wheeled the Thirty-fifth Illinois and Sixty-eighth Indiana and portions of the Eighty-sixth Indiana and Fifty-ninth Ohio to the left, and charged the enemy in the flank, while the other regiments of the brigade followed the fleeing enemy down the east slope of the ridge and took from him five pieces of artillery and eight caisson, which had already reached on their flight, a half to three-quarters of a mile from the crest. Colonel Chandler followed up the charge in the flank of the enemy for one and one-half miles, joined by men of Generals Beatty's and Baird's commands, who had gained the crest in the wake of the charge. I then recalled my regiments from the pursuit, and received orders from General Grant in person to reform the brigade on the crest for further eventualities, which I did. Our trophies, credited to my brigade are five pieces of artillery, eight caissons, 1200 stand of small arms, two battle flags, and between 300 and 400 prisoners, though properly it is entitled to more. It should be a rule that no command has a right to claim a trophy which it finds and from which it does not drive the enemy by force of arms".¹

General Thomas J. Wood, who was for so long a time our beloved division commander, describes our assault on Missionary Ridge so clearly and comprehensively in his official report that the historian is loth to omit a line of it. He says:

"I was ordered to advance and carrying the enemy's intrenchments at the base of Mission Ridge and hold them. The signal for the advance was to be six guns, fired in rapid succession from the battery on Orchard Knob. The necessary instructions were given to the brigade commanders. * * * Mission Ridge is an elevated range with an average altitude of several hundred feet above the general level of the country, running from northeast to southwest. The part of it assaulted by my division * * * is about four miles from Chattanooga and about a mile from Orchard Knob. Between the latter and the base of Mission Ridge there is a broad wooded valley. Of course this had to be traversed before the intrenchments at the

1 W. R. R., 55-263.

base of the ridge could be assaulted. So soon as my troops began to move forward the enemy opened a terrific fire from his batteries on the crest of the ridge. The batteries were so posted as to give a direct and cross fire on the assailing troops. It would not, perhaps, be an exaggeration to say that the enemy had fifty pieces of artillery disposed on the crest of Mission Ridge. But the rapid firing of all this mass of artillery could not stay the onward movement of our troops. They pressed forward with dauntless ardor, and carried the line of entrenchments at the base of the ridge. The assault was so rapid that a considerable number of prisoners were captured in the intrenchments. When the first line of intrenchments was carried, the goal for which we had started was won. Our orders carried us no further. We had been instructed to carry the line of intrenchments at the base of the ridge and there halt. But the enthusiasm and impetuosity of the troops were such that those who first reached the intrenchments at the base of the ridge bounded over them, and pressed on up the ascent after the flying enemy. Moreover, the intrenchments were no protection against the enemy's artillery on the ridge. To remain would be destruction—to return would be both expensive in life and disgraceful. Officers and men all seemed impressed with this truth. In addition, the example of those who commenced to ascend the ridge so soon as the intrenchments were carried, was contagious. Without waiting for an order the vast mass pressed forward in the race for glory, each man anxious to be the first on the summit. The enemy's artillery and musketry could not check the impetuous assault. The troops did not halt to fire. To have done so would have been ruinous. Little was left to the commanders of the troops than to cheer on the foremost—to encourage the weaker of limb, and to sustain the very few who seemed to be faint hearted. To the eternal honor of the troops, it should be recorded that the laggards were, indeed, few in number. The interval which elapsed between the carrying of the intrenchments at the base of the ridge and the crowning of the summit must have been one of intense and painful anxiety to all who were not participants in the assault. The ascent of Mission Ridge was indeed an effort to try the strongest limbs and stoutest hearts. But surprise and anxiety were not of long duration. Upward steadily went the standard of the Union (borne onward by strong arms, upheld by stout hearts) and soon it was seen flying on the crest of Mission Ridge. Loud indeed were the shouts with which this spectacle was received. Some of the first troops on the crest of the ridge pressed forward in pursuit of the fleeing enemy immediately in front of them,

while others (with great good sense on the part of their brigade commanders) were deployed to the right and left to clear the ridge and relieve the pressure on the troops that had not gained the summit. The good effect of the flank attacks was almost instantaneously apparent, and soon the entire crest was occupied by our troops. Mission Ridge was ours. * * * The assault on Mission Ridge is certainly one of the most remarkable achievements that have ever occurred. Military history would probably be ransacked in vain for a parallel. With so much of physical obstacle to overcome, with so much armed resistance encountered, probably no assault was ever so eminently successful. In fifty minutes from the time the advance commenced the first flags were seen flying on the crest of the ridge.¹

General Granger in his official report describes the topography of the battle ground much as General Wood does, and adds that "in front of Mission Ridge the enemy had cleared away the timber for a distance of from 300 to 500 yards, so as to leave no obstruction to a direct and enfilading fire from them." He describes the preliminaries to the advance and the advance itself as follows: "At daylight the next morning, November 25, Major General Sherman, having crossed the Tennessee River at the designated points, gained possession of the northern end of the ridge near the railroad tunnel. Long columns of the enemy could be seen before sunrise moving towards that point, and it was not late in the day before their guns, with General Sherman's briskly replying, were heard opening the battle. For hours my command, from behind their breast works, anxiously and impatiently watched this struggle of their brothers in arms away off to their left, on the northern end of the ridge. They saw these veterans from Vicksburg coming to their relief and engaging the same enemy who had beleaguered them for nine long weeks, holding them in their defensive works by strong lines of circumvallation that rested upon Lookout Mountain and Mission Ridge and in the Cattanooga Valley, and that stretched like an iron crescent from the river on their right to the river on their left. As the day wore on, their impatience of restraint gathered force and their desire to advance became almost uncontrollable; at last came the order to move. General Sherman was unable to make any progress in moving along the ridge during the day, as the enemy had massed in his front, therefore, in order to relieve him, I was ordered to make a demonstration upon the works of enemy directly in my front, at the base of Mission Ridge. I accordingly directed Major General Sheridan and Brigadier General Wood to advance their divisions at a

1 W. R. R. 55-257-258.

given signal, moving directly forward simultaneously and briskly, to attack the enemy, and, driving him from his rifle pits, to take possession of them. At twenty minutes before 4 P. M. six guns, the signal agreed upon, were fired in rapid succession, and before the smoke had cleared away these two divisions, (Sheridan on the right and Wood on the left) had cleared the breast works that had sheltered them for two days, and were moving forward. They were formed in the following order: first a double line of skirmishers * * * then the line of battle by brigades, commencing on the extreme right with Colonel Sherman's brigade, then Colonel Harker's, then General Wagner's, then General Hazen's, then General Willich's and next, on the extreme left General Beatty's; following this line were the reserves in mass. * * * At the moment of the advance * * * Mission Ridge blazed with the fire from the batteries which lined its summit. Not less than fifty guns opened at once, throwing a terrible shower of shot and shell. The enemy, now taking the alarm, commenced to move troops from both extremities of the ridge for the purpose of filling up the works below and around these batteries. In the meantime the troops holding the woods were driven back to the works at the base of the ridge, their pursuers rapidly following. Here they halted and made a stout resistance, but our troops, by an impetuous assault, broke this line in several places; then scaling the breast works at these points, opened a flank and reverse fire upon them, which throwing them into confusion, caused their precipitate flight. Many prisoners were left in our hands, and we captured a large number of small arms. My orders had now been fully and successfully carried out, but not enough had been done to satisfy the brave troops who had accomplished so much. Although the batteries at short range, by direct and enfilading fire, were still pouring down upon them a shower of iron, and musketry from the hillside and thinning their ranks, they dashed over the breast works, through the rifle pits, and started up the ridge. They started without orders along the whole line of both divisions from right to left and from left to right, simultaneously and with one accord, animated with one spirit and with heroic courage. Eagerly they rushed forward to a danger before which the bravest, marching under orders, might tremble. Officers caught the enthusiasm of the men and the men in turn were cheered by the officers. Each regiment tried to surpass the other in fighting its way up a hill which would try those of stout limb and strong lungs to climb, and each tried to place its flag first on the summit. Above these men was an additional line of rifle pits, filled with troops. What was on the summit

of the ridge they knew not, and did not stop to inquire. The enemy was before them; to know that was sufficient. * * * I sent my assistant adjutant general to inquire first of General Wood and then of General Sheridan, whether the troops had been ordered up by them; and to instruct them to take the ridge if possible. In reply to this General Wood told him that the men had started up the ridge without orders, and that he could take it if he could be supported. In the meantime an aide-de-camp from General Sheridan had reported to me that the general wished to know whether the order that had been given to take the rifle pits 'meant those at the base of the ridge or those on top'. My reply was that the order had been to take those at the base. Conceiving this to be an order to fall back to these rifle pits, and on his way to General Sheridan so reporting it to General Wagner, commanding Second Brigade of Sheridan's division, this brigade was withdrawn from a position which it had gained on the side of the ridge to the rifle pits, which were being raked by the enemy's artillery, from this point, starting again under a terrible fire, made the ascent of the ridge. My assistant adjutant general, on his way to General Sheridan, reported to me General Wood's reply, but by my instructions went no further with the message which I had given him, as I had already sent Captain Avery, my aide-de-camp, directly to General Sheridan, with orders to go ahead and take the ridge if he could. I had also in the meantime sent all the rest of my staff officers, some of them to deliver similar messages to General Sheridan and General Wood—fearing the first messages might not get through—and others to order up the reserves and every man that remained behind to the support of the troops starting up the ridge. * * * Through the shower of musket shot that came from above, climbing up the ridge over rocks and felled timber, my command marched upward. In just one hour, (General Wood says fifty minutes)⁴ from the time of leaving Orchard Knob it was driving the enemy from his last line of breastworks and rifle pits and capturing his batteries. * * * The bold and successful attempt to storm Mission Ridge, the results which followed, the short time consumed in beating back the enemy, and the fruits of victory render this one of the most remarkable battles of the age. The ridge was taken after a hard struggle, and those who looked on from below were unable to tell which division or what regiment first reached its summit, for along my whole line many regiments appeared to dash over the breastworks on the crest at the same moment. Although it took but one hour to gain the ridge, my command lost 20.21

1 Page 377 ante.

per cent of the forces engaged in killed and wounded. We captured thirty-one pieces of artillery and 3812 prisoners."¹

General Thomas in his official report says:

"Instructions were sent to General Hooker to be ready to advance on the morning of the twenty-fifth from his position on the point of Lookout Mountain to the Summertown road and endeavor to interrupt the enemy's retreat, if he had not already withdrawn, which he was to ascertain by pushing a reconnoissance to the top of Lookout Mountain. The reconnoissance was made as directed, and having ascertained that the enemy had evacuated during the night, General Hooker was then directed to move on the Rossville road with the troops under his command (except Carlin's brigade which was to rejoin its division), carry the pass at Rossville and operate on the enemy's left and rear. Palmer's and Granger's troops were held in readiness to advance directly on the rifle pits in their front as soon as Hooker could get into position at Rossville. In retiring on the night of the twenty-fourth, the enemy had destroyed the bridges over Chattanooga Creek on the road leading from Chattanooga to Rossville, and in consequence General Hooker was delayed until after 2 P. M. in effecting the crossing of the creek. About noon General Sherman becoming heavily engaged by the enemy, they having massed a strong force in his front, orders were given for General Baird to march his division within supporting distance of General Sherman. Moving his division promptly in the direction indicated, he was placed in position to the left of Wood's division of Granger's corps. Owing to the difficulties of the ground, his troops did not get in line with Granger's until about 2:30 p. m. Orders were then given him, however, to move forward on Granger's left and within supporting distance, against the enemy's rifle pits on the slope and at the foot of Missionary Ridge. The whole line then advanced against the breastworks and soon became warmly engaged with the enemy's skirmishers; these, giving way, retired upon their reserves, posted within their works. Our troops advancing steadily in a continuous line, the enemy, seized with panic, abandoned the works at the foot of the hill and retreated precipitately to the crest, where they were closely followed by our troops, who, apparently inspired by the impulse of victory, carried the hill simultaneously at six different points and so closely on the heels of the enemy that many of them were taken prisoners in the trenches. We captured all their cannon and ammunition before they could be removed or destroyed".²

1 W. R. R., 55-257.

2 W. R. R., 55-127.

Lieutenant Colonel John McClenahan who was then Major of the Fifteenth Ohio, and, as before stated, was in command of our skirmishers, in a paper read at Monmouth College, Illinois, gave his recollections of the battle as follows:

"The Army of the Cumberland was directed to storm the ridge (Missionary Ridge), and I was ordered to take command of the division's skirmish line. I asked General Willich where we should stop. He replied 'I don't know, at H—— Hades, I expect'. The skirmish line pushed across the valley to the foot of the ridge. We found we could not stop there but were forced to mount the ridge half way, where we halted to await the line of battle then approaching the valley. The approach of the army crossing the valley was the grandest sight I saw during the war, 50,000 men, the whole Army of the Cumberland, Hooker's corps on the right and Howard's corps on the left, in line of battle, with the line of reserves in column behind,—all plainly in sight at one time—each regiment slightly V shaped with the colors at the apex—the enemy's cannon firing over our heads from the ridge above us, and the heavy guns of Fort Wood firing over our army at the enemy above. Soon as our battle lines arrived, we pushed forward on up. The enemy abandoned their works and we captured the ridge after determined and hard fighting."

Major Joseph N. Dubois, who was adjutant of the regiment at the time, in a letter dated May 9, 1909, at Dallas, Texas, where he now resides, says:

"You will recall the charge on Mission Ridge, how we pressed up the gully until we came to the works; how the men lifted the front ones up so they could reach the top of the breastworks; how, when Captain J. C. Cummins was lifted over, he being in my judgment the first man on top, and received the wound that caused his death. I was within five feet of him at the time, but did not stop to see him, but soon got together a score of the boys from the different companies and pushed over the top, and shot the front artillery horses of the retreating enemy as they were attempting to escape down a road on the opposite side, thus causing them to lose a large quantity of artillery. Then, indeed, in my enthusiasm, did I pray for daylight, for if we had had two hours more, we would have compelled a large surrender."

Washington J. Vance of Company K, a short time before his death in 1910, related his experience in the capture of the enemy's artillery, and remembered that he and others fired at and brought down some of the horses of the enemy's artillery which was trying to escape, and that he and T. C. McColley

of Company G, captured two of the horses and rode them up to where General Willich was surrounded by the men of the brigade, and saying: "My poys, you kills me mit joy, you kills me mit joy."

January 25, 1909, Lieutenant Samuel C. McKirahan, then a non-commissioned officer of Company F, wrote a letter from Los Angeles, Cal., recalling his experiences at Orchard Knob and Missionary Ridge, as follows:

"November 23, we marched out in front of Fort Wood and formed in line, as some thought, for dress parade. We were ordered to advance, and hardly before we knew it, our regiment and the Forty-ninth Ohio had possession of Orchard Knob, where General Grant established his headquarters. From that position we witnessed Hooker's men charging the face of Lookout Mountain on the 24th. Next forenoon we saw the rebs marching along on Mission Ridge going to our left against Sherman, who had crossed the Ridge and was threatening their rear. I was but a few feet from General Grant when Sherman opened up communication, and reported that the rebels were pushing him back. Soon after this four companies of our regiment, A, B, F and G, were ordered out on the skirmish line. A short time after this our Major and Bugler came to us (we were supporting Company A) and said they were ordered there; they didn't know what for. We had not long to wait. First a shot was fired from headquarters, and then all along the line came the bugle call to go forward. That is all the order we had, all we got. In fact, we didn't want any more—you know the result.

When the skirmishers had climbed up about two-thirds or three-fourths of the way, we came to a halt and for the first time I thought of looking back. I was surprised to see we had no support. I said to one of Company A, 'What are we going to do up here? Why don't they send us support? They can easily capture this little line.' Just then Company A's man said, 'Look! Yonder they come.' As they came across the valley on double quick, flags unfurled, arms at right shoulder shift, their bright barrels glistening as the sun shone on them, it certainly was a grand and inspiring sight. As they approached, the skirmishers, with a shout, arose as one man, and we were soon climbing over the rebel works on top of the ridge. Thomas B. Jackson of Company F, claimed the honor of being the first man in the works in our front.¹ The Johnnies hardly began to move their artillery until we, the skirmishers, were inside their works. The country being

1 Morris Cope, then a noncommissioned officer of Company E thinks that Jackson was the first man of the regiment inside the works.

very rugged and broken we took cross-cuts and captured men, horses and guns. I remember so well Company F boys following an outfit of that kind quite a distance and coming back with the whole shooting match, riding the horses and compelling the rebs they had taken prisoners to march back on foot. Of course we had a jollification when General Willich came up. With hat in hand, as usual, and laughing, he said: 'Look! As I was coming up the hill I saw a son-of-a-gun stopped behind a stump, and jumped on him and kicked him, and see, I broke all my spurs.' About that time there was a great shout from the Company F boys, and General Willich came running and said: 'What! What is de matter now?' Captain Glover said: 'Best news of all, General, our company cook has brought us two big kettles of hot coffee.' And so he had. Away back in camp at Fort Wood, Dave Mills, our cook, as soon as he saw us start up the ridge, left camp with the hot coffee and followed on after until he reached us and delivered the goods."

Colonel Askew concludes his official report of the part the Fifteenth Ohio took in the grand movements and battles described in this chapter as follows:

"I desire to call the attention of the General to the gallant conduct of Sergeant Ward,¹ our brave color bearer, who, while climbing up the ridge with the colors in advance of the regiment, received a severe wound. The colors were taken up by Corporal Norton, one of the color guard, and borne on up, and we have the gratification of knowing were among the first planted on the enemy's works. Robert B. Brown, a private of Company A, also deserves special mention for having captured a flag of the enemy. Major McClenahan and Adjutant Dubois * * * fully sustained their reputation as brave men and good officers, which they had gained on other battlefields. Captain J. C. Cummins (who had his arm shot away after he had gained the top of the ridge), Captain Glover, Captain Dawson, Captain Carroll, Captain G. W. Cummins, Captain Pettit, and Captain Byrd (who was again wounded, having just rejoined the regiment from an absence on account of wound received at Chickamauga) were conspicuous for their gallantry, and were with their men, cheering them on. The subalterns of the regiment bore themselves well and rendered valuable service. Lieutenant Sanders, who was killed, although lately promoted, gave promise of being as good an officer as he was an excellent soldier. * *

I regret that on account of the already voluminous extent of this report I cannot furnish you the names of every

non-commissioned officer and private of this regiment who participated in the assault on Mission Ridge, but I hope that measures may be taken to have their names preserved and recorded, so that in after days, when their labors shall have been rewarded with the blessings of peace, they may be able to point with pride to the fact that they were among the heroes of Mission Ridge.

Our loss was as follows:

KILLED.—Commissioned officers, one; enlisted men, three.

WOUNDED.—Commissioned officers, two; enlisted men, eighteen; total, twenty-four".¹

Their names as gleaned from the official rolls and rosters are as follows:

KILLED, WOUNDED AND MISSING, MISSIONARY RIDGE, NOVEMBER 25, 1863.

COMPANY A.

KILLED OR DIED OF WOUNDS RECEIVED IN BATTLE.—Captain James C. Cummins (wounded and died of wounds February 19, 1864.

WOUNDED.—Samuel Rankin.

COMPANY B.

KILLED.—Simon Sines, Clark Sears.

COMPANY C.

WOUNDED.—Captain John G. Byrd, Sergeant William A. Ward, Joseph P. Moulton, William C. Markward, Richard L. Wrenn.

COMPANY D.

WOUNDED.—Oscar Davis, Henry C. Nagle.

COMPANY E.

WOUNDED.—William R. Davis, William H. Hays.

COMPANY F.

WOUNDED.—James K. Barker, Asbury Welsh.

COMPANY G.

WOUNDED.—H. P. Hagerman, George H. Stone, William S. Williams.

COMPANY H.

WOUNDED.—Sergeant Joseph S. Lehew, Henry J. Flagg, Christian M. Haverstick.

COMPANY K.

KILLED.—Lieutenant Frank W. Sanders, Balaam Norris. The battle of Missionary Ridge was probably the most spectacular engagement during the war. The setting was

¹ W. R. R. 55, page 275.

superb. The day was clear and fine, and the whole line of our advance could be plainly seen from Chattanooga. Non-combatants who witnessed our charge on the ridge spoke and wrote of it as something almost miraculous. The enemy's position on the crest of the ridge, fortified as it was, with more than fifty cannon in position to defend it, seemed impregnable. General Willich, when first told that we were expected to assault it, said: "Vell, I makes my vill." It is quite evident from the official reports that some general officers doubted the wisdom of a direct assault, and that General Grant, who had given the order for such assault simultaneously with General Sherman's attack on the north end of the ridge, possibly withheld its execution, hoping Sherman's success on the left and Hooker's advance on the Rossville road, would make it unnecessary. General Bragg in his official report says: "Such was the strength of our position that no doubt was entertained of our ability to hold it. * * * The position was one which ought to have been held by a line of skirmishers against any assaulting column, and wherever resistance was made the enemy fled in disorder after suffering heavy loss. Those who reached the ridge did so in a condition of exhaustion from the great physical effort in climbing, which rendered them powerless, and the slightest effort would have destroyed them."¹

Mr. Chas. A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, witnessed the assault, and telegraphed Secretary Stanton: "The storming of the ridge by our troops was one of the greatest miracles in military history. No man who climbs the ascent by any of the roads that wind along its front can believe that 18,000 men were moved up its broken and crumbling face unless it was his fortune to witness the deed. It seems as awful as a visible interposition of God."²

The whole moving force seemed to be inspired with a noble rage, which spurned death and any obstacle however great. The whole valley resounded with cheers, and even the wounded, whose voices were not silenced, joined in the cheering. Major William M. Clark, Surgeon of the Fifteenth Ohio, relates that a boy of not more than 18 or 19 years came back with one arm hanging limp at his side, cheering, and swinging his cap with the other. He examined him and found that the limp arm was literally shot off, that the shot had knocked him down and that in falling, his coat sleeve had been twisted so as to stop the flow of blood, and in this condition he had started back down the ridge, cheering and waving his cap.

Mr. Dana must have partaken of the enthusiasm, for at

1 W. R. R. 55-66

2 W. R. R. 55-69.

4:30 P. M., he telegraphed to Secretary Stanton: "Glory to God. The day is decisively ours; Missionary Ridge has just been carried by a magnificent charge of Thomas' troops, and rebels routed."¹

After the battle, it seems, almost every regiment, brigade and division of our corps were "so covetous of honor" as to be "the most offending souls alive." All made claim to having first planted its colors on the crest of the ridge, and nearly all made claim to the trophies of victory—the captured cannon and prisoners. General Willich strongly intimates that other commands laid claim to some of the cannon our brigade captured, and General Sheridan openly charged that General Hazen had taken and claimed credit for eleven cannon which his division had captured.² General Willich in his official report only claims the capture of five pieces of artillery by our brigade. But Colonel Askew, as will be remembered, reported the capture of five pieces, and that he "sent Captains Dawson, Carroll and Pettit to bring up the artillery and caissons which we had compelled the enemy to abandon," who "returned with five pieces of artillery and several caissons." Colonel Nodine of the Twenty-fifth Illinois, reports the capture of "one James rifled cannon and seven caissons loaded with ammunition";³ Colonel Chandler, Thirty-fifth Illinois, reports the capture of two cannon by his regiment;⁴ Colonel Erdelmeyer of the Thirty-second Indiana, says his regiment captured five pieces of artillery with caissons;⁵ Colonel Martin of the Eighth Kansas, officially reports that his regiment "assisted in capturing and hauling off several pieces of artillery and caissons, which the enemy were trying to run off";⁶ Colonel Gray of the Forty-ninth Ohio, says his regiment contributed to the capture of "several pieces of artillery."⁷

It is not strange that these conflicting claims should have been made. In climbing the ridge the lines of regiments were broken, the reserves in the second line pressed forward into first line, and all were eager to be first in the enemy's works. General Wood in his official report treats these conflicting claims fairly and justly as follows:

"As is not at all singular, there is a difference of opinion as to what troops first crowned the summit of Mission Ridge. All the different divisions engaged in the assault set up claims to this honor. The brigades of the same division (I know it

1 W. R. R. 55-68.

2 W. R. R. 55-192.

3 W. R. R. 55-266.

4 W. R. R. 55-268.

5 W. R. R. 55-271.

6 W. R. R. 55-274.

7 W. R. R. 55-278.

is so in my division) have conflicting claims, and in like manner the regiments of the same brigade lay claim to the honor. Each commander, observing of course, his own troops more closely than others, is disposed to think, with all honesty, that his command was first on the crest. While I am liable to be mistaken, I sincerely think a considerable portion of my division were the first troops that reached the summit; but I am not able to discriminate with certainty which one of the three brigades was first up. The truth is, parts of each brigade reached the crest almost simultaneously, and where injustice might be done I do not think it advisable to make a decision on the conflicting claims. In fact, I do not consider myself competent to do so. I was much more interested in getting to the top of the ridge than in seeing who reached there first. Happily, it is a question which does not require to be definitely settled. The strong position of the enemy was carried, and it matters little what particular regiment, brigade or division, was the first on the summit. Where all strove so arduously to do well he who was first up can only be considered more fortunate, not more deserving, than his comrades."¹

As to conflicting claims in regard to the capture of artillery, he says:

"There is, I believe, some conflict of claim between Generals Willich and Hazen as to the priority of capture of two pieces of artillery, and I think they have both included them in their reports of captures. Without pretending to decide which of the two has the better claim, which I am really not able to do (nor is it at all important the question should be decided), but making the correction to avoid counting two pieces twice, the reports of the brigade commanders show an aggregate capture of twenty-nine pieces of artillery by my division, all field guns. In regard to the conflict between Generals Hazen and Willich, it may be remarked that it is not at all strange such differences of opinion should exist in regard to occurrences on the battlefield, as by reason of the turmoil of the conflict, it is often impossible to mark distinctly the exact order and precedence of events, and when also two regiments may arrive simultaneously at the same place and each honestly thinks itself the first there."

It is a dangerous thing for a regimental historian to enter the field of inquiry so ably covered by others, and attempt to discuss the still open question, whether or not specific orders were given for the assault on Missionary Ridge. Claim

1 W. R. R., 55-259.

is made that no such orders were given, and that the rank and file, by a patriotic impulse moved forward, without orders, and carried the ridge. On the other hand, it is claimed that such order was given, that it was a part of the orderly plan of battle devised by General Grant, and was made in pursuance of such order. Notwithstanding the conflicting record evidence on this question, we are constrained to believe that the rank and file did no violence to General Grant's orders or wishes in assaulting the ridge, even without orders from their immediate commanders.

Shortly after the battle it was charged that the assault was unnecessarily delayed, and that by reason of such delay the enemy could not be successfully pursued, his way of retreat cut off, and larger portions of his troops captured, which would have been the case if the assault had been made an hour earlier. Mr. Dana in a dispatch to Secretary Stanton, dated 8 P. M. the day of the battle, says:

"The rebels having sent the great mass of their troops to crush Sherman, Grant gave orders at 2 P. M. for an assault upon their lines in front of Thomas, but owing to the fault of Granger, who devoted himself to firing a battery instead of commanding his corps, Grant's order was not transmitted to the division commanders, until he repeated it an hour later. Accordingly it was not executed until after 4 P. M., when the nearness of night rendered it impracticable to follow up and complete the victory."¹

M. V. Sheridan, who was an aide on the staff of his brother, General Sheridan, in *Hearst's Magazine* of March, 1914, says that after we had taken the line of Orchard Knob, he was ordered to report to General Granger, which he did, and adds: "I found General Granger enjoying himself hugely. He always had the idea that he had a wonderful eye for artillery. So I now found him going from gun to gun of Fort Wood's great siege guns, sighting each at the ridge, and watching with much satisfaction the results of the shots. Just as I reached him, General Grant and General Thomas approached, and after watching for a moment, General Thomas very testily ordered: 'Pay more attention to your corps, sir.'"

General Grant, in his *Memoirs* states, that late in the afternoon, Sherman's condition was getting so critical that he decided not to await the arrival of General Hooker's troops, which he expected to see crossing the ridge in the neighborhood of Rossville, and which was to be the signal for the movement against Missionary Ridge, and directed General Thomas to

¹ W. R. R., 55-68.

order the charge at once. He says he "watched eagerly to see the effect and became impatient at last that there was no indication of any charge being made. The center of the line, which was to make the charge, was near where Thomas and I stood, but concealed from view by an intervening forest. Turning to Thomas to inquire what caused the delay, I was surprised to see Thomas J. Wood, one of the division commanders who was to make the charge, standing talking to him. I spoke to General Wood, asking why he did not charge an hour before. He replied very promptly that this was the first he had heard of it, but that he had been ready all day to move at a moment's notice. I told him to make the charge at once. He was off in a moment, and in an incredible short time cheering was heard and he and Sheridan were driving the enemy's advance before them towards Missionary Ridge."¹

The hour thus lost may have prevented the almost total destruction of Bragg's army. It will be remembered that our Major Dubois in his reminiscent letter before quoted, says he prayed for one hour more of daylight. General Sheridan, in his *Memoirs*, says that he pursued the flying and demoralized enemy until dusk, and then went back to ask for more troops to follow up the enemy. He found Granger in command, General Thomas having gone back to Chattanooga. He says:

"Granger was at Bragg's late headquarters in bed. I informed him of my situation and implored him to follow me up with the Army of the Cumberland, but he declined, saying that he thought we had done well enough. I still insisting, he told me finally to push on to the crossing of Chickamauga Creek, and if I encountered the enemy he would order troops to my support. I returned to my division about 12 o'clock at night, got it under way and reached the crossing about half a mile from the station at 2 o'clock on the morning of the 26th, and then found the bridge destroyed, but that the creek was fordable. I did not encounter the enemy in any force, but feared to go farther without assistance. This I thought I might bring up by practicing a little deception, so I caused two regiments to simulate an engagement by opening fire, hoping that this would alarm Granger and oblige him to respond with troops, but my scheme failed. General Granger afterwards told me that he had heard the volleys, but suspected their purpose, knowing that they were not occasioned by a fight, since they were too regular in their delivery. * * * I thought an active pursuit

¹ Grant's *Memoirs*, Vol. 2, page 78.

would almost certainly complete destruction of Bragg's army."¹

If the assault on Missionary Ridge had been made an hour earlier with the same results, it is quite possible that immediate pursuit by the whole army would have followed, and that we would have compelled the surrender of a great portion of the opposing forces. Even as it was, if more of our commanding officers had shown a little more of Sheridan's indomitable spirit and energy, the results he predicts would doubtless have been achieved. It was a moonlight night, the troops were not greatly fatigued and the enthusiasm of victory would have carried them forward to further victories. But the rank and file of the army probably thought with General Granger that we had done well enough, and the troops on the ridge, after recounting the day's experiences and glorifying over them, lay down and slept.

In the general jollification over capturing Missionary Ridge we had forgotten that our movement was only one step towards the relief of General Burnside at Knoxville, whose position had become extremely critical. This was recalled next morning, when we received orders to be ready to at once march to his relief.

1 Sheridan's Memoirs, Vol. 1, pages 315-318.



CHAPTER XIX.

THE MARCH FOR THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE AND RE-ENLISTMENT AS VETERAN VOLUNTEERS.

As stated in the preceding chapter, the battles of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge had in view, not only the defeat of Bragg's army before Chattanooga, but also the relief of General Burnside, who was closely besieged at Knoxville. It was General Grant's plan, if the movement against Bragg at Chattanooga was successful, to at once send a heavy column to General Burnside's relief, and on the evening of the 25th he directed General Thomas to detach General Granger with a force of 20,000 men, taking no wagons, or but few, with him, and move up the south side of the Tennessee River towards Knoxville. The Steamer Chattanooga, loaded with rations, was to accompany the expedition which was to get off by the 27th.¹ Having given such orders General Grant joined the forces which were pursuing the retreating enemy. After such orders were given and General Sherman's advance had gained possession of the Dalton and Cleveland Railroad, thus cutting Longstreet off from direct communication with Bragg, it was thought he would retreat from East Tennessee and that the movement of General Granger's forces for Burnside's relief would not be necessary.² General Grant's information, however, was that Longstreet was still holding fast at Knoxville, that General Burnside had only rations sufficient to last until December 3, when, unless relieved, he must either surrender or retreat, and that the latter was impossible.³ General Hooker and Thomas had reports from citizens and deserters that Longstreet was about to abandon the siege—one report being that General Hardee had said that Longstreet was in an extremely critical position.⁴ But on the 27th at 1 p. m., General Grant, who was then at Ringgold, telegraphed to General Thomas, who was at Chattanooga: "I think it best not to rely on statements of citizens altogether. You will, therefore, direct Granger to start at once, marching as rapidly as possible, to the relief of Burnside. Should he obtain satisfactory evidence that Longstreet has abandoned the siege of Knoxville, he will return at once."⁵

Our regiment had gone out on picket duty late on the evening of the 25th, and was relieved at 8 o'clock next morn-

1 W. R. R., 55-45.

2 Dana to Stanton, W. R. R. 55-70.

3 Grant to Granger, W. R. R. 55-49.

4 Hooker to Grant, W. R. R. 55-47.

5 W. R. R. 55-47.

ing. The next evening it was ordered back to our old camp at Fort Wood, which was reached about midnight. The next day we had orders to be in readiness to move at any moment. The next day, the 28th, we turned over all our cartridges except forty rounds per man, and at 3 P. M. fell in, left our camp at Chattanooga and marched five miles and went into camp. The next day we marched to Ringgold, only eight miles.¹ General Grant in his official report says that he returned to Chattanooga on the 28th and found Granger had not got off, and that he did not have the number of men he had directed and besides that, he moved with reluctance and complaint."²

On the 29th he addressed the following letter directly to General Granger, hoping to spur him into greater energy and activity:

Chattanooga, November 29, 1863.

Maj. Gen. Gordon Granger,
Commanding Fourth Corps:

It is now ascertained that up to the 26th instant, Longstreet had not abandoned the siege at Knoxville. Now that Bragg's army has been driven from Chattanooga, there is no reason to suppose he will abandon the siege until forced to do so by reinforcements sent to Burnside's aid, when he will probably take up his march eastwards to rejoin Lee about Richmond, but where he can still threaten East Tennessee. On the 23rd instant General Burnside telegraphed that his rations would hold out ten or twelve days; at the end of this time unless relieved from the outside, he must surrender or retreat. The latter is an impossibility. You are now going for the purpose of relieving this garrison. You see the short time in which relief must be afforded or be too late, and hence the necessity for forced marches. I want to urge upon you in the strongest possible manner the necessity of reaching Burnside in the shortest time. Our victory here has been complete and if Longstreet can be driven from East Tennessee, the damage to the Confederacy will be the most crushing they have experienced during the war. This important task is now entrusted to you and it is expected you will do your part well. Use as sparingly as possible of the rations you take with you. Replenish all you can from what you find on the road, giving receipts in order that settlements may be made with loyal people hereafter. Deeming what is here said sufficient to show you the importance of great promptitude in the present movement, I subscribe myself.

U. S. GRANT,
Major General."³

General Grant after writing this letter must have doubted its efficacy in moving General Granger to greater activity, for on the same day, November 29, he wrote to General Sherman, giving him the latest news from Burnside and saying that it was evident Longstreet had determined to starve the garrison into surrender. In this letter he also says:

¹ Diary of William McConnell.

² Grant's official report, W. R. R. 55-35.

³ W. R. R. 55-49.

"Granger is on the way to Burnside's relief, but I have lost all faith in his energy and capacity to manage an expedition of the importance of this one. I am inclined to think, therefore, that I shall have to send you. Push as rapidly as you can to the Hiawassee and determine for yourself what force to take with you from that point, which you will select in conjunction with the forces now with you. In plain words, you will assume command of all the forces now moving up the Tennessee, including the garrison at Kingston, and from that force organize what you deem proper to relieve Burnside. The balance send back to Chattanooga. * * * I will only add that the last advices from Burnside himself indicated his ability to hold out only to about the 3rd of December."¹

So, before we were well under way, our corps commander, who had been selected to command this important expedition, was superceded and General Sherman was put in his place. On November 30, General Sherman sent word to General Granger that he had been directed to assume command of the expedition against Knoxville, that he had a copy of General Grant's instructions to him, Granger, that they were full and explicit and that he, Sherman, could only renew General Grant's orders therein contained to push on with the utmost expedition. He further ordered General Granger to cross the Hiawassee the morning (December 1) and march for Athens, thence to Kingston and thence on to Knoxville. He also directed General Granger, should he arrive at Kingston first, to do everything possible to cross the troops expeditiously.² On the evening of the same day General Granger dispatched to Generals Grant and Thomas that he had reached Kincannon's Ferry on the Hiawassee at 3 p. m. that day and that the roads were horrid and marches difficult and laborious, that a steamer with flats had arrived and that the army was crossing the Hiawassee as rapidly as possible. He also said that he proposed to move directly to Kingston, cross the Hiawassee River and attack Longstreet's right flank, and that he hoped to reach Kingston December 3 and be in front of Knoxville by the 5th or 6th at latest.³ The dispatch was doubtless sent before he received General Sherman's order assuming command of the expedition. On the same day General Sherman ordered General Blair, commanding two divisions of the 15th corps, to march at once for Kingston.⁴ It appears that General Howard with two divisions of the Eleventh corps was also ordered to join the expedition. General Howard at 2:15

1 W. R. R. 55-49.

2 W. R. R. 56-279.

3 W. R. R. 56-279.

4 W. R. R. 56-278.

p. m. on the 30th reported the arrival of the head of his column at Charleston, several miles south of Kincannon's Ferry on the Hiawassee, and that he found on his arrival that the railroad bridge was partly destroyed and the pontoon bridge swung to the other side of the river, that the railroad bridge could be repaired so that the infantry could cross on it that afternoon which was being done, that one regiment had been sent across and as soon as the bridge was repaired a brigade would follow.¹ General Granger the same day sent orders to the commanding officer at Kingston to hold his command in readiness to move upon Knoxville at a moment's warning, stating that his, Granger's, troops would reach Kingston at the latest by December 3. He also directed such commanding officer to gather in as much forage and subsistence as he possibly could, to make every possible arrangement for the crossing of the Tennessee River at Kingston by the troops as soon as they should arrive and to send out spies and scouts to gain all possible information of the whereabouts, intentions and movements of Longstreet's army and send their reports by courier.² At the same time he sent orders to General Thos. J. Wood saying that every preparation would be made for crossing our division over the Hiawassee as soon as possible, that the crossing would continue all night and that General Sheridan's division which was ahead of ours, would probably be across by one o'clock that night.³

On December 1, at 5 p. m. it seems that General Thomas had received General Granger's dispatch of the 30th and at once sent him word that General Sherman was on his right and had orders, on uniting his forces with his, Granger's, to assume the direction of affairs. On the same day General Sherman sent orders to General Granger announcing his arrival at Athens and directing him, Granger, to move by the most practicable route directly for Philadelphia and Loudon and to send the steam boat to Kingston with a small guard, there to await further orders.¹ So it seems that General Granger's plan to cross the Tennessee River and attack Longstreet's right flank, was set aside and that the relieving army was to concentrate at Loudon instead of at Kingston.

On the same day, evidently before receiving General Sherman's order to move directly to Loudon, General Granger had ordered General Sheridan to proceed to Knoxville without delay, assume command of all the forces at Kingston and make every preparation for crossing the Fourth corps and the command of General Sherman "now en route for that place."⁴

1 W. R. R. 56, page 282.

2 W. R. R. 56, page 281.

3 W. R. R. 56, page 282.

4 W. R. R. 56-299.

The same day General Sherman who was at Athens, issued orders directing the several divisions in his immediate command to move at early dawn the next morning, prepared to make a forced march on Loudon. The march was to be in the following order: First, the Eleventh Corps, General Howard in command, Second, the division commanded by General Jeff. C. Davis, Third, the Fifteenth Corps, General F. P. Blair commanding. All the cavalry was to be massed under command of Colonel Long and march at 2 o'clock a. m. between General Howard's and General Davis' commands, prepared to leave the column and dash forward to secure the bridge at Loudon. The head of the infantry column was to await at Philadelphia a report from the cavalry as to conditions at Loudon.¹ While these movements were going on amid some confusion, General John G. Foster, who had arrived at Cumberland Gap November 30, and had taken command of the troops there (about 3000 infantry and 2000 cavalry), at his own suggestion, was directed by General Grant to move on Knoxville by way of Tazewell and Maynardville.² On the first of December he had reached Tazewell, and it was through him that the War Department at Washington and General Grant at Chattanooga, got any information at all of the situation of General Burnside's command at Knoxville.

At 9 o'clock p. m., December 1, General Sherman who was at Charleston, dispatched to General Grant that Mr. Dana and Colonel Jas. H. Wilson had arrived the night before and brought Grant's message of the 29th: that he had already crossed the Hiawassee and was marching for Loudon and Knoxville: that he had sent a messenger down to the mouth of the Hiawassee to communicate with General Granger, but thought he could beat him in moving fast; that he would have Burnside hear his guns if possible on the 3rd or 4th at furthest, and adds this characteristic outburst:

"Recollect that East Tennessee is my horror. That any military man should send a force into East Tennessee puzzles me. Burnside is there and must be relieved, but when relieved, I want to get out, and he should come out too. I think, of course, its railroad should be absolutely destroyed, its provisions eaten up or carried away, and all troops brought out. Cumberland Gap should be held simply as an outpost of Kentucky. But Burnside must be relieved first and these other things after."³

This, as will be seen, was in frank opposition to the plans of the administration and of General Grant.

1 W. R. R., 56-300.

2 W. R. R., 56-283-296.

3 W. R. R., 56-297.

On the morning of December 2, it appears from the official reports and correspondence that our Corps, General Granger's, was at Decatur, fifteen miles to the left of Sherman's column, and was directed to move thence on Philadelphia:¹ that at 4 p. m. that day the first division (Sheridan's) had arrived at Prigmore's Farm: that his troops would reach Philadelphia early next day and that his advance would be in Loudon sometime during the day. At sunset on the 2nd, General Jeff. C. Davis with his division went into camp eighteen miles from Loudon and would resume the march to that place at day light next morning.²

On December 2, the advance of General Howard's Corps had reached the immediate vicinity of Loudon and he reported his progress to General Sherman. General Sherman on that date (no hour is given) dispatched to General Howard, saying, he took it for granted that the enemy would destroy the bridge on our approach and escape on the other side of the river, and that on the whole he did not object to it, as he would then be within the narrow peninsula between the Holston and Clinch, we holding Kingston and Knoxville, but that it was all important to know that the bridge was substantially destroyed before pushing eastward. He therefore directed him, General Howard, at day break next day to display his forces at Loudon to feel the enemy, and if necessary to attack him in force. He also stated that he proposed to turn the division (Davis') following Howards corps, to the east toward Morgantown ford or build a bridge and push directly for Knoxville, leaving the other troops to follow as soon as it was learned that the bridge at Loudon was destroyed and could not be relaid. General Sherman also directed, if the morning was quiet, that it would be well to fire some artillery in the direction of Knoxville as the sound might reach Burnside and give him comfort.

The above movements were ordered by General Grant and General Sherman in the hope that the forces under Longstreet would be caught between the Holston and Clinch Rivers and compelled to retreat up the valley towards Lynchburg, that our troops in West Virginia would be reinforced and a column strong enough to be effective would interpose between Longstreet and Lynchburg, cut off his retreat and destroy or capture his army. This hope, however, was dispelled on December 3 when General Halleck telegraphed to General Grant that the forces in West Virginia were not strong enough to cut off Longstreet's retreat, that orders were given General Meade sometime before to cut the railroad at Lynchburg so as to separate

1 W. R. R. 56-312.

2 W. R. R. 56-313.

Longstreet from Lee, but that nothing had been done and that nothing was likely to be done by the army of the Potomac in this campaign.¹ All that was left therefore for the armies marching for the relief of Knoxville to do, was to relieve General Burnside and drive Longstreet so far up the valley that he would no longer be a menace to East Tennessee.

On the same day, General Foster, whose advance from Cumberland Gap had reached Tazewell, reported that he was completely held in check by Wheeler's and Jones' cavalry, which was stronger than his force, that Longstreet would retreat by road leading through Rutledge or Rogersville, and advised General Granger that the best point for him to strike the retreating column with his cavalry was at Blain's Crossroads.² At noon on the 3rd General J. H. Wilson reported to General Sherman that he had just forded the river at Morgantown and had found it deep, uneven and rapid, and, in fact impracticable for anything but cavalry, that the stream was at least 200 yards wide, that little material was at hand for bridges and suggested that if any boats had been saved at Loudon the crossing of the infantry and artillery would better be made there.³

Our Corps (the 4th) on the evening of December 3 was at Fork Creek, about 6 miles from Philadelphia, and from that point General Granger dispatched to General Sherman, that in the morning he would move his troops to Loudon to meet the steamboat Paint Rock and get some rations, as his command was entirely out, that in the meantime he would do all in his power to gather in wheat and corn and have it ground, that in case the steamboats Paint Rock and Dunbar (which had been ordered to Loudon) arrived promptly with a sufficient number of flats, he suggested that the whole command should proceed to Loudon and cross the river there,⁴ and adds: "In case our troops are caught in a cold rain in these mountains at this inclement season of the year, many of them must perish and many more become disabled, without the means of sheltering, feeding or otherwise providing for their comfort."⁵

In answer to this dispatch General Sherman replied on same day saying the river was a more formidable obstacle than he had supposed and ordering Granger to halt his column where he then was and keep a staff officer at the river to advise him when the bridge would be completed. At the same time he sent the same word to General Howard and asked if the cavalry had gone to Burnside. He also said it would take some time to

1 W. R. R., 56-315.
2 W. R. R., 56-315-316.
3 W. R. R., 56-316.

4 W. R. R., 56-316.
5 W. R. R., 56-317.

build the bridge and in the meantime that we must advise Burnside that we were near.¹

When General Howard with his command reached Loudon he found the pontoon bridge across the river destroyed, all railroad cars destroyed and 48 of them and their engines run into the river. On reporting to General Sherman he was directed to spend the day there, refresh and follow by the Morgantown road in the morning.²

On the same day, December 3, at one o'clock p. m., our division, which was then five miles from Philadelphia, received orders from General Granger saying that the advance of the corps had arrived at that place and that we would push on to Morgantown that night, that all the troops were moving to Knoxville on the south side of the Tennessee, and we should move, leaving Philadelphia to our left, and pass through either Madisonville or Rockville to Marysville, and thence on to Knoxville.³ On receipt of this order General Wood acknowledged it, promised prompt obedience and added, "Should Longstreet remain much longer at Knoxville he may be captured."

December 4, General Sherman issued the following order:

"Headquarters Army in the Field,

Little Tennessee, December 4, 1863.

I. The troops now marching for the relief of the army in Knoxville will for the purpose of maneuver and battle, be arranged as follows:

Right Wing: Fourth Army Corps, two divisions, General Granger.

Center: Fifteenth Army Corps, two divisions, General Blair.

Left Wing: Eleventh Army Corps, two divisions, General Howard.

The division commanded by General Jeff. C. Davis will constitute the reserve and will be habitually in support of the center. The cavalry under Colonel Long will act under the special orders of the commanding general.

II. The whole army will move direct on the enemy at Knoxville and fight them at the earliest possible moment. The center will cross the bridge at Morgantown and move via Marysville. The left wing will follow and march by the road directly west of Baker's Creek to Utica, Louisville and Little River. The right will then cross and move to the main Madisonville and Knoxville road. At Marysville all must communicate and then march by concentric roads on Knoxville. The reserve will cross the bridge last and close up on the center.

III. As time is all important, every commander will at once place his troops convenient to the bridge, or assure himself he can reach it as soon as his turn comes. Every soldier should have all his ammunition on his person, cautioned to use it with great prudence, three days' cooked meat and bread, if to be had. If rations are not to be had,

1 W. R. R., 56-317.

2 W. R. R., 56-319.

3 W. R. R., 56-319.

the men will cheerfully live on meal till their fellows in Knoxville are released from their imprisonment.

IV. In case of battle each commander must fight his command offensively. There must be no delay in the attack, only using the proper precaution to cover it with a good line of skirmishers, but we must be quick and prompt to attack. When the head of either column is in Knoxville, then new combinations will be made.

By order of Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman.

R. M. SAWYER,
Assistant Adjutant General."¹

After this order was given, and on the same day, General Howard who was at Loudon, reported that he could cross the river at Davis Ford about six miles from that place and thus save ten miles of march with no loss of time² and was authorized to do so. General Granger was informed of this, and was directed to move so that at early dawn on the 5th his leading division should occupy the bridge.³ At 4 o'clock p. m. on the 4th, General Wood proposed to cross the bridge at daylight next morning.⁴

That night, or the next day, General Sherman received word that Longstreet had raised the siege of Knoxville, had retreated up the valley and that our cavalry had entered the place. He at once issued orders stating that the object of the expedition had been accomplished, that the enemy was in retreat and ordered General Granger to move on the 6th as far as Little River, there go into camp and report in person to General Burnside for orders.⁵

It was now learned that General Longstreet had attacked one of the fortifications at Knoxville on November 29 and had been signally repulsed, but had held on until a dispatch from General Grant to General Burnside, which it was intended should fall into his hands,⁶ was captured by some of his men and hastened his retreat toward Rogersville,⁷ December 3. Our regiment's part in the march so far was not distinguished from that of other regiments in the brigade division or corps, but we were not behind them in the vigor and energy which characterized all the troops of the expedition. It was a hard march over bad roads, we had no tents and had virtually to live off the country through which we marched. Our itinerary given the diary of William McConnell was as follows:

"On the 28th of November, left camp at Chattanooga and marched five miles. Sunday, November 29, marched to Ringgold eight miles; November 30, marched through Georgetown to

1 W. R. R., 56-330.

2 W. R. R. 56-331.

3 W. R. R. 56-329.

4 W. R. R. 56-331.

5 W. R. R. 56-340.

6 W. R. R. 56-273.

7 W. R. R. 56-819.

Harris' Landing, twenty-three miles; December 1, marched to Kincannon's Ferry, crossed the Hiawassee and went into camp, distance about three miles; on the 2nd, marched through Decatur, about twenty miles; on the 3rd, marched to Sweetwater, twenty miles; on the 4th, marched fifteen miles, and on the 5th, started at daylight, crossed the Little Tennessee river, passed through Morgantown and went fifteen miles." McConnell adds to his report of this day: "Had no rations."

We were then about twenty-two miles from Knoxville. On the 6th we went on through Marysville, marching about eleven miles, and went on picket. The next day we marched through Rockford and after a ten mile tramp, during which we lived wholly on what we could get in the country along our line of march, we arrived at Knoxville and went into camp about one mile from the town.

It was soon learned that General Burnside had not been in such dire straits as he had caused the authorities at Washington and General Grant to believe.

General Sherman in his memoirs says, that on the morning of December 6, with General Granger and some of his staff, he rode into Knoxville and found General Burnside and staff domiciled in a large fine mansion looking very comfortable, that after walking with General Burnside along his lines and examining the salient known as Fort Sanders, they returned to General Burnside's headquarters and sat down to a good dinner, embracing roast turkey. He further says:

"There was a regular dining table with clean table cloth, dishes, knives, forks, spoons, etc., etc. I had seen nothing of this kind in my field experiences and could not help exclaiming that I thought 'they were starving' etc., but Burnside explained that Longstreet had at no time fully invested the place, and that he had kept communication open with the country on the south side of the river Holston, more especially with the French Broad settlements, from whose Union inhabitants he had received a good supply of beef, bacon and corn meal. Had I known this, I would not have hurried my men so fast, but until I reached Knoxville I thought our troops there were actually in danger of starvation."¹

Captain Orlando M. Poe, General Burnside's Chief Engineer, in his official report of the operations at Knoxville during the siege, says:

"The question of supplies during the siege was second to none in importance. The failure of the enemy to close the

1 Sherman's Memoirs, Vol. 1, page 368.

Sevierville road and French Broad river, enabled us even to accumulate a quantity of commissary stores. I was told that it was officially reported at the beginning of the siege, that we had on hand full supplies for only one day and a half. Yet after nineteen days siege we had accumulated to such an extent over the lines just referred to, that we had provisions enough to last ten days.¹

At the meeting at Burnside's headquarters, reported by General Sherman, General Burnside stated that General Granger's troops would be all he would need to drive General Longstreet out of East Tennessee, and General Sherman thereupon directed General Granger to report to General Burnside and at once started back to Chattanooga, taking with him the troops of the 15th corps under General Blair, General Davis' division, and the 11th corps under General Howard. General Sherman says that General Granger "unreasonably remonstrated against being left at Knoxville" complaining bitterly of what he thought was hard treatment to his men and himself, that his language and manner produced on his mind a bad impression, and was one of the causes which led to his being relieved as a corps commander in the campaign of the next spring.²

The officers and men of the 4th corps if they had had the opportunity would doubtless have joined General Granger in such remonstrance. They would certainly have done so, if they had known of the hardships and privations which they were compelled to undergo to so little purpose during the next few weeks.

The regiment remained in camp about one mile from Knoxville from the 7th until the 16th of December, subsisting on half rations, pieced out by individual foraging on occasions, and doing the usual routine of camp and picket duty. On the evening of the 15th orders to march were received and on next morning the division crossed the Holston River, passed through Knoxville, marched fifteen miles and halted six miles from Lane's (Blain's) Crossroads.³ It was a rainy day and night and very disagreeable. We remained at this place until the 25th.

When General Longstreet retired from before Knoxville, he marched to Rogersville and when there decided to send back to General Bragg, Martin's cavalry, but a telegram from Jefferson Davis gave him discretionary power as to his movements and he therefore retained such cavalry. Learning that General Sherman with the fifteenth and eleventh corps had started back to Chattanooga, he decided to advance against the forces which had

¹ W. R. R., 54-322.

² Sherman's Memoirs, Vol. 1, page 368.

³ McConnell's Diary.

followed him from Knoxville.¹ Our March toward Blain's Cross Roads was to reinforce the troops which had followed Longstreet and against which he was again advancing.

There was heavy cannonading on the 24th, which was probably the cavalry fight between Longstreet's cavalry and that of General Sturgis near Mossy Creek.² General Sheridan, who was in command of the forces in advance of us, thought General Longstreet was about to bring on a general engagement, but it was only a deoonstration to deceive us as to his real movement to Lynchburg.³

On the morning of December 25, part of our brigade moved four miles to Strawberry Plains and in the afternoon our regiment and the Forty-ninth Ohio followed. In the evening there was a call for mechanics to work on the bridge across the Holston River.⁴

General Grant visited Knoxville about this time and decided that it would be better to supply the troops at Knoxville by way of Chattanooga, than as formerly through Cumberland Gap, and gave orders to rebuild and re-equip the railroad between Knoxville and Chattanooga.

On the 26th of December, our men set to work to build log huts to shelter themselves from the winter rains and snows, and on the 27th, although it was Sunday and very wet, there was a large detail sent across the Holston River to work on the railroad. On the twenty-eighth the weather was cold and windy. The men stood around camp fires, their eyes smarting with the smoke of the green timber, trying to keep warm.

At about nine o'clock the regiment was formed to hear an important order read. It was the order proposing our re-enlistment as veteran volunteers. There never was a more inopportune time to present such a proposition to the troops of our command.

Sheridan in his Memoirs describes the condition of the troops at that time as follows:

"On arriving at Knoxville, an inspection of my command showed that the shoes of many of the men were entirely worn out, the poor fellows having been obliged to protect their feet with a sort of moccasin made from their blankets, or from such other material as they could procure. About six hundred were in this condition, and plainly not suitably shod to withstand the frequent storms of sleet and snow. * * * Midwinter was now upon us and the weather in this mountain region of East Tennessee was very cold, snow often falling to the depth

¹ Longstreet's report, W. R. R., 54-463.
² W. R. R., 54-625.

³ Sheridan's Memoirs, Vol. 1, page 335.
⁴ McConnell's Diary.

of several inches. The thin and scanty clothing of the men afforded little protection and while in bivouac their only protection was the ponchos with which they had been provided before leaving Chattanooga; there was not a tent in the command. * * * Every command in the army was suffering to the same extent as mine."

To ask men suffering the privations and enduring the hardships above described to forego their release from such trials, which would surely come in a few months, and to re-enlist for a further term of three years or during the war, was putting their patriotism to a very severe test.

Detachments from the regiment worked on the railroad on the 29th, 30th and 31st days of December, 1863. The weather during these three days was pleasant, but on the evening of the 31st it began to rain and during the night it grew very cold. The next day, New Years Day, 1864, will long be remembered as one of the coldest New Years Days on record. John G. Gregory in his diary says, "The coldest morning this winter. Wind blew briskly all day. All we can do to keep from freezing. Veteran volunteering progressing slowly. Our third New Year in the service. In strong hopes that ere another rolls around we may all be safely at home, with peace and plenty. Almost given up the notion of reenlisting." That night he records that he had to get up in the night to warm his feet, that next day the men did nothing but get wood and keep up fires, and that one-half pound of corn meal was issued to each man.

On the 3rd of January both he and Wm. McConnell report that the brigade was formed in column and that General Willich made a speech on the subject of re-enlistment as veteran volunteers, in which he stated that the regiment which first re-enlisted would be the first sent home on furlough. McConnell says that General Willich made this speech at one o'clock in the afternoon and that at four o'clock it was reported that the regiment had the full complement of re-enlistments to entitle it to organize as a veteran volunteer regiment. Gregory reports the same day that "our regiment reports its quota first."

The weather continued very cold, but the men were kept busy, working on the railroad, or on the bridge across the Holston. On the 5th of January, an order was published requiring all men who did not re-enlist to report to the 68th Indiana. Gregory this day reported that 18 men of Company A would not re-enlist, that it was thought the regiment would soon be ordered to the front and adds, "I wonder how much longer Old Grant is going to keep us here without clothing."

It has already been stated in an extract from General Sherman's Memoirs that on the 6th of December at Burnside's headquarters, General Granger unreasonably remonstrated against being ordered to remain in East Tennessee. Two days afterwards, on December 8, when General Sherman was on his way back to Chattanooga, General Granger addressed a letter to General Burnside, stating in substance, that the object of our expedition had been accomplished, that Knoxville had been relieved, that the enemy was in full retreat with no possibility of returning, that many of his troops were without shoes, blankets, overcoats, or shirts, were entirely destitute of shelter, that such clothing as they had was the light blouse and pantaloons for summer wear, and for these reasons he "respectfully, and most persistently and urgently" asked leave to withdraw his troops to Chattanooga.¹

December 9, he despatched to General Thomas at Chattanooga saying:

"I think Burnside is retaining us here beyond all reason. The weather is fine and we would now return without much suffering, but the moment it rains the roads will become impassable and great suffering must ensue among our officers and men, who are without shelter, badly clad and not half fed." He also states in a general way that Burnside had enough troops without his command.²

On the 10th, General John G. Foster relieved General Burnside at Knoxville and telegraphed to General Grant that he had just arrived, that Longstreet had given out that he would make a stand at Bristol, that he, Foster, proposed to advance with all his available forces and attack him there, that General Granger was impatient to return to Chattanooga, and asked if he should retain him for that purpose.³ General Grant answered this dispatch on the 12th saying: "Drive Longstreet to the farthest point east you can. Retain Granger as long as may be necessary."

On the same day, December 12, General Granger addressed a letter to General Foster, in which he said:

"As is well known to you, the troops under my command marched immediately after a hard battle of three days duration from Chattanooga to Knoxville to relieve their suffering and besieged brethren. They came hurriedly, with scarcely any transportation, no shelter, and many of them destitute of shoes, overcoats, or even shirts, for the exigency was urgent and we expected to be detained on this service but a few days. Not one

1 W. R. R., 56-358.

2 W. R. R. 56-365.

3 W. R. R. 56-372.

of my officers has a change of clothing. For more than three months these men have been living on less than half rations. In their hurried forced march hither they have subsisted off the country, and now they have but limited quantities of bread and meat. They are weak and growing feeble in consequence of all this. Never have troops more cheerfully borne privations, but it is certain, unless they can speedily have some means of shelter, more than half of them must fill the hospitals, from there only to be discharged by death. In addition to all the deficiencies of food and clothing, the storms of winter, so long delayed, have at last evidently set in, and the prospect for men who, with all the advantages of fine weather and good fires, have not been able to keep from shivering, is sufficiently deplorable. The climate in its extreme variableness is extremely trying to northern constitutions. While we are enduring these privations of food, clothing and shelter, one half or two thirds of this city is occupied by the worst kind of rebels, who are only constrained by circumstances from acting as our bitterest foes. While our soldiers are enduring the furious peltings of the pitiless storm, these vipers to the Government we are trying at such cost of life and suffering to maintain, are living in a state of affluence and plenty. I, therefore, suggest, as a fitting notice of their friends' treason, and at the same time in some degree to ameliorate the condition of our men, that these people be as closely packed together as possible, and that their houses, so vacated, be turned over to the officers and men of this command."¹

On the same day he sent to General Grant a copy of the letter he had addressed to General Burnside on December 8,² and wrote to General Thomas making the same appeal.³

December 13, General Halleck telegraphed to General Grant saying that Richmond papers of the day before stated that Longstreet was preparing to hold Rutledge, that his cavalry had passed through Pound Gap to Mt. Sterling, Kentucky, burning that place and capturing money and supplies and threatening Cumberland Gap; that if this was true, and Longstreet was establishing himself in East Tennessee, he asked if it would not be unsafe to withdraw Sherman's forces from the neighborhood of Knoxville until the enemy was driven from East Tennessee; he said further that "the holding of East Tennessee and the prevention of the enemy from getting supplies there, is deemed of the greatest importance," and added: "Moreover, as General Meade's operations have failed to produce any results, Lee may

¹ W. R. R. 56-392.

² W. R. R. 56-393.

³ W. R. R. 56-391.

send by rail reinforcements to Longstreet without our knowing it."¹

Of course, if General Halleck's information was correct, General Grant could not safely order the return of the Fourth corps to Chattanooga. General Foster on the 13th answered General Granger's letters of the 12th, saying he appreciated the gallantry and devotion of the troops in our corps, that he was awaiting orders from General Grant to know what was to be done and that upon their receipt immediate action would be taken to insure the prompt return of the troops to Chattanooga, or their movement up the railroad to attack the enemy. He added that all the buildings in the town that could be had had been taken for hospitals, and that he could not comply with the request to quarter them in the town. Later, the same day, he stated that since his letter of that morning he had learned that some of the buildings taken for hospitals had not been occupied, that they could be at once utilized as shelter for a portion of the troops and that General Carter would designate them. That he could probably accommodate 3000 men, and that officers "would be billeted in secesh families by him."²

It does not appear that the offer to quarter the men of our command in houses in Knoxville was accepted, as we crossed the river on the 15th, and were hurried forward to meet the enemy, as before related. On the 14th our division commander, General Wood, forwarded for the information of the commanding general of the corps and other higher commanders, a report of Surgeon W. W. Blair, Medical Director of the Division, which was as follows:

"Having just returned from a personal inspection of the men in this command, I have the honor to report that I find them exceedingly destitute of clothing. The entire outfit of many soldiers consists of a blouse, worn as a shirt, a pair of pants, well worn, a pair of shoes, and in some instances not even those, an oil or woolen blanket and a hat or cap. As one of the results of this exposure, I find the men attacked with rheumatism, with diarrhea and with fever of a typhoid character. I deem it therefore my duty to bring to your notice the fact that continuance of this exposure will, without doubt, seriously impair the efficiency of this command."³

General Wood, in forwarding this report, said:

"It is very evident from Surgeon Blair's report that, if the command be left much longer in its present exposed,

1 W. R. R. 56-396.

2 W. R. R. 56-400-401.

3 W. R. R. 56-409.

unprotected and unprovided condition, the ordinary military commanders will be relieved soon of the further care of very many of the men, as they will have been placed by Generals Rheumatism, Diarrhea, Pneumonia and Typhoid Fever beyond the reach of further human care. For reasons not necessary to be given in detail here, but which are well known to the higher commanders, the troops of the Fourth Army Corps—at least the Second and Third Divisions—have not been supplied with clothing since the march from Middle Tennessee in August last. Clothing was beginning to arrive at Chattanooga when we marched from there on the 28th ultimo, but we were not allowed to remain there long enough to derive any advantage from this supply. After fighting a great battle we were hurried off to the relief of the beleaguered garrison of Knoxville. We came cheerfully and with alacrity, not only as a matter of duty, but as a work of love. But the siege being raised (the enemy having retreated) and it being apparent that further active operations in this field for some time to come are impossible, we ask now that immediate and effective measures be taken to supply our wants. The men are not only destitute of clothing, but men and officers are suffering for want of sufficient protection in tents, and both are suffering from want of variety in rations. When we marched from Chattanooga we were allowed but one wagon to each regiment to transport baggage and shelter for the use of the line officers and men; of course, so limited an amount of transportation allowed us to bring but a very limited amount of protection. We supposed we should be allowed to return to our supplies as soon as the siege should be raised and I know of no other effectual remedy but to allow us to return to them at once. With the difficulties of transportation with which we are surrounded, I do not believe the whole transporting power can do more than keep the troops supplied with subsistence. The country can do little more in the way of affording supplies. The local stock of subsistence is well nigh exhausted, even to the infliction of great want, perhaps starvation, on its inhabitants. These evils certainly require an immediate remedy.”¹

General Granger at once referred General Wood's communication to department headquarters for the consideration of the commanding general and indorsed it as being substantially correct and as “affording conclusive proof of the impossibility of further offensive operations until clothing, shelter and subsistence, forage and transportation, are provided for

1 W. R. R., 56-408.

the troops and animals."¹ These representations seem to have impressed General Grant, for on December 15, he telegraphed General Foster that as soon as he deemed his position secure he should order the Fourth Corps to return to Chattanooga.² On the same day General Foster telegraphed to General Grant that his information was of such a nature that he was pushing the Fourth Corps to Blain's Cross Roads to meet a reported advance of General Longstreet and to cover and protect trains coming from Cumberland Gap, and that if Longstreet had been reinforced from Virginia, he would take up the most advantageous position and accept battle.³

It was this reported advance of Longstreet which led to our movement from Knoxville on the 15th and 16th of December as previously described.

It seems from the correspondence of that time that the authorities at Washington deemed it of vital importance that Longstreet should be driven from East Tennessee, and that the Fourth Corps, notwithstanding its wretched condition as to clothing and shelter, was absolutely essential to the success of such movement. General Grant showed this feeling. On the 17th of December, he reported to General Halleck that three steamers were employed in carrying supplies from Chattanooga to Knoxville and that two others were being built, and adds:

"If Longstreet is not driven from the valley entirely and the road destroyed east of Abingdon, I do not think it unlikely that the last great battle of the war will be fought in East Tennessee."⁴

On the same day he telegraphed to General Foster giving him information about the building of additional boats, and saying, "Collect all the stores you can in East Tennessee this winter. A great battle may be fought in East Tennessee next spring and stores must be collected for the subsistence of a large army."⁵

On the same day, he telegraphed another message to General Foster as follows: "Keep General Granger's forces as long as it may be necessary to do so, but order them back when you feel your position perfectly secure. If you find it necessary for the efficiency of his command, relieve him from duty and order him to Cincinnati to report to me by letter and place Sheridan in command of his corps."⁶

There seems to have been wretched mismanagement of the movements intended to drive Longstreet out of East Ten-

1 W. R. R. 56-409.

2 W. R. R. 56-415.

3 W. R. R. 56-416.

4 W. R. R. 56-430.

5 W. R. R. 56-433.

6 W. R. R. 56-433.

nessee until Grant went to Knoxville and took personal control. Sheridan in his *Memoirs* says, that after the troops from Chattanooga arrived in the vicinity of Knoxville and General Sherman had returned to Chattanooga, the operations in East Tennessee constituted a series of blunders lasting through the entire winter, and that when his division was finally ordered back to Loudon, Tenn. and took the road for that point, it was with few regrets; for a general disgust prevailed regarding our useless marches during the winter.¹

On the 18th of December, General Grant went to Nashville in order to give more direct attention to the movements of the enemy at various points on the Mississippi River, leaving General Thomas to act in his stead in all matters in East Tennessee requiring immediate attention.²

On the 20th he received word from General Foster that Longstreet would probably attempt to hold the east end of the East Tennessee valley, and so reported to General Halleck at Washington. The War Department and the Administration, as before stated, had made the possession of all of East Tennessee one of the important and indispensable requirements of the campaign in the Tennessee valley, and kept pressing it upon the attention of Generals Grant and Foster. With this in view tremendous efforts were made to supply the army at Knoxville, and to reinforce it from the east and from detachments scattered about in Kentucky.

After the battle at Missionary Ridge, General Grant had communicated to Mr. C. A. Dana, Assistant Secretary of War, a plan for a winter campaign in Alabama, and on the 12th of December had asked Mr. Dana to go to Washington to lay it before Mr. Lincoln, Secretary Stanton and General Halleck.³ On the 21st of December, Mr. Dana wrote that he had had several conversations with these officials about the proposed Alabama campaign, and that it met the approval of all of them, not only because it would keep the army active during the otherwise useless weather of the winter, but because it appeared to be well conceived and as certain of producing the desired effect, as any plan would be. Dana reported that the Secretary of War had said, "If it succeeds Bragg's army become prisoners of war without our having the trouble of providing for them," and added "You would be authorized to proceed immediately with its execution but for the anxiety which seems to exist respecting East Tennessee. If Longstreet were expelled from that country, you could start for Mobile at once."⁴ On the same day General Halleck wrote

1 Sheridan's *Memoirs*, Vol. 1, page 335-337.

2 W. R. R. 56-437.

3 W. R. R. 55-73.

4 W. R. R. 56-457.

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to General Grant saying in substance, that the driving of Longstreet from East Tennessee was the first matter to be considered.¹

December 23, General Halleck telegraphed to General Grant saying among other things, "I am directed to call your attention particularly to Longstreet's army. Fears are expressed that Foster and Wilcox are not able to cope with it, and unless it is driven out of East Tennessee new raids will be made into Kentucky." General Grant replied on the same day saying, that as soon as he could get some necessary munitions forwarded to Knoxville he would go there in person,² and on the 24th he telegraphed to Secretary Stanton, "I will go to Knoxville in person immediately. If Longstreet is not driven from East Tennessee, it shall not be my fault."³ General Grant arrived at Knoxville December 31 and was there for more than a week. As a result of his visit, a campaign against Longstreet was organized and by the middle of January he was finally driven from East Tennessee and moved to Lynchburg, Va. After that General Grant's proposed campaign in Alabama was abandoned, and the immediate planning and direction of the campaigns in the west passed into other hands.

Of course the rank and file did not know the reason for their being held at Knoxville and Strawberry Plains with insufficient clothing and shelter during such intensely severe weather. They supposed there was some urgent necessity for it, and bore the severe privations with becoming fortitude. Judging from the daily records in the diaries of Wm. McConnell and John G. Gregory, Generals Granger and Wood were the chief complainers. Their men accepted the situation and managed to get through without the calamitous results which their commanding generals predicted would surely follow their unusual exposure.

It will be noted that the foregoing narrative traced the movements and employments of the regiment up to include January 5, 1864, when John G. Gregory railed out against "Old Grant" keeping us at Strawberry Plains without clothing. We learn from the diaries of both John G. Gregory and Wm. McConnell, that on January 6, it snowed all forenoon, that the men worked on the bridge over the Holston River and that at 2 o'clock p. m. the Forty-ninth Ohio started for home on veteran furlough, that regiment having re-enlisted. Gregory, after noting that the Forty-ninth had started, said: "Our

1 W. R. R. 56-458.

2 W. R. R. 56-472.

3 W. R. R. 56-479.

time will come next." Gregory, as before stated, was not at all sure he would join the veterans. He was a thoughtful, conscientious and patriotic soldier, but he realized better perhaps than most of his comrades, what it meant to bind himself to stay with the fighting forces of the Union until the war ended. January 7, was cloudy and cold and our men or a portion of them were again detailed to work on the bridge. That evening Gregory records that all in Company A, his company, who had not re-enlisted as veterans, held a council and that as a result six more re-enlisted and two more promised to do so and adds: "We expect to have some very perilous times during the next three years." On the 8th he says: "All our company are veterans except three, Wm. Dodds, R. W. Thompson and John Wilson." William McConnell says the day was cold and that Company L remained in camp and rebuilt the chimneys to their shanties. On January 9, details from both Companies A and I were at work on the bridge. McConnell notes that his company got the clothing which had been sent to Nashville the summer before. Gregory states that he was out boat-riding in the evening. January 10, according to Gregory's diary, was the coldest of the year and ice was floating thick in the river, but the usual detail of men was made for work on the bridge. January 11, Gregory notes that his company elected officers, but that the election would be contested as invalid. January 12, a detail from the regiment were at work on the bridge. Gregory states that the men were "dissatisfied because they have been kept lying here so long." McConnell records that in the evening an engine passed over the bridge the men had been building.

January 13, Company I had an election of officers, and McConnell notes the return of Trego, Barnett Sims, Gardner and Nazor to the regiment. Gregory says there was snow in the morning and that orders came to make out descriptive rolls of all the non-veterans, who were to be sent to the Sixty-eighth Indiana, as before stated; he says: "Only one from our company, R. W. Thompson." He also states that one-half the company were at work on the bridge and that Lieutenant Hanson fell into the river. He adds, "We expect to leave for Chattanooga tomorrow." This expectation was realized, for the next morning the division and brigade moved to the front with the troops which were to drive Longstreet out of East Tennessee, leaving our regiment behind. The non-veterans were transferred to the Sixty-eighth Indiana, and at 3 o'clock p. m. the regiment started home on veteran furlough. The regiment marched four miles toward Knoxville and encamped for the night.

The hardships and privations of the East Tennessee campaign were now all forgotten. The men's faces and thoughts were turned homeward, and even Gregory's rather pessimistic diary at once grows brighter. He says that when the regiment went into camp in the evening he "bought some meal and got it baked and had a chat with some pretty girls," and only the next day he tells that he "stopped at a house and bought a canteen of milk from a pretty girl."

On the 15th, the regiment marched to Knoxville on the railroad track, distance 12 miles, where it arrived at noon. It drew two days' rations and at 2 o'clock started for Kingston, marching nine miles, making the day's march twenty-one miles.

The next day, the 16th, the regiment resumed its march and tramped 17 miles. The homeward march for the first three or four days seems to have been a sort of go as you please affair. On the 16th, Gregory says that he and "Pete" Gardner stopped at a house and got supper, and McConnell says he bought a hound to take home. On the 17th the regiment reached Kingston, crossed the river and went into camp having marched 17 miles. McConnell says he stopped at a private house and got dinner, and we learn from Gregory's diary that some of the men had considered the project of making a raft and trying to get back to Chattanooga by floating down the Tennessee River. This, however, was abandoned, and those who were considering it decided to march down the river until they came to a boat. Gregory in his record for this day says that some of the men of the regiment captured a rebel spy under a bed.

January 18, the regiment marched thirteen miles to Johnson's Mills, and there encamped for the night. It was a rainy and disagreeable day and the marching was difficult. The next morning at 7 o'clock the march was resumed and McConnell says "we went four miles and halted on top of a hill, and in the afternoon crossed the Tennessee River." Gregory says we "marched four miles to a ferry, got our dinners on the south side and then crossed over in a ferry boat belonging to a company of the Forty-ninth Ohio and camped on the river." He also says that there was a report that General John Morgan was after us. Frank L. Schreiber, who had rejoined the regiment on the evening of the 13th, had re-enlisted on the morning of the 14th, and was with the regiment on this march, says that on the 19th the regiment resumed its march at 9 o'clock, went to the ferry and was going into camp for the night when Colonel Burt sent a dispatch asking us to return to Kingston, as General John Morgan was making a raid

on the place. This does not seem to have impressed our officers very much, for all three diaries agree in stating that we crossed the river and encamped for the night and next morning at 7 o'clock resumed our homeward march. On the 20th, the regiment marched 20 miles, passing through Sluphur Springs, and went into camp about two and one-half miles from Washington. Both Gregory and Schreiber, in their diaries, state that about one-half of Company A was ordered out on the hunt of some bushwackers who were said to be infesting the neighborhood. Schreiber says two of the bushwackers were captured, but nothing could be proved against them; that one of them was a rebel soldier, who was kept and that the other was let go. Gregory says four were captured and that he wished they would hang them. The day was pleasant and the regiment marched 20 miles.

On the 21st, the regiment started at 7 o'clock in the morning, passed through Washington and Smith's Cross Roads, and came to the same road Schreiber remembered to have foraged on the fall before, while we were at Chattanooga. The regiment marched 18 miles and at 3 o'clock went into camp on Sale Creek.¹

January 22 the weather was fine and the march was resumed at daylight. The near approach to Chattanooga seemed to quicken the pace, for Schreiber says the men marched very fast. That night the regiment encamped on North Chickamauga Creek, having marched 16 miles. Gregory notes that the Colonel and Adjutant went on into Chattanooga, probably to report the arrival of the regiment and to select a camping ground for it. On January 23, the march was resumed at daylight. The distance to Chattanooga, 13 miles, was soon covered. The Tennessee River was crossed at the ferry and Schreiber in his diary noted that the pontoon bridge had been partly washed away. The regiment arrived at Chattanooga at 10 o'clock a. m., marched through the town and was placed in camp on Signal Hill.²

The first and most trying stage of the home journey was completed and a feeling of profound thankfulness was felt by many. There was to be no further marching, railroad communication northward was uninterrupted, and there was to be no more suffering for want of food, clothing and shelter. The next day, the 24th, was Sunday. There was no special duty to perform and the men slept late. In the evening good Chaplain Ross preached a short discourse,³ and doubtless in his

1 Frank L. Schreiber's Diary.

2 Schreiber's Diary.

3 Schreiber's and Gregory's Diaries.

prayer rendered devout thanks to the good Providence which had watched over the regiment and had led it into pleasanter places.

We remained at Chattanooga, with no special duties to perform, until February 4th. The men spent the time visiting friends in other regiments and points of interest in and about Chattanooga, especially Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge. On January 30, Colonel Askew formed the regiment and told us that we were to have an election of field officers. Such election was held that afternoon, but neither Gregory, Schreiber nor McConnell give the result. On the first of February the regiment was paid off. Three hundred and two men had re-enlisted for three years more or until the war ended, and on the 4th day of February at 4 o'clock in the morning they started for Ohio to enjoy the promised 30 days' furlough. The train was delayed by a car off the track and the regiment did not get to Stevenson until 10 o'clock. There the men got dinner and at 5:30 p. m. started for Nashville, traveling all night and reaching that place at 8 o'clock the next morning. The regiment lay at Nashville until that evening and Gregory in his diary says quite a number of the men got intoxicated. At dark the regiment left for Louisville in freight cars and traveled all night, reaching Louisville at 2 o'clock p. m. on the 6th. It remained in Louisville all day the 7th, and until 1 o'clock p. m. of the 8th, when it crossed the Ohio River on a ferryboat. It left Jeffersonville, Ind., at 6 o'clock that evening, again traveled all night and reached Cincinnati at 1 o'clock on the 9th, where it was taken care of at the Sanitary Fair. It left Cincinnati about 4 o'clock p. m. and arrived at Columbus about 2 o'clock a. m., the 10th, and was escorted to Todd Barracks. There the regiment separated, each officer and man going to his home, but with orders to reassemble at Columbus at the expiration of the 30 days' furlough.

CHAPTER XX.

THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN—ROCKY FACE AND RESACA.

While the Fifteenth Ohio and the other regiments who had re-enlisted as Veterans were enjoying their furloughs, important events were occurring which were to bring the great war to an end and restore constitutional government to the country.

Shortly after General Grant's visit to Knoxville, mentioned in a former chapter, he established his headquarters at Nashville and set himself to the task of placing his troops in position from which they could move to advantage, and in collecting necessary supplies, so as to be ready to move upon the enemy on the first appearance of good weather in the spring. He expected to retain the command he then had and to move against Atlanta. He also hoped to make a campaign against Mobile, after Atlanta had fallen to occupy that place permanently, and to cut off Lee's army from the west by way of the road running through Augusta to Atlanta and thence south-west. He was purposing to hold Atlanta with a small garrison and expected to push through to Mobile, if that city was in our possession; if not, to Savannah, and in this manner to get possession of the only road that would then be left to the enemy.¹

The bill restoring the grade of Lieutenant General of the Army was passed February 26, 1864, and General Grant was appointed to the position. On the 9th day of March following, his commission was handed to him by President Lincoln, and on the 11th, orders were issued placing him in command of all the armies in the field. He at once had General Sherman advanced to the position he had vacated, General McPherson to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, and General Logan made commander of McPherson's Corps. Happily, General Thomas was left undisturbed as Commander of the Army of the Cumberland. General Grant then returned to his headquarters at Nashville, where he met General Sherman, and on March 18, the two Generals on whom the ultimate success of our armies depended, journeyed together to Cincinnati, in order, as General Grant says, that they could talk over matters of mutual interest without losing any more time from his new command.

It would be of profound interest could we know all that occurred on that eventful journey from Nashville to Cincinnati. General Grant in his memoirs says, that the first point that he

¹ Grant's Memoirs.

wished to discuss with General Sherman was particularly about the co-operation of the two armies when the spring campaign should open. Among the minor points discussed was the restoration to duty of officers who had been relieved of important commands, namely, McClellan, Fremont and Burnside in the east, and Buell, McCook, Negley and Crittenden in the west. General Grant's charity was as broad as his patriotism, and both were broad enough to prompt him to seek opportunity for these rejected General Officers, in which they might still serve the country and regain part of their lost prestige.

General Grant states that he agreed to see the Secretary of War and urge the restoration to command of these officers, and did so. He particularly recommended General Buell for such restoration and states that Secretary Stanton afterwards told him he had offered General Buell an assignment, but that the latter had declined it, saying, it would be a degradation to accept the assignment offered. That he afterwards understood that General Buell had refused to serve under either General Sherman or General Canby, because he had once ranked them both, and adds:

"The worst excuse a soldier can make for declining service is that he once ranked the Commander he is ordered to report to." General Grant also says that "there could have been no difference of opinion (between himself and General Sherman) as to the first duty of the armies of the Military Division of the Mississippi. Johnson's army was the first objective, and that important railroad center, Atlanta, the second."¹ The occupation of Mobile and Savannah, as before related, were a part of his ultimate plans.

General Sherman in his Memoirs confirms in part what took place during this journey, and adds some facts in connection with General Buell's declination to re-enter the service. He says that General Crittenden also refused service under an officer he had once ranked, and that our General McCook accepted a command under General Canby, in which he rendered valuable and patriotic service.²

So, while as before stated, our regiment was on furlough, the plans for the great campaign in the west on which we were about to enter were fully outlined and decided upon.

On the 18th day of March, 1864, the very day of the important conference between Generals Grant and Sherman, our regiment, recruited to nearly its full strength, marched to the

1 Grant's Memoirs, Vol. 2, page 121. See also General Sherman's Memoirs, Vol. 2, page 6-7.

2 General Sherman's Memoirs, Vol. 2, page 6-7.

east front of the Capitol at Columbus, where it turned over to Governor John Brough the old battle torn flag it had carried at Chickamauga and Missionary Ridge, and received a new one, which was presented by the patriotic women of Rix's Mills, Muskingum County, Ohio. The presentation speech was made by Rev. David Boyd and Lieutenant Colonel Askew received it for the regiment and promised that it should not suffer dishonor.¹ The regiment then marched to the railroad station where at 5 o'clock p. m. it took cars for Cincinnati on its way to the front. We reached Cincinnati at 3 o'clock on the morning of the 19th and were quartered on Fifth Street. At 9 o'clock next morning we embarked on the steam boat War Eagle for Louisville, Ky., where we arrived at 11 o'clock that night and were given quarters on Sixth Street. We remained at Louisville all day the 21st, and at 7 o'clock the morning of the 22nd left for Nashville, where we arrived at 5 o'clock p. m. and were quartered in the Zollicoffer Building. We remained there until the morning of the 25th. It was announced that we would be expected to march to Chattanooga, as the cars were all needed for transporting supplies to that place preparatory to our grand forward movement.

Some of the regimental officers had neglected to provide themselves with horses while at home, expecting to find suitable mounts at Nashville. In this they were disappointed, and the surgeon and adjutant had to content themselves with two scrawny, scraggy specimens, which were the laughing stock of the regiment. Each of these officers provided himself with a large pair of saddle bags in which to carry a change of under clothing, and when these bags were strapped on their saddles the horses looked like winged skeletons. The adjutant humorously named his beast "Pegasus" and Doctor Clark countered by calling his steed "Rosinante". The horses had both seen hard campaigning and were probably among those which had barely escaped starvation in the Chattanooga campaign the fall before.

On the morning of March 25 at 9 o'clock we moved out on the Murfreesboro Pike, and commenced our march to Chattanooga. As we passed out of the city the rain began to pour. The prospect was not at all pleasant and was quite depressing to our new recruits. After a march of about 8 miles we turned off the pike, put up our shelter tents and bivouaced for the night.²

Next morning, the 26th, at 7 o'clock we resumed our march and reached Stewart's Creek, 12½ miles, about noon, where we

1 For the history of this flag see proceedings of 36th Annual Reunion of the Regiment, 1911.

2 Wm. McConnell's Diary.

went into camp and remained until next day. The weather was fair and warm and the men had an opportunity to dry their wet clothing and write letters home.

The next morning was Sunday, but it was a day of only partial rest. At 7 o'clock we resumed our march and in about 10 miles reached Murfreesboro. Just before reaching the town the band of the Sixty-fourth Ohio, which was with us, took position at the head of the regiment with our own band, and we marched through the town with our colors flying and keeping time to the music. Our own band was new and had little practice but it played one march quite creditably.¹ We marched through the place without halting and pitched our tents on Stone River, near our old camp (Camp Sill) of the year before. Religious services were held in our camp by a volunteer chaplain who came out from Murfreesboro to conduct them. It was understood we were to remain here until supplies and clothing needed for our march were provided. The next day, March 28, such supplies and clothing were received and issued. Among the articles issued were axes and hatchets. In the evening there was a heavy thunderstorm accompanied by rain which flooded the camp and made some of the tents untenable.

March 29, reveille sounded at day light and we started again on our southward march. The bad weather had been very trying to the new recruits and we were compelled to leave quite a number of them in the hospital at Murfreesboro. We took the Shellyville Pike, marched 18 miles and went into camp about sun set, four miles from the town, near some old intrenchments abandoned by the enemy the year before. There was a keen wind blowing, betokening more rain, and the boys pulled dry grass for bedding and made themselves comfortable for the night.

March 30 at 7 o'clock we resumed our march over an undulating region. We were to pass through Shelbyville, which we had left to our right in our advance from Murfreesboro the year before. We had heard that it was one of the finest towns in Middle Tennessee and that the greater part of the people there were loyal to the Union. As we passed through the place both these reports were confirmed. As we neared the town, from many of the farm houses handkerchiefs and small flags were waved from doors and windows. Our band had now two pieces in its repertoire, which it played as we marched through the town, and many a pretty face beamed from the houses on our line of march, as our bright new flag and tidy uniforms caught their eyes.²

¹ and ² Gleason's Diary.

We stopped at Duck River, about a mile south of the town, to fill our canteens, and then took the road to Tullahoma. The country grew more hilly as we progressed. We halted at 10 a. m. for dinner and then pressed forward over hills and through hollows;—a rougher road than those we had encountered on our march up to this time. We met a party of soldiers surveying a military road and passed a school house, where a light haired handsome schoolmarm was presiding over about twenty flaxen haired children. They kept their seats as we marched by the open door, which spoke well for the discipline of the school and the tact of the fair school mistress. Gleason, in his diary, says this school reminded him of the North more than any thing he had yet seen on the march, and in part accounted for the strong Union sentiment manifested by the people of that region. We finally found a favorable camping place, on a piece of table land not far from Tullahoma, where there was a stream of good water, and halted for the night, having marched during the day about 20 miles. On the morning of March 31, we continued our march a few miles, passing through Tullahoma and encamping about one mile beyond the town, where we were to remain during the balance of the day. We drew rations and prepared to resume our march next day. The morning of April 1, 1864, was rainy and cold, but we resumed our march at the usual time. The road was muddy and slippery and most of the men were permitted to march on the railroad track, that ran near the road and which was higher and dryer. After a toilsome tramp of about 14 miles we passed through the town of Decherd and went into camp about a mile beyond it. It was reported that some of the men had boarded a train for Chattanooga. April 2, we marched to Cowan Station on the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, distant about 6 miles, and went into camp at the foot of the mountain we were to cross in order to reach Stevenson. There we drew two days rations which were to last until we reached that place, said to be thirty miles distant.

The morning of April 3, was frosty and pleasant and we began the ascent of the mountain about 7 o'clock. The ascent was not difficult, except in places where the roads had been made rough by the recent rains. After passing the summit we again took advantage of the railroad track and after a march of 10 miles halted for the night, in order that our wagon might overtake us. It rained steadily all night. Next morning, April 4, the reveille sounded and it was understood we were to continue our march to Stevenson, although the Colonel was reported as saying we would stop midway if we could procure rations. We

1 Gleason's Diary.

resumed our march about 7 o'clock, and the road being very wet and slippery, the whole regiment, except the officers who were mounted, took the railroad track down the mountain. The railroad track was also difficult in places, and there was a good deal of straggling, notwithstanding that Captain Dawson who was in immediate command of the marching column, did his best to prevent it and thereby earned the soubriquet of "old close 'em up." There was a brief halt for dinner and we again pressed forward, passing one or two small stations by the way. The valley widened as we neared Stevenson. When we were within a mile of that town we halted at a place which the colonel had selected for our camp and supposed we would remain there for the night. The colonel and the adjutant rode on into Stevenson. The adjutant soon returned with an order to march on to Stevenson, where we should be ready to take cars for Chattanooga in twenty-five minutes. No time was lost in obeying the order, for it was what everybody wished. When we arrived at the station we found that our train was made up of flat cars loaded with bridge iron, upon which the men seated themselves contentedly. It was bad, but better than marching afoot, as we were ready to testify.

We were delayed two or three hours in starting, during which time we were served with bread, ham and hot coffee from the Soldiers Home nearby. It was near dark when we got started and we did not reach Chattanooga until about 9 o'clock. Upon arriving there we were marched through muddy streets to a brick building called the Soldiers Home, where we were crowded into the third story for the night. The quarters were close and uncomfortable, but Gleason says, "we thought it a great deal better than lying out in the rain and mud."

The next morning the regiment was given a breakfast of soft bread, boiled pork and coffee by the Sanitary Commission. It then formed in line and marched to the outskirts of the city and was placed in camp on a hillside near a wooden Catholic Church. Here we remained until the morning of April 8. The weather was cloudy and cold, but the men made themselves comfortable and there was time for cleaning up, writing letters home and visiting points of interest. Here it was first ordered that the band should play just after reveille and be followed by morning roll call. It was a pleasant innovation and we began to appreciate that our regimental band was a valuable aid to our enjoyment. On the night of the 6th, the Gleason boys, Major McClenahan and some other singers met in Doctor Clark's tent and sang old songs. It was pleasant to think that this pleasure of former campaigns was to be continued.

On the morning of April 8, there was a thunderstorm and a heavy rain and the order to strike tents and march to the railroad station was a most unwelcome one. Roll call was omitted and after a hurried breakfast we packed up in the rain and at 6:30 A. M. were off for the station. There were not cars enough to accommodate every one inside and some had to ride on top. After the usual delay we moved out on the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, our destination being Loudon, about 100 miles distant, where it was said our division and brigade were encamped. Just after we passed through Cleveland, Tenn., our train stopped and looking ahead we saw a freight train off the track. We were told it had been blown off the track by a torpedo, planted by some villain the previous night. However, the damage was soon repaired and we passed on through Charleston, Athens and Sweet Water. As we were nearing Loudon we heard that our division was marching for that place, so we disembarked and went into camp near the Tennessee River and not far below the railroad bridge. We had barely time to pitch our tents when a thunderstorm broke over us, accompanied by a hard rain which continued all night. On the ninth the weather was threatening and the men remained in quarters most of the day. There was a convalescent camp just across the river from which a number of our men rejoined the regiment,—among them, Sergeant Scott and W. J. Rhodes of Company H.¹

We remained in camp at Loudon all day April 10. It was Sunday and our good old Chaplain, Randall Ross, held religious services. Just before dark our non-veterans, who had been temporarily attached to the Sixty-eighth Indiana, rejoined the regiment and we learned from them that our division had arrived at Loudon. That night there was singing in Doctor Clark's tent and the music blended with the musical ripple of the waters of the Tennessee. There was a soft rain falling on the morning of April 11, but there was the usual reveille, music by the band and roll call, and then, an order to have the recruits drill at 9 o'clock.

We were getting the recruits out ready for drill when the bugle sounded "the assembly". The drill was postponed, of course, and we struck tents and marched to the railroad station and took cars for Cleveland, Tenn. We left in such a hurry that we had to leave some of our rations and some of our men behind. The train was made up of box cars and, as the weather was mild, many of the men preferred to ride on top rather than on the inside of the cars. Those who were compelled to ride inside were the more fortunate as it afterwards proved, for as

¹ Gleason's Diary.

the train was nearing Athens a number of the cars left the track and some of them turned completely over. It was a frightful spectacle as seen from the rear car, and when the train was brought to a full stop wounded men were scattered along the railroad on both sides of the track. About thirty were severely wounded and many more were knocked breathless, or were slightly wounded and soon recovered. News of the accident was sent to Athens and a relief party came out from the village, among whom was Governor Andrew Johnson of Tenn. The officers and men who were uninjured hastened to the relief of the injured and soon they were all placed in a car and taken to Athens for further treatment. Fortunately, no one was killed and most of the wounded afterwards returned to duty. An examination of the track disclosed that the ties were rotten and that the rails had parted and thrown the cars from the track. The track was repaired in a few hours and our train reached Cleveland shortly after dark and we went into camp in the outskirts of the town. The night was warm and many of the men did not pitch their tents. They were sorry for it before morning, for it began to rain in the night and they were compelled to rise and pitch their tents in the rain.

We remained in camp at Cleveland until April 20. The Ninety-ninth Ohio had been stationed here for some time, one company being quartered in the Court House as Provost Guards. Frank Kerr a member of this company from Van Wert, an old "typo", was printing a small newspaper called "The Battle Flag", which was quite creditable.¹ The men, thinking we would probably remain here some days, began to make "permanent improvements" to their quarters, as the weather was cloudy and cold. We began to lick the new recruits into shape by daily drills. On the fifteenth, the Forty-ninth Ohio came up and went into camp near us. This was very gratifying to officers and men of both commands, for they had not been separated so long since we were united together in the same brigade at Camp Nevin in 1861. Of course, there was a general exchange of visits between the two old regiments and warm and cordial were the greetings.

On the sixteenth of April our old division arrived, having marched through from Loudon, and moved on some six miles west to a place called McDonald's Station. As soon as we were fairly settled at Cleveland, the singers got together and almost every evening their voices were heard above the hubbub and laughter of the camp. We held a dress parade the evening of the seventeenth,—the first since our return from veteran furlough. On the twentieth at 7 o'clock A. M., we packed up and

¹ Gleason's Diary.

marched toward McDonald's Station taking a road parallel to the railroad. Upon reaching the camp of our division, we filed into a large open field and were placed in camp, closely followed by the Forty-ninth Ohio. Shortly after this a mail came in, bringing quite a number of commissions for officers who had been promoted. Those receiving them were all called to the colonel's tent and congratulated. On the twenty-first orders for daily drill were issued as follows: Company drill at 7 A. M., battalion drill at 9 A. M., and brigade drill at 2 P. M. Orders were also issued reducing to the ranks all non-commissioned officers who had not enlisted as veterans and filling their places with veterans. It was a bitter degradation to a number of sergeants who had failed to re-enlist. They had earned their promotions by gallant conduct and it now seems like a needless injustice. There was, however, another side to it. At the critical moment they shrank from further sacrifice, while their successors did not. The latter were therefore deemed the more worthy. On the twenty-second new Springfield rifles were issued to the men and we got notice that we would remove our camp next day to get away from the dust which began to be quite annoying. On the twenty-third both our regiment and the Forty-ninth Ohio moved their camps to a pine forest about one mile south of our old ones, which we found much more comfortable. On the twenty-fourth an order was issued reducing the sergeant major, quartermaster sergeant and hospital steward to the ranks and appointing Andrew J. Gleason, Company H, John W. Wilson, Company G and Willison B. White, Company A to the respective vacancies. An order was also issued detailing two men from each company to form a company of pioneers, to be commanded by Lieutenant J. Alonzo Gleason. The remaining days of April were occupied with drill and target practice, the issue of better arms and equipment, and other preparations for the campaign upon which we were about to enter. Gleason in his diary notes that a supply of whiskey arrived on the twenty-eighth at the brigade commissary's "and produced unusual merriment among the shoulder strapped gentry, who partook of it". On the twenty-eighth orders were received for a general review the next day. The review took place as ordered and the reviewing officer was General O. O. Howard, who had succeeded General Granger in command of our corps. It was the first time we had had an opportunity to see him at close quarters. We noticed that he had only one arm, the left, and that he managed his horse with considerable skill. On the whole he made a very favorable impression.

On the thirtieth, shortly after the arrival of a train we heard

cheering, which gradually but quickly came nearer, and almost before we were aware of it, our dear old brigade commander, General Willich, was in our midst. A wildly cheering crowd was about him. As he sat on his horse, some had hold of his strirrups and others of his bridle reins, while he joked and talked with "his poys," as he called them. He made a little speech in which he said he had arrived just in time to lead us in a forward movement which would begin in a few days. He had been absent for some months and it was said he had undergone an operation for cancer of the lip at a Cincinnati hospital. We were all overjoyed to see him again. The same day we had notice that the paymaster was in camp and would pay us off as soon as the rolls were prepared.

There was every indication of an early movement against the enemy, and the usual letter writing on such occasions was seen. Surplus baggage was sent to the rear and we were literally being stripped for the great encounter. Our army, which was now commanded by General Sherman, was posted as follows: The Army of the Cumberland under command of General Thomas at and about Ringgold, Ga., the Army of the Ohio under command of General Schofield at and near Cleveland, Tenn., and the Army of the Tennessee commanded by General McPherson at and near Gordon's Mills on the Chickamauga. The enemy was at Dalton, holding Taylor's or Rocky Face Ridge, the Buzard's Roast Pass, the line of Mill Creek to the North, and his line of railway back toward Atlanta. It will be remembered that General Grant, in his personal conference with General Sherman when the two rode together from Nashville to Cincinnati, said that one of the important matters discussed was how the armies of the east and west could co-operate, and it is quite probable that each assured the other that he would keep the enemy in his front too fully occupied to permit any part of its force from being sent to operate against the other. With this in view, it was arranged that both armies would move against the enemy on the same day, May 5, 1864. Grant's army from Culpepper, Va., and Sherman's from Chattanooga.¹ The organization of our corps at the beginning of the campaign was as follows: General Howard commanding the corps, General Stanley the first division, General Newton the second division and General T. J. Wood the third division. The three brigades of the third (our) division were commanded respectively by Generals Willich, Hazen and Samuel Beatty.

Our brigade, the First, when the campaign was opened was made up of the following regiments: the Thirty-fifth and Eighty-

¹ W. R. R., 72-62.

ninth Illinois, the Fifteenth and Forty-ninth Ohio, the Thirty-second Indiana and the Fifteenth Wisconsin. The Twenty-fifth Illinois joined the brigade June 6, and the Eighth Kansas June 28.¹

On May 1, all surplus baggage was sent to the railroad station, to be sent to and stored at Bridgeport, and on the second all unserviceable arms were packed in boxes and sent to division headquarters. That day the brigade was ordered out to drill as a brigade, but was soon dismissed by General Willich and regimental drill was substituted.

On the morning of May 3, 1864, the bugler sounded the reveille and the Colonel's voice was heard directing that company commanders be notified that we would march promptly at 12 o'clock. It was the signal for the opening of the memorable Atlanta campaign. Rations were drawn for three days and promptly at noon we started on our march. We moved out, marching past the Widow Tucker's house,—division headquarters,—and taking a road leading southward toward Ringgold, Georgia, as we supposed. From a citizen we learned that we were seventeen miles from Ringgold and twenty-three miles from Chattanooga.

After marching about ten miles we halted at the intersection of two roads where we bivouaced for the night. The advance brigade of our division had preceded us and were in camp in a pleasant location. We were soon also in camp and made ourselves comfortable for the time being. That evening we heard the sound of Gleason's violin from the non-commissioned staff's tent. Orders came to have reveille next morning at 4 o'clock and to be ready to march at 5:30.

On the morning of May 4 the little valley where we were encamped rang with bugles calling us to prepare for another day's march. We were not long in packing up and getting our breakfast and at sunrise the assembly sounded and we moved out. The sun came up red and fiery, seen through the smoke of numberless campfires, betokening bloody work ahead.² All, however, was as quiet as if the enemy were two hundred miles away.

Our course continued in a southerly direction through a sparsely settled wooded region until we came to a place where the roads forked—one branch leading to Ringgold and the other to Tunnel Hill. We took the latter. The air was cool and bracing and we marched rapidly without discomfort. We reached Catoosa Springs about 10 o'clock and found our advance brigades encamped there. We passed about a mile beyond the

¹ W. R. R. 72-92- note.

² GGleason's Diary.

springs, where the Thirty-second Indiana was sent out as pickets. We encamped partly in a narrow valley and partly on a hillside. The southern side of the valley was a steep ridge which formed our front and picket line. It was said that the enemy was close at hand and it looked like we would soon have serious work to do, though as yet we had heard very little firing. On the morning of the fifth we had orders to pitch our tents in order, which indicated that we would remain in camp at least for a day. The sun was hot and the men sought the shelter of their tents and rested. The Fifty-second Ohio having moved into camp near us, there was visiting between the two regiments, both regiments having companies from Belmont and Van Wert Counties. In the evening we received orders to have reveille early next morning and to relieve the Forty-ninth Ohio on picket. We also drew three day's rations and were admonished that they might be all we would get for five days. It was reported that we would advance against the enemy in the morning. All the wagons were ordered back to Ringgold, except one for brigade headquarters. In the late evening when the candles were lighted in the thousands of tents, the Gleason boys, Major McClenahan, Doctor Clark and others sang several selections from "The Bugle Call" and thus added to the harmony of the soft, balmy May night.

On the morning of May 6, we heard the reveille sounding from the camps all about us before our own bugler, Wilson Iler, "Pete", we called him, got fairly awake. He was a little startled at being behind time and the blast he blew was so loud and shrill that no one in our camp was left asleep. A few weeks after this he blew another similar blast amid far different surroundings,—the last he ever sounded—but we will come to this later on. The right wing of the regiment went out on picket and the left wing remained in camp all day. A mail came and brought news that the Army of the Potomac was also advancing against the enemy. It was again reported that we would move next morning and later came an order to have reveille at 3:30 A. M. and be ready to march at 5 o'clock.

While we were thus lying in our camp at Catoosa Springs, our comrades of the other divisions and corps of our great army were closing in on the enemy which, as stated in the beginning of this chapter, was at Dalton in position covered by Rocky Face Ridge. This position was strongly fortified, as was also Buzzards Roost Gap through which passed the Chattanooga and Atlanta Railroad. General McPherson was moving from Gordon's Mills by the way of Ships Gap, Villanow and Snake Creek Gap directly on Resaca. General Schofield was passing down

from the north and General Thomas, commanding our army, was moving against Tunnel Hill.

General Sherman arrived in our camp, at the headquarters of the Fourth Corps, at about nine o'clock on the morning of May 6 and our division commanders called to see him. While there he gave General Howard general orders and instructions in reference to our movements. At 12:30 P. M. our corps received orders to march the morning of the seventh, at daybreak on Tunnel Hill, the object being to drive the enemy from that place should he be in force. Our corps was to take him in flank while the Forteenth Corps, General Palmer, should attack in front. General Schofield commanding the Army of the Ohio had been ordered to march on Varnell's Station and to feel toward our left, while General Edward M. McCook, commanding the first division of cavalry, was ordered to move under directions of General Howard. The orders for our corps were as follows: The first division, General Stanley, was to lead, moving via the Alabama or old Federal Road, the first road to the right after leaving Ben Clark's, our division was to follow, and the second division, General Newton, was to move via Burke's Mill to Doctor Lee's house.

It was the intention to find out first whether the enemy occupied the Tunnel Hill range in force. If not, the hill was to be taken by the first division, in connection with General Palmer's corps, the Fourteenth, which was moving directly on the place from Ringgold. The third division (ours) was to form on the left of the first, and the second division was to be massed in reserve opposite our left, to cover our left flank and await the arrival of General Schofield's corps, the Twenty-third, which was now ordered to move and take position with its right resting at Doctor Lee's house and its left at Ellidge's. If the enemy was found in force at Tunnel Hill, the ridge was to be taken at the most accessible points and then we were to change front toward the tunnel.¹

The morning of May 7, the bugles began sounding reveille at 2:30 o'clock and continued until 3:30 A. M. when our own bugle sounded the same call and we arose and prepared to march at daybreak. Our pickets came in and we were all ready to march by the appointed time. We were delayed, however, by other troops passing until near 8 o'clock, when we moved out, taking a road leading in an easterly direction through a gap in the hills. We supposed it to be the Dalton road. There was a report current that we would meet the enemy today, but the silence which prevailed during the morning did not indicate his

1 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R., 72-841-2.

near presence and we began to think he had "skedaddled". Our march was slow, with frequent halts, and we soon began to hear an occasional boom from a big gun away to the front, but the reports were not frequent enough to indicate any serious engagement. At noon we halted and made coffee and after thirty minutes rest were ordered forward to occupy Tunnel Hill, which had been taken by our advance troops. We reached the village after a march of about two miles and halted a short time before beginning the ascent of the hill. Near our halting place a gallows had been erected and a new grave dug. These were said to have been prepared for the execution of a spy but for some reason had not been used.¹ We ascended the hill and were formed in line on the left of our division, which extended along its crest about a mile, and made ourselves comfortable for the night. The next morning our bugler did not arouse us until after daylight. While we were having a late breakfast, we heard the "general" call in another brigade and were quite in a flurry thinking our call would at once follow. It did not, however, and an aide-de-camp came to notify us to be ready to move at any time. We struck tents and awaited orders. The enemy occupied a high eminence across a little valley which we were told was Taylor's or Rocky Face Ridge. At 8:30 our assembly call sounded and we formed in double column in support of the Fortyninth Ohio. That regiment moved down the slope in front until it reached the foot of the hill, where it moved quite a distance to the right and skirmishing began. We had little to do for several hours, except to lie on our arms and watch the skirmishers who seemed to be gaining some ground. While thus occupied a staff officer rode up and announced that General Grant had won a victory over Lee on the Rapidan. The news caused cheering all along the line, bands played national airs and a big gun on a hill to our right roared defiance across the valley to the rebels on the ridge.²

After this our regiment was moved about one-half mile to the right, where we saw one of our signal flags waving from the northern point of Rocky Face and knew that some troops of Newton's division had effected a lodgment there. The regiment was formed in column by division and thus formed we bivouaced for the night, with orders to be under arms at four o'clock next morning.

On the morning of May 9, we were under arms as ordered and ready for any emergency. Skirmishing began to the right and left of us about 6 o'clock, and soon on the right we heard volleys of musketry and cheering by our men which indicated a

¹ and ² Gleason's Diary.

charge. At 9 o'clock we moved down the hill in column still supporting the Forty-ninth Ohio, which was advancing in line of battle. Still in advance of them was the Eighty-ninth Illinois deployed as skirmishers. We moved down the hill and across an open field at the base of Rocky Face and began the ascent of the ridge, which was thickly wooded. After going a short distance we were halted and lay on our arms for three or four hours. In crossing the open field above mentioned Brown Deselms of Company K was severely wounded,—the first casualty of the campaign in our regiment. While we lay in this position the company cooks served coffee and the men filled their canteens. After this the three left companies under Major McClenahan were sent forward to relieve a portion of the picket line. While here General Willich took post with our regiment and the old adjutant general of the brigade, Captain Carl Schmitt, rejoined us. About 3 o'clock the brigade signal sounded and the part of the brigade not on picket moved quite a distance to the right. We had to pass across an open field, where all were exposed to the fire of rebel sharpshooters posted in ledges of rocks on the ridge, and two men of the Forty-ninth Ohio were killed and several wounded. While moving to the right we saw in the valley to our rear an officer mounted on a splendid dun horse. The horse was wounded and became uncontrollable. At each leap a stream of blood gushed from his flanks, and thus leaping, horse and rider passed out of our sight. In about an hour our regiment was ordered back to the left to relieve the Eighty-ninth Illinois on the picket and skirmish line. Continual firing had been going on all day and, night coming on, it was very difficult to withdraw the men under fire. However, by taking advantage of the trees, the relieving line approached within calling distance of the skirmishers and then advanced as the others retired, each picket sheltering himself as best he could. We had sent a detail for rations but it was so difficult to reach the picket line in the darkness that they were not brought up. There was a heavy charge on the right about sunset.

In our front at Rocky Face the hill rose to a perpendicular cliff of rocks about one hundred feet high. We could not climb it nor could the enemy descend it. The enemy held its summit and we held its foot with our skirmish or picket line. The woods were quite dense and we could not see the enemy nor could they see us. Any noise or movement on our part was followed by a rattling fire from the enemy and our men fired back at the points from which the shots seemed to come. Occasionally we would hear a shrill rebel voice calling out, "Look out Yanks! here comes a stone," and a big rock would come crashing down through the

trees above our heads. This would be answered by a volley, aimed at the point whence the rock came. All through the night we were annoyed by the frequent "zt" of the enemy's bullets from the ridge and there was little rest for any of us.

At 4 o'clock on the morning of May 10, all were under arms. The adjutant went to brigade headquarters to ask that we be relieved early so we could get rations. As before stated, because of the great difficulty in getting to the picket line the evening before, rations were not brought up and the men were hungry.

We had great difficulty in being relieved from picket duty when daylight came. Our men were so near the enemy they could not leave their cover without becoming targets for his sharpshooters who were watching our every movement. The Forty-ninth Ohio, who relieved us, had the same trouble. The difficulty, however, was overcome by each individual choosing his own route to the rear. The men of the Forty-ninth Ohio in relieving us took the same course and the relief was accomplished with little or no injury to either regiment.

Our regiment when relieved went back to our position of the day before. After breakfast we took stock of cartridges on hand and the adjutant made a detail of men to go back to the ammunition wagon and bring up a fresh supply. The enemy had got a better range on our position and their bullets were quite annoying. While we were eating our dinner one whizzed just above our heads and, passing through a shelter tent, buried itself in a haversack which a man inside was using as a pillow. We would not have minded the bullets so much if we could have returned the fire. We heard great cheering, which began on our right and rolled down the line, and were told that General Grant had fought a great battle, driving Lee's army from the field, and was in hot pursuit of the defeated enemy. There were the usual rumors in regard to our own movements. One was that General Hooker was in Dalton and another that General McPherson was at Resaca, all of which were received with due allowance. There was heavy cannonading on our immediate right, on both sides of the line, but we noticed no perceptible advantage to either side.

During the afternoon two officers came walking along in rear of the regiment, telling the men some doubtful stories and asking numerous questions, which led to the suspicion that they were spies, although they represented themselves to be members of General Thomas' staff. The adjutant followed them to the field below where he saw them looking at the ridge with a field glass, but allowed them to go unmolested. Lieutenant Colonel Askew, however, was not satisfied and directed him to go back and conduct them to General Willich's headquarters. Colonel

Wallace, who had just awakened from a nap, confirmed the order and went with the adjutant, but the supposed spies had disappeared over the hill toward Tunnelton.¹ In the evening we had orders to relieve the Thirty-second Indiana on the line, but later were moved to the brigade rendezvous where we put in the night.

The morning of May 11, we had reveille at the usual hour and while at roll call a man in Company A was slightly wounded. After breakfast we received orders to march in an hour. The Adjutant made a report of our casualties up to this time, and although we had been under fire for two or three days, they only summed up six men, one severely and five slightly wounded. About 10 o'clock we moved back to Tunnel Hill, went into camp near the position that we first occupied and pitched tents in regular order, as if we were to remain there for some time. The firing had been quite brisk in the morning but slackened up during the day. We learned that the Sixty-fourth Ohio had suffered severe losses in taking the north end of Rocky Face two days before and that Colonel McIlvaine had been killed. General Willich's quarters were quite near and we noticed, by certain signs, that something unusual was on his mind. Before long he called the regimental commanders together and evidently imparted some news of great moment.² At night we received orders to have reveille at 2:30 o'clock and to relieve the pickets at 4 o'clock next morning.

The news that General Willich had imparted was doubtless that General McPherson was through Snake Creek Gap and was on the enemy's flank. What troubled the General was the doubt about what the enemy would do. Would he fall on our corps and try to destroy us, would he demonstrate with a small force in our front to hold us there and with his main force try to overwhelm McPherson, or would he retreat? There was evidently apprehension that he would do the first, and try to defeat our army in detail. There was real danger in the situation and all the general officers of our corps were apprehensive that the enemy would concentrate and try to overwhelm us. General Howard says that when it was learned that General McPherson was through Snake Creek Gap, General Sherman at once sent the rest of General Thomas' army after him, leaving him, General Howard, with the Fourth Corps and General Stoneman's division of cavalry to hold the enemy in our front and protect our base of supplies, and that General Johnston "terrified him" for two days, till our skirmishing amounted, at times, almost to a battle.³

1 and 2 Gleason's Diary.

3 The Struggle for Atlanta, The Century, Vol. 12-442.

The morning of May 12 we reileved the pickets along our front at Rocky Face. After daybreak the usual sharpshooting was resumed, and in Company D, Newton Kennedy was killed and Samuel S. Steel was wounded. Two of our batteries on Tunnel Hill frequently sent shells up among the enemy on the ridge. What the effect was we could not tell, except that after a round or two their picket firing ceased for a while. While we were thus engaged on picket duty, the rest of our brigade moved rapidly to the left, where it was reported the enemy was concentrating against General Newton's division. Our Surgeon, Doctor Clark, brought to headquarters a rumor that General Hooker's corps had gained the railroad near Dalton, had driven the enemy into his fortifications at Resaca, that we would be able to reach Atlanta first, and that General Grant had defeated Lee's army in another battle. Late in the evening we were relieved by the Forty-ninth Ohio and joined the brigade, which we found about three miles to the left, strongly intrenched. In fact the bulk of our division and General Newton's division were stretched across the valley in echelon by brigade, each line strongly fortified, and we were momentarily expecting to be attacked. There were reports that Wheeler's rebel cavalry had captured Cleveland and were threatening our base of supplies at Ringgold. The situation was so grave that we got little sleep that night.

The morning of May 13 we were moved forward to a line of works in our front and expected to remain there during the day. In a short time, however, we were ordered back to Tunnel Hill. We started and had marched about a mile when we learned that the enemy had abandoned Rocky Face Ridge. We at once retraced our steps, marched past our late position and soon turning to the right, followed a road leading through a narrow gap in the rear of Rocky Face in the direction of Dalton. That place was reported to have been evacuated by the enemy. As we marched up the valley we noticed that the enemy's field works were quite extensive and formidable.

We reached Dalton about noon and found it abandoned and dirty. The wind blew dust from the streets in great clouds and we were glad to get quickly through the town and out into the country. We here met the Forty-ninth Ohio, which had marched by another road. A mile from the town we came to a large spring, issuing out of a hill in a stream large enough to run a mill, and halted to refill our canteens. In passing through Dalton the men found large quantities of peanuts. Gleason, in his diary says, "the boys also found a large amount of tobacco, which was confiscated from the stores, as well as every thing else which was desirable". After marching until supper time we halted

for coffee and then pushed on two or three miles and bivouaced for the night—making our days march about fifteen miles. The enemy, we were told, was close at hand.

At about 2 o'clock the morning of May 14, the Adjutant made a detail of men to go for rations and at 4 o'clock another detail to draw and issue cartridges. Our brigade was detained several hours by failure of our supply wagons to come up. While we waited for them a squad of 85 rebel prisoners passed to the rear under guard. Our regimental band, which had been left behind at Tunnel Hill, here came up and when we resumed our march it played some inspiring music. Our course was almost due south along or near an old railroad grade until we reached the edge of a tableland, where we found a long line of log breast works, evidently built by the enemy. Here we left the main road and turned to the left, marching inside of a line of works for some distance. We then marched on a road through the woods until we reached an opening where our brigade formed in line of battle. A sharp cavalry fight took place on our right. While we were forming General Wood came riding by with some members of his staff and called out to the adjutant, "Lieutenant Copie, tell General Willich to throw out a cloud of skirmishers—a cloud of skirmishers." The cavalry fight was soon over and for a brief time there was an oppressive silence. Suddenly cannonading opened up to our right, followed by musketry, and the battle raged furiously for an hour or more. It was apparent that our lines were advancing steadily. Two or three times we saw columns of smoke arising, which indicated burning buildings.

When the firing had worked well to our front and left, we changed direction a little to the right and moved forward over a range of wooded hills. General Hazen's brigade was on our immediate left as we advanced, and the writer was much impressed by its steadiness and soldierly bearing and by the coolness of its commander. As we approached the enemy's lines, our brigade was crowded out of line by the troops on our right and left and was placed in reserve.¹ In the late afternoon we were ordered forward into the front line, relieving Colonel Reilly's brigade of General Cox's division of the Twenty-third Corps.² This restored us to our proper place in the line, immediately on the right of General Hazen's, Second brigade, and we at once barricaded our front as well as we could under the circumstances. Our line was along a range of hills, opening on a plantation thickly covered with a short growth of young pines. The enemy's works were visible about two hundred yards to

¹ General Wood's report, W. R. R. 72-374.

² General Wood's report, W. R. R. 72-375.

our front and our men kept up a well directed fire on them until our ammunition was exhausted, when we were relieved by the Eighty-ninth Illinois and retired to the woods in our rear for the night. While the regiment was on the front line, lying down and firing at the enemy, the adjutant went on to the line and, rising to obtain a better view of the enemy's works, was suddenly caught by Lieutenant Dubois and pulled to the ground with a sharp reproof for his carelessness. Just at this moment Sergeant David E. Livenspire of Company I rose to get better aim, when a rifle ball pierced his heart and he fell dead with a smile on his lips. The adjutant's stay on the firing line was short, for he was soon ordered back to hurry up a fresh supply of ammunition. On his way back he passed a pathetic little group which he has never forgotten. Two of the group were digging a shallow grave, another was sorrowing over his mortally wounded brother, who was not yet dead, and for whose body the grave was being dug. Passing further on, he saw two men carrying on a stretcher a wounded lieutenant colonel, whom he thought was Lieutenant Colonel Barnes of the Ninety-seventh Ohio. He afterwards learned that Colonel Barnes was not wounded in the battle, and has often wondered who the dark bearded officer was whom he saw carried off the field that day.

The adjutant succeeded in getting the ammunition needed, the cartridge boxes were replenished and after a supper of raw bacon and hard bread we bivouaced for the night. Early on the morning of the 15th, it was announced that the whole line would advance at 8 o'clock, but the order never came.¹ The adjutant made out a list of casualties of the day before, which showed two men, Sergeant Livenspire of Company I, and Charles Baldwin, of Company D, killed, and twelve others wounded.

Firing had opened on our front quite early. Our brigade lay in reserve, expecting to be called at any time. The pioneers of the brigade went to work on intrenchments. A battery on our left fired an occasional shot and two batteries on our front and right belched forth from time to time. The enemy made several charges on our rifle pits during the forenoon, but were signally repulsed. The pioneers worked all forenoon, cutting roads for the artillery, throwing up earth works and felling trees so as to give our artillery unobstructed range. While we were eating our noon luncheon, the adjutant general of the brigade came up and told our colonel that, in the advance proposed, our regiment would be in the third line in rear of the Forty-ninth Ohio and Eighty-ninth Illinois. Generals Howard and Wood rode along our line that morning and the former pointed out, it was said,

¹ General Wood's report, W. R. R., 72-375.

a place where 20 guns were to be placed, to be opened out all at once on the enemy.¹ About noon General Howard received an intimation that an attack was to be made on the enemy's right by the Twentieth Corps, and an order to observe closely its effect on the enemy's center, nearly opposite our position, and if any weakening or shaking of his lines was observed, to attack vigorously.

With this in view our brigade received orders to change direction and we took our position in the rear of the Forty-ninth Ohio and Eighty-ninth Illinois, which we were to support and which occupied a line of log breastworks on a wooded hill. While lying in this position General Wood and staff were immediately to our rear. An aide brought word that General Hooker's troops on our left had taken one of the enemy's batteries. There had been heavy firing on our left, but General Wood had observed that General Hooker's attack had caused no perceptible weakness of the enemy in our immediate front. Still, with a view of ascertaining more certainly the condition of the enemy confronting us, he ordered an advance of our brigade and the brigade of General Hazen. The front line advanced only a short distance when a terrific direct and cross fire of musketry and artillery swept over the open field which divided the two opposing armies, and showed, to use General Wood's language, "that wherever else the enemy might be weak, there, certainly, he was in full force." He adds that: "fortunately, the condition and strength of the enemy were discovered before our two brigades were deeply or dangerously committed to the assault, which enabled them to be withdrawn without the very heavy loss which at one time seemed so imminent."²

General Willich was deeply impressed by the serious work involved in the above described movement and, rigged out in his full brigadier general's uniform, including his yellow sash, he went out to the front line to see for himself the obstacles to be overcome. While so engaged he was shot by a rebel skirmisher, the ball penetrating his right shoulder and side. As he was carried back on a stretcher through our lines, the men crowded about him in sincere grief. A thoughtless young officer³ ordered them back, thinking they would annoy him, and received a severe rebuke from the wounded general. He was evidently suffering severe pain, but he loved "his poys," as he called them, and as they crowded

¹ Gleason's Diary.

² General Wood's Report, W. R. R. 72-375.

³ The Adjutant.

about him, he exhorted them in broken English to do their duty as well without him as if he were present.

Just at this time the batteries of General Newton's division on our right began firing by volley, pouring a perfect storm of shot and shell into the enemy's lines. The noise was deafening and we thought at first that the enemy was attacking that part of the line in force. But it turned out only to be the attempted destruction of a battery of the enemy which had become annoying.

After this cannonade ceased, our pioneers were set to work throwing up epaulements for some heavy field guns on a knoll to our left which commanded the enemy's works, and afterwards were sent out to the skirmish line to dig pits for the better protection of our skirmishers. They returned about midnight. The adjutant had borrowed some tools from the battery, which had in the meantime been posted behind the epaulements before mentioned, and with a small squad of men started to return them.

Our regiment at this time, except Company H, which was on the picket line, lay about 200 feet back of the line of works in a little cove or depression—the men sleeping on their arms. The adjutant and his squad had just returned the tools to the battery and were passing in front of and below the big guns behind the epaulements before mentioned, when the enemy opened a brisk fire. The big guns at once opened a fire above the heads of the adjutant and his squad, who were knocked to their knees by the unexpected explosions, and firing began all along the line. The adjutant, fearing the men on the line would forget our skirmishers and kill or wound them before they could get back, ran along the line calling out not to fire until the skirmishers came in. The men in the works and behind them in the woods seemed in a panic and some of them commenced firing their guns in almost any direction. The adjutant caught one fellow who seemed half asleep and gave him a severe smack with his sword, which seemed to awaken him, and he rushed forward to the works. Our regiment, awakened from a sound sleep, was a perfect babel of confusion. Even the officers had lost, or seemed to have lost, all sense of direction, and the men were yelling and some of them firing their guns in the air. The adjutant rushed among them and called out: "This way to the works!" and by a common impulse they followed him without command and distributed themselves along and behind the breastworks. It was difficult to make them understand that they must reserve their

fire until the skirmishers were in, as they were shivering with excitement and cold, for the night was chill. It was thought that it was a night attack by the enemy and our guns opened all along the line. But the enemy's advance, if it really was an advance, was soon checked. The fire slackened and then ceased, and soon all was quiet, and the men not on picket returned to their rest. We had one man, John Bevo of Company H, killed in this night broil.

The next morning, May 16, we found that during the night the enemy had abandoned his position at Resaca, had crossed the Oostenaula River, and was retreating southward. Our losses since the campaign opened had been as follows: *At Rocky Face*, killed, Newton Kennedy of Company D, Wounded, Samuel S. Steel and Harmon H. Brewer of Company D, John C. Jones Company E, Riley Cook Company H, and Brown Deselms of Company K. Besides these there were three of four men in Companies A and G who were reported as being hit, but their wounds were so slight they were not officially noted.

At Resaca the killed were Sergeant David E. Livinspire of Company I, Charles Baldwin of Company D, and John Bevo of Company H, and the wounded, Corporals John D. Fleming and John A. McKinney and Peter Hammond of Company A, Sergeant David A. Thomas of Company B, James Bernard of Company F; William Stough, Louis Gothier and Walker A. Smith of Company G, and Sergeant George M. Scutchall, Henry Beamer and Walker A. Smith of Company H. Louis Gothier of Company G, above mentioned, died of his wounds at Resaca May 18, 1864, three days after he was wounded.

So the summary is actually as follows:

At Rocky Face—Killed, 1; wounded, 5; and at Resaca, killed, 4; wounded, 11.

There were camp rumors to the effect that some one had blundered, or the enemy would not have been permitted to escape us at Resaca. It was known throughout our part of the army that General McPherson's force, supported by the Army of the Cumberland, except our corps, was through Snake Creek Gap and to the enemy's right and rear, before he left our front at Rocky Face Ridge. Why the advantage thus gained was not pressed we could not understand. It is now known that we had the opportunity to defeat and practically destroy Johnston's army. The situation is well described in the official report of General Cleburne, who commanded a division of Johnston's army. He says that while

at Dug Gap, "Receiving orders during the night (the night of May 10, 1864), I marched on the morning of the 11th, starting at 7 o'clock upon the Sugar Valley road in the direction of Resaca. This movement was rendered necessary by the untoward circumstance of Snake Creek Gap not being adequately occupied to resist the heavy force thrown against it under the sagacious and enterprising McPherson, which opened up on our rear and line of communication, from which it was distant at Resaca only five miles. Why it was neglected I cannot imagine. General Mackall, Johnston's Chief of Staff, told me it was the result of a flagrant disobedience of orders, by whom he did not say. Certainly the commanding general never could have failed to appreciate its importance. Its loss exposed us in the outset of the campaign to a terrible danger, and on the left forced us to retreat from a position where, if he adhered to his attack, we might have detained the enemy for months, destroying vast numbers of his men, perhaps prolong the campaign, until the wet season would have rendered operations in the field impracticable. As it was, if McPherson had hotly pressed his advantage, Sherman supporting him strongly with the bulk of his army, it is impossible to say what the enemy might not have achieved—more than probable, a complete victory. But McPherson faltered and hung back, indeed, after penetrating to within a mile of Resaca, he actually returned, because, as I understand, he was not supported and feared if we turned back suddenly upon him from Dalton, he would be cut off, as doubtless would have been the result."¹

General Sherman, in his official report says, that by reason of the operations of our part of the army at Rocky Face and Buzzards Roost, General McPherson was enabled to march within a mile of Resaca almost unopposed, that he found Resaca too strong to be carried by assault, and although there were many good roads leading from north to south, endangering his left flank from the direction of Dalton, he could find no road by which he could rapidly cross over the railroad, and accordingly fell back and took a strong position near the east end of Snake Creek Gap. I was somewhat disappointed at the result, but still appreciated the advantage gained, and on May 10, ordered General Thomas to send General Hooker's corps to Snake Creek Gap to support General McPherson, and to follow with another corps (the Fourteenth, General Palmer), leaving General Howard with the Fourth Corps to continue to threaten Dalton in front, while

¹ W. R. R., 74-721.

the rest of the army moved rapidly through Snake Creek Gap.¹ It will thus be seen that General Sherman only mildly expresses the keen disappointment he must have felt in McPherson's failure to press his great advantage. General Howard in his article, "The Struggle for Atlanta,"² relates that on May 6, at a conference between Generals Sherman and Thomas at which he, General Howard, was present, General Thomas urged that the skirmishing and demonstrations before Rocky Face and Buzzard's Roost be given to Generals Schofield and McPherson, while he (Thomas) with his strong army should pass through Snake Creek Gap and seize Johnston's communications, and that if he was permitted to do so, he felt sure of victory.

Sherman, says Howard, "hesitated to put his main army twenty miles away beyond a mountain range on the enemy's line, lest he should thereby endanger his own," and adds that "in less than a week he ran even greater risk." General Howard further relates that: "On May 9, when McPherson passed through Snake Creek Gap and out into Sugar Valley, he found the Gap unoccupied, and so with Kilpatrick's small cavalry detachment ahead, followed closely by Dodge's Sixteenth Corps with Logan's Fifteenth Corps well closed up, he emerged from the mountains on the morning of May 9 at the eastern exit. The cavalry advanced, stumbled upon Confederate Cavalry, which had run out of Resaca to watch this doorway." That "Kilpatrick followed up the retreating Confederates with dash and persistency, till they found shelter behind the deep cut works and guns at Resaca." General Howard further says:

"In plain view of these works, though on difficult ground, Logan and Dodge pressed up their men under orders from McPherson to drive back the enemy and take the railroad. And, pray, why were not these orders carried out? McPherson's answer, in a letter sent that night to Sherman: 'They (probably Polk's men) displayed considerable force and opened on us with artillery. After skirmishing among the gulches and thickets till nearly dark, and finding that I would not succeed in cutting the railroad before dark, or in getting to it, I decided to withdraw the command and take up a position for the night between Sugar Valley and the entrance to the Gap.' At the first news Sherman was much vexed and declared, concerning McPherson's failure to break the enemy's main artery: 'Such an opportunity does not occur twice in a single life—still he was perfectly justified by his orders.'"³

1 W. R. R., 72-63-64.

2 Century Magazine, Vol. 12, page 443.

3 Century Magazine, Vol. 12, page 445.

General Sherman in a letter to General Grant dated June 18, 1864, says: "My first movement against Johnston was really fine, and I now believe I should have disposed of him at one blow if McPherson had crushed Resaca, as he might have done, for then it was garrisoned only by a small brigade, but McPherson was a little over-cautious lest Johnston, still at Dalton, might move against him alone; but the truth is I got all of McPherson's army, 23,000, eighteen miles to Johnston's rear before he knew they had left Huntsville."¹

It is plain now that Resaca was a lost opportunity. It is perhaps idle now to speculate on what would have been the result if McPherson had held his ground and pressed the advance he had gained. Hooker and Palmer and Schofield were closely following him up and if Johnston had broken away from Dalton we would have been close on his heels and the campaign for Atlanta might have been ended then and there. It is perhaps well we did not know of this lost opportunity. All we did know was that the enemy was in retreat and that we should soon follow him.

1 W. R. R. 75-507.



ALEXIS COPE

Adjutant of the Fifteenth Ohio Volunteers, during the Atlanta Campaign and Hood's Invasion of Tennessee.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN—ADAIRSVILLE, CASSVILLE, NEW HOPE CHURCH, PICKETT'S MILL.

On the morning of May 16, 1864, when it was known that the enemy had escaped us at Resaca, orders were given for immediate pursuit by our whole army—General Thomas directly on the heels of the enemy, General McPherson by Lay's Ferry and General Schofield by obscure roads to the left. General McPherson got across the Oostensaula on the 16th, but as the enemy had destroyed the railroad bridge at Resaca, leaving only one bridge on which to cross the river, our part of the army did not get across until the 17th. General Schofield had more trouble and had to make a wide circuit by Fite's and Field's ferries across the Conesauga and Coosawattie Rivers, which form the Oostensaula. On the 17th, all the armies moved south, by as many roads as could be found, except General Davis' division, which was sent southwest along the west bank of the Oostensaula to seize Rome and destroy the arsenal there.¹

It was with a feeling of regret that we heard the enemy had gone from our front, but his position was very formidable and so well fortified that to attack it in front would have involved a great sacrifice of life, with great risk of failure. Orders were given to have the men discharge and clean their guns and not to leave the camp, as we would soon move. Notwithstanding this order some of the men went forward to the enemy's abandoned works in the front, where they saw that our fire had been very damaging. Before they returned we received orders to march into the town. We reached the town about 10 o'clock and found it quite strongly fortified. There were some strong earth works and every building had port-holes for musketry. We saw where on May 9th McPherson's cannon had made some holes in the walls besides the portholes above mentioned, and when, for a time, the town was at his mercy. The railroad bridge had been destroyed and the other bridge partially burned. The latter had to be repaired before any troops could cross. In the meantime our men helped themselves from the commissary stores the enemy had left behind in his retreat. After a wait of two or three hours we crossed the river on a

1 General Sherman's official report, W. R. R., 72-65.

very shaky bridge and marched after the enemy. As we were leaving the river we heard the whistle and rumble of one of our railroad trains coming into Resaca. We marched about five miles beyond Resaca and went into camp. The enemy was close at hand and the skirmishers were firing as we drew our blankets over us for the night. The weather had been fine for three or four days, but on the morning of May 17 it was foggy and raining. Very little firing was heard in our front, although the prisoners we captured had said they would fight us at Calhoun, which was only about a mile from our front.

After drawing three days' rations, at 7:45 o'clock a. m. we marched on, crossing the railroad and taking what seemed a main traveled road and soon reached Calhoun, the county seat of Gordon County. We found the town a larger place than we expected. While we were resting by the roadside General Sherman and staff rode by on their way to the front. The most noticeable thing we saw in Calhoun was a monument to a General Nelson in the courthouse yard. After leaving Calhoun we followed the railroad and made slow progress. We found the wayside strewn with old papers and letters which our advance had probably captured, read and thrown aside. Gleason in his diary says he picked up a few but found none of sufficient interest to be worth keeping. After crossing Oathkaloga Creek our advance halted for dinner about 11 o'clock. Skirmish and some artillery firing had been heard some distance in the front during the forenoon, but, as yet, there were no indications that the enemy was making a decided stand. By the time our dinner was over the troops in advance were well out of our way and we moved rapidly until we overtook them. Quite a scare was occasioned by some teamsters riding up to our line and saying that the enemy had fired upon and captured four wagons belonging to our telegraph corps. Upon investigation it was found that our teamsters had unintentionally been stampeded by some of our own men. The teamsters were given a sound reprimand by Colonel Gibson, who was now in command of our brigade. "Such a reprimand," says Gleason, "as only Colonel Bill Gibson could give," and sent back to their wagons. Arriving within three miles of Adairsville, word came that the enemy had turned and were advancing upon us. We at once formed line to meet them and barricaded our position with rails. The report, however, was not confirmed. The fighting seemed to be a brisk skirmish and an artillery duel. While it was going on we saw the smoke from a burning building to our left front.

The rebel battery was soon silenced by our guns and we bivouaced where we were for the night, having marched eight miles during the day. While the brigade was barricading its line, the adjutant rode over to the right to reconnoiter and came near riding into the enemy's line, mistaking it for our own. He discovered his mistake in time and turning his horse made his way back hurriedly under a shower of rebel bullets.

The morning of May 18 there was a dense fog and we did not move until 7 o'clock. When we moved out we crossed a stream on a rail bridge and marched straight for Adairsville, which the enemy had abandoned the night before. There we halted for about three hours and before leaving the place had our dinners. General Sherman had assembled his army, corps and division commanders at Adairsville, evidently for consultation, and the council was not over when we moved on.¹ We here met the Fifteenth Corps and as they marched by our men exchanged greetings with the Forty-sixth Ohio and other regiments in which they had acquaintances and friends. The council of war which Gleason mentions in his diary, was probably caused by reports brought by rebel prisoners we had captured, that General Johnston had decided to stand and give us battle at or near Kingston. Kingston was at the junction of railroads leading respectively to Rome and Atlanta and near the Etowah River. It was a point of great strategical importance and its abandonment meant the abandonment of the entire line of the Etowah River. We arrived within about three and one-half miles of Kingston and ascended a hill to our right where we bivouaced for the night. We had to get our supply of water from a spring at the foot of the hill and found it quite difficult. We did not pitch our shelter tents, but spread them over our blankets to keep off the heavy dew. From our high position we could see the camp fires of our mighty army all about us and felt comforted by the knowledge that we were all together again and ready to take up the gage of battle we were told the enemy had decided to offer. There was some skirmishing as we took position, but it soon quieted down until there was only an occasional shot on the picket line. Taps sounded wonderfully sweet that night and, sweeter than all, was the German tattoo, sounded by the buglers of our own brigade.

The morning of May 19 was quite foggy, but it soon began to clear up and orders came to move. General Stanley's division moved out first and apparently met with little opposi-

¹ Gleason's Diary.

tion. When our turn came we marched in columns of eight men abreast. The road soon became blocked with marching troops and our progress was slow and unsteady. At 8 o'clock brisk artillery firing opened on our left and we were halted at the railroad about two miles from Kingston. But we soon pushed on and at 9 o'clock entered the town, which the enemy had abandoned. We found it a lovely little place, with two churches, a stone railway station and a number of tasteful dwellings. We marched through it with flags flying and our band playing "Hail Columbia," and were halted at its further side for a short time. A mile beyond the town we passed a large hospital near a fine spring. Considerable skirmish firing was heard to our right across a stream of some size, and we presently left the road and moved to the left through the woods toward Cassville. We soon ascended a hill which overlooked a wide open valley where we could plainly distinguish the contending lines. The enemy seemed to be trying to save a large wagon train which was being shelled by our artillery. It was quite a lively fight, in which Stanley's division was engaged, and which ended in the retreat of the enemy closely followed by our troops. While the pioneers were busy building a bridge across a small creek, we made coffee. Soon another brigade took our place and we moved on. After marching two or three miles we came to a place where large masses of troops were assembled on the open plain and forming for battle in the midst of beautiful fields of waving wheat, ripening for the harvest. As we halted for a moment a column of our troops marched by us to our left, led by a large drum corps as its only music. The time was perfect and the men moved with such spirit and precision as to provoke a cheer. The scene was wonderfully imposing and those who witnessed it can never forget it. The day was fine and seldom in all our experience was it possible to behold the "pomp and panoply of glorious war" to better advantage. Brigades, divisions and corps were soon in their proper places and the heavy lines of battle and columns moved forward a mile or more across those beautiful wheat fields. The skirmish firing was quite heavy in front and we fully expected to close with the enemy. Soon, however, we were halted and bivouaced for the night, while the troops in the front line began fortifying their position. That we did not engage the enemy then and there was a great disappointment, for we were never in better fighting condition, never in better spirits and never more confident of victory.

We were very near a general engagement on that 19th day of May, 1864, which, if fought, would probably have been

decisive of the campaign. General Johnston in his official report says, that French's division of Polk's corps, which had been in the rear, joined his army on the 18th day of May. On the morning of the 19th when half the Federal army was near Kingston, the two corps at Cassville (Polk's and Hood's) were ordered to advance against the troops which had followed them from Adairsville, Hood's leading on the right; that when Hood's Corps had advanced some two miles, one of his staff officers reported to him that the enemy was approaching on the Canton road, in the rear of the right of our original position, and that he then drew back his troops and formed them across that road. He further says, "When it was discovered that the officer was mistaken, the opportunity had passed, by the near approach of the two portions of the Federal army. Expecting to be attacked I drew up the troops, in what seemed to be an excellent position—a bold ridge immediately in rear of Cassville, with an open valley before it. The fire of the enemy's artillery commenced soon after the troops were formed, and continued until night. Soon after dark Lieutenant Generals Polk and Hood together expressed to me decidedly the opinion, formed upon the observation of the afternoon, that the Federal artillery would render their positions untenable the next day, and urged me to abandon the ground immediately and cross the Etowah. Lieutenant General Hardee, whose position, I thought, was weakest, was confident he could hold it. The other officers were so earnest, however, and so unwilling to depend on the ability of their corps to defend the ground, that I yielded, and the army crossed the Etowah on the 20th, a step which I have regretted ever since."¹

General Sherman, in his report, says that "near Adairsville" (on the 17th) "we again found signs of the rebel army, and of a purpose to fight, and about sunset of that day, General Newton's division in the advance had a pretty sharp encounter with his rear guard, but the next morning he was gone, and we pushed on through Kingston to a point four miles beyond, where we found him again in force on ground comparatively open and well adapted to a grand battle. We made the proper dispositions, General Schofield approaching Cassville from the north, to which point General Thomas had also directed General Hooker's Corps, and I had drawn General McPherson's army from Woodland to Kingston to be in close support. On the 19th the enemy was in force about Cassville with strong forts, but as our troops converged upon

1 W. R. R. 74-615-616.

him, he again retreated in the night time, across the Etowah River, burning the road and railroad bridges near Cartersville, but leaving us in complete possession of the valuable country above the Etowah River."¹

On the night of May 19 and the morning of May 20 the enemy left our front and retreated across the Etowah River. The morning of May 20 was foggy, but the fog soon lifted and the weather became clear and warm. We got word that we would not move that day and so made ourselves comfortable. We heard cannonading some distance to the front and supposed the guns were fired by some of our troops who were in pursuit of the enemy. Report came that our railroad train had come into Kingston, and soon after we heard the whistle of an engine, and a train ran past us to the front. On the 21st and 22nd we remained in our bivouac of the 20th. There were rumors that we were to go on an expedition, with three-fifths' rations for 20 days, cutting loose from our lines of communication, with North Carolina or Atlanta as the objective point.

Sunday the 22nd, religious services were held in a grove of live oaks near our regimental camp, and Surgeon Clark and the Gleason boys led the singing. It was rumored that we would move the next morning, but no orders to that effect came. On the morning of May 23 we received orders to march at noon, but when the hour came the road was occupied by the Twentieth Corps and we had to wait until it got by. A little after 1 o'clock we moved out taking a road leading in a southerly direction, crossing the railroad nearly at right angles. We were provided with three days' rations which were to last five. Orders directed that no straggling was to be permitted. It was rumored that we were to try to reach Atlanta by a flank movement. After marching about five miles and once getting on the wrong road, we took a direct course over a hill to a road leading to Gillem's bridge over the Etowah River. We followed this road to the bridge, crossed the river on it, and continued our march. South of the river we marched through some of the finest country we had yet seen. It bore few marks of the bloody and ruinous struggle which was being waged elsewhere, yet it was now destined to receive its full share of the blighting curse which must fall alike upon all rebellious soil.² After we crossed the river we had a hot dusty march of five miles and just as darkness fell we crossed Euharlee Creek and encamped in the edge of a little village near a mill. As no regular foraging parties had been organized, the men did some individual foraging, with the

1 W. R. R. 72-65.

2 Gleason's Diary.

result that a good supply of fresh pork was added to our rations.

The morning of May 24 we resumed our march at 7 o'clock, moving steadily in a southwesterly direction until we reached a range of hills. Here the artillery seriously impeded our progress and we halted in a large field. Our men confiscated a large quantity of smoking tobacco, which they found nearby. Colonel Gibson heard of it and ordered it equally distributed among the regiments of the brigade. All the men in the brigade who had pipes soon filled them and those who had none made them out of corn cobs, there being abundant cane for stems all along the road.¹ Our march now was through beautiful groves of yellow pines which were quite thick on the hills. The road was so crooked we could not tell our exact course, but it seemed more to the east than yesterday. We marched steadily on over the hills until 6 o'clock in the evening, when we descended to a small stream and encamped on a hillock nearby. As we were pitching our tents a thunder storm was approaching. It soon broke above us and continued for two or three hours. But the men were secure in their shelter tents and so escaped the downpour—all except the commissary men, who were issuing beef and who were thoroughly drenched.² We had marched during the day eleven miles.³ The advance of our corps was about one mile from Burnt Hickory on the Dallas road.

The morning of May 25 our army was directed to march on Dallas, our corps to follow General Geary's and General William's divisions of the Twentieth Corps. General Newton's division of our corps was to march at 9 a. m., General Stanley's at 9:30 a. m. and ours at 10 a. m. At 10 o'clock a. m. our brigade bugle sounded and we moved out, our regiment being the advance of our brigade. We first marched north a quarter of a mile by mistake, then retracing our steps, marched in the opposite direction across woods and fields, until we reached a by-road which ran parallel with the Dallas road. Here we were delayed for two hours by other troops of our corps which were passing. The two other divisions of our corps were in advance of us on the same road and Hookers Corps still in advance of them. When the road was clear we pushed on rapidly. Several details were made from the regiment to guard trains and intersecting roads. About 5:30 p. m. we heard heavy artillery firing at the front, which was so continuous that we knew we had met the enemy in force. It continued for about an hour and the road being then

1 Gleason's Diary.

2 Gleason's Diary.

3 Gregory's Diary.

cleared of trains we advanced more rapidly. A thunder storm was coming up about that time and the thunder from the clouds mingled with that of our cannon. In the midst of the din there was one mighty peal of thunder—so loud, so deep, so profound, that we were awe-stricken. It made our heavy guns sound like the snapping of matches in comparison. It was comforting, as well as awe inspiring, for it made us remember that God was on His throne and still watching over His world. No one who heard that peal of thunder could ever forget it. At dusk we crossed Pumpkin Vine Creek on a bridge which had been saved by Hooker's men, after the enemy had set it on fire. We soon began to meet large numbers of wounded men from Hooker's corps and were told that they had run into an ambuscade where they met a murderous cross fire of both artillery and musketry.¹ It soon became quite dark and began to rain. For several hours we made but little headway. The road sides were crowded with wounded men. Large numbers of stragglers had built fires which blinded us and made the darkness almost impenetrable, but we stumbled along a muddy road through a dense forest. About 11 o'clock we were halted, stacked arms along the roadside and lay down on the wet ground, with orders to be ready to move at 3 o'clock next morning.

The general movement of our armies on May 25, 1864, as partially related above, is described in General Thomas's official report as follows:

"On the 25th the first division of the cavalry (McCook's) moved on the road leading to Golgotha, preceding Butterfield's division of the Twentieth Corps. The balance of General Hooker's command advanced on the road leading to Dallas, running south of the one used by Butterfield's division. Howard's corps followed Hooker's and in rear of Howard's, Palmer's. About 11 a. m. General Geary's division of the Twentieth Corps, being in advance, came upon the enemy in considerable force, at a point about four and a half miles from Dallas, the country on both sides of the road being thickly wooded and covered with undergrowth. Geary skirmished heavily with the enemy, slowly driving him, until Butterfield's and William's divisions came up and relieved Geary's troops. Soon after the arrival of Williams, about 3 p. m. the column was again put in motion, William's division in advance, and although heavily engaged drove the enemy steadily before it into his intrenchments. Our loss was heavy, but it is believed that the loss of the enemy was much greater. Shortly after 3

¹ Gleason's Diary.

p. m. the head of Howard's column got within supporting distance of Hooker's corps, and Newton's division was placed in position on Hooker's left about 6 p. m. and by morning the whole of Howard's corps was in position on the left of Hooker's."¹

The morning of May 26, a little before 3 o'clock, the brigade bugler sounded reveille and we heard Colonel Gibson caution him not to repeat it. Our bugler was also cautioned not to play. The Ajutant and Sergeant Major went along the line and called on the men to rise and we were soon ready for an emergency.

But little firing was heard during the morning and we were given ample time to get our breakfasts. We waited, expecting to be called on every moment, for over an hour before orders came. Our brigade then marched out in advance, our regiment being in the rear. We marched about two miles on a road leading a little east of south, when we formed in line of battle facing east, along the crest of a ridge overlooking quite an opening in the woods. While moving into position the enemy's presence was made known by bullets whizzing over our heads. General Wood in person superintended the placing of our brigade in position and when he rode away gave directions to keep close watch on our front and await further orders. The men at once set to work building breastworks of logs and earth, but General Wood told us it was of no use, as the line would soon advance. He had barely left us when the advance was sounded and a brisk exchange of shots began on the skirmish line.

The rebel skirmish line seemed to be stronger than was anticipated, as our skirmish line failed to advance. The skirmishers still kept up a desultory fire which gradually slackened and our men resumed the building of a barricade to cover our front. Generals Sherman, Thomas, Howard and Wood came along our part of the line about noon and examined our position carefully. Dinner was brought up to the line by the company cooks. We had barely time to swallow it, when we were ordered by the generals to advance under their observation. We moved forward with little opposition to a point where a good position for a battery was uncovered on our left, and the Sixth Ohio was moved forward and placed in such position. The battery opened with effect and we saw the enemy's troops get up and make to the rear. Our skirmishers gradually worked round to the left of the enemy's position in our front, about 200 yards distant, and they were

¹ W. R. R., 72-143.

permitted to retire almost unmolested.¹ The battery to our left now began throwing shells at the enemy's main line and a battery of the enemy replied quite vigorously. A man in Company B was severely wounded by one of its shells. This same evening Major James P. Hampson of the One Hundred and Twenty-fourth Ohio, a very popular young officer, well known in our division, was fatally wounded and died the next day. The rebel battery was finally silenced and night came on rather quietly. Our regiment was ordered to relieve the Thirty-second Indiana on the skirmish line and did so with five companies. The other five companies were placed in reserve behind the works. Our ammunition was replenished, we drew three days' rations, and thus made ready for the morrow. The day and the night were clear and warm and the night was still, except for occasional shots between the pickets of the opposing armies. We did not know that on the morrow we would undergo the severest trial of our entire service.

The morning of May 27 dawned clear and gave promise of a bright warm day. Our skirmishers were relieved by the Twenty-ninth Illinois and the regiment retired a short distance to the rear of the front line. The timber had been cleared away at a point in our line and a battery of Parrot guns was placed in position and opened on the enemy whose lines were in plain sight, and apparently did some execution. The enemy's battery which we thought was silenced yesterday again opened on us, but was soon silenced again. Our brigade was soon relieved and moved about one mile to the left where we rejoined our division in the rear of the Twenty-third Corps. The operations of the 26th had disclosed the position of the enemy in our front, and it was decided to make a general attack. His position, however, was so strong that it was decided, if possible, to find and attack his right flank with a view of turning his position. Our division was selected to make this attack. We received our orders about noon and at once began our movement towards the enemy's right. The country over which we moved was quite rough, thickly wooded and covered with a thick growth of underbrush, which made our progress difficult and laborious. Our expedition, as we understood, was intended to surprise the enemy and yet, strange to relate, our brigade commander decided to have all orders given by the bugle. This gave the enemy immediate and continuous notice of our movement every step of the way. To the men in the ranks who quickly compre-

1 Gleason's Diary.

hended the purpose of our movement, this use of the bugle was universally condemned. More than one officer and man exclaimed: "If we are expected to surprise the enemy, why don't they stop those d—d bugles?" But on we went, our bugles blowing. Even when we halted for a short rest, the bugles sounded the long drawn out note which commanded us to stop. The afternoon was almost consumed by this difficult and tiresome march. We finally came to an open timbered space, near a road which wound up a hill toward the enemy's supposed position, and came to a halt on the right of the road. There was a house to the left of the road where it began to climb the hill. It was reported that we had found the enemy's right flank. Here we rested for about an hour in a fervidly hot sun. Generals Howard and Wood came up to our position and stopped for a while. There was a sudden and sharp rattle of carbines in our front and a little to our left, and almost immediately following it came an order to us to advance.

The horses of the lieutenant colonel and adjutant which had been left behind when we started on our surprise party had, in the meantime, been brought up, and they mounted them. The regiment was formed in line and advanced up through the open wooded space before mentioned, our colors floating in a brisk breeze, which caught them as we neared the top of the slope. Here we saw an open cleared space to our front. Suddenly a battery of the enemy, who was strongly posted across the open space a few hundred yards away, opened on our colors. The first shot wounded Lieutenant Thomas C. Davis of Company C, and a number of the color guard, and the regiment momentarily halted. A terrific fire of musketry opened on our left, where General Hazen's brigade was charging, and we received an order to move to the left across the road to the shelter of the woods. The horses of the field and staff were quickly sent to the rear and, singular to relate, we were thrown into dire confusion by conflicting or misunderstood orders of our regimental commander, Colonel Wallace. Before the disorders were corrected, the bugler, Wilson S. Iler, with quick, sharp, clear notes, sounded the advance¹ and we charged forward into the woods and across a steep ravine toward the enemy's position—the left wing of our regiment on the right of our colors, and the right wing on their left.² The writer, who was then adjutant of the regiment, confesses to a momentary

1 It was his last blast. Seizing the musket of a comrade, who had fallen, he joined in the charge and received his death wounds.

2 See Colonel Askew's report, W. R. R., 72-406-9.

fit of complete demoralization over its disorganized condition when it went into action. But there was no diminution in the courage of the men in the ranks, and they rushed forward through the woods and down into the ravine and across it, under a murderous fire of artillery and musketry from a line they could not see. They pressed forward up the side of the ravine, found the enemy on its further edge, in a position too strong to be successfully attacked, and held on until night-fall and until their ammunition was exhausted. They then retired to the rear and closed up their fearfully decimated ranks. While we were holding on, on the other side of the ravine and within a few feet at some points of the enemy's works, we suffered from a severe cross and enfilading fire from both the enemy's right and left. This fire did little damage to the men closest to the enemy's line in our immediate front, but was killing the wounded who were lying in the ravine and on its slopes to our rear.

The brigade commander, Colonel Gibson, was not with the charging line, but Captain Cyrus Askew of the Fifteenth Ohio, a member of his staff, was, and the adjutant appealed to him to go to the rear, report this deadly cross fire and ask that troops be sent in on our right and left to check it. For some reason Captain Askew declined to go, but suggested that the adjutant himself go. The adjutant started to the rear and as he passed into the ravine saw Captain J. R. Updegrove of Company H, his face and neck crimsoned with blood from a wound behind the ear. The adjutant examined his wound, saw it was serious and urged him to go to the rear. He was, for the moment, mentally unbalanced and insisted on remaining with his company, but the adjutant sent for Lieutenant J. A. Gleason, who was in command of the Pioneers, to take command of the company and went on. Passing up the slope of the ravine to the rear it seemed almost impossible to escape the bullets and shells of the enemy. The minnie balls seemed thick as hornets about a nest which had been suddenly disturbed, and a shell seemed to explode near him almost every step. But he soon reached the thicker woods beyond the ravine, where he found Colonel Gibson and General Wood and attempted to explain to them the situation in front. They were both laboring under terrible stress of excitement. Just then General Howard rode up and seeing that the adjutant had just come from the front, asked him particularly about conditions on the firing line. The adjutant reported the conditions and the general said:

"Go back and tell the men that I will have troops sent in both on their right and left as soon as I can get them."

The adjutant started back and had gone a few paces when one of the enemy's shells exploded apparently right over these officers. General Howard's horse whirled round and the general, putting his armless sleeve before his eyes, exclaimed: "I am afraid to look down! I am afraid to look down!" The adjutant at once turned back and told the general that the shell had only torn off the heel of his boot. The general thought it had taken off his leg and seemed much relieved when he knew that only his boot was injured. When the adjutant returned to the firing line he struck it where the Fifteenth Wisconsin of our brigade was still holding on, and by a rapid fire was keeping the enemy down behind their works. If a head showed itself above the enemy's barricade it at once became a target for the riflemen of our line. The adjutant passed on to the right, hoping to find the Fifteenth Ohio. It was then growing dark. Failing to find the Fifteenth Ohio, the adjutant went to the rear and found it gathering together its scattered remnants, near the house we had noticed when we were resting just before the attack. There had been fearful losses, how great no one could tell, but those who were left closed up their ranks and, together with the remnants of the other regiments of the brigade, moved to a position on a line which had been established along a ridge to our right front. It was very dark and near midnight before we got into position and protected our line by intrenchments. As we were out of ammunition, the adjutant took a detail of two men from each company and started out to find the ammunition train. Where it was no one could tell. The woods were thick and dark, but after stumbling about in the darkness for an hour or more the train was found. Each one of the twenty men took a box of cartridges on his shoulder and the detail finally got back to the line. After the cartridges were distributed and the adjutant was about to drop down for a little rest, he heard Colonel Wallace, who was lying near by, groaning. He said he had fallen over a rock as we charged down into the ravine and had wrenched his back. He complained of being cold, although wrapped up in his overcoat and blankets. The adjutant at once took his own blankets, spread them over the colonel and then sank down in the rank reeking weeds without covering, and slept from sheer exhaustion.

Gleason, who was then sergeant major of the regiment, wrote in his diary at the time an account of the affair and

his personal experiences, which are here reproduced. He says that when the division was lying in the rear of the Twenty-third Corps, as before related, the adjutant directed him to take his, the adjutant's, horse and ride back and hurry up the cooks so we could have something to eat before the movement began. That he did so, and finding his mess (the non-commissioned staff who were non-combatants and kept habitually in the rear) at dinner, he sat down and ate with them, while the company cooks were getting ready. That when he got back he found that the regiment had started and, leaving the adjutant's horse with his orderly, he hastened on to overtake the regiment and found it when it had marched about a mile toward the left. He then proceeds as follows:

"The country being quite rough made a great deal of maneuvering necessary to keep in line, which was quite laborious. A large part of the afternoon was consumed in this way before we finally halted in a clear space with rough timber land in our front and rested about an hour. There Generals Howard and Wood rode along and gave the order to advance, when skirmishing began at once in the woods in front. Some time previous to this, a sharp rattle of carbines had been heard to our left, indicating that our movement had been discovered by rebel cavalry. Before we advanced the rebels shelled the woods vigorously, one shell bursting in Company C's ranks, injuring several men, while we were yet on the reserve. We were soon ordered to double quick and soon became exposed to a galling cross-fire of musketry and artillery. I followed the left of the regiment until a halt was made, dropping behind a convenient log until it moved on, when I reluctantly left my natural breastwork. Moving forward to the crest of a ridge, a severe cross-fire was encountered and the line advanced into a ravine close to the rebel works, where it met with a decided check, and having little protection, was in a literal *slaughter-pen*. Here fell gallant Sergeant Ambers Norton, our color bearer, with his life blood staining the flag a deeper crimson, and, one by one, all the color guard, with one exception, were either killed or wounded. Company H, the left color company, seemed almost annihilated. Orderly Mumaugh, Sergeant Miller, Corporal Updegrove, and several others were killed, while Captain Updegrove and many of his men were wounded. The only protection available was to lie close to the ground, or seek cover behind trees and rocks—by no means plenty—until the fire had slackened. No supports had come up and our bugle had sounded the recall as soon as it was apparent

the works could not be carried. A galling cross-fire scorched the ravine and ridge alike, rendering it almost useless to seek shelter of tree or rock. I noticed two men taking shelter behind a medium sized tree, on the brink of the ravine, and when one of them was hit in the hand by a minnie ball and retired to the rear, I crept to his place behind the other. He was leaning against the tree and would not lie down, although he was not firing. In a few minutes a ball came from the left and struck him squarely in the temple, with that peculiar 'spat,' which once heard, is at once recognized as the passage of a bullet through flesh and bone. It killed him so suddenly that he never changed his position, and had I not heard the shot strike and been spattered by his blood and brains, I might have believed him still untouched. He was a stranger to me, evidently from another regiment, and being past all human aid, I soon left him, going to another tree where I could get a better view of the front. To my surprise not a soul was visible. The woods were full of smoke, and I thought the line could not be far away. The rebel fire still swept the ground like a hailstorm and I deemed it better to quietly await further developments than to try to get away, although our bugle kept blowing the recall. It was now past sunset and the woods were growing dark, when a wounded man belonging to Company I, of our regiment, came from the left front, painfully limping toward the rear and, seeing me, asked me to help him, as he was nearly exhausted. I at once arose and taking his roll of blankets in one hand and his arm in the other, led him to the rear as rapidly as his condition would permit. He was severely wounded in the thigh. Passing on to the right, I soon gained the shelter of the ridge, and near its foot passed Major McClenahan, with a bugler, watching for stragglers from the front and having the recall blown at intervals. Alas! Too many of our brave comrades lay up that bloody ravine, forever beyond the sound of bugle; many more were so badly wounded as to be helpless, and others were so close to the rebel works that they dared not stir until darkness shielded them. Pausing for an instant, I gave Major McClenahan the little information I possessed and passed on with my charge. We moved more slowly now, as we were safer from the enemy's shot and shell, which still swept the forest like a besom. I fell in with stragglers from all regiments of the brigade and division. Nearly every regiment seemed to have lost all formation in the mad and futile charge into the angle of the enemy's works, but I met no one that I knew."

Gleason relates that he helped his wounded comrade nearly a mile to the rear, where he turned him over to another comrade and returned to where the brigade was re-forming, near the place where we began the advance, and that he accompanied the regiment to the position on the ridge to our right in the woods, as before described. He adds the following comment on the day's operations, which fairly expresses the opinions of our men at that time:

"It seemed to be the prevailing opinion that some one (whether General Howard or General Wood was not quite clear) had made a blunder, and a costly one for our division, in attacking where we did. The supposed object was to strike the rebels in flank beyond the protection of their works, which would have been then taken in reverse. There had been ample time for reconnoitering, even after the rebel cavalry had discovered our approach. But the blow was delivered at the very strongest part of their line, after giving them ample time to reinforce it. The battle, while covering only our division front, was decidedly our bloodiest so far, and Company H (Gleason's company) lost four killed and sixteen wounded, so far as known, besides several missing, who it was feared had also been killed, or left severely wounded in the ravine or on its bloody slopes. The losses of Company H were the heaviest of any company in the regiment, and all had suffered terribly. This is surely not war, it is *butchery*".

The writer's recollection is that there was not time, between hearing the carbine shots and our advance, to reconnoitre and determine the enemy's position and strength, but there was ample time to do so before. In so difficult a country, so thickly wooded that an enemy was easily concealed, it seems almost incredible that a great mass of troops should have been sent blindly forward without first determining the position of the enemy and his probable strength. While we were resting on the hillside to the right of the road, there was plenty of time to send forward a strong skirmish line, which would have found the enemy's main line and disclosed his strength. But we were ordered to take the enemy by surprise and this caution was neglected. It was a blunder, and a fearful one, as all afterwards admitted. General Wood, long after the war, privately admitted and grieved over it, but insisted that he was not responsible for it. General Fullerton, chief of staff of the Fourth Corps at the time, says: "General Wood was instructed not to attack the enemy if he found him protected by intrenchments," but as General

Howard was present when the attack was ordered, he doubtless acted under General Howard's personal directions.

The battle was only an incident in the great campaign for the capture of Atlanta, but it was a battle in which the losses, in some of the regiments of our brigade, were heavier than in any battle during their entire service and seems to demand that it shall be treated fully in this history. The writer, therefore, adds to his own and Gleason's personal recollections of it, the accounts of it given in the reports of our corps, division, brigade and regimental commanders, and in the reports of Generals Cleburne and Wheeler, who were in immediate command of the opposing forces.

General Howard, in his report, says, that on May 27, General Stanley moved to the left of General Newton, and relieved General Wood's division preparatory to the latter making an assault on the enemy's line, at a point which General Sherman had designated; that a careful reconnoissance, made by General Thomas and himself, showed that the enemy was then prepared to bring a cross-fire of artillery and musketry upon that position, and the assault was abandoned. "Therefore, I was directed to move General Wood farther to the left, and beyond all troops, and endeavor to strike the enemy's flank. Johnson's division, of the Fourteenth Corps, was sent to me as a support. I have omitted to say that the Twenty-third Corps, General Schofield commanding, was already in position on the left of the Fourth. Therefore, I selected a field on the extreme left and rear of the Twenty-third Corps, which was pretty well concealed from the enemy by intervening woods, and in this massed the troops. Wood's division on the right formed in column, six lines deep, and Johnson's on the left, with a brigade front. The advance from this position commenced at 11 a. m. and in an easterly direction. The columns moved forward with very little interruption for nearly a mile. I thought we must have reached the enemy's flank, whereupon General Wood wheeled his command toward the right until he was faced nearly south. A brigade of the Twenty-third Corps, General McLean's, deployed so as to form a junction with General Wood on his right. The latter pressed forward his skirmishers, until a large open field was reached. Here it was discovered that the enemy's works were still in our front. Immediately the skirmishers were withdrawn, and the column moved rapidly by the left flank, at least another mile to the eastward. The ground was carefully reconnoitered by General Wood and myself. We still found a line of works to our right, but they

did not seem to cover General Wood's front, and they were new, the enemy still being hard at work on them. I gave a little time for the troops of Wood's division to rest, and for Johnson's to form a little retired on his (Wood's) left. From the position now occupied by the troops, woods more or less open, extended up to the enemy's apparent flank. A road skirted the woods opposite our right, running perpendicular to the enemy's lines. Another road ran obliquely to the left and in rear of Johnson's position. McLean's brigade was sent to a place in full view of the enemy's works, a little to the right of the point of attack, with a view to attract the enemy's attention and draw his fire. As soon as everything was in readiness at about 5 p. m. General Wood commenced his advance, Hazen's brigade leading. The entire column marched briskly forward, driving in the enemy's skirmishers, and vigorously assaulting his main line. Complaint came immediately that the supporting column, under General Johnson, was not far enough advanced. General Johnson was directed to push forward a brigade to Hazen's left. He answered that he would do so, and that it would soon be in position. General Wood became very heavily engaged, so as to necessitate moving forward his supporting lines, and he found strong works in his front except, perhaps, opposite his two left regiments. Colonel Schribner, who commanded General Johnson's advance brigade, finding his own left fired into, from across Pickett's Mills Creek, halted and threw some troops across it for his own protection. This delay, occurring at precisely the same time with Wood's assault, was unfortunate, for it enabled the enemy, with his reserve, to force back the left of Wood's line, and bring an enfilading and reverse fire upon his troops. Again, by some mistake of orders, McLean's troops did not show themselves to the enemy, nor open any fire to attract his attention on Wood's right, so that the enemy was able to pour a cross-fire of artillery and musketry into his right flank. Under these circumstances, it soon became evident that the assault had failed, and that the troops must be withdrawn with care, in order to bring off our wounded and to prevent a successful sally of the enemy, from his works. General Johnson formed his troops in rear of, and to the left of the entire position, while General Wood carefully withdrew his division, and formed on a ridge farther to the right. General McLean having been requested to push farther to the right, in order to make connection with the rest of the army, disregarded the request and moved off at once by the road, leaving these two divisions

isolated. He (McLean) alleged in excuse that his men were entirely without rations. Our losses were very heavy, being upward of 1400 killed, wounded and missing, in General Wood's division alone. Though the assault was repulsed, yet a position was secured near Pickett's Mills, of the greatest importance to the subsequent movements of the army, and it has been subsequently ascertained that the enemy suffered immensely in the action, and regarded it as the severest attack made during the campaign. Johnson and Wood made strong intrenchments during the night.¹

General Wood, in his official report describes the march through the woods, to find the enemy's right flank, and then says:

"When all these movements, so well calculated to try the physical strength of the men, were concluded, and the point gained from which it was believed that the column could move directly on the enemy's flank, the day was well spent. It was nearly 4 p. m. The men had been on their feet since early daylight, and of course were much worn. The column was halted a few moments to readjust the lines, and to give the men a brief breathing space, and to give the division, which was to protect and cover the left flank of the column, time to come up and take position. At 4 p. m.² precisely the order was given to attack, and the column with its front well covered, moved forward. And never have troops marched to a deadly assault, under the most adverse circumstances with more firmness, with more truly soldierly bearing, and with more distinguished gallantry. On, on, through the thickest jungle, over exceedingly rough and broken ground and exposed to the sharpest direct and cross-fire of musketry and artillery on both flanks. The leading brigade, the Second, moved (followed in close supporting distance by the other brigades) right up to the enemy's main line of works. Under the unwavering steadiness of the advance, the fire from the enemy's line of works began to slacken and the troops, behind those works, first began perceptibly to waver and give way, and I have no hesitation in saying that as far as any opposition, directly in front was concerned, though that was terrible enough, the enemy's strongly fortified position would have been forced. But the fire, particularly on the left flank of the column which was at first only *en' echarpe*, became as the column advanced enfilading, and finally took the first line of the column in reverse.

¹ W. R. R., 72-193-5.

² The writer thinks it was a half hour later, though General Wood was usually very accurate in his statements.

It was from this fire that the supporting and covering division should have protected the assaulting column, but it failed to do so. Under such a fire no troops could maintain the advantage ground which had been gained, and the leading brigade, which had driven everything in its front, was compelled to fall back a short distance to secure its flanks, which were crumbling away under the severe fire, by the irregularities of the ground. (It is proper to observe here that the brigade of the Twenty-third Corps, which was ordered to take post so as to cover the right flank of the assaulting column, by some mistake failed to get into a position to accomplish this purpose.) From the position taken by Hazen's brigade, when it retired a short distance from the enemy's works, it kept up a deadly fire, which was very galling to the foe. The brigade was engaged about fifty minutes. It had expended the sixty rounds of ammunition, taken into action on the men's persons. It had suffered terribly in killed and wounded, and the men were much exhausted by the fierceness of the assault. Consequently I ordered this brigade to be relieved by the First Brigade, Col. William H. Gibson, Forty-ninth Ohio, commanding. So soon as the First Brigade had relieved the Second Brigade, I ordered Colonel Gibson to renew the assault. I hoped that with the shorter distance the brigade would have to move, after beginning the assault, to reach the enemy's works, and with the assistance of the knowledge of the ground which had been gained, a second effort might be more successful than the first had been. I also trusted some cover had been provided to protect the left flank of the column. This had been partially but by no means effectually done. At the signal to advance the First Brigade dashed handsomely and gallantly forward up to the enemy's works. Men were shot down at the very base of the parapet. But again the terrible fire on the flanks, and especially the enfilading fire from the left, was fatal to success. In addition the enemy had brought up fresh troops and greatly strengthened the force behind his intrenchments. This fact had been plainly observed by our troops, and was subsequently fully corroborated by prisoners. The First Brigade, after getting so near to the enemy's works, and after almost succeeding, was compelled, like the Second Brigade, to fall back a short distance, some seventy or eighty yards, to seek shelter under cover of the irregularities of the surface. It maintained a sturdy contest with the enemy, confining him to his works, till its ammunition was expended * * * The First Brigade had suffered very severely in the assault. This fact, connected

with the expenditure of its ammunition, induced me to order this brigade to be relieved by the Third Brigade, Colonel Knefler, Seventy-ninth Indiana, commanding. Colonel Knefler was simply ordered to relieve the First Brigade and hold the ground without renewing the assault. The purpose of holding the ground was to cover bringing off the dead and wounded. Colonel Knefler's brigade at once engaged the enemy sharply and confined him to his works. This was a work of much difficulty. The ground was unfavorable for the use of stretchers, darkness was coming on apace, and the whole had to be done under the fire of the enemy. Of course, under such circumstances the work could not be done with that completeness so desirable, and subsequent evacuation of the enemy showed, from the numerous graves outside his lines, that many who were at first reported missing were killed. When the Second Brigade was relieved by the First Brigade, a portion of the former retained their position near the enemy's works. So also when the First Brigade was relieved by the Third Brigade, a portion of the former held on near to the enemy's works. These gallant officers and soldiers remained on the field bravely keeping up the conflict till the Third Brigade was drawn off at 10 p. m. About 10 p. m. the enemy, rushing over his works, pressed forward rapidly, with demoniac yells and shouts, on Colonel Knefler's Brigade. In the long conflict which the brigade had kept up, it had expended its ammunition to within the last two or three rounds. Reserving its fire till the advancing foe was only some fifteen paces distant, the Brigade poured in a terrible and destructive volley, and was then handsomely and skillfully withdrawn, with the portions of the other brigades that had remained on the field. The enemy was brought to a dead halt by the last volley. Not the slightest pursuit was attempted. This ended the bloody conflict. It was opened precisely at 4:30 p. m. and raged in the height of its fury till 7 p. m. From this hour till 10 p. m. the conflict was still kept up, but not with the unabated fury and severity of the first two and a half hours of its duration. Fourteen hundred and fifty-seven officers and men¹ were placed hors du combat in the action. It may be truly said of it, that it was the best sustained and altogether the fiercest and most vigorous assault that was made on the enemy's intrenched positions during the entire campaign. The attack was made under circumstances well calculated to task the courage and prove the manhood of the troops. They had made a long and fatiguing

1 The number was 12 more. See W. R. R., 72-393.

march of several hours' duration, on that day immediately preceding the attack. The assault was made without any assistance or cover whatever from our artillery, as not a single piece could be carried with us, on a strongly-intrenched position, held by veteran troops and defended by a heavy fire of musketry and artillery. Yet at the command, the troops, under all these adverse circumstances, moved to the assault with a cheerful manliness and steadiness—more, warming up with the advance, moved with a gallantry and dash that nearly made the effort a complete success. After the troops had all been drawn off and between 10 o'clock in the evening and 2 o'clock of the following morning the entire division was comfortably encamped, and by daylight was securely intrenched.”¹

This latter precaution, General Wood says, was to guard against a sudden attack by overwhelming numbers, as we were in a measure isolated from the greater part of the army. General Wood afterwards reported that he had twice visited the battlefield of Picket's Mill, after its evacuation by the enemy, and examined it closely. That the numerous single graves and several lines of trenches, capable of containing from twenty-five to forty bodies, on the battlefield outside the enemy's intrenchments, explain where most of the 255 missing on that day went to, and adds that the enemy have never pretended they made any material capture of prisoners.²

Colonel Charles T. Hotchkiss, of the Eighty-ninth Illinois, who made the report of the movements of our brigade in this action, says, that when the movement to find and turn the enemy's right flank was begun, the brigade was formed in two lines, with the Eighty-ninth Illinois on the right, the Thirty-second Indiana on the left and the Fifteenth Wisconsin in the center of the first line; the Fifteenth Ohio on the right, the Forty-ninth Ohio on the left and the 35th Illinois in the center of the second line, and that, closely following Hazen's brigade, we arrived at a point near Pickett's Mill about 2:30 p. m. and found the enemy in considerable force protected by barricades, hastily but strongly built of logs on the crest of a considerable ridge and supported by artillery, planted so as to enfilade the approaches and ravines in his immediate front, over and through which a force attempting to dislodge him would have to pass. He then adds:

“About 4 p. m. Hazen's brigade gallantly charged close up to the enemy's works, but being unable to carry them, in obedience to orders, the first line of this (our) brigade, closely followed by the second line, moved forward in fine style and

¹ W. R. R., 72-377 to 380.

² W. R. R., 72-387.

with its accustomed dash to his support, and we, in turn, by a portion of Knefler's brigade, but the enemy being unexpectedly found in force, comprising, according to his own statement, the veteran troops of both Cleburne's and Bate's divisions it was impossible to dislodge him. Our troops, however, stubbornly maintained their position, close up to his works, in some places we occupying one side of his barricade and he the other, giving an effective fire, and receiving in return a heavy direct and enfilading musketry and artillery fire, until dark, when our troops, under orders fell back. This brigade being withdrawn about 8 p. m. moved about 400 yards to the right, taking and strongly intrenching a position about 250 yards from the enemy's works, connecting on the right with Knefler's brigade, and on the left with Hazen's brigade, our front being a little west of south. On account of the constant and effective firing of the enemy, we were unable to bury our dead, and part of our wounded fell into his hands, together with a considerable number of prisoners, who were endeavoring during the darkness of the night, to remove our wounded. * * * Our casualties were very large, being, killed 105, wounded 484, missing 114. Total 703."¹

Colonel Askew, who reported officially the part our regiment took in the action says:

"In the battle of Pickett's Mills, on the 21th of May, we occupied, as I understand it, the right of the second line of the brigade, in the rear of the Eighty-ninth Illinois. Upon moving to the position to attack, about 5 p. m. the right wing of the regiment emerged from woods, into an open field, directly in front of the position of the enemy, who immediately opened on us from a battery to our front and right. I immediately threw out Company A, Lieutenant Hanson, as skirmishers to cover that part of our front and right flank, and sent word to Colonel Wallace, who was near the left of the regiment, that our right was thrown out into an open field with none of our troops in front, and nothing connecting with our right to protect us from an attack, in that direction, and that the enemy was strongly posed in a line of works on the farther edge of the open field, on rising ground from us and apparently enveloping our right flank. We soon received orders from Colonel Gibson, commanding the brigade, to refuse our regiment to protect the right flank. This disposition was partly made when the line was ordered forward. In the advance the regiment was thrown into some confusion, as we were moving by the left flank, at the time the order to advance came, and

¹ W. R. R., 72-392-393.

by some means or other, to me unknown, the line was broken near the center, and in moving forward the right wing, with the exception of Company A, moved in such a direction, that it came to the attack to the left of the left wing of the regiment. Upon receiving the order, however, the men moved forward with spirit and determination under a terrible fire from the artillery and small arms of the enemy posted behind their works. The fire was so hot and well directed and decimated our ranks so rapidly, that the advance was checked within a short distance of the enemy's works, where we were compelled to seek such shelter from the storm of shot as the nature of the ground afforded. It soon became evident that the attack had failed, and the recall was sounded, by the brigade bugle, about 6 p. m. As I could not find Colonel Wallace on the field (I learned afterward that he had been injured by a fall, and had gone or been taken off) I did not think it prudent to withdraw then, as it was still daylight, and an attempt to withdraw then would have exposed us to great risks; besides we would have been compelled to leave nearly all our wounded in the hands of the enemy. I waited until dark, then sent out parties to gather up the wounded, and carry them to the rear. After we had carried off all we could find, we quietly withdrew and joined the brigade. Our loss in this battle was Captain Updegrave, Company H, severely wounded; Lieutenant Davis, Company C, wounded in foot; Lieutenant Leiter, Company I, lost right hand; Color Sergeant Ambers Norton, Company D, was killed, and five of the color guard successively killed or wounded, with the colors. They were finally brought off by Sergeant David D. Hart of Company I, then one of the color guard. Our loss of enlisted men, including these, was 19 killed, 61 wounded and 19 missing. The missing were mostly wounded, whom we were unable to find in the darkness."

General Cleburne and General Joseph Wheeler are the only officers on the Confederate side whose reports of the engagement are at hand. General Cleburne says that at 2 or 3 o'clock on the 26th of May his division arrived on the extreme right of the Confederate line, where he was sent to support General Hindman, that at that point their lines, which had a general bearing of North and South, retired for a few yards to the east. That on the continuation of this line he placed Polk's brigade of his division in and diagonally across it upon a ridge; that on Polk's right he placed Hotchkiss' artillery, consisting of four Napoleons, four Parrott guns and four howitzers, and that supporting Hotchkiss on the right, was one

regiment of Govan's brigade, and that the remainder of his division (consisting of eight regiments of Govan's brigade, Lowrey's brigade of five regiments and Granbury's brigade of eight regiments), were disposed in rear as a second line in support of Hindman's right brigades and his own front line, and that intrenchments were thrown up in the afternoon of the 26th and on the morning of the 27th. That the position in the main was covered with trees and undergrowth, which served as a screen along their lines, concealed them, and were left standing for that purpose. He then states that on the morning of the 27th at about 7 o'clock he sent Govan's brigade to the north front on a reconnoissance with directions to swing to the left in his advance. That while on this reconnoissance Govan, from time to time, sent him word that the enemy was moving to the right—his own left. That at 11 a. m. Govan came in, leaving his skirmishers about three-quarters of a mile in front, and that he placed him on the right of Polk, where he covered himself in rifle pits. He then adds:

"About 4 p. m. hearing that the enemy's infantry in line of battle were pressing the cavalry (Wheeler's) on my right (they had already driven in my skirmishers) I placed Granbury on Govan's right. He but had just gotten into position, and a dismounted cavalry force, in line behind a few disconnected heaps of stones loosely piled together had passed behind him, when the enemy advanced. He showed himself first—in the edge of an open field in front of Govan, about 400 yards across, where he halted and opened fire. From a point on the ridge where Govan's right and Granbury's left met, there made off a spur, which at about 100 yards from it turned sharply to the northeast, running then in a direction almost parallel with it (the ridge) and maintaining about an equal elevation. Between this spur and the parent ridge, beginning in front of Granbury's left was a deep ravine, the side of which next to Granbury's was very steep, with occasional benches of rock up to a line within thirty or forty yards of Granbury's men, where it flattened into a natural glacis. This glacis was well covered with well-grown trees and in most places with thick undergrowth. Here was the brunt of the battle, the enemy advancing along this front in numerous and constantly reinforced lines. His men displayed a courage worthy of an honorable cause, pressing in steady throngs within a few paces of our men, frequently exclaiming, 'Ah! damn you, we have caught you without your logs.' Now, Granbury's men, needing no logs, were awaiting them, and throughout awaited them with calm determination, and as they appeared upon the slope

slaughtered them with deliberate aim. The piles of the dead on this front, pronounced by the officers in this army who have seen most service to be greater than they had ever seen before, were a silent but sufficient eulogy upon Granbury and his noble Texans. In the great execution here done upon the enemy, Govan, with his two right regiments, disdaining the enemy in his own front, who were somewhat removed, and Key with two pieces of artillery ran by hand by my order to a convenient breach in our breast works, materially aided Granbury by a right oblique fire which enfiladed the masses in his front. In front of a prolongation of Granbury's line and abutting upon his right was a field about 300 yards square. The enemy driving back some cavalry at this point, advanced completely across the field and passed some forty or fifty yards in its rear. Here, however, they were confronted by the Eighth and Nineteenth Arkansas (consolidated), commanded by Colonel Baucum hastily sent by Govan upon Granbury's request and representation of the exigency. In a sweeping charge Baucum drove the enemy from the ridge in his front, and with irresistible impetuosity forced him across the field and back into the woods from which he had at first advanced. Here he (Baucum) fixed himself and kept up a heavy fire, aided by a deadly enfilade from the bottom of the ravine in front of Granbury. When Baucum was about to charge, Lowrey of my division, who had been hastened up from his distant position upward of a mile and a half from my right as finally established, came into line, throwing his regiments in successively as they unmasked themselves by their flank march. His arrival was most opportune, as the enemy was beginning to pour around Baucum's right. Colonel Adams with the Thirty-third Alabama, which was the first of Lowrey's regiments to form into line, took position on Baucum's right and advanced with him, his seven left companies being in the field with Baucum and his four others in the woods to the right. Baucum and Adams, finding themselves suffering from the enemy's direct and oblique fire, withdrew, passing over the open space of the field behind them. The right companies of Adams, which were in the woods, retired to a spur, which rises from the easterly edge of the field, about 200 yards from its southerly edge, where Baucum's and Adam's left companies rested. Here they halted, Captain Dodson with fine judgment, perceiving the importance of the position—it would have given the enemy an enfilading fire on Granbury, which would have dislodged him—and making his company the basis of alignment for the remainder of Lowrey's, now coming into

position. This retrograde movement across the field was not attended with loss, as might have been expected, the enemy not advancing as it was made. It was mistaken, however, for a repulse and some of my staff officers hearing that my line had broken, hastened forward Quarle's brigade of Stewart's division, just then providentially sent up by General Hood to re-establish it. Lowrey, being under the same impression, detached his two right regiments (which had not been engaged) under Colonels Tison and Hardcastle, and had them quickly formed in support of Baucum and Adams. The error, however, was soon discovered and my line being ascertained to remain in its integrity, Quarle's brigade was conducted to the rear of Lowrey and formed as a second line. The Fourth Louisiana, Colonel Hunter, finding itself opposite an interval between the two regiments of Lowrey's line (caused by Baucum's resting closer upon Granbury on his return from the advance than he had done at first) under the immediate superintendence of General Quarles, advanced with great spirit into the field, halted and delivered a very effective fire on the enemy in his front. After some minutes Quarles withdrew this regiment, and formed it behind the field, where they continued their fire across it. * * * During these movements the battle continued to rage on Granbury's front, and was met with unflagging spirit. About the time of Quarles getting into position night came on, when the combat lulled. For some hours afterwards a desultory dropping fire, with short vehement bursts of musketry, continued, the enemy lying in great numbers immediately in front of portions of my line, and so near it that their footsteps could be distinctly heard. About 10 p. m. I ordered Granbury and Lowrey to push forward skirmishers and scouts, to learn the state of things in their respective fronts. Granbury, finding it impossible to advance his skirmishers until he had cleared his front of the enemy lying up against it, with my consent, charged with his whole line. Wathall, with his brigade of Hindman's division, whom I sent to his support, taking his place in line as he stepped out of it. The Texans, their bayonets fixed, plunged into the darkness, with a terrific yell and with one bound were upon the enemy, but they met with no resistance. Surprised and panic-stricken, many fled, escaping in the darkness, others surrendered and were brought into our lines * * * During the progress of the battle much service was rendered by the rifle battery and the two remaining howitzers of Key's battery, in position on Polk's right. They were trained in enfilade upon the enemy's reserves massed behind the hill, in front of

the spur we occupied. I regretted I did not have more guns for this service. I had sent the Napoleon guns to the right, where they were unable to find positions, and so were useless. During these operations, Polk was not engaged, but it was a source of strength and confidence to the rest of the division to know that he had charge of the weakest and most delicate part of our lines."¹ Cleburne gives his losses as 85 killed, 363 wounded, and states that they took 160 of our men prisoners. He closes his report by saying: "This battle was fought at a place known as the 'Pickett Settlement,' and about two miles northeast of New Hope Church."²

From General Cleburne's report we learn that we were confronted at the beginning by the four brigades of his own division, and Hotchkiss's artillery—four Napoleon guns, four Parrot guns and four Howitzers, and that during the engagement, he was reinforced by Quarle's brigade of Stewart's division, and Walthall's brigade of Hindman's division. General Cleburne, of course, only reports concerning the movements and action of his own division and of the troops of Stewart's and Hindman's divisions sent to his support, and one gets the impression from reading it that these were the only Confederate troops actively engaged in the battle. But from the report of General Joseph Wheeler, commanding the cavalry corps of General Johnston's army, we learn that his troops had quite an important part in the engagement. From this report it appears that almost the entire cavalry force of the enemy was on its right and covering its right flank, and that a portion of it was actively engaged in the action. He says:

"May 27, General Cleburne's division of infantry, having been formed on the right of our infantry line, I placed portions of Hannon's and Allen's small cavalry brigades of Kelley's division upon General Cleburne's right flank. They were dismounted and intrenchments thrown up extending on the prolongation of General Cleburne's line, for a distance of about 800 yards. The enemy having, during the morning and the preceding day, made several attacks on the pickets on the Burnt Hickory road, I had placed General Martin's command in position to oppose the enemy, who were menacing that point, leaving a space of about two miles between General Martin's left and General Kelley's right, which was filled by a line of skirmishers from General Humes' command, which was held in reserve to move to any point which might be attacked. About 3 o'clock this line of skirmishers was driven in by a force of the enemy's cavalry advancing up Pumpkin Vine

¹ W. R. R., 74-724-6.

² W. R. R., 74-725-726.

Creek by Widow Pickett's house. I immediately galloped to this point and found a squadron moving by General Hume's direction, to reinforce the picket. On arriving at the creek I soon observed that a considerable force of infantry was before us, and I directed General Humes to bring one brigade (dismounted) to that point, and to prolong his other brigade upon its right to fill the gap between said position and General Martin's left. These dispositions were made under a warm fire from the enemy. At this moment I received information that General Martin's line was being attacked, and at the same time that Granbury's brigade of infantry was moving up to relieve General Kelley, whom I ordered to move to the right and close upon General Humes. While making this movement and before it was completed, the enemy moved a column up a ravine, between Kelley's right and Hume's left. I ordered a regiment from Humes' to oppose them, which was promptly placed in position, but finding it was warmly pressed, General Humes reinforced it with another regiment from his command. While this movement was going on, Hazen's Federal infantry brigade charged our line, but was repulsed by a counter charge of Humes' and Kelley's commands.

My command captured 32 prisoners, including one commissioned officer, whom they turned over to Lowrey's infantry brigade, which was just forming to their right to relieve General Humes' command. On the arrival of General Lowrey's brigade. General Humes moved to the right in front of the temporary breast works thrown up during the engagement. Quarle's brigade also reported to me during the fight, but too late to join in the action. The enemy we fought proved to be General Wood's division of Howard's corps, General Howard having moved to that position to turn our right flank."¹

General Wheeler reports the losses in Kelley's and Humes' divisions between May 6 and May 31, at 52 killed, 242 wounded and 33 missing,² and it is probable that a considerable part of such losses occurred in the engagement at Pickett's Mill.

General Cleburne's and General Wheeler's reports were made respectively on May 30 and June 1, within three or four days after the engagement, and the reports of our corps, division, brigade and regimental commanders, not until in September, after the close of the Atlanta campaign. The lapse of nearly four months, between the engagement and the date of our officers' official reports, which were filled by other im-

1 W. R. R. 74-948.

2 W. R. R. 74-949.

portant movements and battles, may in part account for their apparent conflicts.

We are indebted to the report of General Cleburne for the clearest and most satisfactory description of the enemy's position and the general lay of the ground we fought over.

It is clear from an examination of these reports that the enemy knew of our movement to attack and turn his right flank as early as 11 o'clock that morning and had made preparations for it. It is also clear that his position and probable strength had not been ascertained by our corps and division commanders when they ordered the attack. It is also made plain that the troops which were expected to support our division, on the right and left flanks, did not do so, and that we were recklessly sent against a concealed enemy of unknown numbers and strength behind intrenchments, prepared to meet us at a point where we were subjected to a murderous direct fire of musketry and an equally murderous cross-fire of artillery from our right flank. It is also clear that we were piled into the ravine in front of Granbury's line, brigade after brigade, line upon line, and that once in, it was as disastrous to fall back, as it had been to advance, until the darkness covered us. It is also apparent that all efforts on the part of our corps commander, after we had made the assault, to relieve us from the enfilading fire on the right and left absolutely failed. Johnson's division, which was to come up on our left, was kept back by Wheeler's dismounted cavalry, and General McLean's brigade of the Twenty-third Corps which, according to General Howard, was to engage the enemy's attention on our right flank, did absolutely nothing.

It is painful to reflect that the ordinary precautions usually preceding such an assault were neglected, and that after it failed there were no troops in close enough support to retrieve the disaster. Even when our division was formed late at night in the woods, in momentary expectation of a sortie by overwhelming numbers of the enemy and we were isolated from the rest of the enemy, General McLean, on being requested to form his brigade on our right, refused to do so and marched to the rear, his only excuse being that his men were out of rations.¹

General Wood's report, above quoted from, describes the assault as having been made with orderly precision, and states that General Hazen's brigade first became engaged, fought for fifty minutes and then was relieved by our brigade; that we renewed the assault and having also failed, were in turn re-

¹ General Howard's report, W. R. R., 72-195.

lieved by Knefler's brigade. The reports of brigade commanders and officers who were on the firing line, and the recollection of those who actively participated in the engagement, do not confirm General Wood's statements, but show, to the contrary, that our brigade and General Knefler's brigade were thrown after each other in quick succession, following General Hazen's brigade, into that awful ravine. According to General Cleburne's report, our troops showed themselves first in front of General Govan, in an open field about 400 yards across, and opened fire.¹ These troops were undoubtedly the companies of our regiment, which received the first fire from the enemy's artillery, as before described, and it was shortly after this, that we heard the terrific firing which told us of Hazen's charge. It was only a very few minutes, almost immediately after Hazen's charge, that our brigade also charged. That spur, running sharply to the northeast from the point where the lines of Govan and Granbury met, and then continued parallel to the ridge where the main line of the enemy, was formed, was a natural flank protection to the enemy, made doubly efficient by the deep ravine in front of it. The twelve guns of Hotchkiss's artillery, posted just on Govan's left, swept its front from the enemy's left, and Wheeler's dismounted cavalry swept it from their right. There, just in front of Granbury's line on the edge of the ravine, covered by a thick growth of large trees and undergrowth, concealing his men, was that natural "glacis," over which our men had to pass to reach his position. Here was the great slaughter, as our men were shot down by the concealed foe the moment they appeared upon this glacis. The grim satisfaction with which General Cleburne describes the piles of our dead in front of Granbury's line, "pronounced by the officers of his army to be greater than any had ever seen before" and his regret that he did not have more rifled cannon, in addition to his four Parrotts and four Howitzers, with which to enfilade our lines and kill our men in Granbury's front, add new horrors to the recollections of that terrible day. The reports above quoted from show prompt, cordial and vigorous co-operation among the different commands of the enemy's army and a painful lack of it among our troops. After the engagement there was a disposition to blame some one for our disaster, and the blame was in some instances wrongly placed. General Hazen tries to make it appear

1 W. R. R. 74-724.

that he was not properly supported by our brigade. He says in his official report,¹ that it was forty minutes after beginning the attack, when he met, for the first time, the troops of the line in his rear. He also says, "I will here say, that the Thirty-second Indiana, the first regiment I saw coming to my support, did so in detached fragments, and not as a regiment. None of the other troops, except about 50 men of the Forty-ninth Ohio, advanced as far as my lines during their desperate and unsupported battle." If General Hazen had taken the pains to learn the real position and conduct of the troops of our brigade (and he had ample time to do so, as his report was not made until September 15, 1864), he would never have written this libel on the Thirty-second Indiana and Forty-ninth Ohio and the other troops of our brigade. If he had done so, he would have learned that the Thirty-second Indiana, a small regiment, had been almost decimated in its advance into the deadly ravine in Granbury's front, and that the Forty-ninth Ohio, which had advanced to the attack with a little over 400 men, had already left 203 officers and men on its deadly slopes.

The fact is, that when General Hazen's brigade advanced it changed direction to the left,² and our brigade came into action on its right, our regiments slightly over lapping its right, that his desperate encounter was with Kelley's and Hume's dismounted cavalry of Wheeler's Corps and Lowrey's infantry brigade, while ours was with Granbury's brigade, supported by the enfilading fire of Hotchkiss's artillery on Govan's right. General Wheeler, in his official report, says, that "Hazen's Federal Infantry Brigade charged our line, and was repulsed by a counter charge of Hume's and Kelley's commands." It will be remembered that our brigade was much nearer the enemy's line than Hazen's when the assault was begun, our regiment being only about 400 yards from it, and that we became immediately engaged at the moment of the advance.

We were too fully occupied in our front to go to Hazen's relief, and his repulse but added to our difficulties, for it left our left flank exposed to the enfilading fire from Wheeler's dismounted cavalry, when we were already suffering from a similar enfilading fire from Hotchkiss's terrible rifled guns and howitzers on our right flank. General Hazen complains justly because Scribner's brigade of Johnson's division failed to support him on the left, but it, too, was enveloped on its left by Wheeler's dismounted cavalry. The fault was with those high in command,

¹ W. R. R., 72-423.

² See his report, W. R. R. 72-423.

who failed to ascertain the position and strength of the enemy, before sending us to the slaughter. With them must rest the blame.

No troops ever went into action with more spirit and vigor, or sustained an unequal combat with more courage and fortitude.

The losses were appalling. In the space of a little over an hour our division sustained a loss of near 1500 officers and men. The losses in our brigade of six regiments (two of them small) were 703. In Hazen's brigade of eight regiments, 467. In Knefler's brigade of seven regiments, 301.¹

The names of the killed, wounded, captured and missing in the Fifteenth Ohio, as shown by the printed rosters, are as follows:

COMPANY A.

WOUNDED—Corporal James W. Paxton, John Mitchell, Edward Richardson, Samuel B. Few, Solomon Hammond, Joseph S. Brown.

COMPANY B.

KILLED—David Priestly.

WOUNDED—Sergeant John A. Green, Henry M. McCoy.

COMPANY C.

WOUNDED—Lieutenant Thomas C. Davis, Sergeant Alfred C. Hurd, (died of wounds at Altoona, Ga. June 14, 1864), Sergeant George Thompson (and captured), Corporal John C. Iback (and captured), James M. Barrett (and captured and died in rebel prison), Corporal Benjamin F. Leehman (and died of wounds May 28, 1864), Corporal Smith Walker (and died of wounds at Chattanooga, Tenn. July 4, 1864), Welcome Ashbrook, Samuel C. Burke, Daniel C. Courtwright, Geo. M. Chambers (and died in Andersonville prison), Nathaniel M. Grice (and died of wounds May 28, 1864) William D. Hammell, Adonis McMath, and Wilson S. Iler, (died of wounds at Chattanooga.)

CAPTURED—Corporal William E. Shedd.

COMPANY D.

KILLED—Sergeant Ambers Norton, Corporal Charles H. Huffman, William H. Campbell.

WOUNDED—Sergeant Jasper N. Welch, Corporal John S. Albert, Corporal Oliver C. Brown, Corporal Daniel Logan, Jonathan M. Embody (and died in hospital at Jeffersonville, Ind. June 24, 1864), Oswald E. Gravel, John F. Hickman, Isaac Leith (and died May 28, 1864), William Shepperd, Peter Worley (and died of wounds June 4, 1864).

¹ W. R. R., 72-387.

MISSING—John Harnett, Daniel K. Pridmore, John A. Schriver.

COMPANY E.

KILLED—Sergeant George B. Hutchinson, Corporal Samuel McMillan, Thomas Anderson, Thomas Wood, James N. Booth, James Anderson, Jno D^r Roscoe.

WOUNDED—Sergeant Hugh Hawkins, Corporal Isaac W. Knight, John Michener, Joseph Durbin (and died in rebel hospital) John C. Jones (and died of wounds June 30, 1864), Jos. E. Stewart, Hugh Crymble, John Elliott.

CAPTURED—William Young (and died in Andersonville prison February 16, 1865).

MISSING—James M. Booth and John D. Roscoe.

COMPANY F.

KILLED—Corporal Joseph A. Jones.

WOUNDED—Elihu B. Rowles (and died May 28, 1864).

COMPANY G.

WOUNDED—Smith A. Walker, Richard Newland.

COMPANY H.

KILLED—Sergeant Nathaniel Mumaugh, Sergeant Casper Miller, Corporal James L. Updegrove, John F. McCullough, Amos Yohe.

WOUNDED—Captain Joseph R. Updegrove, Sergeant George M. Scutchall, Sergeant Joseph S. Lehw, Corporal Cornelius Linn, David Capper (and died of wounds at Ackworth, Ga. June 7, 1864), Eli Timbers, Cyrus Bowers, Orin Lewis, Adam Black, James A. Jackson, Pelham C. Johnson (and died at Ackworth, Ga. June 7, 1864), George Miles (and captured and died at Altoona, Ga. June 7, 1864), Parker I. Rhoads, John A. Roberts, Hiram Shirtleff, Wm. J. Rhoads, James Wortman (and captured).

CAPTURED—Simon Hamilton, William H. Dougherty (and died in Andersonville prison Aug. 24, 1864).

MISSING—Corporal Enoch H. Butts, Emery S. Edson, William J. Lewis.

COMPANY I.

KILLED—Corporal Isaac Kerr, Ezra Eckis.

WOUNDED—Lieutenant Colin P. Leiter, Sergeant Thomas C. Cory, Samuel L. Cline, Benjamin F. Gallatin, Joseph E. Meek, Caleb Zouvers, Bugler Wilson S. Iler (and died of wounds at Chattanooga, Tenn. September 14, 1864), John Hilborn.

CAPTURED—Thomas S. Collins (and died in Andersonville prison July 19, 1864), Michael R. Hill, William Shaw (and died in Andersonville prison September 9, 1864.)

COMPANY K.

WOUNDED—John G. Sherwood.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN FROM PICKET'S MILLS TO BALD KNOB.

On the morning of May 28, 1864, the Adjutant was awakened by one of the enemy's shells exploding in the trees over his head, and went at once to work preparing a list of the casualties in the regiment the day before. Some of the companies had been almost marvelously protected by the inequalities of the ground while others had suffered terribly. In Company H, out of 49 men carrying guns who had gone into action, only 22 remained, a loss, including Captain Updegrove, of 56 percent.¹ The enemy threw a number of shells into our line about sunrise and wounded two or three men of the brigade. Desultory firing was kept up during the day, but no assault was made on our position. About 10 a. m. our regiment relieved the Forty-ninth Ohio in the first line and sent out two companies as pickets. Firing was heard both in our front and rear during the day. That in our rear it was said was caused by Stoneman's cavalry fighting its way into position on our left flank. We learned afterwards that we were to hold the position we had gained the day before as a basis for a movement of our entire army to the left. This movement was devised in order to regain possession of the railroad which we had left when we crossed the Etowah River at Kingston and moved south toward Dallas. It was only part of General Sherman's plan to get the enemy out of the Allatoona Pass, which was too strong a position to be carried by a front attack. In pursuance of such general plan, on the 28th, General McPherson was about to move to the left and relieve General Thomas, who was to move still further to the left, when his lines were suddenly attacked and the movement was delayed for a few days.² Later in the day we reinforced our picket line, which had been changed to some extent, by two more companies. Picket firing continued all day and all night, but as we had not been out of hearing of such firing for four weeks we had become accustomed to it, and many of them men not on duty lay down behind our works and slept. The adjutant found time during the day to visit the wounded at the field hospitals, where the surgeons with rolled up sleeves had worked all the night before and were still at work, cutting off legs and arms and otherwise trying to relieve the wounded men. Among those the adjutant recalls was the regimental bugler, Wilson S. Iler, whose sunny dis-

¹ Gleason's Diary.

² Sherman's Report, W. R. R. 72-66.

position and cheerful manners endeared him to everyone who knew him. When he had blown that loud, sharp, clear bugle note which commanded us to charge forward, he had seized the musket of a comrade who had fallen and had gone forward with the line. He too was soon laid low by bullet wounds in his arm and leg. His arm had been amputated and although suffering from pain he was cheerful as ever, said he would soon be back, and added, "Adjutant, a bugler only needs one arm." Poor fellow, he died of that terrible gangrene at Chattanooga a few days later.

A terrible depression pervaded the ranks this day. It was partially relieved by the arrival of a mail which brought letters from home, by the constant fire of the enemy's pickets and occasional shells from his batteries. If it had not been for these and the activities made necessary by the enemy's immediate presence, this depression would have been almost unbearable. Many of the very flower of our young comrades had been killed or fatally wounded, and there were some whose fate was unknown, as the enemy still held the ground where the battle was fought. Word came late in the evening that the enemy had made an attack on General McPherson's position and had been more severely punished than we had been the day before. It was Saturday, and Gleason in closing his diary for the day says: "Night came on with the usual amount of desultory firing and we retired to rest at the close of another eventful week. May God forbid that I should be compelled to witness events more painful than those of this week."¹

Quite an alarm occurred during the night, the whole brigade being called to arms by the stentorian voice of Colonel Gibson, who had heard (or imagined) some unusual noise, and there was a general uproar all through the camp. There was very little firing, but men were rushing here and there, some yelling at the tops of their voices, evidently just roused from sleep and imagining the whole rebel army right upon us. It was soon known that it was only an unreasonable panic and was caused by a disordered dream of Colonel Gibson. Gleason described the scene as above and says "it was not to be wondered that the men's minds should also be in a similar wrought up condition after passing through such a hell as we did when we were led into such a slaughter pen." It was a long time before the buzz of the men's voices and the firing which broke out to our left subsided sufficiently to permit one to sleep.²

Next morning, the 29th, the company cooks began to arrive at daylight with coffee for the men on the line and we soon had

¹ and ² Gleason's Diary.

our breakfasts. A revised list of our losses on the 27th, prepared by Gleason under the direction of the adjutant, showed 18 killed, 64 wounded and 17 missing, 99 in all, but there were conflicting reports as to three or four men. Gleason in his diary records that Captain Hartsough of the Forty-ninth Ohio told him that he, Hartsough, had been on the field of the 27th until 9 o'clock at night, had picked up our regimental colors from the side of our dead color sergeant, and had given them into the hands of Corporal Hart, one of the color guard, who was trying to recover them.¹

During the afternoon of the 29th there was an alarm caused by sharp musketry on our immediate right and our men hurried into the breastworks. But there was no advance by the enemy in force and the alarm was soon over. There was also heavy artillery firing to our right, but it soon subsided. In the late evening one of our batteries was placed in position on our line and opened on the enemy's position. It was soon joined by another battery a little to our right, and for a half hour there was lively artillery firing. The enemy's artillery did not respond. There was an unusual amount of firing all through the night, which was not conducive to sound sleep.

There was the usual increase in amount of picket firing at early dawn the morning of the 30th, but it soon lessened to the accustomed desultory fire. We lay along our line of works during the day, no untoward or unusual event occurring. There was a point on our general line to the right of our brigade where one could have a clear view of the enemy's works near the scene of our bloody encounter of the 27th, and many of our men got permission to visit it. The thought that some of our dead were still lying there, perhaps unburied, made them long to go there, but the enemy still held the ground and it was impossible.

About sunset an order came to be ready to move in a short time, as our lines were to be changed. As soon as it became dark we marched by the left flank about one fourth of a mile and took position on the right of Hazen's brigade. Here our brigade formed in line and at once began fortifying our position by carrying logs and throwing up earth in front of them. The pioneers were on hand and assisted in the work. We erected a pretty strong defense of breastworks, sent out Companies D and H as pickets and then bivouaced for the night. Picket firing continued along other portions of the line but there was little in our front, as the woods were so dense there our pickets could not see the enemy's pickets and the enemy could not see ours.

¹ Gleason's Diary.

On the morning of May 31, we resumed work on our breastworks. Word came that we might be attacked in force and soon every man was in his place along the works and on the lookout for the enemy. Sharper picket firing began on the left, gradually extended to our front and thence along our whole line. Companies C and I had just relieved Companies D and H and soon came running in followed by whizzing bullets, which indicated an advance by the enemy. The orderly sergeant of Company C was hit in the face and a private of Company I was hit in the body.¹ As soon as the pickets were in our men poured a volley into the woods in our front, but its effect was not perceptible. The attack seemed general all along our line to the left and heaviest in front of the Twenty-third Corps, which was on our right. It ended in about an hour, but the enemy's sharpshooters from their picket or skirmish line continued to annoy us from an advanced position which they had taken after the retirement of our pickets. One man in Company D was severely wounded inside our breastworks. A number of men of the Eighty-ninth Illinois armed with Spencer rifles were sent after these sharpshooters and drove them back,¹ and our pickets were soon ordered back to the position they held when the attack commenced. This attack was made by General Loring's division of the Confederate Army, which suffered severely.² There was anticipation of a night attack on our front, and at one time the picket firing became so sharp that we thought the attack was begun. But it soon subsided to the usual desultory night firing and our awakened men returned to their slumbers.

On June 1, there was the usual amount of sharp shooting by the pickets in our front and in the afternoon considerable artillery firing on our immediate right. Our pioneers were engaged in cutting a road for artillery up the hill side. The Thirty-second Indiana in cutting down a large tree for breastwork material by mistake caused it to fall on a row of stacked guns, knocking them to pieces.³ It was currently reported that our army was being gradually moved to the left. There were several sharp bursts of picket firing during the night but they caused no uneasiness. Fortunately for our movements there had been no rain since May 26 and the weather had been warm. On June 2, there was a violent thunderstorm just before noon, with vivid lightning and loud peals of thunder, followed in the afternoon by a furious hailstorm, which played havoc with some of the shelter tents. Assistant Surgeon W. J. Kelley and Chaplain Ross came in from the field hospital and reported all our wounded doing

1 Gleason's Diary.

2 General Wood's report, W. R. R. 72-380.

3 Gleason's Diary.

well, except Johnson of Company H, whose thigh bone had been fractured.¹ Artillery firing was heard to our left and it was rumored that General Hooker had forced the enemy back on that part of their line. It was also reported that the railroad bridge over the Etowah had been repaired so that cars could soon reach the front. We had been fighting on three fourths rations and this gave promise of full rations at an early day, if we got possession of the railroad east of Allatoona. On the evening of June 2, we were relieved from our position on the first line by the Thirty-second Indiana and retired to a second line of works which had been recently constructed.

An amusing alarm occurred during the night. About midnight there was a sudden increase of the usual picket firing, when the colonel of the Thirty-second Indiana sprang to his feet and shouted "To Arms!" and Colonel Wallace of our regiment with a loud voice cried out "Fix Bayonets!" The firing suddenly lessened and we had a good deal of merriment over the panic of the two colonels.¹ June 3, some of the higher officers conceived the idea of drawing the enemy into an attack on our intrenched line. Accordingly in pursuance of orders, between 9 and 10 o'clock, a. m., our tents were all struck, our pickets were withdrawn and officers and men concealed themselves behind our main line of works. All were admonished to keep strict silence until the enemy appeared in force and we were then only to fire when ordered to do so. It was a strange scene, the men with guns ready, crouching behind the works and waiting for the expected attack. The silence was intense and the suspense was nerve-racking in the extreme. The ruse however was not successful. The enemy did not take the bait and after waiting in painful silence until near one o'clock the idea was abandoned and our pickets were sent back to their posts. In the evening we relieved the Thirty-second Indiana on the front line and had just taken position when it began to rain. There was the usual picket firing during the night, most of it probably caused by the excited imaginations of the men on both sides, who would fire with very little or no cause. One shot would often start a lively fusilade which would cause the men behind the works to be called up to the line to meet an expected attack of the enemy. If however the pickets remained at their posts, the alarm soon ceased and the men behind the works resumed their broken rest. But when, as was often the case, the pickets came running in pell-mell over the works, the alarm lasted longer. One alarm of the latter kind occurred about 4 a. m., June 4 and the singing of rebel bullets over our heads made it easy to imagine that the enemy were

1 Gleason's Diary.

making an early morning assault. The men quickly seized their guns, lined up behind the intrenchments and awaited the expected assault. It proved to be another false alarm. The pickets were admonished and sent back to their posts and the men behind the works turned in for a little more rest.

When we rose the morning of June 4, a soft rain was falling and the men who were not on duty sought the shelter of their dog tents, hoping to remain undisturbed during the day. But soon came an order to the Thirty-second Indiana, directing it to move to the right across a ravine and our regiment was ordered to join them on the left as soon as we were relieved by a regiment of Hazen's brigade.

We were told that the line of our division was to be extended so as to relieve Davis' division of the Fourteenth Corps so it could be sent elsewhere. We completed our part of the movement by 9 o'clock a. m. and found ourselves in a better position than before, but we had to hold it with a single line of troops. Just at the right of our new position were three grim "dogs of war", masked by green branches and keeping silent vigil over the ravine below. That night there was only one alarm. The men quickly lined up behind the works, but the expected attack did not take place. Next morning, June 5, the usual picket firing continued and we supposed the enemy was still in force in our front. But on sending out a reconnoitering party at 8 o'clock, we found that they had decamped during the night. A detail from each company was at once sent out to the battel field of the 27th to try to get trace of our dead and missing comrades. They soon returned and reported that our dead had all been buried by the enemy. The men spent the day in general relaxation. A mail came in bringing letters and papers from home. Sergeant Major Gleason at the adjutant's request made out the descriptive roll of Wilson S. Iler, and the adjutant took it to him at the field hospital,¹ whence he was to be taken to Chattanooga as soon as railroad communication was reestablished. That night we went to rest early and slept undisturbed by war's alarms.

The morning of June 6, was warm and sultry. The reveille was sounded by the bugle before day-break and we had orders to be ready to march at sunrise. It was about an hour after sunrise when we started, our regiment being the fourth from the head of our brigade. Our course was mainly eastward. We halted at 10 a. m. and found the entire division resting in a large field, waiting for the completion of a bridge across Allatoona creek. We did not have to wait long until we were again on the

¹ Gleason's Diary.

march. After crossing Allatoona creek our division moved across the fields to the left and thence on a road to the left of the Ackworth Road and about 11 a. m. was placed in camp. It was formed in two lines, the left resting on the Big Shanty Road and the right a little refused.¹ General Stanley's division was immediately on our left across the road. Our regiment was assigned its proper place and we remained here the rest of the day and during the night. The day was fair and many suffered from the intense heat. While we were resting near Pickett's Mill on the 5th, the grand movement of our entire army to the left which began June 1, was practically completed, General McPherson's army having that day marched in rear of our line to the left.² After this grand movement had given us possession of the roads leading back to Allatoona and Ackworth, General Stoneman's and General Garrard's cavalry were sent against Allatoona pass, the former to the east and the latter to the west end of it. We thereby gained possession of the pass³ and our cracker line was safe. Our camp on the 6th of June was about two miles from Ackworth which was occupied by our troops. There we remained until June 10. During this time General Sherman in person visited Allatoona pass and designated it as a secondary base for supplies.⁴ The bridge across Etowah River was being rebuilt.⁵

The morning of June 7, the men were allowed to sleep until after sunrise. It was an unusual experience. There was no sound of cannon or small arms to disturb our slumbers, the first respite we had had from these sounds since the campaign began and the only one we had during its continuance. When the men were called up some of them found they had only hard tack and coffee for breakfast and others had nothing. When a detail was made to clean up quarters some of the men protested, saying they should not be required to work without rations. Some of the men went foraging and brought in some green apples and half ripe mulberries. However, the supply trains came up during the day and we had full rations for supper. A part of the rations was fresh beef which was so tough and lean the common remark was "that the beeves were so poor they had to shoot them to prevent their starving and that they had to prop them up to shoot them."⁶ Gleason also says a supply of whisky was issued during the evening, that some of his mess got boozy, as did also most of the regimental band, and that the latter started out to serenade Colonel Gibson and kept up a din until quite late.

1 Fullerton's Diary, W. R. R. 72-872.

2 Fullerton's Diary, W. R. R. 72-871.

3 and 4 General Sherman's Report, W. R. R. 72-66.

5 General Howard's Report, W. R. R. 72-196.

6 Gleason's Diary.

June 8 Colonel Wallace sent in application for leave of absence and went to the hospital at Ackworth. It was generally believed he would never return to the regiment. News came that Sergeant David Capper and Pelham C. Johnson of Company H. had died in the field hospital. Late in the evening we received orders to be ready to march at 6 o'clock the next morning. There were heavy showers the morning of June 10. The reveille sounded at 4 o'clock and we made ready for another forward movement. It was to be part of a grand general movement by our entire army, as our communications to the rear were now secure and supplies were ample. General McPherson was ordered to move toward Marietta, his right on the railroad. General Thomas on Kennesaw and Pine Mountains and General Schofield off toward Lost Mountain; the cavalry were to protect our flanks and our communications to the rear. General F. P. Blair had joined us with two divisions of the 17th Corps and Garrard's cavalry, which about made up for our losses so far in the campaign. They of course became a part of General McPherson's Army of the Tennessee. General Sherman in his official report describes the military situation as follows:

"Kenesaw, the bold and striking twin mountain, lay before us, with a high range of distant hills trending off to the northeast, terminating to our view in another peak called Brush Mountain. To our right was a smaller hill called Pine Mountain and beyond it in the distance, was Lost Mountain. All these, though linked in a continuous chain, present a sharp, conical appearance, prominent in the vast landscape that presents itself from any of the hills that abound in that region. Kenesaw, Pine Mountain and Lost Mountain form a triangle, Pine Mountain the apex and Kenesaw and Lost Mountain the base, covering perfectly the town of Marietta and the railroad back to the Chattohochee. On each of these peaks the enemy had his signal station; the summits were crowned with batteries, and the spurs were alive with men busy in felling trees, digging pits and preparing for the grand struggle impending. The scene was enchanting, too beautiful to be disturbed by the harsh clamor of war; but the Chattohochee lay beyond and I had to reach it."¹

As above stated we were to be ready to march at 6 o'clock but a later order directed us to march at 8 o'clock. Our corps was to march on the main road to Marietta, which crossed the railroad at Kenesaw Station and then passed on east of the mountain to Marietta. General Stanley's division was first, General Newton's second and ours third. Stanley and Newton were to move at 7 a. m. and our division at 8 a. m. The ambulance

¹ W. R. R. 72-67.

train of each division was to follow in rear of the division to which it was attached.¹ Our regiment moved promptly with the brigade and division at 8 o'clock and marched about a half mile, when we were halted just as a heavy thunder storm broke over us. Here we rested for an hour and were then told we would not move for an hour and a half. We resumed our march at 2 o'clock in a heavy rain. We passed some breastworks which Hooker's men had thrown up where we halted for a short time. We then marched about a mile and went into a camp in an open field. We were formed in double column near a thick wood which concealed a line of breastworks. It was understood we were waiting for the Fourteenth Corps to come upon our left. There was skirmishing and cavalry fighting in front and we heard the "boom" of artillery. We rested in the open field during the night. Prisoners taken during the day reported the enemy strongly fortified, their line extending from Kenesaw to Lost Mountain.

June 11 was spent in being shifted from place to place along our line. There was considerable cannonading from a battery of heavy guns in our front and some scattering shots from the enemy's skirmish line showed they were nearer then we supposed. Our last position during the day and where we bivouaced during the night was just in rear of the troops of Newton's division. The country was very thickly wooded. There were heavy rain-storms during the day and the roads, such as we tried, were very deep with mud.

The morning of the 12th it was raining steadily, but we were ordered into line and marched to the front and left about a mile. Here our brigade was formed behind some unfinished works and went to work to strengthen them, the pioneers assisting. Here we pitched our tents in regular order. Owing to the bad condition of the roads, rations had not been brought up and some of the men were entirely without food.² June 13, there was no change in our lines and there was little picket firing. It rained all day. The 14th of June, there was a general right wheel of Newton's and our division, which advanced the left of the corps about three fourths of a mile toward Pine Top Mountain. Our regiment and brigade had orders early in the day to be ready to move at any time, but it was not until near noon that our movement began. Skirmishing began soon after we moved out. Our regiment crossed a deep ravine and formed along the crest of a ridge. Company A was sent out to relieve the skirmishers of the Thirty-second Indiana. Our regiment

¹ Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 72-874.

² Gleason's Diary.

was the extreme left of our division and on the immediate right of Baird's division of the Fourteenth Corps. Late in the afternoon we moved to the left and occupied a line of works built for artillery. We found the position a hot one. The enemy's bullets came singing among us and wounded two men. Our skirmishers were ordered to advance and clear our front, but met with such a heavy fire from an unseen force that they halted and we could not get them forward. Just then General Howard and staff rode up. The General dismounted and very much to our surprise started through the woods to the skirmish line. Two or three of his staff hurriedly dismounted and started after him but he ordered them back. He went alone to the picket line, told Lieutenant Hanson that if the men would rush the enemy's lines they would probably only find a few men behind a pile of rails. The line was at once ordered forward and found the situation just as General Howard had predicted. A few men behind a pile of rails had been holding the whole skirmish line in check. The men of Company A suffered severely in the rush. Lieutenant Andrew L. Hadden, a lovable young officer, and Robert M. Brown were killed and Wm. Alexander, Albert G. Fleming and James F. McGee were wounded.¹

Just before sunset we moved a little to the left and threw up defenses for the night. During the day there was much artillery firing, our batteries being instructed to open fire whenever the enemy showed any force.² A shot from the Fifth Indiana Battery, Captain Simonson, posted to our right, struck and killed General Leonidas Polk of the Confederate Army.

The next morning June 15, at 8 o'clock, we moved forward across a ravine and found the enemy's works abandoned. There was an order for a general advance of our corps at 2 o'clock p. m. We were to move southward to the left of Pine Top, Newton's division in advance, then Stanley's, and Wood's to follow at 2:30 p. m. Our corps was to be supported on the right by Hooker's corps and on the left by Palmer's. There was such a decided resistance to our advance by the enemy's skirmishers and the woods were so thick, that the advance was slow. At 4:30 p. m. Newton's skirmishers drove the enemy from a wooded hill in front about one mile from where the line started. The capture of the hill was reported to General Thomas who ordered the entire line to press forward as far as it could. The line moved forward and occupied the hill. At 6 p. m. our skirmishers advanced to a second ridge about twenty-five yards from the enemy's main line of works, but at 6:15 p. m. were driven back

¹ John G. Gregory's Diary.

² General Howard's report, 72-196.

by the main line of the enemy which came out of their works. Our skirmishers were reinforced and were able to hold a position about seventy-five yards from the enemy's line. Here our advance was ordered by General Thomas to halt for the night and throw up intrenchments. The Fourth Corps' position was, Newton on the left, Stanley on the right and our division (Wood's) in reserve in rear of Stanley's right. The hill that our main line was now on was on the line of ridges which connects Lost Mountain and Kenesaw Mountain and from which the waters flow into the Chattahoochee.¹

As our division was practically in reserve we had little part in the hazards of this movement. From a point on our left we could see the rebel batteries firing on our line from a ridge. On the right was a high knoll where rebel signal flags were waving. Late in the evening we moved forward and soon reached the abandoned works of the enemy. They were very strong and well built, having traverses for protection against a flanking fire. We congratulated ourselves that we did not have to attack them in front. They had apparently been occupied for several days, as bark shanties had been erected in their rear as a shelter from the rain. To obtain the bark the trees had been peeled for some distance from the ground. One large tree thus stripped of its bark bore the record of General Polk's death the day before.²

On June 16, while other portions of the army were advancing their lines and strengthening the points gained we were still lying in reserve. We attributed this to our terrible losses on the 27th of May and were not averse to having other troops take the lead. Indeed, we felt that so far in the campaign we had done more than our share of hard fighting. The day was clear and bright and we enjoyed the rest. Many of the men walked to the summit of Pine Top not far away and were well repaid by the splendid views it afforded. We could see to the south the western extremity of Kenesaw Mountain and beyond it a large brick building, said to be a military school near Marietta. We could also see the enemy's works in that direction. Signal flags were sending messages along their lines and we saw one of their batteries firing at our line and a wagon train moving to their rear. Gleason picked up a scrap from the "Memphis-Atlanta Appeal," containing a list of Union prisoners in the Atlanta hospital and found the names of two of our regiment, George Miles of Company H (who died June 7) and George Thompson of Company C. In the evening orders were issued for the regular monthly inspection the next morning. Some of the men fired

¹ General Fullerton's Diary, W. R. R. 72-878.

² Gleason's Diary.

off their guns without orders and were arrested and fined.¹ The next morning, June 17, the brigade "assembly" was blown and we struck tents, marched to the left some distance and halted behind a strong double line of works which the enemy had abandoned. While here Generals Sherman, Thomas, Howard and others rode forward to examine the position. We were soon ordered to advance in support of the Eighty-ninth Illinois which was deployed as skirmishers. We moved forward about half a mile to the edge of a clearing, where the 89th Illinois found and engaged the enemy's skirmishers. We soon changed direction to the left and moved forward some distance and again halted. There we remained most of the afternoon. We heard heavy cannonading and cheering to the left which lasted about half an hour, supposed to be General McPherson's troops making an advance. Our division and General Newton's were held in check by a rattling fire from the woods beyond an irregular shaped open filed in our front. A number of batteries were brought forward to the line and shelled the woods for an hour. One of the batteries was quite near our position and our Lieutenant Colonel, (Askew), who was quite irascible that day, got into an altercation with Captain Lyman Bridges chief of artillery of the corps. Askew denounced the waste of ammunition in shelling the woods, said the artillery did no good any way and that the infantry had to do the real fighting. Captain Bridges stoutly defended the artillery and the contention became so warm that General Wood threatened both officers with arrest and thus stopped the quarrel. After the woods had been thoroughly shelled the skirmish lines of both divisions, strongly reinforced, charged across the open field and were followed by the main lines. The enemy was driven from his rifle pits and we held and fortified the position from which we had driven them. Here we remained during the night. There were two alarms during the night and after that it began raining. Some of the men had not put up their shelter tents and had to get up before daybreak and put them up in a hard shower.

The morning of June 18, the Thirty-second Indiana moved out early to relieve the pickets of the Forty-ninth Ohio and soon the whole line moved forward and found the enemy still in force. General Hazen's brigade on our immediate left charged a line of the enemy's works and took a number of prisoners. Our pioneers threw up epaulements for artillery and we soon had several big guns playing on the enemy with good effect. It was understood we were to go on picket in the evening and we made fires to dry our blankets and tents. At 6 o'clock our brigade

1 Gleason's Diary.

moved by the right flank to a road where we crossed a slough on a pole bridge and then filed off just forward of the slough, which extended along the front of the brigade. Seven companies of the regiment were sent out on the skirmish line, three remaining under shelter of the bank. The position of the three companies was safe from fire from the front but not from the rear, as two men in Company A were wounded by a shell from one of our own batteries. Firing was kept up along the skirmish lines until after dark when it slackened until only an occasional shot told of the presence of the enemy. The pickets were watchful and the men on the reserve soon slept unconscious of the enemy and of the rain which pattered down all night. About three or four o'clock on the morning of the 19th, Lieutenant Joseph N. Dubois, commanding Company E, sought the adjutant and reported that the enemy was falling back. He asked permission to take his company out to the front of the picket line and said he could gather in a number of the enemy's stragglers. The adjutant took him to the colonel who at first refused Dubois' request, as it was very hazardous, but finally yielded under promise of Dubois that he would proceed cautiously. Lieutenant Dubois at once led his men to the front through the picket line and forming them in line went on and on, gathering up stragglers until his prisoners were more in number than the men in his command. One of his sergeants, Calvin Etzler, mildly protested against further risk, when Dubois curtly said, "If you are afraid you can go back," Etzler, a brave soldier, touched to the quick by the insinuation, retorted, "I will follow you to hell", and moved on with the line. Gaining the crest of a little knoll they were confronted by a long rebel skirmish line moving back upon them. But Dubois did not lose his coolness or courage. He at once about faced, ordered his prisoners to double quick to the rear, followed them at the same pace and brought the prisoners all into our lines *with their guns*.

Peter B. Cupp of Company H had followed Dubois' company outside the lines, and had gone with them a certain distance and then turned back. He missed direction in returning and suddenly came upon two rebel officers and seventeen men, evidently a picket reserve which had not been notified of their army's retreat. As Cupp knew Dubois was still further toward the enemy he at once demanded their surrender. He told them our men were between them and their command, and that they were already within our lines. As Cupp was coming from their rear, they believed his statement and surrendered. Cupp proudly marched them into our lines as prisoners of war and thus became the hero of the hour. The prisoners taken by Cupp were Captain

S. Yates Levy, Lieutenant Cunningham and seventeen men of the First Georgia Volunteers. These, the prisoners brought in by Dubois and a few others taken by Sergeant Scott of Company G and others, swelled our captures that morning to about eighty.¹ The enemy had evidently left in haste and many more captures might have been made if the other troops along the picket line had been as watchful and diligent. At 6 a. m. the morning of the 19th, our corps was ordered to march for Marietta—General Stanley's division to lead, General Wood's to follow, Standley's and General Newton's to follow Wood's. At 6:40 a. m. our corps was on its way and at 7 a. m. came upon the enemy posted on a line of ridges just west of Marietta. Stanley at once formed in line of battle and Wood's (our) division moved up to his support;² Our regiment moved forward as far as the abandoned rebel works, where we halted to await the coming up of the rest of our brigade, which had remained behind to draw rations. Skirmishing had been going on for some time in our front. There was heavy cannonading during the afternoon. We finally received orders to remain in our position during the night and made ourselves as comfortable as possible under the circumstances. There had been heavy rains during the day. Orders came to General Wood to relieve General Stanley's division at 5 o'clock next morning. At the same time Stanley was to move to the left and relieve General Hooker's right division, which joined him on the left.³ There was skirmishing all along the line all night.

The morning of June 20, we were called at four o'clock and after a hurried breakfast moved out past Stanley's division hospital where we struck a travelled road which we followed about a mile and relieved a part of General Hooker's corps. The troops we relieved occupied a line of unfinished works which our men completed. A battery of heavy guns was brought up in the afternoon and placed in position just to the right of our line, where it opened out on the enemy. The enemy's artillery at once replied and their shells flew thick and fast over our heads, some of them exploding in our line, but no one was injured by them. There was very heavy skirmish firing all this time and the enemy's bullets whistled past over our heads constantly. One man in Company I was wounded back of our line. Our position was very much exposed, being quite close to the enemy, whose works were plainly seen. But we had strong breastworks in our front and the ground descended back of them so that we were sheltered from the enemy's fire. Our works ran along a ridge.

1 Gleason's Diary.

2 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 72-882.

3 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 72-883.

Immediately in our front there was an open cleared space, which descended rapidly toward the enemy and rose to a rounded eminence which was sparsely covered by dead trees. On this eminence, which we afterwards called "Bald Knob", the enemy had strong rifle pits well manned, and it was from this point, about 500 yards distant, that we were receiving a most constant and annoying fire. To the right of the open space woods extended down to the right of Bald Knob and beyond it. Back of Bald Knob a short distance was the enemy's main line where his batteries were posted. From the front of our regimental line we had a good view both to our front and left. At 4 p. m. our artillery opened and General Stanley's division advanced and drove the enemy from Bald Knob in our front. This occurred about 5:40 p. m. At 6 p. m. the enemy advanced and drove Kirby's brigade from Bald Knob back to its main line. We witnessed all this fighting from our regimental front. The firing continued until after dark and we saw the flashes of the guns of the opposing forces and heard their reports but were not called on to take part. The right of our line was threatened at the same time and word came that the enemy was moving to attack us in force. The attack however was not made. That night the Forty-ninth Ohio was placed out in the woods to our right in support of the battery to the right of our line and we slept in the depression behind our works, leaving enough men in them to guard against surprise. Picket firing continued all night without abatement. It rained hard nearly all day.

The morning of June 21, broke cloudy and dark, with a cold drizzling rain falling. It was a morning that made one feel dismal and depressed. There was some firing of artillery and the enemy's sharpshooters on Bald Knob were doubly annoying, after they had re-captured it from Kirby's brigade. We supposed there was some movement on foot but received no orders. About 11 a. m. Colonel Askew and the adjutant were standing near the left of our line of works, when General Howard came from the left along the line. When they saluted him he stopped and said "Colonel, I want you to take your command and assault and carry that knob and hold and fortify it. After you have carried it I will have the pioneers of the brigade report to you. Make your dispositions and be ready to advance when you receive the order". He then passed on. The colonel and adjutant were both surprised that General Howard had selected one regiment to do what an entire brigade had tried to do the day before and failed. But the task was assigned and we had to set our teeth and attempt it. Colonel Askew at once, accompanied by the adjutant, passed to the right of the line and down into the

woods to the right of the open space in front of the knob, to reconnoiter the position. While so engaged he quietly observed that General Kirby had failed to hold the knob the day before, because the enemy attacked him from the woods to the right, and that in order to hold it we would have to make a lodgment in those woods. He then and there told the adjutant that when the order to move came he would march the regiment by the left flank down into the woods where we then were. That the four left companies would be sent at a double quick against the knob, and when they had carried it, the six right companies would rapidly deploy by the right flank on the left company and dash forward into the woods to the right of the knob. When the colonel and adjutant returned, the latter saw the company officers and told them of General Howard's orders and of the dispositions for the attack as above related. They were all deeply impressed by the gravity of the task imposed on the regiment, for all had witnessed the capture of the knob by General Kirby's brigade and his subsequent repulse. Soon the men in the ranks knew about it and realized that we had a difficult and dangerous job before us. There was less talking than usual, and one could see that the men were soberly considering the situation and nerving themselves for the conflict. The cooks came up at noon with coffee which all drank in unusual silence. Oliver Cope, a private soldier in Company E, came to the adjutant and asked to be excused from going into the fight. When asked why he wished to be excused he said, "I know I will be killed if I go into this charge. I have no right to ask such a thing, but I have been in every battle and skirmish the regiment has been in since the war began, have always done my duty and think I ought to be excused under the circumstances". The adjutant tried to rally him saying, it was a dismal day and one naturally felt gloomy and depressed, and that his idea of being killed was only a fancy. But he persisted and the adjutant sent him to the colonel, who kindly but firmly refused his request.

While we were forming for the movement, General Howard took position near the battery on our right and at his order the artillery opened out on the enemy and thoroughly shelled his lines in our front. In a short time we received orders to advance. We crossed our breastworks and moved down into the woods a short distance in the formation above described. At the proper moment, Companies B and G commanded respectively by Lieutenant Augustus L. Smith and Captain Andrew R. Z. Dawson, wheeled into line and dashed down the hill into the open space, closely followed by Companies E and K commanded respectively by Lieutenant Joseph N. Dubois and Captain Chand-

ler W. Carroll. The company commanders led their companies in the charge and it seemed to be a race among them to see which company should gain the top of the knob first. The enemy in the rifle pits on the knob poured a deadly fire at our rapidly advancing troops, but in the excitement they shot high and most of their bullets went over our men's heads. The charge was so impetuous and swift that the enemy were literally run over and many were captured in their rifle pits. One Confederate soldier shot one of our men after his comrades had surrendered and paid the penalty with his life. We had no time to look after the prisoners and they went to the rear into Colonel Kirby's lines and were claimed by him. We had no sooner gained the knob when the enemy's artillery opened out and poured a storm of shot and shell on us from their main line about 600 yards distant. Notwithstanding this fire Companies H, Lieutenant Vesper Dorneck, C, Captain John C. Byrd and I, Captain George W. Cummins, together with the pioneers of the brigade who had been ordered to report to Colonel Askew for that purpose, set to work to fortify the position gained. In the meantime the right companies of the regiment had rapidly moved forward into the woods to the right of the knob where they met the enemy in force. Colonel Askew and the adjutant were standing together just in rear of the crest of the knob, when Major McClenahan, who had command on the right, came out of the woods to the right and reported that our men were hard pressed and he feared could not hold their ground unless reinforced. By direction of the colonel the adjutant at once hurried back to our main line to report the situation and ask for help. He could not find Colonel Gibson who he supposed was in command of the brigade, nor any of the brigade staff. While looking for them he came upon the Forty-ninth Ohio who were resting in a little cove or depression in the woods, having been on duty all the night before. He explained the situation to Lieutenant Colonel Samuel F. Gray who was in command of the regiment and appealed to him for help. Colonel Gray said his regiment had been on duty all the night before and that he would not move a step for any other regiment but the Fifteenth Ohio. He at once called to his men to fall in and the adjutant, the writer, led the regiment down through the woods to the right of the Fifteenth Ohio. On the way down through the woods two men of the Fifteenth Ohio, one of whom was George W. Murdock of Company E, who were carrying back a wounded comrade to the rear, called to the adjutant, who turned aside for a moment and saw that the wounded man was Oliver Cope. A bullet had shattered his jaw and pierced his breast, and his

life blood was fast ebbing away. His presentiment had proved true. The adjutant directed the men carrying him to take him to the field hospital, where he died shortly after they reached it.

Seven companies of the Fifteenth Ohio had moved into the woods to the right of the knob and had held their ground against the Fifteenth and Thirty-seventh Tennessee regiments of Bate's division of the Confederate Army which had been sent to drive them back, and probably would have yielded had not the Forty-ninth Ohio voluntarily come to their relief.

The official reports of commanding officers as a rule take care to state formally that everything was done in obedience to orders of their superiors. In this instance, Colonel Gray in his official report says he moved by order of Colonel Nodine commanding the brigade, but the real facts are as before stated. Colonel Gray does say, however, that "Seeing the skirmishers of that regiment (the Fifteenth Ohio) closely pressed, I exceeded my orders and changed the direction of my line and charged the position, driving with the assistance of the Fifteenth Ohio, the enemy from it".¹ Having conducted the Forty-ninth Ohio to the relief of our right companies, as above stated, the adjutant rejoined Colonel Askew just back of the crest of the captured knob. The battle scene was one of the most brilliant and spectacular in which we had been engaged. General Howard afterwards made this attack on Bald Knob the subject of an article published in the Pittsburgh Dispatch of May 13, 1894, entitled "My Most Thrilling Adventure During the War". This testimony from an officer of high rank who had been at Fair Oaks, who had commanded a corps at Gettysburg, and whose troops had assaulted and captured Fort McAllister, confirms its brilliancy. Two or three batteries of the enemy posted in their main line of works from 600 to 700 yards distant, says Colonel Askew,² were pouring a terrific fire upon the knob where our three companies and the pioneers of the brigade were fortifying it. The sharp rattle of musketry mingled with the cheers of the combatants resounded from the woods to our right. The batteries on our main line to the right were pouring shot and shell into the enemy's works and above it all rose the dun smoke of battle. It was all wonderfully impressive, but most impressive of all, was the coolness and interpidity of our men. There were a number of dead trees on the knob and when a shot or shell would strike them, huge branches would be knocked off and fall over our men who were at work. It was noticed that one of the enemy's shells struck a large limb of one of these trees

¹ W. R. R. 72-414.

² W. R. R. 72-409.

about 40 feet from the ground and left its mark in the shape of a half moon. In about the space of time it would take to reload and re-fire the piece, another shell came over and passed through this half moon, just knocking a little dust out of it. This incident seemed to disprove the theory that a cannon shot would never strike twice in the same place. A large dead tree stood just in front of the line of works we were constructing and it was necessary to cut it down and use it as a part of our defensive works. As it was exposed to the fire of both the artillery and musketry of the enemy and the work of cutting it down extremely hazardous, volunteer axmen were called for. At once Sergeants Washington J. Vance, Company K, and Vincent T. Trego, Company I and two others whose names the writer cannot now recall, responded and stepped out with axes and chopped the tree down amid a perfect storm of cannon shot and bullets evidently directed against them. Once when a shell struck the tree, Sergeant Trego paused a moment and said, "Hold on there Johnny, I commenced on this tree first". The tree was thrown in the exact position needed for our defensive works and the four stalwart men retired behind the crest uninjured. In all the writer's experience he recalls no instance of more heroic courage than was shown by these four men in cutting down that tree on Bald Knob. Sergeant Vance often spoke of this incident and although he was a hero in many battles he cherished this incident as the proudest in his career. When the enemy had been driven back in the woods and our position was secure, General Howard, General Wood and a number of their staff officers rode up to the knob where Colonel Askew and the adjutant were standing. General Howard was glowing with satisfaction over the success of the movement and saluting, Colonel Askew said, "Colonel you took the knob right out of their teeth".¹ Among the staff officers who were with General Howard was Captain Lyman Bridges, with whom Colonel Askew had the altercation a day or two before. He could not forbear and called out, "Colonel, I see you paid your respects to the artillery today". The colonel at once stiffened up and said: "No sir, not a damned man hurt".

There was great rejoicing in our regiment over the success of our day's fighting. We felt that our regiment had been selected to perform an unusually difficult and dangerous piece of work and that it had succeeded beyond expectation. But we had done so at a great loss. Our casualties were twelve men killed and Lieutenants Hanson of Company A and Donner of Company E and forty men wounded. Late in the afternoon we were relieved

¹ Gleason's Diary and Author's recollection.

for a short time in order to care for our dead and wounded and were then posted in line to the right of Bald Knob where we threw up a line of works and covered our front by Company A Sergeant Gardner commanding, and Company F Lieutenant Glover commanding, as skirmishers. Here we bivouaced for the night.

The following are the names of the killed and wounded in the engagement at Bald Knob, as gleaned from the official published rosters.

KILLED.—Benoni Ledman, Company A; William O'Brien and Henry C. Nagle, Company D; Oliver J. Cope and George A. Todd, Company E; Isaac H. Green, Company F; Thomas Hudson, Charles W. Craycraft, Charles Laport, and John W. Wilcox, Company G; William J. Rhoades, Company H; and Samuel W. Wilson, Company K.

WOUNDED.—Lieutenant Thomas N. Hanson, James W. Anderson, Benjamin Briggs, Charles E. McKinney, Hugh McWhirter, Samuel M. Thompson, Sergeant Robert S. McClenahan and Luther Brown, Company A; James E. Ash, Company B; Augustus Bevington and Geo. F. Bowers, Company D; Lieutenant Oliver Donner, Sylvester C. Brown, Robert Applegarth and Joseph Clegg, Company E; Joseph Ebright, Christopher Hinkle and Wilson S. Piper, Company F; Sergeant Henry G. Palmer, Sergeant Phillip Youngblood, Francis R. Burnham, Nathan Barrett, Levi Barcus, Theodore Coss, John Cole, Joseph Frazier, John Kennedy and James F. Meanor, Company G; Sergeant Franklin Armstrong and Harrison Ball, Company H; Sergeant Thos. C. Cory, Sergeant David Snyder, Sergeant David D. Hart, Corporal Barnet Sims and Newton F. Mickey, Company I; and Sergeant David Smith, Sergeant Eber T. Fort, Corporal William B. Drum, Stephan Bricker and John G. Sherwood, Company K—twelve killed and forty-two wounded. A number of the wounded died of their wounds within a few days after the engagement.

We were all very proud of our achievements at Bald Knob. It was an instance where as a regiment we had been distinguished above all other regiments of the brigade and division and where we had most notably earned the distinction. Our fame as a regiment in this instance we felt was secure. But in 1887, when the *Century Magazine* was publishing its great series of War Papers, there appeared one written by General Howard, our old corps commander, entitled, "The Struggle for Atlanta"¹ (heretofore quoted from), in which he said alluding to our operations in June in front of Kenesaw Mountain, "Again another (Kirby's

¹ *Century*, Vol. 12, page 442.

brigade) having lost Bald Knob in a skirmish, retook it by a gallant charge in line, under a hot fire of artillery and infantry, and intrenched and kept it".

Upon reading this statement the writer at once wrote to Colonel Askew, calling his attention to the article, and asking him to write to General Howard and have him recall or correct this statement. Colonel Askew had lost all his papers on his way home after the regiment's final muster out and shrank from a controversy with General Howard. The writer thereupon on July 7, 1887, wrote to General Howard relating his recollections of Bald Knob substantially as given in this history and asked him to make the proper correction. General Howard replied July 14, 1887, saying "I will look up all the data I have and make correction as soon as I have opportunity. I think you must be mistaken as to the extent of the force operating to retake the hill for it would be necessary for even more than one brigade to cover the whole ground, and further, I have an indistinct recollection that I desired much to give the discomfited troops an opportunity to regain what they had lost. * * * Was not Colonel Nodine commanding Willich's brigade at the time? If so my official account is corroborated by your letter, provided you allow for Kirby's operations to the left of Colonel Askew's position".¹ In concluding his letter General Howard suggested that the writer prepare an article giving his personal recollections of Bald Knob, but he did not have the assurance to go into print in contradiction to so distinguished an officer as General Howard and in course of time concluded that his memory after the lapse of twenty-three years was wholly unreliable. Nearly six years afterwards the official reports of the Atlanta campaign were placed in the writer's hands and he saw that every material fact he had stated to General Howard in his letter of July 7, 1887, was confirmed by the reports of Colonel Askew, Fifteenth Ohio, Colonel Gray, Forty-ninth Ohio, Colonel Williams, Eighty-ninth Illinois, Colonel Johnson, Fifteenth Wisconsin, by Colonel Hotchkiss, who made the official report of the brigade, General Wood, commanding the division, and in part by the report of General Howard himself. Even the report of Colonel Kirby was a negative confirmation, for there were no casualties reported in his brigade that day. After reading these reports the writer, April 18, 1893, again wrote to General Howard, enclosing copy of his (the writer's) letter of July 7, 1887, and again calling the general's attention to the incident, and the above named official reports. In this second letter to General Howard the writer stated

¹ Letter in writer's possession.

that Colonel Askew had suggested that when General Howard was giving personal directions to him (Askew) to assault and retake Bald Knob he may have thought he was talking to Colonel Kirby, "as they were both tall and slim." General Howard answered this second letter as follows:

"Headquarters Department of the East,
Governor's Island, New York, May 4, 1893.

Capt. Alexis Cope,
Sec'y., etc., Ohio State University,
Columbus, Ohio.

My Dear Captain:

You appear to be thoroughly right by the record. Still my recollection is that more than one brigade stood with me by the large battery, following up the movement of the first line.

I did think the tall officer with whom I conversed and to whom I gave orders was Colonel Kirby. It was too bad to have made such a mistake. Colonel Askew is certainly deserving of the first place in mention of that remarkable attack and success. As the Century doesn't wish any more from me, could you not write a brief rectification and send it to the editor?

Very truly yours,
O. O. HOWARD,¹
Maj. Genl. U. S. Army."

The writer was still averse to appearing among the distinguished authors of War Papers and did not act upon General Howard's suggestion. He sees now that it was a mistake. But he prepared a paper giving the facts above stated and presented it to the regimental association of the Fifteenth Ohio and the then survivors of the regiment knew that the correction had been made. General Howard afterwards wrote an article, which has already been mentioned, for the Christian Herald, and which was reproduced in the Pittsburgh Dispatch of May 13, 1894, headlined as follows:

Capture of Bald Knob.

General Howard Tells of His Most Thrilling Adventure During
the War.

The Air Thick With Bullets.

A Terrific Mountain Top Charge That Reformed Sherman's
Line.

A Combat That Marked a Crisis.

In this article he made full amends for the mistake he made in his Century war paper, "The Struggle for Atlanta." A short

¹ Original letter in writer's possession.

time before his death the writer wrote to him and asked for a copy of the article. On September 11, 1909, he answered from Burlington, Vermont, saying: "I take pleasure in enclosing herewith my old Mss. on the capture of Bald Knob, which after using please return to me. The Mss. is in my own hand writing and may be difficult for you to read. I do not find any reference to what was really the case concerning Col. Askew. He was tall and I took him to be Colonel Kirby, the brigade commander, when I spoke to him at the right moment and asked him if he could not charge then and take the Bald Knob. He assured me in a single sentence that he could do so, and I was surprised that the brigade commander, as I supposed him to be, should charge with so few men. It was thus that the Fifteenth Ohio led the assault and crowned the height. Of course the two brigades followed immediately and supported the charge" * * *

A few days after this manuscript was received General Howard died and his son, Major Charles Howard, at the request of the writer, gave him the original manuscript and he holds it as one of his most valued possessions. The following extracts from the manuscript fitly close the history of the regiment's capture of Bald Knob.

"In my corps in Stanley's division we had a very brave, handsome prepossessing young brigade commander, General Kirby. Stanley had great confidence in him and his command, but unfortunately the afternoon of the twentieth of June, as Sherman was pressing Johnston all along his front, and also trying to turn his flank, a Confederate force, coming with Bedouin velocity, made a tremendous demonstration against my foremost division and Kirby's brigade was knocked out of position. An open space fringed with woods was taken from him. Confederate cannons put behind epaulements in the best places, and long lines of intrenchments speedily dug and filled with gray coats, in and out of the woods. We called the highest point of this ground which Kirby had lost "Bald Knob".

"The night of the twentieth of June was a sorry one in our camp. * * * The continuity of General Sherman's long line had been broken. The wedge had entered the block and would soon be driven home. Stanley, Kirby and myself were mortified. Generals Sherman and Thomas were worried lest Johnston should follow up his advantage, break across our center defenses and roll up in shameful defeat our lines in good earnest. I told General Thomas, 'Tomorrow, General, I will retake Bald Knob'. 'All right, General Howard go ahead'".

"Parts of the two divisions, Stanley's and Thomas John Wood's, were opposite the *lost position*. They each sent me a brigade, Colonel Nodine's on the right and Colonel Kirby's on the left. * * * Colonel Askew put his regiment, then designated for skirmish duty, the Fifteenth Ohio Volunteers, out in advance of all others arriving. He and his adjutant say that I probably thinking him, Askew, to be Colonel Kirby, gave him direct orders, but Colonel Kirby was ready with support. Colonel Gray's Forty-ninth Ohio Infantry stood close behind the Fifteenth Ohio".

* * *

"Before the action I rode down the slopes from my night bivouac, having with me three or four members of my staff, till I came to one of those strong works which were made to protect four cannon of our heaviest calibre—the work being made in the edge of a wood was made first of large logs, leaving apertures (embrasures) for the cannon's fire. Then the dirt was dug up inside and thrown over the logs, making a good wide embankment. Lastly short blocks were put crosswise on the work and a series of huge logs stretched from block to block. This last contrivance was intended to protect the heads of the men who, with rifles in hand, were "supporting" the cannon. Along the work here and there a tree was left standing. Our cannon fire had begun before I arrived, shelling the Bald Hill and the fringes of trees, and replying to the lively Confederate batteries. The latter were abundant and arranged so as to hinder an advance of Yankees. I ascended the artiller works and stood (exposed to the Confederate fire) leaning against one of the trees. * * * For a few moments I was reminded of the Gettysburg cannonade. The enemy's gunners had this battery well in view and range. Shells screamed and cracked in the air over my head—solid shot struck our embankment, and little rifle balls whizzed and whistled as they sped with lightning swiftness. My officers protested, 'You'll get killed'. * * * 'What's the good of such exposure'. Some were inclined to seize me by force and put me under shelter. But I said 'I know what I am doing'. I had a very distinct purpose. In plain view before me were the Fifteenth Ohio men, the Forty-ninth Ohio also, and Kirby's brigade which had lost the knob, the pioneers and other men. I wanted every man to feel that this combat marked a crisis, and that I did not ask the soldiers to encounter a danger that I did not share with them, so I determinedly, with set teeth stood there before them and participated in their excitement".

"Many descriptions of that prompt advance by our brave Union men lie before us. It was as resolute as Pickett's charge

at Gettysburg—it was as unique as Jackson's onset at Chancellorsville. * * * Colonel Askew says 'At the signal four companies dashed forward in splendid style and with such rapidity that the astonished enemy had hardly time to get off—we captured twenty or thirty in their works'. He applies like language to the six companies on his right which struck for and cleared the troublesome woods. Askew instantly set his men at work 'to fortify and hold the knob' according to 'General Howard's instructions'. * * * 'This we did under a terrific fire from two or three batteries of the enemy, posted in their main line of works from 600 to 700 yards distant'. Meanwhile the firing in the woods grew worse and worse, for the Confederates had sent thither the Fifteenth and Thirty-seventh Tennessee. But the Forty-ninth Ohio, backing up our men already there, prevented a Confederate recapture. Askew adds 'our loss was Lieutenant (Hanson) Company A wounded, Lieutenant (Donner, Company E, severely wounded, nine enlisted men killed and forty-four wounded'".

"Lieutenant Colonel Gray of the Forty-ninth Ohio, writes: 'I executed my orders, changed the direction of my line and charged the position (a wooded eminence) driving with the assistance of the Fifteenth Ohio the enemy from it. * * * our loss * * * was one officer killed and thirteen enlisted men wounded.'"

"General Wood, the division commander, reports: 'At noon of the following day (June 21) the corps commander, (General Howard) arranged an attack, embracing part of the First Brigade, Kirby's) of the first division and part of the First Brigade (Willich's) (the Fifteenth and Forty-ninth Ohio) of my division. The Fifteenth Ohio dashed gallantly forward, carried the hill which had been lost and intrenched itself on it under a heavy fire of the enemy'".

"Kirby moved in conjunction and did nobly, but the rapidity of Nodine's gallant charge, led by Askew, whose adjutant, then Lieutenant Alexis Cope, has furnished me the detail in which he bore no small part, outstripped Kirby's longer line so that General Stanley says, Kirby's losses that day were not severe".

* * *

"As soon as the half hour's preliminary cannonade was ended, and the signal agreed upon for a charge was given, all of the men moved—some faster and some slower right into the teeth of the whirlwind. The instant I saw them sweeping up the last ascent, I descended from the 'top log' (of the battery epaulements), mounted my horse before my staff could get to me, * * * and galloped into the midst of these foremost men and was with them whilst the air was full of the missiles of

death. They had crowned the height, they had recovered the lost ground, they had restored the continuity of Sherman's lines and for once I, their corps commander, fully shared their feelings of enterprise, of danger, of ultimate security and of glory".

"I was closer beset at Fair Oaks, having had my brother Charles near me badly wounded, my three horses shot, and my right arm shattered by two painful wounds, yet no adventure has ever thrilled me like that spirited charge of the Fifteenth Ohio men under Colonel Askew, when we recaptured that Bald Knob along the lines of Muddy Creek in plain sight of the Twin Mountains of Georgia, all on the twenty-first day of June, 1864".

NAMES OF KILLED AND WOUNDED IN FIFTEENTH OHIO VOLUNTEERS DURING MONTH OF JUNE, 1864, IN OPERATIONS ABOUT KENESAW MOUNTAIN, INCLUDING PINE TOP, BALD KNOB, AND OTHER MINOR AFFAIRS.

COMPANY A.

KILLED.—Lieutenant Andrew L. Hadden, Robert M. Brown.

WOUNDED.—Lieutenant Thomas N. Hanson, Joseph S. Brown, Samuel M. Thompson, William L. Brown, Benjamin B. Birggs, Jas. W. Anderson, Hugh McWhirter, Albert G. Fleming, Charles E. McKinney, William Alexander, James T. McGee.

COMPANY B.

WOUNDED.—Sergeant Robert S. McClenahan, James E. Ash, Charles H. Williams.

COMPANY D.

KILLED.—William O'Brien, Matthias Howell, Henry S. Nagle, John Crouse.

WOUNDED.—Lieutenant David A. Geiger, George F. Bowers, George F. Johns, Clearchus Reed, Augustus Bevington, Oscar Davis.

COMPANY E.

KILLED.—Oliver J. Cope, George A. Todd, David Wallace.

WOUNDED.—Lieutenant Oliver Donner, Allen Wade, Sylvester C. Brown, Robert Applegarth, Samuel Bell, Calvin Etzler, Josephus Clagg, James E. Tipton.

COMPANY F.

KILLED.—Sergeant Lafayette Hess, Isaac Green.

WOUNDED.—Wilson S. Piper, Samuel Early, David Mills, Christopher Hinkle, William H. Davis, Nathan Downs, John C. Fletcher, Andrew Garloch, Josiah D. Glover, Dixon M. Hays, Joseph McMillan, Leander Warren, Joseph Ebright, Crawford E. Welsh.

COMPANY G.

KILLED.—Charles V. Craycraft, Thomas Hudson, John W. Wilcox, Charles Laport.

WOUNDED.—Sergeant Henry G. Palmer, Sergeant Philip Youngblood, Nathan Barrett, Theodore Coss, Francis R. Burnham, Joseph Frazier, Levi Barcus, James F. Meanor, John Kennedy, John Cole.

COMPANY H.

WOUNDED.—William J. Rhodes.

COMPANY I.

WOUNDED.—Sergeant David Synder, Sergeant David D. Hart, Sergeant Thomas C. Cory.

COMPANY K.

KILLED.—Samuel W. Wilson.

WOUNDED.—Sergeant David Smith, Corporal Eber T. Fort, William B. Drum, Stephen Bricker, John G. Sherwood, John Irwin.



CHAPTER XXIII

THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN—FROM BALD KNOB TO THE CHATTAHOOCHEE.

The last preceding chapter closed with a description of the engagement at Bald Knob and left the regiment formed in line to the right of the captured knob with Companies A and F covering our front as pickets. Our line was very close to the enemy's main line of works and our pickets had a hard night of it. There was constant firing during the night and four men of Company A were wounded. The next morning, June 22, 1864, we were relieved on the first line by the Eighty-ninth Illinois and retired to a second line of works a few rods behind the first line. In front of our line were open woods and the ground gradually ascended towards the enemy's works. It would have been easy for the enemy to make a sudden dash down through the woods over our line of intrenchments, if we had been for a moment off our guard. So we constructed a double line of works, not only to guard against a sudden surprise, but to provide a place where the men of the second line could rest and sleep in some security. During the 22nd, both of our lines of intrenchments were strengthened and rifle pits were dug to protect our skirmishers. Besides the strong picket force in our front we required one-third of the men in our front line to be constantly on duty day and night. The position was so extremely critical that the officers usually slept in their boots with swords at their sides. As the brigade remained in this position for ten days, all voted it one of the most trying decades in our experience. On the 22nd there was a great deal of firing in our front, both musketry and artillery, and fighting was going on on our right. Picket duty was more than usually hazardous. Early on the morning of June 23, our regiment relieved the Eighty-ninth Illinois in the first line and Companies C and H were sent out to relieve the pickets. It looked very much as if we should continue to hold our position, as the enemy were very strongly intrenched in our front and behind them were the frowning battlements of Kenesaw Mountain. On this day Colonel Gibson returned and as ranking officer resumed command of the brigade. The regimental officers met in his tent and orders were published requiring us to advance our skirmish line in co-operation with General Hazen's skirmishers on our immediate right. Our batteries pounded the enemy's position with shot and shell for about

half an hour when we reinforced our skirmish lines by Companies D and F, Companies C and H being already on the picket line. All moved rapidly forward and drove the enemy's skirmishers from their pits. But General Hazen's men did not move forward on our right and we were caught by an enfilading fire and suffered severely, losing three men killed and Lieutenant Geiger and seventeen enlisted men killed and wounded.

That night the pioneers were sent out to dig rifle pits and erect barricades for the better protection of the pickets.

The morning of June 24, we retired to the second line of works and our place on the front line was again taken by the Eighty-ninth Illinois. A brook of running water just in rear of our position furnished us with water for drinking, cooking and bathing. We seldom inquired where our water came from or whether it was pure or impure; we knew nothing then about germs or microbes, and if it was moderately clear and cold we were grateful. From a point near our position we could plainly see the opposing troops moving about inside their works, apparently paying little attention to our sharpshooters; the batteries on our part of the line were quiet and it seemed almost as if a truce had been agreed upon. From a hill behind our position we could see a building said to be in Marietta and the enemy's works on Kenesaw and on two smaller eminences which our artillery was shelling. Bridge's battery, First Illinois Artillery, of four heavy guns, had been placed in position on Bald Knob to our immediate left. In the afternoon General Thomas and several other officers came riding up to the rear of Bald Knob. General Thomas dismounted and slowly climbed up the knob to look out over the ground in its front. Quite a number of officers of our brigade, including the writer, were attracted to that part of the line by his presence and at a respectful distance also ascended the knob and stood behind the works. General Thomas looked through one of the embrasures with his field glasses and turning to one of the artillery officers said, "Lieutenant, suppose you fire a shot or two and see if they are still there." The officer had the shots fired as ordered and there was an immediate response. The enemy's batteries opened with a furious storm of shot and shell, one of which dismounted one of our guns. General Thomas at once trotted down the hill to his horse, his heavy form shaking with laughter, and saying, "they are still there." On the morning of the 25th when we again relieved the Eighty-ninth Illinois on the front line, our men were cautioned not to unduly expose themselves, as the


Eighty-ninth Illinois the day before had several men wounded inside the works. An order for the regular monthly inspection was issued and also an order requiring an estimate of clothing needed. As the blank forms required for the estimate were eight miles to the rear at Big Shanty, Sergeant Major Gleason was sent for them, riding the adjutant's horse.¹ There was sharp picket firing during the day.

Sunday morning, June 26, our good Chaplain Randall Ross came up from the hospital bringing a supply of stationery and tracts. There was service by the Chaplain of the Twenty-fifth Illinois. We were relieved on the front and skirmish lines by the Eighty-ninth Illinois and the men of our regiment engaged in writing letters, bathing, washing their clothing and preparing for rain which was threatened. During the morning there was a truce along the lines of our brigade and the enemy buried some of their dead, who had fallen in the recent fighting.² After the truce was ended, picket firing was resumed as fierce as ever. Shortly after this two of our men came from the front, bearing on a stretcher a stalwart Confederate who had been severely wounded a day or two before. He was a shocking spectacle. His black hair was matted above his white unshorn face, his wounds were festering and his clothing was in rags. Our men were bearing him back to our hospital where he could receive attention. Who he was and what was his fate one cannot tell.

In the afternoon there was furious cannonading all along the line. Colonel S. F. Gray and the adjutant were standing together just to the left of our line of works behind a large tree which sheltered them from the enemy's bullets, whose *zt. zt.* was unusually annoying, when a Captain of Artillery, riding a fine horse, came galloping up. Behind him was his battery, the horses at full run. The officer had dark hair and beard and we thought it was Captain Goodspeed, whose battery was formerly attached to our brigade. He quickly unlimbered his guns preparatory to opening fire on the enemy. We at once started towards him and Colonel Gray called out: "Goodspeed, you don't know what you are doing! You can't live there a minute!" The officer, however, paid no attention to Colonel Gray's warning and we then saw he was not Captain Goodspeed. He placed his guns in line in a small open space between the left of our intrenchments and Bald Knob and commenced firing by file, giving the signal for the discharge of each piece by clapping his hands. He was a splen-

¹ Gleasons Diary.

² Frank L. Schreiber's Diary.



JOHN McCLENAHAN

Lieutenant Colonel of the Regiment from July 24, 1864 to its final muster out. He was with the regiment from its organization, and was present in all its campaigns and battles.

did figure as he sat on his horse directing the fire of his guns. This battery fire, coming as it did from a new and lower point, was evidently disconcerting to the enemy, who at first fired over him, but they soon got his range and dismounted one of his guns. One of his Lieutenants and a number of his men were wounded, so many, that the writer has an indistinct recollection that he made a detail of men to aid in serving the guns after the battery ranks had been depleted. He continued serving his guns for about an hour and until the enemy's batteries in our front were silenced, when he limbered up and galloped off as suddenly as he came. We learned afterwards that the officer in command of the battery was Captain Hubert Dilger, and his battery, Battery I, First Illinois Artillery. He had become quite noted as a sort of free lance in the artillery service. He wore buckskin trousers and the boys called him "Leather Breeches." It was said that he would carefully examine the location of the enemy's batteries, get permission to choose his own method of attack and then would rapidly lead his own battery to a new position, sometimes outside of our skirmish line, and open out on and silence the enemy's guns almost before they knew of his presence. General Stanley was reported as saying, in his quiet, humorously sarcastic way, that "he was going to order bayonets for Dilger's guns." The usual sharp picket firing continued during the night and our pioneers worked all night felling trees on the hill in our rear, in order to remove obstructions to the fire of batteries posted there.

For several days, with varying success, we had been working and fighting our way into position in front of the enemy's strong position on Kenesaw Mountain. On the 22nd of June some of us had watched the affair at Kolb's House on Kenesaw Mountain, where Hood's corps had assaulted the white and blue star divisions of Hooker's corps and were signally repulsed. It was a fine sight to watch this fighting of Hooker's men and to see how gallantly they met and defeated the enemy's troops. General Sherman in his official report says, speaking of the affair at Kolb's House and subsequent movements, says:

"Although inviting the enemy at all times to commit such mistakes, I could not hope for him to repeat them after the example of Dallas and the Kolb House, and upon studying the ground I had no alternative in my turn, but to assault his lines or turn his position. Either course had its difficulties and dangers, and I had perceived that the enemy and our own officers had settled down to a conviction that I would

not assault his fortified lines. All looked to me to outflank. * * * I wanted, therefore, for the moral effect, to make a successful assault against the enemy behind his breastworks, and resolved to attempt it at that point where success would give the largest fruits of victory. The general point selected was the left center, because if I could thrust a strong head of column through at that point, by pushing it boldly and rapidly two and one-half miles it would reach the railroad below Marietta, cut off the enemy's right and center from its line of retreat, and then by turning on either part it could be overwhelmed and destroyed. Therefore on the 24th of June I ordered that an assault should be made at two points south of Kenesaw on the 27th, giving three days' notice for preparation and reconnoissance, one to be made near little Kenesaw by General McPherson's troops and the other about a mile further south by General Thomas' troops.¹

The point for this assault by General Thomas' troops was near the left of Stanley's division of our corps. General Harker's and General Wagner's brigades were designated to lead the assault while General Kimball's brigade moved in echelon in support of Wagner's brigade. Such troops of Stanley's and our (Woods) division as were free to move were massed in support.² Both assaults failed and we suffered heavy losses in killed and wounded. Among the killed were General Harker and Colonel Daniel McCook, two young officers of great promise.

Our part in this engagement was inconspicuous. On the morning of the 27th, we were informed that there was to be a general assault on the enemy's lines and that our brigade was to occupy and hold the line held by our entire division while the assault was being made. At 7:30 a. m. our regiment took the place on the line of Hazen's brigade as it moved out of it. A little later heavy cannonading opened, from all our batteries, apparently, and at 8:30 we heard musketry firing on our left toward Kenesaw, which evidently was the assault planned to be made by General McPherson's troops. We heard little firing on our right and supposed that the assault ordered to be made by General Newton's troops had been postponed. We afterwards learned that the assault had been made and that our troops had been repulsed with heavy loss. We also heard that General Harker and Colonel Dan McCook were among the killed. The position where Newton's troops had assaulted was quite near us and we supposed the contour of the hills or conflicting air currents had prevented the

¹ W. R. R. 72-68.

² General Howard's Report, W. R. R. 72-199.

noise of the battle from reaching us. About noon word came from General Wood that the enemy was massing on our front, whereupon every man was ordered to his place behind the works ready for any emergency. No attack, however, was made and we were soon afterwards relieved and took up our position on our former line, relieving the Eighty-ninth Illinois. While we were retiring a man in the Thirty-fifth Illinois was wounded by a rebel sharpshooter. The usual picket firing continued during the night.

It was reported that our losses in the assaults on the enemy's works were several thousand killed and wounded and there was an undercurrent of severe criticism of General Sherman for sending our troops against works which were generally believed to be impregnable. This criticism was not softened when the General publicly assumed the responsibility and said that he had ordered the assault because the enemy had come to believe he would not attack their works; that he wished to show them they were mistaken and at the same time to improve the morale of his own troops. It was afterwards learned that the losses had been greatly exaggerated. Indeed, the losses in General Newton's division of our corps were officially ascertained to be only 654 killed, wounded and missing,¹ and in General Davis' division of the Fourteenth Corps, 824,² or a total of 1458 in the two divisions which made the assault on our immediate right. The losses sustained by the column under General Morgan L. Smith, which made the assault at a point on McPherson's front were only 317.³ The total losses in both assaults were 1795. It will be observed that the losses in both Davis' and Newton's divisions were only twenty-one more than the losses in our division alone on May 27 at Pickett's Mills. But the battle of Kenesaw alone on May 27 at Pickett's Mills. But the battle of Kenesaw Mountain, June 27, was more spectacular, was more widely reported and discussed and was more conspicuous, because of the loss of so many promising officers of high rank. The assault on Kenesaw Mountain was the culmination of a long series of movements, partial successes and failures, since crossing the Etowah River, which were alike trying to officers and men. Perhaps they had been most trying to the highly wrought, nervous temperament of our great commander, General Sherman.

On the 22nd day of May at Kingston, Ga., he telegraphed to Lieutenant Colonel Donaldson at Nashville, Tenn.: "Horse

1 W. R. R. 72-296.

2 W. R. R. 72-637.

3 W. R. R. 74-179.

arrived all safe and sound. He looks well, and I will ride him to morrow across the Etowah, which is the Rubicon of Georgia. We are now all in motion like a vast hive of bees and except to swarm along the Chattahoochee in five days."¹ He was cutting loose from the railroad, his line of supplies, and expected in three days to have his entire army concentrated about Dallas, from which point he could strike Marietta or the Chattahoochee, according to developments. He evidently thought Johnston, if the concentration was successful, would abandon Marietta and place his army safely behind the Chattahoochee. But in this he was disappointed. Instead of "swarming like bees along the Chattahoochee in five days," it was more than five weeks before that hope was realized. General Johnston, able and wary strategist as he was, did not propose to permit such concentration without strenuous efforts to prevent it. In these he was favored by a better knowledge of the most difficult country and its roads and streams. He also knew that General Sherman had cut loose from his line of supplies and knew the great risks he had taken in doing so. He was also aided by the summer rains which began on May 25 and continued with only slight intermissions for over a month. On May 25 he struck the head of General Thomas' column at Pumpkin Vine Creek, checked the concentration at Dallas and when Sherman halted and closed in on him with a view of forcing an engagement, he was found too strongly intrenched to warrant an attack on his lines. Then followed the arduous, dangerous and often unsuccessful maneuvers toward getting him out from behind his works and flanking him out of one position only to find him as strongly and securely intrenched in another, often with severe losses and without compensating benefits.

General Sherman almost every day reported progress to General Halleck, but about the only reassuring news he could continue to give was that he was so engaging the enemy that he could not detach any troops to send to oppose General Grant in his advance on Richmond. This was the burden of so many dispatches that General Grant on June 28 telegraphed through General Halleck saying his, General Sherman's, movements might be made entirely independent of any desire to retain Johnston's forces where they were. That he did not think Lee would bring any additional forces to Richmond on account of the difficulty of feeding them.² General Johnston, besides holding Sherman in check as above described, detached numerous cavalry detachments to break

¹ W. R. R. 75-299.

² W. R. R. 75-629.

and interrupt our line of supplies, and almost every day there were actual or rumored raids on the railroad, burning of bridges, blowing up portions of the track, cutting of telegraph wires and other such depredations. When it was realized that our army was in the enemy's country and that practically all our supplies of every description had to be transported over a single line of railroad nearly 500 miles in extent, running for a greater part of its length through the enemy's country, crossing wide and deep streams and threading its way through mountainous regions infested by roving bands of guerillas, it is not surprising that at times the General in Chief was almost overwhelmed by the magnitude of his task. His official reports and correspondence, however, show only a grim determination to meet and to overcome all obstacles in the way of success. There was one person to whom he seems to have opened his heart, and that was General Grant. In an official letter to him, written June 18, 1864, we get an insight into some of the difficulties and trials of the campaign which we do not get in the official reports. In this letter, after telling of McPherson's failure to sieze Resaca, he says: "Our cavalry is dwindling away. We cannot get full forage, and have to graze, so that the cavalry is always unable to attempt anything. Garrard is over-cautious and I think Stoneman is lazy. The former has 4500 and the latter 2500. Each has had fine chances of cutting in but were easily checked by the appearance of the enemy. My chief source of trouble is with the Army of the Cumberland, which is dreadfully slow. A fresh furrow in a plowed field will stop the whole column, and all begin to intrench. I have again and again tried to impress on Thomas that we must assail and not defend, we are the offensive, and yet it seems that the whole Army of the Cumberland is so habituated to be on the defensive that, from its commander down to the lowest private, I cannot get it out of their heads. I came out without tents and ordered all to do likewise, yet Thomas has a headquarters camp on the style of Halleck at Corinth—every aide and orderly with a small tent, and a baggage train big enough for a division. He promised to send it all back, but the truth is, everybody there is allowed to do as he pleases and they still think and act as though the railroad and all its facilities were theirs. This slowness has cost me the loss of two splendid opportunities which never recur in war. At Dallas there was a delay of four hours to get ready to advance, when we first met Johnson's head of column, and that four hours enabled him to throw up works to cover the head of

his column and he extended his works about as fast as we deployed. Also here I broke one of his lines, and had we followed it up as I ordered at daylight there was nothing between us and the railroad track back of Marietta. I ordered Thomas to move at daylight and when I got to the point at 9:30 I found Stanley and Wood quarreling which should not lead. I'm afraid I swore, and said what I should not, but I got them started, but instead of reaching the Atlanta road back of Marietta, which is Johnston's center, we only got to a creek to the south of it by night, and now a heavy rain stops us and gives time to fortify a new line. Still I have all the high and commanding ground but the one peak near Marietta which I can turn. We have had an immense quantity of rain, from June 2 to 14, and now it is raining as though it had no intention ever to stop. The enemy's cavalry sweeps all around us, and is now to my rear somewhere. The wires are broken very often, but I have strong guards along the road which make prompt repairs. Thus far our supplies of food have been good and forage moderate, and we have found growing wheat, rye, oats, etc. You may go on with the full assurance that I will continue to press Johnston as fast as I can over come the natural obstacles and inspire motion into a large, ponderous, and slow (by habit) army. Of course it cannot keep up with my thoughts and wishes, but no impulse can be given it that I will not guide."¹ General Sherman's strictures in the above quoted letter on the Army of the Cumberland seemed uncalled for in an official letter. That it had failed to come up to his expectations on two important occasions are doubtless true, but there may have been extenuating circumstances. The Army of the Cumberland may have been slow, but up to that time it had done the heavier part of the hard fighting and had suffered the heaviest losses. What General Sherman says about General Thomas' headquarters is literally true. They seemed like a small village and were called "Thomastown" or "Thomasville" by officers and men of the line. It was known that General Sherman had only a single tent, and sometimes only a fly which was carried on a pack-mule, and which was erected wherever he happened to be when night came on. It was said, however, that whenever General Sherman wanted a good meal he went to General Thomas' headquarters to get it.

But there were other things besides these which were causing General Sherman trouble, of which we get a hint by reading the now published correspondence. Some of the sub-

¹ W. R. R. 75-507.

ordinate general officers were querulous and complaining and the General found it necessary to call Generals Thomas and McPherson into counsel to see if possible who were trying to foment jealousies and create difficulties.¹

The enemy had been flanked out of and driven from Pine Mountain, had been flanked out of Lost Mountain, had been hemmed in about Kenesaw Mountain, covering Marietta, for about ten days, and all efforts to turn either of his flanks and get him out of his strong position had failed.

The Army of the Tennessee had closed in on the eastern side of the mountain as far as Noonday Creek, the Army of the Ohio on its western side, had closed in to Noyes Creek and both Generals McPherson and Schofield reported a further advance as impossible. The Army of the Cumberland hugged its northern end closely and seemed equally powerless to advance. In a letter to General Thomas of date June 24, General Sherman ironically says: "Schofield reports he can't go ahead for the enemy and his intrenchments, and is far outflanked. I suppose the enemy, with his smaller force, intends to surround us. But I propose to study the ground well and the day after tomorrow break through after letting him develop his line as much as possible and attenuate. According to Blair his right is now at Roswell Factory and, according to Schofield, his left is more than a mile to his right, across Olley's Creek, so our best chance is to break through. I am just making orders on the subject, which I wish kept to army commanders for the present."²

These were the orders issued for the assault which is known as the battle of Kenesaw Mountain of June 27, 1864, our part in which has already been described.

During this attack General Sherman had taken position on "Signal Hill" to overlook and direct the movements should the enemy's line be broken, and his dispatches to his army commanders show his keen disappointment at its failure. Even after its failure he seemed eager for its renewal.

After General Thomas had reported to him that Harker had advanced his brigade to within twenty paces of the enemy's intrenchments and had been repulsed with canister at that range, losing an arm; that Wagner's brigade was so severely handled that it was compelled to reorganize; that Colonel McCook's brigade of Davis' division had also been severely handled, nearly every Colonel being killed or wounded, and compelled to fall back and reorganize, he dispatched to General Thomas:

¹ W. R. R. 75-589.

² W. R. R. 75-582.

"McPherson's column reached near the top of the hill through very tangled brush, but was repulsed. It is found almost impossible to deploy, but they still hold the ground. I wish you would study well the position, and if it is possible to break the line, do it; it is easier now than it will be hereafter. Hold fast all you make."¹

An hour later he again dispatched to General Thomas:

"McPherson and Schofield are at a deadlock. Do you think you can carry any part of the enemy's line today? McPherson's men are up to the abatis and can't move without the direct assault. I will order the assault if you think you can succeed at any point. Schofield has one division close up on the Powder Springs road, and the other across Olley's Creek, about two miles to his right and rear."²

General Thomas answered these dispatches saying that Generals Howard and Davis had reported that they did not think they could carry the works by assault because of the steepness of the hill, but could put in two batteries at night and probably drive them out in the morning; that the enemy's works were from six to seven feet high and nine feet thick, covered by strong abatis, and that he, General Thomas, did not think they could be carried today, but could be approached by saps. To this General Sherman replied:

"Secure what advantageous ground you have gained; but is there anything in the enemy's present position that if we should approach by regular saps he could not make a dozen new parapets before one sap can be completed? Does the nature of the ground warrant the time necessary for regular approaches?" To this General Thomas at once replied:

"We still have all the ground we have gained and division commanders report their ability to hold it. They also report the enemy's works exceedingly strong. In fact, so strong that they cannot be carried by assault except at immense sacrifice, even if they can be carried at all. I think therefore the best chance is to approach them by regular saps, and if we can find a favorable position to batter them down." He then adds this pointed rebuke: "We have already lost heavily today without any material advantage; one or two more such assaults would use up this army."³

Of course General Sherman could not let this fling pass unnoticed, and mildly urged that such assaults were often justified. He did not let it interfere with the good relations existing between him and General Thomas and at once sought the latter's counsel as to the next move on the enemy.

¹ and ² W. R. R. 75-609.

³ W. R. R. 75-610.

The only point of advantage gained during the day's movements was far on the right, where General J. D. Cox effected a lodgment in a commanding position which threatened the enemy's left and his communications to the rear. Acting alone and almost without immediate support, that accomplished and clear-headed officer advanced and occupied the crossing of Olley's Creek on the Sandtown road and, seeing its importance, decided to hold it at all hazards until he had orders to do otherwise. Upon receiving his modest report, General Schofield reported the matter to General Sherman, who ordered that the position gained be permanently held with a view to future movements.

Before the close of June 27, General Sherman had virtually decided to again cut loose from the railroad, and move by the Sandtown road on Fulton or Turner's Ferry of the Chattahoochee. General Thomas acquiesced in the movement and issued orders to his army to make immediate preparations to move with the utmost celerity with ten days' rations and forage.¹ The Fifteenth Ohio on the night of June 27, occupied its former place on the front line with the usual quota in the rifle pits in its front. There was an alarm during the night which brought every one into the works, but the firing soon subsided to the usual exchanges between the pickets. The next morning, June 28, the Eighth Kansas, which had been caught at Chattanooga on its return from veteran furlough and placed in charge of a pontoon train, rejoined the brigade and was warmly welcomed by its old comrades. The exaggerated reports of our losses in the operations of the day before caused a general depression among the men in the ranks. John G. Gregory in his diary says: "Boys somewhat discouraged at our reverses. I will not yet despair, feeling as I do, that the God of Battles is on our side. Our prospects are dark at times, but behind the dark clouds there is a clear sky. Let us hope for the better."

There was heavy firing on our immediate right about midnight, said to be General Davis' division charging the enemy's breastworks, and the regiment was ordered into the front line of works.²

On the morning of June 29 we again relieved the Eighty-ninth Illinois on the front and picket lines and enjoyed an unusually quiet day. There was a sort of truce between the contending picket lines in our front all morning and for the time the men ceased shooting at each other. In the evening our batteries shelled the mountain and we could see the shells

¹ W. R. R. 75-630.

² Wm. McConnell's and Gleason's Diaries.

exploding in the enemy's works. The enemy's batteries in our immediate front were silent and it was thought they had been withdrawn. Picket firing was resumed in the evening. In the middle of the night there was a rapid roll of musketry from the right and every one rushed to the breastworks to repel an expected attack. The fire was kept up for some time but our pickets remained at their posts and the alarm was soon over.

June 30, we were relieved from duty on the front line and rested during the day. The pickets kept up their usual rattling fire and our artillery failed to awaken the enemy's big guns. Had they been withdrawn, or was the enemy merely saving up his ammunition? There was a heavy thunderstorm in the afternoon, which flooded the ground and made us very uncomfortable. There was only one alarm during the night but the firing soon subsided and we were not called out. The morning of July 1, our regiment was ordered back in rear of the position we held when we charged Bald Knob on June 21, where the men received such clothing as they were in need of. Our batteries opened on the enemy but there was no response—a mystery we could not understand.

On the morning of July 2, we again took position in the front line, relieving the Thirty-second Indiana. Our batteries had been firing since daylight all along the line but the enemy's guns were silent. Before we had occupied the front line very long our pickets were ordered to open fire and continue firing for half an hour, after first giving the enemy's pickets timely warning. Our pickets did not fire so briskly as usual and the enemy's pickets laid low until the half hour was up. Our men then waved their hats and the men on both sides came out of their works and looked at each other.¹

Since June 27 our commanding officers had been hurriedly at work accumulating the ten days' supplies of food and forage ordered to be supplied in preparation for the movement around the enemy's left flank, as above mentioned. All was now ready for the movement. McPherson's army was to give up its place on our left and move behind our lines to our right to lead in the movement. Soon after dark our regiment was relieved by the Thirty-second Indiana and moved back to brigade headquarters. The entire brigade was assembled there and moved by the left flank about a mile and took the place of a brigade of the Fifteenth Army Corps of McPherson's army, which was on the front line in an open

1 Gleason's Diary.

field. As we moved into position the enemy's bullets told by their *zt. zt.* that our only secure place was in the trenches. The ground was very filthy, but it was a choice between danger and dirt,¹ and most men preferred the latter. It was quite dark and we did not fully realize how exposed our position was. The next morning, July 3, before daybreak, when we did realize it, we suspected that the enemy had abandoned his position. Our suspicions were soon confirmed by a man who came in from the picket line. Sergeant Major Gleason was at once sent to brigade headquarters with the announcement, which was the first they had received.² Our breakfasts were hurriedly prepared and eaten and we then moved back whence we had come the night before. Quite a number of prisoners were gathered in by our brigade. They mostly belonged to the First Georgia Reserves, the same regiment from which Peter Cupp had corralled a company two weeks before. In the early hours of the morning, before it was clear daylight, Thomas C. Bethel, a Corporal of Company K, was mistaken for a rebel by a soldier of the Fourteenth Corps and instantly killed. His loss was greatly deplored, for he was a brave soldier and much beloved by his comrades.

We marched back by our former position and on until we reached the Marietta road where we rested, awaiting orders, until about 10 a. m. We then resumed our march beside the road, leaving the road for the artillery and ammunition trains. We reached a point near the Georgia Military Institute about noon and made preparations for dinner. We were not permitted to finish our meal but were pushed forward west of the town of Marietta to the railroad track near a large tannery. Here we remained for two or three hours and then moved on over a very crooked road and in the evening turned out for camp on a large plantation. The occasional boom of a cannon and some skirmish firing not far to our right indicated that the enemy was still near at hand and delaying our advance.

All day the Armies of the Tennessee and Ohio had been making strenuous efforts to strike the enemy in flank before he should reach the Chattahoochee, but as usual, he was found behind strong intrenchments, too strong to warrant attack in front, at Smyrna Camp Meeting Ground, about five miles from Marietta. He had a strong *tete-de-pont* at the Chattahoochee and his flanks were covered and protected by the Nickajack and Rottenwood Creeks.

¹ and ² Gleason's Diary.

On the morning of July 4, reveille sounded from brigade headquarters and orders came to be ready to move at daylight. No order to move, however, came and we waited while other troops of our corps moved forward. Our artillery had been throwing an occasional shell into the enemy's lines during the night and now opened a rapid fire, which was followed by a charge of a part of the Fourteenth Corps and Stanley's division of the Fourth Corps. These troops over-ran and captured the entire line of the enemy's rifle pits on the main Marietta road, together with several hundred prisoners. Our brigade did not move until shortly after noon. We took a round-about course through the woods to our left and were placed in position in the second line behind the crest of a ridge in a large opening where we remained during the night. The sky was clear and the day was hot and humid. Blackberries were abundant on our line of march and the men feasted on them as they marched. On the morning of July 5, while we were at breakfast, word came that the enemy had again decamped. The appearance of our cavalry and some of McPherson's troops at a point below them on the river, caused their hurried retirement. We moved out at 7 a. m. across the fields and along country roads until we reached the railroad about two miles distant, which we followed toward the river. The sun was intensely hot; there were frequent halts and there was no shade to give shelter from the fervid heat. There was heavy skirmishing in our front and our progress was arduous and slow. Upon nearing Vining's Station we left the railroad and taking a road to the left, marched over the hills toward the river. Our artillery had been firing for some time quite rapidly and we heard that it was shelling a pontoon bridge at Pace's Ferry over which the enemy's troops were crossing. The enemy was so closely pressed they could not save the bridge but cut it loose on this side and swung it to the other side of the river.¹ We were placed in camp not far from the river, but exposed to stray bullets from a considerable force of the enemy occupying a strongly intrenched position, still on our side of the Chattahoochee. Here we first became acquainted with an insect called "chigger," which caused an eruption all over the body and set everyone to scratching.²

And now, forty-two days after crossing the Etowah River, instead of five as buoyantly predicted by General Sherman, we were "swarming like bees along the Chattahoochee." During these forty-two days, except two days at Ackworth,

¹ W. R. R. 76-51.

² Gleason's Diary.

we had been in immediate touch with the enemy, and the boom of cannon and the zt. of bullets had not been absent from our ears a single day or night. They had been days of continuous, arduous, striving and fighting, with, in some cases, appalling losses in killed and wounded. It may truly be said that the period was one continuous battle. From a high hill just in the rear of our camp, we could see with a field glass the city of Atlanta, the goal of our campaign. But the deep, muddy Chattahoochee lay before us, and beyond, and between us and our coveted goal, was the army of the Confederacy, strongly intrenched and still powerful and defiant. There was the Chattahoochee and other streams to cross and other fierce battles to fight before Atlanta could be won.



CHAPTER XXIV.

THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN—FROM THE CHATTAHOOCHEE TO ATLANTA.

The evening of July 5, orders were issued to our division to force a crossing of the Chattahoochee at Pace's Ferry, making use of the pontoon brige which the enemy had swung to the farther shore of the river at that point and abandoned, if it could be secured. If a crossing could not be forced at this point the division was to cross at some other point to be selected by General Wood, on a pontoon bridge to be furnished,—all of the artillery of the corps to co-operate in the movement.¹ For some reason the attempt to force a crossing as above ordered was not made. On the morning of the sixth, our regiment received orders to be ready to move at 5 o'clock. No order to move came, however, and we were notified that we might not move for several days. The men thereupon went to work to clean up camp and make themselves comfortable. The forced crossing of the river may have been abandoned because of the movement of General Garrard's cavalry against Roswell further up the river. He reported the capture of the place and the destruction of the woolen and cotton mills there, which had been supplying the enemy with clothing. During the night we were all awakened by the prolonged whistle of a locomotive in the direction of Vining's Station which announced that our cracker line was in working order.² July 7, our men were engaged in usual police and guard duty and in the evening at 7 o'clock three companies were detailed for picket duty. Orders came directing that at 8 o'clock all noise should cease and that no retreat or tattoo should be sounded. It was also announced that at that hour our artillery would open on the enemy's position across the river. If the enemy replied the men were directed to shelter themselves in the timber as well as they could. Five or six of our batteries opened at the hour named and for a half hour poured a storm of shot and shell into the enemy's supposed line, but awakened no response. Our picket line was on the face of the hill overlooking the river and the enemy's works beyond, and was very much exposed to his fire. To protect themselves our pickets dug what they called "rat holes" with trenches leading into them which they covered with green branches. During July 8, there was the usual picket firing and one of the enemy's

¹ W. R. R. 76-52.

² Gleason's Diary.

batteries threw several shells at us, but without injuring any one. There was a rumor that General Schofield had effected a crossing of the river at some point above us, which proved to be true, General Cox's division had crossed the river at Isham's Ferry, had seized a good position and made it secure by intrenchments.¹ It was learned that on the night of the seventh, during our cannonade of the enemy's position, some of our men got across the river and secured the pontoon bridge which the enemy had abandoned.² July 9, there was no unusual occurrence on our portion of the line. Our men were occupied with usual guard and police duty. Either on this or on some other day while we were in camp near Vining's Station, Major W. M. Clark, the surgeon, and the adjutant, while riding through the woods above the river, came upon the body of a man hanging by the neck to a low over-hanging limb. The buzzard's had torn much of the flesh from the bones and it was a shocking spectacle. They supposed it was the body of some spy or Union man which some marauding band had captured and executed. In January, 1914, J. M. Ewing, of Mary Esther, Florida, formerly a sergeant of Company D, Fifteenth Ohio, in a letter printed in the National Tribune recalled this incident. He stated that the body was taken down and buried nearby, that there was a furlough in his pocket, that he had been a soldier in a Confederate Georgia regiment, but he had forgotten his name and the number of his regiment.

The evening of July 9, Major McClenahan, Surgeon Clark and the Gleason boys met in a tent near regimental headquarters and awakened the echoes along the Chattahoochee by patriotic songs. It was the first time they had met for this purpose since crossing the Etowah River.

While our part of the army was in camp near Vining's Station, occupied as above related, grand plans had been forming for the transfer of the entire army across the Chattahoochee River and a movement upon Atlanta from the north. General Garrard's lodgment across the river at Roswell and General Schofield's at Isham's Ferry had opened the way. It was understood that General McPherson's army was being transferred to the left flank of our army with a view to the movement above mentioned. These movements, General Sherman believed, would compel General Johnston to either attack our right at and near Turner's Ferry or withdraw from our front across the river and concentrate on our left.³

1 W. R. R. 76-89.

2 Frank L. Schreiber's Diary, also W. R. R. 76-86.

3 W. R. R. 76-93.

Early on the morning of July 10, our pickets saw a large fire in the direction of the railroad bridge below Vining's Station and soon afterwards the report came that the enemy had abandoned the position they still held on our side of the river. The report was later confirmed. It was Sunday and many of the men were getting ready to attend religious services when an order came to march at 10 o'clock. We moved out at 11 o'clock taking a road leading to the left and up the river. We were impeded by trains and other troops moving over the same road. The road was very crooked and at times we were in doubt as to our destination, but our general course was eastward. The day was extremely hot, the road dusty and many of our men were overcome by the heat and fell out of ranks by the wayside. In the afternoon, however, there was a copious shower which cooled the air and converted the dust into mud. After a march of six miles we came to a pontoon bridge across the Chattahoochee near the mouth of Soap Creek, over which General Schofield's troops were crossing, and went into camp for the night. The next morning the adjutant was busy making out a report of our effective strength. As we had no orders to move we occupied the time in watching the troops crossing the river. The bridge was thronged with infantry, artillery and trains crowding and jostling each other. A large drove of cattle was swimming across where the water was shallow, hundreds of our men were bathing in the river and a large number of wagons were parked on the other side. It was a scene for an artist's pencil.¹

The next morning at 8 o'clock we received orders to march at 10 o'clock and started promptly on time. Instead of crossing the river on the pontoon bridge, as we supposed we would, we took a road leading down the river, passing General Schofield's headquarters on the way. We finally descended to the river bottom where the pioneers had made a road for us leading to Power's Ferry. We reached the ferry at 11 o'clock and found a force under Colonel D. C. Buell throwing a pontoon bridge across the river at that point. General Stanley's division had crossed the river above and now occupied a ridge across the river which he was to hold in order to cover our crossing. We halted along the river bank until the pontoon bridge should be completed. Our regiment was the head of the column that day and we were in close touch with General Howard who with his staff was leading it. When we halted the general was quite near to us and we had an opportunity to exchange personal

¹ Gleason's Diary.

courtesies with him and his staff while the bridge was being laid.

A great many of our men went into the river to bathe and swim and some of them were very noisy and profane. We could see that General Howard was greatly annoyed by their profanity. He finally could stand it no longer, and spurring his horse to the river bank exclaimed: "My men, I think you should be afraid to use such language if the water is deep." The rebuke went home, and there was no more swearing while the general was within earshot.

In about four hours the bridge was completed and we marched across it and about a mile beyond, passing behind Stanley's division.

After some delay our division was formed in line on Stanley's left, where we pitched our shelter tents and at once began to throw up intrenchments to cover our front, on which we worked by reliefs all night. Our trains did not get up and no rations were issued. On the morning of July 13, rations came up but before they could be issued orders came to move forward and occupy another ridge about one mile still further down the river, where the brigade again formed into line and threw up intrenchments. The Eighth Kansas was put to work on them and were aided in the work by the pioneers of the brigade. We received rations during the day and about 5 o'clock our regiment was ordered on a reconnaissance out to the front and down the river. We moved out to a ridge in front on which our picket line had been established, followed it for some distance, and descended through a dense thicket until we came out into an open cove near the river. Upon an adjoining height a single rebel picket was seen who, after taking a good look at us, fired at our skirmish line and then disappeared over its crest. We saw a few of the enemy's pickets or skirmishers and they were evidently cavalry. The object of the reconnaissance was to see if the way was clear for a further advance down the river so as to permit the crossing of other troops at Pace's Ferry. That being accomplished we returned to our place in the line. Late in the evening orders came to have reveille at 3:30 and march at 5 o'clock next morning,—leaving our tents standing and under guard—which order was later countermanded. During the morning of the fourteenth, we received a large supply of clothing and equipment, including blouses, trousers, socks and canteens and they were duly distributed. In the evening there was a violent thunderstorm and a high wind, which played havoc with many of our tents and caused a good deal of swearing among the unfortunates. We remained in this position all day

the fifteenth and sixteenth engaged in routine camp duty. Our regimental wagon came up and the adjutant's desk was taken from it and some delayed reports were made out. Gleason in his diary describes these two days as "about as restful as we had experienced during the campaign." At 5 o'clock the evening of the seventeenth about one-half the regiment was ordered out on picket duty. Soon afterwards orders came to march next morning, leaving our tents with a guard, each man to carry sixty rounds of ammunition. The night was unusually quiet with only an occasional shot on the picket line.

The morning of July 17, we moved out as ordered, it being understood that our division was to move to the front and down the river to cover the crossing of the Fourteenth Corps at Pace's Ferry. We left nearly one-half the regiment on the picket line and the remainder formed the left of the first line of the brigade and division in the advance. We took the same course our regiment had taken in the reconnoissance on the thirteenth. Our progress was slow but we finally reached a commanding ridge from which we drove the enemy's pickets. We here reformed our lines and advanced over a succession of hills finding it very difficult to preserve our formation. We drove the enemy's pickets as we advanced, capturing several at their posts. They were mostly dismounted cavalymen. Some of the prisoners were armed with new Enfield rifles which apparently had never been fired. At one of the vidette posts we found green coffee and one of the prisoners said they had been drawing it quite often of late which facts we thought did not show a very effective blockade.¹ Reaching a point on the river opposite our old camp at Vining's Station we halted and sent out a strong line of skirmishers who took position along a road which had lately been used by cavalry. A rebel cavalryman came into our lines and reported that General Wheeler's entire command was in camp only three-fourths of a mile from our front. A little after noon General Hazen's brigade relieved us on the skirmish line and our regiment moved back to where our brigade was intrenching its line. At one time Wheeler's cavalry made a dash at our skirmish line, but was quickly repulsed. While our division was holding and fortifying the position above named, a pontoon bridge was being laid across the river. It was finally completed and after two divisions of the Fourteenth Corps had passed over it, our division was withdrawn, the Fourteenth Corps troops moving into the intrenchments we had prepared for them, and we marched back to our camps, arriving at 5:30 p. m. Our entire army was now across the Chattahoochee and General Sher-

¹ Gleason's Diary.

man by special Field Orders No. 36 directed that General Thomas' army should move forward and occupy Buckhead and the ridge between Nancy's and Peachtree Creeks and all the roads toward Atlanta as far as Peachtree Creek; that General Schofield's army should march through Cross Keys and occupy the Peachtree road where intersected by the road from Cross Keys to Decatur; and that General McPherson's army should move toward Stone Mountain, which was a little north of east of Atlanta, and secure strong ground within four miles of General Schofield's position pushing General Garrard's cavalry to the railroad. After General Garrard had destroyed a section of the railroad east of Atlanta he was to resume his position to the front and left of McPherson.¹

Our orders to move were received at 3:30 a. m., July 18, and directed us to march at 5 a. m. We knew that our troops were now all across the river and that our movement was to be forward against Atlanta. Rations had been issued the night before and we were all ready to move. The order of march of our corps was first Newton's division, then Stanley's, and then ours, and being in the rear we did not get started until 10 o'clock. We moved very slowly and by noon had only gone one-half mile, when we stacked arms and the men got their dinners. On resuming our march we soon came to a beaten road leading in a southeasterly direction. We then left the intrenchments behind us and moved so rapidly forward we thought we would reach the neighborhood of Atlanta before we went into camp. There was heavy skirmishing far to the front, and heavy cannonading to our right where Hooker's corps was advancing. About 4 o'clock we turned off the road to the left and bivouaced in double column. An old cabin near the regiment was occupied by the field and staff as headquarters. A light shower came just after we had halted but was soon over. Our letter carriers came up bringing letters, papers, etc. and commissions for a number of officers and non-commissioned officers, among them one as second lieutenant for Sergeant Major A. J. Gleason.² As we were on the reserve we were undisturbed by picket firing during the night. We had orders to rise at 3 o'clock next morning and be ready to move at 4:30 with the division on a reconnaissance, leaving our tents behind. We moved out slowly with frequent halts, passing the little hamlet of Buckhead about one mile from our bivouac. Here we found the head of our corps column in camp. We moved about a mile further and halted by the roadside for several hours. Our advance had reached Peachtree

¹ W. R. R. 76-166.

² Gleason's Diary.

Creek and found that the enemy had burned the bridge and were strongly intrenched on the opposite bank. From a point near where we then were we had a good view of the enemy's intrenchments. Our batteries were pouring a hot fire at the enemy's position and our skirmishers were actively engaged with those of the enemy. About 4 o'clock our pioneers were ordered to cut timbers for a temporary bridge across the creek and it was said there would be an attempt to force a crossing. A part of our brigade was now ordered on to the skirmish line, a brigade on our right having been moved to the right a short distance. About 5 o'clock the movement began to the right and left of our position and the enemy was forced back, our men advancing in the face of a heavy fire of artillery and musketry. Before long we received orders to move up to the bridge which was being repaired. Our pioneers had constructed a foot bridge beside the one which had been burned and we crossed on it and soon had possession of the enemy's works in our front. In them we found five of the enemy's dead who had been killed in the fight. Our loss was small, a few men being wounded and none killed. At dark we re-crossed the creek, having been relieved by troops of Newton's division, and marched back to our camp. There were rumors that two of the railroads leading into Atlanta had been cut. That night General Sherman issued orders directing the whole army to move on Atlanta at 5 o'clock the next morning by the most direct roads. General Thomas from Buckhead, General Schofield by the road leading from Doctor Powell's to Atlanta, and General McPherson to follow one or more roads direct from Decatur to Atlanta, each army commander to accept battle on anything like fair terms. If either army should reach within cannon range of the city without receiving artillery or musketry fire he should halt, form a strong line with batteries in position, and await orders.¹ The orders for our corps were that it should move in two columns, starting at 5 a. m. on different roads. Stanley's division to constitute one column and the other to be composed of Newton's and Wood's divisions, Newton's division to take the lead. After the two columns should form a junction, Stanley's division was to take the lead, followed by Newton's and then Wood's division.² On the morning of July 20, reveille sounded and we were off on time. It was reported that General Hood had succeeded General Johnston in command of the Confederate Army in our front, and that General Sherman had said "Now boys we will have to fight." We were

¹ W. R. R. 76-193.

² W. R. R. 76-194.

therefore cautioned to be on the lookout, as Hood was likely to attack us at any time.

When we reached Buckhead we took a road leading to the left which we followed for a mile or two, crossing a branch of Peachtree Creek, and found Stanley's division beyond it fortifying its position. We relieved them and continued fortifying, aided by our pioneers. Our regiment occupied a little grove of young pines, the ground sloping back from a commanding position in front, along which our line had been established. The pioneers cut away the timber in our front and soon had our fortifications in very good condition to resist an attack. At 4 o'clock we heard the sound of battle some distance on our right on Newton's and Hooker's fronts. From our line of works we had a very good view of the valley and could follow the course of the contending forces by the smoke of their guns. The fighting continued until dark when it suddenly ceased. We learned that the enemy had massed on that portion of our line and after gaining at first a slight advantage had been repulsed with heavy loss. This engagement came afterwards to be known as the battle of Peachtree Creek. In the evening our skirmish line was advanced some distance and protected by rifle pits. We got a fresh supply of ammunition for our skirmishers, which was issued to them about midnight. There was the usual picket firing at night. The next morning, July 21, Company commanders were ordered to have their men called so as to have breakfast and be ready to move at daylight. Lieutenant Geiger who was on the skirmish line had reported about midnight that the enemy had left our front, so we naturally expected to soon follow him up. The men had about finished their breakfasts when the "general" call sounded, followed by the "assembly," and soon everything was ready for an advance. We moved to the left crossing the creek on a temporary bridge of rails after which we took a course leading, as we supposed, to Atlanta. Our skirmishers soon found the enemy in front of a line of works about three miles from the town and we lay quiet while they developed his position. We were on quite a hill and some of the men climbed trees from which they could see the city and its fortifications. We afterwards moved about half a mile to the right to support a battery and finally the entire brigade was formed at the same place and threw up the usual defensive works. A line of the enemy's works was in plain view and our battery threw shells into them with great accuracy, while the enemy in turn directed his fire on our men at work on our intrenchments. We remained in this position during the night.

The morning of July 22, on awakening we found that the enemy had again left their line of works in our front. Our pickets had been out to the enemy's intrenchments and had brought in two of their men who had been left behind. Before long we received orders to move, struck tents and moved out across the fields until we reached a road. Here we halted near the enemy's works which they had abandoned and found them very strong,—much stronger than our own. It was reported that the enemy had taken up a new position nearer the city, whose works were much stronger even than those we had just seen.

The enemy had seemed to give way so quickly all along our front, we suspected he had massed on some other part of the line for a sudden attack on one of our moving columns. In high official circles it was reported and believed that Atlanta had been evacuated and orders were issued for a hot pursuit. Our skirmishers were pushed rapidly forward and soon developed the main defenses of the city. After this was done we moved forward a short distance and halted for dinner. While we were so engaged one of the enemy's batteries opened on us and made our position very uncomfortable. Some time after noon we were ordered to move forward and our regiment took the lead. While we were in motion word came that the enemy had massed against the Army of the Tennessee, that a severe battle was raging and that General McPherson had been killed. The news of General McPherson's death was so shockingly painful that word was passed to the officers to keep it from the men in the ranks. It was soon seen, however, that that was impossible. The story reached the line of marching men somewhere and so quickly spread that very soon every one knew it. It caused a profound sensation among the troops, not of depression, but of sorrow and indignation, and one could read in the faces of the men a grim determination to fight all the harder. We soon reached the front and relieved a portion of Newton's division which moved rapidly to the left. We found the works in our front only partially finished and at once went to work to complete them. The enemy's bullets came whistling through the woods dangerously close, as also did shells from one of their batteries. Regimental headquarters were located in rear of the center of the regiment and for the first time during the campaign were protected by a barricade.¹ Toward evening we heard heavy cannonading far to the left indicating that the fight in McPherson's front was not yet over. Later, word came that the fighting had been severe and that the enemy had finally been repulsed and driven back into their main works at Atlanta.

Two of Colonel Gibson's aids, Lieutenants McGrath and Caylor, had a narrow escape in the evening. They were riding the lines with General Wood and Colonel Gibson, our division and brigade commanders, when one of the enemy's shells knocked off the head of Caylor's horse and exploded, a fragment striking McGrath's foot and passing through his horse. Caylor's horse when killed fell on and broke his rider's leg, but neither officer was dangerously hurt. A man of Company B was killed while standing inside the works.¹

We were now, after seventy-six days of hard working and fighting, close up to the "Gate City" of the south, but between us and the coveted prize were frowning battlements and bristling parapets, strengthened by abatis, slashings and other entanglements, apparently too strong to be carried by direct assault.

¹ Gleason's Diary.



CHAPTER XXV.

THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN—THE SIEGE AND CAPTURE OF ATLANTA.

The morning of July 23, 1864, found us occupying the works we had completed the day before. All through the night of the twenty-second skirmish or picket firing continued and we were so close up to the enemy that his bullets came whistling among us constantly. From the left his fire was particularly annoying and we had to construct traverses to protect our men behind our defenses. The talk during the twenty-third was all about the fierce onslaught on General McPherson's troops the day before. Captain Dawson of our regiment was at corps headquarters in the afternoon and when he returned reported that the enemy's loss was fully ten thousand. We learned that our own losses were about 3500 killed and wounded and ten pieces of artillery. There was a general feeling of sorrow and regret over the death of General McPherson. While few of us knew him we knew how his soldiers loved and trusted him and how proud they were of him. We also knew the high esteem in which he was held by his brother general officers, especially General Sherman. The latter announced his death in an official letter to General L. D. Thomas, Adjutant General U. S. Army, in which he said: "General McPherson fell in battle, booted and spurred, as the gallant knight and gentlemen should wish. Not his the loss, but the country's, and the army will mourn his death and cherish his memory as that of one who, though comparatively young, had risen by merit and ability to the command of one of the best armies which the nation had called into existence to vindicate its honor and integrity. History tells us of but few who so blended the grace and gentleness of the friend with the dignity, courage, faith and manliness of the soldier. His public enemies, even those who directed the fatal shot, ne'er spoke or wrote of him without expressions of marked respect: those he commanded loved him even to idolatry, and I, his associate and commander, fail in words adequate to express my opinion of his great worth. I feel assured that every patriot in America on hearing this sad news will feel a sense of personal loss and the country generally will realize that we have lost not only an able military leader but a man, who, had he survived, was qualified to heal the national strife which has been raised by ambitious and designing men."¹

¹ W. R. R. 76-241.

Through this announcement runs the same proud minor note we hear in King David's lament over the death of Jonathan,

"The beauty of Israel is slain upon thy high places: how are the mighty fallen!

"Tell it not in Gath, publish it not in the streets of Askelon, lest the daughters of the Philistines rejoice,

"From the blood of the slain * * * the bow of Jonathan turned not back. How are the mighty fallen in the midst of the battle! O, Jonathan thou wast slain in thine high places.

"I am distressed for thee, my brother Jonathan; very pleasant hast thou been unto me; thy love to me was wonderful, passing the love of women.

"How are the mighty fallen and the weapons of war perished!"¹

General Sherman had some hope that the enemy would abandon Atlanta and retreat to the southeast, and on the twenty-fifth gave orders to follow him with all possible vigor and speed. In the event he should remain in Atlanta on the defensive, the cavalry were to attack the Macon road, his only line of supplies, beyond Fayetteville and McDonough and thoroughly destroy it, and the entire army was to move by shifts to the right, stretching out so as to reach said road if possible. The cavalry to move out July 27.² These movements he thought would compel the evacuation of the place. General Stoneman was eager to undertake the breaking of the railroad to Macon and asked permission if successful, to take a portion of his command, make a dash on Macon, release the officers who were prisoners there and afterwards go on to Amerius (Andersonville) and release the prisoners at that place. To this General Sherman consented, but ordered that after the railroad was destroyed he should send Garrard's division back to the left of the army.³ General Stoneman was to go round the enemy's position to the left and at the same time General McCook with his cavalry was to drop down the west bank of the Chattahoochee to about Campbelltown, cross there and strike out for the railroad from that direction.⁴ General Stoneman's force was about 5000 and McCook's about 3500. These cavalry movements were extremely hazardous and their results were awaited with unusual anxiety. While they were going on, our portion of the line held fast in the position we occupied on July 22, with the usual constant picket firing day and night. We were so close to the enemy that no one was safe from his bullets in the open, even behind our main line of works.

1 2 Samuel 1: 17 to 27
2 W. R. R. 76-255.

3 W. R. R. 76-264-5.
4 W. R. R. 76-260-261.

On the night of the twenty-third, Robert B. Brown, (Paddy we called him) a member of the regimental band, was wounded quite severely in the leg while sleeping in a ravine to the rear of our intrenched line.¹

A great light was seen in the direction of Atlanta and we thought the enemy was leaving the place. At the same time we heard cannonading far to our left. July 24, our faithful Sergeant Major, Andrew J. Gleason, was assigned to duty as Second Lieutenant² and we lost his valuable services at regimental headquarters. Orders came to strengthen our works, which we did by constructing abatis and placing slashings in front of them. The men were given strict orders to wear their cartridge boxes day and night, so as to be ready for an attack at any time. The morning of the twenty-fifth, we were awakened by a battery of the enemy in a new position which threw shells into our midst and beyond us, but fortunately no one was injured. We continued strengthening our works and the men built arbors of green bows over the trenches to protect themselves from the sun. The barricade in front of the regimental headquarters was demonstrated to be insufficient, as two bullets came through it, one of which struck Gleason's sword belt which was hanging on a tent pole. Fortunately he was lying down at the time.³ The next day the bullets came so thick that the pioneers put up some traverses, and so strengthened the barricade that the field and staff could rest behind them in comparative safety. Occasionally a bullet would strike the limb of a tree over head and glance downward. It was a bullet so deflected that had seriously wounded "Paddy" Brown of the band on the night of the twenty-third. There was a large tree just inside our barricade and Surgeon Clark and the adjutant slept with their heads at its foot. Sometimes a bullet would strike the tree far above their heads and they could feel the tree tremble to its roots from the impact. There was considerable cannonading to our right during the day. On the twenty-seventh, we advanced the picket line on our front and the men dug rifle pits to protect themselves. Just after noon in obedience to orders previously received our pickets commenced firing and every one began to cheer and yell. It evidently startled the enemy and caused them to apprehend an assault, for they rained shot and shell at us for nearly an hour. It was intended to divert the attention of the enemy from our left where the Army of the Tennessee was beginning its movement to our right. This day General Howard relinquished command of our corps, having succeeded General McPherson as commander of the Army of the Tennessee. We were sorry to

1, 2 and 3 Gleason's Diary.

lost him as our commander, as he had won the respect, admiration and confidence of our officers and men. General David S. Stanley was appointed to succeed him and Gleason in his diary says that "neither change met our approbation." This doubtless expressed the prevailing sentiment of our division at the time. In the evening our shells set fire to a mill about one-half mile to our front, which made a bright light.

July twenty-eighth, Gleason took up quarters with the officers of Company A, to which he had been assigned, and Sergeant David Weh of Company I took his place as sergeant major. The morning was without unusual incident and Gleason in his diary tells of having a game of chess with Bugler Smith Gardner. In the afternoon there was another demonstration on our front similar to that of the day before, but much more serious, as succeeding it we were ordered to advance and drive the enemy from his rifle pits. The adjutant had made a strong detail to reinforce the skirmishers and had sent them out to the picket line. He then started with Colonel Askeu to the front, the former wishing to direct the movement in person. Just as they stepped upon the parapet of our main line of works, the colonel was struck in the breast by one of the enemy's bullets, which staggered him, and he would have fallen if he had not been supported by the adjutant. The bullet fortunately had struck a pocket dairy which he carried in his breast pocket, which probably saved his life. He was very much shaken up and soon went back to regimental headquarters, first directing the adjutant to go out to the line and caution officers and men not to take too great risks in the movement, which was only intended to be a strong demonstration. The adjutant soon gained the picket line, delivered his orders and was about to return, when Captain Carroll and Lieutenant Dubois begged him to remain and take part in the advance, which he did. Our part of the line moved farward cautiously for quite a distance, the men sheltering themselves from the enemy's fire by the trees, until they came in plain view of one of the enemy's rifle pits, in which seemed to be twenty-five or thirty men. Our men from behind trees covered them so completely that they could only fire an occasional shot. Carroll and Dubois, both eager to take them in, got a few men together and with swords in hand led them in a rush on the rebel rifle pit and captured the entire force,—consisting of a captain, lieutenant and twenty-two men,—not however without some loss, as Philip Fogle of Company C was killed and Oliver J. Henderson, Company E, and John P. Morris of Company H were wounded. After the capture of these officers and men they pleaded to be taken to the rear, as they

were within four or five hundred yards of their main line of works and were liable to be shot by their own men after their surrender. But Dubois and Carroll were hot over the loss of our own men and insisted on marching them along with our line as we advanced further. We finally came to the edge of the woods, and about 400 yards beyond it saw the enemy's main line of works, drew their fire and then quickly about faced and sought cover. The prisoners were then sent to the rear and went at a pace which made it difficult for the guard to keep up with them. Fortunately, none of them was killed or wounded. Our skirmishers occupied the line of rifle pits taken from the enemy, which were at once turned by the pioneers, and were directed to hold them. Besides the prisoners we captured a number of new Enfield rifles and some side arms.¹ It was decided to hold permanently the ground we had gained. In the evening large fires were seen in the direction of Atlanta. This day commissions came for Lieutenant Colonel Askew as colonel, Major McClenahan as lieutenant colonel and Captain Dawson as major.¹ While we were making the demonstration against the enemy as just described, General Hood attacked the Army of the Tennessee, which was just getting into position on our right, and was repulsed with heavy loss.² This engagement is known in history as the battle of Ezra Church.

On July 29, we found that as a result of our operations the day before, the men behind our main line of works were not so much annoyed by the enemy's bullets. Our skirmishers reinforced by Company A held the line gained the day before and with the aid of the pioneers had greatly strengthened it. Lookouts were posted in front of it behind trees, and in such positions had a clear view of the enemy's main line of works about 400 yards distant. These lookouts occupied peculiarly dangerous positions and one of them was wounded before he had been out long. Even from our rifle pits we could see the enemy's line of works through the trees and distinguish men moving about behind them. The adjutant visited the line during the morning, bearing orders to take two-thirds of the men from the rifle pits and with them form a reserve several paces to their rear. In the afternoon the pioneers were sent out and constructed strong defensive works for such reserve. While they were so engaged a sixty-four pound shell thrown by the enemy struck within a few feet of the squad and exploded without injuring any one. Gleason says the but end of the shell remained intact and gave the pioneers an idea of its size and caliber. The pickets were

¹ Gleason's Diary.

² W. R. R. 76-289.

undisturbed during the night, except by an occasional shot from the enemy's main line.

The morning of the thirtieth at 5 o'clock, sharp skirmishing began on our right in front of Newton's division. It was thought a severe engagement was in progress, as the artillery on both sides was brought into action. Our pickets were relieved after breakfast had been taken out to them and retired behind the main line of works. In the afternoon orders came to strengthen our main line of defenses as much as possible. This was done by cutting down trees in our front, sharpening the branches and drawing them stem first up to our abatis. Our field officers who had received commissions found that our regiment lacked thirteen of the number which would entitle them to be mustered in. It was found, however, that more than that number had been wrongfully dropped from the company rolls, and an order was issued restoring them. The officers were then duly mustered into the service as of their increased rank. July 31, was rainy and damp and the men except those on duty kept inside their shelter tents. There were rumors that our cavalry had destroyed the tracks of the Macon road near Jonesboro.

The morning of August 1, we received orders to be ready to move at 7 o'clock, leaving tents and taking arms, accouterments and haversacks and all the intrenching tools belonging to the regiment. The pioneers were ordered to report at brigade headquarters half an hour earlier. We could not imagine where we were going, or on what duty we were assigned. We started at the time named and marched to division headquarters, where we halted and remained an hour. We then marched past the house which had been used as headquarters of the division, stacked arms and began tearing down the buildings and building a line of works with the timbers. The line was marked off and each company was given a section to work on. While we were at work Thomas Salty of the Third Ohio Cavalry came up. He said he had been with General Stoneman when he started on his raid round Atlanta and had escaped after his command had been ambushed. We continued at our work until sunset and then returned to our former position in the besieging line.

The line of works we were working on was being built to protect our left flank when the troops to the left of us should be withdrawn and moved over to our right. There were rumors that General Stoneman's expedition and also that of General McCook, which had been ordered to co-operate with him, had met with disaster, and the rumor afterwards was confirmed. It will be remembered that General Stoneman with his own and

Garrard's cavalry was to make a detour by the left round Atlanta and strike the Macon road at McDonough, that General McCook was to move by the right on Fayetteville, and the two were to join their forces and destroy the Macon road. This accomplished, General Stoneman was to send General Garrard's cavalry back to our left and with his own proceed to Macon and Andersonville and release the prisoners there. Both expeditions started on the twenty-seventh of July as ordered. General Stoneman sent Garrard's cavalry to Flat Rock, for the purpose of covering his own movement to McDonough, and then went off toward Covington and did not again communicate with General Garrard, who returned on the thirtieth and resumed his position on the left of our line. Thomas Salty's regiment belonged to this command. General Stoneman did a great deal of damage in the way of burning bridges, destroying the railroad and a large number of locomotives, and actually appeared before Macon. He could not cross the Okmulgee river at Macon, nor get further toward Andersonville, but retired in the direction whence he came, followed by various detachments of the enemy's cavalry under General Iverson. He was so hemmed in that he gave consent to two-thirds his force to escape back, while he held the enemy in check with the remainder, about 700 men, and a section of light guns. One brigade, Colonel Adam's, came in almost intact. Another, commanded by Colonel Capron, was surprised and scattered. Many were captured and killed and the balance got in mostly unarmed and afoot. General Stoneman surrendered his small command, and himself became a prisoner of war.

General McCook moved down the Chattahoochee to River-ton, crossed on a pontoon bridge and moved rapidly to Palmetta Station on the West Point Railroad, where he tore up a section of the track. He then moved on to Fayetteville, where he found several hundred of the enemy's wagons and took 250 prisoners. He then pushed on to Lovejoy Station on the Macon road, burned the station, tore up a section of the track and continued his work of destruction until he was forced to leave off to defend himself against the enemy, which was closing in on him. He could hear nothing of General Stoneman and so turned south and west. At Palmetta Station he was hemmed in and was compelled to drop his prisoners and cut his way out, losing 500 officers and men. He finally recrossed the Chattahoochee and got to Marietta without further loss.¹ The failure of these cavalry raids had a depressing effect on our officers and men, and postponed our capture of Atlanta, it seemed, indefinitely. But

¹ General Sherman's official report, W. R. R. 72-76.

we set to work doggedly to hold our grip on the place, while our commander inch by inch and foot by foot moved the army to the right towards the West Point and Macon roads.

August second, nothing unusual occurred on our front and some of the officers took occasion to stroll to parts of the line which gave better views than our own of the enemy's works in our front and of the city beyond them. At one point to our right we could see one of the enemy's forts in which two heavy guns could be seen commanding a road to our right. The Confederate flag was flying over it. At a post or lookout on the front of the Forty-ninth Ohio, we had a good view of a portion of the city about a mile distant. August 3, in the afternoon the adjutant appeared at the picket line with an order to advance at 4:30 p. m. and if possible take the newly erected rifle pits of the enemy in our front. Our brigade signal did not sound until after the pickets on our left had begun the advance. The enemy was on the alert and his shot and shell fairly swept the woods where we were. There seemed to be a furious engagement going on at our right, but a ridge shut off our view of it. Our position was such that we could not advance beyond the troops to our right and left who finally retired to their rifle pits. We distinctly heard the Confederate officers giving commands and soon after we reached our rifle pits the enemy raised a shrill yell and fired a volley. It was thought that he was advancing in force, and seeing the troops on our left retiring after returning the enemy's volley, our skirmishers were ordered to fall back on the reserve. We soon learned that the enemy's movement was only a feint and our men were sent back to the rifle pits.¹ That evening General Stanley reported that he had "carried the rebel picket lines on the whole corps front, excepting in front of Gibson's brigade of Wood's division. * * * Gibson met a destructive fire of musketry and canister, the rebels opening on us with at least twenty pieces of artillery. * * * After Hazen had taken the enemy's skirmish rifle pits * * * the rebels rallied out and drove his skirmishers back. * * * We lost about thirty killed and wounded."²

August 4, we kept up the usual exchange of shots with the enemy's pickets. Our men by continued rifle practice had got the exact range of the enemy's main line of works and could knock the dust from their head logs by careful aim.

General Sherman had again grown very impatient at the slow progress we were making. The failure of Stoneman's and McCook's cavalry raids had mortified him, and he was urgent

¹ Gleason's Diary.

² W. R. R. 76-343-4.

that his troops should either break the enemy's line in some place or turn his flank. On the fourth of August he issued orders that General Schofield, with his own command and General Palmer's Fourteenth Corps, should move directly on the railroad leading south out of Atlanta, at any point between White Hall and East Point, and not stop until he had absolute control of said road, and that Generals Thomas and Howard should press close on the enemy at all points. He closed his order by saying:

"On the right we must assume the offensive, and every man be prepared to fight, leaving knapsacks, etc. in the present trenches. Wagons will not be taken east of Utoy Creek until General Schofield has secured position on the railroad or so near it that it can be reached by musket ball and canister. If necessary to secure this end ordinary parapets must be charged and carried, and every hour's delay enables the enemy to strengthen. Therefore let it be done today."¹

All the army commanders, Generals Thomas, Howard and Schofield, at once set about carrying out the above orders and gave the necessary directions, but General Palmer, commanding the Fourteenth Corps, refused to serve under General Schofield's orders because, as he claimed, he was General Schofield's superior in rank. General Schofield disputed this claim and the matter was referred to General Sherman to decide. He decided in favor of General Schofield and thereupon General Palmer tendered his resignation. Afterwards, at the urgent solicitation of Generals Sherman and Thomas, he agreed to withdraw his resignation and co-operate with General Schofield, but General Sherman on further consideration decided to accept it. General Jeff C. Davis, on account of his proved ability, vigor and splendid fighting qualities, was at once suggested as the proper officer to succeed General Palmer in command of the Fourteenth Corps, but he was too ill to then undertake it. So the command temporarily devolved on General R. W. Johnson, the ranking brigadier general of the corps. On account of this dispute nothing was done on the fourth, and on the morning of the fifth, General Thomas recommended that General J. C. Davis be raised to the rank of Major General U. S. Volunteers and assigned to command of the Fourteenth Corps.²

General Sherman, as shown by the letters and dispatches of August 5 and 6, was urgent to the extreme in pushing the movement ordered on the fourth, and was impatient of the delay. He was evidently in the same condition of mind as at Kenesaw,

¹ W. R. R. 76-364.

² W. R. R. 76-369.

when he ordered the assault of June 27. He was irritated at the slow movements of the Fourteenth Corps. To General Thomas he wrote or dispatched, "That it (the Fourteenth Corps) is the largest corps we have and thus far has not sustained heavy loss in this campaign. It moves slowly and reluctantly and there is something wrong." On the same day, the fifth, General Schofield telegraphed that he "had totally failed to make any aggressive movement with the Fourteenth Corps" and General Sherman in transmitting the telegram to General Thomas said: "From what I saw myself there was a manifest determination not to move toward the enemy." General Thomas at once resented this reflection on the Fourteenth Corps and protested that "it has always been prompt in executing any work given to it heretofore."¹ On the same day General Sherman again dispatched to General Thomas saying, "I would prefer to move a rock than to move that corps. On the defensive it would be splendid, but for offensive it is of no use. It must have a head that will give it life and impulse. I was ashamed yesterday and kept away on purpose today to see if orders would move it, but if an enemy can be seen with a spy glass, the whole corps is halted and intrenched for a siege. Unless it will attack I will relieve it in orders and state the reasons." He fired despatches to Generals Schofield, Thomas, Howard, Logan, Stanley and others urging and pleading for vigorous assaults all along the line. Thomas and Howard reported that they had pressed forward their skirmishers, in some cases up to the enemy's main line and were pouring volleys of artillery into their works. At 7:15 p. m. of the fifth, General Schofield reported, "I am compelled to acknowledge that I have totally failed to make any aggressive movement with the Fourteenth Corps, and have very little hope of being able to do better. The efforts of yesterday and today on this flank have been much worse than mere failures. I have ordered Johnson to relieve Hascall this evening, and propose tomorrow to take my own corps on to the right and try to recover what has been lost by two day's delay."¹ To this General Sherman answered "Very well, take your divisions and order in writing both Generals Baird and Morgan to follow your movement, either in support or in echelon, with General Johnson to hold the tete-de-pont, push out for the Sandtown road, and, if possible, a position where you can control the railroad * * * those divisions of the Fourteenth Corps are the strongest and best in the army, and all they want is a good leader."²

1 W. R. R. 76-371.

2 W. R. R. 76-380.

A report of General Sherman's irritation and impatience had probably reached Washington for on the sixth of August, Secretary Stanton telegraphed him: "Do not imagine that we are impatient of your progress; instead of considering it slow, we regard it as rapid, brilliant, and successful beyond our expectations. Take your time and do your work in your own way."¹ General Grant who was in Washington at the time wired to him: "Your progress, instead of appearing slow, has received the universal commendations of all loyal citizens, as well as the President, War Department, and all persons whose commendations you would care for."²

August 6, General Schofield put his two divisions on the extreme right and assaulted the enemy's intrenched lines, but found the obstructions so strong he could not reach the parapet. The loss in his two divisions, Cox's and Hascall's, were about 1000 killed and wounded.³ After this attack he made a much larger circuit to the right for the purpose of reaching the enemy's flank, or a point of his line not protected by abatis, struck the point where the Sandtown road crosses the main Utoy Creek, and reported that he was intrenching the ground gained and would be ready for work again in the morning.³

August 7, General Sherman it appears became satisfied that he could not compel the evacuation of Atlanta by merely extending his lines to the right, and on that day telegraphed General Halleck saying, "I do not deem it prudent to extend more to the right, but will push forward daily by parallels, and make the inside of Atlanta too hot to be endured."⁴ The same day he ordered General Thomas to telegraph to Chattanooga and have two 30-pounder Parrotts sent down on the cars with 1000 shells and ammunition and added, "Put them into your best position, and knock down the buildings of the town."⁵ But when General Schofield reported that his troops were now across the Sandtown and Campbelltown roads, he at once telegraphed to him: "That's right. Go on in your own way to accomplish the end and keep your five divisions so as to hold the enemy until a battle is fought."⁶

While the events and movements of the fifth, sixth and seventh of August were transpiring, our regiment was holding its position and doing its part to keep the enemy occupied on our immediate front. On the fifth, in the afternoon, there was a vigorous demonstration on our skirmish line which at first caused quite an alarm, as no previous notice of it had been given. It drew the fire of the 64-pounders in the enemy's fort and

1 W. R. R. 76-390.

2 W. R. R. 76-407.

3 W. R. R. 76-399.

4 W. R. R. 76-408.

5 W. R. R. 76-412.

6 W. R. R. 76-415.

several of the big shells passed over us "with a noise not unlike the flight of an immense turkey."¹ During the momentary panic at the beginning of the demonstration an amusing incident occurred in our brigade. Brigade headquarters were about one hundred yards to the rear of the headquarters of our regiment and like the latter were protected by a heavy parapet and traverses. At the time the demonstration began a court martial was in session there. The court suddenly adjourned and the officers composing it hurried to their respective commands, thinking there was a sudden attack by the enemy. Captain Chandler H. Carroll of the Fifteenth Ohio was the Judge Advocate of the Court and lingered behind to gather up the papers. As he was crossing the space between the brigade and regimental headquarters, a sixty-four pound shell came bounding and ricocheting across his path. He at once turned aside, followed it, picked it up and started with it to brigade headquarters. Colonel Gibson who was standing at the door of his tent saw him coming and with arms aloft shouted, "G—d d—n you! Don't you bring that d——d thing here," repeating the words, until Carroll turned about and brought the shell to regimental headquarters. The members of the regimental staff chided him for his temerity in picking up the shell, but he said there was no danger, as he "saw no smoke coming from it and knew that the fuse was out." He coolly unscrewed the plug, poured out the powder and we kept the shell at regimental headquarters as a curiosity. Orders were issued that night for renewed vigilance on our front in order to prevent surprise.

August 6, there was the usual firing on the skirmish or picket line and in the afternoon another demonstration was made and our batteries threw shells into the enemy's line, without provoking any response from their artillery. It was said they had decided to save their ammunition for more serious work. There was a thunderstorm in the afternoon.

On the seventh, our pickets directed their fire at a tent inside the enemy's works with some effect for we saw men about and near it executing some very active movements.² We heard musketry and artillery firing on the right and while it lasted we also heard considerable commotion in the enemy's camp.

On the eighth, there was constant picket firing and our men kept up a continual wordy noise, shouting over to the enemy's pickets all sorts of badinage, but they did not reply. The adjutant started back to Bridgeport, Ala., where our baggage train was parked for some needed books and papers.³ General Thomas and staff inspected our line and it was said had ordered

1, 2 and 3 Gleason's Diary.

a battery placed in our regimental line. On the ninth, it was rainy and disagreeable. Our batteries pounded away at the enemy with unusual vigor. It was a long time before the enemy's artillery replied and then only with a single piece whose shots were directed to our right.

August 10, there were the usual daily incidents of the siege, which was becoming somewhat monotonous. On the eleventh early in the morning we heard heavy cannonading far to the right, which indicated an engagement. Captain Carroll, who was still acting as judge advocate of the court martial at brigade headquarters, came to regimental headquarters and reported that the War Department had sent a dispatch to General Sherman announcing the capture of Mobile by Admiral Farragut. It was evident from the artillery firing that we had some guns of heavier caliber than the ordinary field artillery. In fact some heavy siege guns had been received and were firing shot and shell in the city at intervals day and night. It seems that General Sherman had decided to give the enemy no rest either by night or day.

August 12, in the afternoon the brigade inspector, Captain Green of the Forty-ninth Ohio, came to the picket line and gave notice that another demonstration would soon be made, and directed that all be ready when the signal was given. At the signal our batteries opened all along the line and the fire from our rifle pits was redoubled. It aroused the enemy's artillery in our front and a number of shells struck near us, but did no damage to any of our men in the rifle pits. One of the shells struck inside our main line of works and killed one man and wounded another, both of the Eighty-ninth Illinois, while they were lying down behind the works. That night Lieutenants Hanson, Glover and Gleason, by turns took charge of our advance pickets and look-outs. Gleason says that during his relief, from 8 to 11 p. m., the enemy's pickets were unusually quiet and that he could plainly hear their bugles sounding tattoo and taps and their drums beating, and that he also heard a violin and talking and laughter inside the works.¹

The morning of the thirteenth of August, a man in Company F was severely wounded by a minnie ball back of our line and a man in the Forty-ninth Ohio was killed. There was no unusual occurrence during the day. Soon after dark our siege guns opened out on the doomed city and kept it up all night. During the night a great fire was seen in the direction of Atlanta and we heard the fire bells ringing. So it seemed our guns were doing some execution.²

¹ and ² Gleason's Diary.

August 14, was Sunday and we got ready for the regular Sunday morning inspection, which however did not take place. Our good chaplain came up from the field hospital and preached a short sermon. Captain Updegrave, who had been painfully wounded at Pickett's Mill, rejoined the regiment, having walked from Vining Station. Very heavy cannonading was heard on the right in the evening. The day was clear and pleasant.

August 15, a foraging party was sent out from our brigade made up of two men from each company, the men from our regiment being in charge of Lieutenant Welker. There was the usual skirmish or picket and artillery firing during the day.

Meanwhile, on August 12, General Sherman had invited Generals Thomas, Howard and Schofield to meet at his headquarters at 10 a. m. the next day.¹ This meeting was evidently to consider the next great movement of the combined armies, for on the thirteenth at 8 a. m. he telegraphed General Halleck:

"We have now pressed the enemy's lines from east around to East Point on the south. The nature of the ground, with its artificial defenses, makes it too difficult to assault, and to reach the Macon road by a farther extension will be extra-hazardous. I have ordered army commanders to prepare for the following plan: Leave one corps strongly intrenched at the Chattahoochee bridge in charge of our surplus wagon trains and artillery, with 60,000 men, reduced to fighting trim, to make a circuit of devastation around the town, with a radius of fifteen to twenty miles. To do this I go on the faith that the militia in Atlanta are only good for the defense of the parapets and will not come out. * * * "If I should ever be cut off from my base, look out for" me about Saint Marks, Florida, or Savannah, Ga."² This dispatch is notable as prefiguring the celebrated march to the sea. At the time there were rumors that our forces had captured Mobile. General Sherman in a later despatch to General Halleck on the same day said, that if there was any possibility of the forces under General Canby pushing up to Montgomery, his best plan would be to wait awhile and at the proper time move down to West Point and operate into the heart of Georgia from there.³

This proposed movement was probably carefully considered in Washington, for on the 14th General Grant telegraphed:

"The move you propose to make is a little hazardous, but I believe it will succeed. If you do not force the enemy out to fight you will easily get back to your base."⁴ General Sherman seems to have submitted the proposed movement

1 W. R. R. 76-472.
2 W. R. R. 76-482.

3 W. R. R. 76-482.
4 W. R. R. 76-488.

to his army commanders and asked them to submit in writing their opinions on two alternative propositions, i.e., a movement to compel the enemy to abandon his works about Atlanta and give battle on equal terms, or retreat below East Point.¹

General Howard promptly, on the day of the conference, submitted the following, which is given in full because it is almost identical in substance with the orders afterwards given for the movement:

• *"Proposition."*

"Accumulate all impedimenta not going to proposed depot prior to movement, and move trains of Armies of the Ohio and the Cumberland under cover as much as possible, to vicinity of Utoy Creek, there to be parked and guarded by infantry; this before the troops draw out. Then

First. Move Fourth Corps, in the night, to position in rear of the Fourteenth Corps, so that the Twentieth Corps can withdraw at daylight and march to proposed depot, cavalry following closely Twentieth Corps, and taking up position on south side of Proctor's Creek. Next night, let trains of Army of the Tennessee move down Green's Ferry road, under guard, toward Sandtown, and park near Utoy Creek.

Second. At daylight Armies of the Ohio and the Cumberland move out simultaneously, by two routes, if possible, in direction of Fairburn, Army of the Ohio to halt in position, Army of the Cumberland to form on its left, and the Army of the Tennessee, marching at same hour to pass via Utoy or Sandtown to the rear and right of the other two armies.

The three armies will march by three roads, if possible, not more than two miles apart. The cavalry (Kilpatrick's) intended to cover the right flank to precede the Army of the Ohio, and that intended for the left flank to follow the Army of the Tennessee as far as Utoy Creek."²

General Schofield submitted a plan, which was to continue shifting to the right until the enemy's line was so attenuated that it could be broken at some point, or one or two corps could be withdrawn as if to continue the movement to the right, and then sent by a circuitous route to the left to seize Atlanta.³

General Thomas' plan conformed to that of General Sherman and indicated with more particularity how it might be carried out.⁴

General Sherman on the 15th, in answer to General Schofield's suggestions, said: "I am more and more satisfied the movement we contemplate is the true one to be made."⁵ and stated that he wanted to hear of Generals Kilpatrick and Garrard before making his orders.

1 W. R. R. 76-498.
2 W. R. R. 76-487.
3 W. R. R. 76-498.

4 W. R. R. 76-507.
5 W. R. R. 76-511.

While this movement was under consideration General Wheeler with about 5000 cavalry had crossed the Chattahoochee to our right, and on the 14th was reported to be before Dalton on our line of communications.¹ To offset Wheeler's raid, General Sherman decided to at once send a cavalry force to again attempt the destruction of the Macon road, in the hope of compelling the evacuation of Atlanta. This movement seemed opportune, for the detachment of Wheeler's force had probably left the enemy's cavalry inferior in numbers to our own. Accordingly, August 14, orders were issued directing General Kilpatrick to cross the Chattahoochee at Sandtown and make a bold push for Fairburn and the West Point road, and at the same time General Garrard was to feel well around the enemy's right flank.² The order for the grand movement above described was therefore postponed until the results of these cavalry raids were known.

In the meantime army, corps and division commanders were urged to give the enemy no peace by night or day. The heavy guns which had been placed in position poured a constant fire of big shells into the doomed city, and the enemy's rifle pits were assailed almost daily on some part of his line.

August 16, word was received from General Kilpatrick that he had cut the West Point Railroad at Fairburn and burned the depot there.³ Thereupon General Sherman issued the order for the grand movement around the enemy's left. The order is styled Special Field Orders No. 57⁴ and directed that the movement begin Thursday night, August 18, and continue on the general plan General Howard had suggested.

But August 17, a message enclosing a copy of General Kilpatrick's report was received, in which he stated that it was "not only possible but comparatively easy to break the railroad to Macon effectually," and therefore General Sherman dispatched to General Thomas, quoting the above from General Kilpatrick's report and saying:

"I do not want to move this vast army and its paraphernalia round Atlanta unless forced to do so, and it does seem the enemy has offered us the very opportunity we seek. We know positively that Wheeler is above Dalton, and that he must have taken the very flower of his cavalry. He has, and may do us harm, but that we cannot help. I do not think he can carry any point on our road that he can maintain, and his own necessities will force him back soon with jaded and worn-out horses. Now, ours can be quickly moved to Sand-

1 W. R. R. 76-501.

2 W. R. R. 76-497.

3 W. R. R. 76-535.

4 W. R. R. 76-546.

town at a walk, and according to General Kilpatrick, can reach Red Oak or any point below the enemy's infantry, and by a single dash can beat the remaining cavalry of the enemy and break up many miles of that railroad. General Garrard with one brigade could amuse those on the east, and General Kilpatrick with his own and two brigades of General Garrard, under Colonel Long, could make in a single move a break that would disturb Hood seriously. The risk will be comparatively small, as General Schofield can act in support with his whole command. I am perfectly alive to the fact that the loss of our cavalry would be most serious, but I do not think such an opportunity if neglected will never again appear. In this combination I would merely suspend the final execution of the movement of the whole army till the result of this move is reached. I think we could give General Kilpatrick such orders that he would not be rash, and General Schofield could move to his right a couple of miles, and make it certain that Hood would not attempt to use infantry to interpose to the return of our cavalry. Don't make any orders till you and I have perfectly agreed on this plan. In the meantime anything done toward the movement of the whole army will not be lost, as it simply means sending to the bridge (at the Chattahoochee) all the loose ends. I have sent for General Kilpatrick to come up."¹

On the same day General Sherman directed General Thomas to notify General Garrard to have one of his brigades ready to make a demonstration on our left and two other brigades ready to move that night by moonlight by Pace's Ferry and Sandtown bridges to operate under Kilpatrick on our right—but they were not to move until General Sherman had seen Kilpatrick and had an understanding with him. He also directed that Stanley's line should persistently annoy the enemy by making feints as though looking for a place to assault, and that preparations to move the infantry as before ordered might be continued, but no movement was to be actually made until further orders.²

Afterwards, on the same day, he again dispatched to General Thomas that he had seen General Kilpatrick and was convinced that he could so effectually destroy the Macon Railroad that it could not be used in two weeks, and that without risking his cavalry. He then gave orders for the raid. Kilpatrick was ordered to move the night of the 18th, cross the West Point road at Fairburn, reach the Macon road near

¹ W. R. R. 76-548.

² W. R. R. 76-548.

Jonesborough, face toward East Point and break the road to the south.

On the 19th, there was to be a strong demonstration by Stanley's corps on the enemy's right, to aid in Kilpatrick's movement. Notice of this raid was given to Generals Schofield and Howard. They were ordered to demonstrate actively against Atlanta the next two days and make the enemy believe we would attack them in their trenches.¹ Meanwhile the grand movement around the enemy's right was again postponed to await the result of Kilpatrick's second raid. While this raid was being planned and carried out a shower of dispatches came to General Sherman from Allatoona, Resaca, Chattanooga and other points to our rear, telling of assaults and threatened assaults by Wheeler's cavalry on our single line of railroad. The track was torn up in several places, the telegraph wires were cut, and for a time we had no communication with the outside world, except by courier and signalling across the breaks.

August 18, General Grant from City Point, Va., telegraphed General Sherman: "If you can hold fast as you are now and prevent raids on your rear you will destroy most of that army (meaning the army holding Atlanta.) I never would advise going backward even if your roads are cut so as to preclude the possibility of receiving supplies from the north * * * and if it comes to the worst move south as you have suggested."²

August 16, our regiment had the usual number of men on picket and there was the usual amount of firing. Rumors came that Wheeler's cavalry had made a raid on Tunnel Hill, but later, word came that they had struck several points on the railroad in our rear and had been repulsed at all of them. There came to the line about midnight a communication from Colonel Askew that the enemy was massing on our front and directing that unusual precaution should be taken to guard against surprise.

On the 17th, heavy demonstrations were the order of the day, especially in the afternoon, troops being moved toward the left in plain view of the enemy and then back toward the right in the woods where they could not be seen, so as to make the enemy think we were massing on his right. We had orders to have enough ammunition to last next day and then have sixty rounds per gun. We interpreted that to mean a movement of some kind, but where we could not guess.

¹ W. R. R. 76-550

² W. R. R. 76-569.

The morning of the 18th opened by our batteries firing by volleys to which the enemy replied vigorously. Fires were started in the rear of our camps and troops were maneuvered as yesterday to deceive the enemy. Our one wagon was ordered back to the Chattahoochee. This further convinced us that some big move was contemplated, but no orders came.

Early on the morning of the 19th, a furious cannonading began and there was an increase of musketry firing all along the line. In the evening heavy artillery firing was heard far to the right and our signal officers and lookouts reported movements of the enemy's troops in that direction. During the afternoon an attempt was made to advance our line and if possible make a lodgement in the enemy's works, but they proved too strong to be successfully assaulted. The attempt led to the increase of musketry firing before mentioned and also developed artillery on the enemy's line in new positions. These demonstrations were all in accordance with previous orders, and were intended to keep the enemy from sending his infantry against Kilpatrick, the result of whose raid was awaited with feverish anxiety by our commander in chief. Strange to say, that evening our regimental quartette, the Gleason boys, Major McClenahan and Surgeon Clark, got together and amid the din of skirmish firing and exploding shells sang a number of "the old songs." During the 20th of August, there was the usual picket firing in our front, and the usual artillery practice on the beleaguered city, but there was no demonstration attempted. Our pioneers were engaged in cutting logs to use in building advanced works on our picket line. The adjutant returned from Bridgeport, having brought the regimental books and papers as far as Vining's Station, where he was ordered to leave them. He brought with him some peach butter which was highly appreciated by the officers' mess.¹ Gleason also reports that he also brought an express package for him, Gleason, containing a faded bouquet, sent by a fair hand far away in the north. One smells its fragrance even yet although near fifty years have passed since then and both sender and receiver are no more.

At 10 p. m., August 19, the signal officer at the Howard House, near our part of the line, reported that he saw a column of smoke south of Atlanta, distant about eight or ten miles.² Could it be Kilpatrick? The report was sent to General Sherman. On the 19th, Jeff C. Davis was appointed to command the Fourteenth Corps and on the 20th, one of the

¹ Gleason's Diary.

² W. R. R. 76-596.

brigades of his old division made a forced reconnoissance, struck the West Point Railroad half a mile east of Red Oak Station, cut the telegraph wires, tore up a portion of the track and then returned to camp¹—but brought no news from Kilpatrick. On the 21st, a part of Kilpatrick's force returned after having struck the main road at Fayette and being attacked by a superior force. His main force had not been heard from and there were grave fears that it had met with disaster.² But on the 22nd he arrived at Decatur on his return and reported to General Thomas. General Thomas at once reported the fact to General Sherman who asked that Kilpatrick be sent to him as soon as possible. At 10 p. m. that night General Sherman telegraphed to General Halleck, saying:

"General Kilpatrick is back. He had pretty hard fighting with a division of infantry and three brigades of cavalry. He broke the cavalry into disorder and captured a battery which he destroyed, except one gun, which he brought in in addition to all his own. He also brought in three captured flags and seventy prisoners. He had possession of a large part of Ross' brigade, but could not encumber himself with them. He destroyed three miles of the road about Jonesborough, and broke pieces for about ten miles more, enough to disable the road for ten days. I expect I will have to swing across to that road in force to make the matter certain. General Kilpatrick destroyed two locomotives and trains."³

Instead of the Macon road being disabled for ten days as General Sherman had supposed, on Tuesday, August 23, at 9:15 a. m., he telegraphed to General Thomas:

"As near as I can make out the rebels have repaired the Macon road, and we must swing across it. Let me know when you will be ready to execute the former plan."⁴ General Thomas at once answered the dispatch and said:

"I would like to commence the movement without being hurried, and can do so by Thursday night. I think the cavalry ought to have a little rest and time to shoe up. I will be perfectly prepared by Thursday with provisions, and can arrange to get forage by Sandtown the day after, if forage comes down."⁵

General Sherman readily acquiesced in General Thomas' request for delay, and at 3 p. m. that day gave orders to Generals Howard and Schofield to be ready to move Thursday night, August 25.⁶

1 W. R. R. 76-614.

2 W. R. R. 76-627.

3 W. R. R. 76-628.

4 W. R. R. 76-639.

5 W. R. R. 76-639.

6 W. R. R. 76-641.

August 21, when our pickets went to relieve those on duty they found that the line had been advanced the night before. The pioneers had worked until midnight on the advanced pits and our men had quietly moved into them without resistance. From a point on the advanced line we got a view of the enemy's defenses and a portion of the city, but the aim of his sharpshooters was so good one did not like to linger long "viewing the landscape o'er." Sergeant John S. Penrose of Company B, was killed in one of our new rifle pits. It was said he had become reckless of danger and had exposed himself unnecessarily. He was a fine soldier and his death was greatly regretted. It was too hazardous to remove his body by daylight and it was not removed until nightfall. Head logs were placed on the parapets in front of the rifle pits that night. The reserve was called up at 2:30 a. m. and stood to arms until daybreak. On the 2nd, in the evening, quite a number of stray bullets came over our "works" at regimental headquarters, one of which struck Willison B. White, our hospital steward, in the knee, inflicting a painful wound. Surgeon Clark at once dressed the wound, which White bore with his usual Christian fortitude.¹

On the 23rd, our pioneers were sent to construct an additional rifle pit on the left of our picket line, as the Nineteenth Ohio which was on our immediate left had failed to connect its picket line with ours, and our left rifle pit was enfiladed by the enemy's pickets. While they were about their work the Nineteenth Ohio picket line showed signs of advancing and the work was postponed until evening. As necessary blanks had been brought up by the Adjutant, company commanders were busy making out returns. During the forenoon one of the enemy's batteries threw a few shells which struck pretty close to our quarters but no one was hit by them. A man in the Forty-ninth Ohio was killed on the picket line, also said to be the result of carelessness in unnecessarily exposing himself.

On the 24th, we had the usual round of duties and there was the usual firing. In the evening a Lieutenant of the Nineteenth Ohio was killed just to the left of our picket line while on a tour of inspection. At supper time orders were issued to have ammunition enough on hand to last until Friday, the 26th, and then have sixty rounds per man.

On the morning of the 25th, after breakfast, the non-veterans of the regiment and brigade whose terms of service had expired, started for home under charge of Colonel Gibson,

1 Gleason's Diary.

whose term of service had also expired. Indications pointed to a movement of some kind, but the rank and file did not know where. At supper time orders were issued to strike tents as soon as it was dark, pack up and be ready to move. The men were enjoined not to make any unusual noise or to attract the enemy's attention otherwise. The pickets were instructed to remain in their rifle pits until midnight and then quietly to withdraw. After packing up we lay down to await orders, which were not received until near 11 o'clock. When they came the men were awakened, formed into line in rear of our quarters and moved out to the right, ours being the advance regiment of the brigade. Our progress was impeded because of the First Division taking the wrong road. The roads were very muddy in places, as it had rained that afternoon, and the artillery made slow progress. After making about four miles, flankers were thrown out on the left and cautioned to keep a sharp lookout for the enemy, as it was said our troops had all been withdrawn from our works on that flank of our column.

We soon crossed the railroad leading back to the Chattahoochee, and marching about a mile beyond it, stacked arms by the roadside and waited for the dawn which was then beginning to redden the east. During the slow night march some of the officers learned that General Sherman had decided to march to the south and southeast of Atlanta and force the enemy to come out of his works and give battle. They also learned that a strong line of works had been constructed at the railroad bridge crossing the Chattahoochee, and that the Twentieth Corps had been detached to hold them while the rest of the army turned the enemy's left flank. There was the usual speculation on the result. Some were very pessimistic about it. They argued that our army had been greatly depleted in numbers by sickness and death, and by the detachment of large numbers to guard the forts and bridges on our line of communication, while the enemy had been constantly strengthened by withdrawing men from such service. As the adjutant was riding along beside the line of marching men, Captain C. W. Carroll took hold of one of his stirrups and trotted along beside him for some distance. The Adjutant told him of this pessimistic talk, to which he listened attentively and said: "Yes, that's all true, we'll have a big fight, but—we'll whip 'em." His indomitable courage and hopefulness made a profound impression on the adjutant's mind and when they parted he rode on with a lighter heart. This spirit must have pervaded the rank and file of the army,

for the next day they showed a feeling of relief that we were now out in the open and could meet the enemy on equal terms.

While we bivouaced by the roadside the men got two or three hours of sleep. We then had breakfast and awaited orders. Other troops soon began moving in front of us and our brigade began to fortify. Another line of works was being laid off on a commanding ridge in our front. From a point near us one could see a high knob in the direction of Atlanta, and we were told it was occupied by one of the enemy's batteries which had been throwing some shells during the early morning. The regiment soon moved to the right a short distance and resumed throwing up fortifications. After working about half an hour we again took up our line of march, passing the Sixteenth Corps, which was also building intrenchments.

The sun was very hot, there was little air stirring and many of the men were overcome by the heat. The inaction in front of Atlanta, where we had practically lived in the trenches for more than a month, had unfitted them for severe marching. We made frequent halts to give them rest, but at 1 o'clock when we halted for dinner we had not more than 100 men in our ranks. When we resumed our march we were told that we would only have to go two miles further. But the two miles lengthened out to five miles, and when we climbed a hill and went into camp for the night not a hundred men in the regiment stacked arms. Many of the stragglers did not get up to the regiment until late in the night. Our march was through a thickly wooded region and we could not tell in what direction we were moving, but one thing was clear, it was not a *retreat* and we began to suspect it was a grand flank movement toward the rear of Atlanta.¹

The 27th was cloudy, with light rain in the morning. Our men found a stone-walled spring in a little cove below our camp and filled their canteens from it. We resumed our march about 8 o'clock and to our surprise took the back track. It was only for a short distance, however, for in about half a mile we reached a road leading southward and followed it. When we halted at noon there was brisk skirmishing in our front and we thought the prospects good for a fight. Two regiments of cavalry went forward, drove the enemy and made the way clear for our further advance. We marched about a mile further, when we halted, stacked arms, and began throwing up intrenchments. We faced a large opening to the southward, across which we could see the

¹ Gleason's Diary.

enemy's skirmishers. As we had brought along extra shovels and found rails in abundance, we soon had a very good defensive line of works in our front. One of the enemy's batteries threw shells at our skirmishers, but only for a short time, as the Sixth Ohio Battery took position near us and opened out and probably caused its withdrawal. Three companies of the regiment were sent out on picket in the evening, among them, Gleason's company. Gleason says that during the night the enemy was so quiet he thought it portended some unusual movement. There was frequent snapping of gun caps along the enemy's line and he imagined it might mean that the troops were massing for an attack which, however, was not made.¹

The morning of the 28th the enemy seemed to have abandoned a portion of his line in our front and the scouts who were sent out reported that he had entirely disappeared. His pickets, however, soon returned, and skirmishing with them was resumed and continued until 9 o'clock. A line of skirmishers of the Fourteenth Corps then advanced upon them on our right and drove them back and was followed by a column of troops of the same corps. It was noticed that the troops of the Fourteenth Corps moved with unusual quickness and spirit, and we attributed their increased activity and vigor to the fact that General Jeff C. Davis was now in command of the corps. We remained in the position held the day before, and some of our men found some roasting ears about a half mile away on which they feasted. Troops and trains were passing us all the afternoon and it was after supper before we received orders to move. This was because the marching orders of our corps for the day placed our division in rear of the First and Second Divisions of the Corps and their headquarter trains, and our division later was ordered not to move until all the troops and trains of the corps had passed.¹ We were marching for Red Oak Station on the West Point Railroad and were closely following the Fourteenth Corps. Our course was southwardly. The Army of the Ohio, General Schofield, was moving forward on our left, and the Army of the Tennessee, General Howard, to our right. The road we marched on was so obstructed by fallen trees that our progress was tedious and slow. After marching about three miles we halted in the woods, stacked arms, and lay down for the night. The men were ordered to sleep with cartridge boxes on. The night was very dark. This day at 5 p. m. our advance division, General Kimball's, arrived

¹ Gleason's Diary.

at a point 300 yards from the railroad at Red Oak Station and there went into position facing Atlanta. On its right was General Davis' division, Fourteenth Corps, which extended across the railroad. Our corps was formed with General Kimball's division on the right and ours on the left.¹

On the 29th, our brigade lay quietly in our bivouac in the woods most of the day, while Kneffler's and Post's brigades were destroying the railroad track between Red Oak and a point about two miles from the enemy's works that side of East Point. In the afternoon we moved forward a short distance, formed a line and were ordered to fortify it, but the Twenty-third Corps soon came up and formed a line in our front and began fortifying. We were told our labors had been in vain, as we were on the reserve and would move in the morning.²

The orders for our corps for August 30, were to move at 6 a. m. by a road leading past Ballards, Godby's and Miller's to Mrs. Long's, thence to the Decatur and Fayetteville road and there take up position covering said road.³ Our brigade received marching orders about 6 a. m. and moved out, our division following General Kimball's. Just as we started a newsboy come into our camp bringing Cincinnati and Nashville papers, which put us in touch with the outside world. We struck the West Point Railroad after marching about three-fourths of a mile, and found that the men who had been sent to destroy it had done their work thoroughly. The ties had all been burned and the rails had been heated and twisted into every conceivable shape. We took a road near by parallel with the railroad, crossed and re-crossed it several times and finally left it and moved to the right. Arriving at an intersecting road our regiment was left to guard it until the First Division, which was following us, came up. We threw up a barricade of rails and logs and remained here long enough to get our dinners. We were then relieved and pushed forward to rejoin the brigade. We were delayed by other troops and trains which occupied the road. At a place where the road again crossed the railroad track we halted for a while and our men found some honey at a little house near by.⁴ The sun was very hot and the road quite dusty. At one place we came to a large opening made up of several plantations and heard what appeared to be skirmishing back in the woods we had just left. We supposed it was the enemy and were at once formed in the most commanding position near, and carried rails and threw

1 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 72-929.

2 Gleason's Diary.

3 W. R. R. 76-700.

4 Gleason's Diary.

up breastworks to repel an attack. It was soon, however, reported that it was a false alarm and we withdrew and marched on. It was not long until we came up with the brigade. After marching about two miles further we turned into a cornfield near a frame church, were placed in line of battle and as usual began to fortify. We remained here during the night. We had roasting ears for our suppers and corn-blades for our beds. It was now evident that the Macon Railroad was our destination, and everything seemed to be working favorably toward the success of our movement.¹

That night our corps was formed facing a little to the north of east, our right joining General Baird's division of the Fourteenth Corps near the Decatur road.² During the night skirmishers reported heavy columns of the enemy moving to our right.

At 3 o'clock a. m., August 31, General Howard reported to General Sherman that General Kilpatrick's cavalry had made an attempt to get upon the railroad near Jonesborough, but met with such strong resistance that he had given it up until daylight, and that General Logan's center was about 800 yards from the depot at that place. Howard also said the Seventeenth Corps would move up at daylight.³

General Sherman at once sent a copy of General Howard's report to General Thomas and with it the following order:

"Order one of Davis' divisions down at once to Renfroe's and move all your trains well to your right, so that you can rapidly fling your whole command over to Jonesborough. Then let Davis send out from his front, obliquely to the right front, a strong skirmish line with supports, as though to reach the railroad three or four miles below Jonesborough. Have Stanley do the same toward, but below, Rough and Ready. Impress on these commanders that it is not so necessary to have united lines, but rather columns of attack. We are not on the defensive, but offensive, and must risk everything rather than dilly-dally about. We must confuse the enemy. As soon as Schofield comes up I will put him against Rough and Ready till he meets formidable resistance."⁴

The morning of the 31st, at an early hour, we heard skirmishing to the eastward of our front and one of our batteries threw a few shells toward the enemy. We soon had orders to move and marched out in a southeast direction, crossing a small creek and ascending a wooded hill upon which some of our troops were building works. We here lay for some time in reserve. We moved to the opposite side

1 Gleason's Diary.

2 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 72-930.

3 W. R. R. 76-725.

4 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 72-931.

of the road into a thicket where there was a large hornets' nest, which afforded much amusement to our men, as they watched the passersby become panic-stricken at the attack of the little sharpshooters. They evidently had no love for "the ruthless invaders."¹ When we moved again it was over the hill to the east, and we soon came to a line of works which the enemy had abandoned. Here we halted and had dinner beside a small pond. After noon we advanced slowly, with some skirmishing in front, and gradually approached the Macon Railroad, which the Twenty-third Corps had possession of to our left. There were dense clouds of smoke to our left and it was evident that our men were destroying the railroad track. Arriving at a point within half a mile of the railroad we were halted and formed in line in a dense thicket and ordered to build works. The thicket was soon cleared and works built which would enable us to resist any ordinary attack. That night the left of our corps rested on the railroad and its right at Thorn's Hill, a mile and three-fourths distant in a straight line—our line facing Jonesborough. Schofield's right connected with our left at the railroad and his line faced toward Atlanta. Thus our two lines of battle formed a V, the sides facing in different directions.² We learned late at night that Hardee's and Lee's corps of Hood's army that afternoon had twice assaulted the Army of the Tennessee and had twice been repulsed.

General Stanley, commanding our corps, received orders directing him the next morning to commence the destruction of the Macon and Western Railroad in connection with General Schofield. He was directed to destroy the road as far as he could in the direction of Jonesborough, or until he met with General Baird's division of the Fourteenth Corps, which would likely be engaged in the same work. Should he meet with or overtake General Baird he was to report to General Thomas for further orders.³

Early next morning, September 1, the pioneers of our brigade began the destruction of the railroad track along our front. They loosened the track in sections, which they lifted up and turned over. Then detaching the ties they made piles of them, laid the rails across them and set fire to the piles. When the rails became heated in the middle sufficiently, they took hold of the ends and bent and twisted them so they could not be used again. They completed their work in an incredibly short time and our squad returned to

1 Gleason's Diary.

2 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 72-931.

3 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 72-932.

the regiment. We marched at 8 o'clock a. m., taking a southerly course, but made slow progress. Artillery and trains obstructed the road and the enemy's skirmishers delayed the advance. We halted for dinner near a white house not far from the railroad track where some rabidly "secesh" ladies exchanged left-handed compliments with some of our officers. They had buried their silverware in the garden and some of our men discovered and appropriated it while digging for potatoes. But before we resumed our march, through the efforts of our officers, most of it was recovered and returned to the fair southerners. One of the officers' servants was roughly handled at the negro quarters and a near riot was quelled by the efforts of Major Dawson and Captain Taft.¹ We moved along the burning railroad track to the vicinity of Jonesborough and arrived just as a lively battle took place. The First and Second Divisions of our Corps took part and we moved to their support and lay in reserve, within range of the enemy's artillery. Repeated charges were made by our troops on the right of our corps, which were finally successful, as we knew from the cheering. We heard that a large number of prisoners, cannon and small arms had been captured from the enemy.

This was the battle of Jonesborough and was another lost opportunity, because our corps did not get up in time. General Sherman, on the representations made to him by Captains Poe and Audenried of his staff, sent a sharp letter to General Thomas, saying:

"General Stanley remained today for hours on the railroad awaiting orders, when he heard firing heavy to his front and right. * * * I knew you had given him orders and think we should not overlook it. I don't know why Stanley could not have pushed along the railroad while General Davis was heavily engaged, and absolutely enveloped the enemy in Jonesborough. * * * If General Stanley lost a minute of time when he should have been in action I beg you will not overlook it, as it concerns the lives of our men and the success of our armies."² It is presumed that General Thomas did not press any investigation of General Stanley's conduct on this occasion. His own orders to General Stanley directed him to move down the railroad toward Jonesborough, destroying the track as he went, until he came up with General Baird's division of the Fourteenth Corps, which was also engaged in tearing up the railroad. He was then "to report for further orders."³ At noon General Thomas reported to

¹ Gleason's Diary.
² W. R. R. 76-746.

³ W. R. R. 76-720.

General Sherman that "General Stanley was at Morrow's Station, having destroyed all the road to his rear as far as his camp of last night. I have ordered him to concentrate there and move right down on Jonesborough. He will connect with General Davis and thus make our line complete."¹ Colonel Fullerton says in his "Journal" that he gave this message to General Stanley at 12:15. General Wood was ordered to move to Morris Station to join the rest of the corps and Stanley was directed "as soon as Wood arrived" to put his troops in column to move on and report *his readiness to move* to him (General Thomas) as soon as he could."² Fullerton saw that General Wood had come up and, at 12:45, started to General Thomas to inform him of this fact and found him near Jonesborough with General Howard. At 2:30 p. m. General Thomas sent word to General Stanley to push forward down the railroad for Jonesborough at once. This message was not delivered to General Stanley until 3:30 p. m.³ General Stanley's column moved in ten minutes after receiving the order,⁴ and if there was any delay it certainly appears that he was not in fault. The fault, if there was any, was with General Thomas who had, perhaps, needlessly, encumbered him with orders. Possibly General Sherman, upon reflection, realized that he himself was primarily responsible for the delay, because he put so much stress upon the destruction of the Macon road. Instead of having his army stop to destroy the railroad, if he had left its destruction to a small but adequate force and had pushed on to Jonesborough, the battle there would have had the result he desired. From all the evidence at hand it is clear that after Stanley's corps received orders to move, it moved with vigor and as rapidly as possible. But when Newton's division had by a vigorous assault gained a position on the enemy's right flank it was dark and too late to press his advantage.

About midnight we heard what at first seemed like heavy musketry in the direction of Atlanta and we finally concluded it was the exposition of ordnance stores at that place.⁵ General Sherman thought it was a night attack on Atlanta by General Slocum, or the blowing up of the enemy's magazines.⁶

Early next morning, September 2, we learned that the enemy had decamped during the night and we packed up and moved out along the railroad. We halted near our advance works for over an hour. Some of the men took this oppor-

1 W. R. R. 76-745.

4 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 72-932.

2 Fullerton's Journal W. R. R. 72-932.

5 Gleason's Diary.

3 Idem and Stanley's Report, W. R. R. 76-746.

6 W. R. R. 72-82.

tunity to inspect the enemy's works and found evidence that he had lost heavily in the battle of the day before. It was reported that the Fourteenth Corps alone had captured nineteen guns and 1500 prisoners. After we resumed our march we soon came in sight of Jonesborough and halted near the ruins of a tannery, said to have been destroyed during one of our cavalry raids. The iron water-tank nearby had been perforated by a shell. As we marched through the town the ruins of the court house presented another sample of the work of our cavalry raiders. On a plantation just beyond the place large quantities of cornmeal and salt were found. We soon increased our pace and made fewer halts and the men suffered from the heat. After we had marched about eight miles, we came up to the Fifteenth Corps which had found the enemy in a strong position near Lovejoy Station and had commenced to deploy into line of battle on the right of the railroad. Our corps, General Newton's division leading, as it arrived, at once began to deploy on the left of the railroad. Newton's division on the right, then Wood's and then Kimball's. While our troops were thus deploying some of the officers and men climbed up on the railroad track, which at that point was on a considerable embankment, in order to get a better view of the enemy's position. They were a little surprised to see General Sherman already there, closely examining the position. Seeing officers and men coming up he exclaimed: "Men get off the parapet! Get off the parapet! The enemy is getting ready to throw a shell right along the track." Of course we got off "the parapet" in short order, but some of us were there long enough to get a view of the enemy's position and to see that he was still at work on his fortifications. About 3 o'clock all three divisions of our corps were deployed into line and at 3:20 p. m. General Howard reported he had given his troops orders to advance. At 3:30 p. m. our corps, the Fourth, was also ordered to advance and division commanders were ordered to take the enemy's works if possible and not to stop for anything trifling.¹ Our skirmishers were well in advance and two five-gun batteries on our right opened out, with instructions to quiet the enemy's batteries. Our division had to move through an almost impenetrable swamp and over deep ravines and high ridges and it was after 5 p. m. when we came in sight of the enemy's works. At 5:30 p. m. our division assaulted the enemy's position and Kneffler's brigade got inside his works but could not hold them, suffering heavily in officers.² In

¹ Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 72-933.

² Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 72-934.

this advance General Wood, our division commander, was painfully wounded in the heel, but remained on duty until night closed the conflict. The losses in our regiment and brigades were elight. When night came we held the position gained and threw up the usual defenses. It was rumored during the day that Atlanta was in our possession, and there was a feeling on the part of some of the men in our ranks that, if such was the case, we should have a rest from fighting, for awhile at least. In the afternoon, while our corps was deploying into line, the adjutant saw a group of Generals under the shade of a tree a short distance to the left of the railroad and rode up near them, curious to know what they were discussing. He heard one of them whom he did not know say: "My men believe we now have Atlanta and think they should have a rest. I do not believe they will obey orders to charge the enemy's works." Perhaps General Sherman had heard similar talk. At any rate, that night at 8 o'clock he wrote to General Thomas, saying: "Until we hear from Atlanta the exact truth, I do not care about your pushing your men against the breastworks. Destroy the railroad well up to your lines; keep skirmishers well up, and hold your troops in hand for anything that may turn up. As soon as I know positively that our troops are in Atlanta I will determine what to do."¹

The next morning, September 3, at 6 o'clock we received orders from department headquarters saying that Atlanta was in our possession and that we would advance no further.² General Sherman announced the fact in Special Field Orders No. 62,³ and at the same hour sent the following message to General Halleck, which fitly closes this chapter:

"Near Lovejoy's Station,
Twenty-six miles South of Atlanta, Ga.,
September 3, 1864, 6 A. M.

Gen. H. W. Halleck, Washington, D. C.

As already reported, the army drew from about Atlanta, and on the 30th had made a good break on the West Point road and reached a good position from which to strike the Macon railroad, the right (General Howard's) near Jonesborough, the left (General Schofield's) near Rough and Ready, and the center (General Thomas's) at Couch's. General Howard found the enemy in force at Jonesborough and intrenched his troops, the salient within half a mile of the railroad. The enemy attacked him at 3 P. M., and was easily repulsed, leaving his dead and wounded. Finding strong opposition on the right, I advanced the left and center rapidly to the railroad, made a good lodgment and broke it all the way from Rough and Ready down to Howard's left, near Jonesborough, and by the same movement I interposed my whole army

¹ W. R. R. 76-764.

² Fullerton's Journal, 72-934.

³ W. R. R. 76-789.

between Atlanta and the part of the enemy intrenched in and around Jonesborough. We made a general attack on the enemy at Jonesborough on September 1, the Fourteenth Corps, General Jeff C. Davis, carrying the works handsomely, with ten guns and about 1000 prisoners. In the night the enemy retreated south, and we have followed him to another of his well-chosen and hastily constructed lines, near Lovejoy's. Hood, at Atlanta, finding me on his road, the only one that could supply him, and between him and a considerable part of his army, blew up his magazines in Atlanta and left in the night time, when the Twentieth Corps, General Slocum, took possession of the place. So Atlanta is ours and fairly won. I shall not push much farther on this raid, but in a day or so will move to Atlanta and give my men some rest. Since May 5 we have been in one constant battle or skirmish, and need rest. Our losses will not exceed 1200, and we have possession of over 300 rebel dead, 250 wounded, and over 1500 well prisoners.

W. T. SHERMAN,
Major General."

NAMES OF KILLED AND WOUNDED IN THE FIFTEENTH OHIO
VOLUNTEERS DURING MONTHS OF JULY AND AUGUST
IN OPERATIONS AROUND ATLANTA.

COMPANY A.

WOUNDED.—Hospital Steward Willison B. White, William R. Stewart, Robert B. Brown, Joseph S. Brown.

COMPANY B.

KILLED.—Sergeant John G. Penrose, David M. Douglass.

WOUNDED.—Sergeant John A. Green, Rezin Bond, Porter Gibson.

COMPANY C.

KILLED.—Philip Fogle.

COMPANY D.

WOUNDED.—Daniel Vaugundy, John Osborne, Joseph A. Wilson, the last two at Lovejoy Station.

COMPANY E.

WOUNDED.—Oliver J. Henderson, George W. McMasters, Samuel L. Norris, Allen Wade.

COMPANY F.

WOUNDED.—Jacob Graf.

COMPANY G.

WOUNDED.—Jacob Stauffer.

COMPANY H.

WOUNDED.—Sergeant Thos. C. Cory, George Stoll.

COMPANY K.

KILLED.—Ephraim Houser, Nelson J. Reed.

CHAPTER XXVI.

FROM ATLANTA TO GAYLESVILLE, ALA.

On the morning of September 3, 1864, we still held our position to close up to the enemy's works near Lovejoy Station. In the afternoon sixty-seven of the non-veterans of the regiment whose terms of service had expired started north under command of Captain George W. Cummins. Among them were many with whom we were loth to part. All had helped to make the history of the regiment during its three years of service which had expired, and had earned the gratitude of their country. There was quite heavy picket firing during the day and our corps lost a number of men killed and wounded, but no advance was attempted. At night the pioneers cut roads back from the lines of each division of the corps, so that the troops might be easily drawn off when we marched back to Atlanta. This backward march had been ordered,¹ though we did not know it. The next day, September 4, there was the usual picket and artillery firing and one man in Company A and two men in Company D were wounded, making six men wounded since we moved into our then position.² There were forty-two killed and wounded in the corps that day.³ Rumors prevailed that we would withdraw from our position. That night, orders were received directing that there should be no reveille sounded next morning and that the men should be under arms at 4 o'clock.

The morning of September 5, we were able to read letters which came the night before and newspapers, which announced the nomination of McClellan and Pendleton as the Democratic candidates for President and Vice President on a platform declaring the war a failure. There were indications that we would withdraw from our position that night and towards evening we received orders to do so. The orders for our corps were to withdraw the troops at 8 o'clock, the pickets at midnight. We were to move back to the position occupied by the corps on the night of September 1, just beyond Jonesborough. Our order of march was first, Newton's division, second, Kimball's, third, Wood's. The usual skirmishing and artillery firing continued during the day and our casualties were twenty-five.⁴ There was a hard shower during the afternoon, and an order to build no fires in the evening prevented us from drying our wet

¹ Fullerton's Journal, 72-935.

² Gleason's Diary.

³ and ⁴ Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 72-735.

clothing. It was nine o'clock when we moved out, and was very dark. We floundered along a muddy road and across corn-fields, making very slow progress. After much vexatious delay and any amount of profanity, we emerged at last into an opening near the railroad track, where we halted to wait for our pickets.¹

Gleason says: "We felt that Atlanta was the objective point of our campaign, and it had not been contemplated to go further than was necessary to secure it." Doubtless this sentiment pervaded the ranks, but there were some who remembered that the Confederate Army was the main objective and who felt a secret humiliation in turning our backs to it.

After waiting until midnight we again moved on, keeping near the railroad and following the road with difficulty. We stumbled along in the darkness, ankle deep in mud, and many were the falls and resulting curses. We finally came to Jonesborough, where we found the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Corps in bivouac. We stopped for a short rest and then pushed on through the town, passing a large number of cotton bales which were burning near the railroad. We marched on until we came to the position we had held the night of September 1, where at 4:30 a. m. September 6, we went into camp and remained the rest of the day. In the afternoon of the 6th, the bands of the Eighth Kansas and Ninety-ninth Ohio gave us some lively music.² The morning of September 7, at 7:30 we moved out towards Atlanta, our regiment being the advance of the corps. We followed a road parallel to the railroad for several miles and then turned off, taking a more direct road leading to our destination. Gleason with ten men was left behind to direct the troops following us on to the proper road. When we came to Rough and Ready, six miles from Atlanta, we halted and went into camp for the night.

The next morning, September 8, at 8 o'clock we resumed our march and at 11 o'clock reached Atlanta, the prize we had so long striven for. We marched through the city in column and as our route was not through the business part of the place we saw few buildings which had been struck by our shells. There seemed to be quite a number of citizens still occupying their residences, and many female faces peered from doors and windows as we passed by. The women were usually attended by some gallant *blue coat*, the Twentieth Corps boys having obviously made good use of their opportunities since they took possession of the place. We marched out Decatur Street, eastward, and saw the ruins of an ordnance depot where a large train of ordnance stores had been burned. Marching about four miles

1 and 2 Gleason's Diary.

beyond the city we went into camp in an open field near Decatur and sent out Company A as pickets.

Fullerton in his "Journal" says our corps was formed here facing south, its right resting on the south side of and near the Decatur and Augusta Railroad, with Kimball's and Wood's divisions in the first line and Newton's division in reserve, in rear of the center of the first line, and adds, "Here we will rest until further orders. * * * The campaign that commenced May 2, is now over, and we will rest here to recruit and prepare for a new campaign."¹

The campaign for the capture of Atlanta may be said to have ended this day, and there was deep satisfaction among the rank and file at the result. We did not feel that we had done anything out of the ordinary. We had become so inured to toil, exposure and danger that we were ready for an emergency, and it was not until we began to make out the official reports, that we realized the sacrifices which the campaign had entailed. The losses in battle and on the skirmish line in our regiment had been: Killed, 44; wounded, 177; missing, 17; total, 240. Besides these large numbers had been disabled by sickness and many had died of diseases incident to camp life. Of the men who were enrolled in the regiment when the campaign opened not over thirty-five per cent remained. We were not much concerned about what the people up north would say about our campaign. Indeed we gave that very little thought.

President Lincoln was the first to send a message of congratulations on the result of the campaign, and on September 3, tendered to General Sherman and the officers and men in his command the Nation's thanks. The message did not reach General Sherman, however, until the morning of September 6, and at the same time came a message from General Grant at City Point, Va., dated September 4, 9 p. m., saying:

"I have just received your dispatch announcing the capture of Atlanta. In honor of your great victory I have ordered a salute to be fired with shotted guns from every battery bearing on the enemy. The salute will be fired within an hour amid great rejoicing."

Also at the same time General Sherman received copy of an order issued by President Lincoln September 3, directing:

"That on Wednesday, the seventh day of September, commencing at the hour of 12, noon, there shall be fired a salute of 100 guns at the arsenal at Washington and at New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Newport, Ky., Saint Louis, New Orleans, Mobile, Pensacola, Hilton Head and New Berne,

1 W. R. R. 72-936.

or the day after the receipt of this order, for the brilliant achievements of the army under the command of Major General Sherman in the State of Georgia, and the capture of Atlanta."

General Sherman at once embodied all these messages in a Special Field Order (No. 66), and directed that all the corps, regiments and batteries composing our army might without further orders inscribe "Atlanta" on their colors.¹

On September 8, he issued Special Field Orders No. 68, saying, among other things.

"The officers and soldiers of the Armies of the Cumberland, Ohio and Tennessee, have already received the thanks of the nation through the President and Commander-in-Chief, and it now remains only for him who has been with you from the beginning, and who intends to stay all the time, to thank the officers and men for their intelligence, fidelity and courage as displayed in the campaign of Atlanta." He then gives a summary of the principal events of the campaign, pays a tribute to Generals McPherson, Harker and McCook and others who had fallen in the strife, and asked all to continue "the cultivation of the soldierly virtues * * * courage, patience, obedience to the laws and constituted authorities, fidelity to our trusts, and good feeling among each other" * * * and it will then, he said, "require no prophet to foretell that our country will in time emerge from this war, purified by its fires and worthy of its great founder—Washington."²

These orders were published to our regiment at dress parade on the evening of September 11.

President Lincoln, in his dispatch tendering the thanks of the Nation, said: "The marches, battles, sieges and other military operations that have signalized the campaign, must render it famous in the annals of war."

General Wood our division commander, a trained soldier, who had studied all the military campaigns of ancient and modern times, says in his official report: "If the length of the campaign, commencing on the second of May and ending on the second of September, with its ceaseless toil and labor be considered; if the number and extent of its actual battles and separate conflicts and the great number of days the troops were in the immediate presence of, and under a close fire from, the enemy be remembered; if the vast amount of labor expended in the construction of intrenchments and other necessary works be estimated; if the bold, brilliant and successful flank movements made in close proximity to a powerful enemy be critically examined, and if the long line

¹ W. R. R. 72-87.

² W. R. R. 72-87-89.

of communication over which vast and abundant supplies of every kind for the use of this great army were uninterruptedly transported during the entire campaign be regarded, it must be admitted that the late campaign stands without a parallel in military history."¹

We remained in our camp near Atlanta until October 3, resting and not knowing what was to come next. From the ninth to the nineteenth of September inclusive, the regiment was occupied with the usual round of duties of troops in garrison. Reveille sounded regularly in the morning and the men fell in for roll-call, then details were made for picket and police duty and in the afternoons there was inspection and dress parade. The officers were busy with reports and returns and the colonel was busy making his report of the Atlanta campaign, correcting and confirming his recollection of dates and incidents by Gleason's diary. The weather was warm, with occasional showers, our camp was in a good location, communication was re-established with the north and we got frequent mails. Our regimental quartette had found some new music and in the evenings, in the adjutant's or some other headquarters tent, sang the songs of the times. Taking it all in all it was one of the most pleasant resting places in our experience. We were about four miles from Atlanta and the mounted officers frequently rode into the city. Other officers and men sometimes did the same. There was not much in the city to interest the visitor. It was carefully patrolled and the troops of the Twentieth Corps monopolized the attention of the fairer sex who remained there. When not on duty both officers and men read the current magazines or paper covered novels, which circulated from tent to tent until they were worn out. The novels of Scott, Bulwer, Thackeray, Dickens and Lever were much in demand among the officers and there were others by authors of lesser note which had wide circulation.

On the morning of September 20, we had reveille at 4 o'clock and at 6 o'clock the regiment started out on a foraging expedition. We took the road to Atlanta which we reached in due time, and there found a train of about fifty wagons ready to pull out. By permission all the men who could do so piled into the wagons and the others followed along on foot until tired, when those in the wagons gave place to them, thus alternating during the expedition. We followed the Marietta road until we reached Buck Head, where we changed direction toward Lawrenceville. The men, Gleason says, moved along chewing sorghum cane and gathering chincapins. When we had reached a point twenty-one miles from Atlanta we parked our train and

¹ W. R. R. 72-384-5.

bivouaced for the night, sending out Companies D, F and H as pickets. Next morning at 6 o'clock we continued our march until we came to a cross-roads where we halted to look for corn. While waiting here a negro woman came out of an adjoining wood with a large bundle on her head, a small babe in her arms, and leading a little mulatto boy. Some of our men had found her at a neighboring plantation in an out-building *chained to the floor* and had set her free. The people living on the plantation said she was a bad woman and that they were unable to manage her in any other way, but her story was that they wanted to sell her away from her children and had chained her to prevent her running away. Here was a practical and pathetic enforcement of President Lincoln's emancipation proclamation, for we had literally struck the chains of bondage from this poor creature. She went toward our train where she was sure of sympathy and help and we do not know what became of her afterwards.¹

Two intelligent contrabands living nearby soon guided us to a plantation where there was plenty of forage, potatoes, apples, honey and a few watermelons which we appropriated against the formal protest of the owner. Our wagons were soon filled to their utmost capacity and we pulled out for Atlanta. After going about fifteen miles we again parked our train, threw out pickets and bivouaced for the night.

The next morning, September 22, at 6 o'clock we resumed our march and by a short cut reached our camp by noon. Besides the forage and food in our wagons, we brought into camp four intelligent contrabands, who had come out of the woods where they were hiding. They all found employment as cooks in our regiment. Word came that afternoon of Sheridan's successes in the Shenandoah Valley, over which we greatly rejoiced. We remembered him as a division commander in our corps at Stone River, Chickamauga and Missionary Ridge.

September 23, 24, 25 and 26, we were occupied with our usual round of camp duties and in making our quarters more comfortable. Both officers and men acted as though we were to remain in our pleasant camp for a long time. On the twenty-sixth, General Newton's division was sent back toward Chattanooga, to guard our line of communications, we were told, and some of the company officers went to their old camp and brought a wagon load of lumber with which to improve their quarters and build a kitchen. They also brought windows for a small house which they had built for an office.¹ A brigade bakery had been established so we could have soft bread, supplies of all

¹ Gleason's Diary.

² Gleason's Diary.

kinds were abundant and we were literally living on the fat of the land. We were ignorant of what was going on even in the immediate field of our operations.

September 27, there was a review and inspection of our division by General Stanley and all morning we were busy burnishing our guns and equipments and putting our quarters in prime order for the event. Colonel Askew called the officers together and announced that our regiment had been selected to escort a set of colors which was to be presented to the division. He also gave the necessary instructions for the ceremony. The review and inspection took place on a portion of the battlefield of July 22, and on our march to the place one of our sergeants picked up by the road side a human skull which dogs had probably scratched out of a shallow grave.¹ The review was an imposing spectacle and occupied all the afternoon. Our escort and presentation of the division colors was said to have been very creditable. There was also a set of colors presented to our brigade during the afternoon, which was received by Colonel John A. Martin of the Eighth Kansas, who was then in command of the brigade.

On the twenty-eighth both officers and men in generous rivalry continued improving their quarters. The company officers above mentioned finished their kitchen, added to their store of kitchen utensils a *waffle iron*,² and put the "glass windows" in their office building. There were rumors that the enemy was trying to cut our line of communications, but little attention was paid to them.

September 29, we had drill in the morning. In the afternoon it rained and Gleason was busy re-arranging "There's Music in the Air" for our regimental quartette. In the evening there was a near riot in our brigade. Men from all the regiments made a concerted raid on the brigade bakery because of an alleged shortage in the bread ration. There was quite a hubbub for a while, and a large quantity of bread was stolen before Colonel Martin, the brigade commander, succeeded in dispersing the raiders, which he did by promising the men full redress—and full rations.

The next day, September 30, after morning drill, Colonel Askew called the regiment together and after reading some passages from the Revised Army Regulations, warned the men against any repetition of the offense of the day before. He said that in such cases redress could always be secured in a legal and proper way. He then gave the men their choice between hard

¹ Gleason's Diary.

² Gleason's Diary.

and soft bread and all chose *the latter*. He then said he would have a *regimental* bakery as soon as it was practicable.¹ There was dress parade that afternoon and in the evening the regimental quartette tried out the music Gleason had re-arranged and there was literally "Music in the Air."

October 1, Gleason put a lock on the door of the "office with the glass windows" before mentioned and the pioneers were put to work building and almost finished a huge oven for a regimental bakery. In the evening Captain Updegrove, who had just returned from Atlanta where he had gone that morning, reported that Generals Forrest and Wheeler with a large force of cavalry and mounted infantry were raiding in Tennessee, but the report aroused little interest.

October 2, we had the usual Sunday morning inspection and there was Divine Service morning and evening. In the evening our regiment was called on to furnish extra pickets, as the second brigade of our division was to start early next morning on a foraging expedition. At midnight to our great surprise, the adjutant awakened the company commanders with an order that reveille would sound next morning at 2:30 and that we would march at early daylight. We did not know what was afoot, where we were going, or why, but suspected that some unusual emergency had arisen—and such was the case.

It was afterwards learned that on September 21, General Hood had shifted his army from the Macon Railroad at Lovejoy Station to the West Point Railroad at Palmetto Station, and that President Jefferson Davis had there visited his army and in a public speech had urged an invasion of the north. Also that General Forrest with a large cavalry force, on September 24, had made his appearance at Athens, Ala. and had captured our garrison there.¹ This was the occasion of Newton's division being sent to our rear on the twenty-sixth. It was ordered back to Chattanooga and at the same time General Corse's division of the Seventeenth Corps was sent to Rome. By September 27, general Sherman had become convinced that General Hood had begun a general movement against the railroad in our rear and on the twenty-ninth sent General Thomas to Chattanooga, with Morgan's division of the Fourteenth Corps, to meet the danger in Tennessee. There was great difficulty in obtaining correct information about Hood's movements and it was not until October 1, that General Sherman learned that he had crossed the Chattahoochee at Campbelltown, and not until the third, that he concluded that Hood would strike our railroad about Kingston

¹ Gleason's Diary.

or Marietta.¹ It must have been immediately after coming to this conclusion that the orders were given for our unexpected movement, although Gleason says we received the orders about midnight, October 2. Frank Schreiber says it was about 2 a. m. October 3² and the adjutant thinks it was still later. The order is dated October 2, and was received at corps headquarters at 9 p. m. that day.³

The morning of October 3, reveille sounded in our camp at 2:30 and there was a busy time packing up. There was also much regret in giving up our pleasant quarters but there was no help for it. A little after daylight we moved out. The first division of our corps preceded us. We marched to and through Atlanta and there took the Marietta road which ran parallel to the railroad. The road was quite slippery from rain the night before but we made rapid progress. We reached the railroad bridge across the Chattahoochee at 11 a. m. and halted for dinner. We had but a short time for it and before some of the men had taken their hard-tack and coffee our march was resumed. We crossed the river on a pontoon bridge. Some men of the Twentieth Corps were guarding the railroad bridge which was undergoing repairs. We moved rapidly on toward Marietta and went into line and camp inside of some old works of the enemy. Our line faced northwest and we were in the second line. We had marched twenty-five miles, according to Gleason, and were glad to be able to lie down and rest.

The morning of October 4, there was a light rain falling and as we had no orders to move the men lay in their shelter tents and were slow in getting out even for breakfast. A number took strolls through the woods looking for chestnuts. They were however soon recalled by the bugle and we moved on towards Marietta, said to be six miles distant. Soon after starting we struck the railroad near our old camp of July 4, near Smyrna Camp grounds, and were soon marching into and through the town. We halted for a brief rest after passing through and then moved on until we reached the foothills of Kenesaw Mountain, where we were placed in camp along a line of the enemy's abandoned works. Captain George W. Cummins, who had rejoined the regiment at Marietta, reported that when he was coming through from Chattanooga the day before on the train, the enemy was seen near Big Shanty and had struck the railroad ten minutes after his train had passed and began tearing up the track. From our camp we could see a signal station on one of the highest

1 General Sherman's Memoirs.

2 Frank L. Schreiber's Diary.

3 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 77-593

points of Kenesaw, busily wig-wagging messages to the front and rear. Of course we could not imagine what the messages were, but doubtless one of them was to General Corse at Rome directing him to move to the defense of Allatoona, as General Sherman says he signalled such an order on October 4.¹

On October 5, we moved forward about three miles in the direction of Pine Top, evidently with much caution, and with frequent long halts. During one of them Colonel Askew and the adjutant rode up to the signal station on Kenesaw. When they reached the summit a startling prospect opened before them. The railroad from Ackworth north to Allatoona was marked continuously by the smoke of burning ties, and distant cannonading was heard in the direction of Allatoona. We had heard that there was over a million rations stored there and suspected that the enemy was attacking the place. The enemy was between us and its garrison and we were extremely anxious as to the result. We had a superb view of the country to the north and northwest and in the latter direction could see the smoke of camp fires, evidently the enemy's, who appeared to be in heavy force. We soon made our way to where the signal officers were trying to get communication with Allatoona. General Sherman was there and seemed to be impatient to hear from that point. We could see smoke, evidently the smoke of battle, at Allatoona and thought we could hear cannonading. Presently the signal officers caught a message which seemed to greatly please the General as he stepped about nervously and said, "That's all right! That's all right!" The message caught was "C., "R., "S., "E., "H., "E., "R., which the signal officer translated "Corse is here." The general however was evidently very anxious as to the result of the battle still raging there. About 2 o'clock the smoke about Allatoona seemed to diminish and by 4 o'clock it had disappeared. Later the signal flag at Allatoona announced that the enemy had been repulsed and that General Corse had been wounded. It was not until the next day that General Corse sent the characteristic dispatch which at once became historic. The dispatch was as follows:

Allatoona, Ga., October 6, 1864, 2 P. M.

Captain L. M. Dayton,

Aide-de-Camp.

I am short a cheek bone and an ear, but I am able to whip all h—l yet. My losses are heavy. A force moving from Stilesboro to Kingston gives me some anxiety. Tell me where Sherman is.

JOHN M. CORSE,²

Brigadier General.

¹ General Sherman's Memiors.

² Sherman's Memoirs.

This signalling from Kenesaw Mountain gave rise to the popular hymn beginning

"Hold the fort for I am coming."

Captain Samuel Bachtel of the Fifteenth Ohio had charge of the signal forces with the Army of the Cumberland and directed the sending of the messages above mentioned. A short time before his death—he wrote a full account of the incidents above related for Mr. W. W. Bond of Columbus, Ohio, who permitted the author to take a copy of it. He says that when General Hood commenced his movement against our communications he had signal stations at Marietta, twenty-three miles distant from Atlanta, at Kenesaw Mountain, three miles north of Marietta, and at Allatoona, fifteen miles further north. His narrative then states, "About the time Sherman learned of Hood's movement, he sent Colonel Warner to me to learn what facilities I had for communicating with Allatoona. I informed him that I had stations at the previously named places. This as I now recall occurred on the third day of October. On the following day, the fourth, Sherman sent a telegram to General Corse at Rome to move with such force as he could to Allatoona. The message was wired to Marietta and then signalled to the station on top of Kenesaw and thence to Allatoona over the heads of the rebel troops who were tearing up the railroad and destroying the telegraph line. From Allatoona the message was wired to Corse at Rome. On the same day Sherman, leaving a force to hold Atlanta, with the rest moved to the rear to, if possible, punish Hood. Sherman ordered me to accompany him with a detachment of the Signal Corps under my command. We camped to the south of Marietta that night and resumed our march the following day. During the afternoon we went to the signal station on top of Kenesaw to learn if possible any news regarding the situation at Allatoona. We there learned from Lieutenants Fisk and Connelly that a battle had been and was then in progress, that the repeated desperate charges of the enemy had been repulsed and that General Corse had arrived and was in command at Allatoona though wounded. I gave this information to Sherman. Sherman doubted whether Corse had arrived and said he feared that the enemy had captured the place and were compelling our Signal Corps to send those messages. I assured him it was not captured, as with our telescopes we could see the infantry fire from our works, but that the artillery ammunition was running low, as our men seemed to be using it sparingly, which afterwards proved to be the case."

* * *

"It was late in the afternoon when Sherman and staff left

Kenesaw Mountain. Before leaving, I directed the signal officers on top of Kenesaw to keep watch for my signal torch as soon as darkness came on. Sherman's headquarters that night were several miles to the rear and west of Marietta. After headquarters were established I called Kenesaw signal station and communication was established through to Allatoona and I received a message from Allatoona stating that we had driven off the enemy and still held the place. I took this message to General Sherman and told him that if he wished to send any message I would be pleased to send it. Still doubtful whether or not Corse had arrived and we still held the place, he said again that he feared the enemy had captured the place and were compelling our men to send such messages. Studying a moment, he said: 'Send this message it can do no harm.'

'Corse how are you.

Sherman.' "

In a few moments came back the answer. Captain Bachtel's story of this signalling, disagrees materially with that of General Sherman as related in his memoirs. In the latter, General Corse's famous message appears to have been sent to Captain L. M. Dayton who was one of Sherman's staff. In Bachtel's account it was sent to Sherman himself.

Captain Bachtel was one of the most efficient officers in the signal service, and afterwards rose to the head of the corps in Sherman's army. He was modest, quiet, clear headed and of unquestioned truth and sincerity. He related the story as given above a number of times to the compiler of these pages. It is not necessary however to cast a doubt on either story. General Corse may have sent the message first to Captain Dayton, and then to General Sherman himself as soon as he knew where he was. This possibility completely reconciles the apparent conflict between the two. There were two messages signalled from Kenesaw Mountain to the "Commanding Officer, Allatoona" by General Vandever, on the afternoon and evening of October 4, one at 2 p. m. saying: "Sherman is moving in force. Hold out" and the other at 6:30 p. m. saying: "General Sherman says hold fast. We are coming."¹

On the night of the fifth we encamped near Pine Top in a sheltered position and retired early. We were now convinced that the enemy was to our rear and it looked very much like we would have to fight our way back to where we started from five months before. We also learned that the Army of the Ohio was

¹ W. R. R. 79-78.

moving on our right toward Allatoona and that the Army of the Tennessee was within easy support of us.

On the sixth and seventh of October, our regiment remained in camp near Pine Top and during this time we heard some of the particulars of the battle of Allatoona. On the morning of October 5, General French with three brigades of infantry had appeared before Allatoona. After practically enveloping the place he had demanded its unconditional surrender in order, as he said, "to prevent the needless effusion of blood." General Corse who had reached the place from Rome, thirty-five miles away, at 1 o'clock that morning, bringing with him about 1000 reinforcements, was in command. He acknowledged receipt of the demand for surrender in the following words:

General S. G. French, Confederate States, etc.

Your communication demanding surrender of my command I acknowledge receipt of, and respectfully reply that we are prepared for the "needless effusion of blood" whenever it is agreeable to you.

JOHN M. CORSE,

Brigadier General Commanding Forces, United States.¹

The enemy nearly surrounded the place and at once began the attack. It was a vigorous assault of near 5000 of the enemy against about 2000 of our troops, but our forces were behind skillfully constructed fortifications, were commanded by an intrepid leader, and the result was as might have been expected. General Corse's losses were killed 142, wounded 358 and missing 213, a total of 707—more than one-third of his command. His loss of officers was thirty-five. General Young of French's command who was captured estimated the enemy's losses at 2000 men, including over 300 dead and over 400 prisoners.² The number of casualties on both sides shows the sanguinary character of the struggle. General French withdrew very suddenly after his final repulse, probably because of the approach of the Army of the Ohio, then commanded by General Cox.

During the two days we were in camp near Pine Top both officers and men had opportunity to ascend it and enjoy the fine prospect from its summit. On the sixth we saw the Twenty-third Corps moving north toward Allatoona. To the northwest were clouds of smoke which indicated the camps of the enemy.

On the seventh the adjutant strolled out on top of the mountain alone and was scanning the horizon to the northwest. While he was so engaged General Sherman, attended only by an orderly, suddenly appeared close at hand and commenced looking across the country with a field glass. Nearby was a tent-fly under which

¹ General Sherman's Memoirs.

² Sherman's Memoirs, Vol. 2-150.

he had evidently been taking a nap. There was a sound of cannonading in the distance and he suddenly exclaimed, "What direction is that! What direction is that!" The adjutant thereupon approached and saluting offered him a small pocket compass. He did not take it but putting his hand in his coat pocket produced a similar but much larger and finer compass and said, "No thank you! This is the thing we run the machine by." After getting the direction he looked again through his field glasses and then mounted his horse and rode off, leaving an attendant to take down his tent-fly, pack it on a mule and follow. This tent-fly became quite a familiar object to the officers and men of our army. It was said that sometimes the general did not even have its shelter at night, but laid down on a rubber blanket without it. Once when our regiment was moving along a road in the edge of a wood the men looked over a rail fence and saw an officer lying apparently asleep, his head at the foot of a tree. Some one said, "another drunken officer," and others began to roast the shoulder straps, when suddenly the officer rose and they saw it was General Sherman. He climbed the fence, crossed the road to where an orderly was holding his horse, mounted and started in the same direction our column was moving. He took a cigar from his pocket and not finding a match rode up to the line of marching men and asked a light of a big fellow who was smoking a cigar. He promptly handed his lighted cigar to the general who puffed away at it until his own cigar was lighted and then coolly threw it away and rode on. Every one was astonished and no one more so than the man whose cigar had been so contemptuously thrown away, who exclaimed, "Well! That beats h—l." There was a momentary feeling of indignation which did not have time to express itself, for the orderly who saw it all, called the general's attention to what he had done. He suddenly wheeled his horse and taking a handful of cigars from his pocket, exclaimed, "Where is that man? Here take a cigar, take three or four of them." Having thus made amends for his forgetfulness, he rode on.

On October 8, the Eighty-ninth Illinois, which was mostly made up of railroad men and was called the "Railroad Regiment" was sent to repair the railroad track. In the afternoon orders came to march and our division moved toward Ackworth. The second brigade soon turned toward Big Shanty, but our brigade kept on and reached Ackworth after dark and encamped for the night.

October 9 was Sunday and having no orders the men rested quietly in camp. In the village there were some comely girls which Gleason says were much regarded by some of our men, not

all of them unmarried. That evening the "quartette" sang some sacred music.¹

The morning of October 10, the colonel gave orders to "fix up" camp and we somehow got the impression we would remain near Ackworth for some days. Every one went to work tearing down some old buildings nearby to get material for quarters. Some of the shacks or shanties were about finished when orders came to "get ready to move right away." The din which had been caused by chopping, hammering, nailing, etc., instantly ceased and every one began to pack up. We moved out towards Allatoona at 4 p. m. which place we reached about dark. It was light enough however for us to note evidences of the fierceness of the attack on General Corse's little garrison on the fifth. We followed the railroad track through the pass after which we descended into a little valley. Here we found a good road on which we made rapid progress. We crossed the Etowah River, marched two miles beyond it and at 9 p. m. encamped near the village of Cartersville, having marched about twelve miles.

Next morning, October 11, we resumed our march at 6 o'clock, moving quite rapidly. For some cause unknown to us there seemed to be unusual hurry and excitement. It was election day in Ohio, and as voters of that state we held an election. At a meeting judges and clerks were appointed and a tin bucket with a slit in the lid was improvised as a ballot box. Two of the judges carried the ballot box on a ramrod at the head of the regiment and when the regiment halted the men came forward and voted.

We marched through Cartersville and Caswell Station, passed by Kingston, and went about two miles beyond it towards Rome, where we bivouaced for the night, having marched about fourteen miles. That evening the adjutant and other judges of the election counted the ballots cast at the election and made out the returns in an old saw mill near our camp. There were 221 votes cast, 215 for the Union ticket and six for the Democratic ticket.²

October 12, we resumed our march at 8 a. m. and moved on toward Rome. We marched through the woods and alongside of a road which was overcrowded with wagons and artillery and our progress was slow. We heard cannonading in the direction of Rome. At 1 p. m. we halted for dinner on a hill by the roadside where we rested an hour. We then pushed on until 11 o'clock p. m. when we went into bivouac about two miles from Rome, having marched twenty miles.³

1 Gleason's Diary.

2 Frank L. Schreiber's Diary.

3 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 77-601.

October 10, General Sherman wired General Thomas who was at Nashville, that General Hood had crossed the Coosa River and was probably making for Tuscumbia on the Tennessee River.¹ He thereupon ordered the entire army to Kingston and thence to Rome. But while we were marching in such haste toward Rome, Hood was marching up the west side of the Oostenaula and on the 12th appeared before Resaca. He at once demanded its immediate surrender, coupled with the threat that if he had to carry it by assault no prisoners would be taken. To this demand Colonel Weaver, who was in command, replied, expressing his surprise at the threat that no prisoners would be taken and saying: "In my opinion I can hold this post. If you want it come and take it."² General Hood's Experience at Allatoona had made him cautious and he did not attempt to carry the place by assault, but limited his attack to a little skirmishing, while with the rest of his army he destroyed the railroad for twenty miles back to Tunnel Hill. At Dalton he captured a regiment of colored troops.³

Our regiment lay in camp near Rome until 3 o'clock the afternoon of the 13th, and then marched out taking the back track, going by way of Calhoun. Our regiment led the advance of the entire corps and we made good time. The officers were called together and cautioned to be very saving of ammunition, as the railroad had been cut both north and south of us. They were also advised that we were to march to relieve the garrison at Resaca, which was besieged but still held out. Company commanders were ordered to march in the rear of their companies in order to prevent straggling. As we marched along we soon heard artillery firing in the direction of Resaca. At nightfall we were still marching, but there was a full moon and a clear sky and we could see our way almost as well as in daylight. After marching about fifteen miles we turned into an open field where we bivouaced for the night. The Fourteenth Corps was closely following us, both the Fourth and Fourteenth Corps being now under command of General Stanley.

On the morning of October 14, we resumed our march at 6 o'clock. Just before we started we were entertained by a quiet fight and knock down between two men of Company F. (Logan and Gibson.)⁴

We reached Calhoun at 9 a. m. and marched through it without halting. Three trains bearing soldiers of the Seventeenth Corps passed us before we reached Resaca. We

1, 2 and 3 Sherman's Memoirs.

4 Gleason's Diary.

arrived at the place about noon, having marched about fifteen miles, and crossed the river on a pontoon bridge. We marched through the place, with bands playing and colors flying, and soon reached the vicinity of our works of May 14, where we finally halted, very tired and hungry. During the preceding twenty-four hours we had marched thirty-five miles, with only seven hours rest.¹ We expected to move on to Dalton, but after resting about two hours we moved about one-half mile and bivouaced inside of some old breastworks facing toward the east. A reconnoissance that afternoon showed that Lee's corps of Hood's army occupied Snake Creek Gap and his other two corps the gaps beyond Dalton.²

At 12:30 a. m., October 15, our corps received orders announcing that General Howard would move at 7 a. m. direct on Snake Creek Gap, and that at daylight General Stanley with the infantry of the Fourth and Fourteenth Corps would cross over to the hills about two miles north of the gap, somewhere south of Tilton, and if possible find a way across the valley beyond toward Villanow. General Cox with the Army of the Ohio was to follow General Howard.³ That morning at 7 o'clock our regiment and brigade moved out taking the road to Dalton. At our first halt we heard skirmishing some distance to our left toward a range of hills we were approaching. We turned in that direction and after moving about three miles came to an opening near the hills, and formed line of battle near the edge of a woods along a rail fence. Here we stacked arms and awaited further orders. We sent skirmishers out toward the hills, but they found no enemy to oppose them. While waiting here our men found a cornfield and a sweet potato patch which they raided. A call summoned the officers to headquarters, where they were told that our corps would attempt to cross the almost mountainous ridge before us, that both officers and men would move on foot, taking no horses and nothing that could not be carried on their persons. This caution seemed to be unnecessary, for those of us who had been near the foot of the ridge we were to cross, saw that it would be impossible to ride a horse up its steep, rocky and thickly wooded slopes. General Wood, who was not yet recovered from the wound in his foot received at Lovejoy Station, insisted in going with our division, even if he had to be carried on a stretcher. It seemed to be a wild adventure but both officers and men were eager to undertake it. Later we were informed that our brigade had

1 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 77-602.

2 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 77-602.

3 W. R. R. 79-268.

been designated to guard the supply and ammunition trains while the other troops crossed the ridge. We were to escort the trains and artillery back toward Resaca as soon as the other troops started on their arduous expedition.

The movement began late in the afternoon and the trains at the same time commenced to pull out towards Resaca. Companies A and F were sent back to the intersection of the Dalton road, and instructions to guard the crossing until all trains had passed. By 11 p. m. we had the trains and artillery safely back inside the enemy's old works near Resaca, where we were formed into line behind the works and bivouaced for the night. At 4 p. m. the other troops of the Fourth Corps had gained the top of the mountain ridge and at 6 p. m. had worked over it and come out in Snake Creek Gap. The Fourteenth Corps also reached the top and encamped for the night on its summit. General Sherman sent a dispatch saying that the enemy had left the mouth of the gap and that the Army of the Tennessee was working through it. Orders were therefore sent to bring up the trains and artillery.

Next morning, October 16, we were ordered to march at 6 o'clock. By the time we were ready the trains had moved out and we followed them to Resaca and thence on to Snake Creek Gap, where we halted for dinner. Captain J. T. Updegrove's resignation on account of his wounds had been accepted and he left for home. After dinner we resumed our march through the gap. After we had gone about a mile we had to halt for an hour to let the trains of the Twenty-third Corps pass. We got through the gap by 7 p. m. and pressed on for about four miles, passing through the village of Villanow, with its white church, and found our corps encamped about a mile beyond. Here, at 9:30 p. m., we went into camp, having marched during the day about fifteen miles. The Army of the Ohio was encamped near us. On the 17th, General Wood having, as he thought, sufficiently recovered from his wound, reported for duty and was assigned to the command of the Fourth Corps in place of General Stanley, who was commanding the Army of the Cumberland, in the absence of General Thomas. There were no orders to march and we remained quietly in camp. At 8 a. m. that morning our cavalry occupied Lafayette and reported the enemy as moving south in the direction of Summerville.¹ General Sherman at once issued orders directing our whole army to move against him at that place the next morning—the Army of the Tennessee to move through to Lafayette and there take the direct road to Summerville; the Army of the Cumberland (the

1 W. R. R. 79-327.

Fourth and Fourteenth Corps) to cross Ship's Gap and take a road to Summerville, to the left and east of that taken by the Army of the Tennessee, and keep abreast and in communication with it; the Army of the Ohio to move down the Rome road, cross by Subligna, and thence take the best road to Summerville.¹

The next morning, the 1th, at 6 o'clock, our corps moved out pursuant to said orders. As the first division was in advance we did not get started until 2 a. m. After a march of about six miles we reached Ship's Gap in Taylor's Ridge, where we noticed rude barricades of stones and signs of a skirmish some days before. Upon descending through the gap, we saw the familiar profile of Lookout Mountain far to the northwest. We made good progress until about noon, when our head of column ran into the Army of the Tennessee, which was moving on the main Summerville road. Here we were halted for about an hour, and then turning to the left soon reached another road leading to Summerville along Taylor's Ridge and followed that. We marched on until after dark and finally halted in a woods near a cornfield not far from Foster's House on the Chattooga River, about six miles from Summerville, having marched during the day twenty-five miles. That night a little before midnight orders came directing the next day's movement. The Army of the Tennessee was directed to pass to the right of Summerville and move toward Alpine. The Army of the Ohio was to move on the main Gaylesville road, while our corps and the Fourteenth Corps were to mass near Summerville, ready to move in any direction.²

On the morning of October 19, we had orders to march at daylight, but as the Fourteenth Corps preceded us we did not move until after we had dinner. Our pioneers had gone forward early in the day and, in connection with the pioneers of the other commands, had constructed a fine foot bridge over the Chattooga River, where it was 700 feet wide, on which our two corps crossed. Shortly after crossing the river the head of our column again ran into the Army of the Tennessee, about eight miles from Summerville, and we had to wait until it got by. We reached Summerville about 6 p. m. and marched through the town by a back street into a large field, where we encamped for the night, having marched about ten miles. During the day's march we heard from the elections in Ohio, Indiana and Pennsylvania, which had all gone strong for the Union. Gleason in his diary says, "the

¹ W. R. R. 74-325.

² W. R. R. 74-346.

news was received with all the joy that a victory for our arms could inspire." It was also reported that General Forrest had been repulsed at Fort Donelson.

In view of what afterwards occurred it is interesting to note that about this time General Sherman received a dispatch from General Slocum who, with the Twentieth Corps had been left at Atlanta, saying, that he would like to take two of his divisions and strike out for Macon and Milledgeville. He said one division in the new works at Atlanta could hold it and that he believed he could go through the state with two good divisions. He urged that he be permitted to undertake it.¹ It may be presumed that General Sherman had then no notion of letting any one else set out on an expedition, which he had at heart and wished to lead himself. He answered General Slocum's dispatch on the 20th, saying in substance, that he himself would march through Georgia, taking Slocum's corps along, and asking Slocum to bend all his energies toward securing supplies, so the grand march could begin November 1.²

October 20, the whole army moved to Gaylesville, Ala. Our brigade and division marching at 6:30 a. m. Our march was rapid and the halts few and short. We reached the little hamlet of Chattooga about noon and halted for dinner in a young orchard. In the rear of the orchard was a large patch of sweet potatoes, which was soon full of scratchers—there being no guard to interfere. Officers mingled with the men in the general scramble. Among the officers who were most conspicuous in the raid were the surgeon of the Fifteenth Ohio and the chaplain of the Eighth Kansas.³ After dinner we resumed our march and after passing through the hamlet crossed the Chattooga River on a covered bridge. Gleason says: "Two miles further on we crossed the Alabama line and bade adieu to Georgia after sojourning more than five months on her soil, and I could not help wondering how long it would be ere we returned, as it was evident that we were moving toward Northern Alabama, the supposed destination of the rebel army."⁴ We reached Gaylesville in the evening, after a march of twenty miles and encamped in an open plain near the village. Here the pursuit of Hood's army ended. Here we rested until October 27, engaged with the usual round of camp duty, going occasionally on foraging expeditions. In the meantime plans were forming for two memorable campaigns in which the military power of the Confederacy in the southwest was to be practically destroyed.

1 W. R. R. 79-348.

2 W. R. R. 79-370.

3 Gleason's Diary.

4 Gleason's Diary.

CHAPTER XXVII.

HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE—FROM GAYLESVILLE, ALA. TO PULASKI, TENN.

On the 13th day of August, 1864, while we were in front of Atlanta, and were shifting our position round to the right to gain possession of the railroads and compel Hood to evacuate the city, General Sherman in a dispatch to General Halleck said:

"If I should ever be cut off from my base look out for me about St. Mark's, Fla. or Savannah, Ga." August 18, when¹ Wheeler's cavalry was breaking up our railroad to the north, burning bridges and cutting telegraph wires, General Grant wired him from City Point, Va., saying, among other things:

"I never would advise going backward even if your roads are cut so as to preclude the possibility of receiving supplies from the north, but would recommend the accumulation of ordnance stores and supplies while you can, and if it comes to the worst move south as you suggested."²

Doubtless General Sherman, while we occupied Atlanta and before General Hood began his raid on our communications in October, had accumulated a large amount of supplies at Atlanta, with the possibility above mentioned in view. Even before Hood moved on our line of communications, on October 1, in a dispatch to General Grant, he asked why, if Hood should go over to the Selma and Talledega road, it would not do for him (Sherman) to leave Tennessee to the force which General Thomas had and the reserves he expected, destroy Atlanta and then march across Georgia to Savannah and Charleston.³ This suggestion was the subject of serious consideration by President Lincoln, Secretary Stanton and Generals Grant and Halleck. The situation, however, was very different from that of August 18, 1864, when General Grant gave implied assent to such a movement. Then only Wheeler with his cavalry was raiding in Tennessee, and he could do little of permanent injury even to our line of communications. Now, Hood's seasoned army of nearly 50,000, including his cavalry, troops which had so successfully resisted our advance on Atlanta, were menacing our rear and it was proposed to meet

¹ W. R. R. 76-482.
² W. R. R., 76-569.

³ W. R. R. 79-3.

him with an army made up largely of new and untrained soldiers, which had yet to be organized into an effective force. It was true that A. J. Smith's corps of perhaps 10,000 men had been ordered to Nashville from Missouri, but they were far into the interior of that state and no one could tell whether they would arrive in time to be of service in repelling Hood's proposed invasion of the North. But General Sherman had his heart set on a march to the sea, and persisted in urging it upon the authorities in Washington. In his memoirs General Sherman does not mention having received any reply to his dispatch of October 1. On the 9th of October he sent another dispatch to General Grant saying:

"It will be a physical impossibility to protect the roads, now that Hood, Forrest and Wheeler and the whole batch of devils are turned loose, without home or habitation. I think Hood's movements indicate a diversion to the end of the Selma and Talledega Railroad at Blue Mountain, about sixty miles south west of Rome, from which he will threaten Kingston, Bridgeport and Decatur, Ala. I propose we break up the railroad from Chattanooga and strike out with wagons for Millledgeville, Millen and Savannah. Until we can repopulate Georgia it is useless to occupy it, but the utter destruction of its roads, houses and people will cripple their military resources. By attempting to hold the roads we will lose 1000 men monthly and will gain no result. I can make the march and make Georgia howl. We have over 8000 cattle and 3,000,000 of bread, but no corn; but we can forage in the interior of the state."¹

Again on October 10, he wired General Grant saying that Hood was crossing the Coosa River below Rome bound west, and asking if he had not better execute the plans above referred to.² General Grant the next day at 11 a.m., answered this dispatch in a message which shows strong common sense and superior military judgment. He said: "Your dispatch received. Does it not look as if Hood was going to attempt the invasion of Middle Tennessee, using the Mobile and Ohio and Memphis and Charleston roads to supply his base on the Tennessee River about Florence or Decatur? If he does this he ought to be met and prevented from getting north of the Tennessee River. If you were to cut loose, I do not believe you would meet Hood's army, but would be bushwacked by all the old men, little boys, and such railroad guards as are still left at home. Hood would probably strike for Nashville, thinking that by going north he could inflict greater damage

¹ W. R. R. 79-162.

² W. R. R. 79-174.

upon us than we could do upon the rebels by going south. If there is any way of getting at Hood's army, I would prefer that, but I must trust to your judgment. * * * I am afraid Thomas with such lines of road as he has to protect could not prevent Hood from going north."¹

To the candid critic it seems that General Grant's objections to Sherman's "cutting loose," from the ordinary military point of view, were logical and sound.

It will be remembered that at the beginning of the Atlanta campaign General Sherman had announced that Hood's army would be his *first* objective, Atlanta the second.² Could General Grant have had that in mind when he said: "You will be bushwacked by all the old men and little boys and such railroad guards which are left at home?" The plain meaning of this language seems to be "you are running away from Hood's army of fighting men, your first and main objective, to fight old men, little boys and home railroad guards." The proposed movement was perhaps contrary to military rules and to common sense, but General Sherman's heart was set upon it and he turned an unwilling ear to General Grant's suggestions. He answered General Grant's dispatch the same day, repeating his arguments in favor of a movement through Georgia to the sea, and saying, "answer quick, as I know we will not have the telegraph long."³ This was the day the army was concentrating at Kingston for the march to Rome. At 11:30 p. m. that night General Grant telegraphed:

"Your dispatch of today received. If you are satisfied the trip to the sea coast can be made, holding the line of the Tennessee firmly, you may make it, destroying all the railroad south of Dalton or Chattanooga, as you think best." The "if" in this dispatch and the movement of Hood to Resaca delayed the final decision for some days.

The proposed movement by General Sherman caused deep anxiety at Washington and on the evening of October 12, Secretary Stanton telegraphed to General Grant at City Point, saying:

"The President feels much solicitude in respect to General Sherman's proposed movement and hopes it will be maturely considered. The objections stated in your telegram of last night impressed him with much force, and a mis-step by General Sherman might be fatal to his army."⁴

General James H. Wilson, who had been sent by General Grant to General Sherman to take command of his cavalry,

1 W. R. R. 79-202.

2 Sherman's Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 6-7.

3 W. R. R. 79-202.

4 W. R. R. 79-222.

with the remarkable statement that his presence and personal activity would increase its efficiency fifty per cent.¹ had arrived at Gaylesville. In a letter to General John A. Rawlins, General Grant's chief of staff, setting forth fully the situation Sherman would leave behind him, made a vigorous plea against subdividing Sherman's forces until Hood had been disposed of.² This letter so aroused Rawlins' apprehensions of disaster, should Hood not attempt to follow Sherman, but move against Middle Tennessee, that he sought and obtained General Grant's permission to go to St. Louis and hurry up A. J. Smith's command and other troops to General Thomas' aid.³

The wires between General Sherman and City Point were kept open several days after this, and the whole movement in all its details and bearings was thoroughly threshed over between him and General Grant, who finally yielded, but only on the assurance and belief that General Thomas would be left with sufficient force to successfully oppose Hood's invasion of the North. That it succeeded is now a matter of history and General Sherman is entitled to all the fame it earned for him. But that it did not result in disaster to our arms and the country, was due to fortuitous circumstances, accidents of war—which sometimes seem to be the work of overruling Providence.

On the 7th of November, 1864, at 6 p. m., General Sherman telegraphed General Grant his final message before cutting loose, as follows:

"On the 10th the election will be over, the troops all paid and all our surplus property will be back in Chattanooga. On that day or the following, if affairs should remain as now in Tennessee I propose to begin the movement which I have hitherto fully described. I can hear of no large force to our front, and according to Thomas, Hood remains about Tusculum, and he feels perfectly confident of his ability to take care of him."⁴ On the same evening at 11:30 p. m., General Grant answered saying:

"Your dispatch of this evening received. I see no reason for changing your plan; should any arise you will see it. I think everything here favorable now. Great good fortune attend you. I believe you will be eminently successful and at worst can only make a march less fruitful of results than is hoped for."⁵

1 W. R. R. 79-64.

2 W. R. R. 79-442 et seq.

3 J. H. Wilson's "Under the Old Flag," Vol. 2, pp. 29-30, also Grant's Memoirs, Vol. 2, 376.

4 and 5 W. R. R. 79-679.

In preparation for the march to the sea, which at that date he felt pretty sure would be made, General Sherman on October 26, issued orders directing General Stanley to move his entire corps, wagons, artillery, &c., via Alpine, Winston's, &c., to Chattanooga or Bridgeport, according to intelligence received of the movements of Hood's army—which was then reported moving toward Decatur or Tuscumbia, Ala.—turning over any surplus provisions on hand to the Fourteenth Corps.¹

He also issued orders stating that "in the event of military movements or the accidents of war" separating him from command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, General Thomas should exercise command over all troops and garrisons not in his, General Sherman's, presence.²

In pursuance of the first of the above named orders, on the morning of October 27, at 4 o'clock, announcement was made that our brigade (Willich's) would march from Gaylesville at 6:30 a. m. We soon learned that the entire Fourth Corps was to move. We turned over to the Fourteenth Corps some wheat which we had gathered on a foraging expedition the day before and were nearly on time. There had been rain the night before and the roads were slippery. At noon we halted for dinner at a deep spring, where the water seemed to come from an unfathomable depth. It was cool and clear and we noticed some quite large fish in it. We were, it was said, marching to Alpine, about sixteen miles from Gaylesville. As we neared the town we passed through the picket line of Newton's division, which had marched down from Chattanooga and there rejoined the corps. We arrived at Alpine about 5 p. m. and went into camp in a large field thickly overgrown with broom sedge, which made excellent beds.

On the morning of October 28, soon after reveille sounded, we got orders to move at 6:30 a. m., our regiment to have the advance of the entire corps. We were now near Lookout Mountain and not far from the most southerly position held by McCook's corps a few days before the battle of Chickamauga. As we moved out "old Lookout" loomed up on our left. Our course was about parallel with the range and toward Lafayette, which we reached about sunset and went into camp west of the town, having marched twenty-two miles. The day and night were frosty and pleasant. We had had a long march and so slept the deep sleep of weary men.

1 W. R. R. 79-442.

2 W. R. R. 79-442.

October 29, we resumed our march at daylight, taking the road toward Chattanooga. The fine valley through which we marched seemed not to have been much disturbed by the ravages of war until we approached the battlefield of Chickamauga. Even there nature had begun her marvelous work of restoration, greening the sod and hiding the scars in the earth's bosom made by the battle storm which raged there only a little over a year before. Few objects seemed familiar, and Gleason had some difficulty in recognizing the spring near the hospital to which he was borne wounded September 19, 1863. We finally reached Rossville where we went into camp near the position to which our army retired after the battle.

On Sunday, October 30, at 6 a. m., we moved out toward Chattanooga and marched direct to the railroad station where we were to take a train. During a short wait we got some Cincinnati papers, which reported that Hood's army had made an attack on the garrison at Decatur and had been repulsed. We guessed that this was our destination. Our men were piled into some very dirty freight cars, so filthy that many chose to ride on top, and we soon moved out, meeting with no delay until we reached Stevenson. There it was reported that the track had been torn up near Bellefonte, and we remained on a siding for more than an hour. Our train then ran down to the break, where we were detained until evening. Just before reaching the break we stopped at a small wood station. As we slowed up an old woman stood at the gate of a small house with her apron full of fine apples which she began tossing to the men. There was soon a crowd about her which became so dense that she fled into the house, but returned with another supply which she distributed as before—the men scrambling over each other to get them, to her great amusement. When the train pulled out the men gave her a great cheer and she answered by swinging her bonnet until we passed out of sight. After the break was repaired our train moved forward through the night. It began to rain and the men who were riding on top of the cars were in a sorry plight. We passed Huntsville, Ala., about 4 a. m., where we made a short stop and then moved on, toward Decatur, as we supposed. But on arriving at the railroad junction we proceeded towards Athens, which we reached at 6:30 a. m. October 31. There we found other trains carrying troops, and after some delay were detrained and ordered to get breakfast. A new regiment, the One Hundred and Eighty-first Ohio, was nearby and their new uniforms were in sharp

contrast with those of our dusty veterans. There were no orders to move and some of the men slipped out and looked about the town.

At 11 a. m. General Stanley received a dispatch from General Thomas at Nashville ordering him to march his command to Pulaski at once and prepare to make a stubborn defense of the place, and stating that it was reported the enemy was across the Tennessee River at Florence. At the same hour a dispatch was received from General Robert S. Granger, who was in command at Decatur, dated at 7 p. m. the day before, stating that Hood had landed his infantry three miles above Florence at 4 p. m. that day.¹

Just before noon we moved out near a fort, where we received one day's rations of bread, sugar and coffee. Near the railroad station each man received sixty rounds of ammunition. We did not then know where we were to go but it looked like serious work ahead. We marched at 2 p. m. and were told our destination was Pulaski, Tenn., thirty-five miles north, and we must cover the distance by the next evening. We sent out Companies A, F and D as advance guards of the division, and a small detachment as feelers. We soon got beyond the pine country about Athens and came into a monotonous level forest region. The soil was thin and the cleared spaces far apart. Our side foragers scoured the woods for stray hogs but found none. Their disappointment was keen for we had no meat. After marching several miles, we came to a good sized farm, where the division went into camp and we sent out Companies A and F as pickets. On the morning of November 1, we were aroused by the bugle at 4 o'clock, with unexpected orders to march at once. As one of the brigades preceded ours, we had time to make coffee and eat hard tack before we started. The stretcher-bearers were ordered to the rear of the division, Gleason in charge.

It was rumored that the enemy had entered Athens the night before. A citizen reported that he had left the place after dark and that the enemy was then within two miles of the town. We reached Elk River at 9 a. m. The stream was waist deep, there was no bridge across it, and we waded through and pressed on. We struck a good pike at Elkton, a hamlet on a hill north of the river, and made rapid progress. We reached Pulaski at 4 p. m. and found it quite a town, with many good buildings and but little ravaged by the war. As we marched through it many fair faces looked from windows on this new invasion. We went into camp near a large fort on

¹ W. R. R. 77-606.

a hill beyond the town. At 4:20 p. m., November 1, General Stanley telegraphed to General Thomas, reporting his arrival at Pulaski with the infantry of our division, that Athens had been evacuated two hours after we left the place by his (General Thomas') orders, and that there had been no preparation for the defense of Pulaski. At 6 p. m. he received a dispatch from General Thomas, saying:

"General Granger evacuated Athens yesterday after you left, on your advice, he says. I have ordered him to re-occupy it immediately which I suppose he has done. Whittaker's and Wagners' troops (the First and Second Divisions of the Fourth Corps) have left Chattanooga and some of them should reach you tomorrow. Assume command at Pulaski by my order. Make dispositions for the defense of the place. General Sherman will send me Schofield, whose troops I will endeavor to give you in four days. Your artillery is coming up with Wagner. If General Hatch has left Pulaski send a staff officer after him and bring him back."¹

At 7:30 that evening General Hatch reported to General Stanley with 2500 cavalry and was directed to remain at Pulaski and scout well down on the roads towards Florence and Athens. In addition to our division and Hatch's cavalry, there was at that time at Pulaski a brigade of four regiments of cavalry, under command of Colonel George Spalding. At 9 p. m. General Rousseau telegraphed from Columbia, Tenn., to General Stanley, that General Thomas had ordered him to assist in case of a fight with Hood and that he was ready to do so.²

November 2, at 7 a. m., word came that a portion of the First Division of our corps had arrived at Athens and that the rest was on the way.

At 7:30 a. m. a note was received from General Croxton, commanding a cavalry brigade at Shoals Cross roads, saying, that the enemy was in force at Florence and was intrenching, that no part of his forces had yet moved out on either the Huntsville or Lawrenceburg roads and that Forrest's cavalry was reported crossing the Tennessee River below Florence. Word also came that Russell's brigade of rebel cavalry was near Larkinsville for the purpose of tearing up the railroad between that place and Stevenson.³ There was no word from the Second Division of the Fourth Corps. On November 2, some of the troops of our division began fortifying the ridges north and northeast of the town, but our regiment rested quietly in camp and we tried to make ourselves comfortable

¹ and ² Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 77-608.

³ Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 77-609.

in spite of a cold rain. On Thursday, November 3, the First Division of our corps reached Pulaski. We heard that the Second Division was three miles north of Athens at noon and would march for Pulaski that day. Forrest's cavalry was reported having reached Lawrenceburg, and General Hatch was directed to send a cavalry force to that point to find out the truth about it. At 7:30 p. m. General Stanley received a dispatch from General Thomas saying:

"Keep Hood at Florence until Sunday (two days longer) and you will be all right, as Schofield's corps will be up by that time. I have heard from Croxton up to yesterday p. m. He reports the enemy still at Florence fortifying."¹

General Sherman had not yet "cut loose" and gone on his famous march to the sea, and Hood was evidently wary about also cutting loose, knowing that Sherman could still reinforce Thomas to a considerable extent.

Sherman was busy accumulating supplies and weeding out the force with which he proposed to "make Georgia howl,"—sending all sick and disabled men and horses and all defective equipment back for General Thomas to take care of, retaining about 60,000 well drilled and trained soldiers. The only well drilled and trained organizations which he was leaving to Thomas with which to resist Hood's invasion of the north, were the Fourth Corps (ours) and the Twenty-third Corps. The former on October 31, 1864, had an effective force of 11,087 officers and men² and the latter 10,965 officers and men present for duty.³ With these men and 7898 cavalry⁴ under command of General Wilson, which included two regiments detached at Tullahoma, he was expected to resist Hood's advance. It is true that there were other troops under General Thomas' command, but they were fully employed in holding the fortified posts at Chattanooga, Bridgeport, Stevenson, Murfreesboro and other points on the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad. Other regiments were being sent to him, but they were raw troops and had not yet been organized and trained for field service, and added little to the effective strength of his army. A. J. Smith's corps which was away out in Missouri had been ordered to Tennessee, but it was not likely to arrive for two weeks at least. So it devolved on General Thomas to repel Hood's advance with the Fourth Corps, the Twenty-third Corps and the cavalry above named. The field returns of Hood's army November 6, 1864, show at that time an aggregate present of 44,832,⁵ not including Forrest's cavalry and

1 W. R. R. 79-620.
2 W. R. R. 79-552.
3 W. R. R. 79-569.

4 W. R. R. 79-573.
5 W. R. R. 79-893.

other cavalry detachments which were menacing our lines of communications, which probably swelled his force to over 50,000 men.

The problem was therefore to hold Hood's army back until A. J. Smith's corps of about 10,000 should arrive and the new troops arriving could be assigned and made effective. On November 4, our regiment and brigade were moved across a ridge a little further from the town, where we were placed in camp in low ground between two ridges which formed a complete horse shoe, and we thought was an admirable position for defense. It was a sheltered location, where we were protected by the hills from the winds, which were quite cold. This far we had not been detailed to work on fortifications, but on the fifth we drew a lot of intrenching tools and received orders to be ready to do such work next morning. It was reported that our cavalry had met the enemy some twenty miles to the southwest and were gradually falling back, so we rather expected an early attack on our position.

At 7 a. m. November 6, we ascended the ridge in our front and began a line of works, building them mostly of earth, as the timber had nearly all been cut away. That morning at 8 o'clock a dispatch from General Croxton dated Six-Mile Creek, ten miles east of Florence, November 5, addressed to General Thomas, was opened by Colonel Fullerton. It stated that he had been attacked by infantry and artillery at Shoal Creek and that the enemy had crossed the river below him in force. The telegraph line between Nashville and Columbia had been cut, and General Stanley sent by Captain Moxley a message to General Thomas, asking for 500 boxes of ammunition and saying, "I will hold this place."¹ At 10 a. m. the telegraph line was working to Nashville. A regiment of cavalry was ordered to Lawrenceburg. On learning from General Croxton that the enemy had recrossed Shoal Creek, General Stanley was ordered to keep Generals Hatch and Croxton as close to the enemy as they could get and be secure, at Shoal Creek for instance, in order that they might get the earliest intelligence of any movement of the enemy. November 7, it was raining and some of the men did not get breakfast in time to go to work on the fortifications as ordered. This displeased Colonel Askew who ordered the men to move and breakfast to be sent out afterwards. We finished the parapet we had been working on the day before and were moved to another place, to extend the line between the hills, which would complete the work assigned to our brigade. We cut down a large tree and rolled it to the line, which saved a good deal of digging. We were relieved at

1 W. R. R. 77-611.

noon and rested the afternoon and evening. No signs of the approach of Hood's army as yet.¹

That evening a dispatch was received from General Hatch saying he had found the enemy's pickets on the Lawrenceburg road, three miles north of Bough' Factory, had driven them across Shoal Creek and that they belonged to Armstrong's cavalry, said to be 4000 strong. A deserter from Cleburne's division came into our camp and reported that all three corps of Hood's army were across the Tennessee River near Florence, but that the cavalry were all on the other side of the river watching for Sherman. He also reported that Jeff Davis had visited the army when below Decatur and that he and General Hood both made speeches; that General Hood said they would plant their flag on the Ohio before they stopped, and that they were going to Murfreesboro via Athens and were waiting for their cavalry to start.

The next morning, the eighth, the right wing of the regiment worked on the fortifications until 11 o'clock and the left wing from 2 p. m. until dark. It was the day of the Presidential election. Judges and clerks were chosen and 129 men in the regiment voted for Lincoln and Johnson and 9 for McClellan and Pendleton.² At 2 p. m. General Thomas sent a dispatch to General Stanley saying he wished Generals Hatch and Croxton of Wilson's command to hold the enemy as long as possible. Should the enemy overpower them and march on Pulaski, he, General Stanley must hold that place, but should the enemy avoid Pulaski and move north, General Stanley was to so place his troops as to cover Nashville and strike the enemy the first favorable opportunity. He also said that A. J. Smith's troops would begin to arrive soon, and also the cavalry which had been sent to Louisville to be remounted, and that we would then be able to assume the offensive. Orders were sent to burn every mill in the country if the enemy advanced.³

November 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 we continued work on the fortifications. The recent rains had caused a rise in all the streams and the railroad bridge across Duck River at Columbia had been destroyed, thus breaking our "cracker line." A reported big rise in the Tennessee was regarded with unusual interest, as General Hatch had reported on the tenth, that one of his scouts had just come in and reported that only one corps of Hood's army and Roddey's cavalry were across the river, and that the other two corps were at Iuka and Tuscumbia. On the eleventh of November, a strolling theatrical company from Louisville gave

¹ Gleason's Diary.

² John J. Gregory's Diary.

³ Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 77-612.

a performance at a hall in the town which was quite an attraction to both officers and men. The principal play was "Toodles." On the evening of the 13th, we heard that Lincoln was re-elected, carrying every state except Kentucky. No change was reported in the position of the enemy. There was, however, an unconfirmed report that 1000 of Forrest's cavalry passed through Waynesboro Thursday afternoon, November 10, moving in the direction of Columbia. At 9 p. m. on the thirteenth, General Schofield, with a part of the Twenty-third Corps arrived by rail and reported the rest on the way.¹

The wires between General Sherman and the north were finally broken. He had "cut loose" and had left us to take care of Hood's army, which his entire force had fought all summer and had failed to conquer;—with its relative strength but little reduced and its organization unimpaired.

November 14, General Schofield assumed command of the forces at Pulaski and of the detachments of the cavalry corps with General Hatch's command. General Hatch reported that General Beauregard had made a speech to Hood's army telling them that they were going forward,—Hood to attack Nashville, and Forrest to lead a grand raid to the Ohio River.²

On the 16th the Fifty-first Indiana was assigned to our brigade. Its commanding officer, Colonel A. D. Streight had gained notoriety by escaping from Libby Prison. It was said that his regiment was so assigned in order to give him command of a brigade, as he outranked Colonel John A. Martin, who was then in command. Colonel Martin was much beloved by the old officers of the brigade, and Colonel Streight did not receive a very cordial welcome. It rained from the 15th until 9 p. m. the 19th.

On the 17th prisoners taken by General Hatch reported that another corps of Hood's army was across the river, that the third and last corps was to cross the the night of the 16th and that Forrest's cavalry 10,000 strong was also across and was near Florence.³

We finished work on the fortifications of Pulaski on the 18th, and on the 19th were engrossed by the usual camp duties. On the 20th, word came that Forrest's cavalry was moving north from Florence on the old military road. General Schofield thought it probable that he was marching for the railroad between Pulaski and Columbia, and directed General Stanley to send a division to Lynnvile, about thirteen miles north of Pulaski in the morning. Orders were given to General Wagner

1 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 77-614.

2 and 3 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-142.

in command of the Second Division to march for Lynnville early the next morning. The rain which ceased the day before at 9 p. m. again began to pour and poured down all day. The men who were not on picket kept close in quarters, and in the evening we heard Colonel McClenahan, Major Clark and the Gleason boys singing in one of the tents.

November 21, at 6 a. m. the order directing General Wagner to march for Lynnville was recalled, evidently because General Hatch reported the capture of a rebel dispatch stating that General Forrest would not move until Monday morning, which would be the 26th. The morning was very cold and we had the first snow storm of the season. There was a camp rumor that we would soon move but no one regarded it as reliable. The men had made their quarters very comfortable and had settled down to the happy belief that we would remain at Pulaski at least several days longer. At 6:45 p. m. that day, General Stanley received a dispatch from General Schofield saying:

"General Hatch's report just received leaves no doubt of Hood's advance. He was last night about twenty miles from Florence—one corps on the Waynesborough road and one on the Lawrenceburg road, the third was only six miles out from Florence. Hood must be going to Columbia or west of that. We will have to move accordingly without delay. Have your quartermaster move all surplus stores to Columbia at once, and make all preparations to withdraw entirely from Pulaski by Wednesday morning the 23d. Let Wagner march to Lynnville tomorrow morning. Cox will precede him."¹ The night was bitter cold, but we were tucked in our shelter tents and slept, not knowing how very soon our courage and physical endurance would be put to one of the severest tests of our service.

¹ W. R. R. 93-143.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE—THE RETREAT FROM PULASKI, SPRING HILL AND THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN.

The morning of November 22, 1864, the Second Division of our corps marched for Lynnville. That day General Jas. H. Wilson arrived at Lynnville and posted the cavalry on the north bank of Duck River to watch the fords and roads above and below Columbia.¹

There were rumors that our division would move soon and that Pulaski was to be evacuated. Some of our officers who were in the town, on their return, reported great excitement there. All sorts of rumors were afloat, but the one, that Hood's entire army was marching north, was the most persistent and came to be generally believed. Many of the officers knew that General Hatch had so reported and the report was the cause of much anxiety. We believed that the enemy far outnumbered us and did not know when our reinforcements would arrive. The fact that the Second Division had been ordered to Lynnville indicated a fear on the part of General Schofield that Hood would try to strike the railroad between us and Columbia and thus cut us off from the north. Both Generals Thomas and Schofield were slow to believe, notwithstanding General Hatch's dispatches to the contrary, that Hood would attempt a general forward movement, because the weather and the roads were so bad.² The latter suggested that perhaps General Forrest was only moving out to encamp his cavalry on Buffalo River where the forage was abundant.³ Still both realized the possibility that Hood might attempt to interpose his army between us and Columbia and so on the 22d, as before stated, Cox's division of the Twenty-third and Wagner's division of the Fourth Corps were ordered to Lynnville. On November 20, General Thomas sent one of General Hatch's dispatches to General Halleck at Washington, and said he had ordered General Schofield to move his main force to Lynnville, so as to be able to support General Hatch, or concentrate at Columbia, according to circumstances; that he had nearly two brigades at Columbia and would have a third there by the next night; that he had heard from General A. J. Smith who was at St. Louis and that he, General Smith, would not be able to embark his troops before the 22d and could not

¹ Under the Old Flag, Vol. 2, p. 36.

² W. R. 93-944-955.

³ W. R. 93-955.

reach Nashville before the 27th or 28th: that he would do his best to keep the enemy from the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, but that his cavalry force was only 3000, whereas the enemy's was at least 10,000, and that three of Wilson's cavalry divisions were still absent for horses, and Grierson's division was still in Missouri.¹

November 21, General Thomas sent another of General Hatch's dispatches to General Halleck, which reported that the heads of Hood's marching columns were on the roads leading north from Florence, fifteen and twenty miles respectively north of that place, and said he had ordered General Schofield to move back gradually from Pulaski and to concentrate at Columbia before Hood could reach that place. He also said that Hood's force was so much larger than his then available force, both in infantry and cavalry and that he would have to act on the defensive: that the effective force of the Fourth Corps, Stanley's was 12,000 and that of the Twenty-third Corps, Schofield's 10,000 and that General Wilson as yet could only raise about 3000 effective cavalry.²

The situation was alarming. Our anxiety was shared in Washington, where extraordinary efforts were being made to reinforce our thin ranks. But these efforts did not keep pace with the rapid advance of Hood's army. At 11 p. m. November 22, a dispatch was received from General Hatch saying that Hood's infantry was then at Lawrenceburg and that his cavalry was probably moving round to the railroad. Lawrenceburg is about twenty-five miles a little north of west of Pulaski and Waynesborough a few miles farther in the same direction. The three places are about equidistant from Columbia, which is about thirty-five miles north of Pulaski. It will be remembered that one of Hood's columns was advancing on the Waynesborough road. So it seemed problematical whether our little army could concentrate at Columbia before the whole of Hood's army would be upon us.

At 7:30 a. m. November 23, General Stanley was informed by General Schofield's Adjutant General that Hood's advance infantry was in Lawrenceburg the night before, and that Forrest was striking for the railroad and might possibly reach it that day; that General Schofield would go that morning to Lynnville and had directed that he, Stanley, should have all the railroad trains at Pulaski loaded and started to the rear as soon as possible, and have his entire command in readiness to march to Lynnville that afternoon.³ On the receipt of this order there

1 W. R. R. 93-954.

2 W. R. R. 93-970.

3 W. R. R. 93-997.

was tremendous activity among the troops remaining at Pulaski, and there were all sorts of wild rumors regarding the advance of Hood's army. The railroad and wagon trains were quickly loaded with surplus supplies and there was a "hurrying to and fro" of aides and orderlies carrying directions about the evacuation. The paymaster was in camp and some of the men were being paid off. Companies A and F were sent out on picket duty and posted by Major Dawson of our regiment and Captain Greene of the Forty-ninth Ohio. At about 2 p. m. the stores were nearly all loaded, such as we could not take with us were destroyed, and our column moved out toward Lynnville. A brigade of the first division was left behind to cover our trains, artillery, etc., with orders to follow us at 3 a. m. the next day. At 2:15 p. m. General Stanley received word from General Hatch that the enemy's infantry were moving through Lawrenceburg toward Columbia and that one of his, General Hatch's, spies was just in and reported that Hood had 40,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry.¹ This dispatch quickened our march and the head of our column reached Lynnville about 7 p. m. The artillery and trains did not arrive until about 11 p. m. Before we encamped we had orders to march for Columbia at 6 a. m. next morning. The air was frosty and cold and the ground frozen.

At 1 a. m. November 24, General Schofield received a dispatch from Colonel Capron, who with a small brigade of cavalry had been over on the Waynesborough road. The dispatch was dated at 9 p. m. the day before and stated that the enemy's cavalry and a small body of infantry had driven him back through Mount Pleasant, a village about fifteen miles southwest of Columbia.

There was a good turnpike from Mount Pleasant to Columbia, and as the enemy at Mount Pleasant was several miles nearer Columbia than our column, this dispatch caused increased apprehension. Our marching orders were therefore changed to 3 a. m. next morning. Fortunately, General Cox's division of the Twenty-third Corps had moved forward and was then seven miles from Columbia. General Ruger, who was in command of a division in the Twenty-third Corps, was at Columbia, but with only about 800 men, the rest of his division being scattered in observation along the Tennessee and Duck Rivers. At 3 a. m. on the 24th, our corps moved out, the Second Division, General Wagner's, in the advance. Our division followed, then came the artillery brigade and trains and in the rear was the First Division, General Whitaker's. Our march was unusually rapid and every one seemed to feel that there was some emergency to be met.

¹ Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-144.

During the morning we heard cannonading over on the left and supposed the enemy was engaging our cavalry. The nearer we approached Columbia the louder the reports seemed and we soon heard skirmish firing on our left. When we were about three or four miles from Columbia the adjutant was directed to take Companies A and F and drive back the enemy's cavalry which had appeared on our flank. The two companies were deployed into line and advanced through an open woods, driving the enemy's cavalry to the farther side of the woods, and then retired and rejoined the regiment. One of the men captured a fine blooded grey mare which he presented to the adjutant. When General Cox was within three miles of Columbia his division was sent over to the Mount Pleasant pike and reached it just in time to prevent the annihilation of Colonel Capron's cavalry, which was rapidly being driven back into Columbia by a largely superior force. General Cox's division checked the enemy's advance and drove him back for some distance.¹ His timely arrival doubtless prevented the enemy from entering Columbia ahead of our troops. A short distance out of Columbia which, we reached about noon,² our brigade turned to the left across the fields and formed in line of battle. Shortly afterwards we were moved across the Pulaski road to the east and were formed behind the first line of the brigade, which at once began throwing up defensive works. While we were in this position, the paymaster came up and finished paying the companies of our regiment. There were some fine residences some distance in front of our position. It was seen that they might afford protection to the enemy's artillery and they were ordered set on fire. Some of our staff officers, with their swords ripped up the richly upholstered furniture and applied the torch to it and to everything else inflammable, and the houses were soon in ruins. Some of them contained valuable paintings and other works of art. It was barbarous, but the exigencies of war seemed to justify it. It was Thanksgiving day. There was no formal observance of it, but many in our army were devoutly thankful that we had been able to reach Columbia ahead of Hood's army and to concentrate there our effective force. That night our troops were formed in line as follows: General Cox's division west of the town covering the Mount Pleasant road, its right resting on Duck River; General Wagner's division on Cox's left, his left on the Pulaski pike; General Wood's (our) division connecting with the left of General Wagner's division, facing south, our right on the Pulaski pike; and General Whitaker's division connecting

1 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-144.

2 Frank L. Schretter's Diary.

with our division on its left, extending to near the river east of the town and facing almost southeast. Our artillery was placed on the rising ground and knolls along our line of battle. The cavalry, Hatch's division of about 2000 men, Croxton's brigade, about 1300, and Capron's brigade 1500, of the cavalry corps, which had been fighting Hood's advance and holding him back while we were concentrating at Lynnville, was also concentrated at Columbia that evening, and was immediately stationed on the north side of Duck River between Columbia and the Lewisburg pike to watch the movements of the enemy.¹

In these positions, with skirmishers thrown well to the front and watchful, we awaited the advance of the enemy, who we felt pretty sure would attack us next morning. The morning of November 25, was unusually quiet and work was continued on our intrenchments. About noon our regiment was ordered to go to work on a new line, being told by Colonel Streight, our new brigade commander, "to work lively, as the enemy was reported advancing." Our first task was to remove a long row of cedar fence in front, which would make a good cover for the enemy, and we could make good use of the posts in our defenses.² A small detachment was set to work making chevaux-de-frise to cover a part of our works on the east of the pike. We worked until dark, then got our suppers and prepared to make ourselves comfortable for the night. But after dark orders came to move to the right about one-half mile. Our division was to occupy the whole line of the works, while Wagner's and Whitaker's divisions retired to an interior line which had been partly constructed during the day. It was pitch dark, but we finally found our way and went into position behind a line of works which had been constructed by Wagner's division. Our position was in a corn field. The works we occupied were covered by abatis and chevaux-de-frise and, although we were stretched along them in only a single line "like an India rubber string," as General Wood described it, we felt we could hold them against any ordinary attack. We were undisturbed during the night. During the morning a reconnoissance out the Pulaski pike developed the fact that the enemy's cavalry covered our whole front and were not more than two miles distant at any one point.³

General Grant at that time seems to have been more interested in General Sherman's movements in Georgia than in the critical situation in Tennessee. On the 24th of November, he telegraphed General Thomas from City Point, enclosing a news-

1 General Wilson's Report, W. R. R. 93-554.

2 Gleason's Diary.

3 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-145.

paper clipping stating that Beauregard had issued a proclamation calling on the people of Georgia to arise to oppose Sherman, and asking Thomas "not to let Forrest get off without punishment."¹ To this, General Thomas pointedly replied as follows:

"Hood's entire army is in front at Columbia and so greatly outnumbered mine at this time that I am compelled to act on the defensive. None of General Smith's troops have arrived yet, although they embarked at St. Louis on Tuesday last (the 22nd). The transportation of Generals Hatch's and Grierson's cavalry was ordered by General Wasburne, I am told, to be turned over at Memphis, which has crippled the only cavalry I have at this time. All of my cavalry was dismounted to furnish horses to Kilpatrick's division which went with General Sherman. My dismounted cavalry is now detained at Louisville awaiting arms and horses,—horses are arriving slowly and arms have been detained somewhere enroute for more than a month. General Grierson has been delayed by conflicting orders in Kansas and from Memphis, and it is impossible to say when he will reach here. Since being placed in charge of affairs in Tennessee I have lost nearly 15,000 men, discharged by expiration of service and permitted to go home to vote. My gain is probably 12,000 of perfectly raw troops. Therefore as the enemy so greatly outnumbered me both in infantry and cavalry, I am compelled for the present to act on the defensive. The moment I can get my cavalry, I will march against Hood, and if Forrest can be reached he will be punished."²

This dispatch seems to have awakened General Grant and the authorities at Washington to an appreciation of the difficulties of the situation in Tennessee, for the same day General Grant advised General Halleck that all troops coming from Missouri should receive directions from General Thomas, and the Secretary of War authorized him to call on the governors of Indiana and other western states for militia.³ The morning of November 26 was rainy and very disagreeable. Before daylight a crash of musketry admonished us of the near presence of the enemy, but only sharp skirmishing followed. When the pickets of the Forty-ninth Ohio came in they reported that Captain Greene, brigade inspector, was wounded. Later it was announced that his wound was mortal. He was a brilliant young officer and beloved by everyone who knew him. His loss was generally mourned, and the report, that he had been driven to needlessly expose himself by an unjust insinuation of his superior officer,

1 W. R. R. 93-1014.

2 W. R. R. 93-1034.

3 W. R. R. 93-1034.

gave added keenness to the general sorrow. We sheltered ourselves as well as we could from the rain and awaited developments. In the afternoon orders came to be ready to move, but soon afterwards they were countermanded and we were told we would remain where we were during the night. We were ordered to be aroused at 4:30 next morning and to stand at arms until daylight. Firing was kept up along the line nearly all night. The night was rainy and cold. During the afternoon General Schofield had ordered all the artillery and trains across the river and the infantry to be prepared to move after dark. But the rain which had continued all day made it almost impossible for the artillery and trains to move down the bank to the pontoon bridge and up the bank on the other side. At 7 p. m. only a few wagons and two or three caissons had crossed. At 8 o'clock the order above mentioned was suspended and the artillery which had been taken out of our works was ordered back into position. It was reported that only one division of the enemy's infantry had shown itself in our front during the day, and it was thought that he was only making a demonstration while his main force might be endeavoring to cross Duck River, or moving over toward the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad.¹

General Wilson on the 25th had sent a strong battalion of cavalry to the point where the Lewisburg pike crossed Duck River to feel well out toward Lewisburg for the enemy,² and had taken other precautions to guard other crossings and fords of Duck River and to watch the enemy's movements both above and below Columbia. On the 26th at 2 p. m. he reported that his command was encamped seven miles from Columbia and five miles from Rally Hill, and that Capron's brigade was at the crossing of Duck River watching out toward Lewisburg.³

Sunday morning, November 27, there was the usual picket firing at daylight but no other demonstration. After breakfast a portion of the left wing of the regiment was sent out to the picket line and orders to be ready to move at any moment were received. After dinner Colonel Streight ordered that the men be kept together close to the works, as he had an intimation of an attack by the enemy. No attack however was made. Toward evening our batteries shelled the enemy vigorously without provoking any response. The enemy's artillery had been silent since Friday the 25th. We got no orders to move and were making preparations to pass another night where we were, when suddenly at about 6 p. m., the order to fall in was quietly passed

1 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 92-145-146.

2 W. R. R. 93-1041.

3 W. R. R. 93-1059.

along the line and we formed and marched out to the Pulaski pike: There we found the other brigades passing, and having gathered in all the stragglers, we marched through the city towards the river. The rain had ceased early in the morning, but the streets were very muddy and sloppy. It was plain to us that we were evacuating Columbia. The streets were filled with marching troops and some of our artillery was on its way to the ford. The pontoon bridge had been moved below the railroad bridge and we moved in that direction. A building in the town took fire after we left it and it was reported that it had been set on fire by some southern sympathizer as a signal to the enemy. The approaches to the bridge were very muddy and there were frequent short halts which were very exasperating: Our army swore terribly in this campaign, that is, our part of it. Much of the profanity was doubtless caused by the example set by our brigade commander, Colonel Streight. He was loudly, brutally and aggressively profane. It was said that he could not give an order to an orderly without accompanying it by a profane oath. His profanity directed to others incited profane language in reply and when conditions were unusually trying, as on this night, many unused to swearing swore profanely. We finally got across the pontoon bridge and up the river bank and after marching about a mile formed in line in a woods overlooking the river. On the 27th, Lee's corps of Hood's army remained with its right resting on the Mount Pleasant pike. Cheatham's corps moved over from the Columbia pike across the Pulaski pike and went into position with its left on the Pulaski pike and its right on Duck River. Stewart's corps moved up and went into position with its right on the Pulaski pike and its left on the Mount Pleasant pike.¹ His cavalry was threatening the Chattanooga Railroad near Tullahoma, and the Northwestern Railroad from Centerville,² about twenty-five miles down Duck River. The last of our troops, except the pickets, got across the river about midnight, and General Schofield gave orders to destroy the bridges across the river as soon as the last of our pickets were withdrawn. General Schofield wired General Thomas that he thought Hood did not intend to attack but would try to cross Duck River above Columbia, as near it as he could.³ There was no word from A. J. Smith's corps. Our trains were moved back on the Franklin pike to Rutherford's Creek, a short distance north of Columbia. Rutherford's Creek was an affluent of Duck River, emptying into it a short distance below Columbia. No

1 General Hood's Army, W. R. R. 93-670.

2 W. R. R. 93-1084-5.

3 W. R. R. 93-1084.

report of the enemy's movements could be obtained. General Wilson, from his headquarters four miles east of Columbia, at 10 a. m., reported that no evidence of a movement by the enemy toward Shelbyville or the Lewisburg pike could be obtained, that there were no reports from below since the morning of the 26th, and that the people said Duck River was impassable or nearly so, everywhere that morning.¹ That night, however, he received word that General Croxton's pickets, who were stationed at the fords above Huey's Mill, reported that there were rumors that rebel infantry were moving on the opposite side of the river toward the mouth of Cedar Creek and that they intended crossing where the Lewisburg pike crossed Duck River. He also received a report from Colonel Capron giving various rumors; among them that on November 26th, a Confederate regiment of cavalry had passed six miles north of Chapel Hill,, going toward the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad; that Forrest was moving on the south side of the river, but in what direction could not be ascertained; that a brigade of cavalry and a corps of infantry were expected in Lewisburg the morning of the 28th; and that there were rumors that Hood's main army was not before Columbia, but was crossing the river lower down and moving on Nashville by way of Centerville. General Wilson forwarded these reports to General Schofield the morning of the 28th, stating that they were nothing but rumors obtained from country people and that no reliable information, other than that obtained from prisoners "sent herewith," had been obtained from south of Duck River.²

November 28 was a day of anxiety and intense activity. At 5 a. m., the last of our pickets crossed the river on the railroad bridge, having been followed through the town by the enemy's skirmishers. The ends of the railroad bridge were burned and the pontoon boats scuttled and sunk. Very early in the morning Colonel Askew, himself, awakened the men of the regiment and directed them to get ready to march. There was evident anxiety in his face and manner, and he probably knew more about the critical nature of our position than anyone else in the command. He felt intuitively that Hood's purpose was to interpose his army between us and Nashville, and that the chances were ten to one that he could do it. There was heavy skirmishing toward the ford. We soon moved out toward the Franklin pike and it looked as if we would continue our retreat. We crossed Rutherford Creek but when we reached the pike turned southward and

1 W. R. R. 93-1089.

2 W. R. R. 93-1109.

marched toward Columbia until we reached a point about two miles from the town. There we formed into line facing Columbia, one-fourth of a mile east of the pike, and at once began to throw up intrenchments. We were a part of the general line of battle which was formed from east to west as follows: Our division (Wood's) on the left or east of the Franklin pike, Wagner's division on our right, and Kimball's (lately commanded by General Whitaker) on Wagner's right, his right resting on Rutherford Creek. Across the creek covering, the railroad bridge, was Ruger's division of the Twenty-third Corps. General Cox's division of the Twenty-third Corps was in advance of ours and Kimball's division, and covered the crossing of the river at the Franklin pike. The main body of General Wilson's cavalry seems to have been still five miles from Rally Hill, where he had reported it as encamped at 2 p. m., the 26th. Capron's brigade was at Duck River, where the Lewisburg pike crossed it, and Croxton's brigade at Caldwell's house, six miles above Columbia, on the Rally Hill road, with a strong picket at Huey's Mill, directly south of his camp, and pickets at the fords below Columbia.¹ Stewart's brigade was below Columbia, probably on the right of General Ruger's division of the Twenty-third Corps.²

November 28, there was heavy skirmishing along the river front, and artillery firing continued all day. Our distance from the enemy's guns in Columbia, however, was so great that little damage was done. We continued work on intrenchments all day and into the night. Picket firing along the river continued all night long.

The incidents of the day had been startling. At 9:40 a. m., Colonel Capron sent a dispatch to General Wilson stating, that his troops across the river reported a brigade of the enemy in line of battle within two miles of the river. At 12:45 p. m. General Wilson sent the dispatch to General Schofield and asked if he should move to the pike leading from Lewisburg to Franklin. Later, General Wilson received a dispatch from one of General Croxton's lieutenants, stating that the rebel infantry were crossing in force above Huey's Mill, and at 1 p. m. forwarded it to General Schofield saying, he could scarcely credit it, but would find out at once.³ At 2:10 p. m. General Wilson sent a dispatch to General Schofield saying that General Capron reported his force driven back from the south side of river by a heavy force of the enemy, and was then fighting them, and that the force crossing the

1 General R. W. Johnson's Report, W. R. R. 93-597.

2 W. R. R. 93-1111.

3 W. R. R. 93-1109-1110.

river above Huey's also seemed to be heavy.¹ At 3 p. m. Colonel Capron reported that his brigade of cavalry had been driven back from the ford eleven miles east of Columbia, and that some of the enemy's infantry had crossed the river at that point. At 4:30 p. m. General Wilson again dispatched to General Schofield, saying the enemy's cavalry had crossed the river on the roads leading to Spring Hill and that he (Schofield) would better look out for that place.² In the evening after 5 o'clock word came to our brigade, which was the extreme left of our line, that two regiments of the enemy's cavalry had crossed the river a short distance up the river from our left. Colonel Streight reported the fact to headquarters, and orders were sent to him to drive this cavalry back. It was 9 p. m. when the order came and General Wood decided it was too dark to send us on that expedition. He, however, sent 150 men beyond our left flank up the river to find out what the enemy was doing. To crown it all, General Thomas at 6 p. m. sent a dispatch to General Schofield, saying he thought General A. J. Smith would be in Nashville in *three days*³ and directing that if he, Schofield, could not prevent the enemy from crossing Duck River, he should fall back to the north bank of the Harpeth River at Franklin. The officers to whom these facts were known passed an anxious night.

At 7:30 a. m., November 29, word came from General Wilson that the enemy had laid a pontoon bridge across the river about five miles east of our flank, and at his suggestion orders were given to General Stanley to send two divisions to Spring Hill, which was about ten miles to our rear on the Franklin pike, to hold the enemy in check in case he should approach that point, until the rest of the force could withdraw from the enemy in our front. He was also directed to send a brigade of our division up the river to see if the enemy was crossing the river as reported. Our regiment and brigade were astir at daylight. There was only desultory picket firing along the river. We soon saw the Second Brigade of our division, under command of Colonel Post, moving out to the left on a reconnoissance and extended our line in that direction about a mile. Messengers from Post's brigade reported that the enemy's infantry was across the river on our left. The report was soon confirmed and we wondered why our troops were not at once ordered back towards Franklin. Instead, we were ordered to continue fortifying

1 W. R. R. 93-1111.

2 W. R. R. 93-1112.

3 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-147.

our line. The crossing of the enemy's infantry so near our left caused General Schofield to halt Kimball's division, which together with Wagner's had been ordered to Spring Hill, at Rutherford Creek.¹ Just before we moved to the left, as above stated, there was a sharp artillery duel between batteries on opposite sides of the river, but the enemy's batteries were soon apparently silenced. We worked all day on our fortifications and finally finished them. There was no approach of the enemy on our front, no orders came to move and we wondered what it all meant. Just before sunset a terrific cannonading began at the ford where General Cox's division was posted, accompanied by volleys of musketry and the shrill cheers of the enemy. It was an attempt of the enemy to force a crossing of the river in General Cox's front. The fight continued until after dark and it was reported that the enemy had been repulsed and that General Cox still held his position.² It was afterwards known that the enemy had succeeded in getting about 1500 men across the river and had put down a pontoon bridge. We put up no tents, as everyone realized that we were to move back towards Franklin. We waited patiently for orders, and at last were quietly called into line and moved down to the Franklin pike. There we found a large body of troops massed in column and building fires.³ At length after all the troops there assembled moved out, we followed them. We were fairly well on the road when we noticed a red glare in the sky to the north, and Colonel Askew said to the adjutant who was riding beside him: "Cope, I am not an alarmist, but I think that light is from the enemy's camp fires." The situation was in fact even more critical than we then imagined. Hood had made our chief officers believe that his cavalry would cross Duck River about twelve miles up the river from Columbia, and General Wilson had withdrawn nearly all our cavalry to that point to oppose him. He had held the greater part of our army at Columbia by threatening an attack on our front, and in the meantime had crossed the main body of his infantry not more than five miles from our left flank and had marched directly on Spring Hill. He arrived near Spring Hill with sufficient forces to have overwhelmed the small number of troops there, and to have interposed the greater part of his army between us and Nashville, and thus wrought our destruction. That it did not succeed was due to the warning given by General Wilson, the superior skill of General Stanley, the intrepid courage of the

1 W. R. R. 93-1141.

2 Gleason's Diary.

3 Gleason's Diary.

troops of Wagner's Second Division, who held the enemy's veterans under General Cleburne at bay, and to one of those "accidents of war" before referred to, which will be mentioned further along.

We did not know the real condition of affairs and it is perhaps as well that we did not. We marched on over a weary and difficult road, hurrying up the laggards, and trying to keep the men from straggling. For a week they had been on very severe duty, with little sleep, and it was hard work to keep them awake and in place. All at once we came to a bend in the road and there, in plain view before us, were the enemy's camp fires, not more than a half mile away—so near, in fact, that we could see the men's faces by their camp fires' light and hear their talk and laughter. Pursuant to orders the adjutant rode back along the line of marching men and cautioned them to hook up their canteens so they would not rattle against their bayonets, and to preserve strict silence, as those were the enemy's camp fires. At first the men were inclined to scoff at the caution. They could not believe such a thing was possible. Soon, however, they realized the truth of the situation and something akin to awe crept along the ranks. The canteens were hooked up as ordered, all talking ceased, and nothing was heard but the click of our horses' hoofs and the shuffle of the men's feet as we moved along in the darkness. The enemy's camps were about 700 yards to our right. The road ran along the top of an embankment and there seemed to be a mist covering the low ground between us and the enemy. One who rode along that road that memorable night imagined that heavy lines or columns of troops might be concealed by it, and wondered what he would do if he escaped the first volley from such a concealed foe. No flankers were thrown out and we moved on, realizing our almost helpless condition in case of such an attack. We were strung out along the road for a long distance. Our artillery and trains, the First Division of our corps and the pickets at Columbia were to follow. Strange to say our column was not fired into. It was the most remarkable incident in all our military experience.

Mr. Samuel T. Wallace, Company F, of Benton, Iowa, a boy in his teens, who was recovering from a severe attack of fever and had been ordered to rejoin our thin ranks, relates his experience on the march from Columbia to Spring Hill as follows:

"I rejoined the regiment at Columbia the evening of the eventful 29th day of November, and in less than an hour we

began that noted march. About midnight, as we approached Spring Hill, we saw a long line of camp fires ahead of us, parallel with and not far from the pike on which we were marching. It was a grand sight, but the anxious inquiry was: 'What does it mean? Are they our men or Confederates?' Soon a lone horseman, coming from our front, was seen riding along beside the column. He leaned over and in low tone said something to our commanding officer, repeating the same as he hurriedly passed along at the side of the marching column. It was an order to preserve strict silence, as we were then about to pass immediately in front of the Confederate army, within speaking distance. Every soldier soon seemed to comprehend the seriousness of the situation, and not a word was spoken above a whisper, as we silently marched by this threatening line of battle less than half a mile away. Even the usually noisy driver of the six-mule team sat statue-like on the lead mule as the team and wagon moved slowly and quietly on."

How and why it occurred is still a matter of dispute. General Hood's plan was to have Cheatham's division attack our small force as soon as it arrived at Spring Hill, Stewart's corps and Johnson's division of Lee's corps were to support him and the two divisions of Lee's corps which had held us at Columbia were to follow us, press our rear and finally join the left flank of his army. General Hood in his official report,¹ says:

"Late in the evening of the 28th of November General Forrest, with most of his command, crossed Duck River a few miles above Columbia, and I followed early in the morning of the 29th, with Stewart's and Cheatham's corps, and Johnson's division of Lee's corps, leaving the other divisions of Lee's corps in the enemy's front at Columbia. The troops moved in light marching order, with only a battery to the corps, my object being to turn the enemy's flank, by marching rapidly on roads parallel to the Columbia and Franklin pike, at or near Spring Hill, and to cut off that portion of the enemy at or near Columbia. When I had gotten well on his flank the enemy discovered my intention and began to retreat, on the pike toward Spring Hill. The cavalry became engaged near that place about midday, but his trains were so strongly guarded that they were unable to break through them. About 4 p. m. our infantry forces, Major General Cheatham in the advance, commenced to come in contact with the enemy about two miles from Spring Hill, through which place the Colum-

1 W. R. R. 93-652

bia and Franklin pike runs. The enemy was at this time moving rapidly along the pike, with some of his troops on the flank of his column to protect it. Major General Cheatham was ordered to attack the enemy at once and vigorously, and get possession of this pike, and although these orders were frequently and earnestly repeated, he made but a feeble and partial attack, failing to reach the point indicated. Had my instructions been carried out there is no doubt we should have possessed ourselves of this road. Stewart's corps and Johnson's division were arriving on the field to support the attack. Though the golden opportunity had passed with daylight, I did not at dark abandon the hope of dealing the enemy a heavy blow. Accordingly, Lieutenant General Stewart was furnished a guide and ordered to move his corps beyond Cheatham's and place it across the road beyond Spring Hill. Shortly after this General Cheatham came to my headquarters, and when I informed him of Stewart's movement, he said that Stewart ought to form on his right. I asked if that would throw Stewart across the pike. He replied that it would and a mile beyond. Accordingly, one of Cheatham's staff officers was sent to show Stewart where his (Cheatham's) right rested. In the dark and confusion he did not succeed in getting the position desired, but about 11 p. m. went into bivouac. About 12 p. m., ascertaining that the enemy was moving in great confusion, artillery wagons and troops intermixed, I sent instructions to General Cheatham to advance a heavy line of skirmishers against him and still further impede and confuse his march. This was not accomplished. The enemy continued to move along the road in hurry and confusion, within hearing nearly all the night. Thus was lost a great opportunity of striking the enemy for which we had labored so long—the greatest this campaign offered and one of the greatest during the war." General Hood also states that General Cheatham afterwards confessed his mistake and took the entire blame upon himself.

In 1865 General Hood gave support to a story that General Cheatham, early in the evening of November 29, went to call on a well known woman who lived near Spring Hill, placed a guard around the house with orders to admit no one, and thus lost for Hood the opportunity of crushing our army.¹

It must have been long after midnight when our tired and sleepy column reached Spring Hill. General Cox's advance reached the place at 11 p. m.² and our division followed his. John G. Gregory, in his diary, says: "We camped

¹ New Orleans Paper, July, 1865.

² Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R., 93-148.

at 3:30 a. m., and threw up some rail breastworks." Gleason, in his diary, says: "We halted at 1 a. m.," and General Wood, in his official report, says: "The head of the division reached Spring Hill about midnight."¹ We marched quietly through the town and a mile beyond it, where our division was formed in line east of and parallel to the Franklin pike, to protect the artillery and trains which were passing hurriedly along it towards Franklin. We threw up a barricade of rails in front of our line, sent out pickets, and the tired men dropped on the ground for a moment or two of rest. There was little or no sleep for any one, for artillery, trains and troops were hurrying by in great confusion. At 9 p. m. word had come to General Schofield, who had reached Spring Hill at 7 p. m.,² that the enemy had possession of Thompson's Station, three miles north of Spring Hill, and he at once started there with a brigade of Ruger's division to force a passage for our trains and troops. At 11:30 he returned and reported that the enemy had withdrawn from that place. He left General Ruger's troops at Thompson's Station. At 11:40 p. m. General Cox's division, which had arrived at 11:30 p. m., was ordered to move at once for Franklin, Ruger's brigade to go with him from Thompson's station. The wagon train was to follow Cox, Wood's and Kimball's divisions to follow the wagon train. Wagner's division was to remain at Spring Hill until everything had passed and then move out, acting as rear guard.³

At 1 a. m., November 30, General Cox's division had passed and our train of 500 to 800 wagons moved out. It had to cross a small stream on one dilapidated bridge and its progress was exasperatingly slow. Our division moved at the same time, marching along to the right side of the train. At a point two and a half miles from Spring Hill the train was attacked by the enemy's cavalry. Repeated attacks were made at the same point and at a point a half mile further on, and a number of men and mules were killed and wounded and some of the wagons destroyed. Hood's infantry, as before stated, had crossed Duck River between our infantry and Wilson's efficient cavalry, and Forrest had turned to the left toward the Franklin pike, but was held in check by Stanley at Spring Hill. The attacks on the wagon train were continued until daylight when two regiments of our division and a section of artillery were hurried to the front and drove the enemy's cavalry off.⁴ Because of these attacks and the single

1 General Wood's official report, W. R. R. 93-123.

2 General Stanley's official report, W. R. R. 93-114.

3 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-149.

4 W. R. R. 93-123-4.

defective bridge over which all had to cross, the rear of the train did not leave Spring Hill until nearly daylight. General Wagner's division left Spring Hill about 4 a. m. and his pickets were withdrawn at daylight.¹ No one who took part in the march of Schofield's column from Spring Hill to Franklin that November morning can ever forget it. The distance was about fifteen miles and every mile of the way was full of excitement and action. Forrest's cavalry threatened our flanks at every cross road. They would dash in at our train, troops would double quick forward and drive them off, and we would then resume our march. General Stanley says: "The rebel cavalry was in possession of all the hills to our right, and made numerous demonstrations upon our flank, but were easily driven off by General Wood's skirmishers."² The enemy's infantry followed us with tremendous energy. Our column was impeded by our long train, while his troops were unincumbered with trains, were in light marching order, had had a night's rest and could easily out-march us. Colonel Opdycke's brigade of Wagner's division acted as our rear guard and was praised by every one for the skill with which it held the enemy in check. At every defensible position Colonel Opdycke put his men in line and threw out skirmishers. This would cause the enemy to halt and deploy into line, when Opdycke's troops would be withdrawn, his skirmishers would slowly retire and thus our column was enabled to proceed. This was kept up until about noon, when the rear of our column reached a high knoll, two miles southeast of Franklin. Here Colonel Opdycke was halted and ordered to hold the position, supported by the two other brigades of Wagner's division, until he was threatened by a superior force of the enemy.

Our regiment had performed no very conspicuous service on this hurried march from Spring Hill, but we were part and parcel of the moving scene—one of the most vividly impressive in our experience.

Our division arrived within about a mile of Franklin about noon, when we were halted a short time for dinner and then pushed on through the town. On our way we saw troops of our own and the Twenty-third Corps working on the bridge-head, in front of the town, which General Cox had begun. We crossed the Harpeth River on a pontoon bridge,³ moved to the left and were posted in a commanding position to cover the right flank of our army and protect our trains

1 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-149.

2 W. R. R. 93-115.

3 Gleason's Diary.

which had been hurried across the river. The Harpeth River was a small stream and was fordable at a number of points, both above and below Franklin. The occasion of our being sent to the position above named was that at 1 p.m. General Schofield received word that the enemy was trying to cross the river a few miles above the town, and he therefore wished General Stanley to send our division to watch the trains and drive back the enemy if he attempted to take them.¹ Our position was an admirable one for a reserve. We could quickly move to either flank or to the center, as occasion should require. From it we had a fine view of the country to the south of us. We could see the hills beyond Franklin, where the enemy was supposed to be. The day was mild and the sun shone through a fine mist, which softened all harsh outlines, and the air was soft and unusually still. The bridge-head which had been constructed under General Cox's immediate direction, extended from the river above to the river below the town—a distance of about a mile and a half. The line had been designated by General Schofield. The ground in front of it was almost level, without any cover from woods or orchards for a distance of nearly a mile, the part of it on both sides of the Columbia pike for a distance of about 800 yards, being almost as level as a floor without any obstruction whatever. The men had thrown up the usual parapet and in some places it was topped by head logs and protected by abatis. An osage orange hedge in front of Stile's brigade on the extreme left had been partially cut away to form such abatis and on the right a similar hedge, a small locust grove and an orchard, had been used for the same purpose. At the left of the line across the river was Fort Granger, which had been constructed two years before. It commanded a stretch of the river, which here runs in a northwesterly direction to the left, and also a cut in the railroad which here ran nearly parallel to the river and to the left of the Lewisburg pike. General Cox's division of the Twenty-third Corps was placed in the line with its right resting on the Columbia pike and its left extending across the Lewisburg pike to the river. Upon the right of the Columbia pike, extending to and across the Carter's Creek pike, which entered the town from the southwest, was placed Ruger's division of the same corps, and on his right was General Kimball's division of the Fourth Corps, the right of his line resting on the river. Our division (Wood's) of the Fourth Corps, as before stated, had been posted across the river in a position to protect the left flank

1 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-149.

and guard the trains. The line, where it crossed the Columbia pike, was just south of Carter's house, the southernmost house in the town. There was no ground in the rear of the works where artillery could be posted to advantage and the batteries of the Fourth Corps were posted along the bridge-head, as follows: The First Kentucky Light Artillery, four guns, on the left of the Columbia pike, in the line of the One Hundredth Ohio; the Sixth Ohio Light Artillery, four guns, on the right of the Columbia pike, just west of the Carter house; Battery B, Pennsylvania Volunteers on the Carter's Creek pike; Battery M, Fourth U. S. Artillery, and Battery G, First Ohio Artillery, to the left of Stile's, the left brigade of General Cox's division; Battery A, First Ohio Artillery, in reserve near the Columbia pike; and Bridge's Battery, Illinois Light Artillery, near the left of Strickland's, the left brigade of Ruger's division. The artillery of the Twenty-third Corps had been sent across the river early in the morning and a part of it placed in Fort Granger.¹ The larger part of General Wilson's cavalry, which the day before had covered the main road of Forrest's advance, had fallen back on the Lewisburg pike and taken position on the extreme left of the infantry on the north bank of the Harpeth, with Croxton's brigade on the south side, both connecting with the infantry pickets and protecting the left flank of the army.² At 1 p. m., General Wagner who, with his two other brigades, was supporting Opdycke's brigade on the high knoll south of the river, before mentioned, reported that two large columns of the enemy's infantry were approaching Colonel Opdycke's position, moving on the Lewisburg and Columbia pikes, and that he was moving his division back to the bridge-head.³ At 10:25 a. m., General Thomas telegraphed that A. J. Smith's troops had arrived that morning at Nashville and that it would take him quite all day to disembark.⁴ So all hope of his being able to reach Franklin was abandoned, and at 2 p. m. General Cox was ordered to withdraw his command to the north side of the river at 6 p. m.⁵ At 2:50 p. m., General Schofield sent word to General Stanley that the enemy's infantry was trying to force a crossing of the river at Hughes' Mill, about three miles above Franklin, and at 3 p. m. General Wood was ordered to send one of our brigades there. Kneffler's brigade, then commanded by General Samuel Beatty, was selected for this duty and started at 3:30 p. m., but never reached the point. He had been preceded by the cavalry,

1 General Cox's report, W. R. R. 93-348.

2 General Schofield's report, W. R. R. 93-343.

3 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-149.

4 W. R. R. 93-1169.

5 W. R. R. 93-352.

which drove the enemy back across the river. At 3:45 p. m. word came that the enemy was forming for an assault on our line and General Beatty was ordered to post his brigade on the left of Fort Granger instead of moving to Hughes' Mill.¹

By this time Colonel Opdycke's brigade of Wagner's division had withdrawn from the knoll, had marched inside the bridge-head and was posted in reserve about two hundred yards back of where the bridge-head crossed the Columbia pike, near the Carter house. The other two brigades of Wagner's division had been halted from 500 to 800 yards in front of the bridge-head, or main works, with orders to withdraw "whenever the enemy appeared to be advancing in decidedly superior force without allowing his troops to become seriously engaged."² He was then to take position near Opdycke's brigade and form a part of the reserve.³ Two brigades of Wood's (our) division still occupied the position they had taken when the division crossed the Harpeth River at noon. Such was the position and alignment of our little army when the storm broke.

It was unexpected. General Stanley in his official report says: "From 1 until 4 o'clock in the evening the enemy's entire force was in sight and forming for attack, yet in view of the strong position we held, and reasoning from the former course of the rebels during this campaign, nothing appeared so improbable as that they would assault. I felt so confident in this belief that I did not leave General Schofield's headquarters (at Fort Granger) until the firing commenced."³

About 3 p. m. the enemy formed line of battle behind the knoll above mentioned. Stewart's corps of three divisions on the right of the Columbia pike facing the town, Loring's division on the right, then Walthall's, and then French's, whose left was on the Columbia pike. Cheatham's corps of three divisions was formed on the left of the Columbia pike in order from right to left as follows: First Cleburne's, then Brown's and then Bates'. Buford's division of cavalry, dismounted, was on Stewart's right extending to the river, and Jackson's division was on the left of Buford's, south of the river. Chalmer's cavalry division was on the left of Cheatham's corps, covering the space between his extreme left and the river. Johnson's and Clayton's infantry divisions of Lee's corps were placed in position to support the attack.⁵

About 4 o'clock the enemy's troops appeared in great force on the hills south of the town moving with admirable

1 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-150.

2 General Cox's report, W. R. R. 93-352.

3 General Cox's report, W. R. R. 93-352.

4 W. R. R. 93-115.

5 Report of General A. P. Stewart.
W. R. R. 93-708.

steadiness. His divisions were formed with two brigades in front and one or two in their rear, and in this formation moved to the top of the range of hills. On reaching the top, the troops moved down the hills by the right flank of regiments and formed forward into line.¹ The moment they debouched from the hills a section of artillery with Wagner's two brigades opened out on them, but did not check their advance for a moment. When they came within range of Wagner's muskets, his infantry line opened out on them, but even this fire did not apparently retard their progress. Wagner's brigade commanders, Colonels Conrad and Lane, had received orders from him "not to retire to the main line until forced to do so by the fighting of the enemy."² The section of artillery above mentioned, after firing a few shots, rapidly retired to the main line, but not so the infantry. Under the mistaken orders of General Wagner they held to the slight barricade of rails they had thrown up in their front until the enemy was upon them and orderly retreat was impossible. The men in our main line saw with amazement the two brigades in disorderly retreat, with the enemy, Gordon's and Gist's brigade of Brown's division,³ so close upon them and so intermingled with them that they could not fire without danger of hitting our own men. There was a momentary panic, and a portion of Reilly's brigade, Twenty-third Corps, directly east of the Columbia pike, and Strickland's brigade immediately west of it, broke to the rear. At this critical moment Colonel Opdycke of his own motion led his brigade against the enemy and drove him from the parapet east of the Columbia pike. General Stanley, who had just arrived, and General Cox exerted themselves personally to restore the line. Stanley's horse was killed and soon after he was struck by a musket ball in the back of the neck and severely wounded, but did not leave the field. Opdycke's charge not only restored a portion of our broken line, but the courage and intrepidity of his troops inspired the same qualities in others, and soon the men in Reilly's and Strickland's brigades who had given way returned to the fight. The men in Conrad's and Lane's brigades did likewise, taking their places along the line with the troops of other commands. One result of Opdycke's charge was the capture of several hundred prisoners, who had broken through and when our lines were restored found themselves inside and surrendered. Among the captured were General George W. Gordon, com-

1 Colonel Capers, commanding Gist's brigade, Hood's army, W. R. R. 93-736.

2 General Stanley's report, W. R. R. 93-116.

3 Report of Colonel Capers, W. R. R. 93-736.

manding a brigade in Brown's division of Cheatham's corps, and a large portion of his brigade. West of the Columbia pike for a space about the length of a regiment, the enemy held on to our main line of works and could not be dislodged. There was a second line of works about twenty-five yards in rear of the main line at this point, and Opdycke's men and others, under cover of the battle smoke, strengthened and held it until the close of the engagement. The air was so still and moist that the smoke of the guns settled over the field and after a half hour's fighting it was almost impossible to see any object along the line at a distance of a few yards.¹ The assault further to the left of the Columbia pike was just as determined. Our guns from Fort Granger poured an oblique and direct fire on Stewart's advancing columns, and those distributed along the line poured grape and canister into their front. But the line still pressed on and in a number of places reached our parapet, where a hand to hand conflict ensued. The heaviest assault seemed to be directed against our center and left, and officers of all ranks joined the men in desperate efforts to break our lines. General John Adams and his horse were both killed on our parapet. Generals Quarles and Cockrell, brigade commanders, were severely wounded; General Wathall, division commander, had two horses shot under him and was severely bruised, while scores of Colonels and officers of lesser rank were killed or wounded by the sturdy, cool and intrepid men of General Cox's division. But perhaps the enemy suffered the heaviest losses in the center on the Columbia pike. There General Cleburne, with the same brigades—Govan's, Granbury's and Lowry's—which we had met so often before, fought with the same steadfast valor and he and General Granbury, whose brigade of Texans had slaughtered us in that awful ravine at Pickett's Mill, were both killed near our works. The losses in Cleburne's division were appalling, and must have exceeded the losses of our division at Pickett's Mill, about six months before. The retribution, if such it may be called, was not exacted by our division, but by other troops of the Fourth Corps, and troops of the Twenty-third Corps, who stubbornly held the line against their repeated attacks.

It is to be regretted that one is unable to find in the War of the Rebellion Records any report of this battle by General Cheatham, or of any one for him, or any report of the part taken by General Cleburne's division. When the Confederate Army moved to the attack Cleburne's division was directly west of the Co-

¹ General Cox's report, W. R. R. 93-354.

lumbia pike. It must have crossed the pike before the attack was delivered, for it was General Gordon's brigade of Brown's division which first came through our line on the pike, and Brown's division was to the west of Cleburne's when the advance began. Wherever Cleburne was there was sure to be fire and hard fighting, and this was the case at Franklin.

In fact the entire attacking force moved with a steady courage and intrepidity worthy of a better cause. With the exception of that portion of his forces which so closely followed Wagner's brigades in their retreat from their advanced position, that neither our artillery or infantry could fire without danger of shooting our own men, his whole assaulting lines had to advance over an unobstructed plain from 800 to 1000 yards wide, exposed almost every step of the way to the fire of artillery and infantry. General Stewart says that the ground over which Loring's, his right division, advanced, was perfectly open and unobstructed, except by the railroad cut and the osage orange hedge before mentioned, and was swept by a terrible cross fire of artillery from our works and from the opposite side of the Harpeth¹ (Fort Granger). Major General Walthall who commanded the center division of Stewart's corps says:

"Both officers and men seemed fully alive to the importance of beating the enemy here at any cost, and the line moved steadily forward until it neared his outer works, and then fell upon it so impetuously that the opposing force gave way without even retarding the advance and retired in disorder to the strong intrenchments in rear. There was an extensive, open, and almost unbroken plain between the outer and inner lines across which we must pass to reach the latter. This was done under far the most deadly fire of both small arms and artillery that I have ever seen troops subjected to."²

The ground on either side of the Columbia pike was equally open and exposed for a distance of nearly a mile.³ The entire plain was swept by a terrible fire from our small arms and artillery and the charge of Hood's veterans across it was as courageous as Pickett's charge at Gettysburg, or the charge at Missionary Ridge, and more deadly than either. But it was met by a little army of veterans as brave as themselves, who behind their low intrenchments literally slaughtered them as they came on. After the momentary panic and break in our line due to Wagner's retirement at the beginning, there was no flinching, and the men of the Fourth and Twenty-third Corps held fast

1 W. R. R. 93-708.

2 W. R. R. 93-720.

3 General Cox's report, W. R. R. 93-250.

against superior numbers and repeated charges until near midnight, when they were withdrawn. At a number of places along the line our troops held one side of the parapet and the enemy the other and continued in such positions until about 10 o'clock at night. In one place to the west of the Carter house the enemy held our main line of works until our troops were withdrawn at midnight.¹

While the infantry was engaged in the fierce struggle above described the cavalry, unknown to us, was fighting an important and independent battle on our left up the river. It is described as independent because General Wilson says, "I received neither orders nor information from General Schofield during the contest between him and Hood, although I was not two miles away."² General Schofield in his official report says he sent such orders, but that General Wilson had anticipated them.³ The enemy's cavalry under General Forrest had forced a crossing of the Harpeth and at 3 p. m., when General Beatty's brigade of our division was ordered to Hughes Mill, as before stated, was threatening our connections and trains. He was met by General Wilson's cavalry and after a hot encounter which lasted until nightfall, was defeated and driven back across the river.⁴ This made safe the infantry's road to the rear.

The losses of the enemy were enormous, especially in officers. In two of the brigades, Gist's and Quarle's, when the battle ended, the highest ranking officer present for duty was a captain. All of higher rank had been either killed or wounded. Among his General Officers, Major General Cleburne and Brigadier Generals Gist, Adams, Strahl and Granbury were killed. Major General Brown and Brigadier Generals Carter, Manigault, Quarles, Cockrell and Scott were wounded and General George W. Gordon was captured.⁵ No detailed report of the enemy's aggregate losses is obtainable. General Hood in his official report says: His loss was 4500, but General Cox in his official report says:

"The loss of the enemy we are enabled to approximate with some accuracy from the public admissions from their commander as well as from the statements of prisoners, our own examination of the field when it came into our possession, and the statements of citizens and hospital attendants remaining in Franklin. From all these sources the testimony is abundant that the rebels lost six general officers killed, six wounded and one captured; that they buried 1,800 men on the field, and that 3800 were

1 Report of Colonel Capers, W. R. R. 93-737.

2 Under the Old Flag, Vol. 2, pp. 49 and 53.

3 W. R. R. 93-343.

4 W. R. R. 93-343 and 1170, and "Under the Old Flag," Vol. 2, pp. 47 to 54.

5 W. R. R. 93-654.

wounded. The number of prisoners captured by the Corps (the Twenty-third) was 702. Thus without estimating the prisoners taken by the Fourth Corps, who are known to have been numerous, the enemy's loss was not less than 6300."¹ The losses on our side in battle were 990 in the Twenty-third Corps² and 1368 in the Fourth Corps.³ In the War of the Rebellion Records there is given a list furnished to General S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General of the C. S. Army giving the names of the division, brigade and regimental commanders, killed, wounded, missing and captured in the battle of Franklin, November 30, 1864. Such list shows a loss of 65 such commanders, and it is fair to presume that the loss of other officers was proportionately great. It may be truly said that in no battle of the war was the relative loss of officers so great. It can also be safely affirmed that in no great battle of the war were the numbers of killed in proportion to the numbers wounded so large.

While this fierce struggle was going on, the Fifteenth Ohio Volunteers, with the first and second brigades of the division lay quietly on the hill covering the left flank, awaiting orders. About 3:40 p. m., General Wood received an order from General Stanley directing him to hold his force in readiness to cover the crossing of the river in case the enemy who was advancing in heavy lines should break our lines across the river. Some of the men slept and others chased and captured some hogs to add to their meat rations. About 4 o'clock from the top of the hill where we were posted, we saw shells bursting in the air beyond the town but could hear no explosion. We could hear no boom of cannon or rattle of musketry, although the air was unusually still. The smoke across the river beyond the town seemed to slightly increase, but still there was no sound of battle, and yet we were within two and one half miles of the battle ground. No word came to us telling of what was going on, and the men were as apparently care-free as if the enemy had been a hundred miles away. The adjutant at one time stood beside Colonel Askew who was silently watching the exploding shells, saw the grave look on his face and judged from that more than from what we saw, that there was serious work going on beyond the river. Gleason in his diary says: "Artillery firing from the direction of the town mingled with rapid musketry indicated an assault of the works by the enemy and it lasted until after dark. All being quiet on our front across the river, we prepared our suppers and after the sound of battle had died away we were ordered back

1 W. R. R. 93-355-356.

2 W. R. R. 93-355.

3 W. R. R. 93-125.

to the bridge".¹ But it is the writer's recollection that we heard no firing until we descended from the hill and moved to the river to cover the crossing of the army in its withdrawal; that we then first heard sounds of the strife.

The writer's recollection is confirmed by Major Wm. M. Clark, surgeon of the regiment, who, in a letter dated El Cajon, California, April 27th, 1914, says:

"I have no recollection of seeing bursting shells or hearing any sounds of battle and did not know there had been an engagement until towards evening, when—I think—Rev. Randall Ross came over from town and told of what had occurred. Had we known a battle was in progress, Major McClenahan and I would hardly had the nerve to strip off and take baths in a pool of water in an abandoned quarry in the rear of our position, which we did as I remember distinctly. The only shells I saw or heard were those that were fired in our direction, as the bridge was burning and we were taking up our line of retreat towards Nashville."

General Thomas on the afternoon of November 30th had telegraphed to General Schofield that one of General A. J. Smith's divisions was still behind and that he must therefore hold Hood at Franklin until those troops could be got up, and asked if he, Schofield, could hold Hood three days longer.² To this General Schofield answered at 3 p. m., saying in substance, that he did not think that he could hold Hood for more than a day and would risk something in doing even that; that the enemy had two corps in his, Schofield's, front and was prepared to cross the river above and below; that he, Schofield, thought the enemy could cross the river that night or the next day in spite of all his efforts to prevent him, and that Forrest would be in his rear the next day or doing some greater mischief. He also said that a worse position than that we then held for an inferior force could not be found, and that he ought to take position at Brentwood near Nashville at once.³

At 7:10 p. m. General Schofield telegraphed to General Thomas, announcing the attack of the enemy and his repulse, and was cautioned "to look out that the enemy does not still persist."⁴

After the receipt of this last dispatch, General Schofield issued an order directing that the troops should be withdrawn from the south bank of the river that night and march for Brentwood, and that General Wood's division should cover the crossing and act as rear guard.⁵ It was after dark when this order

1 Gleason's Diary.

2 W. R. R. 93-1170.

3 W. R. R. 93-1170.

4 W. R. R. 93-1171.

5 W. R. R. 93-1172.

reached us and we moved down from the hill and thence along the pike toward the river. When we struck the pike we first realized that a heavy battle had been fought across the river. There was the usual hurry and confusion which is always seen in the rear of a fighting army. As we were moving slowly toward the river quite a body of men in dusty gray uniforms were being hurried to the rear and one of them called out, "Where is General Askew?". Colonel Askew had ridden back to the rear for some purpose and the adjutant answered, "This is Colonel Askew's regiment". Thereupon a soldier in gray stepped up and handed the adjutant a note for General Askew. When the colonel came up the adjutant gave him the note. It was written on a piece of brown wrapping paper. The colonel stopped beside some burning cracker boxes and read the following:

"Dear General Askew:

"I plunged my brigade through your center on the Spring Hill road today and was captured with my command. I have received no injury except a severe bruise from a musket, in the hands of one of your men. I hope you have escaped personal harm."

"GORDON."

It was the same Lieutenant Colonel George W. Gordon, now Brigadier General Gordon, with whom Colonel Askew had become acquainted when they were carried wounded to the same room at Murfreesboro during the battle of Stone River.

Our brigade moved on down to the river and were posted on a bluff bank just west of the railroad bridge, over which the left of our fighting line was to cross. Colonel Post's Second Brigade of our division was stretched along down the river on our right and the Third Brigade, General Samuel Beatty, was similarly placed along up the river to our left. We waited hour after hour for the withdrawal to begin. Finally, about midnight, it was reported that our troops on the other side of the river were moving, or beginning to move. All at once some villian set fire to the town. The light from the burning buildings streamed over the surrounding country and compelled a suspension of the movement.

The swearing at Columbia was mild as compared to that which broke loose in our brigade at that time, led of course by Colonel Streight. A detail of 100 men was sent across the river and under the direction of the corps and division staff officers the fire was soon extinguished. Our skirmishers in front across the river kept up a brisk fire to deceive the enemy as to our purpose to withdraw, and soon the columns began to cross the river; those on the right over the wooden bridge where the Columbia

pike crossed the river, and those on the left on the railroad bridge, which had been covered with plank.

Just north of the crossings great piles of boxes of hard tack and side bacon had been knocked apart, the bacon cut into small pieces, and as the hungry men marched by each helped himself and hurried on toward Nashville.

For over three hours we stood under arms while our weary comrades marched across the bridges and moved on to the north. When it was thought that nearly all were across, we gathered together near the railroad bridge hundreds of those empty cracker boxes with which to set fire to the bridge. General Streight ordered that the boxes be piled on the bridge, but a staff officer of General Schofield interposed, saying we must wait until sure that the troops were all across. This caused an outbreak of profanity from Colonel Streight. Later it was announced that all were across, when the bridge at the pike was torn up and the cracker boxes were piled on the railroad bridge and the torch applied. The blaze lighted up the surrounding country and plainly disclosed the position of our brigade standing in line along the river bank. There was low wooded ground just beyond the river, and we felt that the enemy might at any moment send a deadly volley into our exposed ranks. All the troops, except our brigade, had by this time marched on northward and we were ordered to remain until the bridge went down. A number of times we heard commands across the river in the dark low ground, and once or twice thought we heard moving artillery. We did not know but any moment we would receive a storm of grape and canister from the unseen foe. The position was very trying and there were bursts of profanity which, if possible, exceeded anything we had heard before. General Schofield had sent one of his staff to see that the bridge was actually destroyed before our brigade was withdrawn. The fire on the bridge had been burning, it seemed an age, and Colonel Streight insisted on moving out, but the staff officer protested that we must not go until the bridge fell. There then occurred the most vicious exchange of profane oaths we ever heard. While this was going on, we distinctly heard the rattle of artillery harness across the river. Suddenly the bridge fell in, and in an incredibly short time we were hurrying away out of the light of the burning structure. Fortunately, our officers steered the column away from the pike, for we had not gone more than a few hundred yards, when the enemy's artillery opened on us. They mistook our direction and their shots went wild, but it seemed to our overwrought nerves the wickedest cannonading we had ever heard. It was then after 4 a. m., December 1. We

threw out a strong rear guard to gather up the stragglers, sent out small squads of mounted men to drive in all live stock on the farms on either side of the road for quite a distance, set fire to all ricks and stacks, and all barns containing grain or forage. Looking backward, as we ascended the hills on our toilsome march, we literally saw a land of smoke and flame. Our rear guard was relieved at daylight by Wilson's cavalry which had held off Forrest's cavalry and guarded our flanks during the withdrawal from Franklin.¹ We pressed on until we reached Brentwood and halted for breakfast. We then pushed on for Nashville and in the middle of the afternoon halted at one of our old camps, "Camp Andy Johnson", and had our dinner. We then moved on toward the city. Filing off the Franklin pike to the left, we finally reached a position on Lauren's Hill near the Hillsborough pike, about two and a half miles southwest of the city, and were formed into line. As our corps was moving into position General A. J. Smith's corps, so long and anxiously awaited, moved up and went into position on our right.

1 "The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War," John Fiske, p. 343.



CHAPTER XXIX.

HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE—THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE.

When we reached Nashville, December 1, 1864, the men were so worn out that nothing was required of them but to take position and rest.¹ Fortunately, Hood's army had suffered so severely at Franklin that he did not follow us up as vigorously as from Spring Hill to Franklin, and as A. J. Smith's troops had now arrived and it was reported that General Steedman had arrived from Chattanooga with 5000 men, our anxiety was much relieved, and we enjoyed a few hours of welcome rest and relaxation.

On the morning of December 2, our army was formed in line of battle south of Nashville on a series of ridges running north of west, about a mile and a half from the city,—the line facing west of south. On the left was the Twenty-third Corps, then came the Fourth (our) Corps and to our right was General A. J. Smith's command. The left of our corps, Kimball's division, was a few hundred yards east of the Granny White pike, then came our division, whose right extended over to and beyond the Hillsborough pike, and then came Wagner's division, which connected on the right with General A. J. Smith's command.² Our brigade was to the right and in front of Mrs. Acklin's residence, its left on Lauren's Hill and its right extending to the Hillsborough pike.³ The cavalry had been withdrawn from the Nolensville pike and for the next ten days was encamped and refitting at Edgefield on the north bank of the Cumberland.⁴ Some time in the forenoon a body of the enemy's cavalry made its appearance on the pike in our front, skirmishing with our pickets, and in the afternoon we saw from the hill in our front columns of his infantry about a mile and a half away moving toward our right and deploying into line of battle. We were at once ordered to throw up fortifications to resist an attack. The Fifty-first Indiana was on the left, on the crest of the hill; our regiment was on its right, but moved further to the right down the hill to make room for the Forty-ninth Ohio. The Eighth Kansas was on our right, and to its right was the Eighty-ninth Illinois. We soon threw up a formidable line of intrenchments. The ground was rocky and we used a good many loose stones in

1 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-151.

2 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-152.

3 Colonel Streight's report, W. R. R. 93-294.

4 General Wilson's report, W. R. R. 93-550.

its construction. After it was finished we covered it with a fine abatis. Our regiment was then moved to a position a short distance back of the line and placed in reserve in a dense thicket, where we had to clear the ground to get room to put up tents. The night came on with no attack by the enemy and we slept the sleep of tired men.

On the morning of December 3 we found a gap in our intrenchments between our right and the Eighth Kansas, and our pioneers were set to work to close it by works similar to those we had built the day before. December 2, General Hood ordered General Lee to form his corps with its center resting on the Franklin pike,—General Cheatham's to form his corps on Lee's right, and General Stewart to form on Lee's left, his entire line to curve forward from Lee's center so that the right of General Cheatham's corps might come as near the Cumberland river above Nashville as possible, and General Stewart's left as near as possible to the river below the city,—the line to be strengthened and extended as fast as possible.¹ By the evening of December 3, the enemy's infantry was in force along our entire line and pressing forward so as to reach the river, both above and below the city. On the first day of December, at 9:30 p. m., General Thomas sent a dispatch to General Halleck saying:

"After General Schofield's fight of yesterday, feeling convinced that the enemy far outnumbered him, both in infantry and cavalry, I determined to retire to the fortifications about Nashville, until General Wilson can get all his cavalry equipped. He has now but about one fourth the number of the enemy, and consequently is no match for him. I have two iron clads here, with several gun boats, and Commander Fitch assures me that Hood can neither cross the Cumberland nor blockade it. I therefore think it best to wait here until Wilson can equip all his cavalry. If Hood attacks me here, he will be more seriously damaged than he was yesterday. If he remains until Wilson gets equipped, I can whip him and will move against him at once. I have Murfreesborough strongly held and therefore feel easy in regard to its safety. Chattanooga, Bridgeport, Stevenson and Elk River bridge have also strong garrisons".²

This dispatch created alarm at Washington and Secretary Stanton at once telegraphed to General Grant at City Point saying that President Lincoln felt "solicitous about the disposition of General Thomas to lay in fortifications for an indefinite period until Wilson gets equipments" and added, "this looks like the McClellan and Rosecrans strategy of do nothing and let the

¹ W. R. R. 94-640-641.

² W. R. R. 94-3.

rebels raid the country. The President wishes you to consider the matter."¹

General Grant at 11 a. m., December 2, wired General Thomas as follows:

"If Hood is permitted to remain quietly about Nashville, you will lose all the road back to Chattanooga and possibly have to abandon the line of the Tennessee. Should he attack you it is all well, but if he does not you should attack him before he fortifies. Arm and put in the trenches your quartermaster employes, citizens, etc."² Again at 1:30 p. m. General Grant telegraphed:

"With your citizen employes armed you can move out of Nashville with all your army and force the enemy to retire or fight upon ground of your own choosing. After the repulse of Hood at Franklin, it looks to me that instead of falling back on Nashville we should have taken the offensive against the enemy where he was. At this distance, however, I may err as to the best method of dealing with the enemy. You will now suffer incalculable injury upon your railroads, if Hood is not speedily disposed of."³

At 10 p. m. General Thomas answered these dispatches saying:

"At the time that Hood was whipped at Franklin, I had at this place but about 5000 men of General Smith's command which, added to the force under General Schofield, would not have given me more than 25,000 men, besides General Schofield felt convinced that he could not hold the enemy at Franklin until the 5,000 could reach him. As General Wilson's cavalry force also numbered about one-fourth that of Forrest's I thought it best to draw the troops back to Nashville and wait the arrival of the remainder of General Smith's force, and also a force of 5,000 commanded by Major General Steedman, which I had ordered up from Chattanooga. The division of General Smith arrived yesterday morning, and General Steedman's troops arrived last night. I now have infantry enough to assume the offensive, if I had more cavalry, and will take the field anyhow as soon as the remainder of General McCook's division of cavalry reaches here, which I hope it will do in two or three days. We can neither get reinforcements nor equipments at this great distance from the north very easily, and it must be remembered that my command was made up of the two weakest corps of Sherman's army and all the dismounted cavalry except one brigade, and the task of reorganizing and equipping has met with many delays, which

1 W. R. R. 94-15.

2 W. R. R. 94-17.

3 W. R. R. 94-17.

have enabled Hood to take advantage of my crippled condition. I earnestly hope, however, that in a few days I shall be able to give him a fight."¹

General Grant seemed to appreciate General Thomas' need of more cavalry, for on December 2, he suggested to Secretary Stanton that Thomas be given authority to impress horses in Tennessee and Kentucky, which authority Secretary Stanton at once granted, together with authority to impress and seize every other species of property needed for the military service in his command.² General Grant also asked General Halleck if troops from General Hooker's department, (Ohio, Indiana, Illinois and Michigan) could not be sent to General Thomas and urged, "If there are new troops, organized state militia, or anything that can go, now is the time to annihilate Hood's army." He also suggested that Governor Bramlette of Kentucky might put from 5,000 to 10,000 horsemen into the field to serve only to the end of the campaign.³ To these suggestions General Halleck, December 3, replied:

"Every available man from Hooker's and other western departments has been sent to General Thomas. Hooker is already calling for more men to guard his prisoners, and General Fry is getting all he can from the hospitals. Thomas was authorized some time ago to call on the Governors of any western state for militia, if he wanted them. He himself says that no more troops should be sent from Kentucky. Loyal Kentuckians say that if Bramlette's militia are armed a large portion of them will join the rebels," and added, "I believe that every possible effort has been made to supply General Thomas' demands and wants so far as the means at the disposition of the government permitted."⁴

The first two weeks of December, 1864, seem to have been a period filled with apprehension and anxiety. Nothing had been heard from General Sherman. A Confederate column, estimated as containing from 3000 to 10,000 troops, under General Breckenridge, was reported as advancing into Kentucky from East Tennessee, and another similar column under General Lyon was advancing from Western Tennessee into Kentucky and threatening our railroad communications.⁵ The loyalty of Governor Bramlette's militia was suspected and many Union people believed that these invasions were secretly invited by Confederate sympathizers and that the larger portion of such militia would join the invaders. At the same time the Confederate refugees and conspirators in Canada were reported making Greek fire at Windsor and other

1 W. R. R. 94-17.

2 W. R. R. 94-18.

3 W. R. R. 94-17.

4 W. R. R. 94-28.

5 W. R. R. 94-63-79.

points, to use in a campaign of incendiarism in the lake and other northern cities.¹ The Sons of Liberty were unusually active, and urgent calls were made for additional troops,—cavalry and artillery,—to strengthen the garrisons at Rock Island and Chicago and protect Detroit, Cleveland and other cities from plunder and fire.² This period, beginning with Hood's invasion of Tennessee, seems now to have been the last desperate, despairing, struggle of Rebellion in the Southwest, into which was thrown all the accumulated venom of four years of bloody strife.

General Thomas's confidence that the two iron clads and several gun boats under Commander Fitch could prevent Hood's crossing the Cumberland or blockading it was soon rudely shattered. On December 3, the enemy planted a battery at Bell's Landing a few miles down the river from Nashville and turned back a steamer loaded with troops for Nashville.³

Following the orders and suggestions of General Grant and the War Department, there was intense activity at Nashville in preparation for an immediate attack on Hood's army, especially on the part of the cavalry. Orders were issued making details of officers and men for a general impressment of horses, saddles and cavalry equipment of all kinds. The orders were imperative and commanded the taking of every horse owned by or under the care of a citizen. The writer can testify that it was rigidly enforced. He was persuaded to let the regimental sutler ride his favorite horse into the city and it was taken and he never saw it afterwards. General Wilson in his absorbingly interesting book "Under the Old Flag", says: "This arbitrary measure was entirely without precedent within our lines, but it was carried ruthlessly into effect while the contending armies were facing each other in front of Nashville. Within seven days after the Secretary's authority came to hand seven thousand horses were obtained in middle and western Kentucky, and our mounted force was increased to twelve thousand." He also says, "Every horse and mare that could be used was taken. All street car and livery stable horses and private carriage and saddle horses were seized. Even Andrew Johnson, the vice-president elect, was forced to give up his pair and a circus then at Nashville lost everything except its ponies; even the old white trick horse was taken, but it is alleged that the young and handsome equestrienne, who claimed him, succeeded in convincing my adjutant general that the horse was unfit for cavalry service."⁴

By December 4, it was ascertained that Hood's left had been

1 W. R. R. 94-82.

2 W. R. R. 94-41-42.

3 W. R. R. 94-41.

4 Under the Old Flag, Vol. 2, pp. 33-34.

extended to Bell's Landing on the Cumberland River (four miles below Nashville) and that Forrest was there in command.¹

December 5, at 8 p. m., General Grant again telegraphed to General Thomas as follows:

"Is there not danger of Forrest moving down the Cumberland to where he can cross it? It seems to me whilst you should be getting up your cavalry as rapidly as possible to look after Forrest, Hood should be attacked where he is. Time strengthens him, in all probability, as much as it does you."²

The same evening General Thomas telegraphed General Halleck that he had been along his entire line during the day, and that if he could perfect his arrangements he would move against the advanced position of the enemy on December 7.³ The same day General Hammond telegraphed from Gallatin, which is about 3 miles north east of Nashville, to General Wilson, that his scouts just in, had been chased by the rebels to the river, that Breckenridge with three brigades of 8000 mounted men left Lebanon, a town about 35 miles east of Nashville, and was expected to cross the Cumberland river at Carthage, about 50 miles up the river from Nashville, and strike for the railroad at Bowling Green, and that citizens reported that Forrest would cross down the river near Clarksville.⁴ December 5, word also came that a strong force of the enemy had made an attack on Murfreesboro, which however had been repulsed. These alarming reports of the enemy's activity caused increased apprehension at Washington, as there seemed to be no corresponding activity on the part of our army at Nashville.

The evening of December 6 General Thomas sent a dispatch to General Grant acknowledging his telegram of 8 p. m. December 5, and saying that as soon as he could get up a respectable force of cavalry he would march against Hood, that he had no doubt Forrest would attempt to cross the river, but was in hopes the gun boats would prevent him, and that Breckenridge was reported at Lebanon, Tenn., with 6000 men, but he could not believe it.⁵ These reports were sent to General Grant at City Point, Va. who at 4 p. m. December 6, telegraphed General Thomas: "Attack Hood at once and wait no longer for a remount of your cavalry. There is great danger of delay resulting in a campaign back to the Ohio River."⁶ At 9 p. m. the same day, General Thomas acknowledged receipt of the telegram and said "I will make the necessary dispositions and attack Hood at once, agree-

1 W. R. R. 94-44.

2 W. R. R. 94-55.

3 W. R. R. 94-55.

4 W. R. R. 94-63.

5 W. R. R. 94-70.

6 W. R. R. 94-70.

able to your order, though I believe it will be hazardous with the small force of cavalry now at my service."¹

December 7, at 1:30 p. m., General Grant telegraphed to Secretary Stanton:

"You probably saw my order to Thomas to attack. If he does not do it promptly, I would recommend superseding him by Schofield, leaving Thomas subordinate."²

December 7 at 9 p. m., General Thomas sent a message to General Halleck saying among other things that a convoy of transport steamers had not been able to get down the Cumberland River because of the enemy's batteries,³ but said nothing about attacking Hood's army.

December 8 at 4 p. m., General Grant asked General Halleck to direct General Dodge, who was in command at St. Louis, to send all the troops he could spare to General Thomas, and suggested that they had probably better be sent to Louisville, as he feared either Hood or Breckenridge would get to the Ohio River. He also suggested calling on Ohio, Indiana and Illinois for 60,000 men for thirty days and added, "If Thomas has not struck yet, he ought to be ordered to hand over his command to Schofield. There is no better man to repel an attack than Thomas, but I fear he is too cautious to ever take the initiative."⁴ At 8:30 p. m. the same afternoon, General Grant dispatched to General Thomas as follows: "*Your dispatch of yesterday* received. It looks to me evident the enemy are trying to cross the Cumberland River, and are scattered. Why not attack at once? By all means avoid the contingency of a foot race to see which, you, or Hood, can beat to the Ohio. If you think necessary call on the Governors of States to send a force into Louisville to meet the enemy if he should cross the river. You clearly never should cross except in rear of the enemy. Now is one of the finest opportunities ever presented of destroying one of the three armies of the enemy. If destroyed he can never replace it. Use the means at your command and you can do this and cause a rejoicing that will resound from one end of the land to the other."⁵

General Grant's suggestion that General Thomas be relieved and General Schofield be placed in command at Nashville did not meet with favor at Washington for at 9 p. m., December 8, after he had sent the last above quoted dispatch to General Thomas, General Halleck telegraphed him:

"If you wish General Thomas relieved from command, give the order. No one here will, I think, interfere. The responsi-

1 W. R. R. 94-70.

2 W. R. R. 94-84.

3 W. R. R. 94-85.

4 W. R. R. 94-96.

5 W. R. R. 94-97.

bility, however, will be yours, as no one here, so far as I am informed, wishes General Thomas' removal".¹ At 10 p. m., the same evening, General Grant answered this dispatch saying: "Your dispatch of 9 p. m. just received. I want General Thomas reminded of the importance of immediate action. I sent him a dispatch this evening (the dispatch dated 8:30 p. m.) which will probably urge him on. I would not say relieve him until I hear further from him."²

The reports from various points on December 8, show that on that day the enemy had placed a large artillery force on the south bank of the Cumberland river between Nashville and the Harpeth shoals; that one of our gun boats had come to grief at Bells Ferry or Landing, and that the Confederate General Lyon held the same bank of the river below Harpeth to Fort Donelson.³ The river was falling, and the larger gun boats in the squadron patrolling the river would soon have to get below into deeper water. A strong force of the enemy's cavalry had crossed the river below the mouth of the Harpeth and were reported moving up the river to strike the Springfield pike, taking cattle and everything within reach.³

A council of war was called to meet at General Thomas' headquarters,⁴ and it is safe to assume it did not favor immediate action. That evening at 7 o'clock, General Wilson, commanding the cavalry, after conference with his division commanders, reported to General Thomas that "his forces could not be assembled and put in proper condition to move in a general campaign before Sunday afternoon" (December 11), and intimated the hope that the movement might be delayed until Monday, December 12.⁵

In the meantime, the authorities at Washington and General Grant were growing more and more impatient over General Thomas' delay. At 10:30 a. m., December 9, General Halleck telegraphed him:

"General Grant expresses much dissatisfaction at your delay in attacking the enemy. If you wait until General Wilson mounts all his cavalry, you will wait till dooms-day, for the waste equals the supply. Moreover you will soon be in same condition that Rosecrans was last year,—with so many animals that you can not feed them. Reports already come of a scarcity of forage."⁶

At 11 a. m., General Grant telegraphed to General Halleck as follows:

1 W. R. R. 94-96.

2 W. R. R. 94-97.

3 W. R. R. 94-101.

4 W. R. R. 94-103. See also *Under the Old Flag*, Vol. 2, pp. 79 et seq.

5 W. R. R. 94-106.

6 W. R. R. 94-114. See "*Under the Old Flag*," Vol. 2, pp. 87 et seq.

"Dispatch of 8 p. m., last evening from Nashville shows the enemy scattered for more than seventy miles down the river and no attack yet made by Thomas. Please telegraph orders relieving him at once and placing Schofield in command. Thomas should be directed to turn over all orders and dispatches received since the battle of Franklin to Schofield."¹

In accordance with this dispatch an order of the War Department was prepared for the President's signature, whereby General Thomas was relieved and General Schofield placed in command of all the troops in the Departments of the Cumberland, the Ohio and the Tennessee, but was not signed.² In two hours after General Grant had taken this radical step, General Thomas answered Grant's message of 8:30 p. m. the day before, above quoted, saying:

"I had nearly completed my preparations to attack the enemy tomorrow morning, but a terrible storm of freezing rain has come on today, which will make it impossible for our men to fight at any advantage. I am therefore compelled to wait for the storm to break and make the attack immediately after. Admiral Lee is patrolling the river above and below the city and I believe will be able to prevent the enemy from crossing. There is no doubt but that Hood's forces are considerably scattered along the river with the view of attempting a crossing, but it has been impossible for me to organize and equip the troops for an attack at an earlier time. Major General Halleck informs me that you are very much dissatisfied with my delay in attacking. I can only say I have done all in my power to prepare, and if you should deem it necessary to relieve me I shall submit without a murmur."³

An hour later General Thomas sent a similar dispatch to General Halleck and at 4:10 p. m., the latter forwarded it to General Grant, stating that the order relieving General Thomas had been made out when it was received, and saying, "If you still wish these orders telegraphed to Nashville they will be forwarded."⁴

At 5:30 p. m., General Grant dispatched to General Halleck, saying:

"General Thomas has been urged in every way possible to attack the enemy, even to the giving the positive order. He did say he thought he would be able to attack on the 7th, but did not do so, nor has he given a reason for not doing it. I am very unwilling to do an injustice to an officer who has done as much

1 W. R. R. 94-115.

2 W. R. R. 94-116.

3 W. R. R. 94-115.

4 W. R. R. 94-116.

good service as Thomas has, however, and will therefore suspend the order relieving him until it is seen whether he will do anything."¹ Two hours later, at 7:30 p. m., General Grant sent the following dispatch to General Thomas:

"Your dispatch of 1 p. m. received. I have as much confidence in your conducting a battle rightly as I have in any other officer, but it has seemed to me that you have been slow, and I have had no explanation of affairs to convince me otherwise. Receiving your dispatch of 2 p. m. from General Halleck, before I did the one to me I telegraphed to suspend the order relieving you until we should hear further. I hope most sincerely that there will be no necessity of repeating the orders, and that the facts will show that you have been right all the time."²

That night at 11:30 p. m., General Thomas answered the last quoted dispatch saying:

"Your dispatch of 7:30 p. m., is just received. I can only say in further explanation why I have not attacked Hood, that I could not concentrate my troops and get their transportation in order in shorter time than it has been done, and am satisfied I have made every effort that was possible to complete the task."³ Owing to "the terrible storm of freezing rain" mentioned in General Thomas' above quoted dispatches, orders for an attack on Hood's army on the morning of December 10, were suspended. The storm continued during the 9th and 10th, and then turned cold and left the ground a glare of ice which made it difficult to get from place to place on foot and dangerous to try to do so mounted.

On the 10th, General Wood, who was commanding the Fourth Corps, in answer to an inquiry by General Thomas as to the condition of the ground between our line and the enemy's said, "The ground is covered with a heavy sleet which would make the handling of troops difficult, if not impracticable."⁴

On the 11th and 12th there were meetings of the corps commanders at General Thomas' headquarters. At these meetings it was decided that we could not move to attack the enemy, or even to demonstrate against him, until the ice and sleet that covered the ground thawed.⁵

While our army was thus ice bound at Nashville and apparently immovable, the enemy seems not to have ceased his activity. December 10, General Meredith from Paducah reported to General Thomas that the Confederate Generals Lyon and Cheatham had crossed the Tennessee River on the 8th with

1 W. R. R. 94-116.

2 W. R. R. 94-115.

3 W. R. R. 94-115.

4 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-154.

5 Fullertons' Journal, W. R. R. 93-154.

2000 to 2500 men and six guns and were probably making for Green River Bridge on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad.¹

General Watkins, who, with his cavalry brigade, was at Edgefield, was sent by rapid marches to Bowling Green to head off General Lyon² and General Long, who was at Louisville remounting his command, was directed to operate against him from that point.³

The same day a dispatch from the commanding officer at Fort Donelson stated that the day before, General Lyon, C. S. A., had captured the transport "Thomas E. Tutt" at Cumberland City, 20 miles above that point, and had crossed the Cumberland River with his division, numbering about 4000 men, and was reported as marching upon Hopkinsville, Ky.,—also that an attack was anticipated in Clarksville.⁴ On the same day it was reported by General Hooker that a Major Taylor of the C. S. A. with 400 armed men was at Haynesville opposite Carrollton, Ind., recruiting and conscripting for the Confederate army.⁵ These reports of course were forwarded to General Grant at City Point, who at 4 p. m., December 11, again telegraphed General Thomas as follows:

"If you delay attack longer the mortifying spectacle will be witnessed of a rebel army moving for the Ohio River, and you will be forced to act, accepting such weather as you find. Let there be no further delay. Hood cannot stand even a drawn battle so far from his supplies of ordnance stores. If he retreats and you follow, he must lose his material and much of his army. I am in hopes of receiving a dispatch from you today announcing that you have moved. Delay no longer for weather or reinforcements."⁶

At 9:30 p. m., General Thomas sent a dispatch to General Halleck saying that the appearance of the enemy in his front appeared the same as the day before, that the weather continued very cold, that the hills were covered with ice and that as soon as there was a thaw he would attack Hood. He also repeated the report that General Lyon had crossed the Cumberland and said he had sent two brigades of cavalry to intercept him, that General Rousseau at Murfreesboro had reported that Bate's division of Cheatham's corps had threatened that place on the 6th and 7th instants, and that on the 7th General Milroy with six regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery had got on Bate's flank and routed him, capturing two pieces of artillery and 207 prisoners of whom 18 were officers.⁷ General Thomas did not answer General

1 W. R. R. 94-139.

2 W. R. R. 94-136.

3 W. R. R. 94-136.

4 W. R. R. 94-140.

5 W. R. R. 94-140.

6 W. R. R. 94-143.

7 W. R. R. 94-143.

Grant's dispatch last above quoted until 11:30 p. m., December 11, and then said:

"Your dispatch of 4 p. m., this day is just received. I will obey the order as promptly as possible, however much I may regret it, as the attack will have to be made under every disadvantage. The whole country is covered with a perfect sheet of ice and sleet, and it is with difficulty the troops are able to move about on level ground. It was my intention to attack Hood as soon as the ice melted, and would have done so yesterday, had it not been for the storm."¹

General Thomas at once sent word to his corps commanders to have their commands "put in readiness tomorrow for operations," and asked them to call at his headquarters at 3 p. m. the next day,—the 12th.² Telegrams from Clarksville brought further reports of General Lyon's crossing the Cumberland and stated that the boat "Ben South" had been burned by General Lyon at Cumberland City, 20 miles below Clarksville, and that the tow boat "Echo" and steamer "Thomas E. Tutt" loaded with grain and troops coming up the river were also captured and destroyed at the same place.³ To add to the trouble Admiral Lee who was at Clarksville, wired General Thomas that the river was so low that his flag boat the "Cincinnati" could not get over the shoals just above Cumberland City so as to reach the enemy.⁴

December 12, at 10:30 p. m., General Thomas reported to General Halleck at Washington that he had his troops ready to attack the enemy as soon as the sleet had sufficiently melted to enable the men to march. That the whole country was then covered with a sheet of ice so hard and slippery that it was utterly impossible for troops to ascend the slopes, or even move over level ground in anything like order; that it had taken the entire day to place his cavalry in position and that it had only been finally affected with imminent risk and many serious accidents,—resulting from the number of horses falling on their riders on the roads,—and that under these circumstances he believed that "an attack at this time would result in a useless waste of life."⁵

At 9 p. m., December 13, he again telegraphed to General Halleck as follows:

"At length there are indications of a change in the weather, and as soon as there is, I shall move against the enemy, as everything is ready and prepared to assume the offensive."⁶

The same day word came that the enemy under General Lyon had occupied Hopkinsville, Ky. the day before, and had

1 W. R. R. 94-143.

2 W. R. R. 94-147.

3 W. R. R. 94-145.

4 W. R. R. 94-144.

5 W. R. R. 94-155.

6 W. R. R. 94-168.

burned a forty-foot trestle on the railroad, ten miles from Clarksville.¹ General Grant was anxiously waiting for a report that our army under General Thomas had begun the attack on the enemy at Nashville. Still impatient at General Thomas' delay, on December 13, he issued an order directing General John A. Logan, who was then at City Point, to proceed immediately to Nashville, Tenn., reporting by telegraph his arrival at Louisville and also his arrival at Nashville.² An order was given to General Logan directing him to relieve General Thomas, but he was directed not to deliver or publish it until he reached Nashville. If Thomas had moved he was not to deliver it at all, but report to General Grant by telegraph. After General Logan had started, General Grant became restless over the situation and decided to go in person to Nashville.³

The whole country was alarmed, fearing that Hood's army would get across the Cumberland and transfer the seat of war to the Ohio river. At 12:30 p. m., December 14, General Halleck voicing such alarm again telegraphed General Thomas:

"It has been seriously apprehended that while Hood with a part of his forces held you in check near Nashville, he would have time to operate against other important points left only partially protected. Hence General Grant was anxious that you should attack the rebel force in your front, and expressed great dissatisfaction that his orders had not been carried out. Moreover, so long as Hood occupies a threatening position in Tennessee, General Canby is obliged to keep a large force upon the Mississippi River to protect its navigation and to hold Memphis, Vicksburg, etc., although General Grant had directed a part of these forces to co-operate with General Sherman. Every day's delay on your part, therefore seriously interferes with General Grant's plans."⁴ That evening at 8 o'clock General Thomas answered this last dispatch of General Halleck, saying: "The ice having melted away today, the enemy will be attacked tomorrow morning."⁵ General Grant reached Washington on his way to Nashville, presumably just after this dispatch from General Thomas was received, for he says in his memoirs, "I went as far as Washington City, when a dispatch was received from General Thomas announcing his readiness at last to move and designating the time of his movement. I concluded to wait until that time. He did move and was successful from the start."⁶

While the events covering the wider field of our military operations related in this chapter were transpiring, and the War

1 W. R. R. 94-176-177.

2 W. R. R. 94-171.

3 Grant's Memoirs and W. R. R. 94-195.

4 W. R. R. 94-180.

5 W. R. R. 94-180.

6 Grant's Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 383.

Department and General Grant were urging General Thomas to hastier action, as shown by the dispatches given above, the regiment was lying with the brigade on Lauren's Hill in the same position we left it on December 2.

On December 3, from the top of the hill in our front, we saw what appeared to be new earth works thrown up by the enemy. Our pickets in front were firing occasionally, when suddenly we saw the enemy's skirmishers advancing and in rear of them a strong line of battle also advancing. There was a rapid increase of skirmish firing along the line and Colonel Askew, who was watching the enemy's movements, hastened back and gave orders to send our baggage to the rear and prepare for battle.¹ After a few minutes the skirmish firing subsided, and we learned that the enemy was only advancing his line in our front to a more favorable position for intrenching it, which our superior officers did not oppose. That night we heard cannonading to our right near the river. On the morning of December 4, we stood to arms at early dawn awaiting an attack which did not come. During the forenoon, looking to our left from Lauren's Hill, we were surprised to see the enemy throwing up fortifications apparently under the very noses of our men. He had occupied Montgomery Hill about 800 yards in our front during the night, and his rifle pits were in plain view. One or two of our men had been wounded by his skirmishers while inside our works. The rifle pits occupied by our pickets were in a hollow in our front, and the ground between them and our main line was so much exposed to the enemy's fire that we could only relieve them at night. One of our batteries went into position on our line and soon put a stop to the enemy's work on his fortifications. A number of our batteries opened on the enemy, but he was evidently saving his ammunition for he did not reply. On the 5th and 6th there was the usual desultory picket firing and our batteries kept firing at intervals. On the 6th the enemy fired a few shots from two guns on Montgomery Hill which did little damage. On the 7th the enemy was reported moving a considerable force to our right opposite General A. J. Smith's command, and extending his works in the same direction.² Our skirmish line was reinforced by a company of the Fifty-first Indiana for the purpose of making a forward movement, but the movement was not ordered.

The morning of December 8, was the coldest we had so far experienced during the winter and it was difficult to keep warm. The enemy made a demonstration on the first division of our corps to our left in front of Fort Negley, driving in our skirm-

¹ Gleason's Diary.

² Fullerton's Diary, W. R. R. 93-153.

ishers, and we were called into line prepared for an attack. The enemy's skirmishers were finally repulsed and driven back and our pickets resumed their former posts.

On Friday, December 9, early in the morning, there was a storm of sleet and snow which continued all day, and it grew so cold the men crowded together in their tents to keep warm. It was reported that an order to move against the enemy next morning had been issued, but was afterwards countermanded because of the storm. There was a good deal of picket firing during the day. It was reported that we were to be in readiness to move against the enemy as soon as the storm was over. December 10, the storm had practically ceased, but it was very cold and the ground was covered with sleet and snow, and it was very difficult to get about. The enemy was seen working on a new and interior line of works, parallel to and about half a mile in rear of his first line.¹

December 11, was still cold and the sleet and snow did not melt. The men kept their tents, or huddled about their fires. There was but little picket firing. At 10 a. m. there was a meeting of corps commanders at General Thomas' headquarters and it was decided that we could not attack the enemy with any show of success until the weather moderated and the snow and sleet melted. General Grant had been insisting for several days that General Thomas should attack the enemy.² At 10 p. m., General Wood received an order from General Thomas directing him to have our corps put in readiness next day for operations.³ The night was cold and clear.

December 12, it was still cold and although the sun shone in the morning it did not have power to melt the ice and snow which covered the ground. The officers call summoned company officers to regimental headquarters and they were told everything must be at once put in readiness for a contemplated movement. They were also directed to make requisition for supplies of every kind needed on a march. That day the cavalry, 12,000 strong, crossed to the south side of the river on the railroad and pontoon bridges, and was massed between the Hardin and Charlotte pikes.⁴ This looked like moving the next morning.⁵ The enemy was still at work on his second line of fortifications, and was erecting epaulements for batteries in front of General A. J. Smith's line of works which would command the Hillsborough and perhaps the Hardin pike.⁶ There was considerable picket firing during the day.

1 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-154.

2 Gleason's Diary.

3 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-154.

4 General Wilson's report, W. R. R. 93-551

5 Gleasons' Diary.

6 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-154.

The morning of December 13, the weather had slightly moderated but it was still very cold. Our picket relief did not get out to the rifle pits in our front until nearly daylight, and fortunately were not fired at before they reached their protection. The pickets were allowed fires, but the wood soon gave out and a truce was agreed upon between the opposing picket lines, which truce continued all day. The men walked about in plain view of each other and not a shot was fired.¹ A little after noon a deserter from the enemy crossed over to our lines unmolested, having given out that he wished to get some tobacco for himself and comrade. He had previously met one of our men between the lines. He said he had once belonged to the Fifty-Eighth Illinois, that he lived near Meridian, Miss., and while visiting his family there was impressed into the Confederate service as a member of the Fourteenth Mississippi. He said that this was the first opportunity he had to escape and seemed greatly relieved to be back under the old flag again. He was sent under guard to headquarters.² Geason in his diary further says "The boys gathered from the Johnnies whom they met on the sly, that their loss at Franklin was 8000, including a Major General and a Brigadier, and that they seemed rather hopeless, wondering if there was to be another killing soon." About 5 p. m., the weather grew much warmer and the ice began to melt quite rapidly.

The morning of December 14, the ice had all disappeared, but a dense fog shut from sight the enemy's lines and made any general movement extremely hazardous. At 3 p. m. the corps commanders again met at General Thomas' headquarters and it was decided to attack the enemy next morning, if it was not too foggy.³ There was the usual picket firing during the day. The final steps were taken to see that every organization was supplied with everything needed in the way of clothing and equipment. Regular roll calls were ordered and officers were instructed to keep the men in camp both night and day ready for the contemplated movement.⁴ The divisions of General Hatch, Knipe and Johnson and Croxton's brigade, of General Wilson's Cavalry Corps, which had been recruiting and remounting on the north side of the river, had crossed the river to the south side on the 12th, and were in position ready for the advance. In fact everything was in complete readiness.

The position of Hood's army was relatively the same as when he closed in on our position in front of Nashville. He had extended his fortified line to our right beyond A. J. Smith's position, and had protected his left flank by a series of detached

1 Gleasons' Diary.

2 Gleason's Diary.

3 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-155.

4 Gleason's Diary.

redoubts on the hills along, near to and on either side of the Hillsborough pike, each redoubt containing a section, or battery, of artillery and from 100 to 150 infantry. His line was prolonged to the river by Chalmer's cavalry. Ector's brigade of French's division of Stewart's corps was placed on the Hardin pike, with cavalry to his right and left.¹ The enemy's most advanced position was on Montgomery Hill in front of Streight's (our) brigade. The general position of the different corps of our army has been given heretofore. That evening the long expected order for our advance came. It was as follows:

Hdprs. Dept. of the Cumberland,

Special Field Orders Nashville, Tennessee, December 14, 1864.
No. 342.

As soon as the weather will admit of offensive operations, the troops will move against the enemy's position in the following order:

First. Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith, commanding detachment of the Army of the Tennessee, after forming his troops on or near the Hardin pike, in front of his present position, will make a vigorous assault on the enemy's left.

Second. Brvt. Maj. Gen. J. H. Wilson, commanding the cavalry corps, Military Division of the Mississippi, with three divisions, will move on and support General Smith's right, assist as far as possible in carrying the left of the enemy's position, and be in readiness to throw his force upon the enemy the moment a favorable opportunity occurs. Major General Wilson will also send one division on the Charlotte pike to clear that road of the enemy and observe in the direction of Bell's Landing to protect our right rear until the enemy's position is fairly turned, when it will join the main force.

Third. Brig. Gen. Th. J. Wood, commanding Fourth Army Corps, after leaving a strong skirmish line in his works from Lauren's Hill to his extreme right, will form the remainder of the Fourth Corps on the Hillsborough pike, to support General Smith's left and operate on the left and rear of the enemy's advanced position on Montgomery Hill.

Fourth. Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, commanding Twenty-third Army Corps, will replace General Kimball's division of the Fourth Corps, with his troops, and occupy the trenches from Fort Negley to Lauren's Hill with a strong skirmish line. He will mass the remainder of his force in front of the works and co-operate with General Wood, protecting the latter's left flank against an attack by the enemy.

Fifth. Maj. Gen. James B. Steedman, commanding District of the Etowah, will occupy the interior line in rear of his present position, stretching from the reservoir on the Cumberland River to Fort Negley, with a strong skirmish line, and mass the remainder of his force in his present position, to act according to the exigencies of the service during these operations.

Sixth. Brig. Gen. J. F. Miller, with the troops forming the garrison of Nashville, will occupy the interior line from the battery on Hill 210 to the extreme right, including the enclosed work on the Hyde's Ferry road.

Seventh. The quartermaster's troops, under command of Brvt. Brig. Gen. J. L. Donaldson, will, if necessary, be posted on the interior line from Fort Morton to the battery on Hill 210.

1 General Stewart's report, W. R. R. 93-709.

The troops on the interior line will be under the direction of Major General Steedman, who is charged with the immediate defense of Nashville during the operations around the city.

Should the weather permit the troops will be formed in time to commence operations at 6 A. M., or as soon thereafter as practicable.

By command of Major General Thomas.

WM. D. WHIPPLE,¹

Assistant Adjutant General.

General Wood, in company with Colonel Opdyke, had made a careful examination of the enemy's intrenched lines and with the concurrence of Generals Schofield and Smith, in a confidential letter to General Thomas, suggested a conference of Generals Schofield, Smith, Wilson and himself, with a view to some modification of the above orders.² What these modifications were is not disclosed, but it is probable that they resulted in General Steedman being ordered to relieve General Kimball's troops on our left and in General Schofield being directed to mass his corps in rear of the Fourth Corps and General Smith's command,³ instead of on General Wood's left. General Wood's orders for the movement of the Fourth Corps were as follows:

Headquarters Fourth Army Corps,
Nashville, Tenn., December 14, 1864.

Orders of the day for the Fourth Army Corps for tomorrow, December 15, 1864:

I. Reveille will be sounded at 4 A. M. The troops will get their breakfasts, break up their camps, pack up everything, and be prepared to move at 6 A. M.

II. Brigadier General Elliott, commanding Second Division, will move out by his right, taking the small road which passes by the right of his present position, form in echelon with General Smith's left, slightly refusing his own left, and, maintaining the relative position to General Smith's troops, will advance with them. When he moves out he will leave a strong skirmish line in his solid works.

III. Brigadier General Kimball, commanding First Division, on being relieved by General Steedman, will move his division to the Hillsborough pike, inside our lines, and by it through our lines, and form in echelon to General Elliott's left, slightly refusing his own left. He will maintain this position and advance with General Elliott.

IV. As soon as General Kimball's division has passed out of the works, by the Hillsborough pike, General Beatty, commanding Third Division, will take up the movement, drawing out by his left, and will form in echelon to General Kimball's left. He will maintain this position and advance with General Kimball; he will also leave a strong line of skirmishers behind the solid works along his present position.

V. The pickets on post, being strengthened when in the judgment of division commanders it becomes necessary, will advance as a line of skirmishers to cover the movement. The formation of the troops will be in two lines—the front line deployed, the second line in

¹ W. R. R. 94-183.

² W. R. R. 94-184.

³ W. R. R. 93-129.

close column by division, massed opposite the interval in the front line. Each division commander will, so far as possible, hold one brigade in reserve. Five wagon loads of ammunition, ten ambulances, and the wagons loaded with the intrenching tools, will as nearly as possible, follow immediately after each division. The remaining ammunition wagons, ambulances and all other wagons, will remain inside our lines until further orders. One rifle battery will accompany the Second Division, and one battery of light twelve-pounders will accompany each of the other divisions. The rest of the artillery of the corps will retain its present positions in the lines.

By order of Brig. General T. J. Wood.

J. S. FULLERTON,
Assistant Adjutant General.¹

On the evening of December 14, after some of the officers had retired, Colonel Askew called a meeting of company commanders at his tent and communicated to them the substance of the foregoing orders. He also informed them that General A. J. Smith's troops would attack and try to turn the enemy's left flank, that the general movement was to be a grand left wheel, with our brigade as the pivot, and that the men were to be awakened at 4:30 o'clock next morning and have tents struck and everything packed up by 6 o'clock.²

After this meeting, a number of officers of our own and other regiments gathered at our sutler's tent. Among them were Lieutenant Colonel Luther M. Strong, commanding the Forty-ninth Ohio; Lieutenant Colonel John Conover, commanding the Eighth Kansas; Colonel Frank Askew, commanding the Fifteenth Ohio; Lieutenant Colonel John McClenahan, Fifteenth Ohio; Major Wm. M. Clark, Surgeon of the Fifteenth Ohio; Captain Chandler W. Carroll, Fifteenth Ohio, the adjutant and others whose presence is not now remembered. The subject of conversation was of course the battle to be fought next day. All were sanguine of victory and all seemed relieved to know that our period of inaction was about over. A minor note was struck by Lieutenant Colonel Strong of the Forty-ninth Ohio, who said he had a strong presentiment that he was going to be shot in the battle. All tried to rally and laugh him out of his morbid fancy, but without avail, and when we separated he was still moody and depressed.

At 4:50 a. m., December 15, our bugles all along the line sounded the reveille. There seemed to be an unusual note of defiance in the calls, and we fancied they seemed louder and clearer than usual. We were soon all astir, had our breakfasts, struck tents, packed everything up and then awaited orders. There was a very dense fog,—so dense that we could not distinguish objects

¹ W. R. R. 93-127.

² Gleason's Diary.

a hundred feet away,—and we supposed the general movement would be again postponed. But in the depression to our rear we heard the clank of artillery harness and the murmur of multitudinous voices, which indicated the movement of heavy columns of our troops to our right. The thick fog hid them and in imagination they seemed a mighty host.

Between 7 and 8 a. m. the fog began to rise and we saw, besides the moving troops, a heavy column massed in rear of our lines.¹ The Twenty-third Corps was massed in rear of the Fourth Corps and General A. J. Smith's line. Soon we heard heavy cannonading to our left. It was General Steedman, who was making a demonstration on our left flank to withdraw the enemy's attention and troops from his left where our real attack was about to be made. This cannonading continued at intervals all the forenoon. By nine o'clock the fog had lifted and the sun shone from a sapphire sky. The air was crisp and bracing and one thought of the "Sun of Austerlitz" as described in Headley's *Life of Napoleon*. Our regiment and brigade were formed behind the works and the men stacked arms and were permitted to break ranks, but cautioned not to go far from the guns. It was not long until we heard the boom of cannon far to the right, which announced that the battle had begun. The distant cannonading continued and an occasional deeper boom indicated that the big guns from the iron clads in the river were joining in the chorus. Montgomery Hill rising about 150 feet above the level of the surrounding country, its sides covered with open woods which extended down its slopes, across the hollow and up to our works on Lauren's Hill, stood about 800 yards in our front. It was encircled just below its crest by formidable intrenchments protected by an abatis and rows of sharpened stakes firmly driven into the ground.² It was the most advanced position of the enemy and our first duty would be to assault and take it. We were not, however, to advance until the troops on our right had begun to move forward. For some reason the troops on our right did not get into position for the forward movement until about 11 o'clock.³ With hearts beating high and nerves tingling we waited for the order to advance. We waited and waited until noon, and still no orders came. We had our dinners and still waited. In the meantime the sounds of cannonading on our right grew louder and louder and soon we heard the distant rattle of small arms. We heard too an occasional cheer from our men, which told that the battle was going well with us. General Wilson's cavalry had found the enemy's

1 Gleason's Diary.

3 General R. W. Johnson's Report, W. R. R. 93-599.

2 General Wood's Official Report, W. R. R. 93-128.

left flank and, in co-operation with General McArthur's division of General A. J. Smith's corps, soon afterwards charged and carried a redoubt near the Hardin pike which covered such flank.¹

From our position on Lauren's Hill we looked to the right down the valley of Richland Creek, a small stream which ran between the fortified lines of the opposing armies. We could see the skirmishers on both sides keeping up the usual desultory firing, but that was all. Presently, about 12:45 p. m., far down the creek we saw our skirmishers advancing. Soon those nearer towards us up the valley began moving out, driving the enemy's skirmishers back, and the storm of battle kept rolling nearer and nearer. It is nearly fifty years since then and the blood still tingles when recalling the scene. Soon the skirmishers of the second division of our corps took up and prolonged the advancing line and a battery of the enemy in a position not before known opened out on our advancing lines. Our time to advance had come.

General Post's brigade of our division had been designated to lead the assault on Montgomery Hill, our brigade was to follow in close support and a little to his left. Our formation was from right to left as follows: the Eighth Kansas and Fifty-first Ohio in the first line deployed in line of battle, the Eighty-ninth Illinois, Fifteenth Ohio and Forty-ninth Ohio in the second line formed in column by division. At the signal to advance which was given about 2 p. m., the officers and men of the line leaped across the parapet and the mounted officers followed through gaps cut through it by the pioneers. Our troops were so impatient to be in at the finish, that the charge on Montgomery Hill became a race to see who should get there first and, although Post's brigade led, many men of our brigade reached the enemy's works among the foremost. General Beatty in his official report says:

"The second brigade, Colonel Post, moved forward with great rapidity. * * The first brigade, Colonel Streight, which was intended as a supporting column, fired with the spirit of the charge, rushed forward, and the charge almost became a race to the summit of the hill."² Colonel Streight says the Eighth Kansas men were the first of our brigade to reach the enemy's works, though he was not certain but that many men in the second line of our brigade had reached and formed a part of the advance when the works were carried.³ All were so eager and so fired with enthusiasm that they seemed to care no more for

1 W. R. R. 93-434-348-563-577.

2 W. R. R. 93-289.

3 W. R. R. 93-294.

the storm of missiles which poured from the enemy's works than if they were so many snow flakes. They did not stop to fire but pressed on up the acclivity and into the enemy's works, taking prisoners of all who did not escape by flight, and following the fugitives until called back to reform.

As soon as Montgomery Hill was in our possession and the enemy was driven back to his second intrenched line, about 600 yards to the rear of his line on Montgomery Hill, the Fifteenth Ohio was ordered to the left and placed in position to protect the left flank of the brigade. We thus became detached from the rest of the brigade, who had orders to conform their movements to those of the troops on their right. The position in which we were placed was on the left slope of Montgomery Hill and on ground which sloped toward the enemy's intrenched line. We were exposed to artillery and infantry fire from the enemy's intrenchments, as well as from his skirmishers. Our only protection was an osage orange hedge along which the regiment was formed and behind which the men lay down and hugged the ground. It afforded little protection and a number of our men were wounded while so posted. To keep down the fire of the enemy a strong line of skirmishers made up of Companies B, G and K under command of Captain Carroll was pushed to the front some 200 yards. The enemy had a battery near the McCrary house on the Granny White pike about 700 yards in our front, but fortunately for us, its fire was mostly directed to the troops advancing on our right. Colonel Askew and the adjutant had ridden their horses in the charge on Montgomery Hill and still kept them, although they were constantly exposed to the enemy's fire. They did not wish to appear otherwise than brave, but occasionally they would dismount and stand behind their horses using them as animated breastworks against the enemy's sharp shooters. Colonel Askew's horse was a big, ugly, raw boned, ewenecked mare, which the men in the regiment were ashamed of, and the adjutant more than once told him that the boys would all be pleased to see it stop an enemy's bullet.

From our position the crest of Montgomery Hill to our right cut off our view of our own troops, but for perhaps a mile or more we had a plain view of the enemy's intrenched line. The roar of the battle to our right continued to grow louder and nearer and the cheers of our men more frequent. Occasionally we could see one or two men at a time go back from the enemy's intrenched line. They were evidently men who had been wounded by shots from our men, whom we could not see. While we were thus watching the results of our fire, unobserved by either of us, a section of our artillery had taken position on the hill just to

our rear and not a hundred feet away. Suddenly the guns opened out on the enemy's battery near McCrary's house before mentioned. The guns were so near and the explosions were so loud that we were both startled. The adjutant's horse broke away from him, ran around the hedge in our front and made for the enemy's lines. Fortunately, our men on the skirmish line saw and recognized her and brought her back. We had been now holding the position above described about two hours. The conflict on the right deepened, the cheers grew louder and clearer and wounded men in constantly increasing numbers were streaming back from the enemy's works. It was plain that a crisis in the battle had been reached, and we felt confident we would soon see our troops assault and carry the enemy's intrenched line. We wanted to be in when the critical moment came, but we had no orders to move. The rest of the brigade had moved still further to our right and we were practically left alone. Presently Colonel Askew quietly said "I believe we can take that battery", (meaning the battery near McCrary's house). "We can make a dash across the valley to the house, reform behind it, and by a sudden sally can take it in." The words were no sooner said, when the adjutant was galloping out to the skirmish line with the order and the regiment was getting round and through the hedge. The writer can still see Captain Carroll striding along the skirmish line calling out "Forward!" "Forward!", and almost before he was aware of it, the main body of the regiment had overtaken the skirmishers and all were joining in a mad race for the McCrary house. The enemy's skirmishers were literally run over and broke to our rear, and we rushed forward in impetuous haste. The stop at the McCrary house was only for a moment, to get breath, and soon our men were on the enemy's battery, shouting and cheering in wild delirium,—some of them scratching the words "Fifteenth Ohio Battery" on the captured guns. The pioneers soon cut down the epaulements and the guns were dragged through the embrasures and turned upon the enemy. Some of the men got into the bomb proofs behind the epaulements, where the ammunition was stored, and there was a sudden explosion which wounded one or two of them.¹ Soon it was noticed that the enemy was reforming, evidently for the purpose of retaking the battery, and the men were ordered to form behind a stone fence which extended from the battery toward the Granny White pike. While the adjutant was hurrying the men into position, our own Lieutenant Wallace McGrath, who was on the brigade staff, came riding up like a wild man and threw his arms around the adjutant exclaiming, "Oh, Copie, we've captured a

1 Gleason's Diary.

battery! We've captured a battery!" A volley or two from the stone wall above mentioned soon dispersed the enemy's troops who were trying to reform, and the attempt to retake the battery was abandoned.

Almost simultaneously with our capture of the battery our troops on the right with tremendous cheering charged and carried the enemy's intrenched line and sent him back in disorderly but sullen retreat. It was now growing dusk, but the firing continued and the wild cheers to the right proclaimed victory all along the line. We had turned the enemy's flank, driven him from his intrenched line and had captured 16 cannon and about 1000 prisoners.¹

General Logan who was on his way to relieve General Thomas, stopped at Louisville with his undelivered orders in his pocket, and General Grant at 11:30 that night telegraphed to General Thomas from Washington "I was just on my way to Nashville, but receiving a dispatch from Van Duzer, detailing your splendid success of today, I shall go no further. Push the enemy now, and give him no rest until he is entirely destroyed. Your army will cheerfully suffer many privations to break up Hood's army and render it useless for future operations. Do not stop for trains or supplies, but take them from the country as the enemy have done. Much is now expected."²

As soon as the troops could be reformed the division moved forward in pursuit of the enemy who was falling back toward the Franklin pike. In fact the whole corps was ordered to press the enemy vigorously in that direction, and to reach the Franklin pike if possible before dark.³ Our regiment was still the left of the line. We moved on driving the enemy's skirmishers before us until it grew dark, when we bivouaced in line of battle for the night and barricaded our front with logs and rails. Our line was east of and about parallel to the Granny White pike.

That night the field officers of some of the regiments of the brigade were together at the headquarters of one of the regiments, recounting the experiences of the day. Lieutenant Colonel Strong of the Forty-ninth Ohio was rallied because his presentiment had not come true. He had not been shot during the day's engagement. Colonel Askew and the adjutant had kept their horses during the day while the field officers of the other regiments had sent theirs to the rear. This fact was the subject of comment, and the field officers of the Eighth Kansas decided to

1 W. R. R. 94-194.

2 W. R. R. 94-195.

3 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-155.

keep their horses during the next day's operations, with the result that they were all shot.

The operations of the day resulted on our side in the Twenty-third Corps, which was in reserve, being put into line on the right of General A. J. Smith's troops,¹ and on the side of the enemy General Cheatham's corps was sent to their left.²

At nightfall our line was formed nearly parallel to the Hillsborough pike, Schofield on the right, A. J. Smith in the center and Wood on the left. The cavalry was on the right of Schofield and General Steedman held the position he had gained during the day on the Nolensville pike.³

That night before we retired orders came to renew the attack in the morning, and if the enemy had gone from our front, to cross the Franklin pike and move south on the east side of it, while General Smith's and Schofield's troops were to move on our right and the cavalry to move still further to the right.

At 6:30 a. m., December 16, we moved forward by the right of companies to the front until we reached the Franklin pike, when changing direction we advanced on the east side of and parallel to the pike, halting at times for alignment. There was brisk skirmishing to the right of us, and as we advanced the skirmish fire grew heavier and the artillery on both sides opened out. At one point, looking toward the east, we saw another skirmish line advancing and took it to be Steedman's troops. When we reached a point about a mile south of our old camp, Camp Andrew Johnson, we seemed to have developed the enemy's position, which was on the Overton Range about five miles south of Nashville, and came to a halt within 800 yards of his main line. There were no troops immediately to the left of our regiment and the movements of the enemy indicated a sudden attack on our left flank. Colonel Askew said to the adjutant, "If the enemy charges us we will meet him by a counter charge", and the necessary preparations were made for doing so. The charge, however, was not made. Very heavy firing was now heard away to our right and we understood that we were again moving to turn the enemy's left flank. We now had time to take in the general features of the ground before us. General Wood in his official report of the battle describes them, as they were then, substantially as follows:

"The basin in which the city of Nashville stands is enclosed on the southwest, south and southeast by the Brentwood Hills. The Brentwood Hills consist of two ranges or branches—the

1 W. R. R. 93-38.

2 W. R. R. 93-660.

3 W. R. R. 93-39.

branch west of the Franklin pike runs from northwest to southeast and the branch east of it from northeast to southwest, the two branches uniting in a gap at Brentwood about nine miles south of Nashville. The Franklin pike passes through this gap. These two branches form a roughly shaped V with the apex at Brentwood. Nashville is north of and about opposite the center of the V. The Franklin pike nearly dissects the valley between the two ranges. The average elevation of the Brentwood Hills is about 350 feet above the general level of the surrounding country. The surface of the valley is broken by detached hills, some of them 150 feet high, with abrupt sides densely wooded. About five miles from Nashville the Franklin pike passes along the base of one of these isolated heights, known as the Overton Hill. When we had forced the enemy's skirmishers back on the morning of December 16, we found him occupying a fortified line along the base of the western range of the Brentwood Hills, and thence across the valley eastward across the Franklin pike and around the northern slope of Overton's Hill, about midway between its summit and base, with a retired flank running nearly south prolonged along its eastern slope. This line was strongly intrenched and the intrenchments were further strengthened by abatis and other embarrassments."

It was this formidable line which we saw before us at a distance of about 800 yards. We were on a small eminence immediately to the east of the Franklin pike. The ground sloped to the front a short distance and then ascended through an open woods to the enemy's intrenched position on Overton Hill, which it seemed almost folly to assault if it could be turned. We lay in this position with our line barricaded until about 3 p. m. In the meantime two batteries were placed on the line of our division and vigorously shelled the enemy's position on Overton Hill. The roar of the conflict on our right increased and we hoped that our troops on the right would turn the enemy's left flank, as they had done the day before, and thus save us from the necessity of storming the works on Overton Hill. General Steedman's colored troops had come up on our left about 12:30 p. m. and we no longer apprehended an assault on our left flank. General Wood was sitting on his horse on a knoll a short distance to the left and rear of our position, overlooking the field and directing the movements of the corps. Aides and orderlies were coming and going and the scene was one of unusual thrilling interest and activity. The artillery on both sides was engaged and the air was filled with solid shot and shell, while between the lines the skirmishers were keeping up a lively fusillade. A solid shot from one of the enemy's guns knocked

off the head of an officer a little to the left and rear of the knoll above mentioned.

Colonel Askew and the adjutant had ridden up on the knoll, to get a better view of the movements to the right and also to hear reports of our progress on that part of the line. As they sat on their horses not far from General Wood, Colonel Philip Sidney Post, who was in command of the Second Brigade of our division, rode up and addressing General Wood, said he would like to take his brigade and assault the enemy's line on Overton Hill. Colonel Askew and the adjutant looked at each other with surprise, as they had examined the enemy's position on Overton Hill and had remarked its unusual strength. They were still more surprised when General Wood said, "Well, Post, suppose you ride out and reconnoiter the position and come back and tell me what you think of it." Colonel Post at once galloped off and Colonel Askew and the adjutant decided to await his return.

Colonel Post was an intrepid officer, but somewhat rash, and it was bruited about among the officers of the division that he was ambitious to win a general's star. It was therefore with some apprehension that the result of his reconnoissance was awaited. In about half an hour he came galloping back, his horse all afoam. Riding up to General Wood he saluted that officer and said, "General Wood, I have carefully reconnoitered the enemy's position and can take it like a knife." General Wood thereupon said, "Well, Post have your men strip and pile up their knapsacks and I will support you with the First Brigade." The First Brigade was ours, and we realized that there was serious work ahead for us, for we would be expected to take care of the enemy after his line was broken.

General Wood in his official report says: "A close examination of the enemy's position satisfied me that if the Overton Hill could be carried the enemy's right would be turned, his line from the Franklin pike westward would be taken in reverse, and his line of retreat along the Franklin pike and the valley leading to Brentwood commanded effectually. The capture of half of the rebel army would almost certainly have been the guerdon of success. It was evident that the assault would be very difficult, and, if successful, would be attended with heavy loss, but the prize at stake was worthy of the hazard. Early in the afternoon I began to make preparations for assaulting the hill. Owing to the openness of the country the preparatory movements could not be concealed from the enemy; in truth from our close proximity to his intrenchments, they were necessarily made under the fire of his artillery. Knowing that the safety of his

army depended on holding the Overton Hill, to the last moment, he re-inforced the position heavily with troops drawn from his left and left center. I directed Colonel Post to reconnoiter the position closely with the view of determining, first the feasibility of the assault, and, second, to determine the most practicable point on which to direct it. After a thorough and close reconnoissance, in which perhaps three-quarters of an hour were spent, Colonel Post reported that the position was truly formidable; that it would be very difficult to carry, but that he thought he could do it with his brigade. He further reported that an assault, in his opinion on the northern slope of the hill held out the greatest promise of success. I ordered him to prepare his brigade for an assault immediately and to inform me when he was ready to move. I directed General Beatty, commanding Third Division, to have the First Brigade (Colonel Streight's) formed to support Colonel Post. I further ordered Major Goodspeed, chief of artillery of the corps, to open a concentrated fire on the hill for the purpose of silencing the enemy's batteries and demolishing his defenses, and to continue the fire as long as it could be done with safety to our advancing troops. * * * I also conferred with Major General Steedman and explained to him what I intended to do. He promptly agreed to move his command forward with the assaulting brigade to cover its left; also to participate in the assault with a view to carrying whatever might be in its front."¹

When Colonel Askew and the adjutant heard General Wood give Colonel Post permission to assault Overton Hill they rode slowly back to the regiment, the former remarking, "We will also have our men strip and pile up their knapsacks." It was not long until we received orders for the assault. Our brigade was formed in the following order: The Fifteenth Ohio and Forty-ninth Ohio in order from right to left formed the first line under command of Colonel Askew; the Eighth Kansas and the Eighty-ninth Illinois formed the second line under command of Lieutenant Colonel W. D. Williams of the Eighty-ninth Illinois and the Fifty-first Indiana under command of Captain Searce formed the third line.² Companies E and K of the Fifteenth Ohio were at the time on duty as skirmishers to our front and left, Major McClenahan being in command of the skirmishers of the entire brigade.³

About 3 p. m., after our batteries had poured a storm of shot and shell at the enemy's position, Colonel Post's brigade

1 W. R. R. 93-132-133.

2 W. R. R. 93-295.

3 W. R. R. 93-301.

began the advance. It moved forward under a storm of grape and canister from the enemy's batteries, the lines even and steady, the men shoulder to shoulder, marching with that tense nervous stride, which showed plainly that they knew the danger and difficulty of the task before them. Lieutenant Colonel Robert L. Kimberly, Forty-first Ohio, who made the official report of the brigade says there were no stragglers.¹ Our orders directed us to move in support of Post's brigade at a distance of 150 yards, but our men were so impatient of restraint that this distance narrowed to less than that number of feet as we approached the enemy's parapet. The enemy poured into us a withering fire of grape and canister, which was so hot that twice the adjutant felt the wind of a grape or canister-shot on his bridle wrist. How one lived through it was a marvel. The enemy's infantry, lying close behind his intrenchments, seemed to be reserving their fire. Amidst this terrible storm of missiles, Colonel Post's men, led by their intrepid commander, moved steadily forward, our line but a few yards behind them, until they neared the abatis in front of the enemy's works. We could see some of the men in their works start back and their officers forcing them again into line and felt confident Post's men would soon be over the parapet. Suddenly, the front line wavered, then stopped, lay down and commenced firing. Colonel Post had been shot through the bowels by a canister shot and the brigade was without a commander. The enemy's infantry from behind his parapet poured a deadly fire into the then disordered mass of our men lying on the ground before them. A tremendous effort was made to push the succeeding lines of our troops over the men who were lying down, but without avail. Small groups of men and an individual here and there, got forward to the abatis and some of the officers did the same. Captain George S. Crawford of the Forty-ninth Ohio and Captain Thomas C. Davis and Lieutenant Wallace McGrath of the Fifteenth Ohio, of the brigade staff, pressed their horses up to the abatis and fired their revolvers into the faces of the foe. The latter, as he rode back after a retreat had been ordered, proudly held up the stub of a bleeding finger, part of which he had lost in the charge.

Colonel Askew was making vigorous efforts to press the first supporting line forward when a bullet struck him in the breast. The adjutant who was at his side heard the dull thud, saw him reel in his saddle and half fall from his horse, and was dismounted and by his side in a moment. A ball had struck the top button of his overcoat which was buttoned across his breast, had

1 W. R. R. 93-305.

torn it off and his vest button underneath and glanced aside. He had received only a severe bruise, but the blow had made him very sick. He insisted, however, on remaining at his post, and continued to exert himself feebly to encourage the men. About the same time Lieutenant Colonel Strong of the Forty-ninth Ohio had his presentiment verified and was severely wounded while urging his men forward. It was soon realized by every one that the assault had failed, and orders were given to fall back out of range of the enemy's murderous fire. Indeed before the order was given many of the men were falling back in disorder, and soon all the troops which had taken part in the assault were in hasty and disorderly retreat, our regiment among them, and did not halt until they reached the line they occupied when the assault began.

In the final moments of the assault, the different organizations of the two brigades of our division had become intermingled. General Steedman's colored brigade, in its advance on our left, converged toward us as they neared the point of attack, and were also mingled in the general mass. That was noticed when a few minutes afterwards we passed over the same ground and saw the dead black men lying side by side with their white comrades. That sight forever removed from the mind and heart of at least one white soldier all prejudice against the Negro race.

It was the first time the soldiers of our command had seen colored troops in action and it was said, "they fought just like white soldiers, with this difference,—that when a black man was wounded and went to the rear he held on to his gun, while the white soldier dropped or threw his gun aside."

After the assault had failed and our men had fallen back to a distance which made it safe for our artillery to fire, our batteries again opened out on the enemy over our heads, to prevent his sallying out of his works in pursuit of our retreating troops.

The adjutant under the direction of Colonel Askew, who was suffering painfully from his severe bruise, assisted in reforming the regiment in rear of the Sixth Ohio Battery and then went to hunt up Lieutenant Colonel McClenahan to have him take command of the regiment, Colonel Askew being too ill to continue on duty.¹ Colonel McClenahan was some distance to our left in front of General Steedman's line, organizing a skirmish line to guard against a sally by the enemy, and when the adjutant returned with him, our brigade and division were again advancing, sweeping everything before them.

1 W. R. R. 93-301.

A similar assault, made by Colonel McMillan's brigade of General McArthur's division of General Smith's command, and General Hatch's division of Wilson's cavalry,¹ had penetrated the enemy's works, when his entire line began to crumble and fall back in disorderly retreat. We pressed forward and were soon inside the enemy's works which we had failed to carry, and moved rapidly forward capturing many prisoners. While we were pursuing the fleeing enemy it began to rain, but we pushed on and finally bivouaced in a muddy field east of the Franklin pike, about two miles from Brentwood.

We had won a great victory, and in spite of the discomfort, we had good reason to rejoice. The two companies under command of Captain Carroll, who had been detailed as skirmishers had not yet come up, and it was feared they would lose their way in the darkness. The adjutant had the bugler sound the regimental call, which General Willich had taught us, every three minutes and Captain Carroll's men, more than a mile away in a thick cane break, heard and followed it and in about an hour arrived safely in camp.

Gleason who was then a Lieutenant in Company A and took part in the charge on Overton Hill, thus describes it:

"As soon as our men realized that we were to take part in the charge, there was manifest that nervous impatience which so often defeats all discipline, and before we reached a position near the enemy's lines the men began to yell and run forward alternately, each one for himself, in spite of all efforts of field and company officers to keep the line intact. Advancing under a galling fire from the enemy we reached a position a short distance from the works where we halted for formation, the line seeking what cover could be found and replying as best we could to the enemy's fire. A formidable array of chevaux de frise and abatis confronted us and rendered futile any attempt to advance further. Two other lines came up after ours, only to halt as we did. To our left Steedman's 'smoked yankees' met with no better success. Company A having advanced along the pike, was divided by it,—Hanson being on the right and I on the left, as we sought cover among the scattering trees. Before long the brigade of colored troops, which had advanced as near the works as the whites, began to go back, and as the number increased the whites began to join the retreat. Still we held our position for some time, pouring in a hot fire, which kept down the rebel fire in our front. * * * The withdrawal of the troops on our left subjected us to severe cross fire and we soon also retired.

1 W. R. R. 93-434-438-441.

After getting out of range of the enemy's fire I began to get the men of Company A together and reform them, when Sergeant Ferguson joined us with the report that Captain Hanson was killed. I could not believe it. It was, however, soon confirmed by Sergeant Rickey who had been with him when he died. He lived but a few minutes after he was wounded. * * * As soon as our men had retired our batteries opened out on the enemy's position to check any desire they might have to follow us. After we had reformed, a successful movement on the right turned the works, and to our great joy we could see that the force in our front was sharing in the general panic. It now came our turn to advance again and as we went forward, we met the stretcher bearers carrying Captain Hanson's body to the rear. We moved forward at a double quick, meeting with no opposition, the rebels having abandoned their battery and many small arms in their hasty flight. We continued our pursuit of the enemy, moving on the left of the Franklin pike, over the Overton Hill and across the plantation and the Nashville and Decatur Railroad, passing through a dense cane brake. The brigade then turned and moved by the plantation mansion to a position near the pike and advanced to within two miles of Brentwood. By this time it was dark and further pursuit was abandoned." The losses in our regiment in the two day's engagement, considering the fact that we attacked the enemy behind his intrenchments, were unexpectedly small. The first day we had nine men wounded and the second day two officers and one non-commissioned officer killed and one officer and fourteen enlisted men wounded. We captured four 12-pounder brass Napoleons, a large number of small arms and two commissioned officers and one hundred enlisted men, all taken in open field fighting.¹

The following names of the killed and wounded are taken from the imperfect official rosters:

FIELD AND STAFF.

WOUNDED.—Colonel Frank Askew.

COMPANY A.

KILLED.—Captain Thomas N. Hanson.

WOUNDED.—Corporal James W. Paxton, Samuel R. Guthrie, John Mitchell.

COMPANY B.

WOUNDED.—Sergeant Robt. S. McClenahan, Sergeant Corwin F. Camp, William A. Stewart (who died of wounds), Thomas H. Williams.

¹ Colonel Askew's official report, W. R. R. 93-301.

COMPANY C.

WOUNDED.—Lieutenant Wallace McGrath, Sergeant David C. Thurston, Sergeant William Doak, Corporal Harvey C. Calkins, Felix Allbaugh, John R. McBride (and died of wounds December 16, 1864.)

COMPANY D.

KILLED.—Lieutenant Charles C. Rodig.

WOUNDED.—Orville Kerr.

COMPANY F.

WOUNDED.—John Diday, Henry C. Bowles, Jas. F. Gooderich.

COMPANY G.

KILLED.—Sergeant Jacob Ward.

WOUNDED.—Sergeant Logan McD. Scott, Edward McConaughy.

COMPANY H.

WOUNDED.—Sergeant Franklin Armstrong, Henry Crates, William H. Payne.

COMPANY I.

WOUNDED.—Francis W. Hallabaugh (and died of wounds), Newton F. Mickey, Joseph Sheehy, John Barnett.

Though we were unsuccessful in our attempt to force the enemy's position on Overton Hill, our efforts were not in vain, for the enemy in order to meet our assault, rushed reinforcements from his left and left center to the threatened point,—thus weakening his line at those points and making it easier for our troops on the right to storm and carry his works. General Thomas in his official report, after relating the dispositions made for a general advance, says:

“As soon as the above dispositions were completed * * * I gave directions that the movement against the enemy's left flank should be continued. Our entire line approached to within 600 yards of the enemy's at all points. His center was weak as compared with either his right at Overton's Hill, or his left bordering on the Granny White pike; still I had hopes of gaining his rear and cutting off his retreat from Franklin. About 3 p. m. Post's brigade of Wood's corps, supported by Streight's brigade of the same command, was ordered by General Wood to assault Overton's Hill. This intention was communicated to General Steedman, who ordered the brigade of colored troops commanded by Colonel Morgan, Fourteenth U. S. Colored troops,¹ to co-operate in the movement. The ground on which

1 A mistake. Col. C. R. Thompson's Twelfth U. S. Colored troops led the Colored Troops. W. R. R. 93-49.

the two assaulting columns formed being open and exposed to the enemy's view, he, readily perceiving our intention, drew reinforcements from his left and center to the threatened point. This movement of troops on the part of the enemy was communicated along the line from left to right. The assault was made, and received by the enemy with a tremendous fire of grape and canister and musketry; our men moved steadily onward up the hill until near the crest, when the reserve of the enemy rose and poured into the assaulting column a most destructive fire causing the men first to waver and then to fall back, leaving their dead and wounded—black and white indiscriminately mingled,—lying amid the abatis,—the gallant Colonel Post among the wounded. * * * Immediately following the effort of the Fourth Corps, General Smith's and General Schofield's commands moved against the enemy's works in their respective fronts, carrying all before them, (but not till after the cavalry had driven them to the rear),¹ irreparably breaking his line in a dozen places, and capturing all his artillery and thousands of prisoners, among the latter four general officers. * * * Wood's and Steedman's troops, hearing the shouts of victory coming from the right, rushed impetuously forward, renewing the assault on Overton's Hill, and although meeting a very heavy fire, the onset was irresistible, artillery and innumerable prisoners falling into our hands. The enemy, hopelessly broken, fled in confusion through the Brentwood Pass, the Fourth Corps in a close pursuit, which was continued for several miles, when darkness closed the scene and the men rested from their labors."²

The Confederate troops which repulsed our assault on Overton's Hill were Clayton's and Stevenson's divisions of Lee's corps.

Brigadier General Holtzclaw who commanded a brigade in General Clayton's division, in his official report gives a vivid picture of the assault on Overton's Hill from the Confederate standpoint. He says:

"At 12 M. the enemy made a most determined charge on my right. Placing a negro brigade in front they gallantly dashed up to the abatis, forty feet in front, and were killed by hundreds. Pressed on by their white brethren in the rear they continued to come up in masses to the abatis, but they only came to die. I have seen most of the battle fields of the West, but never saw dead men thicker than in front of my two left regiments, the great masses and disorder of the enemy enabling the left to rake them in flank, while the right, with a coolness unexampled,

1 General James H. Wilson in note to writer.

2 W. R. R. 93-39-40.

scarcely threw away a shot at their front. The enemy at last broke and fled in wild disorder. With great difficulty I prevented my line from pursuing; with a supporting line I should certainly have done so; but covering the pike, which would be our only line of retreat in case of disaster, I did not feel justified in hazarding the position for what might have been a temporary success. A color-bearer of the negro brigade brought his standard to within a few feet of my line. He was shot down, and Lieutenant Knox of the Thirty-sixth Alabama Regiment sprang over the shattered works and brought it in. Another flag was carried off by an officer after five different bearers had fallen in the vain effort to plant it in my works. At 2 p. m., the enemy attempted a second charge less determined than the first. Their brave officers could neither lead nor drive their men to such certain death. I noticed as many as three mounted, who fell far in advance of their commands, urging them forward. The shelling of the enemy's batteries between 12 and 3 p. m., was the most furious I ever witnessed, while the range was so precise that scarce a shell failed to explode in the line. The enemy seemed now to be satisfied that he could not carry my position and contented himself by shelling and sharpshooting everything in sight. About 4 p. m., I saw the left suddenly give way three or four brigades distant from me. Almost instantaneously the line crumbled away till it reached me. I had no time to give any order or to make any disposition to check the disaster. When my command showed symptoms of taking care of themselves. I could only order them back, hoping to reform in a new position. I had to retire under a destructive fire of eighteen guns 600 yards distant, sweeping almost an open plain. I could not maintain order. The parallel stone walls on the pike separated my command in the center. I had neither staff officer, or mounted courier with me, and used my best endeavors to get my command all on the same side of the pike. I succeeded in doing this about one mile from the field, getting the greater body of the brigade together. I was directed by the major general commanding to take position as rear guard of the army across the pike. At 11 p. m., I halted four miles from Hollow Tree Gap."¹

General Holtzclaw's report contains a number of inaccuracies. There was but one assault on Overton Hill before its final capture and that was made about 3 p. m., instead of 12 M. The advance of our rear lines after General Post's brigade had failed to carry the enemy's works, may have seemed to General Holtzclaw like other distinct assaults. But they were all parts of the same movement and made at the same time. It was some

1 W. R. R. 93-705-6.

four weeks after the engagement when General Holtzclaw's report was written, and his memory was evidently at fault in these particulars. But his report confirms the sanguinary character of the struggle on the rugged slopes of Overton's Hill, and has therefore a proper place in any history of the battle. At 6 p. m. December 16, General Thomas, from eight miles south of Nashville sent the following dispatch, addressed to the President of the United States, Hon. E. M. Stanton, Lieutenant General U. S. Grant and Governor Andrew Johnson of Tennessee: "The army thanks you for your approbation of its conduct yesterday and to assure you that it is not misplaced. I have the honor to report that the enemy has been pressed at all points today on his line of retreat to the Brentwood Hills and Brigadier General Hatch of Wilson's corps of cavalry, on the right turned the enemy's left and captured a large number of prisoners, number not yet reported. Major General Schofield's troops next on the left of cavalry, carried several heights, captured many prisoners and six pieces of artillery. Brevet Major General Smith next on the left of Major General Schofield, carried the salient point of the enemy's line with McMillan's brigade of McArthur's division, capturing sixteen pieces of artillery, two brigadier generals and about 2000 prisoners. Brigadier General Garrard's division of Smith's command, next on the left of McArthur's division, carried the enemy's intrenchments, capturing all the artillery and troops of the enemy on the line. Brigadier General Wood's corps, on the Franklin pike, took up the assault, carrying the enemy's intrenchments in his front, captured eight pieces of artillery, something over 600 prisoners, and drove the enemy within one mile of the Brentwood pass. Major General Steedman, commanding the detachments of the different armies of the Military Division of the Mississippi most nobly supported General Wood's left and bore a most honorable part in the operations of the day. I have ordered the pursuit to be continued in the morning at daylight, all the troops are very much fatigued. The greatest enthusiasm prevails. I must not forget to report the operations of Brigadier General Johnson, in successfully driving the enemy, with the co-operations of the gunboats under Lieutenant Commander Fitch, from their established batteries on the Cumberland River below the City of Nashville, and of the services of Brigadier General Croxton's brigade in covering and relieving our right and rear in the operations of yesterday and today. Although I have no report of the number of prisoners captured by Johnston's and Croxton's commands, I know they have made a large number and am glad to be able to state that the number of prisoners captured yesterday greatly exceeds the number

reported to me last evening. The woods, fields and intrenchments are strewn with the enemy's small arms, abandoned in their retreat. In conclusion, I am happy to state that all this has been effected with but a small loss to us. Our loss does not probably exceed 3000, very few killed.¹

During the two day's operations there were 4462 prisoners captured including 287 officers of all grades from that of Major General, fifty-three pieces of artillery and thousands of small arms."² The losses of our entire army in the battle, were twenty-nine officers and 358 enlisted men killed, 164 officers and 2398 enlisted men wounded and one officer and 111 enlisted men captured or missing, a total of 3061.

By a singular omission, General Thomas fails to state the number of guns captured by the cavalry. That arm of the service had for the first time in our part of the army fought as an independent organization under a single leader, and commanders of infantry were slow to give it the credit it deserved. According to the official reports of General Wilson and his division and brigade commanders, the cavalry captured during the campaign seventeen cannon,³ the larger portion having been captured in the battle of Nashville, but as they were taken in co-operation with the infantry the infantry received all the credit.

The Fourth Corps suffered the heaviest losses. The brigade which suffered most was the colored brigade led by Colonel C. R. Thompson in the attack on Overton Hill. Its loss was four officers and seventy-three enlisted men killed, fourteen officers and 376 enlisted men wounded and one enlisted man captured or missing, a total of 468. Colonel Hubbard's brigade of McArthur's division came next with three officers and thirty enlisted men killed, twenty-two officers and 259 enlisted men wounded and one enlisted man missing, total 315. Colonel Post's brigade came next with six officers and thirty enlisted men killed, twenty-seven officers and 236 enlisted men wounded and thirteen enlisted men missing, total 312. General Grose's brigade of seven regiments of the First Division of the Fourth Corps came next with four officers and thirty-two enlisted men killed, ten officers and 205 enlisted men wounded and two enlisted men missing, total 253, while our brigade had three officers and thirty-seven enlisted men killed and thirteen officers and 191 enlisted men wounded, total 244. The total losses in no other brigade engaged in the battle reached 200 and in many brigades the loss

1 W. R. R. 94-211.

2 From General Thomas's Official Report, W. R. R. 93-40.

3 From General Thomas's Official Report, W. R. R. 94-40.

3 W. R. R. 93-571.

was far below that number.¹ All honor to the brave colored troops who fought in the battle of Nashville. They were among the black men described by Lincoln who "with silent tongue and clenched teeth and steady eye and well poised bayonet helped mankind on to the great consummation."

On the morning of December 17, Secretary of War Stanton telegraphed General Grant who was at Burlington, New Jersey, that Thomas was victorious at Nashville, that Hood's army was broken, and that Sherman had taken Fort McAllister,² which placed him in communication with the Union fleet in Ossibaw Sound.

Thus almost simultaneously, the two branches of Sherman's army which separated in November, had each accomplished it's mission. General Thomas had practically destroyed Hood's army and General Sherman had cut the Confederacy in twain by his successful march from Atlanta to the sea.

1 W. R. R. 93-97-105.

2 W. R. R. 94-228.



CHAPTER XXX.

HOOD'S INVASION OF TENNESSEE—THE PURSUIT OF HOOD TO THE TENNESSEE RIVER.

At 9:30 p. m., December 16, General Thomas issued orders for the immediate vigorous pursuit of Hood's broken army. Generals Wood and Steedman were ordered to move on the Franklin pike in their then order: Generals Schofield and Smith on the Granny White pike, and concentrate with the troops of Generals Wood and Steedman at or near Brentwood, and the whole army was then to march on Franklin.¹ At the same time General Wilson was ordered to leave Johnson's cavalry division on the Hillsboro pike, to observe the enemy and protect our right and rear, and to move the balance of his command over to the Franklin pike to operate on that road and the road east of it.²

General Wilson before he received the above order had directed General Johnson to move by the Hillsborough pike to Franklin, and was preparing to press the enemy by the shortest roads. This he reported to General Thomas at 3 a. m. of the 17th, and stated that he thought he would be able to do the enemy more damage by crowding him, as he had already decided to do. General Wilson also stated that it was his intention to try to get into Franklin with his whole force, that he had sent General Thomas a dispatch to that effect which had not been acknowledged, but that he would send his cavalry, except Johnson's division, to the Franklin pike as ordered. General Wilson also stated that he inferred that Hood was expecting the arrival of Forrest's forces from the direction of Murfreesboro and that the infantry therefore should crowd the enemy vigorously on the Franklin pike, and if possible prevent the junction.³ These seem to have been such excellent suggestions, that one wonders why they were not followed. Possibly the report that General Breckenridge's army, estimated at 10,000 cavalry infantry and artillery, was at a point 15 miles southeast of Murfreesboro and was moving toward that place⁴ had something to do with it.

About the hour orders as above were given for the pursuit of Hood. Colonel Willett, who had charge of the pontoon train,

1 W. R. R. 94-214-215.

2 W. R. R. 94-218.

3 W. R. R. 94-237.

4 W. R. R. 94-243.

was ordered to move such train at as early an hour as possible on the *Murfreesboro pike*.¹

The order of march of the Fourth Corps was published at 6 a. m. December 17, and directed that the advance against the enemy should continue—the troops to move out in the following order—General Kimball's division on the right, General Elliott's (formerly General Wagner's) division in the center and our division, General Beatty's on the left. Each division was to deploy one brigade and the other brigades were to follow in column until the enemy was met, when a second brigade was to be deployed and the enemy pressed with vigor.²

We were expecting to pursue the enemy vigorously and were up very early and packed up and ready to move by daylight. It had rained all night the night of the 16th and was still raining, but the thrill of our glorious victory was still vibrating and the discomfort was not thought of. Even our grief over the loss of our former comrades was half forgotten in our eagerness to press forward. A detail of men was sent to Nashville to see that the remains of Captain Hanson were sent home to New Concord, Ohio.³ Our brigade moved out about 8 a. m., our regiment in column by right of companies, through open woods and fields to the left of the *Franklin pike*. The pike was a river of soft mud and the ground everywhere was covered with water.

Shortly after we started, General Thomas, attended by his staff, rode by on the pike and was cheered by every one. He was clothed from head to foot in rubber and was covered with mud. His face was splashed, but he was smiling and jolly, and as he swayed in his saddle and bowed to acknowledge the cheers and salutes which were given him, he was a wholesome and pleasant study. We did not then know how near he had come to being removed because he did not move against Hood until he was ready. The marching was very difficult, some of the fields were deep with mud and we had to wade a number of small streams. After we passed Brentwood, where we halted for half an hour, we finally found room to march on the pike, which was preferable to the muddy fields, for it had a firm bottom.

Soon after reaching the pike, we met a Confederate regiment going to the rear as prisoners. It had been captured by the cavalry. We heard artillery firing in front and learned that the enemy's rear guard was still stubbornly opposing our

1 W. R. R. 94-214.

2 W. R. R. 94-232.

3 Gieson's Diary.

advance. Signs of the enemy's demoralization were everywhere visible in broken guns and cast away pieces of equipment.

We reached Franklin about 3:30 p. m.¹ and turned off the road, to remain over night, we were told, and to draw rations which we very much needed. Colonel Suman with his regiment, the Ninth Indiana, was trying to build a bridge across the Harpeth but the river was rising so fast it seemed very doubtful whether he would succeed.² We had orders to cross the stream as soon as the bridge was completed, or the pontoon train arrived. At 8 p. m. General Wood dispatched to General Thomas, that Colonel Suman had reported it impossible to construct the bridge, owing to the rapid rise of the river, and urged that the pontoon train be hurried forward.³ It was not known at that time that the pontoon train had been ordered to move out on the Murfreesboro pike and was not within reach. At 8 p. m., word came that General Wilson with his cavalry had attacked and "bust up" Stevenson's division and a brigade of the enemy's cavalry three miles beyond Franklin and had captured three cannon and a number of prisoners.³ At 10 p. m. orders came from General Thomas to press the pursuit of the enemy at daylight next morning.⁴ On the morning of December 18, we were ready to move at daylight. At 7:30 a. m. Colonel Suman, whose men had worked all night, reported that the bridge he had been working on was completed and orders came to move at once, which we did. Kimball's division crossed first, then Elliott's and then ours. A battery of artillery followed each division. After the three divisions came the rest of the corps artillery, then the ammunition and hospital trains and then the other trains, all moving down the Franklin pike.⁴

As we marched through Franklin we found the place full of Confederate wounded. Almost every other house was a hospital. The number of wounded still remaining there was said to be near 2000. There were some few of our own men in the hospitals there. As we passed by the Carter House we saw many evidences of the fierceness of the conflict which had raged about that now historic dwelling. The side of the house towards the south still bore the marks of the battle. In a number of places were holes torn by the shot and shell of the enemy's artillery and there was scarcely a square inch of its surface that did not show the dint of a bullet. The north side of the house showed similar marks but they were not so

1 Gleason's Diary.

2 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-157.

3 W. R. R. 94-233.

4 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-158.

numerous as on the south side. The marks on the north side were evidently made by the men of Opdycke's brigade at the time our center was broken by the men of Brown's and Cleburne's divisions, and General Gordon led his brigade over our works and was captured with his command. The small grove of locusts to the southwest of the Carter House looked like a cherry orchard in abundant bloom. It had been swept by such a storm of leaden hail that scarcely a twig had not been touched by a bullet. Here and there many dead horses were lying unburied. But most impressive of all the reminders of the fierce conflict, were the hundreds of small headboards which marked the graves of the enemy's dead who had fallen in front of our works. There seemed to be acres of them. The headboards bore the name, rank and regiment of the men buried beneath them, those of each regiment grouped together. The loss of officers was appalling. In some regiments almost all the field, staff and line officers seemed to have been killed. Gleason in his diary says that some of the enemy's prisoners whom we met at Franklin said "that after carrying the line of works held by General Wagner's division, they supposed all was clear and that we had no other intrenched line, that with this impression, they rushed forward blindly into the open jaws of death as it were, thinking the coveted prize within their grasp."¹

We marched rapidly forward through the pouring rain, meeting three or four pieces of artillery which the cavalry had captured, and small groups of prisoners which were being sent to the rear. There was artillery firing in front, which indicated that the enemy was stubbornly resisting our advance. But we pressed forward in support of the cavalry to beyond Spring Hill, where we bivouaced for the night, having marched 14 miles.

Colonel Fullerton in his journal of this day, says:

"The enemy is very much demoralized, about one-third of what remains of Hood's army is without arms and as many are without shoes. Thus far we (the army) have taken from them over 60 pieces of artillery and a large number of prisoners, perhaps 9000 up to date, including the captured in hospital. Hood's trains are two days ahead of him. He has but a few pieces of artillery left. Forrest it is supposed has joined him with one division of cavalry and two divisions of infantry that he has had at Murfreesborough, part of the same force General Rousseau whipped a few days ago. The rest of Forrest's cavalry is in our front. Wilson has been driving

1 Gleason's Diary.

it today, together with Cheatham's corps that has been acting as rear guard today. We (the army) have captured four general officers up to date."¹

That night General Thomas received the following dispatch from General Grant:

"The armies operating against Richmond have fired 200 guns in honor of your great victory. Sherman has fully established his base on Ossibaw Sound, with Savannah fully invested. I hope to be able to fire a salute tomorrow in honor of the fall of Savannah. In all your operations we heard nothing of Forrest. Great precautions should be taken to prevent him crossing the Cumberland or Tennessee below Eastport. After Hood has been driven as far as it is possible to follow him, you want to re-occupy Decatur and all other abandoned points."²

General Thomas answered this dispatch as follows:

"Yours of 12:20 p. m. today received. I have already given orders to have Decatur occupied, and also to throw a strong column on the south side of the Tennessee toward Tuscumbia, for the purpose of capturing Hood's depot there, if possible, and gaining possession of his pontoon bridge. I have also requested Admiral Lee to go up the Tennessee River with a fleet of gunboats, which he has promised to do, and his vessels are no doubt already on the way. General Wilson informed me today that prisoners taken yesterday by him told him that Forrest, Jackson and another division left Murfreesboro Thursday (Dec. 15.) for Columbia direct, and that Buford with another division left Murfreesboro the same day and marched continuously until he reached Spring Hill, where he assumed the duties of rear guard to the rebel army. I hope you will be able to fire a salute tomorrow in honor of the capture of Savannah."³

It appears from General Forrest's report that it was not until the night of the 16th that General Buford was ordered across to the Columbia pike, and that he, with the balance of his command did not reach Columbia until the evening of the 18th.⁴ The morning of December 19, it was still raining hard and the ground was in such condition that a *wagon could not possibly move off the pike*, and it was almost impossible to march infantry off of it.⁵ We were ready to move a little after daylight. We heard artillery firing in the direction of Rutherford's Creek, distant about two and one-half miles, and after some delay moved out in that direction about two miles and

1 W. R. R. 93-158-159.

2 W. R. R. 94-248.

3 W. R. R. 94-249.

4 W. R. R. 94-756.

5 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-159.

were halted in a piece of woodland, the rain pouring down harder than at any time since we left Nashville. We heard skirmishing in front and were ordered to have the men draw the loads from their guns, which looked ominous.¹ This was about 9 a. m. The cavalry had reached the creek before us, and found the bridge destroyed and the enemy holding a high and commanding line of hills on the south side near to and running parallel with the creek. He had constructed thereon a line of earth works, and as our advance appeared opened on it with a four-gun battery. His skirmishers and sharpshooters lined the bank of the creek, which was so swollen that it was impossible to ford it, it being fifteen feet deep in most places. The pontoon train had not come up and we could hear nothing of it.²

After the men had drawn the loads from their guns and replaced them with dry cartridges, we moved out into the pike, marched a short distance and then again moved off the road and went into bivouac where we remained the rest of the day and the night.³ Here Colonel Askew rejoined us. We built large fires and tried to dry our wet garments, with poor success, however. At 10 a. m. parties were sent above and below the position covering the pike held by the enemy, to fell trees across the creek, so that we might cross our skirmishers, and a working party was sent to build infantry foot bridges. At 2 p. m. they reported that there were no trees on the bank large enough to reach across the creek, and those that were cut were swept away by the swift current. We did not have tools to build a bridge that the wagons could cross on. At 3 p. m., General Elliott was directed to drive back the enemy's sharpshooters and try to build a bridge at some point above the pike, and to continue the work until after dark. Similar instructions were given to General Kimball to build a bridge below and not far from the pike. After making all possible efforts to build a bridge as directed, General Elliott gave it up and reported it as impossible because of the rapid rise of the creek and the swiftness of the current.⁴

While our division was in bivouac, keeping up great fires and trying to dry our blankets, some of the men in the other divisions were still at work trying to find some way to get across the swollen creek. Some of the men in General Kimball's division built two rafts and tried to cross to the other bank, but both rafts were swamped by the swift current and two men were drowned. At 1 a. m. December 20, General Kimball reported that General Grose who had been trying to

¹ Gleason's Diary.

² Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-159.

³ Gleason's Diary.

⁴ Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-159.
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build a bridge below the pike had given it up, as the stream was too deep and swift.¹

At 9 p. m. December 19, General Thomas sent a dispatch to General Wood saying, that Forrest with 7000 cavalry was in camp between Rutherford's Creek and Duck River and directing him to cross the creek next morning and move directly against him. General Wilson was ordered to send General Hatch's division of cavalry across on the ruins of the railroad bridge to strike Forrest in flank, while our corps attacked him in front. General Smith was to co-operate by way of the Columbia and Rally Hill road, which crossed the creek near its head waters.²

At the time of the receipt of this order, General Wilson sent word that General Hatch believed Forrest had already gone,³ but orders were given accordingly, with renewed directions to redouble efforts to find some way to get across the creek. The rain ceased about midnight and it grew much colder.

The morning of December 20, we had no orders to move and the men were busy until near noon trying to dry their soaked blankets. At 9 a. m. we heard that General Grose had a few men across the river, was crossing his brigade and would soon have a bridge on which infantry could cross. The bridge was completed at 11:30 a. m. and General Kimball's division commenced crossing. General Hatch's division of cavalry at the same time commenced crossing over the ruins of the railroad bridge. At 12:30 p. m. General Elliott completed a foot bridge at the pike crossing and began crossing his division. Just after we had our dinners the "assembly" sounded in our division and we moved out on the pike and to the creek. After an hour's wait, we crossed on the bridge just below the pike General Elliott's men has constructed, and marched toward Columbia. We heard considerable firing toward Columbia but it soon ceased. We moved forward slowly through the mud until we came to Duck River and went into camp on a part of the same ground on which we had camped on our march to Shiloh in 1862.⁴ Forrest had gone, as General Hatch had reported, and the entire corps was halted along Duck River awaiting for the pontoon train to come up. The enemy held the south bank of the river, which was too deep and swift to bridge with timber and was still rising. At 3:50 p. m. it again commenced raining hard and the prospects of overtaking the enemy were growing more and more remote. General Fullerton in his diary of this day says, that at 3:50 p. m. he had just

¹ Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-159. ⁴ Gleason's Diary.

² and ³ Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-160.

heard from General Thomas, who reported that the pontoon train would be up that night and adds, "This corps has already been delayed thirty-four hours waiting for the pontoon train to cross the Harpeth River, Rutherford's Creek and now Duck River. The enemy has, therefore, gained so many hours in his retreat."¹

The morning of December 21, it was snowing and as there were no orders to move the men generally kept inside their shelter tents. Gleason in his diary says he "walked down to the place where it was proposed to lay the pontoon bridge, when it should come up, and found that the pickets on either side of the river had made an amicable arrangement not to fire until we were ready to cross, and that the rebels had called out to our men not to come too near the river but to go back and build fires, which advice seemed sensible and prevailed." He also says that he "was informed that two pieces of artillery and 300 prisoners had been captured here yesterday (by the cavalry) after the rebels had removed their pontoon bridge (too soon) and that it was reported that several other field pieces had been dumped into the river over the abutments of the old bridge."²

At 8 a. m. General Wood received a dispatch from General Thomas dated 8 p. m. the 20th, saying that General Schofield had been instructed to build a bridge over Rutherford's Creek so that artillery and trains could cross, and that General Smith would assist in getting the pontoon train over and hurry it forward so that a bridge could be thrown across Duck River early next morning. General Thomas also said:

"It is the desire that the entire army be over the river before tomorrow night, in which case it is to be hoped that the greater part of Hood's army may be captured, as he cannot possibly get his teams and troops across the Tennessee River before we can overtake him."³

The pontoon train did not get to Rutherford's Creek until 1 p. m. the 21st, and only a part of it reached Duck River that night. Colonel Streight of our brigade who was to lay it, at 11:30 p. m. reported that it would be impracticable to commence the work until 5 a. m. next morning.⁴ Colonel Fullerton in his diary of this day says:

"The last of Forrest's command and Bate's rebel division of infantry arrived opposite Columbia, on the north bank of Duck River from Murfreesboro yesterday. If we could have had a pontoon train to enable us to cross Rutherford's Creek when we arrived there, we would have captured the

1 W. R. R., Fullerton's Journal, 93-160.

2 Gleason's Diary.

3 W. R. R. 94-287.

4 Fullerton's Diary, W. R. R. 93-161.

most of the force. This part of the enemy's force was in such haste that it abandoned six pieces of artillery that were stuck in the mud near Columbia on the Murfreesboro road."¹

Later in the day he writes, "We have been delayed another day in the pursuit of the enemy on account of the pontoon train not being up with us. The following reason for the delay has been given: On the 17th instant General Thomas sent word for the train to leave Nashville at once, to push forward and join us. Captain Ramsey, assistant adjutant general, wrote the order for the train and directed it to come out on the Murfreesboro pike instead of the Franklin pike. The train had moved out fifteen miles on the Murfreesboro pike when, the mistake having been discovered, it was reached by a messenger, and the officer in charge of it was ordered to move over to the Franklin pike. He crossed over on a country road which was almost impassable. Captain Ramsey says that when General Thomas gave him the order, he had just awakened out of a deep sleep and said 'Murfreesboro pike' and not 'Franklin pike.' By this mistake we have been delayed about three days in the pursuit of the enemy, and have missed many splendid opportunities to inflict severe blows on the enemy, perhaps to annihilate him."² It seems strange that a staff officer of ordinary intelligence should not at once have noticed the mistake, or at least have inquired if Murfreesboro was really intended, for it must have been known to him that the enemy was retreating and our entire army was pursuing him on the Franklin pike. It is now apparent that if the mistake had not been made Hood's army would never have reached the Tennessee river, and that its destruction would have been complete.

At 7 a. m. December 22, Colonel Askew received orders to move our regiment quickly out to the Franklin pike, as the Confederate cavalry were thought to be coming around to cut off some of our troops who had already crossed the river above the bend. The bugle sounded "Fall In" and "Double Quick." The men pulled their bayonets out of the frozen mud and grasping their icy guns fell in, and in an incredibly short time were in line on the pike near the river. The right wing of the regiment was sent down toward where the pontoon bridge was to be laid to take possession of some cabins near the river. It went at a double quick amid quite a patter of carbine shots from the enemy across the river and soon reached the cabins. From this position it opened a hot fire on the enemy, who were concealed by rocks and trees on the

1 and 2 W. R. R., Fullerton's Journal, 93-161.

other side. The Fifty-first Indiana of our brigade, which had crossed the river in pontoon boats above us, soon worked their way down the bank and dislodged the enemy in front of us, who fled in confusion leaving quite a number of killed and wounded and some prisoners. As soon as the enemy was routed we were ordered down to the river and helped to unload the wagons which had come up, and in preparing the approaches for the pontoon bridge. The mud was very deep, there seemed to be a lack of system and the work made slow progress. The men worked by reliefs and those not at work hovered over the fires trying to keep warm. We worked steadily on until about 7 p. m., when our regiment was relieved and went back to camp, got supper and prepared to cross as soon as the bridge was completed. At 8 p. m. it was done and we marched across it and out through the city and went into camp about a mile beyond it.¹

There were only three pontoniers with the pontoon train and the men who laid the bridge knew nothing about the work, which made it necessarily slow. In crossing the river and driving the enemy back, the Fifty-first Indiana lost one man, killed, and eight 'men' wounded.² Our division was the first to cross and bivouaced on a ridge just beyond the picket line we had held when we arrived at Columbia from Pulaski about a month before. The crossing of the river was very slow and General Elliott's division, which followed ours, was not all across at midnight. General Kimball's division was to follow, then the artillery and trains and then the cavalry. The orders for next day were to press the enemy on the Pulaski pike as soon as the cavalry got across. Some of the prisoners captured during the day reported that five brigades of the enemy had left Columbia early that morning for Pulaski and that Hood intended to cross the Tennessee at Decatur.³

There was a heavy white frost the morning of December 23, and when the sun came up the air was full of glistening crystals.⁴ The pontoon bridge had been poorly constructed and the descent to and ascent from it were so slippery that it was difficult to get on and off it. At 5 a. m. only three batteries and a few wagons were over. It was decided to let the cavalry precede the rest of the artillery and the trains, and orders were given to the infantry to move down the Pulaski pike as soon as the cavalry passed them.⁵

Our corps commenced to move out at 2:30 p. m., General Kimball's division in advance, then ours and then General El-

1 Gleason's Diary.

2 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-162.

3 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-162.

4 Gleason's Diary.

5 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-162.

liott's. At 4 p. m. General Kimball's troops came up with the rear guard of the enemy, posted in a narrow gorge through which the pike runs, about five miles south of Columbia. High hills on either side of the gorge, running at right angles to the pike, completely commanded it. Three regiments of Kimball's division and a rifled battery were sent against the enemy and soon dislodged him. A Confederate Captain was killed during the affair. It was now 5 p. m. and the troops all went into camp for the night.¹ Our regimental camp was in a sheltered cove to the left of the pike and quite near the gorge above mentioned. Companies A and F were detailed for picket duty and were conducted to their posts by Captain John M. Farquahar of the Eighty-ninth Illinois, our new brigade inspector. The picket line was on the crest of a high ridge. The reserve was on a bank below, from which hundreds of our campfires were visible, and as the night was clear, they presented a pleasing and inspiring spectacle.²

While we were thus pressing forward in pursuit of Hood, General Steedman was moving by way of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad with a view of reaching Decatur and moving thence to Florence. Word came that he had reached Christiana on the 22nd, that he would cross the Tennessee above Decatur, drive out Roddey's force which held the place and move on to Florence as fast as possible.³ Word also came that General Edward M. McCook had broken up Lyon's command which was raiding in Kentucky.

The morning of December 24, four divisions of Wilson's cavalry passed to the front and our corps followed at 11:50 a. m., General Elliott's division leading, ours next and then followed Kimball's. Our progress was slow, as the cavalry could not move on the side of the pike as was ordered, because of the nature of the ground. The enemy's force in our front consisted of seven brigades of infantry and Forrest's cavalry.⁴ Our division moved out a little after noon. We heard cannonading in our front and as our progress was steady it was evident that our cavalry was meeting with little opposition. We pressed forward through Lynnville and went into camp three miles south of that place, having marched sixteen and one-half miles. Some of the men of the regiment had gone out foraging, and Gleason reports that his mess was happy in the possession of two turkeys which their cook prepared for breakfast the next morning.⁵ We were

1 Fullerton's Diary, W. R. R. 93-163.

2 Gleason's Diary.

3 W. R. R. 94-317.

4 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-163.

5 Gleason's Diary.

to have no Christmas holiday, for orders came to move at daylight next morning.

The morning of December 25, our regiment led the corps and we pulled out at sunrise, following the cavalry. There was the usual cannonading in front, but we marched steadily on, only stopping at times for a short rest. We reached Pulaski, eleven miles distant, at 1 p. m., marched rapidly through the town and crossed Richland Creek on a bridge which the enemy had set fire to, but which our cavalry had arrived in time to save. We noticed quite a change in the appearance of the place since we evacuated it, November 23. The stores were all deserted and the windows broken. It was Sunday, as well as Christmas day, and the few people we saw were in Sabbath attire, but we had no time to exchange compliments with them. We heard sharp firing in front and hurried forward to support the cavalry. We had now bidden adieu to pikes and found the road almost impassable. It was strewn with broken down wagons, abandoned artillery, ammunition, etc., left by the enemy. At 3 p. m. General Wilson sent word from a point two miles south of Pulaski that he had run against eight brigades of the enemy's infantry and Forrest's cavalry, in a strong position, their front covered by rail barricades, and that he needed assistance from the infantry.¹ He had pushed forward too rapidly and the enemy had made a counter charge and captured one of his guns.² Strenuous efforts were made by the cavalry to recover the lost gun, but the enemy finally got off with it. It was afterwards recaptured by **Wilson's cavalry** in the campaign against Selma, Alabama.³ We hurried forward to the cavalry's support, but when we reached the point where Wilson was checked, the enemy had fled and we went into bivouac at 5:30 p. m., about six miles from Pulaski, having marched sixteen miles. The day had been cloudy with light rain.

It could not be known to what point on the Tennessee River Hood was directing his retreat until we reached the junction of the Lamb's Ferry and Florence roads. At 10:10 a. m. on the 25th, General Wilson telegraphed to General Thomas that there seemed to be little doubt that the enemy had gone to Bainbridge, eight miles above Florence on the Tennessee River, fearing a flank movement from Stevenson; that Stewart's and Lee's corps had gone by the Florence road to Lexington, and that Cheatham's corps had gone to Law-

1 W. R. R. 94-348.

2 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-164.

3 Under the Old Flag, Vol. 2, p. 140-141.

renceburg, striking the old military road eight miles below that place, and that a Mr. Carter had told him that the Colonel commanding Hood's pontoon train had said he had left Pulaski on Thursday morning (the 23rd) and was going to Bainbridge.¹ On that day General Hood telegraphed the Confederate Secretary of War that he was already at Bainbridge and was laying a pontoon bridge across the Tennessee River.²

General Wilson in the above dispatch to General Thomas said that it was reported that the enemy was suffering immensely, that Buford's wound was said to be quite severe; that Cheatham's ammunition train of fifteen or twenty wagons had been abandoned at Pulaski and the mules were put in to help the pontoons along; that General Lee had been seriously wounded in the fight at Nashville; that the enemy had lost eighteen generals killed, wounded and captured, since they started north, and acknowledged the loss of sixty-eight pieces of artillery. Word came that General Lyon was still "roaming round" in Kentucky, and on the evening of the 23d had captured Elizabethtown.³ General Thomas thereupon dispatched to General McCook at Nashville:

"Lyon, it seems is not destroyed or driven out of the country. We hear of him on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad." He directed McCook "to keep at work at him until he is finished or driven across the Cumberland."⁴

While these events were transpiring in the southwest the country was electrified by a dispatch from General Sherman to President Lincoln, dated Savannah, Ga., December 22, 1864, saying:

"I beg to present to you as a Christmas gift the city of Savannah, with one hundred and fifty heavy guns and plenty of ammunition, also about twenty-five thousand bales of cotton."⁵

The orders for the Fourth Corps for December 26, were to march as soon as rations were issued, General Kimball's division first, General Elliott's next and ours last. To facilitate rapid marching it was ordered that the only wagons which would be allowed were five ammunition wagons and ten ambulances to each division.⁶

The day was fair and mild. We were entirely out of rations, and the supply train not coming up, the men, and officers too, resorted to various expedients to appease their hunger. One mess sent its forager out, who soon returned

1 W. R. R. 94-351.

2 W. R. R. 94-731.

3 W. R. R. 94-338.

4 W. R. R. 94-364.

5 Sherman's Memoirs, Vol. 2, p. 231.

6 W. R. R. 94-360.

with a bag of corn which was boiled until it was soft enough to grate, when it was grated and the cook made out of it a batch of course corn cakes. Some of the corn was ground in a coffee mill and made into a course mush. Some of the private foragers mounted on the officers horses went out some distance from camp and brought in two hams, a shoulder and some side meat, which were divided up among the messes.¹

The supply train did not get up until 5 p. m., and as it would take all the evening to distribute the rations, marching orders were suspended until 5:30 a. m., December 27. At 7 p. m., December 26, a note was received from General Wilson dated "Sugar Creek, seventeen miles from Pulaski," saying, that the enemy had made a short stand at that place, but soon retreated, and he would stop there to feed his horses. He also stated that as soon as he crossed the creek he would send a brigade to fell trees in the Tennessee River to float down the stream in the hope of destroying the enemy's pontoon bridge.²

At 6 a. m., December 27, the corps resumed its march, the divisions in the order designated in the orders for the 26th. Our regiment did not march until 8 a. m. After ascending a steep ridge we followed it in a southerly direction, threading our way through a thick growth of young saplings, the road being impassable from so much travel on it during the recent rains. We passed a pontoon wagon and one artillery caisson which had stuck fast in the mud and had been abandoned by the enemy. At 10:30 a. m., the head of our column reached the point, thirteen and a half miles from Pulaski, where the Lamb's Ferry and the Florence roads separate, the latter leading through Lexington. As the cavalry had moved out on the latter road and we were directed to follow the cavalry, we also took that road.³ When we descended into the valley of Sugar Creek we found a better country and better roads and could march in the fields around the deep places. We reached Sugar Creek where Wilson's cavalry were halted about 3 p. m., and went into camp on an elevation overlooking the creek. General Wilson's headquarters were at Pinhook Town, two miles beyond Sugar Creek. He reported that he was unable to move farther, as he had no forage for his horses nor rations for his men; that a little forage could be found in the country and was being brought in; that it was impracticable to bring rations up from Pulaski as the road from that place

1 Gleason's Diary.

2 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-165.

3 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 94-165.

was impassable; that he believed the bulk of the enemy was now over the Tennessee River, having crossed at Bainbridge—on the shoals between Lamb's Ferry and Florence. General Wood at once sent the forgoing report to General Thomas by special courier and stated that he, General Wood, had sent out parties to ascertain certainly whether General Wilson's suppositions were correct. If they were not, he would move on and support the cavalry, and if the enemy had crossed the Tennessee he would go no further, but await orders. He also informed General Thomas that Major Goodspeed, chief of the artillery of the corps, had reported that after the next day the artillery horses would have no forage.¹

At 8:30 p. m. that evening a dispatch was received from General Wilson saying that he had received a dispatch from Colonel Spalding, who was at Lexington, saying that the enemy's rear guard had only left that place at 10 a. m. that day; that a lady from Florence had informed him, Colonel Spalding, that on the evening of the 25th the enemy had not finished their bridge at Bainbridge, and that he therefore would push on at once. General Wilson also said he had written to General Thomas that he would press on with all his force early in the morning, and would "move everything, beginning at 5 a. m., though Hatch has received no rations and three days' of Croxton's were taken by A. J. Smith."²

Colonel Fullerton closes his journal of this day as follows:

"General Wilson's proposed movement is not at all judicious, as the rear of the enemy will have crossed the river some time before he can reach it, even if they do not cross until today, December 27. His horses will be without forage and his men without rations and he is going into a barren country. Under orders of General Thomas we are obliged to follow up the cavalry closely and support it, and must follow wherever Wilson leads. As soon as the cavalry moves out of the way tomorrow we will march."³

At 6:30 a. m., December 28, orders were issued to march at 8 a. m. if the cavalry was out of the way, General Elliott to lead, General Beatty to follow and General Kimball to bring up the rear.

At 9 a. m. our brigade moved out, crossing Sugar Creek about a half mile from camp on a rude bridge of fence rails, and halting there until the Third Brigade passed us. Here we heard of Sherman's capture of Savannah. Gleason says:

1 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-166.

2 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-166.

3 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-166.

"The good news brightened our hearts and made our steps more elastic." We soon crossed a branch of Sugar Creek, then turned eastward, and it was thought that our chase of Hood was to be abandoned. But after ascending a ridge we again turned southwesterly through a region similar to that traversed the day before. We had more streams to cross and deeper mud to wade through. Where the road was impassable the pioneers cut trails through the dense woods on the sides of the road. At one time the brigade became almost demoralized by excessive straggling and had to halt and reform its ranks. At 3:30 p. m. we reached a cluster of cabins known as Lexington, and went into camp in the woods beyond it, having marched thirteen miles.¹ All day nothing had been heard from General Wilson, but at 4:30 p. m. a note came from his chief of staff to General Wood, dated Bull's Mills, saying, that information had been received that the last of the enemy's forces had crossed the Tennessee River on the evening of the day before; that his pontoon bridge had been taken up that morning, and that General Wilson had sent a staff officer to General Thomas with the information and to ask for orders.²

December 29, our entire corps lay in camp near Lexington awaiting orders. Large foraging parties were sent out and gathered in all the forage they could find—enough to last two days.³

At 1:30 p. m., December 30, General Wood received a dispatch from General Thomas dated Pulaski, Tenn., Dec. 29, 1864, saying:

"The last of the rebel army having been driven across the Tennessee River, the Major General Commanding directs that the pursuit cease, and that you march with your corps to Huntsville, Athens and vicinity, and there go into camp for the winter and attend to the reorganizing of your command and fitting it generally for an early spring campaign. * * * The Major General commanding the forces in the field tenders his thanks to yourself, your officers and the men for the vigor, bravery and willing endurance of privations and hardships displayed by your command during this long and toilsome pursuit of the retreating rebel army."⁴

This order was published that evening and it was decided to take up our march to Athens and Huntsville next day, not by way of Pulaski, but by new and untried roads, which we hoped we would find less difficult.

1 Gleason's Diary.

2 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-167.

3 Fullerton's Journal, 93-169.

4 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-169-170.

The campaign which was here brought to a close had lasted only about five weeks, but it had been one of the most anxious and arduous in which we had been engaged. The officers and men who had fought under General Thomas will always believe that when General Sherman started on his great raid through Georgia to the sea, he devolved upon them the heavier burden. As will be seen in former pages of this history, he took with him more than two-thirds of the very flower of the great army which had fought first Johnson and then Hood, pressing their army back from Tunnel Hill to Atlanta and finally taking the latter stronghold; and sent his two weakest corps and his broken down and dismounted cavalry to resist the northward march of that same army, aided of course by such new and untrained troops as could be hurried into the field, and the troops of A. J. Smith which were far away in Missouri. But Providence interposed to save us from destruction at Spring Hill, and the heroic fortitude of the Fourth and Twenty-third corps, aided by Wilson's cavalry, at Franklin, broke the spirit of Hood's army and made Nashville an easy victory.

There was great risk in General Sherman's dual campaign, and some military critics will always think that General Grant's first suggestion to him, "to first whip Hood's army and then he could go where he pleased," was correct. But the risk was taken, and although far out of the direct course, the results justified it. Sherman marched to the sea, practically unimpeded, opened communication with the Union fleet at Ossibaw Sound, captured Savannah, and placed his fine army of 60,000 veterans, strengthened and invigorated by their holiday march, in close touch and support of Grant's army at Petersburg, and the troops sent to Thomas practically destroyed Hood's army. That the success of Thomas was absolutely necessary to make General Sherman's march to the sea successful, is recognized by him in his order directing that the troops who fought under Thomas at Columbia, Spring Hill, Franklin and Nashville, might inscribe "Savannah" on their colors.¹ The two campaigns had broken the military power of the rebellion in the Southwest, and it was soon to crumble and utterly fall.

1 W. R. R., and Sherman's Memoirs, Vol. 2, pp. 219-220.

CHAPTER XXXI.

THE MARCH TO HUNTSVILLE—A MONTH OF IDLENESS AND A MISTAKEN MOVEMENT BACK TO NASHVILLE.

The orders for December 31, 1864, for our corps were to march for Athens and Huntsville, Ala., at 7 a. m., General Beatty's division leading, then General Kimball's, and lastly General Elliott's. Each division was to take one battery and all its trains and send its pioneers in front to repair the roads and bridge the small streams.¹

As our division was to march first, we were up early, dried our tents and blankets and were ready to move out at 7 a. m. as ordered. The night had been cold and in the morning there was frost and snow and a keen wind, and we marched rapidly to keep warm. Our course was eastward and the road was much better than that from Pulaski. We crossed a number of small streams and at some of them had to wait until our pioneers completed bridges across them. After such a wait we sometimes went at a double quick.² We arrived at Sugar Creek about 2 p. m. and found the water three feet deep at the ford and the stream ninety feet wide. We halted here until a bridge could be thrown across the creek. In an hour it was completed and we marched across. The teams forded the creek. We marched two and a half miles beyond the creek and at 4 p. m. went into camp, having marched seventeen and a half miles since 7 a. m., and having bridged Sugar Creek and all of the smaller creeks running across the road on our line of march.³

There was little to remind us that it was New Year's eve. Gleason remembered, however, that he was at home on the last day of 1863, and noticed the contrast, while others remembered that they were freezing at Strawberry Plains. Still others recalled the evening of December 31, 1862, when we were freezing after the disastrous first day of the battle of Stone River.

There was no New Year's turkey in sight for any one,—not even a chicken. But there was no enemy near to occasion alarm and we were marching to a region where supplies would be abundant and where we would again be in nearer touch with loved ones at home. The day had been fair and we were thankful for dry ground on which to rest and sleep.

¹ Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-171.

² Gleason's Diary.

³ Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-172.

We were heading for Elk River, but it had not been decided at which ford we should try to cross it, or whether we should not be compelled to march back to Sugar Creek and take the road to Fayetteville, where there was a good bridge across the Elk. It was decided to send a reconnoitering party to the fords next morning to examine and report whether we could cross at either of them.¹

The morning of January 1, 1865, we got the impression that we were not to leave until a bridge had been constructed across Elk River, which would take considerable time. At 10 a. m. the reconnoitering party above mentioned reported that none of the fords could be crossed by wagons and artillery, as the water was six feet deep. But notwithstanding this report, at 10:30 a. m. Colonel Suman and Major Watson of the first division were ordered to construct a good strong wagon bridge across the river at Buck Island Ford for the passage of the corps. All the pioneers of the corps were directed to report to them, and our division and General Kimball's division were ordered to move up to the vicinity of the ford to render Colonel Suman any assistance he might call for.² In compliance with the last named order, our division left its camp a little after noon and marched to within one half mile of Buck Island Ford, where our regiment and brigade went into camp in a sheltered cove, where there were plenty of rails with which to make fires.³ Our rations were getting extremely low and each brigade was ordered to send out parties to forage the country for subsistence and to seize mills in which to grind corn for the troops.⁴ Captain George S. Crawford, brigade commissary, was quick to act upon the latter suggestion and soon had possession of a mill for our brigade a short distance up the river.⁵ At 3 p. m. Colonel Suman and Major Watson commenced work on the bridge, which they found a difficult task. The stream was 325 feet wide, too deep to ford and very swift, and no boats were to be found any where. They had only axes, a few saws, two or three augers and no nails or spikes.⁶

It was thought that time would be saved by going by way of Fayetteville, but that would be thirty-four miles out of the way and many of the men were barefooted, or too nearly so to march such a distance. Fortunately the weather became milder, our camp was pleasantly located, and, barring the matter of rations, we were more comfortable than we had been for many days.

December 29, when General Thomas ordered the Fourth Corps into winter quarters at Athens and Huntsville,⁷ he ordered

1 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-171.

2 Fullerton's Journal W. R. R. 93-172.

3 Gleason's Diary.

4 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-172.

5 Gleason's Diary.

6 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-172.

7 W. R. R. 94-408.

General Schofield's Corps to Dalton for the same purpose,¹ and General Smith's command to Eastport.² General Wilson had been directed to send a division of his cavalry to destroy the bridge across Bear Creek, south of the Tennessee River, and was now ordered to march his other divisions to Huntsville to rest, recruit and re-equip.³

Notwithstanding the orders to go into winter quarters both General Wilson and General Wood were of the opinion that a campaign against the enemy's forces south of the Tennessee should at once be begun. General Wilson at 3 p. m. December 29, wrote to General Thomas saying, "Croxtton's brigade, 1500 strong, marched from Taylor's Springs this morning via Gravelly Springs to Waterloo, with instructions to cross the river at that place, and, if possible, to destroy Bear Creek bridge," and urged that he be not recalled. He also stated that the indications were that the enemy had gone to Corinth, and if such was the case, Florence or Eastport would be better places to reorganize the cavalry, and pointedly said, he "would greatly prefer to go to either place than to trail back on the road to Pulaski with the ultimate prospect of returning by the same route, to make a new campaign against the enemy."⁴

General Wood the next day also wrote to General Thomas detailing the reports concerning the demoralization of the enemy and urging action before Hood could reorganize his army. He said, "I feel confident that Hood has not taken across the Tennessee River more than half the men he brought across it; that not more than one-half of those taken out are armed; that he has lost three-fourths of his artillery, and that, for rout, demoralization, even disintegration, the condition of his command is without a parallel in this war. * * * At present so far as Hood's command is concerned * * * the whole country from the Tennessee River to Mobile is open to us. Should we not then improve the present opportunity for bringing Alabama, at present the best state for supplies the rebels have, under our control? I firmly believe we can within the next few weeks without much opposition, bring the whole state under our control." He then outlined a plan of campaign, and concluded his letter by saying, "that the success of the expedition would be greatly facilitated by moving before Hood's command could be reorganized, armed and equipped, and before a force could be concentrated from other quarters to oppose us."⁵

As soon as General Halleck at Washington got word of

1 W. R. R. 94-409.

2 W. R. R. 94-396.

3 W. R. R. 94-411.

4 W. R. R. 94-411-412.

5 W. R. R. 94-423.

General Thomas' proposed disposition of his troops after his pursuit of Hood had ended, he sent a dispatch to General Grant at City Point saying, "I think from the tone of General Thomas' telegram of last night, that there is very little hope of his doing much further injury to Hood's army by pursuing it. You will perceive that he is disposed to postpone further operations till spring. This seems to me entirely wrong. In our present financial condition we cannot afford this delay, I, therefore respectfully suggest whether Schofield or A. J. Smith with, say 20,000 men should not be sent by water to Pascagoula to assist Canby in taking Mobile, and then using it as a base against Selma and Montgomery. This would prevent any of Hood's force from being sent against Sherman, and the capture of Selma would be almost as disastrous to the enemy as that of Atlanta. Thomas with the remainder of his force, could certainly maintain the line of the Tennessee to Chattanooga. If Schofield should be sent, the two departments (Tennessee and Kentucky) should be united under Thomas. If Thomas was as active as Sherman, I would say march directly from Decatur to Talladega, Montgomery and Selma, living off the country and anticipating Hood should he move by Meridian. But I think Thomas too slow to live off the country. He, however, will make the best possible defense. It is said that the rebels have a very large amount of supplies at Selma and Montgomery. If these can be captured and the railroads destroyed their Western armies cannot get ammunition and ordnance stores. The reason for not suggesting that Schofield move from Vicksburg by Meridian is that the country is mostly stripped of supplies, and at this season very difficult of passage, while that from Mobile is less swampy and moreover the operating army could be supplied by steamers on the Alabama River.¹

To these suggestions General Grant rather curtly replied: "I have no idea of keeping idle troops in any place, but before taking troops away from Thomas it will be advisable to see whether Hood halts his army at Corinth, I do not think he will, but think he is much more likely to be thrown in front of Sherman; if so, it will be just where we want him to go. Let Thomas collect all troops, not essential to hold his communications, at Eastport, if he chooses, a part of them at Tusculumbia, and be in readiness for their removal where they can be used."²

In accordance with foregoing General Halleck sent the following order to General Thomas:

"General Grant directs that all of your available forces not essential to hold your communications, be collected on the Ten-

1 W. R. R. 94-419-420.

2 W. R. R. 94-420.

nessee River, say at Eastport and Tuscumbia, and be made ready for such movements as may be ordered. It is supposed that a portion of the troops in Louisville and other parts of Kentucky and Tennessee can now be availed of for active operations elsewhere. They should be made ready for that purpose. General Dodge wishes you to return to Saint Louis the Thirty-ninth Missouri Infantry, now at Louisville, so that he may complete its organization. Please give us the earliest possible notice of Hood's line of retreat, so that orders may be given for a continuance of the campaign. General Grant does not intend that your army shall go into winter quarters, it must be ready for active operations in the field."¹

On receipt of this order General Thomas sent the following dispatch to General Halleck:

"Your telegrams of 11:30 a. m. and 3:30 p. m. this day received. I am watching Hood closely to determine his line of retreat, of which I will inform you as soon as ascertained. I have ordered the cavalry to Eastport and also General A. J. Smith's command. The Fourth Army Corps has been ordered to Huntsville, Ala., as that place will be convenient to furnish the troops with supplies to refit. I had ordered the Twenty-third Army Corps to Dalton, but countermanded the order yesterday upon a report that Hood was moving toward Corinth. I will now order the Twenty-third Corps to Eastport, I have received a communication from General Wilson today, dated the 29th, instant, in which he represents his cavalry as very much fagged out and in need of rest and asks that he may be allowed to assemble it near Eastport sufficiently long to reorganize and recuperate, shoe up his horses and organize his trains. His losses in horses have been very heavy since we left Nashville, owing principally to the intolerably bad weather, the almost impassable condition of the country, caused by constant and heavy rains and snow, and the great scarcity of forage along the route over which we pursued the enemy. The infantry, also, is very much exhausted, having been constantly on campaign duty since early last spring. To continue the campaign without any rest, I fear, will cost me very heavy losses from disease and exhaustion. The troops, however, will be assembled at Eastport and Huntsville as soon as possible, where we will await orders. I must say, however, in justice to all the commands, that they have not yet had sufficient time to get supplied with the transportation which General Sherman had, necessarily, to take from them to supply himself with the requisite amount for his march. I had already

1 W. R. R. 94-441.

taken steps, before receiving your telegram of today, to refit the troops under my command as soon as possible, so as to commence the campaign at the earliest possible moment, and I do believe that it is much the best policy to get well prepared on an important campaign."¹

As the correspondence and orders above given made no change in the disposition of the Fourth Corps we continued our work on the bridge across Elk River. On January 2, foraging parties were sent out and were so successful that we had provisions sufficient to last us until we reached Huntsville. The work on the bridge proceeded rapidly and Colonel Suman reported he would have it completed by 1 p. m. the next day. It was quite warm and there were indications of rain.

January 3, we were slow in getting out of our tents, for no one supposed we would move until late in the day. But the bridge was completed at 11 a. m. having been built in just twenty-four hours working time, and was strong enough for the heaviest trains.²

At 11:30 a. m. General Kimball's division began to cross the bridge, our division followed and following us came General Elliott's division. It had begun raining at midnight the night before, but ceased about daylight and the weather was fair and mild. The bridge was across the channel east of Buck's Island. The channel west of the island was fordable and we waded through it and struck out at a rapid pace for Athens, twelve miles distant. The latter part of our march the road ran through a number of sloughs which were difficult to cross. Our division reached Athens about 5 p. m. and marched about a half-mile beyond the town where we went into camp for the night.³

That evening General Wood received a telegram from General Thomas directing him to "concentrate his whole corps at Huntsville and prepare for an early resumption of the winter campaign."⁴

January 4, we resumed our march at 6:30 a. m., our brigade being in advance of the entire corps. The morning was frosty, but fair, the air was invigorating and the road was good, so we made rapid progress. About 4 p. m. we arrived at a stream called Indian Creek, where we went into camp, having marched nineteen miles. The only untoward incident of the day was that "Lieutenant Glover was placed in arrest by an officer of General Wood's staff for some imaginary offense."⁵

January 5, we resumed our march at 8 a. m. While wait-

1 W. R. R. 94-441-442.

2 Fullerton's Journal, W. R. R. 93-173.

3 Gleason's Diary.

4 Fullerton's Journal 93-173.

5 Gleason's Diary.

ing for marching orders an order from corps headquarters was published setting forth the evils of a habit which prevailed to quite an extent throughout the corps,—of jeering and shouting derisive epithets when certain officers rode by. Colonel Askew gave notice that he would expect the line officers to see that the practice was discontinued and added, that what ever our private opinions of superior officers might be, it was not proper to express them in the presence of the men¹

After marching about 7 miles we reached Huntsville and had our first view of the place, although this was the third time we had been in its immediate vicinity. We marched through it without halting, and four miles beyond the town went into camp near a splendid large spring, called Bird Spring, or Lake, whose waters overflowed into a swamp called "Big Spring Bottom."² General Kimball's division went into camp about one mile east and General Elliott's about three miles west of the town. Here we remained until February 1.

Our camp at Bird Lake was named Camp Green, in honor of Captain Green of the Forty-ninth Ohio, who was killed at Columbia. It was a pleasant and healthful camp. We had an abundant supply of good water and fuel, plenty of timber for building shacks for quarters, and rations and supplies of all kinds in abundance. The regimental camps were regularly laid out, the grounds were well policed and we soon took up the daily duties of soldiers in garrison. There was no enemy in force near to give us uneasiness and as a natural result discipline was somewhat relaxed.

January 6, an order came to turn over the animals we had accumulated on our recent march. In our numerous foraging expeditions we had acquired so many, that each regiment had a regular caravan of horses and mules which had been used as pack animals.¹ A regular guard was placed about our camp and Colonel Streight issued strict orders about granting passes to the officers and men to go outside the guard lines. In his instructions to the guards he was reported to have said he "would promote any man who shot another while attempting to break guard." This caused great indignation amongst the men and was the subject of severe criticism. The men decided that they did not care to earn promotion in that way.³

January 10, a number of commissions came, which caused quite a change in the duties of some of the officers of the regiment. The adjutant received a commission as captain and Andrew J. Gleason and Rees Pickering received commissions as first lieutenants. The adjutant was assigned to duty as captain

1, 2 and 3 Gleason's Diary.

of Company F, and Gleason took his place as adjutant of the regiment.

January 11, the left wing of the regiment was ordered to a point north of Athens to reconstruct Sulphur Trestle, which had been destroyed during the recent campaign.¹

January 13, Captains Chandler W. Carroll, George W. Cummins and John G. Byrd, three faithful officers who had been with the regiment since its organization, were mustered out of service at their own request and started for home.¹ All had distinguished themselves by faithful and vallant service and all had contributed largely to the regiment's character for courage and efficiency.

January 22, an order was issued from regimental headquarters prescribing regular hours for drill and establishing a school of instruction for the officers,¹ who had become somewhat rusty in tactics and regulations by reason of constant marching and fighting during the previous eight months.

January 24, we received a copy of the Cincinnati Commercial, which announced that Governor John Brough had issued commissions as captain to Lieutenant Thomas C. Davis, Lucius O. Doolittle, Alexander R. Lord and J. Alonzo Gleason, Commissions for these officers were received January 27, and on the same day commissions as first lieutenant came for Second Lieutenants John W. Wilson, Joseph N. Welker, James Gass and Peter T. Gardner,—the commissions as first lieutenant, however, were returned by Colonel Askew because of some irregularity.¹

On the 27th, an ambulance from division headquarters drove up to regimental headquarters and an orderly alighted from it bearing an order detailing the former adjutant, now *Captain* Alexis Cope, as acting assistant adjutant general of the division. That officer was found engaged in his duties as captain of Company F, and was greatly surprised at the order. But he soon got his personal belongings together, climbed into the ambulance and was driven to division headquarters.

It was a cold frosty morning and as the ambulance rattled along over the frozen road, he tried to pull himself together in anticipation of his new and important duties. He thought there must be some mistake, and could not realize how it had come about that he, an obscure subaltern, should have been selected for such an important post. Mingled with the surprise was a feeling of his inadequacy for the discharge of his new duties. But there was the order which must be obeyed, and by the time he reached division headquarters, he had decided to do his best

1 Gleason's Diary.

to justify the confidence reposed in him. It is to be presumed that he had his share of the buoyancy and hopefulness of youth which characterized the volunteer soldier, who needed only the order to undertake any task, however difficult or dangerous.

January 30, some of the newly promoted officers went to Huntsville to be mustered as of their new rank and brought back a rumor that the regiment was soon to move.¹

January 31, an order came to be ready to move at 4 a. m. February 1, our destination being Eastport on the Tennessee river. As the order directed that we should move by rail and boat it was not unwelcome, though all regretted to leave the comfortable cabins of our camp on Bird Lake.²

There was considerable hilarity throughout the camps over the prospect of moving, which was probably increased by the issue of rations of whisky. It was said the whisky was issued to save the trouble of transporting it. Some of the men began firing off their guns down by the swamp, others did the same and soon there was a rattle of musketry, which sounded like a general engagement and which company officers seemed unable to stop. The field officers interposed, but their effects were also in vain. Finally the brigade bugle sounded the "assembly", when the regiments fell into line and the firing ceased. There was a disposition on the part of the men to burn their cabins, or shacks, before leaving, but strict orders forbidding it were issued and fortunately obeyed, for the troops were afterward to re-occupy them during the rest of the winter.

While we were lying in camp at Bird Lake, what to do with General Thomas's army was the subject of serious concern at the War Department, because of his reluctance to begin a new campaign until he was thoroughly prepared. To Thomas' suggestion that he needed time in which to recruit and re-organize his transportation facilities, which had been depleted in order to prepare General Sherman for his march to the sea, (see page 14 ante) General Grant, January 2, telegraphed General Halleck, "Inform General Thomas that he will require no new outfit of teams; his troops will either operate in a country which will supply them, or the surplus ones will be sent where it is not desirable to transport wagons or mules. There has always been an unnecessary accumulation of teams in the Department of the Cumberland, along the railroads, where every supply but fuel was brought on the cars."³

On the same day General Halleck telegraphed General Thomas:

1 and 2 Gleason's Diary.

3 W. R. R. 94-481.

"The orders of General Grant to concentrate your forces on the Tennessee were not intended to interfere in any manner with your pursuit of Hood, or your cutting off his lines of railroad, ie: they have reference to what is to be done when your present operations are concluded."¹

The same day General Thomas reported to General Halleck that General Hood had gone to Corinth, but that in his opinion he would not stop there.² January 3, General A. J. Smith reported to General Thomas his arrival at Clifton on the Tennessee ready to embark for Eastport, and saying that Hood was at Corinth. He also stated that his position at Eastport would not be safe, that with one more corps, say the Fourth and sufficient cavalry he could whip Hood and drive him from the country.³ On the same day, General Wilson, in view of a continuation of the campaign against Hood, telegraphed General Thomas, asking for 10,000 horses and all the Spencer carbines to be had.⁴

It was, however, becoming apparent that the army with which General Thomas had beaten Hood at Nashville and driven him across the Tennessee river was to be broken up. January 4, General Grant telegraphed General Halleck:

"If Hood goes south from Corinth, order A. J. Smith and two divisions besides, to Baltimore, Md., to be thrown where they were needed on arrival.⁵ January 7, General Grant asked General Halleck to order General Thomas, if he, Thomas, was assured that Hood had gone south from Corinth, to send Schofield with his corps east, to be assembled at Annapolis, Md., leaving his transportation at Louisville until further orders, and recommending that the departments of the Ohio and the Cumberland be united in one department.⁶

On the same day, General Thomas telegraphed to General Halleck that A. J. Smith's and Schofield's troops would be concentrated at Eastport by the 11th, instant,⁷ and dispatched to General Canby at Mobile that he was assembling his troops on the Tennessee River, ready for any operations; that he might be ordered south and would let him, Canby, know in time to enable him to co-operate.⁸

The next day, January 8, General Halleck issued the order transferring Schofield's Corps to Annapolis, and consolidating the departments of the Cumberland and the Ohio, under General Thomas's command.⁹

A letter from General J. C. Donaldson, Chief Quarter

1 W. R. R. 94-481.

2 W. R. R. 94-482.

3 W. R. R. 94-499.

4 W. R. R. 94-500.

5 W. R. R. 94-506.

6 W. R. R. 94-529.

7 W. R. R. 94-530.

8 W. R. R. 94-540.

9 W. R. R. 94-540.

Master, Department of the Cumberland, to General M. C. Meigs, dated January 10, 1865, discloses the fact that at that time there were rumors that General Thomas was to be relieved. He says that General Thomas left Nashville the day before for Eastport where he was concentrating his troops. He says, "I saw him on board and he opened his heart to me. He feels very sore at the rumored intentions to relieve him, and the Major Generalcy does not cicatrize the wound. You know Thomas is morbidly sensitive and it cut him to the heart to think it was contemplated to remove him. He does not blame the Secretary, for he said Mr. Stanton is a fair and just man."¹

January 14, General Thomas reported to General Halleck That Hood had gone south to Corinth and that Schofield's corps had been ordered to Annapolis and would begin embarking next day.²

January 17, the order consolidating the departments of the Ohio and the Cumberland was issued—the new department to embrace such parts of Mississippi, Alabama and Georgia as might be occupied by troops under General Thomas' command.³

January 18, General Halleck sent a dispatch to General Grant saying, in substance, that he had learned from General Canby that if General Thomas proposed to move to Selma or some other point on the gulf, he, Canby, could co-operate, but to do so effectively he would require remounts for a part of his cavalry. That since October 1, 1864, all cavalry horses purchased in the west and north-west had been sent to General Thomas. That the question was whether we should continue to send all cavalry horses to General Thomas, or General Canby should receive his due proportion, and that this must be decided in a great measure by his, General Grant's, plan of ulterior operations in that part of the country. That whatever that plan might be, it was important that there should be a concert of action between Generals Canby and Thomas, for the former could not safely operate against the interior of Alabama, unless the latter at the same time aided in the movement, by pursuing Hood or keeping him away from Memphis, Vicksburg, Natchez, etc.; that Canby seemed very anxious to make a winter campaign while the weather was favorable, if he could be certain of the co-operation of Thomas. General Halleck said further, that he felt confident that Selma and Montgomery could be taken this winter, if Thomas and Canby's forces could either unite or co-operate, and that General Sherman had written that abundant supplies would be found in all the interior of Alabama.⁴

1 W. R. R. 94-561.

2 W. R. R. 94-586.

3 W. R. R. 94-603.

4 W. R. R. 94-609.

General Grant answered this dispatch the same day, saying: "I now understand that Beauregard has gone west to gather up what can be saved from Hood's army to bring against Sherman. If this be the case, Selma and Montgomery will be easily reached. I do not believe, though, that General Thomas will ever get there from the north. He is too ponderous in his preparations and equipments to move through a country rapidly enough to live off of it. West of the Mississippi we do not want to do more than defend what we now hold, but I do want Canby to make a winter campaign, either from Mobile Bay or from Florida. You might order all the horses now in the West to Canby and direct him to make an independent campaign, looking to the capture of Mobile, first, if the job does not promise too long a one, and Montgomery and Selma, the destruction of all roads, machine shops and stores, the main object. Thomas can do without horses for some time; a portion of his troops could be sent by water to Canby. If Thomas does not¹ move in co-operation probably the best route for him to take would be by way of Chattanooga, repairing the road to Rome and starting from there. These I give as views. What I would order is, that Canby be furnished cavalry horses and be directed to prepare to commence a campaign, and that Thomas be telegraphed to, to say what he could do, and when, and get his views upon the choice of routes, looking upon Selma as his objective. Thomas must make a campaign, or spare his surplus troops."²

In pursuance of General Grant's foregoing order, General Halleck, on January 19, telegraphed to General Thomas reporting General Grant's "views" and asking General Thomas for his ideas on the proposed operations.³

General Thomas, January 24, answered General Halleck's dispatch of January 19, as follows:

"Your dispatch of 2:30 p. m., 19th instant is received this day. In my dispatch of 12 p. m. 21st instant, I reported the condition of the roads in this region of the country and since writing that dispatch, an officer sent by me under a flag of truce toward Columbus has returned. He succeeded in getting ten miles beyond Fulton, and reports that both the road he went out and the one he returned by are at this time impracticable for artillery and wagon trains. I have also received the same reports from reliable scouts and from refugees of the condition of the roads leading from Tusculumbia, via Russellville to Tuscaloosa and Columbus. I therefore think that it will be impossible to move from the

¹ The word "not" omitted in dispatch as received by General Halleck.

² W. R. R. 94-609-610.

³ W. R. R. 94-614.

Tennessee River upon Montgomery and Selma with a large force during this winter. It was my purpose, after having driven Hood out of Tennessee, to have assembled my available force at or near Huntsville, Ala., for the winter, and as soon as the roads become practicable in the spring to cross the Tennessee River at Whitesburg and Decatur, move by Somerville and Blountsville, through Brown's and Murphree's Valleys, via Elyton, Cedar Grove, Montevallo and Summerville, (Summerfield?) upon Selma, this country having been represented by various persons as being perfectly practicable and abounding in supplies. That country, however, is in the same condition as the country between this point and Columbus, Miss., at this season of the year, and I do not believe I could make a winter campaign, with any reasonable chance of complete success, starting from this point, (Eastport, Miss.) or Decatur. Should Lieutenant General Grant determine upon a winter campaign from some point on the gulf, I could send General Canby, Maj. Gen. A. J. Smith's command and all the cavalry now here except two divisions, feeling able to securely hold the line of the Tennessee, and all the territory now held in East Tennessee, with the Fourth Army Corps, the troops in East Tennessee, and two divisions of cavalry.¹

January 25, at 6 p. m. General Halleck telegraphed to General Thomas saying, "General Grant is anxious that your expedition should get off at the very first favorable weather," but later on the same day at 10:30 p. m., he dispatched to General Grant, saying, that after conversing with General Schofield he was satisfied that no movement would be made from the Tennessee during the winter.²

General Thomas did not receive General Halleck's dispatch of January 25, until the 27th, and at once answered it saying: "Please let me know as soon as possible General Grant's decision, whether I shall make a campaign or send reinforcements to Canby. I can start from here (Eastport, Miss.) early in the spring, but I do not believe any effectual progress could be made with the roads in their present condition."³ General Grant had evidently anticipated General Thomas' last foregoing dispatch, for on January 26, he directed General Halleck to order General Thomas to send A. J. Smith's command to Canby at once. He did not think it wise for General Thomas to strip himself of cavalry, as he had proposed to do, and suggested that he send only one division of 3000 or 4000, which he thought would be sufficient.⁴

Upon receipt of this dispatch General Halleck at once telegraphed to General Thomas the following order:

1 W. R. R. 94-627.
2 W. R. R. 103-581.

3 W. R. R. 103-595.
4 W. R. R. 103-584.

"General Grant directs that you send General Canby A. J. Smith's command of about 18,000 men and 5000 cavalry with all possible dispatch. They will report at New Orleans if they receive no order while enroute."¹

General Thomas evidently received this order on January 29, and in transmission it was changed to read "five cavalry" instead of 5000 cavalry. General Thomas interpreted it to mean *five divisions* of cavalry and gave orders accordingly.²

General Thomas evidently realized that the sending of five divisions of cavalry instead of two, as he had proposed, would leave him with an insufficient force at Eastport, and on the same day telegraphed to General Wood at Huntsville, Ala., to send one division of the Fourth Corps to Nashville, by rail, and thence by steamer to Eastport as rapidly as possible.³

It was this which led to our division being ordered to Eastport as before narrated.

The order of march or movement to Eastport was, first the Third Brigade, second the Second Brigade and third the First Brigade and we were directed to take with us all our tents, baggage, desks, offices, horses and all provisions on hand.⁴ It looked like we were to begin a winter campaign. General Wood, who had been eager to begin such a campaign, had on January 29, telegraphed to General Thomas that the Fourth Corps was prepared to take the field, that it was amply supplied with transportation, and had 150 rounds of small arms ammunition per man and 250 rounds of artillery ammunition per gun.⁵ But there was to be no winter campaign for the Fourth Corps. General Thomas' magnificent army, which had beaten Hood at Nashville and driven him south of the Tennessee River, had been depleted by sending Schofield's Corps to the East and A. J. Smith's command and a large part of his cavalry to Mobile, and there remained apparently only a force sufficient to hold the line of the Tennessee River. It looked very much as if the final blows which were to crush the rebellion were to be struck while we rested in inglorious ease.

The morning of February 1, 1865, reveille was sounded at 2:30 o'clock, and we packed up, had breakfast and were soon on our way to Huntsville. We entered the town about day light with bands playing and halted at the big spring to lay in a supply of water. The brigade commander, Colonel Streight, had issued disciplinary orders which were quite galling to both officers and men, and were in striking contrast to the tactful orders of our

1 W. R. R. 103-584.

2 W. R. R. 103-606.

3 W. R. R. 103-608.

4 W. R. R. 103-618.

5 W. R. R. 103-607.

dear old brigade commander, General Willich.¹ We were soon aboard the train, but had to wait a long time for the transportation to be loaded. It was 9 o'clock before our train pulled out for Stevenson, Ala., which we reached at 2 p. m. Here we had an hour's wait and then moved out for Nashville, where we arrived at 9 o'clock a. m. February 2. By some reason Colonel Streight did not get the train on which we left Huntsville and Colonel Hotchkiss of the Eighty-ninth Illinois, assumed command of the brigade.² The steam boats which were to carry us to Eastport had not yet arrived, and after a conference of regimental commanders it was decided to move out and encamp where we were posted preceding the battle of Nashville. But when we halted near the Acklin place, we were told that the ground we had selected was under special protection by orders of General Thomas, and we moved on to a good location just beyond the old confederate rifle pits, and there went into camp. This special protection did not prevent General Wood, who was now in command of the division, from occupying the beautiful Acklin home as his headquarters. As Mrs. Acklin was then occupying the house, it was doubtless done with her consent and, probably at her request, for, as division headquarters, it would be more fully protected. On the march from the cars Company B showed such lack of discipline that it was required, after trial before Lieutenant Colonel M. Clenahan, provost marshal, to perform three days hard labor of ten hours each.³

Gleason in his diary relates this incident of the day, which he says illustrates the nimble wit of the typical Southern woman.

Colonel Askew received an unexpected call from a lady living on the plantation on which we were encamped who wished a safeguard. She stated the case to the colonel, at the same time apparently trying to recall his name. The colonel modestly said, "My name is Askew" and she laughingly and quickly said, "Why, then I have come to *ask* you for a guard. So neat a play on his name vanquished this usually stern and unemotional officer, and a safe guard was at once ordered.

We remained quietly in camp February 3, 4 and 5, the company officers being busy making out returns with occasional visits to the city.

In the mean time General Thomas had learned that he was only to send 5000 instead of five divisions of cavalry to General Canby and on February 2, telegraphed General Stanley, who had resumed command of the Fourth Corps, that it would not be necessary to send a division to Eastport. When this dispatch

1, 2 and 3 Gleason's Diary.

was received, our division was already at Nashville and was at once ordered back to Huntsville, Ala.¹

About noon, February 6, we marched into the city and took train at 4 p. m. for our old camp at Bird Lake. There was much straggling on our march into and through the city and some of the men got drunk and noisy in spite of unusual precautions to prevent it. Some of the regimental band were boozy and some of the officers were hilarious. Gleason in his diary laments that the prospects for sleep on the train were not flattering. It was snowing when our train pulled out of Nashville and the night was cold. We reached our camp at Huntsville February 7, late in the evening, and found that it had been ruthlessly ransacked by other troops during our absence. The weather was cold and as our camp equipage had not arrived we passed a very uncomfortable night. At Nashville General Wood applied for and received a leave of absence because the wound he had received at Lovejoy Station was troubling him, and because he was satisfied no winter campaign by our corps would be undertaken. General Samuel Beatty again resumed command of our division, with the writer as his adjutant general.

1 W. R. R. 103-655.



CHAPTER XXXII.

ANOTHER LONG PERIOD OF INACTION AT HUNTSVILLE AND A MOVEMENT UP THE EAST TENNESSEE VALLEY IN AID OF OPERATIONS IN THE EAST.

After our hurried and mistaken movement to Nashville, described in the preceding chapter, we remained in winter quarters at Huntsville, Ala., until March 15, 1865. It was a pleasant camp, in easy communication with the north, and supplies of all kinds were abundant. Our mail facilities were seldom interrupted, the daily papers reached us regularly, and we watched with unabated interest the movements of other forces, which were to give the final blows to the rebellion. There was a pleasing monotony in our camp life. We were practically care-free, and each one sought such congenial amusement as he could find in his limited surroundings. Division headquarters were about one mile north of our division camp, in a brick house near the Huntsville road. The writer who was serving as assistant adjutant general of the division recalls seeing more than once General Beatty, our division commander, starting out early in the morning, in rubber coat and boots, to shoot ducks in the swamps about Bird Lake and Big Spring Bottom. Ducks were plentiful and of a very fine quality and our mess table was constantly supplied with them. They were, however, not all of General Beatty's shooting.

We had as a guest at division headquarters Colonel Charles F. Manderson of the Nineteenth Ohio, who was recovering from an illness, and whose grace, courtesy and fine conversational powers, made our mess table most interesting and delightful. After the war he removed from Ohio to Nebraska and became the honored representative of that state in the United States Senate. Our life in camp was so monotonous that for a whole week Gleason made no entry in his diary except that "the week was spent in the usual routine."

General Stanley had recovered from the wound he had received at the battle of Nashville and was back in command of the corps and Colonel Hotchkiss was in command of the brigade.

February 17, there were orders for brigade drill in the afternoon and we were notified that General Stanley would inspect our camp. All set to work to clean up and put everything in order. There was a very high wind, which blew down a number of tents and shacks, and wrecked the chapel tent.

The band was practicing in it at the time, but fortunately the only injury resulting was to some of the horns which were slightly dented. The brigade drill took place in the afternoon in some large fields near the pike. While we were drilling General Stanley rode up, and after some conversation with the field officers of the brigade, rode on to our camp to inspect our quarters.¹

February 18, the following promotions to the non-commissioned staff were made and the appointees at once entered upon their new duties. Sergeant Major James G. Gass, Quartermaster Sergeant Robert S. McClenahan, Commissary Sergeant Morris Cope. Sergeant John G. Gregory, Company A, and Daniel Norman, Company H, were granted furloughs.²

Sunday, February 19, there were religious services morning and evening in the chapel, conducted by a delegate of the Christian Commission.³

Monday, February 20, regular drills and dress parade were resumed. During the day the mail brought newspapers telling that General Sherman was marching rapidly across South Carolina and was approaching Charleston, the cradle of secession. That night, Gleason says, "I had scarcely got to sleep when an uproar in camp awakened me and kept me awake an hour or two. From what we could learn it was caused by the news that Charleston had been evacuated. The great joy it caused found vent in various ways—wild yells, beating of drums, playing by the bands and the firing of guns and squibs over the old swamp, until the welkin rang. I expected to be called out to help restore order, but was not. A party of tipsy officers came by our quarters and tried to awaken the colonel, but he apparently did not hear them and they passed on. After an hour or two it quieted down and I resumed my slumber."⁴

The next morning it was learned that the news of Charleston's evacuation had come in a dispatch to corps headquarters and was believed because it had been foreshadowed by the late newspapers.⁵

February 21, Gleason reports that on that day he had finished some regimental rolls on which he had been working for some time and finished them, with the exception of the history. It is presumed that the history on which he was working is the short sketch which was prepared under direction of Colonel Askew, and which appears in Whitelaw Reid's "Ohio In The War."

February 22, Colonel Askew received leave of absence for

1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 Gleason's Diary.

twenty days, but did not leave for home, hoping he could take with him the regimental rolls and history which Gleason hoped to complete in another day. In the evening an order was published saying that the old flag waved again over Fort Sumter and that salutes had been ordered fired from all navy yards and other public places. Our brigade commander was careful to state that the order was published for information, *not compliance*. So our only celebration of the event was the spontaneous outburst above related. Gleason in his diary says:

"As it was Washington's birthday, a compliance by every battery in the command would have been most appropriate."

February 23, commissions as first lieutenant came for Sergeant Major Gass and Sergeant Stewart McClenahan, the latter still being absent on account of wounds.

On the 24th Colonel Askew left for home. The regimental history not being completed, Gleason was directed to forward it to him by mail. Before the colonel left Adjutant Gleason and Quartermaster Joseph N. Welker, hearing that some promotions to captain would be recommended by him, sought an interview with him and stated that they preferred to remain in their present positions rather than to take command of companies.¹

February 25, reports came that Wilmington, N. C. had been evacuated by the enemy and occupied by our troops and that General Grant had met with a reverse. The report of our occupation of Wilmington was confirmed on the 26th. The 26th being Sunday the usual inspection took place and religious services were held in the chapel tent morning and evening.

February 27, a general court martial was convened at brigade headquarters to try our dear old chaplain, Randall Ross, for absence without leave. Gleason notes in his diary that he was summoned to appear as a witness, but was not needed. It perhaps goes without saying, that the good old chaplain's absence without leave was easily explained.

On the 28th the regular bi-monthly muster and inspection was held. March 1, 2 and 3, there was the usual routine of camp duty. On the nights of the 2nd and 3rd there were violent thunder storms, and on the 4th it was reported that several railroad bridges between Huntsville and Nashville had been carried away by high water.²

Sunday, March 5, religious services were held in the chapel tent at 1 p. m. There was dress parade in the evening

¹ and ² Gleason's Diary.

and after night closed down the voices of Lieutenant Colonel McClenahan, Surgeon Clark and the Gleason boys were again heard singing sacred songs.¹

March 6, we were engaged with usual camp duties and on the same day there was brigade drill for two hours. During the drill Adjutant Gleason's horse ran away with him and, according to his report, "would have been running yet if he had not been stopped by the Forty-ninth Ohio."

March 8, there was the usual daily round of duties and dress parade in the evening. It was reported that Sheridan had won a brilliant victory over Early in the Shanandoah Valley.²

On the 9th, a commission as major came for Captain Jos. N. Dubois, vice major A. R. Z. Dawson, who had been appointed colonel of the One hundred and eighty-seventh O. N. G., one of the 100-day regiments Ohio was sending into the field at that time. Commissions as captain came for Lieutenants Jos. N. Welker and Rees Pickering, as first lieutenant for Morris Cope and as second lieutenant for Vincent T. Trego and Franklin Armstrong. Welker declined promotion, preferring to remain as regimental quartermaster. The weather grew quite cold towards evening.

March 10 and 11, were occupied as usual. On Sunday, March 12, Gleason tells of a ride he took to Whitesburg on the Tennessee River, and that the river was so high, one could not get to the boat landing. Whitesburg, he reports, was then occupied by the Thirteenth Michigan. He says all seemed very peaceful at this point, and that he saw "Southern ladies out riding with officers of the garrison, apparently having laid aside all sectional differences." In the evening it was rumored that the entire Fourth Corps was soon to move to Knoxville. Robert B. McClenahan, the lieutenant colonel's brother, arrived from the north, bringing with him the latter's iron grey war horse.³

On March 13, a soldier of the Forty-ninth Ohio was drummed through the camp for insubordination, having taken a rail from the shoulders of a comrade who had been ordered to carry it for some breach of discipline. The whole brigade was formed to witness the degrading ceremony. He had been sentenced to confinement at hard labor during the remainder of his term of service, with forfeiture of all pay and to be drummed through the camp to the tune of the Rogue's March, having a placard with the word "Mutineer" pinned on his back.⁴ It was not surprising that Gleason in his diary de-

1, 2, 3 and 4 Gleason's Diary.

nounces the sentence as outrageously severe and unnecessarily humiliating.

We had received no marching orders, but it was reported that the First Division was moving, and that the stretcher-bearers had been sent ahead. In the afternoon there was a rumor that Richmond had fallen, which was not credited, and a report that Colonel Streight had resigned and would leave for the north at once, which was believed. There was no mail, as the railroads were said to be wholly occupied by moving troops.¹

On the 14th little was done in our camp. We were in hourly expectation of orders to move, but no such orders came. The only incident noted by Gleason is that Captain David A. Geiger left for home on a 20 days' leave of absence.

The morning of March 15, we received orders to be ready to move at an hour's notice.²

With the exception of the few days occupied in moving to Nashville and back, as before related, we had now been in camp at Huntsville since January 5, 1865—two months and ten days. Our inaction was not our fault, nor the fault of our corps commander, for he had reported to General Thomas January 29 that the corps was fully re-equipped and ready to take the field.³ It was not the fault of General Thomas, for after his fine army had been depleted by sending General Schofield's command to the east and General A. J. Smith's command and 5000 of Wilson's cavalry to Mobile, he had barely sufficient troops to hold the line of the Tennessee River.

On February 5th he had written to General Sherman saying:

"During my pursuit of Hood I had planned a campaign against Montgomery and Selma, to be commenced as soon as the roads became passable, so that I might have a reasonable hope of reaching those places in a week or ten days with my troops in a compact and manageable condition. General Grant, however, has ordered Schofield, either to the Army of the Potomac or to you, and General Smith's command to General Canby. I am now left with the Fourth Corps and about 12,000 effective cavalry. I am willing to undertake the capture of Montgomery and Selma with these troops when the roads become passable, but we can do nothing now; for even here, where we have gravelly hills to move our wagons over, the roads are so bad that we can scarcely get over them with empty wagons. I am as anxious as anybody to strike crush-

¹ and ² Gleason's Diary.

³ W. R. R. 103-607. .

ing blows to the enemy, but I do not see how it is possible to accomplish anything now, and I do not want to fail when I start. If General Canby moves against Mobile and Selma there will be no necessity for the troops remaining with me to go in that direction, and I can effect far more by moving through East Tennessee and Western North Carolina, covering your movements on Charleston, or in the direction of Richmond in the spring. The Fourth Corps, within itself, is prepared to move and the cavalry will be as soon as Wilson can get horses to mount his men, but I assure you, most earnestly, that the roads are in such condition now, that no good whatever can be done by attempting a move. We shall only exhaust our troops and ruin our animals; whereas, if we wait until the roads become passable, about the 1st of March, I do not believe the rebels will have any force short of Virginia, which can resist, successfully, even the troops I have left under my command."¹

January 31, General Grant had written to General Thomas enclosing a letter from General Sherman in which the latter had suggested a movement by General Thomas south of the Tennessee River, saying, that General Sherman, when he wrote the letter did not know of the depletion of Thomas' army. General Grant further said: "It will be impossible for you at present to move south as he contemplated with the force of infantry as indicated. General Sherman is advised before this of the changes made, and that for the winter you will be on the defensive. I think, however, an expedition from East Tennessee, under General Stoneman might penetrate South Carolina well down toward Columbia, destroying the railroads and military resources of the country. * * * It will be necessary probably for you to send, in addition to the force now in East Tennessee, a small division of infantry, to enable General Gillem to hold the upper end of Holston Valley and the mountain passes in rear of Stoneman. You may order such expedition. * * * Let there be no delay in the preparation of this expedition."²

General Thomas did not receive this communication until February 9, but at once answered it saying he would immediately proceed to organize the expedition and get it off with as little delay as possible.³

February 14, General Grant telegraphed to General Thomas, who was then at Nashville, saying that General Canby was preparing a movement from Mobile Bay against

¹ W. R. R. 103-653-4.

² W. R. R. 103-616.

³ W. R. R. 103-678.

Mobile and the interior of Alabama. That Hood's army had been terribly reduced by the severe punishment it had received at Nashville, by desertion, and by the withdrawal of one-half of its members to oppose Sherman. That if such reported withdrawal was true, or even if it was not true, Canby's movement would attract all the attention of the enemy and leave an advance from the Tennessee River easy. He, therefore, advised General Thomas to prepare all the cavalry he could spare and hold it in readiness to go south. General Grant stated that the object of the expedition would be first, to attack as much of the enemy's forces as possible to insure success to General Canby; second, to destroy the enemy's lines of communication and military resources; third, to destroy or capture their forces brought into the field. General Grant said he did not know what number of men General Thomas could put into the field, but thought that 5000 men, all cavalry, would be sufficient, and that the movement should not be started until an expedition from Vicksburg, in aid of General Canby, which had been ordered, had been three or four days out.¹

General Thomas answered this dispatch the same day, saying:

"I can send on the expedition you propose about 10,000 men. They are fully equipped now, with a battery to each division composed of four guns, six caissons, and each carriage drawn by eight horses. I will have the command in readiness to move promptly on receiving orders."²

General Grant at once telegraphed to General Thomas that the expedition might start as soon after February 20th as it could get off. Orders for the expedition were at once sent to General Wilson, and on the 20th General Thomas went to Eastport to hurry it up.³

The Stoneman expedition was very slow in getting started, very much to General Grant's disappointment, and on February 27th, he telegraphed General Thomas saying that as General Stoneman was so late in starting on his contemplated expedition, and as General Sherman had passed out of the state of South Carolina, his course had better be changed. He further said:

"It is not impossible that in the event of the enemy being driven out of Richmond they may fall back to Lynchburg with a part of their force and attempt to raid into East Tennessee. It will be better, therefore, to keep Stoneman between our garrison in East Tennessee and the enemy. Direct him

¹ W. R. R. 103-708.

² W. R. R. 103-709.

³ W. R. R. 103-746.

to repeat his raid of last fall, destroying railroads as far toward Lynchburg as he can. Sheridan starts today from Winchester for Lynchburg. This will vastly favor Stoneman. Every effort should be made to collect all the surplus forage and provisions of East Tennessee at Knoxville, and to get there a large amount of stores besides. It is not impossible that we may have to use a very considerable force in that section the coming spring. Preparations should at once be made to meet such contingency."¹

It will be remembered that General Grant in the winter of 1863-4 expressed the opinion that perhaps the last great battle of the war would be fought in East Tennessee. (See page — ante.)

To General Grant's last above quoted dispatch General Thomas answered the same day, saying he was sorry that General Stoneman could not get off sooner, but that he had not had time to prepare fully and said further:

"I will direct him (General Stoneman) to throw his forces into Southwestern Virginia as you direct; and in anticipation of probable operations in East Tennessee this spring I have already thrown into Knoxville over 2,000,000 rations, and have given orders to have the store houses filled to their full capacity. Orders were given, some weeks since to accumulate forage at Knoxville, which order is now being complied with by the quartermaster's department. Unless you wish otherwise, I shall send General Stanley's entire corps to East Tennessee as soon as a sufficient number of new regiments report to enable me to withdraw it from Huntsville, Ala. I shall also concentrate the surplus of new regiments at Chattanooga, as the most available point from which to reinforce the troops in East Tennessee, if necessary."² The next day General Grant telegraphed to General Thomas, saying: saying:

"I think your precaution in sending the Fourth Corps to Knoxville a good one. I also approve of sending the new troops to Chattanooga."³

It was therefore on the suggestion of General Thomas, approved by General Grant, that on the morning of March 15, as before stated, we received orders to leave our pleasant camp at Huntville, Ala., and move to Knoxville, Tenn.

There seems to have been in the minds of both General Grant and General Thomas the possible escape of a portion, or all of Lee's army at Richmond and Petersburg to Lynch-

1 W. R. R. 1-3-777.

2 W. R. R. 103-778.

3 W. R. R. 103-783.

burg, Va., and thence into East Tennessee, and the Fourth Corps was ordered to Knoxville to provide against such contingency.

It is presumed that it was not General Thomas' intention to order the Fourth Corps to Knoxville until both Generals Stoneman and Wilson had got well started on their respective raids. General Wilson intended to start March 5th, but unprecedented rains and floods delayed him and he did not get across the Tennessee River until the 17th, and did not get started until the 20th.¹ Singular to state, General Stoneman started the same day. These raids have passed into history, the former being one of the most brilliant and successful of the war. Unfortunately for the immediate fame of General Wilson and his command, greater events nearer home were occurring at the time, which absorbed public attention, and he and his gallant troopers did not then receive the honor and praise which they so nobly earned.

The order for our movement was issued March 11, and directed General Stanley to prepare one of his divisions and start it to Bull's Gap, as soon as he could get railroad transportation, sending the division wagons and ambulances by the common roads; the other divisions to follow in the same manner.² General Stanley's orders, issued the same day, directed the divisions to move in the following order: First the First Division; second, the Third Division, and third, the Second Division.³ The order of march of ours, the Third Division, which was dated March 14, was: First, the Second Brigade; second, the First Brigade; third, the Third Brigade. The Second Brigade was to be at Huntsville in time to embark at 7 a. m. the 15th. It was directed in the order that the transportation of the division should march by land under an escort of two regiments—the Forty-ninth Ohio and Fourth Michigan, both under command of Colonel Hall of the latter regiment.⁴

Our brigade was ready to move at an hour's notice, but owing to the failure of an orderly to deliver the order we did not get started until 3 p. m. Our regiment led the brigade on the way to Huntsville. Gleason says: "We were joined by Captain Cope (then acting as assistant adjutant general of the division) and learned from him that our train had been waiting for us four hours. Other delays occurred and the train bearing the regiment did not leave the station until near dark."⁵

1 W. R. R. 104-10-17.

2 W. R. R. 103-892.

3 W. R. R. 103-893.

4 W. R. R. 103-916.

5 Gleason's Diary.

Next morning, March 16th, upon looking out we found our train standing still near Lookout Mountain, whose craggy point rose majestically far above us. A landslide from the mountain had blocked the track in front of us and a working party was slowly removing it. A very heavy rain the night before caused the slide. It was near 9 o'clock before our train got under way again.

There was another delay of several hours at Chattanooga. This gave us opportunity to renew our acquaintance with the veterans of the Thirty-second Indiana, who, when the non-veterans of the regiment were mustered out during the Atlanta campaign, had been sent back to Chattanooga, where they still were. After their arrival there, by order of General Thomas, they had been formed into four companies, aggregating nearly 400 men, and Lieutenant Colonel Hans Blume was placed in command. They afterwards joined the brigade at New Orleans and were with us during our campaign in Texas.¹ Colonel Blume insisted on entertaining the officers and men of the brigade with true German hospitality. At 2 p. m., when our train pulled out, he sent aboard all the lager beer that he could have carried to it, together with several boxes of cigars. In honor of the hospitable colonel the band played some of its old tunes and amid music and cheers we left him, bowing and waving his hat as the train pulled out.

We made fair headway until we reached our old camp at McDonald Station, when a pair of trucks left the track and caused another delay of several hours. It was after dark when we passed through Cleveland, and all settled down for a night's rest.²

The next morning we were at Lenoir, a little hamlet where there was a cotton mill, a grist mill, one good dwelling house and several dilapidated cabins. Our engine was out of water. The water works were not in working order and the water had to be carried quite a distance. We were here run on to a siding and had to wait for a long time for south-bound trains to pass us. During the wait the Eighty-ninth Illinois got up a game of ball which aided in relieving the tedium. We finally got started again, but met with other delays, and did not reach Knoxville until after dark. There was only a short stop there and we moved on to New Market, which we learned was our immediate destination, where we arrived some time after midnight. Next morning we had our breakfast near the station, where we had disembarked before

1 Letter of Colonel Frank Erdelmeyer.

2 Gleason's Diary

daylight, and then moved to a pleasant spot about a mile south of the town and went into camp.

As March 19 was Sunday, many of our men went into the village to church. The house, a good sized wooden building, was well filled by soldiers, with a sprinkling of citizens. Chaplain Paulson of the Eighth Kansas, officiated and preached a patriotic sermon. Gleason says that in the evening he went to the same church again with Colonel McClenahan and Surgeon Clark; that the house was so crowded he and Doctor Clark shared the pulpit with the preacher, our own Chaplain, and pitched the tunes for the singing. That evening Colonel Askew returned from the north and many sought his tent to welcome him back. He had come from Louisville in company with General Wood. From news he brought from Ohio and elsewhere,* everything seemed to be coming our way and portending an early collapse of the rebellion.¹

March 20, Gleason notes that Captain Bestow, the regular adjutant general of the division, returned to duty, thus relieving Captain Cope, who returned and took command of his company.²

On the 21st the Forty-ninth Ohio, which had been left behind at Huntsville to help escort the transportation, rejoined the brigade. There were rumors regarding General Stoneman's expedition, but nothing more definite than that he was moving toward Lynchburg, Va. There was a thunderstorm during the night and after it the weather became colder. On the 22nd, dispatches were published saying that Sherman was reported to have reached Goldsboro, N. C., and that Sheridan was at White House, near Richmond. Gold was quoted at \$1.57 and cotton at 55 cents. There was dress parade in the evening. On the 23rd, our camps were policed and very much improved under orders of General Wood. The weather was cold with a high wind.

March 24, we heard that Mobile had been evacuated. Part of the First Division passed through New Market and it was reported that we would move as soon as our wagons came up. Saturday, March 25, Chaplain Ross received an invitation to preach next day at a church some distance out in the country, and asked Surgeon Clark and Lieutenants Gardner and Gleason to accompany him.

Gleason says they heard there was to be a singing school in the morning at the same church and decided to attend it. They did so and found a well filled house, made up of soldiers,

¹ and ² Gleason's Diary.

principally from our regiment, and citizens, waiting for the teacher who had not then arrived. He soon came and after much persuasion got the thing started. As is the custom in country singing schools, the women sang the tenor part, screaming at the top of their voices, while the men sang the soprano or air. One fine appearing young lady, said to be the daughter of a deceased Union officer, made quite an impression on our susceptible lieutenant, but the rest of the ladies were rather plain looking.¹ Lieutenant Armstrong returned in the evening.

March 27, orders came to ship all surplus baggage to Knoxville for storage. There was the usual routine of daily duty, and in the evening some of the line officers took the regimental band and went out serenading in the town and returned boozy.²

March 28, we received orders to be ready to move at 6 o'clock next morning.

The morning of March 29, at 6:30 o'clock, we left our pleasant camp at New Market under orders to march to Rogersville.³ The weather was fair and mild and the road good, and we made rapid progress. The pace soon began to tell on the recruits of the Fourth and Fifth Michigan, then marching with our brigade, and the road was soon lined with stragglers and strewn with abandoned clothing and other property. We soon came to Mossy Creek, about five miles from New Market, and crossed it, using both railroad and wagon bridges. After a good long rest we resumed our march and after going about seven miles, came to the little village of Panther Springs. In the village two fine springs gushed out of the roadside, the waters of which were cold and pure. We intended stopping over night at these springs, but learning that there were some cases of smallpox in the village, we passed through it and encamped in a large open field about a mile beyond the place. On turning in that night we received orders to march at 5:30 next morning. It rained all night, and next morning we had wet tents to pack. Soon after we started it began to rain again and the marching was difficult and disagreeable. After marching about three miles we came to Morristown, a hamlet of three or four brick houses and a score or more tumble-down wooden buildings. At 11 a. m. we reached Russellville, a village with but a single street, in the center of which a stream of water ran. The inhabitants, with a few exceptions, were of the poorest class. We passed through the village, encamped about a mile beyond

1 and 2 Gleason's Diary.

3 W. R. R. 104-108-109.

and proceeded to make ourselves comfortable. That evening, as night closed down about us, we heard Colonel McClenahan, Surgeon Clark and the Gleason boys singing in the adjutant's tent. Orders came to march next morning at 6:30 o'clock.

March 31, reveille sounded at 4:30 a. m., and at the time ordered we moved out, our brigade being in the advance. Shortly after we started General Wood rode by and spoke cheerily, saying we would have only a short pull today.¹ The road was muddy and many of the men took the railroad track, which ran near the road. We reached Bull's Gap about 10 o'clock, having marched about ten miles, and went into camp on a green hillside to the right of the road.

We remained in camp at Bull's Gap April 1, 2 and 3. On the night of the 2nd we were awakened by hearing a number of shots, and someone crying out as though hurt. As it was outside our regimental camp, we did not take the trouble to learn the cause of it. Next morning at breakfast we learned that a party had attempted to steal some of the horses at division headquarters, had been fired at and had returned the fire, wounding the guard in arm and leg. At daylight a bloody trail was followed from our camp across a small creek to a clump of bushes on a hillside, where a wounded Confederate officer lay shot through the thigh. A party of rebels had entered our lines in search of horses and had made a raid on General Wood's stables. In their retreat one of the party had, by mistake, fired on and wounded their officer, a Lieutenant Carter of the Second Tennessee Confederate Cavalry. His papers were found in the ground beneath him, where he had buried them, and were signed by Confederate General Vaughan. They authorized him to collect horses for the Confederate service. He claimed to have deserted, but his story was not believed.² A dispatch announced the occupation of Raleigh, N. C., by General Sherman's army on April 3. Doctor Joshua B. Young of Hardin county, Ohio, who had been appointed assistant surgeon of the regiment, appeared and entered upon his duties.

In the afternoon General Stanley sent word that General Thomas had received a dispatch from Secretary Stanton, dated April 3, 10 a. m., saying that Petersburg had been evacuated and that General Weitzel's forces had entered Richmond, having taken it at 8:15 that morning.³ At the same time General Thomas reported the successful advance of General Stoneman's and General Wilson's expeditions.⁴

1 and 2 Gleason's Diary.

3 W. R. R. 104-197.

4 W. R. R. 104-198.

General Wilson had reported the capture of Selma, Ala., on April 2, with all its guns and many prisoners.¹ These reports having come from official sources were regarded as reliable and seemed almost too good to be true. In the afternoon a salute of 100 guns was fired by the artillery brigade at corps headquarters. In the evening a barrel of ale was on tap at division headquarters, and there was great rejoicing. Upon receipt of Secretary Stanton's dispatch, General Thomas at once telegraphed to General Stanley that General Lee might try to escape by way of East Tennessee,² and amidst the general hub-bub there came an order to march to Greenville, starting at 7 o'clock next morning. The great rebellion seemed to be crumbling, and it looked as if we might be in position to take part in the final struggle for its overthrow. It was evidently with that in view that we were marching; for before starting we were ordered to replenish our supply of ammunition.

The morning of April 4, reveille sounded about 4 o'clock. We got our breakfasts, struck tents, laid in a fresh supply of ammunition and moved out at 7 o'clock. After passing through the gap the road was good and we made good time. We passed the other divisions of the corps, which were encamped along the road. They had constructed comfortable quarters, evidently thinking they would remain for some time. The Second Division was at a little place called Blue Springs, where we struck the railroad. A little further on was the artillery brigade. We passed Major Goodspeed's headquarters and saw the major himself, looking as natural as when his battery was attached to our brigade. We halted an hour for dinner and then passed on with renewed strength. Half an hour before sunset we came to a pleasant spot one-half mile from Greenville, where we went into camp for the night. Immediately in front of our camp, apparently about ten miles away, towered the great Smoky Mountains—well named, we thought. We had been cheered on our long march by the reflection that the war was soon to end. That night we were further cheered by a report that General Grant had cut off General Lee's line of retreat. Major Joseph N. Dubois was temporarily detailed as division picket officer.

The morning of the 5th of April the Third Brigade of our division was ordered to march to Jonesboro and we occupied their camp. The Forty-ninth Ohio was detailed as provost guard and took up quarters in the center of the town. We had time to look about the place during the day and found

¹ W. R. R. 104-188.

² W. R. R. 104-199.

it rather unattractive. Its chief distinction was that it was the home of Vice President Andrew Johnson. His house and the tailor shop where he worked at his trade were pointed out. We also visited the house of Mrs. Williams, where General John Morgan was killed and captured, and noted the spot at the foot of a grape arbor where he was shot while trying to escape.

Gleason notes in his diary that on April 6, Captain Cope was detailed as acting assistant adjutant general of the brigade, that General Stanley removed his headquarters to the town, and that commissions as captain came for First Lieutenants David Weh and John W. Wilson, and a commission as first lieutenant for Franklin Armstrong.¹ That evening the singers met in the adjutant's tent and sang their usual repertoire of songs.

April 7th, the weather was cloudy and cold, with light rain and the men, as a rule, kept their tents. In the afternoon General Stanley published a dispatch Secretary Stanton had sent at 10 o'clock that morning to General Thomas, saying:

"General Sheridan attacked and routed Lee's army yesterday, capturing Generals Ewell, Kershaw, Barton, Corse and many other general officers, several thousand prisoners and a large number of cannon, and expects to force Lee to surrender all that is left of his army."²

Gleason says: "This was the best news yet and called forth cheers both loud and long. General Thomas acknowledged Secretary Stanton's above dispatch, saying":

"I heartily rejoice to learn of General Sheridan's victory yesterday over Lee's army. I am pushing forward a strong force along the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad, and prepared to meet any force of the enemy coming in this direction."³

Gleason reports in his diary that on the evening of the 7th he detailed Company C, Lieutenant Gass, and Company F, Lieutenant Gieger, to go out with a telegraph corps next morning with five days' rations to aid in repairing the railroad telegraph lines. The writer recalls distinctly that he was in command of a similar detail about this time and took part in the delightful work of cutting poles for repairing the telegraph lines.

There was no noteworthy incident on the 8th of April, and none on Sunday, the 9th, except that a heavy picket detail was called for.⁴

¹ Gleason's Diary.

² and ³ W. R. R. 104-259.

⁴ Gleason's Diary.

On the 10th, we received news of Lee's surrender on April 9, on terms proposed by General Grant. The news came in a dispatch from Danville, Ky. Gleason and Quartermaster Welker were at the railroad station in the town when a soldier handed them a printed dispatch giving them the terms of the surrender.¹ The artillery brigade moved up from the Blue Springs this day, camping between us and the picket line.

A little before midnight a staff officer galloped up to regimental headquarters with orders to the colonel to call the regiment out at once, as there was fighting going on three or four miles distant. We could distinctly hear musketry firing in a westerly direction. The regiment was quickly formed and the colonel rode to brigade headquarters to learn what it all meant. After the men had stood at arms in line for an hour, they were dismissed. At headquarters it was guessed that the firing was the result of a general jollification at Blue Springs over the news of Lee's surrender. The guess was confirmed next day. On the 11th, quite a number of deserters from the rebel armies in the northeast came in and gave themselves up. On the 12th, dispatches came reporting the capture of Confederate Generals Forrest and Roddey by General Wilson at Selma, Ala., and on the 13th, fuller reports stated that Selma and Montgomery, Ala., and the commands of both Generals Forrest and Roddey had been captured.

On the 13th, General Stanley issued the following order:

"Head Quarters Fourth Army Corps,
Greenville, East Tenn.,
April 13, 1865.

"General Orders No. 4.

The glorious success of the national arms under Lieutenant General U. S. Grant, being no longer a matter of any doubt, the army under his command having killed, wounded, captured and forced the capitulation of the entire principal army of the rebels, including their commander in chief, to-morrow, which is the day appointed for the raising of the old flag over Fort Sumter, where it was first pulled down and insulted by insolent traitors, will be kept as a holiday and a day of thanks-giving in this corps. A salute of 100 guns will be fired at 12 m., under the direction of Major Goodspeed, Chief of Artillery. All military duty, excepting necessary police and guard duty will be suspended. It is recommended that Chaplains of regiments hold services in their respective places of worship, to render thanks to Almighty God for His goodness and mercy in preserving us a nation, and giving us this great victory over our enemies. Let us in our thankfulness remember in tears the many brave men who have fallen at our sides in this great and terrible war. Who among us has not lost a brother, a relative or a dear comrade? Let us reflect, and we

¹ Gleason's Diary.

may profit by so doing, that great national, as well as personal sin, must be atoned for by great punishment."

By command of Maj. Gen. D. S. Stanley.

Wm. H. Sinclair,

Assistant Adjutant General.¹

April 14, was propitious for our celebration. The weather was ideal—there was a clear sky and balmy winds. The services in our brigade were well attended, and our good Chaplain Ross and Chaplain Paulson of the Eighth Kansas, delivered feeling and patriotic addresses, expressing devout thankfulness for the near conclusion of the bloody and fratricidal war. Shortly after the sermon a salute of 100 guns was fired from the hill back of our camp, and the shots reverberated from hill to hill as far away as the great Smoky Mountains. The bands all played and there was a general jubilee. An interesting incident of the day was an equestrian parade, or procession, made up of a number of our dashing staff officers and an equal number of the fair women of Greenville.² There was a public meeting at the Presbyterian church in the evening to give the citizens an opportunity to express their feelings. Our regimental band was present to enliven the occasion with appropriate music and a Mr. Britton made a genuine Tennessee oration, which was loudly applauded. Many of the houses in the village were illuminated and a display of fireworks closed the public exercises of the day.

In the midst of our rejoicing we did not know that the culminating crime of the great rebellion was being enacted at Washington, and that our beloved President, Abraham Lincoln, had been slain by a Confederate assassin.

The morning of April 15, we were engaged in our regular duties. A dispatch was sent around stating that Jeff Davis had applied to General Grant for permission to leave the country and that General Grant had informed him that his (Grant's) business was to fight the rebellion, not to answer such questions. It was also stated that General Joe Johnston had retreated in the direction of Charlotte, N. C., and that General Sherman was hot after him. We were not prepared for the next dispatch, which came from our Major Dubois, and said that General Thomas had just telegraphed General Stanley that Lincoln and Seward had been assassinated the day before. The news rapidly passed from lip to lip and the deepest gloom succeeded the joyfulness of the day before. In the evening the hope was expressed that perhaps the report

¹ W. R. R. 104-343.

² Gleason's Diary.

was not wholly true, as no confirmation of it had been received. That night Doctor Clark received a twenty days' leave of absence, and there were rumors that our command would soon receive orders to move.¹

On Sunday, April 16, there were services in all the churches, morning and evening, and at the morning services a dispatch giving the particulars of President Lincoln's assassination was read from the pulpits. At the evening services many ladies escorted by Union officers, attended.²

April 17, the camp was full of rumors regarding our future movements, but there was a dearth of reliable news. That day, unknown to us at the time, General Grant telegraphed to General Thomas saying that owing to the freedom of Virginia from any armed forces of the enemy, it was unnecessary to longer occupy East Tennessee with a large force, and that the Fourth Corps might be withdrawn to Nashville immediately.³ This dispatch General Thomas answered, saying he would at once make arrangements for removal of the Fourth Corps to the vicinity of Nashville.⁴ The same day he sent orders to General Stanley to move the Fourth Corps to Nashville by rail, shipping one brigade at a time, and added: "Use dispatch, but do not hurry."⁵ On receipt of this order General Stanley telegraphed from Knoxville: "The troops will be marched to Rogersville Junction to take the cars. If the roads improve I will march the artillery to Knoxville, and time may be gained possibly by marching the troops here."⁶

On the 18th it was reported in our camp that the First Division had been ordered to Nashville by rail, that our division was soon to follow, or to march to Louisville, and that the Fourth Corps was to go to Texas to end the war in that part of the country.⁷ The order for the movement of the Fourth Corps to Nashville was issued on that day and directed the embarkation of the entire corps at Rogersville Junction, the divisions to move in the order of their respective numbers,—the First Division first—and to embark on the cars a brigade at a time.⁸

On the 19th at 8 a. m., the artillery brigade broke camp and moved out towards Knoxville where it was said it would take cars for Nashville. Not long afterwards, a flag of truce was seen approaching, followed by about seventy Confederates, nearly all mounted but unarmed. They reported themselves as belonging to General Vaughan's command which had been disbanded, a part of it going south to join General Johnston and the rest

1 and 2 Gleason's Diary.
3 and 4 W. R. R. 104-375.
5 W. R. R. 104-378.

6 W. R. R. 104-375.
7 Gleason's Diary.
8 W. R. R. 104-393.

having been ordered to go to their homes and behave as quiet citizens. They seemed glad to seek the protection of the old flag. Following them came a battalion of contrabands, which the Confederacy had organized to fight against us but had not yet armed.

That evening Colonel Askew was ordered to furnish a detail from our regiment to start next morning to Jonesboro as guard to the supply train there and back. That night several horses were stolen and among them the adjutant's. That officer recovered his horse next day out in the country about two miles from town. A handsome young woman was riding it on her way home from a funeral. The thief had loaned it to her. She was much embarrassed to be found riding a stolen horse, but not more so than Gleason. Of course, she did not know the horse had been stolen, and said so. After mutual explanations, she laughingly said she had had a jolly good ride, and turned the horse over to the blushing adjutant.

On the evening of April 20, the officers gave a reception at brigade headquarters to which the ladies of Greenville, who had entertained them so hospitably, were invited. The regimental colors of the regiments in the brigade had been borrowed for the occasion. Some hot-headed men of the Fifteenth Ohio conceived the notion that this use of the colors was a desecration, and getting together a crowd went to brigade headquarters and loudly demanded them. They became so boisterous that Captain Cope, adjutant general of the brigade, sent word to Colonel Askew asking that he send Adjutant Gleason to take charge of and return them to regimental headquarters. Colonel Askew directed the adjutant to call on Colonel Hotchkiss, who was then commanding the brigade, and say that it was his (Askew's) wish that the colors should remain at brigade headquarters during the reception. Colonel Hotchkiss, however, to quiet the mob, sent them by one of his staff to regimental headquarters and thus ended a disgraceful episode.¹ It was understood that the notion that the flag was being desecrated was only used as a pretext for raising a disturbance.

April 21, quite a large body of Confederates came in under guard from the direction of Jonesboro and our men gathered at the road side to see them pass. They did not seem at all cast down over the collapse of the rebellion. The brigade received orders to march next morning at 5 o'clock, our regiment being designated to escort the trains to Bull's Gap. Colonel Askew who had been ill for a few days was worse and it was thought best for him to remain at a private house in Greenville for a short

1 Gleason's Diary.

time, and when well enough, to rejoin the regiment by rail. It was rumored that our regiment was to guard the wagon trains to Knoxville, while the rest of the division should go by railroad.

April 22 was cloudy and cool. The bugler sounded reveille at 4 a. m. and then the band played. Playing by the band immediately after reveille had been the orders ever since we were at New Market. The order was issued to secure prompt falling in line for roll call. It was provided in the order that company commanders, under severe penalties, should see that all the men of their respective companies were in line ready to answer to their names by the time the band had finished playing, and the officer of the day was directed to enforce the order. One morning reveille sounded as usual, and as soon as it was ended the band commenced to play. The officer of the day was Captain Lucius O. Doolittle. The piece of music the band played that morning was unusually short and two or three men of Company F straggled into line after the band had ceased playing, Captain Doolittle, who was near by at once placed the captain of the company in arrest, ordered him to report to regimental headquarters and surrender up his sword. That officer, who prided himself on his uniform attention to duty, proceeded to headquarters quite crest fallen, and handed his sword to the colonel. Colonel Askew demanded to know the cause of the arrest and on hearing it said, "The d—n fool! Go back and take command of your company." Doolittle had taken this opportunity to get even with the arrested officer for some fancied or real slight. The two officers afterwards laughed over the incident and are now good comrades and friends.

We did not get started on our march to Bull's Gap until 8 o'clock and were delayed by bad places in the road. But we made the eighteen miles in fairly good time and went into our old camp on the hillside. We found the other regiments of the brigade occupying their old camps. In the evening we got orders to escort the wagon train to Knoxville, where we were to see that all the transportation of the division was loaded on the cars and then take trains for Nashville. We received an issue of rations sufficient to last us until we reached the last named city. It was arranged to have the men ride a part of the time in the wagons, so as to make the march as easy as possible.¹

The morning of April 23, we moved out with our trains at 7 o'clock and as we passed General Wood's headquarters, he announced to us that General Joe Johnston had surrendered his army to General Sherman, which brought forth a great cheer

¹ Gleason's Diary.

from the men.¹ We reached our old camp near Panther Springs early in the evening and encamped for the night, sending out pickets on all the roads leading into the place.

Next morning, April 24, we started again at 7 o'clock. The weather was fine and we made good progress. We halted at New Market for an hour, had dinner, and then pushed on five miles to Hodges Creek where we found a pleasant camp and good water. Some of our lieutenants stopped at New Market, to call on the young ladies whose acquaintance they had made while we encamped there.¹

Thursday, April 25, we pulled out at the usual time, and reached Strawberry Plains in an hour, where we crossed the Holston River on the long railroad bridge. We found rougher roads after we crossed the Holston. The country was poorer and for quite a distance was hilly and covered with rocks. We crossed a number of fine streams and at one of them halted for dinner. After dinner we pushed on quite rapidly to Knoxville, passed through it and encamped near Fort Saunders, pitching our tents just in front of some of Longstreet's old works. We had marched twenty-one miles, and as soon as pickets were posted we turned in for the night. The next day, the 26th, Doctors Clark and Young and the adjutant went fishing in the Holston, but got nothing. There were a number of trot lines in the river, and some of the men on the sly pulled in some of them and got a good supply of fish.¹ In the evening we heard that the transportation of the Second Division was nearly all aboard the cars and it was said we would begin loading ours tomorrow. On the 27th, the cars for our transportation not being ready we spent the day quietly in camp. News of General Sherman's negotiations with General Joe Johnston reached our camp and occasioned much surprise and comment. In the evening we were cheered by hearing Colonel McClenahan, Doctor Clark and the Gleasons again singing the old familiar songs.

On the 28th, the weather changed and became showery and cooler. The regiment moved camp to near the railroad station and we began loading the division transportation on the cars. During the afternoon we got four sections loaded and ready to move out. Companies A, F and D were to go with them.

On the 29th, we completed our work and if cars for our headquarters, horses and baggage could have been secured, would have got off for Chattanooga on the regular 2 p. m. train. But we failed to get them until 11 p. m. and by that time the larger part of the regiment was on its way to Chattanooga, leaving the

¹ Gleason's Diary.

field and staff behind. During the morning a dispatch was received announcing General Joe Johnston's surrender on the same terms as had been given to General Lee. The field and staff and that part of the regiment remaining at Knoxville had to be content with cars in which stock had been hauled. After cleaning them out a little, all got aboard and while waiting for the train to start curled down and went to sleep.

On awaking next morning, April 30, instead of finding the train at Chattanooga, as we expected, it was still standing on the track near the Knoxville Station. Some unforeseen delay had occurred and it was announced that we would move out at 7 a. m. This gave time to make coffee and get breakfast before starting. We pulled out on time, ours being the second section of the train.

As we rolled and jolted along, the people along the route waved greetings with handkerchiefs and aprons and our men responded with cheers. The news of the fall of the rebellion had evidently reached all parts of the country and every one was rejoicing at the near return of peace. We expected to stop at Chattanooga, where some of the regimental officers hoped to regale themselves with a glass or two of beer, but our stop there was but for a moment, and they were woefully disappointed. We caught glimpses of Old Lookout and Missionary Ridge as we passed through, but our thoughts were too much occupied with the present to even try to recall the struggles which had taken place there only a few months before in which we had borne an honorable part. It was to be years before some of us would again see the grand old mountain, and realize how grand and imposing a theater it was for the great war drama there enacted. In October, 1914, one who was with the troops then on their way to Nashville, revisited Chattanooga, and the evening of the day before he left saw Lookout Mountain towering in serene majesty over the peaceful city which lies at its foot. A new moon was seen just over its crest, accompanied by a bright evening star. It was a scene of surpassing beauty and grandeur, and was probably his last view of the historic mountain.

When we awoke next morning we were at Wartrace. Between that place and Murfreesboro, we were stopped on a siding long enough to get breakfast, and then moved on to Nashville, whose suburbs at Mill Creek we reached at 10 a. m. on the first day of May, 1865. After some delay the regiment marched to our brigade camp, which had been established about three miles from our point of debarkation, near the Lebanon pike.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

SIX WEEKS AT NASHVILLE AND PREPARATIONS FOR A CAMPAIGN IN TEXAS.

The brigade headquarters had preceded the arrival of our regiment at Nashville, and when we reached camp the headquarters tents were up and the brigade commander and his staff had had time to clean up and don their dress uniforms. Our regimental headquarters were at first located near brigade headquarters, but Colonel Hotchkiss, who was in command of the brigade, complained that they crowded him too closely and they were removed to a less favorable place. Our camp was near the Lebanon pike, about five miles from Nashville and was named Camp Harker, in honor of General Charles Harker, who was killed in the assault on Kenesaw Mountain, June 27, 1864. Its location was good, we had abundance of good water and as it was partly wooded we had plenty of fuel. The weather was fine and the air was sweet with the scent of May blooms. Any one who has been favored with even a short stay in the neighborhood of Nashville during this loveliest of the months, can, to some extent at least, realize the pleasure we were at that time enjoying.

As some of the officers were strolling about brigade headquarters they noticed a party of ladies and gentlemen driving into the woods a short distance from our camp and a platform which had been erected for dancing. It proved to be a party from Nashville bent on celebrating May Day with a picnic and dance. The spot had evidently been selected before it was known that we would encamp so near. Presently a committee of gentlemen came to where the officers were strolling about and invited them to join the party.

Those who accepted the invitation were well pleased that they did so, for they made many agreeable acquaintances, whose genuine friendliness and hospitality made the days spent in Camp Harker one of the most pleasant experiences of their service. Through these acquaintances they soon made others equally agreeable and there was a constant succession of picnics and social entertainments during the entire six weeks of our stay. Everything seemed propitious for a period of unusual social enjoyment. The war was over, peace, so long hoped for and prayed for, had come, and the consequent joy was almost universal. Confederate officers and soldiers who had served with Lee and Johnston were returning to their homes, and all sectional bitter-

ness seemed to have entirely disappeared. Both blue and gray uniforms were seen at the picnics and dances in the woods and at social functions in the city. The northerners were charmed with the frank cordial manners of the fair ones of Nashville, and it was bruited about camp that more than one young Yankee had lost his heart to a fair daughter of the late Confederacy. One young officer who was paying marked attention to a dark eyed beauty was somewhat disconcerted when her older sister said, "Captain——— I would give my little sister to you for a sweetheart, but she is engaged to Mr.———."

Remembering this experience at Nashville one wonders why, under wise leadership, the era of good feeling then prevailing, could not have been continued, and the bitterness afterwards revived with added intensity, could not have been prevented.

We found on arrival in Camp Harker that very stringent regulations were to govern the troops while near Nashville.¹

On Tuesday, May 2, we were busy putting our camp in order, cleaning the streets, straightening up our lines of tents, etc. We received orders to prepare for a regimental muster next day at 10 o'clock a. m.

The next day, Wednesday, May 3, the muster and inspection took place and we received orders to prepare for a review of the Fourth Corps to take place on the 5th. May 4, an order came requiring officers to wear crape as insignia of mourning for our dead President. May 5, the Nashville papers announced that the review had been postponed until Monday the 8th. Chaplain Ross arrived in camp and reported that Colonel Askew, who had been left behind at Greenville, had reached Nashville, and was waiting for an ambulance to bring his baggage to camp. The ambulance was at once sent and in the afternoon the colonel arrived, looking as well as ever, thanks to the good people of Greenville, who had taken care of him in his illness.¹ May 6, a party made up of mounted officers of the three brigades went to the Hermitage, taking with them an ambulance to carry their subsistence.

On Sunday, May 7, our chaplain held religious services in the afternoon and in the evening there was dress parade. After the parade the companies were equalized for the review next day. It rained steadily all night and continued at intervals all the next day and the review was therefore postponed until 9 a. m. the following day. The men kept their tents and only necessary duties were required of them.

Tuesday, May 9, the grand review of the corps by General Thomas, to which we had been looking forward for a week, took

¹ Gleason's Diary.

place. The morning broke bright and clear and everything seemed auspicious for a fine day. We needed little time for preparation, as every thing was in readiness the day before, even to the equalizing of the companies. We moved out a little before 8 o'clock and after an easy march of about three miles came to the reviewing ground, which was south of the city and between it and the battle ground of December 16, 1864. The First and Second Divisions were already formed with their long rows of wagons immediately in rear of their lines, which was a new feature on such occasions. We soon found our place in the line, and were surprised that there was not the usual delay in starting the ceremony. Everything moved off on time like clock work, to the great relief of the troops, and evidently to the great satisfaction of the large crowd of spectators, who had come out from the city to witness the affair. There was another innovation, all the more novel because evidently impromptu. As the general and his staff passed in front of each regiment the men cheered, and as the cheering was not repressed it was done with a will. As the old hero rode along the front of the line of one of his favorite corps greeted by tumultuous cheers, which he evidently did not expect, we noticed that he was visibly affected. He was taking his last look at the troops, which had never failed him during the trying period from Missionary Ridge to the present. Doubtless, as he rode along he recalled Chickamauga, Missionary Ridge, the Relief of Knoxville, Rocky Face, Resaca, New Hope Church, Kenesaw Mountain and Atlanta, and the crowning glories of Franklin and Nashville,—battles in which those troops had never faltered. How could he fail to be touched by this demonstration of their confidence and affection?

Our regiment had the distinguished honor of leading the march in review. We were on the extreme right of brigade, division and corps. Both officers and men felt proud of this distinction, and as we passed by the reviewing stand we kept a perfect alignment and marched as we had never marched before on such an occasion. The troops following us caught the same spirit, and it was said afterwards that there had never been a finer review in the Army of the Cumberland. After the review was over the regiment marched back to camp under command of Lieutenant Colonel McClenahan, Colonel Askew having been invited to dinner in the city. The next day General Thomas in general orders expressed his admiration for the conduct of the Fourth Corps at the review and complimented officers and men on their fine marching.¹

1 W. R. R. 104-699.

May 10 we were occupied with the usual routine of camp duties. In the evening a number of the officers and men went into the city to see "Our American Cousin," which had added interest because it was the drama which was being played at Ford's Theater at Washington when the great world tragedy, the assassination of Abraham Lincoln, was enacted. May 11, was cold and rainy and little was done. Albert Noe, the colonel's little orderly, left for home. There were rumors that we were to be mustered out and Gleason voiced a generally prevailing feeling when he noted in his diary that "there seemed to be no good reason why it should not take place, as the war was now over."

May 12, an order came to report the names of all the men in the regiment who were veterans and all who were recruits. This was in compliance with an order of the War Department of May 9, 1865, directing General Thomas to cause the immediate muster out of all officers and soldiers of his command whose terms of service would expire prior to May 31, 1865.¹

May 13, Captains David A. Geiger, J. Alonzo Gleason and Vesper Dorneck were detailed as members of a Court Martial convened to try some of the men who had raised the disturbance at Greenville over the flags, before related.²

May 14, Gleason reports that he and Lieutenant Peter T. Gardner went on an excursion to The Hermitage, and quotes in his diary the inscription on the tomb of Rachel Jackson. That evening news came of the capture of Jefferson Davis.

May 15, we had brigade inspection and in the evening some of the officers went into the city to see the "Bohemian Girl." The weather had become clear and warm and was almost ideal. In the evening our old friends, the singers, met in one of the headquarters tents and made music for those who could not go into the city.

May 16, we learned that we were to have a new brigade commander in the person of General Charles C. Doolittle, formerly colonel of the Eighteenth Michigan. It was reported that Jefferson Davis was expected to reach Nashville at 4 p. m. on his way north.

It appears that on the report of Davis' capture by General Wilson, General Thomas at once gave orders to have him sent under proper guard to Nashville, whence he was to be forwarded to Louisville and thence by boat to Parkersburgh, W. Va. From that point he was to be sent via the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad to Washington. Great care had been taken by General Thomas

¹ W. R. R. 104-678.

² Gleason's Diary.

to provide for his arrival at Atlanta, Chattanooga, Nashville and Louisville, and he had reported specifically all such arrangements to the authorities at Washington. A steamboat, the "Shamrock," on which he was to be taken from Louisville to Parkersburgh, had been selected, and an officer had been sent up the river to prepare the way.¹ General Thomas did not hear from General Wilson and his reports to Washington were not acknowledged. He kept telegraphing to Atlanta and Chattanooga, asking when Davis and party would arrive at these points.² In the mean time General Wilson, acting under immediate instructions from Secretary Stanton, both probably regarding the captives as political prisoners, was sending them to Augusta, Ga., whence they were to be sent by boat to Savannah and thence by the naval vessel "Clyde" to Fortress Monroe.³ General Thomas did not know that the disposition of Davis and party had been taken out of his hands until May 20, and must have felt deeply humiliated and chagrined. He at once sent to General Grant the following dispatch:

"I learn by telegraph from Resaca that General Wilson has sent Jeff Davis by way of Savannah to Washington. He first dispatched to me that he was ordered, from Washington I suppose, to send him direct. On the 14th upon receiving his dispatch, I telegraphed you for orders, as to how he should be forwarded, but received no answer. On the 15th I made preparations to send the prisoner by steamer under a strong guard to Parkersburgh, W. Va., and thence in a special train to Washington, and telegraphed to you what preparations I had made, and asked if they were approved. I have received no answer to this telegram, I am consequently led to the conclusion that General Wilson is considered no longer under my orders. I would be glad to know if my conjectures are correct."⁴

The only answer to this dispatch made by General Grant, was as follows:

"No orders have been made taking Wilson from your command. At the time of receiving your dispatch, relative to the disposition you had ordered for Jeff Davis, I thought he was coming by way of Savannah and let the matter run until I forgot to answer it."⁵

One reads between the lines that Secretary Stanton had probably taken command, as he sometimes did, with little regard for precedent, and less regard for the feelings of others.

May 17, the weather was warm and showery and nothing

1 W. R. R. 104-760-767-774.

2 W. R. R. 104-792.

3 W. R. R. 104-782-813.

4 W. R. R. 104-849.

5 W. R. R. 104-858.

unusual occurred in our camp. May 18, General Doolittle appeared and took command of the brigade, and Colonel Hotchkiss resumed command of his regiment. General Doolittle announced that for the present, at least, the staff would be retained. In the afternoon he called a meeting of the regimental commanders of the brigade at his headquarters. General Doolittle was not known by the officers and men of the brigade, and his coming was not looked upon with any great favor. But his personal appearance and his quiet, sincere and courteous manners disarmed all opposition, and he was soon in high esteem. On the day he took command the Cincinnati papers announced that our dear old brigade commander, General Willich, had been relieved as post commander of that city and ordered to report to General Thomas. This, we thought, could only mean that he was coming back to take command of his old brigade. There was dress parade in the evening, at which the adjutant read an order from Colonel Askew announcing that he had concluded not to court-martial the men who were guilty of riotous conduct at Greenville. He believed we would be soon mustered out of service, and it would be a bitter reflection that at the close of their service he had been compelled to punish men who had previously conducted themselves as soldiers and gentlemen.¹ That evening we heard our singers singing in one of the headquarters' tents.

May 19 and 20, there was nothing unusual to report, except that on the 19th the quartermaster received a large invoice of clothing and camp equipage, which looked like we were to be refitted for another campaign.

Unknown to us at the time, May 17, an order was issued relieving General Sheridan from duty in the east and assigning him to the command of the territory west of the Mississippi River.² Accompanying the order was a letter from General Grant, dated the same day, which was as follows:

"General: Under the orders relieving you from the command of the Middle Military Division and assigning you to command west of the Mississippi, you will proceed without delay to the west to arrange all preliminaries for your new field of duties. Your duty is to restore Texas and that part of Louisiana, held by the enemy, to the Union in the shortest practicable time, in a way most effectual for securing premanent peace. To do this you will be given all the troops that can be spared by General Canby, probably twenty-five thousand men of all arms, the troops with Major General Reynolds in Arkansas, say twelve

¹ Gleason's Diary.
² W. R. R. 104-825.

thousand, Reynolds to command. The Fourth Army Corps, now at Nashville awaiting orders, and the Twenty-fifth Army Corps, now at City Point, Virginia, ready to embark. I do not wish to trammel you with instructions; I will state however, that if Smith¹ holds out, without even an ostensible government to receive orders from or to report to, he and his men are not entitled to the consideration due to an acknowledged belligerent. Theirs are the conditions of outlaws making war against the only Government having an existence over the territory where war is now being waged. You may notify the rebel commander west of the Mississippi—holding intercourse with him in person, or through such officers of the rank of major general as you may select—that he will be allowed to surrender all his forces on the same terms as were accorded to Lee and Johnston. If he accedes, proceed to garrison the Red River as high up as Shreveport, the seaport at Galveston, Matagorda Bay, Corpus Christi and mouth of the Rio Grande. Place a strong force on the Rio Grande, holding it at least to a point opposite Camargo and above that if supplies can be procured. In case of an active campaign (a hostile one) I think a heavy force should be put on the Rio Grande as a first preliminary. Troops for this might be started at once. The Twenty-fifth Corps is now available, and to it should be added a force of white troops, say those now under Major General Steele.

To be clear on this last point I think the Rio Grande should be strongly held whether the forces in Texas surrender or not, and that no time should be lost in getting the troops there. If war is to be made they will be in the right place, if Kirby Smith surrenders, they will be on the line which is to be strongly garrisoned. Should any forces be necessary, other than those designated, they can be had by calling for them on Army Headquarters.”²

It was in pursuance of the foregoing order and instructions that on May 19, unknown to us at the time, General Thomas was ordered to hold the Fourth Corps subject to orders of General Sheridan.³

May 21, there was no unusual incident of record. On the 22nd, there was regimental drill, at which General Doolittle was present, and in the evening dress parade. May 23, there was a rumor that General Stanley had received an order to hold the Fourth Corps in readiness to move on short notice, and as the newspapers announced that General Sheridan was to take troops

1 General E. Kirby Smith who was in command of all the Confederate armies west of the Mississippi.

2 Sheridan's Memoirs, Vol. 2-208.

3 W. R. R. 104-837.

with him to Texas, some thought that was our destination.¹ In the evening our band serenaded General Doolittle. May 24 and 25, we had the usual drill and dress parade. On the 26th, our old comrade, Captain C. W. Carroll, now Lieutenant Colonel of the One Hundredth and Eighty-fourth Ohio, visited our quarters and was cordially welcomed by his old comrades and friends. Orders came to have pay rolls made out immediately, to include our service to April 30. It was ordered that these rolls should not include the men whose terms expired prior to October 31, 1865. These were to be mustered out of service and sent to their respective states to await payment. Captain David A. Geiger of ours was detailed as division mustering officer to muster them out.

On the 27th, Lieutenant Colonel Carroll gave the men of his old commands,—Companies E and K—a treat, and many of them became both boozy and boisterous. A great many of the officers went to the races.

May 28, General Willich made an unexpected visit to the camp. He had arrived that day at Nashville, reported to General Stanley for assignment to duty,² and in the afternoon appeared in the camp of his old brigade. Gleason says, "As he came charging up to one regiment after another of his old brigade, on his big gray horse, the men gathered about him with cheers, such as none but General Willich could draw forth. His right arm was still disabled by the wound received at Resaca, but he said he could do the brain work for us, and that when he heard we were to go to Texas he could not stay away." His English was as broken as ever and he had frequently to pause to get the right word to express what he was trying to say. His call, as he explained was "just a little visit to the boys," but in a day or two he expected to be with us and stay with us until we were all mustered out of service. May 29, there was a meeting in the chapel tent to choose a delegate from the regiment to the state Republican Convention, which was soon to meet in Columbus, Ohio. The choice fell on James McClenahan of Company B.³ On the 30th, the quartermaster and some of the men worked all day putting up swings and parallel bars. Gleason says that while the regimental headquarters mess was at dinner, General Willich suddenly appeared and joined them, saying he was hungry, and that afterward he walked through the company quarters to see what the men had for dinner, laughing and cracking jokes with the

1 Gleason's Diary.

2 W. R. R. 104-923.

3 Gleason's Diary.

men as in former times. On this day General Grant telegraphed to General Thomas:

"Send the Fourth Corps to New Orleans as soon as practicable. Separate the men whose time expires before the 1st of October from the corps and if paymasters are ready to pay the balance let them receive their money before starting. Let there be no unavoidable delay in getting off the corps."¹

May 30, Major Dubois reported that General Wood had orders to move our division to New Orleans as soon as we were paid off.²

June 1, the bars and the swings which had been erected in camp, afforded much amusement, not only to our men but to the men of other commands, and were kept in use all day. Many of the men were busy making transparencies for the grand reception which the men of the brigade were preparing for General Willich. June 1, an order had been issued relieving General Doolittle and restoring General Willich to his old command.³

June 2, preparations for the reception to General Willich were continued, and a delegation of non-commissioned officers went to the city to find out when the General would be out to take command of the brigade. They were assured that he would be out that evening without fail. Newspaper reporters of the Cincinnati and Nashville papers and a number of guests were expected.

This reception was conceived and carried out by the enlisted men of the brigade,—the officers having nothing to do with it,—and was a most remarkable demonstration of their love for and confidence in their old brigade commander. Gleason thus describes it.

"Dress parade came off at the usual hour and shortly after-dark the lights began to start up as the procession began forming a little above our camp. The Ohio state agent and a friend who accompanied him, being our agents, we proceeded to brigade headquarters as the column began moving. It was headed by our own *Fifteenth Ohio* and its band. Two other bands were placed at intervals in the procession. As it passed brigade headquarters the display far exceeded all expectations. It was conceded that our regiment had the most extensive display of transparencies, but those of the Eighty-ninth Illinois were more artistic. One of the Eighty-ninth Illinois bore a fine picture of a railroad engine to symbolize the "railroad regiment" as it was called, with

1 W. R. R. 104-931.

2 Gleason's Diary.

3 W. R. R. 104-943.

an inscription of the general's own words at Chickamauga. "Now boys one more charge," and underneath them "All right General we are on time."

There were scores of transparencies, nearly all giving some homely remark in the General's broken English, or recalling incidents occurring while he was in command of the brigade. Among them one recalls "Bugler blow fight," "Boys what for you spradle out the road so wide for," "Vere is Joe Brown"—one wishes he could recall them all.

After the parade was over the brigade was formed in close column in front of brigade headquarters, about a stand which had been erected for the occasion. General Willich was escorted to it and made a notable speech, so replete with patriotic sentiments expressed in his forcible, though broken English, that Gleason regrets he did not have his note book and pencil with him to take it down.

The next day, June 3, General Willich, resumed formal command of the brigade. The members of the staff were all requested to remain on duty for the present, and Captain Cope was informed by the general that Captain Charles A. Booth, his adjutant general while he was in command at Cincinnati, had been ordered to report to him and would be on hand in a few days to act as adjutant general of the brigade. All of the officers of the brigade were called to brigade headquarters at 9 o'clock to meet the general, who said he "wanted to get acquainted with them." He greeted all cordially, and those he remembered, affectionately. There were many new faces among the officers, for the campaigns and battles of more than a year had thinned their ranks. He wished to see if the men had forgotten the German bugle calls. At his request the brigade bugler sounded the regimental calls and each regimental bugler responded, which pleased the old warrior very much. When the officers were dismissed they returned to their respective regiments and there was short drill. In the evening some of the officers rode to the mouth of Stone River and had a swim in the Cumberland. It was moonlight when they rode back to camp. The air was sweet with the perfume of wild grape blossoms and other blooms and it was delightfully cool. The memory of that night and ride is still fragrant after nearly fifty years have gone.

Sunday, June 4, there was the usual inspection which was more thorough than heretofore, especially the inspection of quarters, and one officer was placed under arrest for having some of the men's bunks so near the ground.¹ There were re-

¹ Gleason's Diary.

ligious services in the chapel tent and dress parade in the evening. Mulberries were ripe and some of the men got permission to go "berrying."

June 5, the commanding officers and adjutants of regiments were summoned to brigade headquarters for a sort of council of war. The Eighty-ninth Illinois was to be mustered out of service on Thursday, and a number of positions at brigade headquarters held by officers and men of that regiment had to be filled. Captain Adams of the Forty-ninth Ohio was selected as brigade quartermaster to take the place of Deering of the Eighty-ninth Illinois. The general announced that we would have battalion and brigade drills morning and evening. He believed that that best way to keep officers and men healthy and contented was to keep them busy. He also took up and discussed the question of varying the rations of the men, so as to keep them in good health. As a result of this council of war all the regiments had battalion drill that evening.

From June 6, to June 10, inclusive, we were drilling every day, and life in camp was much more strenuous than it had been before General Willich resumed command of the brigade. When the regiments were having battalion drill it was not unusual for him to gallop into the field and direct the maneuvers. He was always on hand and in command at brigade drill. He was always welcome and his presence put vigor and spirit into the movements.

On the evening of June 8, there was a meeting of the regiment called to take action concerning a report appearing in the Cincinnati Gazette, of a public reception given at Columbus, Ohio, to a large detachment of drafted men and substitutes, who had arrived there from Sherman's army to be mustered out of the service, and who had represented themselves to be the Fifteenth Ohio.

The detachment, numbering near two hundred men, had been assigned to the Fifteenth Ohio and sent from Columbus, Ohio, in October, 1864, to Chattanooga, where it was temporarily placed on duty as part of a guard of a large drove of cattle which was being driven through to Atlanta. When it reached Atlanta, the Fifteenth Ohio, to which it had been assigned, had gone north with the Fourth Corps to oppose Hood's invasion of Tennessee. Communication between Atlanta and the north was soon broken and the detachment never joined the regiment and never saw its colors. It was continued as cattle guard and in this capacity marched with Sherman to the sea and thence northward through Georgia and the Carolinas. It is said that it carried a flag and called itself the Fifteenth Ohio. It took part, it

was said, in the grand review at Washington, May 23 and 24, 1865, and on June 4, 1865 arrived at Columbus, Ohio, for final discharge. There were 161 men in its ranks,—more than in many of the old regiments. The newspapers announced, and the people believed, that it was the old veteran Fifteenth Ohio Infantry, returning after over four years of arduous service. Further interest in its arrival was aroused by the report that it had served as General Sherman's body guard on his march from Atlanta to the sea.

A meeting of citizens was called and a committee, of which ex-Governor Lennison was chairman, was appointed to arrange for a public reception to the supposed veterans. The reception took place at the east side of the capitol on the evening of June 5, and the detachment, which had been quartered at Tod Barracks, was escorted to the capitol by the Twenty-second regiment of the Reserve Corps. High Street, along which it marched, was thronged by cheering citizens, and young girls strewed flowers in the path of the returnings braves. At the east front Governor John Brough welcomed them in a remarkable patriotic speech.

In the Cincinnati Gazette of June 6, 1865, an account of the reception was published and it was this which gave rise to the meeting mentioned in Gregory's diary. To show how completely the governor and the good people of Columbus were deceived, the following extracts from the published account of the reception and the governor's speech are given:

"Just as the sun was sinking in the horizon the detachment of the Fifteenth Ohio which formed the body guard of General Sherman during his campaign from Chattanooga to Goldsboro, escorted by the Twenty-second regiment of the Veteran Reserve Corps under command of Major J. W. Skiles, marched up High Street in the capital and took position in front of the east terrace, where they were welcomed by Governor Brough and hundreds of enthusiastic citizens." In his speech the Governor said, among other things, "Holding the honorable post of Sherman's body guard, your toils and privations have been great but under an all wise Providence you have been permitted to return home and enjoy the sweets of peace won by the Armies of the Union, for out of the campaigns in which you participated sprang the safety of the country again." He called attention to the circumstances under which the veteran soldiers of Ohio had gone into the service of their country—"Not as conscripts but as patriot volunteers." He described the services they had rendered and the sacrifices they had made under their gallant leader General Sherman, and assured them that "The people were proud

of the record they had made." It appears that Captain W. H. Walker of the Seventeenth Ohio commanded the detachment and signed its muster out rolls.

The meeting mentioned by Gregory, of which he was secretary, passed resolutions informing the people of Ohio, that the men to whom such a notable reception was given were not veterans of the Fifteenth Ohio but conscripts, that they never were Sherman's body guard, but were in fact only cattle guards, and that they had performed no other service.¹

Whether these resolutions ever reached the governor's office is not known. If they did it may have been the part of prudence to withhold from the public the fact that a stupendous practical joke had been played on the governor and the patriotic people of Columbus. There is some ground for believing that the governor and other state officials never knew the truth about it, for, as late as 1894, the late Hon. Wm. Henry Smith, who was secretary of state at the time of the reception, in a public speech at Columbus, Ohio, mentioned the Fifteenth Ohio as "one of the noble regiments who had made the famous march to the sea which had cleft the Confederacy in twain." It is only just to state that this detachment rendered valuable services to the country, for which they are entitled to their meed of praise. It was through no fault of theirs that they did not join the regiment and share with it the hardships and dangers of our last campaigns. If they had done so, doubtless they would have borne themselves as gallantly as those who had seen longer service.

The orders for the movement of the Fourth Corps to the south were issued by General Thomas June 5, and directed that in accordance with instructions from General Grant, "the veteran portion of the Fourth Army Corps" would proceed by the most practicable route to New Orleans and on its arrival at that point report to General Canby, commanding the Military Division of West Mississippi. General Stanley was directed to reorganize the corps, after detaching from it all men whose terms expired prior to October 1, 1865. The transportation allowed was eight teams and two ambulances to each 1000 men. The corps pontoon train was to be taken with the command.²

General Stanley issued orders next day reorganizing the corps as follows: There still were to be three divisions but each division was to have only two brigades. The organization was as follows:

First Division—Brevet Major General Kimball, commanding.

¹ John G. Gregory's Diary.

² W. R. R. 104-959.

First Brigade—Colonel Thomas W. Rose, Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, Fifty-first Ohio, Thirty-first Indiana, Twenty-first Kentucky, Twenty-third Kentucky.

Second Brigade—Colonel I. C. B. Suman, Ninth Indiana, Thirty-fifth Indiana, Thirtieth Indiana, Thirty-eighth Illinois, Twenty-first Illinois, Thirty-sixth Indiana.

Second Division—Brevet Major General Elliott, commanding:

First Brigade—Brevet Brigadier General Opdycke, Twenty-sixth Ohio, Thirty-sixth Illinois, Fortieth Indiana, Forty-fourth Illinois, Fifty-seventh Indiana, One Hundred and Twenty-fifth Ohio.

Second Brigade—Brigadier General L. P. Bradley, Fifteenth Missouri, Twenty-eighth Kentucky, Forty-second Illinois, Fifty-first Illinois, Sixty-fourth Ohio, Sixty-fifth Ohio.

Third Division—Major General Thomas J. Wood commanding.

First Brigade—Brigadier General A. Willich, Fifteenth Ohio, Eighth Kansas, Forty-ninth Ohio, Fifty-first Indiana, Fifty-ninth Illinois, Seventy-first Ohio.

Second Brigade—Brevet Major General Samuel Beatty, Nineteenth Ohio, Thirteenth Ohio, Third Michigan, Fourth Michigan, Thirteenth Wisconsin, Forty-first Ohio.¹

General Stanley's order for our movement to New Orleans directed that the corps should move as soon as the men were all paid and that the route was to be by rail to Johnsonville on the Tennessee River and thence by steamer. The artillery and trains were to move to Johnsonville by the dirt road as early as June 12, if the men were paid. The order of march was first, the Second Division, second, the Third Division, third, the First Division.²

The day General Stanley issued the foregoing orders he addressed an identical letter to Generals Wood, Kimball and Elliott, the division commanders, suggesting: That before the dispersion of the Army of the Cumberland, a meeting of the officers and men should be held for the purpose of giving expression to the sentiment of fellowship and unanimity of feeling which the great events of the past years should inspire within our hearts, and to organize a committee with whom any one might correspond upon the social and friendly ties and subjects in common with us, not coming under official business." He suggested that the meeting he held at the headquarters of the artillery brigade on Saturday, June 10, and that the organization

¹ W. R. R. 104-966.

² W. R. R. 104-965-6.

should embrace the Fourth, Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps and the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Cumberland.¹

The suggestion met with most cordial approval. The meeting was held at the time and place appointed. Three of the delegates from our regiment were W. F. Rickey, Anderson and John G. Gregory.² A committee was appointed to report at an adjourned meeting to be held June 14, a design for a badge to be worn by officers and men of the Army of the Cumberland. At the adjourned meeting the committee reported a design for a badge which was adopted. The proceedings at these meetings were published in general orders from the headquarters of the Department of the Cumberland and included a description and drawing of the badge.³

At one of these meetings the following preamble and resolutions were adopted;

"Whereas; Many of the soldiers of the Army of the Cumberland are about to abandon the profession of arms and again mingle in the peaceful pursuits of home.

Resolved: That in parting with each other we do so with mingled feelings of sorrow, sadness and pride,—sorrow because friends bound together by ties formed on many battle fields must part; sadness at turning our backs upon the thousands of fresh made graves of our brave comrades; and pride, because it has been our good fortune to be numbered among the members of the Army of the Cumberland, and have each done his part in proving to the world that republics have the ability to maintain and perpetuate themselves.

Resolved, That in parting we do as we have many times done in the face of the enemy, renew our pledges of unending fidelity to each other; and that in whatever position in life we may happen to be we will never permit our affections to be estranged from those who continue to fight our battles, but that we will sustain and defend them at all times and in all proper places.

Resolved: That the following named persons, and none others, are authorized to wear the badge of the Army of the Cumberland.

I. All persons now in that army in good standing.

II. All soldiers who formerly belonged to that army, and have received honorable discharge from the same.

Resolved, That any soldier of the Army of the Cumberland, who is now entitled to wear the badge of the army, who may hereafter be dishonorably discharged from the service shall by such discharge forfeit the right to wear said badge.

Resolved, That we exhort all members of the Army of the Cumberland to discountenance any attempt on the part of any unauthorized person to arrogate to themselves honor to which they are not entitled to by wearing our badge."

When it was known that orders sending us south had been recieved, a mutinous spirit developed in some of the brigades of the corps. The terms of enlistment of the veterans provided that

1 W. R. R. 104-961-2.

2 Gregory's Diary.

3 W. R. R. 104-1013-14.

they should serve for 'three years or during the war,' and many thought that the war was now practically over and that they were entitled to be at once discharged and return to their homes. Some of the more reckless, it was said, were secretly signing papers pledging themselves to disobey orders to move to Texas, and meetings were held on the borders of the various camps, at which the men were urged to sign these papers and form an organized resistance to all commands looking toward going further south. The movement, it was said, originated in two of the Michigan regiments and an Ohio regiment belonging to another brigade.¹ It was known that a number of the men of our brigade were attending these meetings.

The following extracts from the diary of Sergeant John G. Gregory show that this feeling of dissatisfaction was prevailing to some extent among the men of our regiment and brigade.

The morning papers of June 7, had reported that the Fourth Corps would be sent to Galveston, Texas. Gregory in his diary of that day says he "could hardly see it in that light, that some of the boys were terribly discouraged," that Hatfield felt so bad about it he cried," and that "it does get me how childish some old soldiers are." He also says, "the hard feeling is all among the veteran troops." June 8, he writes, "orders came for us to go towards New Orleans as soon as we are paid off. I can hardly believe it." June 9, he notes that there was great dissatisfaction among the veterans over the contemplated movement to Texas, that they "claimed to be misused," and adds, "I will go any where in the United States." June 10, he reports "strong talk against going to Texas." June 11, he reports, "a large meeting of our division in a field near here tonight to decide whether to go to Texas, believe the brigade greatly opposed to going." He also reports that the colonel came at night and looked through the company to see who were out at the meeting. June 12, he writes, "The meeting last night fizzled out, the boys themselves coming to the conclusion that it would not do."²

At this point that it was decided to take official notice of what was going on, and on the evening of June 12, General Willich called the brigade together to talk it over. It was known throughout the division that this meeting was to be held, and many officers and men from other commands were present. There was a feeling of intense solicitude as to the result of the meeting, for many feared an outbreak which would require more than ordinary prudence and wisdom to repress.

¹ Gleason's Diary.

² John G. Gregory's Diary.

The brigade was called together at 5 p. m. and for the first time, the two new regiments which had been assigned to it—the Seventy-first Ohio and Fifty-ninth Illinois,—were present. General Grant's farewell address to the army¹ was read and also a vigorous order of General Wood touching on the proposed mutiny.² General Willich made the only speech of the occasion. In his broken, but always forceful and eloquent speech, he told the men before him of the reported circulation of seditious papers and the attempt of some mistaken and thoughtless men to excite discontent and raise a mutiny among the men of the command, and portrayed the necessary consequences of such conduct. He then made an appeal to them to remember their proud record as soldiers of the old First Brigade and not to sully it by any such proposed action. The speech was one of the most eloquent and convincing he had ever made. If there had been any real mutinous spirit among the veterans of our brigade it was dispelled by his eloquent appeal. That night, one of the ring leaders, a hospital steward of the Seventy-first Ohio, who had been an adjutant, had been mustered out of the service and had again entered it as a substitute, was arrested and sent north in irons.³ This ended the mutiny. One who shared the anxiety of this critical moment has always thought that it was fortunate that General Willich was in command at the time, and that it was his notable speech, more than any repressive measures adopted, which prevented a most serious outbreak.

June 10, the Eighty-ninth Illinois, which had been a member of our brigade from the beginning of its service, had fought side by side with us at Stone River, Chickamauga, Missionary Ridge, the battles of the Atlanta Campaign, Franklin and Nashville, had shared with us the rigors and privations of all our long and varied service and had proven themselves true comrades and friends, left for the north, having been mustered out of service. Colonel Askew and a number of the officers of other regiments of the brigade went to Nashville to see them off.

June 12, the men in the regiment whose terms of service would expire before October 1, were marched into the city and quartered in Barracks No. 1 until they could be paid.⁴

June 13, the colonel and adjutant went into the city to see that the discharged men were paid and provided with transportation to their homes, and returned in the evening with the news that the paymaster would be out the next day to pay us off.

June 14, our entire regiment was on guard duty and when the paymaster arrived, the companies were relieved in turn to be paid off and returned to duty. When night came three of the

1 W. R. R. 104-948.

2 3 and 4 Gleason's Diary.

companies and the field and staff were still unpaid. The wagon train of the brigade was ordered to move next morning.

June 15, payment of the regiment was resumed at an early hour, but the progress was so slow that it was not completed until after noon. The state agent was on hand to take charge of surplus money which the men wished to send home. The sutler, in violation of orders, sold liquor to the men so indiscriminately that Colonel Askew called a council of administration, which assessed a heavy tax on that individual and compelled him to pay it, and he was then dismissed and ordered out of the camp. As a result of his indiscriminate sale of liquors, there were a number of cases of "drunk and disorderly."¹ That evening we received an unexpected order to have reveille at 2:30 a. m. next morning, and to be ready to move at 4 a. m. The morning of June 16, about daylight, the regiment marched to the Mill Creek siding and took cars for Johnsonville, Tenn.

When Captain Charles A. Booth, who had been General Willich's adjutant general at Cincinnati, arrived at brigade headquarters a few days before the command moved to Johnsonville, Captain Cope asked to be relieved as assistant adjutant general of the brigade and to be permitted to return to his regiment and take command of his company. General Willich declined the request. Very much to *Captain Cope's* surprise, the general sent Captain Booth to General Kneffler's brigade and retained him in his old position. It therefore became his duty to issue the orders for and superintend the loading of the brigade, its equipment, horses, etc., on the cars. Assisted by the efficient young officers of the brigade staff, the movement of the troops and the loading of them and their equipment and horses on the cars, was done in such orderly, prompt and efficient manner, as to evoke warm praise from General Willich. The memory of such praise is still sweet and the writer hopes he may be pardoned for recalling such personal incidents in this history.

We made a short stop at Nashville, where a number of our officers and men who were in the city and had not heard of the orders to move, rejoined the command. Owing to delays caused by meeting other trains we did not reach Johnsonville until sunset, when we left the cars and at once marched to the river and embarked on the steamer Peytona. We were off for a long voyage by water and were entering a new and unusual campaign, in which we were to have many novel and some trying experiences.

1 Gleason's Diary.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

THE TEXAS CAMPAIGN.—CONDITIONS IN TEXAS AND MOVEMENT FROM NASHVILLE TO NEW ORLEANS.

It will be remembered that in the instructions given by General Grant to General Sheridan May 17, when the latter was assigned to the general command of the territory west of the Mississippi River, he was, in general terms, "to restore Texas and that part of Louisiana held by the enemy, to the Union in the shortest practicable time." The large number of troops placed at his command and the directions for their disposition, however, suggested other purposes than those specified. Sheridan in his *Memoirs*¹ says, that on receipt of such instructions he called on General Grant to see if they were so pressing as to preclude his remaining in Washington until after the Grand Review, which was to take place May 23 and 24, for he naturally had a strong desire to lead his command on that great occasion; that Grant told him it was absolutely necessary for him to go at once "to enforce the surrender of the Confederates under Kirby Smith." He further says: "at the same interview he (Grant) informed me that there was an additional motive in sending me to the new command—a motive not explained by the instructions themselves," and went on to say that, "as a matter of fact, he looked upon the invasion of Mexico by Maximilian as a part of the rebellion itself, because of the encouragement that invasion had received from the Confederacy, and that our success in putting down secession would never be complete till the French and Austrian invaders were compelled to quit the territory of our sister republic."

General Grant in his *Memoirs* confirms this testimony of Sheridan, and says he regarded the invasion of Mexico "as a direct act of war against the United States by the powers engaged, and supposed as a matter of course, that the United States would treat it as such when their hands were free to strike," and that he "sent Sheridan with a corps to the Rio Grande to have him where he might aid Juarez in expelling the French from Mexico."² This was perhaps the controlling reason for sending our corps and a large body of other veteran troops to Texas. In fact, as will be seen later, when we started to Texas, Kirby Smith had surrendered, or had under-

1 Sheridan's *Memoirs*, Vol. 2-209-210.

2 Grant's *Memoirs*, Vol. 2-545-546.

taken to surrender, all the Confederate troops in the Trans-Mississippi department.

But aside from the desire on the part of General Grant to compel the French and Austrians "to quit the territory of our sister republic," the conditions then existing in Texas and West Louisiana were so serious as to demand the presence there of a large military force.

These conditions were so remarkable as to warrant a brief review of them before taking up the story of our long voyage from Johnsonville to New Orleans and thence to Texas.

It is not improbable that during the closing months of the war, the leaders of the Confederacy thought of the Trans-Mississippi country as the place where the final struggle would take place, and as a land of refuge where the beaten officers and men of their armies could find safe asylum. It was a vast country, much of it fertile and productive. They had possession of the important sea ports on the long coast line between the mouths of the Mississippi and Rio Grande, including Galveston, which afforded a safe shelter for blockade runners. Beyond the Rio Grande was the imperial government of Mexico, which was naturally in sympathy with them. To the north was a vast region stretching from California to the Mississippi River, including parts of the territories of Arizona, New Mexico, the Indian Territory, and of the states of Missouri, Arkansas and Louisiana, in which were tribes of semi-civilized Indians, such as the Chickasaws, Choctaws, Caddos, Seminoles, Creeks and Osages,¹ who were contributing both men and supplies to their armies, and savage tribes, such as the Comanches and other prairie tribes, which were actively hostile to the United States.

Over this vast region President Davis had placed Lieutenant General E. Kirby Smith in supreme command, aided by such experienced Major Generals as J. B. Magruder, J. G. Walker, S. B. Buckner and others, with an army estimated at 70,000 men.

When it was seen that the military power of the Confederacy in the states east of the Mississippi River was crumbling, the leaders in the Trans-Mississippi department, in consultation with Jefferson Davis and his cabinet, began to prepare for eventualities.

General E. Kirby Smith seems to have early been impressed with the critical nature of the situation of the Confederacy and to have commenced overtures to the imperial

1 W. R. R. 102-1266-1271.

government of Mexico looking to the employment of himself in high command and the taking over by such government of such portion of his forces as he could control. February 1, 1865, he granted to the Hon. Robert Rose, who had formerly held a diplomatic position under the United States government, permission to cross the lines into Mexico, and authorized him to make known to "His Majesty the Emperor," that in case of unexampled catastrophe to the eastern armies and the final overthrow of the Confederacy, it was his fixed purpose to seek an asylum in Mexico, and that being bred to the profession of arms he wished to still continue in the exercise of his profession. That he had some knowledge of the French and Spanish languages; had once been on duty on the Mexican frontier and that in case of the contingency above alluded to, his humble services and such influence as he could exert might be available to His Majesty's government. He also instructed Mr. Rose to say to "His Majesty the Emperor," "That the national antipathy that would exist in the minds of many citizens of the Confederate States to those of the North, * * * might in contemplation of possible collision between the imperial government and the United States of the North, render very desirable such a corps of Southern soldiers as might be induced by the offer of liberal terms to colonize the Empire," and added, that if Mr. Rose should think that the above offer and views were not inappropriate, he should "tender his services to the Emperor and assure him of his heartfelt wish for the eminent success of his reign, and the honor, welfare and happiness of his people."¹

It is probable that this overture of General Smith was not known to any of his subordinate commanders, who seem to have been more occupied with schemes for strengthening their military power so as to prolong the struggle.

February 18, 1865, Brigadier General Daniel Ruggles sent a communication to General S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General of the Confederacy, suggesting a combination of the "in a measure undeveloped elements of strength in our Trans-Mississippi domains" and proposed:

"First. That prompt and energetic measures be taken to bring into the field such warriors as the civilized and semi-barbarous Indian nations, viz.: The Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws and Seminoles, may still be enabled to furnish * * * thus, adding a probable contingent of between 15,000 and 20,000 warriors to our armies."

"Second. That measures be promptly taken to employ

1 W. R. R. 101-1359.

the Commanche Nation and other cognate tribes, viz.: The Sioux, Black Feet, Pawnees, etc., now hostile to the Federal power, as an appropriate and energetic contingent, numbering probably some 20,000 warriors, who, when stimulated by adroit emissaries, would carry terror throughout the western border." * * *

"Third. That measures be immediately taken to organize and take into the field one-fifth of the effective slave population of that department, changing the terms of their service from slavery to peonage, thus protecting the slave and industrial interests and meeting the existing military necessity of the country." * * * And adds:

"Thus may we combine the reserve corps of those states, the slave force, the Indian force (semi-civilized and savage), the Mexicans and Mormons, in strength sufficient to retain complete military possession of that department."¹ These suggestions were referred to the Confederate secretary of war and doubtless were approved by that officer and by the Confederate States Government. A large number of warriors of the semi-civilized tribes above named evidently joined the Confederate armies in Texas, for we read of the "Choctaw Brigade," and the "Chickasaw Regiment."² On April 8, 1865, General E. Kirby Smith appointed Hon. Albert Pike of Arkansas, to act with General J. W. Throckmorton and Colonel W. D. Reagan of Texas, as a commission to negotiate an alliance with the Commanches and other savage Indian tribes on the borders of Texas.³

The suggestion putting one-fifth of the slave population into the field was so far adopted that orders were issued April 5, 1865, for the impressment "of able-bodied negroes on plantations belonging to owners within the Federal lines and all others not usefully employed, in localities exposed to the enemy's raids"⁴

The negotiations proposing an alliance with the imperialist government in Mexico, were undertaken and were pending both before and after the surrender of Generals Lee and Johnston.

May 2, 1865, General E. Kirby Smith again sent the Hon. Robert Rose to Mexico to present to His Majesty the Emperor certain views as to the future interests of the Confederate States and the Emperor of Mexico, with authority to "give assurance that there is every probability that our government will be willing to enter into a liberal agreement with

1 W. R. R. 101-1393-4.

2 W. R. R. 102-1303.

3 W. R. R. 102-1266-1272.

4 W. R. R. 102-1264.

the authorities of the Mexican Empire, based upon the principle of mutual protection from their common enemy." Mr. Rose was directed to say to His Majesty, the Emperor, among other things, "that from the solemn action of their Houses of Congress, from the public expressions of their eminent public men, from the tone of their public press it was plain that further schemes of ambition and territorial aggrandizement were being nursed and matured by the United States, and that they looked with jealous eyes upon the neighboring Empire of Mexico and meditated a blow aimed for its destruction." Under these circumstances Mr. Rose was instructed to say that it would not "fail to strike his Imperial Highness that in the Confederate States and more especially in the department adjoining his dominions, and over which I have the honor to preside as military chief, that there are many trained soldiers inured to the hardships of the field, and inspired with a bitter hatred of the Federals, whose services might be tendered to him against the North. There is under my command an army of 60,000 men. * * * These men are commanded by veteran officers, who have repeatedly led them in action and who thoroughly understand them and could control them without difficulty. If I am not mistaken in my conclusions as to the future policy of the United States, the propriety of an understanding between the Emperor and the Confederate States Government for their mutual defense will be apparent to His Majesty. The services of our troops would be of inestimable value to him. You will ascertain, if possible, the views of the Emperor on these subjects, and should the occasion seem favorable, inform yourself fully as to the probable terms and conditions upon which an agreement for mutual protection could be determined upon."¹

These facts were not known to the authorities at Washington at the time, but General Grant's sure instincts satisfied him that there was a near, if not actual alliance between the Confederacy and the Imperial Government of Mexico, which could only be destroyed by an actual demonstration of a superior military force.

The nature of General E. Kirby Smith's independent command in the Trans-Mississippi country and his independent character were well known in Washington. It was probably also known that he was to some extent a soldier of fortune, and it was thought that he might be open to overtures looking to his separation from the Confederate Government at Richmond. With this in view, in March, 1865, General Lew

1 W. R. R. 102-1293

Wallace went to Point Isabel, near Galveston, under a flag of truce, to try to get into communication with him and see if terms could not be made for ending the war in the Trans-Mississippi department. The terms proposed by General Wallace to Kirby Smith, though the former stated that they were not final and that the United States authorities had not authorized him to present terms or make overtures of any kind to anybody, were much more liberal than those granted afterwards to Lee and Johnston, and were favorably regarded by General Slaughter, through whom General Wallace hoped to reach General Smith. Unfortunately, perhaps, the letter from Wallace to E. Kirby Smith fell into the hands of Major General Walker, one of Smith's district commanders, who promptly rejected the overtures.¹

A short time afterwards General Smith sent copies of the letters of General Wallace to Richmond, and to Hon. John Slidell, Confederate States Commissioner at Paris, to be laid before the French government.²

April 21, 1865, after Lee's surrender, General E. Kirby Smith, General Magruder and others of his subordinate commanders issued orders appealing to the soldiers of their commands to stand by their colors,—General Smith stating that they possessed means of long resisting invasion and had hopes of succor from abroad,³ and on May 4, General Magruder issued an address "To the People and Army of Texas," making the same appeal and saying, "We are not whipped, and no matter what events may transpire elsewhere, recollect Orleans that Kirby Smith would not surrender."⁴ But reports

At this time it was evidently the intention of the Confederate leaders in Texas to reject all overtures for peace and fight on, hoping to yet form an alliance with the French and Austrians in Mexico. As late as May 20, it was reported from New Orleans that Kirby Smith would not surrender.³ But reports of severe demoralization among the Confederate troops changed the aspect of affairs. May 16, General Magruder reported to General Smith that May 14, 400 troops forming part of the garrison at Galveston attempted to desert the post with arms in their hands; that General Maxey reported that notwithstanding all his efforts he could not produce such a state of feeling in the troops in his division as would justify him in depending on them, and that he had seen letters from intelligent officers in Walker's division who stated that their troops would fight no longer. General Walker indorsed his

1 W. R. R. 101-1275-1282.
2 W. R. R. 102-1277.

3 W. R. R. 102-1284.
4 W. R. R. 102-516.

concurrence in the foregoing and added that he was convinced that the troops in that district could not be relied upon; that they would lay down their arms at the first appearance of the enemy, and that this was the unanimous opinion of all the brigade and regimental commanders of Forney's division. The same report came from Generals Slaughter, Brent and D. H. Cooper.¹ From these reports it is apparent that the troops were preparing not to surrender but to disband, divide up the stores and go to their homes or wherever else they chose.

May 23, General Canby reported to General Grant that he was informed that commissioners on the part of Kirby Smith had arrived at Baton Rouge, authorized to treat for the surrender of the forces in the Trans-Mississippi department.²

These commissioners met at Baton Rouge and it seems agreed that General Osterhaus, representing General Canby, and General S. B. Buckner, representing General E. Kirby Smith, should arrange terms for the surrender by the latter of all the Confederate armies west of the Mississippi. These officers agreed upon terms which were the same given to Generals Lee and Johnston. They were approved by General Canby, but General Smith who signed the agreement June 2, added to his approval of the same, that his approval was "with the understanding that Confederate States officers observing their paroles * * * should be permitted to make their homes either in or out of the United States."

To this General Canby could not agree.³ General John Pope, commanding the Military Division of Missouri, in April had opened negotiations with General Smith for the surrender of his forces on the same terms accorded to Generals Lee and Johnston. Such negotiations were continued with out result.⁴ On May 30, General Smith, who was then at Houston, Texas, addressed a letter to Colonel J. T. Sprague, U. S. A., General Pope's representative, saying:

"When I gave you at Shreveport, a memorandum which I hoped might be the basis of negotiations with the United States Government, I commanded an army of over 50,000 men and a department rich in resources. I am now without either. The army in Texas disbanded before my arrival here. From one extremity of the department to the other the troops with unexampled unanimity of action have dissolved all military organization, seized the public property, and scattered to their homes. Abandoned and mortified, left without either men or

1 W. R. R. 102-1308-1213.

2 W. R. R. 102-558.

3 W. R. R. 102-600-601.

4 W. R. R. 101-186-194.

material, I feel powerless to do good for my country and humiliated by the acts of a people I was striving to benefit. The department is now open to occupation by your government. The citizens and soldiers alike, weary of war, are ready to accept the authority and yield obedience to the laws of the United States. A conciliatory policy, dictated by wisdom and administered with patient moderation, will insure peace and secure quiet; an opposite course will rekindle the flames of civil war with a fierceness and intensity unknown even in this sad and unfortunate struggle. I myself shall go abroad until the future policy of the United States Government toward the South is announced, and will return to my family only when I can do so with security to my life and person." * * * *

"P. S.—Since writing the above I have information that the Missouri and a portion of the Arkansas troops still retain their organization."¹

It will be noticed that three days after writing this letter General Smith gave his qualified approval to the articles of the surrender of all armies west of the Mississippi River.

It is evident that General Grant and the authorities at Washington suspected the good faith of General Smith and his subordinates, and some believed that the breaking up of their armies was planned to prevent their surrender, and in order that they might be reassembled across the Rio Grande, to aid the French and Austrians in a possible war with the United States. May 27, General Sheridan, who was then in St. Louis, telegraphed to General Grant that he had read the correspondence between General Kirby Smith and Colonel Sprague; that there was nothing definite in it, and that it "created the impression in his mind that a portion of the rebels meant to move toward Mexico," and adds: "If the enemy go toward Mexico, would it not be best to take the Fourth Corps to the Rio Grande?"² On the same day General Dodge telegraphed from Fort Leavenworth that reports from Red River say Kirby Smith intends to fight; that he cannot get his generals to agree to surrender.³ The 28th, General Grant telegraphed to Sheridan that Generals Buckner and Price, per Kirby Smith, had surrendered to General Canby all forces west of the Mississippi; that he had directed Canby to push troops to the Rio Grande, without waiting for the Twenty-fifth Corps, and that he, Sheridan, "had better push down the river at once and proceed to carry out the convention, and garrison Texas and Louisiana as soon as it can be done."⁴ Later, the

¹ W. R. R. 101-194-5.

² W. R. R. 102-625-6.

³ W. R. R. 102-632.

⁴ W. R. R. 102-639.

same day, General Grant again telegraphed to Sheridan that a portion of the Twenty-fifth Corps was on its way to the Rio Grande and would touch at Mobile, if he wished to send orders; that he could send the troops placed at his disposal whenever he thought proper, and that if he needed more troops for the Rio Grande than had already been ordered there to send them.

May 29, Sheridan telegraphed General Grant from Cairo, that he would send one of General Reynold's divisions to Shreveport; would have Canby send a garrison to Alexandria, and that he thought it best to send the Fourth Corps to Texas; that it was a compact corps and all at Nashville; that the Twenty-fifth Corps would be needed along the gulf coast, and that the Fourth Corps and the troops from General Canby could be put at points further from the coast, where it was healthier, and adds: "Texas has not yet suffered from the war and will require some intimidation, and Mexican matters are unsettled. Furthermore, I am satisfied that many of the rebels will leave the United States for Mexico." He therefore requests that the Fourth Corps be at once ordered to embark for New Orleans, for which point he was just starting."¹

May 30, it was reported that at Shreveport large amounts of Confederate cotton and sugar were being moved into the interior and secreted for the purpose of defrauding the United States, and that Confederate generals were directing these operations; that a few days before, General Buckner had made a speech to the Missouri troops near Shreveport urging them to go with him to Mexico, stating that they (the Confederates) had a large amount of government property to transport over land to Mexico, and that if they would accompany him, he would in a short time pay them a good round sum in specie; that General Price followed General Buckner, and said they were now free from the army and could do what they pleased.²

June 3, General Grant, who was doubtless well informed of conditions in Texas and deeply impressed by them, telegraphed General Sheridan that probably a large force of cavalry would be needed in Texas; that the whole state should be scoured to pick up Kirby Smith's men and the arms carried away with them, and that if sufficient cavalry could not be obtained in the west he would order all that was required from the east."³

1 W. R. R. 102-647.

2 W. R. R. 102-673-4.

3 W. R. R. 102-743.

June 4, General Sheridan reported to General Grant that nearly all the Texas soldiers had disbanded before Kirby Smith's pretended surrender; that they had broken into the magazines, supplied themselves with powder, destroyed most all of the Confederate government property, and had then gone to their homes. This, he said, was, in his opinion, done to avoid surrender and parole. He also reported that there was much discussion among them on the subject of going to Mexico, and that there was an undoubted intention on the part of many to go; that in view of the foregoing, and of the fact that he, Sheridan, had always believed that Maximilian's advent into Mexico was a part of the rebellion, he would advise that a strong force be put into Texas, and would order the Fourth Corps there as soon as sea transportation could be prepared. He also reported that the Imperialists were strengthening at Matamoras, and that it was reported that the Confederate property at Brownsville, including fourteen pieces of artillery, had been taken across the river to that place.¹

Sheridan, on his arrival at New Orleans, June 2, had at once, with characteristic energy, set about getting the troops sent to him into Texas and distributed at points where they could be used in an emergency. He chafed at delays and had the whole quartermaster's department stirred up by his immediate and urgent demands for transportation. June 8, he telegraphed to General Grant that he did not need any cavalry from the east; that he had already organized "two columns of superb cavalry of 4000 men each"; that one was then en route to Shreveport and would march through Austin to San Antonio, and that the other would march in a few days from Shreveport to Houston.²

Sheridan, on June 9, reported to General Grant that General E. B. Brown, commanding the advance United States forces, had just reported that he had occupied Brownsville on May 30. That the rebels had evacuated the place on his approach from Brazos Santiago, having first delivered six pieces of artillery, battery wagons, forge and transportation wagons to the Imperialist Mexican commander at Matamoras.³

This report was not received at Washington until 10:30 p. m., June 10. General Grant was then in Chicago, but it must have been at once forwarded to him, for, at 11:30 p. m., he wrote the following dispatch to General Sheridan and sent it to his chief of staff, General Rawlins, to be shown to the Secretary of War, and forwarded, if approved by that officer:

1 W. R. R. 102-767.

2 W. R. R. 102-813

3 W. R. R. 102-827.

"Major General Sheridan,
New Orleans, La.

If the rebels moved their artillery and public property to Matamoros after Smith's surrender, demand its return to you. If the demand is not complied with go and take it, and all those engaged in its transfer.

U. S. Grant,
Lieutenant General.¹

No one would attribute to General Grant the quality of rashness, but the above dispatch savors of it, and one can only imagine what might have been the consequences, if an after-thought had not suggested its being shown to the Secretary of War, before actually sending it. At that officer's suggestion it was modified so that Sheridan was directed to make demand for the return of the property; that he need not resort to hostilities to obtain it, but report reply for further instructions.²

June 10, General Steele telegraphed General Sheridan from Brazos Santiago, that it was said by Texas people that General Walker's division of rebels was at Piedras Negras and that it was going to Sonora, Mexico.³

June 12, Sheridan complained to General Rawlins, General Grant's chief of staff, about delay in getting necessary transportation. In the same note he said there was "nothing practical in Kirby Smith's surrender"; that "it looked more like a move than anything else," and that the rebel General Slaughter "had sold his artillery to the Imperialists."⁴

We have already alluded to the manner in which Sheridan had stirred up the whole quartermaster's department by his demands for transportation, even complaining to General Rawlins about delays in furnishing it. This complaint was probably referred to General M. C. Meigs, Quartermaster General, for that officer sent a characteristic dispatch to Sheridan detailing what had been done to meet his demands, and concluded his dispatch by saying:

"This department when Weitzel (the Twenty-fifth Corps) sailed, had more than 33,000 soldiers afloat in ocean steamships, besides Steele's corps (7000 men.) No great nation ever before put such a transport fleet on the ocean. It has been a great and costly effort."⁵

General Grant was intent on sending to Sheridan a force large enough to not only take care of Kirby Smith's army of 70,000 men, and to occupy all important points in Texas, but

1 W. R. R. 102-840.

2 W. R. R. 102-889.

3 W. R. R. 102-842.

4 W. R. R. 102-858.

5 W. R. R. 102-908.

also to provide for any contingency which might arise growing out of the occupation of Mexico by the French and Austrians. He frankly states in his Memoirs that he wanted Sheridan and his army where he could aid the liberal Mexicans in driving the French and Austrians out of their country. Sheridan soon realized that he had a large and increasing army. June 13, he reported to General Grant the number of troops he then had, and stated that the support of so large an army in Texas would be very expensive, and, therefore, suggested that the order sending the Fourth Corps be countermanded, "unless our affairs are liable to become complicated with the Imperial Government of Mexico."¹

To this suggestion General Grant, June 15, sent the following dispatch:

"The Fourth Army Corps is under orders for Texas and the orders will not be changed."²

When this dispatch was received by General Sheridan the Fourth Corps had already begun its embarkation at Johnsonville, Tennessee, and on June 16, our regiment was safely aboard the steamer Peytona, ready for the long voyage.

The Second Division had orders to leave at daylight on the morning of June 17, on the following boats, which were to move in the order following: Nicholas Longworth, Indiana, Clara Dunning, National, and Irene.³ They evidently got started on time and were well under way before our brigade got started.

June 17, an order from General Wood directed General Willich to move as soon as he was ready, in command of the following boats: The Jewess, J. H. Baldwin, W. T. Curtis and Anna, on which were all the regiments of our brigade, except the Fifteenth Ohio, which, as before stated, was on the Peytona. General Willich's flagship was the Anna and on it were the brigade staff and headquarters equipment and the Forty-ninth Ohio and Eighth Kansas. We saw them move out leaving us at the landing. The Peytona was kept back, waiting for General Wood and staff. They were late in arriving, and it was night before their horses and equipment were loaded. Some time in the night the boat pulled out and steamed down the river. It reached Paducah next morning, where it joined the brigade. Strong guards were placed around the boat and also on the shore to prevent the men from leaving it, but notwithstanding these precautions, some of the men got ashore and got whisky and became intoxi-

1 W. R. R. 102-865-6.

2 W. R. R. 102-889.

3 W. R. R. 104-1001.

cated.¹ General Willich, in command of the fleet carrying the other regiments of the brigade, on his way to Paducah, found difficulty in having the boats preserve proper order in sailing and proper distances. So on arrival at Paducah he directed his adjutant general to get the captains of the boats together and arrange a set of signals to be used in our further voyage, which was done. When the Peytona arrived at Paducah General Wood adopted the signals for the entire division. General Wood's orders for our voyage from Paducah to New Orleans are so important that they are given in full.

"Headquarters Third Division Fourth Army Corps,
Steamer Peytona, June 18, 1865.

"General Orders No. 52.

I. The following arrangements and orders of procedure of the boats, and also of the interior economy of the flotilla of the Third Division Fourth Army Corps, will be observed in the movement from Paducah to New Orleans, First, Peytona, headquarters Third Division; Second, Anna, headquarters First Brigade; Third, J. H. Baldwin; Fourth, Jewess; Fifth, W. T. Curtis; Sixth, Sallie List, headquarters Second Brigade; Seventh, Echo; Eighth, Silver Lake; Ninth, Armenia; Tenth, Kate Robinson; Eleventh, Columbia. The above order in sailing will be preserved as nearly as possible. The boats will keep as near together as possible without endangering each other. At all events, each boat will keep in sight of the one preceding it.

II. The signal for landing will be three whistles from the flag ship, and will be transmitted by each boat in succession and the boats will come in and land as near the flag ship as practicable. The signal for sounding will be one long whistle, then two short ones, and then a long whistle from the flag ship. On receiving this signal the boats will all check their headway, and no boat will attempt to pass another in the fleet. The signal of distress will be one long whistle then four short ones in quick succession, accompanied by the ringing of the bell. Whenever this signal is given by a boat it will be taken up by the boat preceding it and passed on to the flag ship. Upon hearing this signal the whole fleet will be checked, and the boats nearest the boat giving the signal will proceed at once to its assistance.

III. The senior officer of each boat will have the boat thoroughly policed each morning, the blankets all shaken out and will maintain good sanitary regulations on the boat for preserving the health of the men. The great danger from fire and the accompanying loss of life with so many troops on board renders it imperatively necessary that there should be no cooking by the troops on the boats, and the same is strictly forbidden. The fleet will be stopped and the men allowed to land and cook meat enough to do them at least three days. Food is furnished to the men cooked. Hot water can be obtained from the boilers or cook gallery for making coffee, and the senior officer on each boat will make arrangements to this effect.

IV. The senior officer on each boat will keep constantly posted a sufficient number of sentinels to preserve order and decorum, as well as to prevent the men from going ashore when the fleet lands for any other purpose than cooking. It is strictly forbidden for the men

¹ Gleason's Diary.

to be allowed to leave the boats for any other purpose than for cooking at the regular landings for that purpose, and this will always be done away from any town or place that will afford inducements to the men to straggle.

V. The commanding officer of each boat will not allow any liquor to be sold or brought aboard his boat. Each brigade commander will furnish a copy of this order immediately to the senior officer of each boat in his command.

By command of General Wood.

M. P. Bestow,
Assistant Adjutant General."¹

Commanding officers of the troops of the several boats, appreciating the great dangers of a voyage such as we were embarked on, added to these regulations other precautions, and unusually strict rules as to guards, etc., were issued and rigidly enforced. Many of the men were in ugly temper because they were being taken to the far south in midsummer, and every additional regulation looking to their closer confinement to the boats was resented. The boats were crowded and the men slept on the floors of the decks, and in such parts of the cabins as were not occupied by the officers. On some of the boats orders were issued prohibiting the men from smoking—orders which were very difficult to enforce, and which were very irksome to many of the men. It was a necessary precaution, for a carelessly lighted match might imperil the lives of hundreds of men on the boats. The boats were dry as tinder and easily ignited, and a fire once started could not easily be controlled. Many of the officers, owing to these conditions, kept awake all night and slept only in the daytime, so fearful were they of the boat taking fire. There was a regular officer of the day and guards patrolled the decks all night.

The fleet of our division was all assembled at Paducah and left that evening, steaming down the Ohio in the order above directed. We sailed all night and a little before daylight, those who were awake heard three whistles from the flagship, which were repeated by the other boats, and was the signal for landing. Shortly after this, they heard one long whistle, then four short ones in quick succession, accompanied by the ringing of a bell. It was the signal of distress. The whole fleet was at once checked, and it was soon learned that the Echo, one of the boats of General Beatty's fleet, on which was the Forty-first Ohio, was the one in distress. As the Anna was near her, that boat immediately went to her relief. It was seen that the Echo had struck a small monitor which was anchored in the river, and was fast sink-

ing. The men on board were in quite a panic, and were crowding to the side of the boat ready to jump aboard the Anna as soon as she got near enough for them to do so. The officers on board the Anna, hastily got the men on their boat all on the upper deck, so as to make room for the men on the Echo, but there were so many of them they feared their own boat would be swamped unless the Forty-first men could be taken aboard slowly. They, therefore, stopped a short distance away from the sinking vessel until another boat came nearer, and the Forty-first men were then, in orderly manner, taken aboard the two boats. Shortly after the men were all taken off the Echo, it went down, carrying with it the arms and equipment of the Forty-first Ohio and all their horses and mules, save a few that got loose and swam ashore. Two lives were lost, it was reported.¹ It was said at the time that the Echo was crowded out of her course by the Sallie List, General Beatty's flagboat. Gleason says the Forty-first men blamed the pilot of the Echo for the accident and came near killing him.²

The Peytona touched at Cairo to coal and then dropped down below the mouth of the Ohio River and landed on the Kentucky shore where our men cooked rations. She then steamed up to the city to get a supply of ice. Orderly Morehead of Company H, received a furlough and left the boat to take a train home.³ At 5 p. m. the fleet got under way again and steamed down the broad Mississippi, the Peytona leading.

The Cairo newspapers gave an account of an attempted mutiny on board two of the steamers carrying the Second Division—the Nicholas Longworth and the Indiana—in which several men succeeded in breaking through the guards and escaping to the shore. With the exception of two or three men, who got drunk and were placed in the guard house, all was quiet on the Peytona.⁴ We passed Columbus, Kentucky, before dark, the Peytona slowing up to allow the other boats to close up. We also passed Island No. 10 and New Madrid.

The morning of June 20 found us steaming down the muddy river between low banks fringed with cottonwood trees. The weather was hot, but there was a light breeze, which, with the motion of the boat, tempered the heat. When we came to Memphis a yawl was sent ashore with the mail and returned with newspapers. The newspapers contained a report of a mutiny on the Nicholas Longworth, and another item stating that the Second Division had preceded us down the river.⁵ After leaving Memphis there was little to break

1 Wm. McConnell's Diary.

2, 3, 4 and 5 Gleason's Diary.

the monotony of our journey. In the evening the Gleasons, Colonel McClenahan, Major Dawson, Doctor Norton and Captain Geiger got together in the cabin and sang several glees, but the weather was too hot to get much enjoyment out of it.¹

The morning of June 21, our fleet was steaming steadily on at the usual rate of speed. We passed the mouths of the White and Arkansas rivers and noticed a military post above the former. About noon General Willich came from his flagship, the *Anna*, in a yawl and the *Peytona* slowed up to take him on board. Immediately after his coming the *Peytona* and other boats of the fleet headed for the shore, where we tied up for two or three hours to cook rations. General Willich brought word that the *Sallie List*, General Beatty's flag-boat, was disabled on the Mississippi shore.² It was probably to give time to repair this boat that we landed at this time. After the men had cooked rations we got under way again, and saw the first cypress trees along the river banks. Just after dark we passed four gunboats.³

The morning of June 22, at 8 o'clock, we reached Vicksburg. It was announced that the fleet would stop there a short time, during which the troops would be landed on the Louisiana side of the river and the boats would cross to the city for supplies. After the troops were put ashore the order was changed so that three officers and thirty men from each regiment were permitted to cross over to the city to make purchases for the men. The men put in the time as best they could and a great many went bathing in the river. It was reported that a man belonging to the Third Michigan was drowned.⁴

When the *Anna* landed at the city General Willich and staff took their horses ashore and spent a couple of hours riding about the city and inspecting the fortifications, which still were about in the same condition as they were July 4, 1863, when Pemberton surrendered the city to General Grant. At 2 p. m., the regiment was again on board the *Peytona* which moved out, followed by the other boats of the fleet. As we steamed down the river we first noticed the Spanish moss clinging to live oaks along the shores—a pretty sight which, Gleason says, varied the monotony of the low green banks. We passed Grand Gulf and other points of interest. Just at dark the signal of distress sounded from one of the boats following us. We stopped and steamed back to offer our

1, 2 and 3. McConnell's Diary.

4. Gleason's Diary.

assistance but soon found that it was not needed and resumed our course. At midnight we passed the city of Natchez.

The morning of June 23, was very warm and sultry. When we awoke Port Hudson was in view and we passed it about 8 o'clock. Gleason says there was little of the town or fortifications left and that if it had not been for its historical importance it would not have attracted attention. After we had passed it, the Anna came along side and General Willich reported that for some reason four boats of our fleet had been stopped at Port Hudson. It was said that the rear boats had been fired on at that place to stop them in order that some negro troops might be taken aboard.¹

The Peytona at once turned and started back, but soon received the signal "all right," and again turned her prow down stream. We passed the mouth of Red River during the forenoon. As we approached New Orleans we noticed that the land was lower than the surface of the river and was protected by levees. A little after noon we passed Baton Rouge and noted the ruins of the state capitol, which seemed to have been quite a pretentious building in ante-war days. We stopped at Baton Rouge to put off two passengers and then proceeded on our way, passing two or three small towns on the right bank of the river and many sugar plantations sadly out of repair. About the middle of the afternoon the fleet tied up on the left bank of the river and the men were allowed to go ashore to take needed exercise and await the approach of nightfall, as we did not wish to reach New Orleans before daylight next morning. The horses were also taken ashore and exercised and some races were pulled off which afforded much amusement. An overseer of one of the plantations was brought down to the Peytona by a crowd of men, who reported that he had very cruelly treated some of his negroes. He was very much frightened and was kept under guard until the boat was ready to leave, when he was put ashore and cautioned to treat his former slaves with more clemency. As darkness fell the Peytona blew a warning whistle and the fleet was soon again under way, every one feeling refreshed by our short stay on shore.

At 6 o'clock the morning of June 24, we saw the city of New Orleans, about five miles away. By the time the men had breakfast we had reached it and were slowly steaming by its wharves, which were crowded with ocean steamers and boats of every description. A yawl was launched from the Peytona and Major Dubois went ashore to report the arrival

¹ McConnell's Diary.

of our fleet. He soon returned and reported that we were to land seven miles below the city on the same side of the river, and we proceeded on down the stream to the point selected for our landing. Pushing as near the levee as the soft mud would permit, we tied up and commenced unloading. The spot selected for our camp was a mile and a half from the landing, and when we reached it we found it without shade to shelter us from the intense heat of the sun. Only the levee was between us and the river. The ground we camped on seemed to be filled with vermin, and as we had no material to build cots or bunks with, we had to sleep on it and take the annoyance and risks.

We lay in this hot camp on the Chalmette bottoms until July 5, awaiting the boats which were to take us to Texas. It added somewhat to the interest of our camp to be told that it was on the battlefield where General Andrew Jackson defeated the British General Packenham in the war of 1812, but nothing to its comfort. Some of the old earthworks occupied by General Jackson's troops were pointed out, which we examined with curious interest. The discomforts of the camp, placed, as it was, on the flat bottom land in the hot sun, with no shade, did not improve the temper of the men, which had been sorely tried by the long hot voyage, and there was a good deal of insubordination. Strong guards were placed about all the camps with strict orders to permit no one to go outside the lines without a pass, but many men broke guard, probably in some instances with the guards' connivance, and went into the city. The city military authorities had orders to arrest all men found there without passes, and soon it was reported that a number of our men had been arrested and were in the city prison. They were soon brought back to camp and placed on extra duty, or required to pace a beat and carry a rail, as a punishment. The latter method of punishment, though common, was much opposed by General Willich. One night when he and his adjutant general returned from the city, he saw a man pacing a beat just behind the brigade headquarters, carrying something on his shoulder. He at once went up to him and said: "My boy, what for you carry that log of wood for?" The soldier frankly stated that he had gone out of camp without a pass and that the provost guard had ordered him to carry a rail for it. The General at once said: "Throw down that log of wood and go to your quarters." He then aroused the provost marshal and directed him thereafter to punish such offenses in some other way. Turning to the adjutant general he said: "Cap-

tain Cope, such punishment for slight offenses is degrading; it tends to destroy the manhood of a soldier to compel him to do a useless thing like that; the provost marshal should have required him to dig a sink, police the camp, or do some other necessary extra duty." This incident was soon bruited about the camp and there were no more men compelled to carry rails in our brigade while General Willich was in command.

While we were in camp on the Chalmette bottoms it was the great pleasure of the adjutant general of the brigade to accompany General Willich in numerous rides about the city. He spoke French and Italian, as well as English and German, and was much interested in talking with what he called "the common people." Riding along one of the streets he would suddenly stop at some little shop, alight from his horse, send for a liter of wine and seating himself on a bench or a chair, engage the shopkeeper and his family in conversation. He would ask how they got along before and during the war, and particularly how it was when General Butler was in command of the city. All, without exception, said that the city was never so clean nor so orderly as when General Butler was in command. One very intelligent shopkeeper said that when General Butler was in command, a woman, unattended, could walk the streets at midnight without fear of molestation. The evidences of the general cleaning up of the city which General Butler had ordered were still apparent. The paved streets were clean as a floor. General Willich was much interested in seeing the monuments in the city, which it was said General Butler had defaced, and we rode to see them. We could not see that they had been marred in any respect, but on the base of the equestrian statue of General Andrew Jackson, we saw carved in deep letters on its base the words: "*The Federal Union By the Eternal, It Must and Shall Be Preserved,*" and on the base of the monument to Henry Clay, carved in letters as deep, and plain, we read the following words from one of Mr. Clay's speeches:

"If I could be instrumental in erasing this deepest stain, slavery, from the character of our country, I would not exchange the proud satisfaction which I should enjoy for the honor of all the conquests ever decreed to the most successful conqueror."

The number of arrests of men of the corps became so great that June 28, General Stanley issued an order absolutely prohibiting enlisted men from going into the city, and another order directing the detail of "an officer and twenty-

five steady men" to report at corps headquarters at once for duty on the small steamer "Alpha," which plied between the camp and the city. Even these precautions, however, did not wholly prevent a daily and nightly exodus of men from the camp to the city, and a daily round of extra duty for the offenders.

We had our regular bi-monthly inspection and muster on June 30, which was soon over, as the weather was too hot to unnecessarily prolong it. Colonel Askew was detailed as a member of a commission to investigate charges against one John S. Williams, the pilot who was thought to be responsible for the sinking of the Echo at Cairo. July 1, commissions as first lieutenant came for Second Lieutenants Vincent T. Trego and Samuel C. McKiraham and as second lieutenant for Sergeant Alex C. Moore. Trego was assigned to Company H. The two last named were absent and there were no vacancies to which to assign them.¹

There was a report, brought by Colonel Askew, that we were to go to San Antonio, Texas. July 3, an order came to send all the sick who were not able to travel to the hospitals. Gleason says this was "welcome news, as we were anxious to leave the place where sickness was daily on the increase." Colonel Askew was at brigade headquarters in the evening and brought word that he would move at 6 o'clock a. m., July 5, our destination being Indianola, Texas.¹

July 4, a salute was fired by one of our batteries in honor of Independence Day. There was quite a celebration in the city and General Banks delivered an oration at the Custom House. In the evening the display of fireworks in the city could be seen from our camp. A few rockets and Roman candles were sent up from our camp, some of the regiments illuminated their tents and the men indulged in firing "squibs" on the sly.¹ Late that evening General Wood issued orders directing the division to hold itself in readiness to move at a signal to be given from his headquarters early next morning. The order prescribed that the division should move as a fleet, that our brigade should move first and that the Second Brigade should immediately follow. The men were to have three days' cooked rations in their haversacks, and the same precautions against fire were urged as in the orders for our movement from Paducah to New Orleans.¹

The signal above mentioned must have been given very early, for at 4 a. m., we were out of our tents and busily engaged in packing up. An order from General Wood to

¹ Gleason's Diary.

General Willich directed him to sail for Indianola as soon as his command was loaded. The order also directed him to have the boats rendezvous at the mouth of the river and sail as a fleet from there to Indianola. Arriving at that port, the troops were to be disembarked promptly and placed in camp on the Victoria road, at the first place where wood and water could be found.¹ Neither of the orders above mentioned named the steamers on which the troops should embark, but as soon as our tents and other camp equipment were packed and loaded on the wagons, they were dispatched to the "Daniel Webster."² From McConnell's diary we learn that another of the boats in our brigade fleet was the "Marta," and that General Wood's flagboat was the "Wilmington."³

Our regiment was the last to leave camp, which we did not do until 3 p. m., and then we had to wait two or three hours before we got aboard. The boat was an old one, with inferior accommodations, but we had no choice. We were to some extent reconciled when we found that General Willich was aboard and that it was to be the flagboat of our brigade fleet. It was night when we finally got started and steamed down the river toward the Gulf of Mexico, distant eighty-five miles.

1 W. R. R. 102-1050.

2 Gleason's Diary.

3 McConnell's Diary.



CHAPTER XXXV.

THE TEXAS CAMPAIGN — FROM NEW ORLEANS TO INDIANOLA

CAMP AT GREEN LAKE AND THE MARCH TO SAN ANTONIO.

When we awoke the morning of July 6, 1865, we were approaching the delta of the Mississippi, and were about eight miles from the South West Pass. Arriving at the little town of Balize we found the rest of the fleet at anchor. We also anchored and sent a boat to the town for a pilot who soon came aboard. The men were ordered to fill their canteens and all other vessels available with water from the river, before we weighed anchor, in order to be sure of a supply of fresh water for the voyage. The adjutant general by the direction of General Willich descended the side of the Daniel Webster and was lifted from the ladder by two stout sailors who rowed him to each of the other vessels of the fleet, where he gave to the captain and the senior officer in command of the troops the sailing orders of the voyage. He does not remember what they were, but they were doubtless much like those published by General Wood when we started on the voyage down the Mississippi. He recalls vividly, however, how the light boat tossed like an egg shell in the waves and what a gloriously exhilarating experience it was.

Soon after the orders were delivered, the signal was given to weigh anchor and the fleet promptly got under way. As we passed out into the gulf a school of porpoises attracted much attention by their grotesque antics, being the first salt water fish ever seen alive by most of the men. Most of us were landsmen and had never seen the sea, and the prospect, as we looked out over the broad choppy waters of the gulf, was novel and inspiring. In about two hours we were out of sight of land and this, too, was a novel experience. The next novelty was a distant waterspout which we were told had been seldom seen, even by the old seamen. It was noticed shortly after noon, and lasted only a few minutes, when it gradually disappeared, leaving a lasting impression on those who beheld it. We saw a number of vessels headed for the Pass, but they were not near enough to hail. With the exception of another school of porpoises, which General Willich at first called "sharks,"¹ there was no other incident during the day to break the monotony of life at sea. The

1 Gleason's Diary.

officers and men when tired of looking at the choppy blue waters and the phosphorescent waves at the vessel's prow, read books or played games as we steamed along. The day had been warm, with mutterings of distant thunder. That night some of the officers, among them Colonel McClenahan, had their cots carried on deck where it was cooler. They were awakened by a heavy dash of rain and had to skurry below.

It rained early on the morning of July 7, and cooled the decks to some extent. But the sun came out hot and fiery and the men suffered from thirst, which the tepid water in their canteens did not wholly quench. Just before leaving New Orleans some one told General Willich that the water in Texas was very bad—not fit to drink, in fact—whereupon he directed Captain Adams of the Forty-ninth Ohio, who was acting as brigade quartermaster and purveyor, to procure several boxes of Rhine wine, a barrel of claret, a box of brandy and a hogshead of ice for the brigade staff. The supply was intended to last until we reached a camp in Texas, but the boys soon began to feign sickness and General Willich, to relieve them, gave so many orders against the stock, that by the time we reached Indianola it was nearly all gone. Gleason complained of the water and longed for the cool springs of Tennessee and Alabama.¹

The other vessels of the fleet had kept well to our left and rear, but towards evening, having hoisted sails, seemed to be gaining on us. After dark we passed a lighthouse with a revolving light, said to be twenty-five miles from shore. Some of the officers and men were seasick, among them Captain Dorneck, officer of the day, who was quite helpless.¹

At 9 a. m., July 8, we came in sight of land, and did not lose sight of it again during the voyage. A little before noon we anchored off the bar at Matagorda Bay. After dinner General Willich and some of his staff went ashore to make arrangements for getting over the bar. Our boat was of too great draught to pass over it, and we had to trans-ship in lighter vessels. While these vessels were being secured the men amused themselves fishing and swimming, regardless of a real danger from sharks, which were said to be quite numerous in these waters. Towards evening there was a stiff breeze and the waters became quite choppy. No lighters appeared, and after enjoying a delightfully cool evening on deck, all retired for a good night's rest.

When we awoke the morning of July 9, we learned that

1 Gleason's Diary.

a lighter had come out from Indianola and was taking the Forty-ninth Ohio off the "Prometheus." At 8 o'clock another lighter, the "Matagorda," with General Willich aboard, came alongside and we began to transfer our baggage and equipment to it as rapidly as possible—the entire regiment assisting in the work. Another boat, more conventionally arranged for carrying animals, took off the horses. It was quite interesting and amusing to watch the horses being transferred to the lighter. This was done by means of a breadth of stout duck with ropes attached which was passed under the animals' belly. In this they were hoisted and lowered over our vessel's side. Some of the horses kicked viciously when the swing was being adjusted and afterwards, but once ahoist the kicking was harmless. One of General Willich's horses, a dun, which his men had captured during the fight with the Texas Rangers at Rowlett's Station in 1862, kicked and struggled until the general became alarmed, fearing it would be injured. But Captain Adams of the Forty-ninth Ohio, who was superintending the work, assured him his horse was in no danger. One of the men, John Schuster of Company F, was severely kicked by it while adjusting the swing.¹ We started up the bay on the Matagorda at 10 o'clock. There was no wharf at Indianola and the Matagorda could not get to the shore. So other lighter boats had to be employed to land us. One of them, the "Lizzie Lake," took off must of the regiment, and the rest were taken ashore in small sail boats. The men of the regiment were gathered together at the landing waiting for orders, and many of them went swimming in a pool near by. Dennis Conroy of Company D, got beyond his depth and was drowning in plain sight of the onlookers. Everyone at once thought of Hiram K. Brooks of Company E—"Pug" Brooks, he was called—who was the most expert swimmer in the regiment and had already saved the lives of a number of men who were drowning. The adjutant general of the brigade who was standing near, was one of the first to see Brooks, who was some distance off, and called to him to save the drowning man. He came at once **kicking off his shoes and throwing off his clothing as he ran.** He plunged into the water, swam with great speed to the spot where Dennis had gone down the third time, dived down into the water and soon came up, holding the head of the drowning man above the water, and swam ashore with him. Poor Dennis was apparently lifeless. But we poured the water out of him, rolled him on a barrel, and finally he came to. It was

1 Gleason's Diary.

a narrow escape for Dennis, and if it had not been for "Pug" Brooks he certainly would have drowned.

The water at Indianola, except a small supply of rain water in cisterns barely sufficient for the inhabitants of the place, was unfit to drink. The men had been cautioned to fill their canteens from tanks on the boats before leaving them, so as to have a sufficient supply to last until we got to camp at Green Lake, said to be eighteen miles distant, and to which point we were to march as soon as our horses were got ashore. We were saved the trouble of transferring the horses to lighter boats, as they were dropped into the water and swam ashore and were caught and corralled. As soon as they were landed the brigade moved to the outskirts of the town and there halted until General Willich and staff came up with a guide. We then moved off in a southwesterly direction, skirting the bay a mile or so, and then struck out across the almost trackless prairie for Green Lake. That night march was one of the most trying we had ever experienced. The men had overloaded their knapsacks and did not march with their usual vigor. All night long we followed our guide over the arid plain, which was wholly without water of any kind. The men gave out rapidly and straggled, or dropped asleep during the halts, to be left behind in the darkness. No tree, or shrub, or habitation, was visible during the long march. Gleason says he longed for a sight of timber as he never had before. To add to our discomfort, as soon as we struck the prairie myriads of mosquitos rose up out of the ground and viciously attacked both men and horses. The horses suffered terribly from them. Gleason says that he frequently scraped them off his horse's neck, head and flanks. Some officers of the brigade staff had bought in New Orleans broad brimmed sombreros to protect them from the hot sun. One of them pulled his sombrero brim down over his neck and face, tied it around his neck with his handkerchief, leaving only sufficient opening to breathe through, and kept the mosquitos away from this opening by a bunch of weeds he pulled from the prairie. He pulled his coat sleeves over his buckskin gauntlets and shaking his bridle reins to keep the pests off his hands, for they actually bit through his gloves, and fighting them away from his nose with the bunch of weeds, he rode silently along in the darkness. Each enlisted man had been given a mosquito net before we left New Orleans, and some of them protected themselves by wrapping the nets about their heads. The men still had on their sea legs. The prairie was broken by innumerable gopher hills

until it looked like the sea and seemed to roll like it, and added to the toilsomeness of the march. A little before sunrise the word was passed along the line that we were "only two miles from the lake," but after going three miles the lake was apparently as far off as ever. The sun came up red and fiery hot, and there was not a breath of air stirring. Every one was seized by an intolerable thirst which the warm water in the canteens did not assuage. Some had neglected to fill their canteens with water on board ship, as had been ordered, and suffered intensely. Many fell down from sheer exhaustion. Some fixed bayonets and sticking the bayonet ends of their guns in the ground, hung their pieces of shelter tents on them and crouched or lay in the little shade they afforded. The column kept doggedly on, the head of it reaching the lake about 8 a. m., when the men waded into it up to their waists and drank the water like thirsty cattle. Nearly one-third the brigade were scattered out over the prairie for three or four miles back, and it was a problem how to relieve them, as we had no wagons. All the canteens of the men who had arrived were filled from the lake, some empty barrels and tubs and a team of horses or two were found around the lake and requisitioned, the vessels were also filled from the lake and relief parties were started back along the line of march to relieve the suffering men and get them into camp. All the mounted brigade and regimental officers and some who were not mounted engaged in the work, but it was late in the evening before all the stragglers were brought in. The distance from Indianola had been reported to be eighteen miles, but it was much longer. Gregory says it was thirty miles,¹ but the writer's recollection is that it was twenty-five miles.

After it was reported that all the men had been gathered in, there was a conference at brigade headquarters, at which it was disclosed that we were about out of rations. General Willich said that some one must go at once to Indianola to bring up a supply, and to inform the commander of the brigade immediately following us of our experience, and caution him not to undertake the march without wagons and ambulances and a sufficient supply of water. It was really Captain Crawford's place to go, as he was chief commissary of the brigade, but he pleaded exhaustion from the all night march and the exertions of the day, and it fell to the adjutant general of the brigade to perform this duty. He had his horses well fed and watered and about sunset started back over the wide prairie, accompanied only by his orderly,

1 Gregory's Diary.

Rufus Keilholtz of the Forty-ninth Ohio. It was a toilsome ride, but both the horses were sure footed and accustomed to their riders, and both he and his orderly got snatches of sleep as they rode along, in spite of the mosquitos. At daylight they reached Indianola and while Rufus took care of the horses, the adjutant general went out over the bar in a small boat, had an interview with Colonel Hall, commanding the brigade immediately following ours, gave him General Willich's message and then returned to Indianola. He then hunted up some wagons, had them loaded with rations and started with them to Green Lake where they arrived in the evening. It was the severest service the adjutant general had undergone. When he reached his tent he found that his faithful colored servant, Charles Anderson, had prepared his cot and had a mosquito bar over it. He crept into the cot, the faithful Charles tucked in the mosquito bar closely all around and he slept the sleep of a tired man.

We remained in camp at Green Lake just one month. Aside from the intense heat and the mosquitos, it was a pleasant camp. At times the heat was tempered by a stiff breeze, which sometimes increased to a gale and blew down tents and tent flies. Around the shores of the lake luscious wild grapes abounded, and from the haciendas scattered about on the prairie within a radius of ten miles, we got an occasional chicken and sometimes delicious watermelons. When we wanted beef the brigade commissary with a squad of men went out on the prairie, rounded up two or three fine steers, and shot them, keeping a record of the brands, so as to settle with the owners. Some of the men who wanted milk, built a pen, in which they put calves which they had run down and captured. The mothers of the calves remained about the pens, and when milk was wanted the cows were let into the pens and the calves turned outside. The cows were then caught and held until they were milked. The calves were then returned to the pens and the cows turned outside. Alligators were numerous in the lake, and the men had rare sport shooting them. Some of them were quite large, measuring eleven and twelve feet in length. At Espirito Santo Bay, a few miles from our camp, there were hard-shelled crabs to be caught, and both men and officers tried their hands in taking them. Even General Willich joined one expedition to the bay to fish for them. The sunsets were unusually brilliant. There was an indescribable charm in the broad lake and broader prairie, canopied by the still broader firmament, studded at night by myriads of stars. During the

day the mosquitoes seemed to drop into the prairie grass and almost wholly disappear. Also during the day the cattle, horses and mules which ran free on the prairie, almost wholly disappeared. But at sunset far away on the horizon we would see here and there the advance stragglers of great herds moving towards us. Their numbers increased until finally the whole prairie would be covered with them, moving down to the lake to drink. It was wonderful to watch the cattle moving and to hear their long horns clashing as they crowded each other in their haste to reach the water. There were other interesting features of the life at Green Lake, but their novelty did not wholly serve to make the men contented. They had been disheartened and discouraged by the first dreadful march on Texas soil. They did not know why they were required to endure such hardships, after the war was over. There was no enemy anywhere that they knew of and it was generally believed that Kirby Smith's army had surrendered. The real object of the campaign was not disclosed to them, nor to the subordinate officers. As a result the insubordinate and mutinous spirit which had been repressed at Nashville was revived. Some houses in the neighborhood were looted and some cattle were wantonly slaughtered on the prairie. On the morning of July 23, the regiments were formed without arms and marched to brigade headquarters, where General Willich denounced the "reskills" who had committed these depredations. To prevent their repetition he issued orders that the arms should all be carefully cleaned and an account taken of the ammunition on hand. The arms of each regiment were then to be stacked "in double column closed in mass" and a guard was to be placed over them. After three days the guns might be removed and parties in charge of a commissioned officer would be allowed to hunt and shoot alligators. That evening Colonel Askew was so impressed by the prevailing discontent that he wrote a letter to Captain Danford urging him to use his influence to have the regiment mustered out.¹ The same evening Lieutenant Colonel McClenahan learned that a number of men were plotting to desert during the night,—first taking all the horses they could lay hands on. This was at once reported to brigade headquarters and reliable men were placed to guard the horses at all the headquarters. On the morning of July 13, Captain Pickering reported that five men of Company I had deserted the night before. The morning of July 16, nine more desertions were reported from Companies A and B, and among them were some of the most reliable soldiers

1 Gleason's Diary.

in these companies. It was also reported that several men of the Eighth Kansas had deserted.

General Willich decided that it was better for the command to keep every one busy and ordered daily regimental drills and dress parades and brigade drill in the evenings. He was extremely solicitous regarding the comfort of the men and tried to keep in constant touch with them. He would ride into company quarters, talk with the men, taste the soup which was being prepared, and then say, "Poys, I will come back and take a plate of soup mit you." He never forgot to keep these engagements, and one frequently saw him seated with the men and sharing their noon day or evening meal. He could do this without any loss of dignity. Every one loved and respected him. But all his efforts and the efforts of other officers of the brigade could not allay the general feeling of discontent.

General Wood had arrived July 13, and July 17, issued orders requiring camps to be policed and daily drill in all the regiments. General Willich also issued an order directing regimental commanders to report every morning the changes which had occurred in their regiments during the previous day and night. The morning of July 18, nine desertions were reported from the Forty-ninth Ohio the night before.¹

July 20, the regimental camp was moved about one-fourth mile nearer the lake where there were some fig trees with fruit beginning to ripen.¹ That evening Colonel Askew returned from brigade headquarters and reported that five deserters from the Fifty-first Indiana *had returned*, and it was hoped that some of our men who had deserted would do the same. Indeed this was expected, for the hardships and dangers of trying to get across to the Mississippi river over land would be greater than those suffered by the men who remained with the command. July 23, Gleason records that he spent some time with Doctor Clark, our surgeon, who had a day or two before returned from a leave of absence, writing down the music of "Tramp, Tramp, Tramp!" That he had recognized the air as one which the author, Mr. Geo. F. Root, had submitted to his class, of which Gleason was a member, in Chicago in 1860, asking their opinion whether it had the qualities which would make it popular. The class having expressed a favorable opinion of it, Mr. Root said he might print it some day. Gleason adds, "How little I then dreamed of the subject to which his melody would be wedded in the future, or when it would reach me again." That evening, the Gleasons and Colonel McClenahan were again heard singing in the camp.

1 Gleason's Diary.

July 25, Lieutenants Alex C. Moore and John W. Wilson arrived from Indianola and reported that the work of unloading the troops of the Fourth Corps was not yet completed, owing to heavy seas, which prevented the transfer to the lighters, and that one vessel had gone to Galveston to transfer her load to a coaster which could get over the bar.¹ By July 28, General Stanley had arrived at Green Lake and was temporarily located at division headquarters. That evening Wm. McConnell reports that "he, (General Stanley) was evidently in very good humor for he sat on the porch and sang."²

The last entry in William McConnell's diary, from which we have often quoted is dated August 2, 1865. It shows him to have been very busy with his duties as clerk of the mustering officer at division headquarters, where he had been employed since August 14, 1864. That night he died suddenly, having been sick only an hour. He had enlisted September 16, 1861, and had been wounded and taken prisoner at the battle of Stone River. After his exchange he returned to the regiment and re-enlisted as a veteran at Strawberry Plains in January, 1864. He was well known and beloved by many in the command and his sudden death was a great shock to all who knew him. He was buried at Green Lake, August 3, at 2 p. m. and when the regiment was mustered out in November afterwards, some of his comrades of Company I, had his body taken up, enclosed in a metallic coffin, and took it home with them. He was re-buried at his home in Auburn Township, Crawford County, Ohio.

August 7, there were rumors that the regiment was to be mustered out which were generally believed, until an order came to send all sick to the hospital in Victoria. This indicated that we were to march further into the interior of the state.³ Next day rumors of a move were confirmed. At brigade drill in the evening, General Willich read some orders in regard to the contemplated march which he said was soon to take place. That evening it was reported that several desertions were being planned, but as no names were given, no steps were taken to prevent them.³ The next morning August 9, five desertions were reported from Company D and it was said a large number had gone from other regiments of the brigade. There was brigade drill in the evening and after dark Gleason learned that a paper was being circulated and numerously signed by men of the regiment, protesting against orders to march and refusing to obey them. Colonel Askew had gone to brigade headquarters to play whist with General Willich, his adjutant general and

¹ Gleason's Diary.

² McConnell's Diary.

³ Gleason's Diary.

Captain Adams, and was not informed of it until next morning. As orders had been received to march at 3 p. m., he decided to take prompt action. The adjutant was directed to have the companies turn out without arms at 12:30 p. m., when they were formed in a hollow square, Colonel Askew being in the center. He had a copy of the "protest," as it was called, and read it and tried to show the men how reprehensible and foolish it was: He then formed the regiment in line and asked all the men who were willing to obey orders until regularly mustered out to step ten paces to the front. Much to his surprise less than one-half the regiment stepped out, the rest remaining sullenly in line. He then directed the adjutant to get the names of those who refused to step to the front. He afterwards asked all who would obey the present order to march, to express their willingness to do so. Only sixteen men, all of Company A were reported as not being willing, and General Willich who had come upon the scene, gave them a sound lecture and they were then dismissed and sent to quarters. Gleason says "To the honor of my own Company (H), not a man of it refused to respond to the call of duty when the crucial test came, and it was the only company whose ranks were solid."¹ General Willich announced that the assembly would be sounded from brigade headquarters at 2 p. m. During the two hours between the incidents just related and the time when the bugler should sound the "assembly," the minds of General Willich and his staff and the regimental commanders were filled with anxiety. But at the appointed hour the clear bugle note from brigade headquarters sounded over the prairie, the Fifteenth Ohio fell into line, every man in the ranks, and moved off in perfect order, taking the road to Victoria. It was thought that the rebellious spirit in the command was again repressed, and it did seem so at first. There was a fine breeze when the column moved out which tempered the heat and made the marching not unpleasant. But we soon came to a portion of road where the sand was deep and the marching hard. The water in the canteens had become heated in the evening sun, that carried in the wagons was equally hot, and many of the men became sullen and mad and began firing off their guns. Scores of men in the brigade, broke their guns and threw them by the road side. Many were exhausted by heat and thirst and began to straggle and fall out. At last, at 9 p. m., we reached water in a little bayou and went into camp pitching our tents in the darkness. We had marched fifteen miles.

The next morning, August 11, Gleason, adjutant of the regiment, reported that eleven men of the regiment had disappeared

¹ Gleason's Diary.

during the march of the day before, or during the night, and that thirty-four guns had been broken up or thrown away, besides accouterments.¹ It was proposed to replace the guns and accouterments when we reached Victoria, charging their cost to the men who had broken or thrown them away. August 11 at 3 p. m., the brigade resumed its march and at 9 p. m., reached Victoria. We marched through the town without halting and forded the shallow Guadalupe River to a wooded island where we encamped for the night. The distance marched was nine miles.

August 12, we did not march until 4 p. m. By that time the heat was not so intense and there was a light breeze. Before starting General Willich called the regimental commanders to his headquarters for consultation. It was sixteen miles to the nearest water on the route we were expected to take. There was, however, said to be a water hole eight miles distant, but it would not furnish sufficient water for the entire brigade. It was therefore decided to haul a supply in the wagons, and also as many of the mens blankets and knapsacks as possible. Requisition was made for guns to replace those broken and thrown away by the men, but only eleven C. S. muskets, without accouterments, could be obtained. After a march of an hour we left the river bottom and struck out across the prairie in a northwesterly direction, paying little attention to travelled roads. Under the direction of our guide we took another route, and after marching twelve miles came to Coletto Creek, which we crossed and went into camp.

On the 13th, we resumed our march at 3:30 p. m. The sun was extremely hot, but after marching a mile or so we struck the open prairie and a fine breeze, which made the marching less unpleasant. Major Dubois and Captain Davis rode ahead to select a suitable camping ground, and when we were within three or four miles of camp an orderly sent by them came to guide us to it. General Willich, however, chose to rely on our guide, an old Mexican, who said he could lead us by a nearer route to water. So we left the route, bearing off to the left, and after going two or three miles came to the bed of the creek the guide had recommended as a good place to camp. It was dry as a bone, with not a sign of water. After marching some distance further in the darkness, the brigade was halted and aides and orderlies were sent out in every direction to search for water, or for the camp which had been selected by Dubois and Davis. Finally a

1 Gleason's Diary.

light was seen about two miles off, which proved to be the camp. In the mean time the bugles were blowing to get the men together and our drummer rolled his drum, executing what General Willich called a "warble."¹ Our camp had been located on Perdido Creek, and when we reached it we found no running water. A small stream trickled from one sand spit to another, but the water was so impregnated with animal deposits that we could taste the filth, even in the blackest coffee.¹ It was all the water we had and we had to make the best of it. The day's march was fourteen miles. The morning of the 14th, Colonel Askew made an unexpected discovery. Going to his saddle bags for a towel, he found a snake coiled inside. He at once offered it to the chaplain to add to his collection of horned toads, centipedes, alligator teeth, etc., but the offer was declined. Wild grapes were abundant along the creek and many were brought into camp. Quartermaster Welker found that by sinking holes in the sand of the creek bed, much better water could be obtained. Holes were therefore dug in which cracker boxes were sunk, and in this way the men got palatable water with which to fill their canteens for the next march. We started at 3:30 p. m., and marched thirteen miles to Manahuila Creek, where we found fairly good water in pools along its bed.

August 15, General Willich decided to send the teams ahead with the cooks and all the camp equipage, under charge of an officer. Other officers went ahead to select the camps and see that the cooks had supper prepared by the time the brigade arrived. The wagons were loaded and started at 1 p. m. The bugles sounded at 3:30 p. m. and we began the day's march. The heat was the most trying we had yet experienced. It seemed too hot for endurance. We were now on a rolling table land broken with gullies, where torrents had roared in wet weather but which were now dry. After marching six miles we came to a creek, containing some water in pools, and the men filled their canteens. A group of houses near by bore the name of "Pole cat" which gave rise to many amusing remarks. A little after dark we saw the lights of our camp fires and the men quickened their paces. We reached camp about 9:30 p. m. and found tents up and supper ready. We had marched about twelve miles.

The next morning we found that our camp was located, as

¹ Gleason's Diary.

on previous days, along a small stream in which water was found in pools.

August 16, the wagons started ahead at 2 p. m. and the brigade afterwards followed at the usual time. The heat was so intense that after marching an hour the brigade was halted in a grove until it became cooler, as it did late in the evening. Some time after dark we saw the lights of our camp fires, which we were a long time reaching, but when we did reach them we found tents up and supper waiting. We had marched eleven miles and had reached Helena on the Rio San Antonio, where we found water sufficient not only for drinking but for bathing. For this we were devoutly thankful.

August 17, the orders were to march as near 3 p. m. as the temperature would permit, the wagons to start at 2 p. m. The regiment started at the usual time, the air being unusually humid and the heat intense. Passing by a wretched little hamlet some young ladies sent a request to Colonel Askew to have the band play. That officer curtly sent word that the band was "played out,"¹ which was near the truth. The rumbling of thunder and a black cloud on the horizon gave hope of a shower. The hope was soon realized for suddenly we were in the midst of a tropical storm, which drenched all who were not protected by ponchos or coats. The storm ceased almost as suddenly as it began, the sun shown out bright and hot, and a beautiful rainbow appeared just before us. From a point in rear of the head of the column, General Willich, on his big gray horse, seemed to be leading the brigade directly under the center of the glorious arch. He had just before been telling his adjutant general that he "would like to take the old First Brigade and land on the shore of Northern Germany and declare a republic." The two incidents had no relation to each other, but are recalled together. The officers charged with the duty of selecting a suitable camping place had preceded the wagons, and the officer in charge of the train had by mistake not followed them but had taken another road. The brigade followed the train and at night fall came to the attractive little Polish village of Palo Maria. The vesper bells were ringing and the air was sweet and cool. It was a pleasant experience, but there was no time to indulge in sentiment for it was found we were on the wrong road and did not know how to get to camp without retracing our steps. The ad-

1 Gleason's Diary.

jutant general of the brigade finally secured a guide at the village, who undertook to lead us across the country to our camp. It was a weary night march and at one or two places the banks of dry streams had to be cut down by the pioneers before the wagons could be got over them. There was much grumbling and some swearing, but we finally reached camp at 11 p. m., having marched about fifteen miles. Our camp was on Cibolo (Buffalo) River.¹

The morning of August 18, the men found occupation in gathering wild grapes which were abundant and the finest we had yet seen. A number of the officers and men went fishing in the river and found many fish too large to be taken with the ordinary tackle. Some very large ones were caught.¹ The wagons started at 1 p. m. and as the sky was overcast the troops marched at 2 p. m. In the afternoon we had another tropical storm, more severe than that of the day before. The distance to be marched was said to be thirteen miles but on account of insufficient water we pushed on four miles farther to a Mexican ranch on the San Antonio River, which we reached at 9:30 p. m. We were now said to be thirty-two miles from our destination.

August 19, we marched ten miles, starting the wagons at 1:30 p. m. and following them in about an hour. We reached camp on Calaveras Creek at 7:30 p. m., it being the first time we had got into camp before dark. Water melons were abundant along the road and almost every man was provided with one before camp was reached.¹

Sunday, August 20, found us short of rations, but Captain Crawford, brigade commissary, had gone to San Antonio and it was said he would meet us at our next stopping place with a fresh supply. In the meantime details were sent out after beef, but returned too late for some of the men to get it cooked before marching. A detail of pioneers was set to work to fix the crossing of the creek, so teams could cross over it, and in the afternoon we resumed our march, our regiment being in the advance. After marching an hour General Willich concluded it was too hot for the men and halted the brigade in a shady place for nearly an hour. The country was more hilly than any we had traversed in Texas and apparently more productive. It was also less sparsely settled. The inhabitants were mostly Mexicans, and horse

¹ Gleason's Diary.

racine seemed to be the chief Sunday amusement. We reached camp quite unexpectedly at 6:30 p. m., after a march of eight miles and had supper before sunset. Safeguards were placed at all the houses in the neighborhood and for four miles back. The supply train had arrived from San Antonio with rations and a company of the Fifteenth Ohio was detailed to escort it back to the city.

August 21, we resumed our march at the usual hour. The heat was so great that some of the men gave out, but the most of them stood it remarkably well. Only two houses were passed during the day and they were so far from the road that there was no inducement for the men to straggle. We finally reached the Salado, a stream five miles from San Antonio, crossed it and found our tents already pitched in a densely wooded bottom land on its bank. Our long trying and dangerous march was over, and although we did not know it, we were to remain here until the Mexican situation had become such that we could with safety be mustered out.



CHAPTER XXXVI.

THE TEXAS CAMPAIGN.—CONDITIONS IN MEXICO AND ALONG THE RIO GRANDE.—THREE MONTHS IN SAN ANTONIA AND MUSTER OUT OF REGIMENT.

While we were enroute from Johnsonville, Tenn. and undergoing the trials and hardships related in the two preceding chapters, unknown to us, other troops were undergoing perhaps even greater hardships, with the view of restoring order in Texas, gathering up the guns and stores carried off by Kirby Smith's men after their disbandment and irregular surrender, and interposing a force sufficiently strong on the Rio Grande to prevent any organized Confederate force from going into Mexico to join Maximilian, and at the same time to warn the Imperialists that their occupation of Mexico was regarded as an act hostile to the United States.

In fact a leading object in sending such a large force to Texas, was as General Grant plainly stated, to force the French and Austrians to quit the soil of our sister republic.

About June 29, Sheridan had started Merritt's column of cavalry, 5500 strong, "said to be the finest which had marched during the war," from Shreveport, La., to San Antonio, by way of Austin, and Custer's column, equally strong, was to start soon from Alexandria, La. and march across the state by way of Houston.¹

July 1, General Grant by telegraph ordered General Sheridan to get his troops on the Rio Grande in readiness for active service should the emergency arise, and to demand the return of all public property carried to the south side of the Rio Grande since Kirby Smith's surrender.²

General Sheridan on the same day telegraphed to General Grant that he had had issued orders declaring all slaves free, and directing all arms to be given up and all public property returned, that he had directed General Steele, who was in command of the forces on the Rio Grande, to make demand on the French authorities for the steamer Lucy Gwin, which had been a Confederate boat, and if not given up, to get her the best way he could, that as soon as Generals Merritt and Custer got to the Rio Grande, the other public property would be taken where ever found, and added:

¹ W. R. R. 102-1026.

² W. R. R. 102-1035.

"The rascality of the Rio Grande frontier is beyond solution on intermediate grounds, where there is no government and a questionable protectorate. It is due to the history of our country that this portion of the late rebellion should be crushed out in a manly way and with the powers of a great nation, as a contrast to this French subterfuge to assist in the attempt to ruin the country."¹

July 3, General Steele reported that he had made demand on the Imperialist commander at Matamoras, General Thomas Mejia, for the return of all property delivered by the Confederates to the Imperialist Government after Kirby Smith's surrender and that the demand had been referred to His Majesty, Emperor Maximilian.²

July 3, Sheridan reported to General Grant that a division of the Fourth Corps would leave New Orleans for Indianola July 5, and that the whole corps would be put on the line from Victoria to San Antonio, Texas.³ July 6, he further reported to General Grant that affairs on the Rio Grande were getting beautifully mixed up, that Cortinas had arrived, then had his headquarters six miles from Matamoras and had driven in Mejia's pickets; that he had also captured the steamer *Senorita*, had taken her over to the other side of the river for safety and that she was taken down the river to Rio Grande City, where she was seized by General Brown of our forces. General Sheridan in the same dispatch also reported that General Steele said the French officers and soldiers were very bitter against our people, that a grandson of Marshal Ney with 2000 French cavalry was approaching Matamoras and declared he was going to invade Texas, that the feeling in the interior of Mexico was very bitter and that natives, soldiers and all, were said to be with our government and wanted to get rid of French rule.⁴

July 10, General Sheridan again reported to General Grant that his scouts had informed him that the French authorities at Matamoras were very much embarrassed, that Cortinas was driving in Mejia's pickets at pleasure, that the arrival of our heavy forces on the Rio Grande and the little irritations he, Sheridan, had encouraged along the river, had alarmed them so much that there was a perfect exodus from Matamoras. Sheridan also reported that many of the rebels who had crossed near Matamoras had returned in disgust, that Confederate General Shelby's command had crossed the Rio Grande high up the river, that he had not found out where they went, but was on their

1 W. R. R. 102-1035-36.

2 W. R. R. 102-1037.

3 W. R. R. 102-1042.

4 W. R. R. 102-1053.

track.¹ Later the same day he reported to General Grant that General Steele had informed him that the Franco-Mexicans on the Rio Grande appeared to be anxious to bring on difficulties with the United States and were very bitter; that Cortinas held all the roads around Matamoras, and said he could take the place if he had ammunition; that Cortinas as Governor of Tamaulipas under the Liberal Government had given permission for our forces to enter Mexico; that Governor Murrah of Texas, and Generals Walker, Shelby and others were at Monterey with considerable numbers; that Shelby took over an organized force; that nothing was yet known of their intentions, but that they were with the Imperialists without doubt; that a Matamoras paper represented them as 10,000 strong, but that was doubtless an exaggeration.² Conditions on the Rio Grande were becoming so critical that on July 13, General Grant telegraphed to Sheridan to go there in person for a few days and manage affairs along the river according to his own judgment, adding, "what you have done seems so well that I desire to change nothing."³

July 14, General Sheridan again reported to General Grant that Maximilian had directed General Mejia to give up the battery of artillery, ammunition, wagons, and animals, which had been turned over to the Imperialists by the Confederates; that Camargo on the Rio Grande, had been evacuated, that its garrison had marched down to Matamoras with large cotton trains, the cotton being U. S. cotton, stolen under the auspices of the French commandment, that the command of General Shelby, which escorted the cotton agent of Texas, Governors Murrah, Clark and Allen, Generals Kirby Smith, Magruder and others had with it three pieces of artillery, forty wagon loads of Enfield rifles and a large wagon train. General Sheridan also reported that Cortinas, the Liberal general, had made application for his artillery, and that he had directed it to be quietly turned over to him.⁴

General Grant was so intent on carrying out his purpose in regard to Mexico, that on July 15, the Secretary of War being absent from his office, he addressed a letter to President Andrew Johnson, saying in substance, that he looked upon the French occupation of Mexico as part and parcel of the late rebellion and a necessary part of it to suppress, before entire peace could be assured, and, therefore recommended that a general officer be given a leave of absence to go to Mexico to probably take service under the Liberal Government there, but in any event to give such aid as he could to "insure the restoration of the Liberal or

1 W. R. R. 102-1067.

2 W. R. R. 102-1068.

3 W. R. R. 102-1075.

4 W. R. R. 102-1077.

Republican Government." He also said that Mexico had men enough if she had arms to defend herself, and that he did not see, therefore, why we should not sell her arms from our surplus.¹

What heed was paid by the President to these recommendations is not disclosed in the records at hand, but from what took place afterwards it is quite probable that the authorities at Washington did not wholly disapprove them. Sheridan in his "Memoirs" says that the Mexican Liberals were largely supplied with arms and ammunition, which were left at convenient places along the Rio Grande to fall into their hands.²

July 17, Sheridan reported to General Grant, on authority of parties who came to Galveston from Vera Cruz, that French and Austrian troops were arriving in considerable numbers, that another considerable body was being organized in France and Austria and that the troops arriving at Vera Cruz were to be sent to Matamoras. The same day he also wired to General Grant a singular suggestion; "that it was possible that Mejia could be quietly carried out of Matamoras and turned over to Cortinas, that this would complicate affairs very much, and that he had sent over to make a reconnoissance".³ Whether Sheridan really intended to carry out this scheme is not disclosed. It is only another incident which shows how near we came to actual hostilities with the Imperialists in Mexico, and what would have necessarily followed, a breach with the European powers that were sustaining them.

July 20, General Sheridan got off to the Rio Grande in obedience to General Grant's orders of July 13, and on August 1, reported to General Grant that the French and Austrian troops had been withdrawn from Matamoras and that the entire Rio Grande frontier except Matamoras was in possession of the Liberals: that Maximilian held but little in Mexico except the towns occupied by Franco-Mexican troops, and in some of these towns only the ground his troops were encamped upon, and that all the troops France could send to Mexico would not restore the ground they had lost. He also reported that he "was happy to state that the rebels who went into Mexico had been defeated in their calculations, and had been forced to join the losing side."⁴ In his previous visit to the Rio Grande Sheridan had informed the Liberals that he believed it was the intention of the Confederates to join them against Maximilian, so that when he was overthrown they would be able to control the new government which would be hostile to the United

1 W. R. R. 102-1080.

2 Sheridan's Memoirs, Vol. 2-216.

3 W. R. R. 102-1092.

4 W. R. R. 102-1147-S.

States. The result of this was that the Liberals turned against the Confederates, and the Governor of Nueva-Leon arrested Generals Kirby Smith, Shelby and others, disarmed them and rejected their overtures. All this was reported to General Grant August 1¹ and it must have been gratifying to him to know that his efforts to compel the foreign invaders "to quit the soil of our sister republic" were meeting with such marked success. But it was getting difficult to hold Sheridan in check and at the same time preserve the position of neutrality which our government through Mr. Seward's cautious diplomacy had assumed. In the same report above quoted from Sheridan stated that General Shelby with 400 Missourians, had taken service with the Imperialists and was to operate against the Liberals on the Rio Grande: that it was reported that two more rebel regiments were being organized at Monterey, and that he thought "we ought to go after Shelby and his command;" that he felt certain that with 6000 or 8000 cavalry he could stir up the whole of Northern Mexico, and that if he was not permitted to go after Shelby, he believed that by going up to Eagle Pass on the Rio Grande and moving Merritt's column to that point he could infuse much enthusiasm into the Liberals.²

The same day, in another dispatch to General Grant, Sheridan reported a list of prominent Confederates who had gone to Mexico through San Anotnia, which included Governors Allen and Moore of Louisiana, Governors Clark and Murrah of Texas, Governor Harris of Tennessee, J. P. Benjamin, late secretary of state and Breckenridge, late secretary of war of the Confederacy, Harris, Jeff Davis' private secretary and Generals Kirby Smith, Magruder, Price, Shelby, Wilcox and Harris and about a score of officers of lesser rank, and that they had taken with them fourteen pieces of artillery, which all fell into the hands of the Liberals.³

August 8, Sheridan reported that a band of between 600 and 700 armed Confederates under command of Colonel Terry had crossed the upper Rio Grande a short time before and were captured by Cortinas, who disarmed them and seized their transportation. They afterwards made their way to Monterey.⁴ The Colonel Terry mentioned in the dispatch was the notorious Judge Terry of California, who had killed Senator Broderick in a duel in 1859.⁵

The campaign seemed progressing so favorably that orders had been issued to muster out some of the cavalry troops in

1 W. R. R. 102-1148.

2 W. R. R. 102-1148.

3 W. R. R. 102-1149.

4 W. R. R. 102-1174.

5 W. R. R. 102-1192.

Texas, but August 15, General Grant telegraphed to Sheridan that the order was made with the view of avoiding the necessity of sending more cavalry horses to Texas, and not with any idea that the forces there should be reduced to the smallest needs for keeping Texas in the traces, and added these significant words. "The Imperialist troops in Mexico still require watching, and before all the seed of the rebellion can be regarded as crushed out they must go back to their homes. We must hold ourselves ready to demand this."¹

August 15, it was reported that a column of French troops was marching on Chihuahua where President Juarez was, and that he and the small numbers of troops with him would probably be compelled to retreat and would soon be on the borders of New Mexico, that Juarez would probably go to El Paso, that the French would follow him to the Rio Grande and he would be obliged to seek refuge on our side. General Carleton, the officer in command, wished under these circumstances, to lend him a helping hand and asked for instructions.²

August 18, General Sheridan telegraphed to General Grant that he would be obliged to go to San Antonio the next week to fix up the cavalry columns and move thence to Laredo and Fort Duncan, and that he would probably see Juarez.³

On the same day he also reported that Kirby Smith had probably come secretly to New Orleans on the Thursday before; that Beauregard came on the Saturday following, and that Sunday night there was a meeting at Beauregard's house; that quite a collection of Confederate generals had been at New Orleans in the past few days, and that he felt quite certain they were engaged in a Mexican colonization scheme. He also reported that an offer of 10,000 men had been made not long before to Maximilian through the Imperial General Mejia, but that the latter was getting "shaky" and had rejected the offer, and that if our government did not watch these rebels closely there would be a Franco-Mexican rebel league.⁴

It was probably to break up this proposed organization that General Sheridan August 21, issued an order, which was approved by Secretary Stanton, directing the arrest of all Confederate officers who had violated the terms of their surrender by leaving the United States and entering Mexico, and their trial by a military commission.⁵

It is apparent from the foregoing that General Sheridan's activities in the direction of scaring the French and Austrians

1 W. R. R. 102-1180.

2 W. R. R. 102-1183.

3 W. R. R. 102-1192.

4 W. R. R. 102-1192.

5 W. R. R. 102-1196.

out of Mexico were producing results. But they were not sufficient to satisfy General Grant's ardor. They were doubtless well known to the authorities at Washington and acquiesced in, but were, in some respects, held in check by Secretary Seward's over cautious diplomacy. General Grant evidently wished to proceed still more vigorously.

September 1, he again addressed a letter to President Johnson, which so clearly presents the views and convictions which had animated him in initiating and carrying forward the Texas Campaign, that it is reproduced in full:

Galena, Ills., September 1, 1865.

His Excellency A. Johnson, President.

Seven weeks absence from Washington and free intercourse with all parties and classes of people has convinced me that there is but one opinion as to the duty of the United States toward Mexico, or rather the usurpers of that country. All agree, that besides a yielding of the Monroe Doctrine, non-intervention in Mexican affairs will lead to an expensive and bloody war hereafter or a yielding of territory now possessed by us. To let the empire of Maximilian be established on our frontier is to permit an enemy to establish himself, who will require a large army to watch. Military stations will be at points remote from our supplies and, therefore, expensive to keep. The trade of an Empire will be lost to our commerce, and Americans, instead of being the most favored people of the world throughout the length and breadth of this continent, will be scoffed and laughed at by their adjoining neighbors, both north and south—the people of the British Provinces and Mexico. Previous communications have given my views on our duty in the matter here spoken of, so that it is not necessary I should treat the subject at any length now. Conversations with you have convinced me that you think about it as I do, otherwise I should never have taken the liberty of writing in this manner. I have had the opportunity of mingling more intimately with all classes of community than the Executive can possibly have, and my object is to give you the benefit of what I have heard expressed. I would have no hesitation in recommending that notice be given the French that Foreign troops must be withdrawn from the continent, and the people left free to govern themselves in their own way. I would openly sell on credit to the Government of Mexico all the ammunition and clothing they want, and aid them with officers to command troops. In fine, I would take such measures as would secure the supremacy of the republican government in Mexico. I hope you will excuse me for the free manner in which I address you. I but speak my honest convictions, and these with the full belief that a terrible strife in this country is to be averted by prompt action in this matter with Mexico.

U. S. Grant,
Lieutenant General."¹

September 21, Sheridan reported to Grant his arrival at New Orleans from the Rio Grande and Fort Duncan, after an extended trip in that region.² In his Memoirs, Sheridan says of

¹ W. R. R. 102-1221.

² W. R. R. 102-1235.

this trip, "As the summer wore away Maximilian under Mr. Seward's policy, gained in strength till finally all the accessible sections of Mexico were in his possession and the Republic under President Juarez almost succumbed. Growing impatient at this, in the latter part of September I decided to try again what virtue there might be in a hostile demonstration and selected the upper Rio Grande for the scene of my attempt. Merritt's cavalry and the Fourth Corps still being at San Antonio, I went to the place and reviewed these troops and having prepared them with some ostentation for a campaign, of course it was bruited that we were going to invade Mexico. Then, escorted by a regiment of horse I proceeded hastily to Fort Duncan on the Rio Grande just opposite the Mexican town of Piedras Negras. Here I opened communication with President Juarez through one of his staff, taking care not to do this in the dark, and the news spreading like wild fire, the greatest significance was ascribed to my action, it being reported most positively, and with many specific details, that I was only awaiting the arrival of the troops, then under marching orders at San Antonio, to cross the Rio Grande in behalf of the Liberal cause. Ample corroboration of the reports then circulated was found in my enquiries regarding the quantity of forage we could depend upon getting in Mexico, our arrangements for its purchase and my sending a pontoon train to Brownsville, together with which was cited the renewed activity of the troops along the lower Rio Grande. These reports and demonstrations resulted in alarming the Imperialists so much that they withdrew the French and Austrian soldiers from Matamoras and practically abandoned the whole of northern Mexico as far down as Monterey, with the exception of Matamoras, where General Mejia continued to hang on with a garrison of renegade Mexicans. The abandonment of so much territory in northern Mexico encouraged General Escobedo and other Liberal leaders to such a degree that they collected a considerable army of their followers at Camargo, Mier, and other points. At the same time Cortinas suspended his free booting for the nonce, and stoutly harrassing Matamoras, succeeded in keeping its Imperial garrison within the fortifications. Thus countenanced and stimulated, and largely supplied with arms and ammunition, which we left at convenient places on our side of the river to fall into their hands, the Liberals under General Escobedo—a man of much force of character—were enabled in northern Mexico to place the affairs of the Republic on a substantial basis."¹

As might have been expected this open demonstration on the part of General Sheridan was duly reported to the French

1 Sheridan's Memoirs, Vol. 2-215-217.

Government and on October 12, the French Minister at Washington, "Montholon," in a note to Secretary Seward complained of these and other alleged violations of the neutrality, which Mr. Seward had assured him would be observed in the events taking place in Mexico, and asked that orders be given to prevent their renewal.¹

This note was referred to General Grant, who on November 6, wrote a cautious reply and said the same would be referred to General Sheridan for investigation and report.²

Sheridan says that the "Montholon" note above mentioned, without any investigation whatever by our state department was transmitted to him, accompanied by orders to preserve a strict neutrality, and that he was again debarred from anything like active sympathy for the Mexican Liberals.³

Notwithstanding this order, however, the covert aid to the Liberals was continued, and during the winter of 1865 and spring of 1866 as many as 30,000 muskets were sent to them from Baton Rouge arsenal alone,⁴ and by midsummer of the latter year the Empire of Maximilian was tottering to its fall. How he was deserted by Louis Napoleon and left to his cruel fate is a sad chapter of history, with which all are familiar.

It has seemed necessary to recount the incidents narrated in the preceding pages of this chapter in order to show why we were sent to Texas and retained there so long. The more so because we were kept in blissful ignorance of it all. Singular to state, there is not one line in Gleason's diary, nor in any other diary quoted from in this history, which refers directly or indirectly to the Mexican situation, or our relations to it. But we were a part of the great army which had a great purpose in view,—the liberation of a sister republic from the despotic rule of a foreign usurper,—made possible by the war of the rebellion and encouraged by its leaders, and we unconsciously did our part in bringing about the desired result.

Our camp on the Salado was suggestive of snakes, and during the first night there, one of the men aroused the whole camp by jumping up in his sleep and yelling that the snakes were after him.⁵ But the next day, August 22, the brigade staff selected another camping place, about a mile further up the creek and on the opposite side of it, where there were some springs, which were thought to be sufficient to supply the brigade. That evening Major Dubois received a letter from Captain Bestow, saying that General Wood had been ordered to Little Rock, Arkansas.

1 W. R. R. 102-1241.

2 W. R. R. 102-1253.

3 Sheridan's Memoirs, Vol. 2-217.

4 Sheridan's Memoirs, Vol. 2-224.

5 Gleason's Diary.

August 23, the brigade removed to the new camp and were busy all day laying out streets, pitching tents and putting the ground in order. It was a pleasant camp and we found the climate delightful. In fact our corps had been ordered here from Green Lake for two purposes, one of which was the climate, and the other, which we did not then know, was that we might be at a point to be quickly thrown to the Rio Grande in case of serious trouble with the Imperialists in Mexico. We remained in the camp until October 20, engaged in the usual routine of camp duties.

August 26, General Willich succeeded General Wood in command of the division and Brevet Brigadier General H. K. McConnell of the Seventy-first Ohio, by virtue of his rank, succeeded to the command of the brigade.

Gleason in his diary of August 27, says that an order was received dissolving the corps organization (an order of the War Department had discontinued it after August 1)¹ and requiring all general officers not in command of colored troops, or on staff duty and not otherwise assigned, to report by letter to the adjutant general of the army. The order was the cause of much discussion, as it would take away from us General Willich and all the other brigade and division commanders. All concluded that it meant our early muster out and Colonel McClenahan offered to bet a keg of beer that we would be on our way back to Powder Horn (Indianola) in ten days.²

The report of the order must have been misunderstood or it must have been intended for some other corps than ours, as the sequel will show.

August 31, there was a muster and inspection of the regiment by Captain Davis, brigade inspector, and it was found that the arms broken up or abandoned by the men on our first days march from Green Lake were to be charged against them on the company rolls.³

The evening of September 1, Colonel McClenahan came from the city and reported that he had seen General Sheridan at the Menger Hotel, and we were notified that General Wright of Sheridan's staff would be out next day, to make us a visit, and that everything must be in order.⁴

The next day General Wright came into our camp so quietly that no one knew of it until it was announced that he was at brigade headquarters and wished to see the regimental field officers. In the afternoon, at his suggestion, these officers accompanied him to San Antonio to call on General Sheridan.

1 W. R. R. 104-1094.

2 3 and 4 Gleasons' Diary.

September 3, General McConnell and the regimental commanders of the brigade went to the city to try to induce General Sheridan to order a larger number of the Fourth Corps mustered out.¹ General Sheridan on August 21 had written to General Rawlins that the muster out of the armies of the Potomac and Tennessee had given his troops such good grounds to ask for the same that it was astonishing how quietly they had behaved, and that when he went to Texas he would at least muster out two regiments of the Fourth Corps.² August 23, he had written to the adjutant general of the army that he hoped to be able to muster out about 3000 troops in Texas after he reached San Antonio.³ Colonel Askew presented to General Sheridan an application for the speedy muster out of our regiment, and the general promised to give it consideration. But conditions along the Rio Grande were then, and for some time afterward continued to be so critical that it was not regarded as safe or wise to too much reduce our fighting force.

September 4. orders were issued prescribing daily drills, dress parade and other regulations looking to the health of the command.

September 6, General Willich's farewell address to the brigade was received, and was read at dress parade next day. The march from Green Lake and the trials incident to it, had prostrated him. On that march the men of the brigade had revolted at the necessary strict discipline he had found it necessary to enforce, and one evening when we had lost our way, turned against and derided him, using opprobrious epithets. It almost broke his heart, and soon after we reached San Antonio he was taken seriously ill with a slow fever. He was well known in San Antonio where a great many Germans who had fled their country after the revolution of 1848 had settled. Hearing of his illness, some of them came to brigade headquarters and took him to a pleasant house in the city, where he lay for several weeks, tenderly cared for by a noted German nurse. It was the height of his desires to lead his old brigade back home, but this was denied him.

September 11, General Sheridan returned from a trip he had made to Eagle Pass. It was thought he would review our brigade, but instead he went to Austin. It was eighty miles away, but he expected to travel the distance in one day. Besides his horses, he had an ambulance drawn by two very large dun mules, which he said could travel ten miles an hour with ease, and when he got tired of horseback riding, he rode in the ambulance.⁴

1 Gleason's Diary.

2 W. R. R. 102-1198.

3 W. R. R. 102-1205.

4 Author's personal recollections.

September 12, orders were published directing the muster out of seven regiments of the corps, all but two of them belonging to the first and second divisions and none of them to our brigade.

September 14, a delegation of the Fifty-ninth Illinois called on General Post demanding to know why that regiment, which claimed to be the oldest in the service, was not included in the list of those ordered to be mustered out. The General told the delegation that he knew as little about it as they did.

Gleason notes that on that day Colonel McClenahan and Surgeon Clark went squirrel hunting, lost their way and finally got to camp utterly tired out, and without any squirrels.¹

September 15, a committee of members of the regiment called on Colonel Askew to ask his consent to the preparation of resolutions asking that the regiment be mustered out, which General Willich had promised to take to Washington when he went home.²

September 16, some of the officers went to San Antonio Springs, about four miles north of the city, and while there were shown the former residence of Governor Charles Anderson of Ohio, from which he was compelled to flee when the war broke out.³

September 22, the Second Brigade of our division arrived and went into a temporary camp just below us on the creek.

September 27, two rumors much disturbed the monotony of camp life, one was that the regiment was to move into the city to act as provost guards, in place of the cavalry who were doing this duty and were to move away. The other was that the Fifteenth and Forty-ninth Ohio were to march to Eagle Pass.

September 28, orders were published designating Wood's division as the Third Division Central District of Texas.⁴

On the 5th Colonel Askew came from brigade headquarters with an order announcing a new brigade staff and publishing some new camp regulations. Captain Alexis Cope was made inspector and Captain Thos. C. Davis ordnance officer. Lieutenant Grimes received a commission as captain.⁵

The afternoon of October 6, the brigade was reviewed by General Willich. This review was planned by members of the brigade staff to give its old commander an opportunity to meet the men again. They received him with the same manifestations of affection as in former days. After the review he made a speech in his usual strain of broken but eloquent English, which warmed the hearts of all. Many ladies and gentlemen of San

1, 2 and 3 Gleason's Diary.

4 Greory's Diary.

5 Gleason's Diary.

Antonio, friends of the general, were present to witness the ceremony. After it was over the brigade staff served a luncheon to the general and his friends, as a parting tribute of respect for him.

Sunday, October 8, many of the mounted officers of the brigade went to the city, some to attend church and others to witness the cock fighting,—the usual Sunday amusement in the city. There was a drove of fifty camels that years before had been imported for service on the plains, which attracted a good deal of attention.¹

October 10, was election day. The polls were regularly opened, but the men did not take much interest in it. Gleason says many of the men did not vote at all. They were opposed to General J. D. Cox, the Republican candidate for governor of Ohio, because he favored negro suffrage, and were offended at the general government for keeping them in the service so long. Gleason notes that General Willich, Major Dubois, and Captains Geiger, Cope and Davis, who were then in the city, came out to vote, and that only 125, not half the voting strength of the regiment, voted at all. The result on Governor was 100 votes for General J. D. Cox, 15 for General Geo. W. Morgan and 1 for John Brough.¹

October 16, an order came conferring on Colonel Askew the rank of brevet brigadier general. About this time Colonel Askew received a request from army head quarters asking him to send forward names of officers of the regiment worthy of brevet appointments. The colonel did not value such appointments very highly and declined to make any recommendations, saying that where all had discharged their duties so well he would not discriminate between them. So no brevet appointments were received by officers of the regiment, except a few who were on detached duty.

October 19, General McConnell left for home on leave of absence and the command of the camp devolved on General Askew. Soon afterward, however, an order came assigning General Philip Sidney Post to the command of the Western Sub-district of Texas, and this placed Colonel Askew again in command of the brigade.¹

October 20, our good Chaplain Randall Ross was summoned to appear before General Stanley to answer for some objectionable statements he had made in a report to the War Department.¹

In the afternoon General Askew received an order to report in person at sub-district headquarters in San Antonio, and to

¹ Gleason's Diary.

direct his regiment to follow, eight wagons being sent to haul the regimental baggage and equipment. The regiment started at 2:30 p. m. and after having marched two miles was met by an orderly with orders to remain where we were. By this time General Askew had returned from sub-district headquarters, decided that we should not turn back, but go forward and encamp in the suburbs of the city. This action was reported to headquarters and approved and we marched on to the city and encamped near it on ground covered by mesquite bushes and chaparral, so thick we could with difficulty pitch our tents. Our camp was only a temporary one, as General Askew had been appointed commander of the post and we expected to move into the city as provost guard as soon as the cavalry moved out.

October 21, the cavalry marched out and we occupied its camp. Captain J. Alonzo Gleason was detailed on the staff of the post commander as assistant provost marshal and Lieutenant Jasper N. Welch as assistant adjutant general.

Sunday, October 22, a great many officers and men of the regiment attended the M. E. Church in the city. Sergeant Major Samuel C. McKirahan having been mustered in as second lieutenant, Sergeant Alex C. Moore was appointed to his place. Sergeant George W. Chessell was appointed quartermaster sergeant and Sergeant Henry M. Leidy, commissary sergeant. Doctor Young was responsible for a report that General Stanley would soon order the muster out of thirteen more regiments of the command.

October 19, General Sheridan, who was then at New Orleans informed General Grant that he had ordered the muster out of all the regiments of the Fourth Corps except three,¹ but such order had not reached San Antonio.

October 23, the Eighth Kansas moved into the city and encamped on our right, and it was reported that the detachment of the Thirty-second Indiana would soon follow.

October 27, the entire regiment was excited over a report that General Stanley had been ordered to muster out all but three of the volunteer regiments. It turned out to be only a newspaper report, but every one believed such an order was on its way and there was great joy over the good news. The order had actually been issued as before stated, but before it reached General Stanley new troubles or complications had arisen along and across the Rio Grande, and on October 28, General Grant telegraphed General Sheridan to discontinue the mustering out of troops in Texas.¹ Fortunately for the peace of the camp it was not known

¹ W. R. R. 102-1248.

that the order had been received and that General Grant had countermanded it.

It was the impression throughout our camp that we would soon be mustered out and October 30, Captain David A. Geiger, division mustering officer, called at regimental headquarters and said it was his opinion that the regiment which first got its muster out rolls ready would be mustered out first. It was therefore decided to begin work on such rolls at once.¹

The weather was getting cold and some of the officers, and men set about putting up chimneys, so as to be able to warm their tents. There was frost the morning of Nov. 4. From this time until November 11, we were occupied with the daily round of guard and police duties. There were frequent rumors that we were soon to be mustered out, but nothing definite, and work on the muster out rolls was suspended. But November 11, Captain Geiger came to tell us to resume work on them, as General Stanley had authorized him to muster out the first regiment that was ready. Printed instructions for making out the rolls were distributed to the companies, and some of the company commanders began work on them at once.¹

The muster out rolls were completed November 20, and we were informed by Captain Geiger that the regiment would be mustered out the next day. That evening Colonel McClenahan, Surgeon Clark and the Gleasons met for the last time during the active service of the regiment and sang. Their voices had been heard in our regimental camps on many a tented field and had mingled with the roar of many waters,—the Ohio, the Cumberland, the Tennessee, the Holston, the Mississippi and many lesser streams, on whose banks we had pitched our tents. Mountain, valley and prairie in more than one half the states of the Confederacy had heard them. In the lonely evenings in camp, often in the immediate presence of the enemy, they sang songs of home which rose like a benediction, and many a home sick soldier heard them and was comforted. All thanks and praise to the regimental quartette. The memory of their songs is sweet to their surviving comrades, who hold the singers in grateful remembrance for the comfort and cheer they gave in many a lonely hour of camp life.

The mustering officer found some mistakes in the muster out rolls, which took some time to correct, and although the rolls were dated November 21, the actual muster out of the regiment did not take place until November 22. That morning the regiment was still on duty, but General Stanley promised to relieve

¹ Gleason's Diary.

it in the afternoon. The muster out took place at 1 p. m., each company being called in its order, and after it was over, all began packing up for the trip to Columbus, Ohio. Just after supper every one was shocked by the report that one of our best soldiers, Benjamin Chance of Company B, had been murdered by a Mexican only a short distance from our camp. There were many conflicting accounts of the incident, but the most plausible was, that Chance while on duty the day before had ejected the Mexican from a house where he was creating a disturbance and the latter had sought revenge. He attacked Chance with a knife, the latter being unarmed, and stabbed him in the heart. Chance was a powerful man, and it was said that after he received his death wound he knocked the Mexican down with a stone. The murderer was arrested and jailed just in time to save him from a mob of infuriated soldiers, who clamored for summary vengeance. It was only by great efforts that General Askew, Colonel Conover of the Eighth Kansas and other officers were able to restrain them from breaking down the jail doors. In this they were greatly aided by Sergeant Washington J. Vance, who was in command of the prison. He was a strong, cool headed soldier and during the riot showed remarkable coolness and courage. But for him the prisoner would doubtless have been torn to pieces by the mob. He placed the prisoner in a cell and guarded him from the mob without, and from other prisoners within the jail, who also wanted to kill him. The mob were finally persuaded to leave the jail, but attacked all Mexicans on the street and compelled them to flee in all directions to save themselves from violence. General Askew and other officers addressed the mob, and a promise to try the murderer next morning by a military commission allayed the excitement and the mob finally dispersed.

November 23, every one was busy packing up preparatory to our leaving for home. The trial of the Mexican for killing Benjamin Chance was proceeding but was not concluded. One of our men, William J. Porterfield of Company E, who was on guard duty, shot and killed a soldier of the Nineteenth Illinois cavalry, who was attempting to escape from prison. An investigation showed that the shooting was justified but Porterfield felt very badly about it.¹

The morning of November 24, 1865, was quite foggy, but the fog soon lifted and the after part of the day was clear and warm. By noon every thing was packed up and we waited for the wagons in which to pack our belongings. Gleason went to sub-district headquarters to report that we were ready to leave. The

1 Gregory's Diary.

wagons were late and did not arrive until 3 p. m. As soon as they came the regimental bugler sounded the "assembly", and the men cheered loud and long.

General Askew was one of the military commission which was trying the slayer of Benjamin Chance. The trial was not yet concluded and he was compelled to remain behind, but said he hoped to overtake us at Victoria. When the regiment was formed, Colonel McClenahan gave the command "forward march", the band played "Tramp! Tramp! The Boys are Marching",¹ and we turned our faces homeward with happy hearts.

Our three months at San Antonio were not unpleasant. The weather during the fall months was delightful, the air was dry and invigorating, the camps were well located and well policed and the men who took care of themselves were in good health. There were many places of interest in and about the city, among them, the old church on the "plazo", or square, the "Alamo", where "Davy Crockett" met his death at the hands of the Mexicans, the old San Juan and San Jose Missions down the river, San Pedro and San Antonio Springs up the river, and many other places of interest. There were services on Sunday in a number of churches in the city which many of the men attended, while others attended the weekly ball given on the same evening at San Pedro Springs, or looked in on the cockfights, which were a regular Sunday amusement of the Mexican portion of the population. There was a fine casino with a fine music hall for theatricals and concerts, with siderooms where General Willich's German friends dispensed a genuine German hospitality. Along the Salado and other streams in the vicinity were wooded stretches where one could shoot squirrels. There was fairly good fishing in the streams, and late in the fall there was an occasional wild duck to reward the sportsman. Both officers and men engaged in these sports. Pecan trees were quite numerous along the stream and the nuts were much sought after by the men. They were so eager to obtain them that they began to cut down the trees to get them, and would possibly have destroyed the most of them if orders had not been issued prohibiting the practice.¹

There was a large German population in San Antonio which had been loyal to the Union from the beginning of the struggle, and whose manifestations of attachment to the country of their adoption had been repressed with a bloody hand. They and many citizens of American birth, who were also loyal, gave the soldiers of the United States a warm welcome and did much to make our stay in the city pleasant. Among the Germans who were fore-

¹ Gregory's Diary.

most in tendering to us a generous hospitality was Edward Degener, who, after the war, represented the San Antonio district in the Congress of the United States. Among the Americans was John Twohig, "Johnie Twohig", a successful banker, who had a fine place in the suburbs of the city and delighted to royally entertain both officers and men. He had lived in San Antonio a long time and was well known to nearly all the officers of the old army. More than once our regimental band was invited to his house and his hospitality was so generous, it was said that even the horns became hilarious.

But amid all these opportunities for enjoyment there was an under current of discontent among the men, who felt that they had been unfairly dealt with by their government. This discontentment showed itself at times in disrespect to their officers. One evening the latter part of September, the men in our camp captured a stray, worn out mule, rigged up and placed on it a figure to represent a drunken officer, and drove it through the camp, followed by a crowd of jeering soldiers.¹

The writer witnessed and recalls that one afternoon General Stanley was driving along one of the streets when a drunken soldier cursed and applied vile epithets to him. There was no guard in sight, and the general, who did not lack physical courage, alighted from his ambulance and arrested the man, put him in the ambulance and took him to the guard house.

We get a good insight into the real feelings of the men from Gregory's diary. He was an orderly sergeant, was in close touch with the men and to some extent shared their feelings. In many entries in his diary he gives expression to the general feeling of discontent. All wanted to go home and some were afflicted with that terrible camp malady, home sickness. Every rumor of a near muster out was greeted with joy and when, as was mostly the case, the rumor was false, there was a corresponding grief. In fact Gregory's diary during the three months at San Antonio is almost one continuous jeremiad. October 2, he writes, "Times are exceedingly dry. I think a history of our adventures through Texas will not be interesting". October 12, he says ironically, "Many reports going through camp." "If they are not careful we will yet get home before New Years". October 27, of a rumor that the regiment was soon to be mustered out, he says, "I hope it is true, we may get out of this before cold weather comes, I am tired of this place sure," and on November 9, he writes, "Still disgusted about having to stay in the service."

Occasionally he seems to have been compelled to write that

¹ Gregory's Diary.

he was having some good times. Like many others in the command he spent much time in reading novels and other light literature, and some times tackled heavier mental pabulum. One entry in his diary states that he "had commenced reading, 'Combe on the Constitution of Man', but not yet interested in it." One who in his youth tried to read this book, is not surprised at the statement. There is, however, an occasional light in the gloom which seems to have possessed Gregory. More than once he writes "We are having such lovely nights", and again, "The health of the company and regiment is splendid," and again, he tells of some pretty girls who came through the camp.

The men had good reasons to feel sore and discontented over being ordered on this remarkably trying expedition in the deadly heat of a Southern summer, after they thought they had good right to be discharged under their contract of enlistment. Under the circumstances, the wonder is that they were so patient through it all. This is the testimony of General Sheridan.¹ Those who were patient and obedient to the end have the proud satisfaction of knowing that they did their full share in the last great campaign of the civil war, which drove a foreign invader from American soil and made possible the re-establishment of a friendly republic on our borders.

The government is sometimes exacting, but is also just, and in closing this chapter it is gratifying to state that most, if not all, the men who absented themselves without leave at Green Lake and on the march thence to San Antonio and were marked on the rolls as "deserters", have had this charge removed and have been honorably discharged from the service.

¹ Page—ante.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

THE JOURNEY FROM SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS, HOMEWARD AND FINAL DISCHARGE.

When the regiment left San Antonio, November 24, 1865, as stated in the preceding chapter, it was 3:45 p. m. The afternoon was clear and warm and the men moved at a brisk pace. We took the Yorktown road and marched nine miles to Roscio Creek, where we found good water and pitched our tents for the night. Our troubles, we thought, were now all over and each hour brought us nearer home. After a good supper all turned in and enjoyed a good night's rest. Next morning, November 25, the cooks were up early, and we had breakfast and were ready to resume our march by eight o'clock. The men started off at a lively pace. There was no straggling and the only trouble we had was to keep the men from running ahead. Water was scarce and Adjutant Gleason and Quartermaster Welker rode ahead to prospect for it.

After a ride of four or five miles they found a well where we stopped for dinner. It was the intention to march to Sulphur Springs, but we decided it was too far to march without too great fatigue. Hearing of a place where there was good water six miles nearer, Surgeon Clark and Adjutant Gleason went forward to investigate. They found water at Cibolo Creek, sixteen miles from our last camp, and at 3:30 p. m. we pitched our tents on a site they had selected. Shortly after we arrived Surgeon Clark borrowed a gun from one of the men, went to a pond not far away and soon returned with a fine wild duck. This started others to duck hunting, but it soon grew too dark to shoot. Gleason had the good luck to land one. A liberal allowance of whisky punch was served to the regiment by Regan, the sutler.¹

Sunday, November 26, reveille sounded before daylight, and after breakfast we resumed our march. We marched ten miles and pitched our tents in a grove of live oaks on the same (Cibolo) creek we camped on the night before. Some of the men were given permission to hunt squirrels in the evening and were quite successful.¹ Gleason and Surgeon Clark in the morning, had gone ahead of the regiment with their guns, resolved to have a good hunt before the approach of the column drove the game to cover. They arrived in camp with one small frog. No

¹ Gleason's Diary.

wonder Gleason notes in his diary that he "closed one of the most unprofitable Sundays he ever spent."

November 27, just before we started on our day's march, Colonel McClenahan sent the adjutant to round up some of the men who had straggled ahead. The two preceding days our route had taken us over a rolling sandy country, thinly covered with post oaks. This morning, however, we soon came out on a wide grassy plain, on which large herds of cattle and horses were grazing. The roads were much better and the men made better time. After a march of fourteen miles we crossed a stream, called Credo Creek, and a mile beyond it went into camp. Surgeon Clark and the chaplain had remained behind to hunt and in the evening came into camp with a fine lot of squirrels. That evening the regimental quartette sang some of the old songs, which were heard with very different felings than in the days ago. There was not the hopeless longing for home which they had awakened in the early days of our service. The longing for home had given place to an eager desire to get there just as soon as possible.

November 28, every one was so eager to get along that the cooks had breakfast before reveille sounded. We resumed our march at 7 o'clock. We traversed another oak barren and then came to another wide green prairie upon which also great herds were roaming. We stopped for dinner at Salt Creek and, after dinner and a good rest, pushed on to Yorktown and went into camp near that place. The days march was twenty-one miles, but there was no grumbling and the only stragglers were those who straggled ahead. Some of these stragglers were called up before the Lieutenant Colonel for disobedience of orders and were given a mild lecture. That evening the regimental band had a slight difficulty which was sttled by a game of fisticuffs between "Paddy" Brown (R. B. Brown of Company A), and Davis Grummon, in which the latter came off second best."¹

November 29, we again started at 7 a. m. and at 11 a. m. reached a steam saw and grist mill where there was sufficient water for cooking, and halted an hour for dinner. After dinner the march was resumed. The men marched with swinging strides which soon brought us to Coletto Creek, which we crossed, and observed that it was larger than when we had crossed it on our hard march from Green Lake to San Antonio. Beyond the creek we pitched our tents for the night, having marched eighteen miles. We now began to feel the sea breeze blowing soft and cool from the gulf of Mexico.

November 30, we started early for Victoria, said to be fif-

1 Gleason's Diary.

teen miles distant. We followed the course of the creek for some distance, and then leaving it threaded our way through another oak barrens for several miles. We finally emerged into a vast prairie beyond which a line of timber marked the winding course of the Guadalupe river. We soon reached Victoria and halted near the place where we encamped on our march to San Antonio. While we were waiting for further orders a note was received from Captain Nichols, district mustering officer, saying that there were several errors in our muster out rolls that must be corrected before we could proceed further. The errors were not serious and were soon corrected. In the meantime Colonel McClenahan had not been idle, and had secured transportation by rail for the men of the command as far towards Port Lavaca as the railroad was finished—nineteen miles. This would take us to within eight miles from this port, where the Colonel hoped to get light boats to carry the regiment to Indianola. We learned that the Forty-ninth Ohio had left Victoria the night before and were eager to overtake them at Indianola. The wagons were placed in charge of the quartermaster with directions to follow us at 4 o'clock next morning. We had only six cars, four box cars and two flats, and it took close packing to get our 350 men into and on them.¹ The train did not start until 7 p. m. and as the track was new our progress was slow. About twelve miles out we passed the Sixty-fourth and Sixty-fifth Ohio, which were in camp beside the track. We reached the end of the railroad at 9 p. m. and disembarked on the open prairie. We had no tents with us, and those who had cots put them up and slept on them in the open air. The men spread their rubber blankets on the prairie and as the weather was mild, all enjoyed a good rest. The night was clear and there was a heavy dew.

The next morning, December 1, Colonel McClenahan went to Port Lavaca to see if lighters could be had to take us to Indianola. While he was gone the wagons came up and we marched six miles to a place called the "Junction", and went into camp for the night. The Colonel returned at supper time and reported that there were no boats to be had at Port Lavaca and we would have to march to Indianola. We hoped we would get there in time to take passage on the Hudson with the Forty-ninth Ohio.

The morning of December 2, reveille was sounded at 5:30 o'clock and by day light we were on our way to Indianola, distant sixteen miles. The men marched rapidly and we were soon in sight of the town. As it came into view the men marched still more rapidly in their eagerness to get to the coast again. As

1 Gleason's Diary.

we approached the place we met Lieutenant Trego, who guided us to the place selected for our camp. We learned that the Forty-ninth Ohio had embarked on the Hudson, but owing to rough waters she had not left the bay. Later in the evening it was rumored that she would return and take us aboard in the morning. Our tents were pitched and many officers and men went bathing along the fine beach. The fine weather which we had enjoyed all the way from San Antonio seemed about over. The clouds began to gather and there was a high wind, which gave warning of a coming storm.

December 3, we remained in camp while Colonel McClenahan was trying to get transportation to New Orleans. The Hudson had not been heard from and it was believed she had gone out over the bar. During the day we witnessed a fine dress parade by the Seventh U. S. colored regiment. Some of the officers of that regiment called at our regimental headquarters to get some of our band music.¹ They had heard our band play and were much impressed by it. Doubtless "Johnie" Sarchet, our efficient band leader, gave them some of the pieces he had arranged. It was quite a compliment to him. In the evening the Sixty-fourth Ohio arrived and went into camp near us. There was a light rain during the day and it was hazy and warm.

December 4, we were still in camp at Indianola, with no immediate prospect of getting away. The men began to tire of the monotony and grew very impatient. There was a light rain in the afternoon and the regiment was marched down to the court house for better shelter. Shortly after it got inside the building a genuine "norther" arrived, which lowered the temperature very rapidly. In the evening the Thirteenth Wisconsin arrived from San Antonio,—which made three regiments awaiting transportation.

The evening of December 5, was quite cold and the wind was still blowing hard, but towards afternoon it grew warmer and there were frequent showers. In the evening, hearing that two vessels were coming up the bay, Colonel McClenahan and some of his staff went down to the wharf and learned that they were the "Beaufort" and "Reindeer". The Beaufort was the larger of the two and could carry 700 men. They were informed that if the men of the regiment would help unload the Beaufort's cargo, we might expect to get off on her the day after tomorrow. It was decided that this was the best chance we had of getting away soon, and orders were given accordingly.

Next morning, December 6, we saw a large vessel, the

¹ Gleason's Diary.

"Austin" of the Morgan line, coming in. We thought we might possibly get away on her, but she did not carry government freight or troops. Our only hope, therefore, was in the "Beaufort". That vessel had met with an accident and lay some distance from shore stuck fast in the mud, with a hole in her side. She could not even begin to discharge her cargo and we put in another monotonous day at Indianola. It was quite cold and we had little fire.

The morning of December 7, was the coldest of the season. There was a keen biting wind and little comfort any where. Going down to the wharf we were told that if we would make a detail to help unload the Beaufort's cargo we might get off that afternoon. The detail was promptly furnished, but when it arrived at the wharf the Beaufort was anchored out in the bay and the water was too rough to risk sending boats out to her. The detail returned, and in the evening another detail was sent down to the wharf with the same result.

The next day another detail was furnished and as the bay was smoother, they soon got to work, and by evening the cargo of the Beaufort was all got ashore. But the vessel had then to take on a supply of coal, which took two or three hours, and we were compelled to pass another disagreeable night at Indianola.

The morning of December 9, another detail was furnished to prepare the Beaufort for her voyage. Colonel McClenahan had gone aboard her and sent word to have the regiment at the wharf ready to embark just after dinner. We were late getting the wagons to the wharf, there was delay in getting rations and forage, and it was late in the afternoon before we were all aboard. It was 18 miles to the bar, which the boat could not cross safely at night, so it anchored where it was until next morning. The boat was a freighter, had meager accommodations for passengers, and both officers and men slept wherever they could find places to spread their blankets. At daylight the Beaufort weighed anchor and was soon under way. After going a short distance we took a pilot on board, who guided us safely across the bar, and we were soon rapidly leaving the Texas shore. The waters of the gulf were quite choppy and there were some cases of sea-sickness.

December 11, was cloudy and cold. There had been rain during the night, the sea was much rougher, and many were sea sick. Those who were not sea sick put in the time reading, playing cards, or wandering aimlessly about the boat. No unusual incident occurred during the day. The boat tossed so much during the night that some got very little sleep.

The morning of December 12, was fair and warmer. When we got out on deck there was nothing visible but sea and sky, but at 9 o'clock we came in sight of land. At 11 o'clock, having secured a pilot, we crossed the bar into the Mississippi. Passing up the river the men amused themselves by shooting at wild fowl. We had a good view of Forts Jackson and St. Philip, made famous in the early days of the war. We noticed that they were garrisoned by colored troops. We also passed a number of orange groves laden with golden fruit, and some sugar plantations, all being flecked with snow from a recent snow squall. At sunset a dense fog settled on the river and our boat was compelled to tie up at the shore. We learned that we had passed the Hudson carrying the Forty-ninth Ohio. It had not passed the bar at South West Pass when we crossed it.

The morning of December 13, before daylight, the men on deck were driven below by a cold drenching rain. The boat had got underway about 1 a. m. and was steaming rapidly up the river. A bitter cold wind was blowing and there was little comfort anywhere. About noon we passed New Orleans, having orders to land at Carrollton, six miles above. When we arrived at that place it took about two hours to get the vessel to the shore and tied up. There was no wharf and we had difficulty in landing the regimental baggage and equipment. Lieutenant Colonel McClenahan at once went into New Orleans to see about transportation up the river. He returned in the evening having failed in his mission, and the men disembarked and went into camp a short distance from the landing place. Colonel McClenahan thought we could get a boat next day. In the meantime an order of General Sheridan directed us to turn over our camp equipage and animals,—as the latter could not be carried further at government expense. The night was cold and both officers and men slept under wet blankets.

The morning of December 14, was freezing cold. Adjutant Gleason made out a report of men "present for duty" and took it to General Sheridan's headquarters in New Orleans. While there, he learned that we were to embark on the steamer *Cornelia* at 5 p. m. Colonel McClenahan had also gone into the city and did not return to the regiment. Later it was learned that he had gone aboard the *Cornelia*. The regiment waited in vain for the promised boat. The men suffered so from the cold wind that Captain Dorneck, the senior officer present, moved it over to a new camping place near the levee. Even there the wind was so piercing that many of the men lay on the ground to shelter themselves from it. There was little fuel to be had

and, finally, the men "appropriated" the wood along the levee and made fires by which to keep warm. No boat appearing, all turned in, or down, for the night.

When the morning of December 15 came there was still no word from the *Cornelia*. It was still freezing cold and every one was very uncomfortable. The Forty-ninth and Sixty-fifth Ohio, and the Thirteenth Wisconsin had arrived the evening before and were in camp not far from us. Lieutenant Vanderburg of the Forty-ninth Ohio was an early morning visitor at our camp. It was afternoon when the *Cornelia* finally came, when the regiment embarked as rapidly as possible. The boat was a good deal crowded, as the Sixty-fifth Ohio was also taken aboard. At 3:30 p. m. the boat swung off and turned her prow up the river. The boat was new and quite comfortable and all were happy that we were again headed for home.

From December 16 to December 21, we were steaming up the Mississippi amid fog and rain, with only an occasional glimpse of the sun. Officers and men whiled away the time playing games and reading the paper backed novels and other literature, which were to be had everywhere.

One day the monotony was broken by a court martial which tried a man in Company K for stealing an overcoat. Sunday, December 17, our good chaplain held religious services in the cabin, but the boat was so noisy that it was difficult to hear him. That evening the quartette sang a number of selections. We reached Memphis at 4 p. m., December 20, and Colonel McClenahan sent a dispatch to the master of transportation at Cairo, advising him of our coming.

The morning of December 22, we were in sight of Cairo. The river was full of floating ice, which so impeded our progress that we did not reach the landing until 8 o'clock. The men were soon ashore, and we waited until Colonel McClenahan saw about a train to take us onward. He soon reported that the transportation agent could not tell when a train would be ready. The regiment was therefore marched to the Soldiers' Home for dinner and some of the men behaved badly.¹ After dinner officers and men wandered about the city and put in the time as best they could. Finally, about sunset, a train was made up on the Illinois Central Railroad, consisting of box cars and a caboose, and by crowding 36 men into a car and the 22 officers in the caboose, all were got on board and the train pulled out. The weather was very cold, but the floors of the car were covered with straw, and the men did not complain. All were so eager to get home that they would have borne almost any inconvenience

¹ Gleason's Diary.

or hardship to get there. The officers in the caboose were even more uncomfortable than the men. Fortunately, 14 miles out we met a train going south and from it got a passenger coach in which they made themselves more comfortable.

The morning of December 23, our train was stopped for several hours in a narrow cove. At 11 a. m. we reached Mattoon, where we were transferred to another train consisting of 7 coaches and three box cars. We were to share it with the Sixty-fifth Ohio, and it was the misfortune of some of our officers and men to be obliged to ride in the box cars. Those who did so voted it the coldest ride of their lives.

The morning of December 24, we reached Terre Haute, where four more coaches were added to our train, and at 8 a. m. we were off for Indianapolis. We arrived at that place at 11 a. m., and while a train was being made up to take us to Columbus, Ohio, the regiment was marched to the Soldiers' Home for dinner. At 2:30 p. m. we took the train for Columbus. We had such a poor engine that at a number of heavy grades the men had to get out of the cars and help the train over them. We arrived in the outskirts of Columbus about daylight, December 25, where the train was stopped at a siding, and Colonel McClenahan went into the city for orders. When he returned we got off the cars and marched to Camp Chase. When we arrived at that place we found nearly every one still asleep. However, when the officers at camp headquarters were aroused they at once directed us to a camping place and showed us every attention. There was no public reception for us at the capital city of our state. That honor had been granted to a detachment of drafted men and substitutes, thought to be the regiment, nearly six months before.¹ We had no camp equipment and were out of rations. Axes and camp kettles were borrowed from the camp quarter-master, rations were drawn and the men made themselves as comfortable as they could under the circumstances. Before noon the wagons came with our baggage and our muster out rolls prepared at San Antonio were delivered to the local mustering officer. He delivered them to the company commanders to be signed by the men and returned to him. No word had been received from General Askew, Major Dubois and Captains Davis and Cope, who were with him, and it seemed doubtful if they would arrive before the regiment was disbanded.

Some Hebrew clothing men followed the regiment into camp and offered to pay the fare to the city of men who wished to see their stock of *cheap* clothing. This tempting offer took a number of the men away, and delayed the signing of the muster out rolls.

1 See page — ante.

They were not completed in the evening and we spent the night in Camp Chase. There was a good deal to be done in correcting the muster rolls, making out reports, etc. During the day a great many of the officers and men went into the city, but returned to camp at night. An agent who was preparing a "Roster of the Field and Staff", visited the camp and Gleason assisted him in completing it. It rained at intervals all day.

December 27, 1865, was cloudy and cold. Sometime during the evening it was announced that the regiment would be paid off in the afternoon and the officers were busy getting the rolls ready. The accountrements and ammunition were turned over to a local ordnance officer, and the camp equipment to the post quartermaster. The paymaster did not get out to the camp until nearly dark, but at once commenced paying the men. During the evening he paid all but the non-commissioned staff and a few stragglers. Some of the men who had been paid started into the city to get the first train to their homes, but many remained in camp during the night. The officers had yet to be paid and could not get their pay until their accounts were made out and examined to see if they had properly accounted for all public property in their hands. They were promised their pay early next morning, but when morning came, there was such a crowd of men who had not been paid off the day before, that their accounts were not examined until late in the afternoon. They were promised their pay that evening or early the next morning. One of the pleasant incidents of December 28, was meeting our old quartermaster, Joseph Goldsmith. He was in the clothing business in Columbus, and some of the officers bought citizens clothing of him.¹

December 29, the officers were paid, but too late for many of them to get early trains home. A number of the men were at the Union Station in the afternoon when the Cincinnati train came in, and saw General Askew and the officers who had remained behind with him alight from it. There was barely time to exchange greetings and say good bye, when out going trains were called and they separated,—each going his own way to the home fireside, to resume the pleasures and duties of civil life. Like the many other regiments which had preceded it to the soil of Ohio after muster out of the service, the Fifteenth Ohio Volunteers melted quickly into the civic population of the state. It had performed its part in the great war to preserve our national life, and the story of its service has been told in the preceding pages of this book. Whether it performed its part well or ill, posterity must judge.

¹ Gleason's Diary.

CORRECTIONS.

On page 57 in line 6 from top read "four" instead of "six" months.

On page 73 in line 14 from top read O. M. instead of O. W. Mitchell.

On page 136 in line 26 from top after word "army", and before word "would" insert the words "might have been captured and he".

On page 165 in line 21 from top for word "not" substitute word "only."

On page 175 in line 18 from top read "vice" instead of "Vice".

On page 197 in line 20 from top read "Munfordville" instead of "Mumfordsville".

On page 442 in line 25 from top read "Oothkaloga" for "Oathkaloga".

On page 470 in line 36 from top for word "enemy" substitute word "army"..

On page 507 in lines 31 and 32 strike out words "But the battle of Kenesaw May 27 at Pickett's Mills".

On page 738 strike out line 28 and in lieu thereof insert the words "that we never will be whipped".

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